§ Mr. John Moore
In accordance with the Euratom treaty, all civil nuclear installations have been subject to Euratom safeguards procedures since January 1973. In connection with the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom as a nuclear weapon state made a voluntary offer to place all civil nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The purpose of the offer was to encourage widespread adherence to the treaty by demonstrating that non-nuclear weapons states would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage from the application of safeguards. The offer was implemented through the United Kingdom-Euratom-IAEA safeguard agreement which entered into force on 14 August 1978.
This agreement, in contrast to those entered into by non-nuclear weapon states, was not intended to provide an assurance to other Governments that material from the civil nuclear programme would not be used for defence purposes. The agreement specifically provides under clause 14 for the withdrawal of nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for national security reasons. If such withdrawals are made, the safeguards authorities are 405W notified. Withdrawals from safeguards are not permitted of material subject to civil end use restrictions under agreements with supplier countries.
The export of plutonium to the United States under the 1959 defence agreement took place before Euratom safeguards or the United Kingdom-Euratom-IAEA agreement came into effect. There have been no withdrawals from safeguards at any time of plutonium derived from CEGB and SSEB power stations and no plutonium from those powers stations has ever been transferred for use in the United Kingdom's defence programme. As already stated, the Government have no plans for putting to military use any plutonium derived from CEGB or SSEB power stations or from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority's prototype fast reactor at Dounreay.