ABORTION BILL [H.L.]

§ THE LORD BISHOP OF EXETER

It is indeed a most agreeable, if surprising, experience to find myself in agreement with the noble and learned Viscount. But certainly on this matter I am entirely in agreement with him, and I also share his total ignorance of the meaning and purpose of this particular paragraph. I cannot think what reason could have persuaded the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, to put it down. It seems to me to be an extraordinary assumption of arrogance that I, or any one of your Lordships, or any two medical practitioners, should determine whether a woman is or is not "adequate" to be the mother of a child. There may, of course, be certain extreme cases where it is quite obvious to any medical man, or indeed to a man of common sense, that a particular woman, by reason of her disabilities or of the size of her family, could not possibly cope with the upbringing of this child and her other children without serious impairment of her mental and physical health; but paragraph (a) deals perfectly adequately with such a case.

Once one goes beyond the ground of a severe threat to the physical and mental health of the mother, as I was trying to explain to your Lordships on Tuesday, one runs into innumerable dangers, and this is but further evidence of that fact. I am sure we all know that there may be a woman whose mental oddities some of us might think would make her inadequate, but it is also within our experience that some women of that type can make, and do make, extremely affectionate mothers, even though their efficiency may not be very great. And in the upbringing of a child affection is far more important than mere efficiency. You may bring up a child with all the luxury of a nursery in Mayfair, while the mother spends most of her time in Bermuda, but that child is less well brought up than the child of a mentally handicapped woman who bestows upon the child the utmost affection. I beg to support the noble and learned Viscount.

§ LORD AMULREE

I would support in one word what the noble and learned 495 Viscount and the right reverend Prelate have said, because it seems to me that the people whom this clause was meant to cover are far more properly dealt with in paragraph (a) where one has the two doctors consulting and probably somebody from the Social Welfare Department is concerned whose opinion should be asked, and they will be able to give an opinion about the mother's health. At the present time I can see no point at all in this paragraph, and if we do go to a Division I shall certainly follow the noble and learned Viscount.

§ LORD SILKIN

I am sorry the noble Lord has already made up his mind before hearing the case for the paragraph. I should like to put the case. I recognise that I have to face a very formidable combination, even if it is unusual. The noble and learned Viscount, I thought, based most of his case against the provision on the vagueness of the language and the use of the word "inadequate", and so on. I would assure him that in drafting this I have not been in consultation with the younger generation; I do not know the vocabulary and I have not been in any way affected by it.

Perhaps the best thing I can do is to explain to the Committee the kind of case I had in mind where the prospective mother would be inadequate to bring up the child properly. There are women who suffer from illnesses which, while they do not affect the pregnancy itself and therefore are not covered by paragraph (a), will nevertheless make her less able to bear the burdens of motherhood. Epilepsy is one case; a woman can be an epileptic and nevertheless be otherwise quite capable physically and mentally of bearing a child. There is the case of a woman who is in prison, serving a long term commencing between the beginning of the pregnancy and the time at which she will give birth. Obviously that woman is inadequate to be a mother of a child. There is the persistent offender, or the shoplifter, and there is the mother who has in the past been found guilty of neglecting or ill-treatment of her existing children. These are some of the cases I have in mind. There is the drug taker or the alcoholic. I am sure the right reverend Prelate would not suggest that such a mother is a fit person 496 to be in charge of children. There is the woman who already has a large family, perhaps six or seven children.

I should like to read to your Lordships a letter I had this morning from a woman who wrote to me about her own circumstances. I will not read the whole letter but a number of extracts from it: I am one of those unfortunate women who am fighting to have a legal abortion, not because I am selfish but I have a very hard life with trying to bring up six children aged from 18 down to 7. I have a husband who is unable to keep a job more than a few days. He is a nervous case. I had a nervous breakdown four years ago through the worry of not being able to make ends meet. She goes on to say that she has recovered, and continues: I am happiest at work in a maternity hospital, but at Christmas I fell for another child. The surgeon who is in charge of my case was very cross with me when I suggested an abortion and he said that if he were to go ahead he would find himself in the Old Bailey and struck off. That is just a case at random, but no one can suggest that that woman would make a good mother capable of bringing up children, when she has to go out to work—I do not know what she is doing, whether she is scrubbing in a hospital—and has to come home at the end of a hard day's work, having left the children to their own resources during that time, and then do her duty as a mother and a wife.

There is the question of the woman who loses her husband during pregnancy and has to go out to work, and obviously cannot bear the strain of doing a full day's work and looking after a child. There is the woman whose husband is a drunkard or a ne'er-do-well, or is in prison serving a long term, and she has to go to work. These are the cases I have in mind. There is no question whether a woman will have the necessary affection for her child; it is a question of whether she is really able to do her duty as a mother and bring up the child as it should be brought up. We have said a great deal about the health of the mother, and the right reverend Prelate regards that as the only consideration to be taken into account. I understand his views. I do not agree with them. And already this House has gone a stage further in accepting the provision 497 Concerning the child who is deformed, incapable of enjoying normal life.

This is another case, and I would submit that this is a question not only where the mother's and the child's interests are involved, but where those of the community are involved as well. I think we owe it to ourselves as a community to ensure that the children who are brought into existence are given a fair chance in life and are capable of being properly brought up, and to start off with some of the terrible handicaps to which I have referred is not really giving a fair chance either to the child or to the community.

I was reading the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee which sat in 1939. Their views were to some extent colored at that time by the fact that it appeared that the population of this country was declining. To-day there is no such problem; in fact the problem is the other way. But I am not asking the Committee to consider the question on that ground. I do not think it would be right, because it may well be that in future there might be a decline once more. But the fact is that these were considerations certainly in the minds of the Committee, and they were considering the interests of the community as well as the interests of the mother and of the child.

The noble and learned Viscount pointed out, and I think with force, that it is unfair—and the right reverend Prelate said it was arrogant—to expect doctors to pass a judgment on this kind of thing. I respectfully disagree. I believe that they are in a position to express a view. After all, in the first place, if they are not satisfied they are under no obligation to carry out an abortion: there is no compulsion about it. Then, secondly, they are entitled to take advice. They can get the advice of a social worker; indeed, I greatly hope that they will do so in doubtful cases of this kind. If, on the report of a social worker, and in the knowledge of the conditions into which a child will be brought, they take the view that an abortion is justified, then I think it is a proper subject for inclusion in this Bill.

I hope that your Lordships will regard this provision dispassionately. I admit 498 that it is an extension of what is at present the Case Law on abortion, but the purpose of this Bill is to extend the opportunity of an abortion to any proper case. I should like this Bill to legislate for a long time ahead, and if, in the circumstances of each case, an abortion is desirable, then I do not think we should be tied to the fact that under present Case Law its legality is limited to questions of the woman's health. For all these reasons, I hope that your Lordships will see your way to accept this new clause as is stands, and will not accept the Amendment to omit paragraph (c).

§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

I do not believe that I shall be able to change the mind of the right reverend Prelate this time. He is shaking his head before he has even heard me; so I am condemned on prejudice alone.

§ THE LORD BISHOP OF EXETER

Perhaps I may say that I have heard the noble Baroness speak on these subjects before, and I know what she is going to say.

§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

The right reverend Prelate has never in his life heard me speak on this Amendment before. I would ask him perhaps to give me the same kind of hearing as I always give him. Of course we approach this question from entirely different points of view. I listened to him the other day and he said something to this effect, "I cannot see how the destruction of a potential human being can be justified on any grounds when the woman can, without risk to herself, bear it". The difference between us is the difference between the meaning we attach to the word "destruction". I believe that deliberately to allow a being to be born when it will destroy the chances of human fulfillment and happiness of its mother, is morally wrong; and I feel morally as strongly for my point of view as the right reverend Prelate does for his.

The mother is already a mature individual who, despite her physical or mental inadequacies, is responsible for caring for her husband, for any children already born and for her home. My noble friend has mentioned that she might be an epileptic. As I listened to him, it occurred to me that she might be an 499 arthritic, with rheumatoid arthritis—not uncommon in a young woman. Or she might be a diabetic. Or she might have some form of neurosis. None of these is a "killer" disease. None of them would make her eligible for an abortion under paragraph (a). But they are conditions which make the life of an individual wearisome and burdensome: the knowledge that you have a chronic illness of some kind, something that you have got to learn to live with, and a condition which is understood by your relatives and friends who try to help you.

By denying such a woman some relief under paragraph (c) it is, in my opinion, proposed deliberately to add to her burdens, while other agencies, which the noble Lord on the other side mentioned, are trying to help her. He said, "What are the welfare agencies doing?" Precisely. The welfare agencies, I know, are trying to relieve this young woman, for the sake of her husband and the existing children. They are all trying to lighten her burdens. Then, unfortunately, another pregnancy comes along, and these welfare agencies have no way in which to help her: they rely upon the doctors.

On the question of mental inadequacy I can say also that there is an abundance of statistics which show that by their progeny high-grade mental defectives are responsible for some of our problem families. As the right reverend Prelate says, these are women with plenty of affection. But the degree of one's affection for one's children is not necessarily related to one's intelligence quotient at all. It has been said that some of these women are highly affectionate. Nevertheless, they establish problem families which, time after time, have to be approached by the welfare agencies; and they can mark children even into the third and fourth generation. There are statistics to prove this.

The other day some noble Lords spoke about the disabilities of Helen Keller. She was blind, deaf and dumb. They said that she enjoyed life. I never had the privilege of meeting this courageous woman, but there is a great difference between courage and happiness. I do know, however, that she was born into a well-to-do family, and had the opportunities of constant help and companion ship.

§ LORD SOMERS

If I may interrupt the noble Baroness for one moment, I would remind her that Helen Keller was not born blind and deaf; she became so at an early age.

§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

I am grateful to the noble Lord. The argument the other day was not contradicted, and I was under the impression that these disabilities were congenital. The argument the other day in a debate of this kind was that this woman was born with these disabilities. However, let us think of a woman with certain of these disabilities, particularly blindness, who is poor, in a poor home, and who already has two children. If you take out paragraph (c) this blind woman is still to continue to bear children. In a slum home (which is what we are talking about), in a home with two or three rooms, with children already, is she to be denied relief? Should we not show compassion and charity for the chronically disabled woman who becomes pregnant and survives childbirth, but whose life becomes more intolerable with the need to care for another child?

If, this afternoon, paragraph (c) is deleted, and no relief within the law is given to these women, will they accept this merciless decision? Of course not! These are precisely the women who will continue to go to the back-street abortionist. It is the back-street abortionist we have been asked during this debate to help to eliminate from our society. Indeed, if paragraph (c) is deleted this afternoon, no great radical change will have been made in our abortion laws by the passage of this Bill.

§ LORD ILFORD

I am bound to say that I find myself in complete agreement with the point of view that has been put by my noble and learned friend. It seems to me that what is essential, particularly in a Bill of this nature, is the maximum precision of language. In this Amendment, the language which is used seems to me to be completely lacking in precision. One doctor may take a certain view of what is inadequacy in the mother, and another doctor may take an altogether different view of what is inadequate. That is not a satisfactory state of affairs for a Bill which aims at making these fundamental changes.

501 I listened carefully, as I always do, to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. It seemed to me that all the cases to which the noble Lord referred were cases which would have been covered by paragraph (c) of the Bill as originally drafted. The possible exception is the case of the woman who is in prison or whose husband is in prison. If she herself were in prison, I should have thought there might be a great deal to be said for the view that her social conditions made her inadequate as a mother. The case of a woman whose husband is in prison is perhaps rather different.

I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that he might agree to take this clause back and try to frame it in language of greater precision than is to be found in the Amendment. I am quite sure that most of the cases to which both he and the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, referred are cases with which this Bill ought to deal; many are cases which the Bill would have dealt with in its original form. The case which the noble Baroness referred to was the case where the health of the mother precluded her from being a satisfactory mother. That case would have been covered by paragraph (c) of the Bill as originally drafted. In these circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to take hack the clause and endeavor to frame it in more precise language than he has hitherto found it possible to do.

§ LORD REAY

I think this paragraph is the most important paragraph of the Bill, and for two reasons. In the first place, because it raises most directly the question of eligibility for abortion for those cases that do not depend on an estimate of the health of the mother but on an estimate of the life that the child will be born to, on the effect its birth and its existence will have on its family and on its mother, or on itself and the mother alone if there is no family. And, without concentrating on the single question of whether one life is worth living, in principle it admits as relevant determining factors of the propriety of an abortion the consideration of social and economic circumstances. Secondly, because by admitting, at any rate by implication, these considerations, this paragraph (in a rather curiously ordered conjunction with Amendment No. 11) ap- 502 Proaches nearest to the real reasons why the majority of abortions are desired.

How many abortions are practiced a year and how they therefore would break down by category of motive is anyone's guess, and I think that there is something alarming in the fact that few estimates are made to anything more precise than the nearest 50,000. But, on the basis of available evidence, it seems that about 80 per cent. of those who have had an abortion are married women whose concern is the strain that an additional birth will impose on themselves and their family. These women do not go to a practitioner, whether authorized or unauthorized, because their motive for abortion is their alarm at the threat to their own physical or mental health. They go to a practitioner for an abortion for reasons, respectable or less respectable, that they do not want their child. This clause has therefore the overwhelming merit of inviting the pregnant woman to an argument over the real reasons as to why she wishes an abortion.

If the legislative imagination has been stimulated to a reconsideration of the law on abortion by an appreciation of the suffering caused and the dangerous illegalities committed as a result either of the law's vagueness or its rigidity, the Legislature will hardly have served its ameliorative intention if it produces a Bill that does not in practice reduce quantitatively this suffering and, specifically, reduce the resort by frightened, desperate, and unwelcome women to illegal practitioners or to incompetent and often superstitious attempts upon themselves.

On Second Reading it appeared that the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, was arguing that there could be no such thing as an unwanted child. This is a metaphysical claim. It may be untrue to say that there are no unwanted children: it cannot be meaningful to argue that there cannot be. It is, for instance, becoming painfully and belatedly clear that certain societies do not want additional children. In our society it must be relevant to investigate the capacities and demands of adoption societies. It is, alas!, also becoming reasonable to believe that children who are born unwanted into families who nevertheless continue to be responsible for their care (if either of the words "responsibility" or "care" 503 Can be properly used) can arrive into a broken home or can break it by their arrival, or can be completely deprived of necessary affection; and that children from such homes can be the maladjusted and the delinquents of their own generation and the inadequate parents of the next. If such a history is a plausible one, then I doubt if society has taken a responsible decision in refusing wanted abortions that might have made such a history less probable or less frequent.

There is a familiar pattern of deterioration in the woman who applies for an abortion. A woman who does so to-day is unlikely to be an untroubled person. She is probably humiliated, indecisive, exceedingly anxious, perhaps unstable, unquestionably very uncertain as to what is safe for her, within her means, right for her, permitted to her. She is probably courageous—and certainly she is unusual if she makes any approach to the medical profession at all. The effect of her initial approach is unlikely to alleviate much of her anxiety—her reference to another practitioner, delay for an investigation of the honesty of her claims, an interim uncertainty by doctors and laymen alike of the precise nature of the changes in the law.

And I think it is important to emphasise that there will be an interim period before a recognition of a more permissive law—if that is what we are to receive—and the evident appearance of a more sympathetic attitude in society will stimulate women who want an abortion to less despair and to more confidence in the qualified medical profession. Before this happens, I do not expect to see much diminution in the deterioration of these women through fear and delay; deterioration in their confidence until they can commit or attempt to commit suicide—which, though uncommon, occurs, as I know from my own experience; deterioration in their capacity until their existing homes are threatened; deterioration in their respect for society's laws until they resort to the illegal practitioner or to attempts to abort themselves.

The most important thing we can do with this Bill is to impress the public with a new generosity in our social laws. The least we can aspire to is to make the authorized medical profession as 504 initially accessible as possible—this is an important consideration to bear in mind when it comes to redrafting the Amendment which was moved by the noble and learned Viscount on Tuesday—and its handling of individual cases as efficient and reassuring as possible to the woman who wants an abortion. The less inviting we make the prospect of appeal to authorised practitioners, the more will alternatives be preferred.

I will conclude by stating my own point of departure in this debate from the proposers of the Bill which, in compromise, I support. I do not believe that the mother is necessarily the best judge of the future lives of her family and its capacity to accept another child or of her own reactions to this child after its birth. But I believe that legally she should be the ultimate judge. I cannot accept that any woman should be forced against her will to bear a child she has conceived.

There would be reasons to accept for the time being, as a legally allowable date for a terminable pregnancy, a cautious estimate based on current medical experience and knowledge of up to the moment when the fœtus could have a viable life outside the womb of the mother. Certain conditions, perhaps, ought to be satisfied before this could be obtainable on the National Health Service. Colorful examples have been given of the girl who will want an abortion because she wishes to go ski-ing or to a garden party. Let such cases be treated as one treats cosmetic surgery. Consider such a girl as frivolous, as trivial, as amoral, as unprincipled; bring to bear all the sanctions of your venerable disapproval. But legal sanctions? No. Leave the passage of morality from one generation to another to the methods that alone bring morality and honour—to influence by education, to persuasion by argument, and to instruction by example.

I am capable of concluding, ruefully, that this view will not be that of the majority of the Members of your Lordships' House. But if it is your Lordships' wish to reduce the resort of women to the commission of illegalities, if it is your wish to reduce the strain, the danger and the exploitation for tens of thousands of women annually, you do this only to the extent that you include in your legislative 505 Permission those reasons for which women actually wish abortions. You can completely do so only if you include them all, and you can be certain that you have included them all only if you leave the ultimate discretion—allow as much power of dissuasion as you please to the doctor and psychiatrist—to the mother.

I do not expect that your Lordships will accept this view, but in my opinion the reasons I have given for rejecting this Amendment to the Amendment require refutation. If all other provisions but this one were to stand part of the Bill, it would, in my submission, probably be regressive, and certainly would be niggardly and inhumane. It could be regressive, because it has never been legally established that abortions for these reasons are illegal; and those who read the descriptions that Sir Dugald Baird gave in last Sunday's Observer of his own decisions in Aberdeen will have seen that, in the opinion of this distinguished and courageous man, these reasons were probably not, in all the circumstances, illegal grounds. It would be niggardly and inhumane, because it would have amended the fringe, but left untouched the cruel heart of this unhappy problem.

§ LORD MOLSON

I am glad the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has indicated that he is going to stand firm upon this principle which is included in his Bill. My noble friend Lord Ilford began by saying that he found himself in complete agreement with my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne, but he later went on to express his approval of paragraph (c) of Clause 1 of the Bill as originally introduced by the noble Lord. It seems to me that the principle which is contained in the paragraph we are discussing now is the same as the principle in paragraph (c) of the original Bill.

After carefully listening to my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne, I came to the conclusion that he really was opposed to the principle of allowing abortion in cases where the social and family circumstances were such as to make the mother unlikely to be an adequate parent. My noble friend Lord Ilford suggested that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, should accept this Amendment to his Amendment and bring forward a re-worded 506 clause at the next stage. It is clear to me that it is essential that in this Committee stage your Lordships should make up your minds whether you are prepared to accept—as I hope you will—this extension of the existing law regarding abortion.

It has been made quite plain all along that the Government will be willing at a later stage to provide skilled drafting help in giving effect to the principles which your Lordships accept in the Committee stage. I think it is essential that this very important principle, which is contained—even if imperfectly worded—in paragraph (c) of the Amendment should be fully debated. Also, your Lordships should take a clear decision to-day whether you desire this Bill to accept this wider and, as I think, most essential principle, or whether you are prepared to drop it and cause this Bill to be really little more than a statutory legalization of what is believed to be the existing law upon the subject.

On Tuesday, without a Division, your Lordships accepted the principle that abortion was justified in the interests of the health of the mother. After a Division, but by a very large majority, your Lordships then went one stage further and agreed to the principle of abortion being legalized in order to prevent a physically or mentally abnormal child from being born. But so far your Lordships have concerned yourselves only with what might be considered to be the physical aspects of the matter. This paragraph asks that your Lordships should go further, and should accept that there are circumstances which are not physical where it is undesirable for a child to be born.

Anyone who has had experience in a constituency, and surely anyone who has read the law reports in the daily newspapers, must be aware that there are many families in this country where a child is brought into the world who has little or no chance of a reasonably happy family life or the prospect of being reasonably brought up. Not only does being born in those circumstances involve for that child the prospect of unhappiness and misery, ill-health, probably crime and, in any case, a thoroughly unhappy life; it may also be that that birth, in addition to bringing unhappiness upon the new-born child, is going to bring great 507 Unhappiness and suffering upon the family into which it is born. It is surely essential that we should take a broader and more humane view, and not regard abortion as justifiable only because of a physical deformity. It is something much more important than that. This should be a major step forward, in order to avert great human unhappiness which can be foreseen and can be prevented.

The noble Lord, Lord Reay, has rightly emphasized another aspect of this matter. Probably most of the illegal abortions which take place at the present time are due to the prospect of a child being born into a family in just the sort of circumstances I have tried to describe. There, the mother, however inadequate she may be in some ways, has at any rate the perception—perception perhaps brought on by long and prolonged suffering—to realize how undesirable it is that that child should be born, and so she goes to an illegal abortionist. Surely, when we are legislating upon this subject we should try so to widen the grounds of legal abortion, in a way which would appear to be reasonable and justifiable to two responsible medical practitioners, so as to avoid the illegal abortion, which is likely to be the only alternative to legal abortion.

So I hope that your Lordships, having gone as far as you have done in dealing with the physical matters, will take a broad and an enlightened view, as I suggest, and will consider other things besides mere physical infirmity; and that, where it is obvious that the grounds should be widened, as is contemplated in paragraph (c), abortion should he legalized. A large proportion of the mental defectives in this country are so by heredity. It is passed on from generation to generation; and I suggest that the safeguards already provided in this Bill are adequate. The consent of the mother or of the mother's guardians is required, and the approval of two responsible members of the medical profession.

I regard this Bill as an attempt at a great, beneficent and human social reform, and if the Amendment to the Amendment were carried I believe that much of the benefit to the nation and to future generations would be lost. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will stand firm, and I hope your Lordships 508 will take the view that I have ventured to put forward.

§ LORD CONESFORD

I so often agree with my noble friend Lord Molson that I am sorry to differ from him on this occasion. Nearly every noble Lord who has spoken has found this problem very simple. I confess that I do not: I think it is difficult. I certainly appreciate, as I think the whole Committee does, the humanity that underlay the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the eloquent support that was given him by the noble Lady, Baroness Summerskill. At the same time, I believe that this paragraph of the clause is one that we cannot leave in. We are, after all, amending the criminal law, and if we amend the criminal law we must, I think, do it in language of sufficient precision to make it quite clear what our object is, and to be certain that the clause achieves that object.

The noble Lord, Lord Reay, gave cogent reasons—cogent in his opinion, and certainly reasons of considerable force—why the mother should determine whether or not her pregnancy should be terminated by abortion. That is a perfectly arguable point of view, but that is not what this paragraph says. If this paragraph said that, we could consider the merit of that proposition. That it has got merit is even the view, according to a report that I read in the Press a week or so ago, of the Bishop of Woolwich. He thinks that if the mother desires an abortion, ipso facto there should be no criminal offence if an abortion is carried out.

§ LORD SILKIN

May I interrupt the noble Lord? The noble Lord, Lord Reay, is not here, but I think it is only right that I should say that he did not rest the case on that. He deliberately made the point that that was his personal view, which might not be acceptable to a large number of noble Lords; but he was not resting the case on that. I thought he gave very cogent reasons for opposing the Amendment apart altogether from this point.

§ LORD CONESFORD

I am not going to differ at all from the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. That was not the whole of his speech. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Reay, is not in his place, because 509 he made an interesting speech on which I wish to comment, and I should certainly have much preferred that he were here; but I think his personal view was the logical conclusion of his argument. I can understand the point of view—and there would be no lack of legal precision if we expressed it in the Bill—that whether or not a pregnancy should be terminated lawfully should depend on the wish of the mother. I am not saying that I agree with that; but, if that had been honestly stated in the Bill, we could have considered that proposition on its merits.

The next thing I wish to say to the noble Lord is that, on one view of the words which he has in his paragraph and which he defends, that is, in fact, the precise effect of what is in the paragraph—though not put forward in that straightforward way—because, if a woman desires to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion, a doctor might well come to the conclusion that she was mentally inadequate to be a mother. If that is the meaning, let us put that in the Bill and consider it on its merits. What I personally find intolerable is that we should have a paragraph as vague as this, which can mean absolutely anything, and put it forward as a serious amendment of the criminal law. That seems to me to be intolerable.

Moving examples were given, both by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and by the noble Baroness who supported him, of cases of families where you did not want, or where no humane person would have wanted, another child. But I could not help thinking, as I listened to those sincere speeches, that the argument was not really in favor of abortion: the argument was in favor of sterilization. I have not recently studied the criminal law closely enough to know how far, supposing what is desired is sterilization, we should require amendments of our existing law. But the argument put forward seemed to me to be an argument, in certain cases, in favor of sterilization, and not in favor of possibly an unlimited number of abortions in a family where you think that there should be no further birth in the interests of all concerned.

Now I appreciate very deeply the argument that, unless you satisfy the mother in every case, you may not wholly prevent her going to some undesirable per- 510 son to have an illegal operation performed. Nevertheless, the whole of this Bill, whatever we think of it, purports to set down conditions, and will still leave some operations illegal. I shall listen most carefully, of course, to what is said by the Minister, who will give us the view of the Home Office on this subject, but I cannot conceive that he is going to say that the paragraph as it stands is satisfactory. I do not suppose for one moment that he will say that, but he may give us some guidance that will make it easier for various Members to make up their minds. But for my own part I must make it quite clear that, where we are amending the criminal law, we must do it in language of precision; and this is not language of such precision.

Secondly, if the argument in favor of the paragraph is that which has been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Reay, then the right method is to put what he wants in the paragraph; and it is really not a justification of the paragraph we are considering. Finally, I beg all noble Lords to consider whether some of the arguments that have been put forward are not really arguments for sterilization in certain cases, rather than, perhaps, for an unlimited series of abortions.

§ THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH

I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, but also with a sense of familiarity as he mentioned case after case which I recognized. When he mentioned the woman who was in prison, I thought: "Yes, we had her case before the Committee on which I served about three years ago." We took the baby into temporary care while the woman served her sentence; when she came out arrangements were made that she should have a job in which she could keep her baby; and I have no doubt that the presence of that baby helped to stabilize her life. At any rate, we have had no further news of her. The woman with a criminal husband—yes, we have had her. She and her children have been a very considerable problem. The last news we had of her and of her family was good news: the husband was out of jail; the family had mostly been reunited; we were keeping an eye on them; they seemed to be doing quite well. The neurotic girl—we have at least 511 Four cases of that kind every year. We assume parental rights and generally get the children adopted. We find there are still a sufficient number of adopters to take on those babies.

I have seen these cases. I know that the Children's Service provides, for the most part, a happy and decent solution. In the Second Reading debate there was talk about the unhappiness of children brought up in children's homes; but children's homes in institutions are on the way out. To-day, more and more is done by fostering. It is true that fostering is not invariably the right solution, but in very many cases it solves the problem. Children grow up well and happy and sometimes get on very satisfactorily in life. Therefore I must maintain what I said on Second Reading: that I think, with community care for these children, it is broadly true to say that the unwanted child does not really exist.

§ LORD TAYLOR

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Molson, that this is about the most important clause in the Bill. In fact, I think it is the only thing which really makes very much difference; the rest is a tidying-up operation and will not greatly alter the behavior of the majority of the medical profession. Many of us have read Sir Dugald Baird's account of what he has been doing in Aberdeen for many years. He is doing precisely what paragraph (c) describes. He is quite tough about it. He is, in fact, dealing with unmarried mothers who are unsuitable, for social reasons, to have their babies and mothers who have large families which are in the position of becoming problem families, where there is likely to be a family breakdown, a social breakdown, if they have any more. You can say: "You can push these into paragraph (a)". This is thoroughly dishonest, and I look at the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, because he wanted to do this.

§ LORD AMULREE

I must protest. I do not think it is being dishonest at all. If we are going to take the words as a whole in their broadest obvious sense, it is not going to mean whether you have a temperature or a pain; it is far more important than that. I think the work done by Sir Dugald Baird and by other people I know of in London, doing the same kind of work, could be done under 512 paragraph (a) as simply as under paragraph(c)

§ THE LORD BISHOP OF EXETER

Has the noble Lord considered the effect of Clause 2(1) in this respect? It seems to me that Clause 2(1) covers almost all, or could cover almost all, the cases that have so far been raised.

§ LORD TAYLOR

Is the right reverend Prelate referring to the Bill or to the Bill amended?

§ THE LORD BISHOP OF EXETER

The Bill amended.

§ LORD TAYLOR

I think I had better not be led to give a snap opinion on Clause 2(1). I shall stick to this one. I think it is important that we should—

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE

Could the noble Lord make one thing clear? Is he suggesting that under the law of Scotland at the present time there is provision similar to paragraph (c) here; or is it the case that the law of Scotland at the present time conforms to the law of England? As paragraph (a) embodies the law of England, presumably Sir Dugald Baird, if he is acting legally, is acting under that paragraph.

§ LORD TAYLOR

I cannot say; I do not know what the law of Scotland is in this respect. What I know is of what Sir Dugald Baird has been doing for many years, and, in my opinion, has been doing rightly. If your Lordships wish that the law of England and Wales should be the same as the behaviour of Sir Dugald Baird in Scotland I think your duty is plain: it is to support my noble friend Lord Silkin and reject the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment to the Amendment.

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE

I hope the noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting again. His argument falls to the ground if the law of Scotland is the same as is now embodied in paragraph (a) and Sir Dugald Baird is acting lawfully—because his argument shows that you do not want anything else, if that is the case. I think the law of Scotland—although I am not an authority on this—does embody paragraph (a) and not paragraph (c). So his argument is ill-based unless he can tell us what is the law of Scotland.

§ LORD RAGLAN

One noble Lord said on Tuesday that Sir Dugald Baird was able to do this because he was not under the shadow of the coroner.

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE

It is a different question.

§ LORD TAYLOR

It was I who said that. It is a different question. I do not know what is the law of Scotland. I do not know whether Sir Dugald Baird was behaving legally or illegally. He was certainly interpreting paragraph (a) pretty loosely. This is what I think we want to be sure about: do we wish to ask doctors to interpret paragraph (a) loosely, as the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, would like; or tightly, as the noble and learned Viscount would, I think, like. Certainly he was very tight in his definition of paragraph (b).

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE

May I say that I did earlier point out that paragraph (a) goes further than existing Case Law, in that it directly contemplates regard to the health after the birth of the child.

§ LORD TAYLOR

I think that is an inevitable concomitant of mental health and, indeed, of the survival of the mother, and I am quite sure that the health of the mother after the birth of the child is considered by every obstetrician; and where there is pulmonary tuberculosis or heart failure, it is the one thing that will lead to him making his decision about abortion. In practice, this particular paragraph (c) is not, in my opinion, perfectly phrased and in some ways I prefer the original phraseology. I hope very much that between now and Report stage my noble friend Lord Silkin will have a further look at it, to see whether it can be clarified a little more. But I hope that in principle, your Lordships will carry it now. That is what I think we ought to do. We ought to make a decision in principle, one way or another, so that the Parliamentary draftsmen may have a go at getting the wording clear.

I do not know what the Government are going to advise. They may think that the inclusion of this paragraph may make the Bill too wide. But I do not think so. If we are going to deal with illegal abortion, we can deal with it only by including these cases. I think this paragraph is 514 a vital piece of the Bill. Remember that there are all the other safeguards—the two specialist practitioners or the patient's own doctor. I sincerely hope that there will be a specification about the place where the abortion should be done, but that is another matter. I have no doubt at all that if we are to make any sort of useful reform we must include this paragraph.

§ LORD FERRIER

I find myself in some difficulty, for two reasons. One is that I agree with both the noble Lord, Lord Molson and the noble Lord, Lord Cones-ford. The second reason is that I am one who would oppose the Amendment to the Amendment. I venture to speak to your Lordships only because there are three points which have not come out in the discussion. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, that we should decide the principle this afternoon.

I am not au fait with the law of Scotland, but the noble Lord put his finger on the point when he said that the system through the public prosecutor makes it more possible for a loose clause to be used as Sir Dugald Baird has used it. I think I am right in saying that in his article Sir Dugald Baird said that he also carried out sterilization in cases such as the noble Lady described, when an additional child would obviously have been a burden to the mother, to the rest of the family and to the community. But no mention has been made of the father. As the father of a large family myself, I feel that if the outcome of this debate is that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is to take back and re-phrase paragraph (c) we must remember that the father also is deeply concerned in this matter. I think I am right in saying that in certain other countries he has a say in law when it comes to a decision with regard to an abortion.

I see that there is a later Amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Strange, referring to the question of a welfare officer. After some of the doubts expressed by noble Lords, who have suggested that two doctors are not sufficient to judge in this matter, and the suggestion that the mother should be the sole judge, I am disposed to say that the father must come into it, too; and if the father is not available, then a welfare officer should come into it.

§ LORD AMULREE

I think that the second doctor should be a consultant on the staff of a hospital, and he would almost certainly have a welfare social worker working with him who would come in. I think that is the point which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Strange. Certainly there would be a trained social welfare worker.

§ LORD FERRIER

So long as that is clear, I am satisfied. I am only saying that if the Amendment to the Amendment goes to a Division, I shall oppose it; but I sincerely hope that in the light of what has been said—we still await what the noble Lord on the Government Front Bench has to say—perhaps paragraph (c) could be recast, so long as the principle for which it stands is established once and for all.

§ VISCOUNT BARRINGTON

I had not meant to speak on this Amendment, but as this discussion has ranged a little further than its wording I should like to say this, as shortly as I can. There are two questions, I think, now being discussed. One is how far this clarifies the law and how far it obscures it? The second is how far is all this a step forward and how far a step back? I am absolutely in agreement with every word said by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, about clarification. I have my own views, which I am afraid are minority views on the other question. I am not convinced that it is a step forward. It seems to me that the law at present, in the three cases which are the basis of the law, is very broad. I am inclined to place great weight on what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, said, that Judges give a liberal interpretation to this. I agree strongly with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and with the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. The word "adequate" is one which I find awfully difficult.

May I shortly give two examples in the form of questions. What is an adequate mother? Take two historical examples, one well known and one not. Was Beethoven's mother adequate? Those of your Lordships who know the life of Beethoven better than I do can give your own opinion, but I think that one thing on which we should all agree if we read an encyclopædia is that she 516 was more adequate than his father, or perhaps rather less adequate. The father was an alcoholic and was also guilty of what would now be considered a more serious offence, of forging a baptismal certificate to get money out of a charity; so that Beethoven, for much of his life, gave a false date of birth. The child born before Beethoven died at birth; the mother died with the following child and the child died a short time afterwards. That may well be an argument for saying that it would have been much happier if Beethoven had not existed. I do not know. But I think that it is an argument as to whether she was an adequate mother. I think this question ought to be more clearly based on what grounds we mean by "adequate".

I give my other example with some diffidence. I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, assumes that we are dealing only with cases of slums, and I understood that it was to deal with all cases. Otherwise I should hesitate to suggest the case of my own paternal grandmother who was an affectionate and delightful parent, but whose case raises certain points. She certainly produced no musical geniuses. Indeed, it is fair to say that, although she was adequate in the sense that she produced seven children, three of whom survived to the age of 80, none, I think, was, in the traditional phrase, capable of saying "Oboe" to a Goossens; and if they had been treated to an obligato, would have been hard put to know which was the obligato and which was the oboe.

My grandmother raises the point about what is an adequate mother. Is it a sign of adequacy or inadequacy to bring up a live pig in the nursery with one's children? I suppose that it was adequate for the pig, which was regularly fed out of a bottle—and I understand it was not her fault that it died. I believe I am right in saying that it diverted much less of her attention from her six children than did a baby crocodile which I am told she kept under her chair. All I mean is that she may be accused of having been an inadequate mother in that she did not always clearly remember the names of her children. She was constantly surprised by the regularity with which they returned from school—and delighted, as I think any 517 Government, except perhaps the contemporary one, are surprised by the English weather. It took her by surprise every time.

I think the only serious accusation is that she was incapable of sending them to school in the right clothes. It was more serious for my father, who at the age of four or five had a great deal of pleasure out of the pig in the nursery, but had no pleasure from having to appear on the first morning of boarding school, rather late for prayers, in a suit belonging to his brother and three sizes too large for him. The noble Baroness will say that this is not a relevant case, because she was in comparatively good circumstances.

That raises another question. Are we legislating for the whole country or legislating for a class? It seems to me that, if we are going to word this clause so that the law would be narrower than it is now, then the word "adequate" is inadequate.

I think I have stated my point of view and will not say any more on that, because the question of principle of whether abortion should be something that any woman is entitled to depends on what one believes about taking human life. I do not think that many noble Lords would suggest, although with the best of motives, that because a woman's life is being made intolerable by blackmail through no fault of her own it is necessary to pass a Bill saying that the blackmailer must, on the advice of one solicitor or a solicitor and a barrister, be silently and painlessly liquidated, because otherwise she has no alternative but to go to the nearest band of thugs and have him put out of the way. That, of course, is an extreme case, but if we regard the fœtus as a person it seems to be a relevant example.

I have not yet been convinced that a human being before it is born—I say this with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Soper, with whom I had a conversation after our last discussion on Committee—has no personality and that his personality is something that emerges only with self-consciousness. It was said by Hood, It gives me little joy To know I am further off from heaven Than when I was a boy 518 It is far less blessed on the whole to think that, The experts cheat us Who tell me I have now more soul Than when I was a fœtus. This is a point which I think might be discussed later on. But, on the wording of the Bill, I am perfectly sure that it does not assist clarification. That is all I have to say.

§ LORD STONHAM

Until I listened to the noble Viscount, Lord Barrington, I thought that this was a subject on which it was possible to speak without apparent emotion. We have heard a number of moving and passionate speeches. We were asked by my noble friend Lady Summerskill to exercise compassion and charity, and by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, to take a broad and human view. These are appeals which are never made without avail in your Lordships' House. I must remind your Lordships that, when the Committee stage started, I promised to refrain from comment on matters of principle and to confine myself to comment on facts, feasibility and the practical application of the proposals before the Committee. I hope that I have your Lordships' sympathy while I try to walk this somewhat difficult tightrope.

The noble Lords, Lord Molson and Lord Conesford, referred to drafting assistance, mentioned that the Amendment might possibly be imperfectly drafted and not viable for that reason, and suggested that my noble friend Lord Silkin might take it back and look at it again. This is one of those occasions when it would appear, from what noble Lords say, that the principle is conceded but the drafting is not viable.

§ LORD CONESFORD

I rise only to correct the noble Lord. I did not make that suggestion, though I think that the noble Lord, Lord Molson, did.

§ LORD STONHAM

The noble Lord, Lord Molson, and the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, though he is not here at the moment, did so in terms. I want to make it clear that though my noble friend Lord Silkin, if he feels so inclined after the debate, may wish to come forward at a later stage with a different form of words, I am not giving that advice. This is clearly a matter for the Committee to decide in principle—there seems to be no sort of halfway house. I would also 519 Make it clear that this is a point which we have not previously considered in Committee. Broadly speaking, what we have been considering is mostly medical evidence. Here, though there are medical grounds, it is largely a sociological question. I think that my noble friend Lord Silkin and the noble Lord, Lord Reay, would not disagree with that.

We have heard a conflict of opinion between Peers who are also doctors. On the one hand, the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, declared that many of these cases would be covered by paragraph (a), where two doctors are of opinion that the mother's life or her physical or mental health might be gravely impaired or endangered if pregnancy were to continue. My noble friend Lady Summerskill, supported by my noble friend Lord Taylor, took the contrary view. I am not going to express any opinion on that, except to say that my noble friend Lady Summerskill mentioned one or two specific diseases, of which I noted arthritis and neurosis, and said that they do not affect pregnancy and therefore would not come under paragraph (a). I would hope that, whatever views are expressed on either side, it should not be taken that the fact that certain diseases do not affect pregnancy necessarily precludes those who are suffering from those diseases and being considered for abortion from having these considered as at least one of the factors guiding the doctors' decision. I do not want to go farther than that, but I must say that so far in our discussions we have attached the greatest importance to the opinion of the doctors. It is not a question of an opinion on a group or class of abortions, but of an opinion at the time on the woman they have in front of them and the factors relating to her.

The next aspect which must be emphasized is that paragraph (c), which it is sought to delete, can be of use only when the health of the mother is not in danger. When we are considering an Amendment and what is meant by it, naturally we all put our own interpretations upon it, and I had regard to the fact that this particular paragraph will he governed by the proposed new Clause 2 which my noble friend Lord Silkin will be moving later, and therefore covers 520 the total environment, actual or foreseeable, of the pregnant woman.

I must confess that the kind of case which came most readily to my mind when considering what my noble friend intended was the case he mentioned of the woman with a large family to whom the prospect of an additional child was something unthinkable. I must say that I was not prepared for the long list of examples that my noble friend gave. I do not want to repeat them all, but I was particularly struck by the fact that he mentioned a woman in prison, a persistent offender and even a shoplifter. Shoplifting is something that we do not like and it has to be punished; but it is not the greatest of crimes. Therefore it would mean that almost any indictable offence, or certainly an offence not greater in gravity than that of shoplifting, could be taken into account. That is what is intended if this paragraph were to be accepted. If it is going to be as wide as that, it could be taken into account by doctors who would have the job of considering whether an abortion is legal. It was, in fact, rather a long list but I mention merely those cases.

I must then point to the practical difficulty for the doctors, and, since this is going to be a Statute, of enforcement. The Government feel that this is not simply, or even mainly, a medical problem, but it is also a social problem. Our great difficulty is in deciding how the mental or physical inadequacy of the woman is to be decided by the doctors, not only on medical grounds but on social grounds. Therefore, it is my duty to point out that paragraph (c) is open to objection on the practical ground that it would be difficult to apply, and on grounds of principle in that it introduces these sociological considerations. The right reverend Primate said that it was an agreeable and surprising experience to find himself in agreement with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne.

§ THE LORD BISHOP OF EXETER

I am grateful to the noble Lord for my promotion.

§ LORD STONHAM

Perhaps I had better not comment on that. It might be regarded as showing bias and getting off that tightrope. But the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Exeter, said it 521 was an agreeable and surprising experience to find himself in agreement with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I make no comment of that kind, but will conclude by saying that the Government cannot commend paragraph (c) to the Committee.

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE

Perhaps I might reply shortly to the debate that we have had, because it has traversed a very wide field, and this is, I think, an important question. I say that it has traversed a wide field because a great deal of the discussion seems to me to have gone far beyond the words of the paragraph which I seek to leave out. We have had, if I may say so, something in the nature of a Second Reading speech—we had one on Tuesday last—from the noble Lord, Lord Reay, in which he covered the whole ground. I would just say this to the noble Lord. I remember the speech he made on capital punishment and his saying how wrong it was to take any human life. I was rather surprised to hear that he regarded as a general principle that it would be right to destroy a potential human life just at the instance of the mother. I cannot go so far as that with him. But, as my noble friend Lord Conesford said, that is not really the issue on this Amendment. Here the question which has to be determined is: is the pregnant woman, physically or mentally, inadequate to be a mother? And that is all.

Is that the right test? The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, gave an explanation of what he meant to cover. I took down the list, and I hope that I have it right. I must say that I was astonished at those who he thought should be included in the category of being inadequate to be mothers. He spoke about the woman who suffered an illness and was less able to bear the burdens of childbirth. These may be, and no doubt are, sad cases. But surely in those cases the illness and the condition of the pregnant woman would be taken into account by the doctors in considering whether she would suffer in health during, or after, the pregnancy. I cannot claim to speak as a doctor, but I should have thought that the vast majority, if not all, of these cases would come under paragraph (a) as it now stands.

522 The reason why I interrupted the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, in his speech was this. I read the article by Sir Dugald Baird. I should not like to assume for one moment that Sir Dugald Baird has been acting illegally under the law of Scotland in a hospital administered by the National Health Service in Scotland. I assume, too, that the law of Scotland is in this respect the same as our law. Rather than suggesting that Sir Dugald Baird's argument is an argument in favor of paragraph (c) I think it is an argument, if it can be used at all, for saying that paragraph (a) is quite sufficient.

Also in the list of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, there were the woman in prison, the persistent offender, the shoplifter, the drug-taker and the alcoholic. Those were the people who he said were not fit to be persons in charge of children; inadequate to be mothers, in the sense of this particular paragraph. I cannot share the view that a woman has only to come within those categories to be regarded as being inadequate to be a mother. I think that we should be making bad law if we provided that.

The noble Lord went on to refer to the case, which I am sure aroused great sympathy, of the woman who had six children, aged from 18 down to 7, and who had had a nervous breakdown four years earlier and found herself pregnant again. I cannot believe that that case would not be covered by paragraph (a) of this clause as it now stands. I cannot think it would be found that doctors were not prepared to say that a woman with that number of children to look after, and with a history of a nervous breakdown, could have another child without serious risk of injury to her health. It seemed to me that, far from that case being an argument in support of this paragraph, it really destroyed the noble Lord's argument. The noble Lord referred to women who go out to work, and to women whose husbands are drunkards. Surely, these should not be grounds for saying that they are inadequate to be mothers. And that is what the wording of this clause says. I think there is great force in what my noble friend Lord Conesford said: that so many of these arguments are arguments which can be used with great effect in favor of birth control and in favor of sterilization. But once you 523 Come to the termination of a pregnancy, you move into a different field.

I listened with the greatest interest to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill. She obviously spoke with great sincerity when she referred to what might happen in slum homes and invited us to exercise compassion and charity. I would say to her that I do not think that inadequacy as a mother—her words were "physical and mental inadequacy to be a mother"—depends upon whether it is a slum home or a rich home. I do not think that that argument really prevails.

We had a powerful speech from my noble friend Lord Molson. He asked that this Amendment should be rejected. He said: "Let us get away from something physical"—I think he was referring to health considerations. But I would point out to him that paragraph (c) is limited to physical or mental inadequacy to be a mother. We are not considering here the wider considerations to which he gave vent. I would suggest to him that if he considers paragraph (a) and its full implications, he will find that most of the cases with which he has such sympathy, and with which we all have sympathy, cone under that paragraph.

I have dealt fairly shortly with the various points that have been raised. This paragraph does not raise the wider issues covering the whole field which have been touched upon in this debate. But it does raise a serious question of whether we are to allow a possible human life to be destroyed because some people, whoever they may be, think that a woman is inadequate to be a mother. I hope your Lordships will not give approval to that principle.

§ LORD SILKIN

I hope I am replying to the debate and that we can shortly come to a decision. In a sense, this discussion has been a lawyers' paradise. We have had three eminent Q.C.s who have directed most of their attention to criticizing and demolishing the wording of the paragraph. I say at once that it is quite easy to do that. The noble and learned Viscount himself tried his hand at drafting, and he was not entirely successful in the Amendment he put down on Tuesday.

524 I have not been entirely successful. No Private Member who tries to draft a Bill can be assured that he will get exactly the right words to meet what he wants to do. If one has the benefit of the help of the Parliamentary draftsmen, then one can put that right.

It is a fact—and I agree fully, therefore, with the noble Lord, Lord Molson —that what we want to consider this afternoon is the principle of what is behind this paragraph. I think most noble Lords will be in no doubt—I do not think the noble and learned Viscount is in any doubt at all—as to the intention of this paragraph. I am not sure about the noble Viscount, Lord Barrington. We heard so much of his reminiscences and his autobiography that it was very difficult—I am not going to give way to him. The noble Lord had his turn, and he said quite a lot. The real issue before the Committee now is that, whatever the defects in the wording may be (and I would agree that it is wrong to pass legislation which is defective as an amendment of the criminal law, but your Lordships will have two more opportunities of ensuring that the wording is not defective), all I am asking this afternoon is that your Lordships should accept the principle.

The noble and learned Viscount made great play of the fact that most of the cases—he did not say all the cases—that we intended to cover were covered by paragraph (a). Would he look at paragraph (a)? It provides that termination of the pregnancy is necessary where there is a serious risk to the life or grave injury to the health, whether physical or mental, of the pregnant woman by the continuation of the pregnancy. The cases that I have in mind do not involve any such risk, and any doctor who tried to carry out an abortion in the cases I have in mind would be failing in his duty, or going beyond what the provisions intend—and I doubt whether any doctor would. My noble friend Lady Summerskill and I set out a number of illnesses which may be affecting a woman, which would not affect gravely her health or her life but which would affect her capacity to be a mother: the woman who is suffering from epilepsy, and the woman who is suffering from an acute disease which would seriously affect her capacity to be a mother, as well as the 525 Woman who is in prison. That is the principle to which I am asking your Lordships to agree. If you do not like my example of shoplifting—and I meant a perpetual shoplifter—then forget it. I merely tried to illustrate, as best I could, the kind of cases which I thought would justify an abortion. But it is not for me: it would be for the doctors. I hope they would be guided in most cases by a social worker, especially, as has been said, if one of the doctors was a hospital doctor, who has access to social workers.

I think I have said enough to indicate that there are many cases outside the provisions of paragraph (a) where an abortion would be justified. I would emphasise that in the last resort it will be the doctors who will decide, and not the mother. The mother will be asking for an abortion, but she will not be the deciding person—it will be the doctors. The noble and learned Viscount agreed that the letter which I read out was a pathetic letter, but he said that, surely, in a case like that she would get an abortion. In fact, she has asked for it and has been refused. She has been refused by a hospital doctor because she does not come within the terms of the existing case law. She does not, and will not, come within the terms of paragraph (a).

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE

I do not know about that.

§ LORD SILKIN

I can assure the noble and learned Viscount that she will not. I have read the letter very carefully. She had a nervous attack four years ago, but she says that she has now recovered, and there is no reason to suppose that her life would be endangered or that she would suffer serious ill-health simply on account of the pregnancy.

Both the noble and learned Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, suggested that many of these cases were cases for sterilization. These are not

§ THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD AILWYN)

Before calling on the next Amendment, No. 8, I think I should explain that if this Amendment is now moved and agreed to I shall be precluded from calling Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 standing in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I understand that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, are willing to move their Amendment No. 8 after Amendment Nos. 9 and 10, and that this arrangement has the agreement of the noble and learned Viscount. I think that this is for the general convenience of the Committee, and with your Lordships' permission I therefore call on Amendment No. 9 as an Amendment to Amendment No. 1.