PEERAGE BILL

§ LORD SOMERS

I should like to oppose this Amendment very strongly, on two main grounds. I think it was during the Second Reading that the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition spoke of the position of a Member in another place as being a grand privilege—words which I do not question in the 1463 least. But now the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, wants to make that grand privilege descend to his heirs and successors. What price the hereditary principle there, my Lords? It seems to me that, if one is going to disregard the hereditary principle, one must disregard it in both directions.

There is another reason, and that is that if one is to decide, not only for oneself but also for one's heirs and successors—and this may be particularly difficult, especially when they are distant relations and not one's own son—I think one will find that many fewer Members of your Lordships' House will take the advantage of disclaiming: not that I think very many are likely to, in any case. I think that with the added weight of having to decide not only for yourself but also for somebody else as to what their future is going to be, it would be extremely difficult to make any decision at all. After all, not everybody is suited to be a Member of another place. It is an extremely specialised and difficult vocation, and it is quite unlike membership of your Lordships' House, where is is comparatively easy—or so I have found it. I know very well that I should not have the ability to be a Member of another place. I think, therefore, it is quite unlikely that many people would disclaim, in view of that fact.

§ THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

It is greatly to be hoped that this Amendment will be rejected by your Lordships with the contumely that it merits. While fully agreeing with my noble friend Lord Somers on the points he has put, I should like to add several others. The first is that to say now that we are going to create a new kind of "mothball" Peerage is far from accurate. "Mothball" Peerages are already in existence, owing to the ridiculous system of the English, as apart from the Scottish, Peerage of a Peerage which can be held by a woman going into abeyance when there is more than the one daughter and no son of a Peer who has died. So the "mothball" argument falls at once.

Secondly, I do not see that a Peer has it both ways, because it does not mean that he can come back to your Lordships' House, and it confers no privilege on his 1464 progeny of being able more easily to get into another place. All it does is to make it possible for someone who would otherwise come to your Lordships' House sooner that he would like, to go to another place and do useful work there. But why that should mean that his descendants for ever after should be debarred from enjoying a Peerage which his ancestors had gained is something that passes my comprehension. I cannot see that there will be any advantage. I agree with my noble friend Lord Somers that all it will mean is that far fewer people will go to another place.

Furthermore, let it be remembered that this provision would put a premium upon spite felt by an inheritor of a title for his possible successor. Some man might well succeed to a Peerage who did not want it and who thoroughly disliked his next heir. He would hurriedly disclaim that Peerage simply for the pleasure of spiting that heir and his descendants. Altogether I cannot regard this suggested Amendment as being other than deplorable.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD DILHORNE)

I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, for the commendable clarity and brevity with which he moved a highly controversial Amendment. I apprehend that this was the subject of very considerable discussion by the Joint Select Committee. If I may remind your Lordships, the Joint Select Committee rejected extinction by twelve votes to six, which is a pretty substantial majority. The first point which the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, put forward was that it would be ridiculous, generation after generation, for Peers to come back, and go out, and so on. I wonder whether there is any real substance in that argument when one bears in mind that the position to-day is that someone who succeeds to a Peerage has a perfect freedom to opt whether he takes any part in your Lordships' proceedings, and, indeed, successive generations may—I do not know—decide not to take part and exercise that option. That in a sense, I suppose, could be said to create some dormant or temporarily dormant Peerages. This Bill does not alter that position. All that this Bill does is to make the difference that a Peer who chooses not to serve in your Lordships' House will be able to attempt to serve in another 1465 place. That is really the effect of the Bill as it stands.

The argument was also put forward by the noble Lord that when one accepts an hereditary Peerage one binds ones successors; therefore, ought not one to be free, if one succeeds to a Peerage and disclaims it, also in that case to bind ones successors? There is a fallacy in that argument, although it may sound attractive from a debating point of view, because the whole point of this Bill is that each successor should be able in his turn to choose whether or not to avail himself of his hereditary rights and to subject himself to his hereditary disabilities.

I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, say that he would like to see the hereditary principle retained, because I think that when he comes to consider and reflect upon the proposal that he has been putting forward, he will see that it is really a proposal that will nibble at the hereditary principle, because what he is suggesting is that the heirs and successors of a Peer who disclaims should be penalised in a way in which no heirs or successors of other Peers would be. That is to say, to that extent he is encroaching upon the hereditary principle. I do not want to start a debate to-day—because we have a lot of Amendments to consider—on the hereditary principle. All that I am saying is that I think, if you are going to curtail the legislative rights of heirs to Peerages or to abolish Peerages, then the enactment should apply to all such heirs and not merely to those whose ancestors happened to have disclaimed under the Bill.

This is, again, one of the issues on which many people will absolutely sincerely hold different views and, as your Lordships know, this matter has been the subject of prolonged consideration by the Joint Select Committee. I make no complaint at all, naturally, of the noble Lord's having raised this issue, and having raised it and having sensed the feeling from several quarters of the House, and in the light of what I have said, I hope that he will not press it to a Division.

§ LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH

I think there is liable to be a little universal assumption that the only issue involved in disclaiming is whether or not 1466 a person wishes to continue his membership of the House of Commons or to stand for election to the House of Commons. But that is not the only issue involved in the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, which I support. There may be other reasons why a person does not wish to take a title or an hereditary Peerage. It may be that his circumstances are modest and he feels that he cannot live up to it (to put it one way, and it could be put in another) and therefore he does not wish to succeed. Other reasons are that his social circumstances are such that a title would be inappropriate; that his employment might conceivably be prejudiced by his holding of a title; or he may have strong convictions against titles and hereditary Peerages. So there may be a number of reasons why a person disclaims, apart from the question of wishing to stand for, or to continue to be a Member of, the Commons House of Parliament.

I personally think this Amendment is right. I supported this line in the Joint Select Committee for two reasons. One is the "Jack-in-the-box" argument which the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, used—which I call the "bob in, bob out, and bob in again" argument. I think that that position is not dignified from the point of view of this Parliamentary institution. I think it is a bad thing, if a Peerage is disclaimed, that the next generation can come in and the one after that can come in or stay out. I do not think it adds to the dignity of the House of Lords. That is one argument.

The other argument is that I think the Lord Chancellor is in danger of making it, in a sense, too easy for a man to disclaim. I do not want it to be too easy. I think the consequences—not penalties, but consequences—of disadvantage to somebody later on should be in his mind. I do not think he should disclaim light-heartedly. Therefore, if it makes him think two, three, four or five times before he disclaims because of the consequences to his descendants, I think it is a good thing, because the decision to disclaim must be taken responsibly and after careful thought. I do not think he ought to be in the position of being able to comfort himself with the thought, "I am not going, but 1467 my son can". I think that is not conducive to the dignity and the status of the House of Lords as things are. I think, therefore, that if a person disclaims and does not want the Peerage then it must be binding upon his successors. Nobody can tell, of course, whether or not a man's successors will want to take advantage of reviving a Peerage. In any case, it is not such a terrible thing that they should not be able to. Therefore, I think that this is a rational thing to do.

I do not think we are called upon this afternoon to express firm opinions about the hereditary principle. In principle, I am against it. On the other hand, I think there might be political disadvantages if this House were converted into too popular a Chamber. I do not want it to be too popular a Chamber, otherwise it will strengthen its moral authority against the elected House. Therefore, I do not propose to discuss the hereditary point too much. The narrow point before us was of a Peer, who would otherwise succeed, deciding to disclaim, and I think it is logical, right and more dignified that, if so, the Peerage should be extinguished—or drowned, as we call it in rather more vulgar language. Therefore, if I am still here, which is not certain, and a Division takes place I shall vote for the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby.

§ LORD SALTOUN

I did not intend to intervene in this debate, and I shall keep your Lordships only a very short time. But I would remind your Lordships that we are a House of Peers, which means that on questions in this House we are all equal. For that reason we should be particularly careful that our legislation is completely and absolutely fair as between one and another.

The reason why I shall oppose this Amendment is that it does not operate fairly as between different Members of your Lordships' House. I can quite understand, and strongly sympathise with, the present Lord Stansgate's attitude and feeling in the matter. But take, for example, my noble friend Lord Forbes. He and his predecessors have been head of the Forbes for hundreds of years. If he should wish to disclaim his Peerage 1468 absolutely, the whole of his family—and I mean not only his children, but everybody connected with him—would object and feel that he was doing them an injury. That reason would operate sufficiently to prevent him from making use of this Bill which is now before us. For that reason I think this Amendment should be opposed, because it does not operate fairly. I am not talking about what a man feels in himself. I am talking about the inducements that will naturally and certainly be put upon him to refrain from making use of the Bill, when it becomes an Act.

§ LORD SHERWOOD

I would say that this Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, opens a new gate to blackmail. A person holding a title might easily say, "I want to return to contest such-and-such a division", where other people hope they are going to succeed in an election. In such a case he can turn to them and say, "Unless you give me so much money I will do away with my Peerage". I can think of one very strong case, the Duke of Portland. He is not here at the moment. He has no direct heir. He could easily say to the whole of the Bentinck family, "Unless you pay me one thousand pounds each I will go back to the Newark division"—where I am certain he would be successful—opening the door to real blackmail. And where did his title come from?

§ LORD BOOTHBY

May I interrupt my noble friend? He is at the moment accusing the whole of this House of being potential blackmailers.

§ LORD SHERWOOD

Lord Boothby perhaps knows more about blackmail than I do. All I said was that Lord Boothby's Amendment is opening the door to future blackmail, which I strongly deplore. As in the case of the Duke of Portland which I have just raised, he could say, "I am going back to the House of Commons. I have been in it, and not unsuccessfully, and I shall return to it": But all descendants of the present Duke, every one who has a right to succeed to the title of Duke of Portland (which brought in Protestantism instead of Roman Catholicism, which I deplore; it brought it in largely due to the lack of security by John Churchill, who became Duke of Marlborough. So he departed to the enemy; yet he became a Duke because he was a Protestant), are 1469 entitled to succeed to the title and not to to Mr. Bentinck, of Welbeck Abbey.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

After the speeches which we have had from the noble Lord, Lord Somers, the noble Earl. Lord Mansfield, and my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, there is little I can add against this Amendment. I certainly do not intend to discuss the hereditary principle, as such, or to wander into the byways where the noble Lord, Lord Sherwood has been leading the House. But I should like to add this to what has been said. I, of course, listened with great interest, like, I suppose, everybody else in the House, to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, in moving his Amendment. He pleaded his case with that great persuasive force which we should expect from him. But I very much hope—and I would say this, if I may, to the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, too—he will not press the Amendment to a Division. I feel that it goes far beyond the terms of reference by which the Select Committee's deliberations were governed, as they were defined to us at the beginning of our sittings. I can only express my own view, but I certainly thought it was made clear to us from the very start that we were not intended to go into all the wider issues of the composition of this House, on which, no doubt, almost all the Members, on one side and the other, had their own very strong views.

I think it is very probable that some, at any rate, of the Labour members of the Committee, possibly the majority, would have liked to abolish the hereditary principle altogether. But I think they realised, as I certainly realised, that the purpose for which this Committee was called was not to raise fundamental issues but to deal with the immediate difficulty which had been caused by Lord Stansgate and for which it was very important, from every point of view, that a solution should be found. I thought, if I may say so, that it was to their very great credit that they did not press their views too far on the Committee. They realised, as we did, that the best one could hope for, and what we must work for, was a fair compromise between widely differing opinions. We accepted that, and I understood that 1470 they accepted that. I think it was a pity, if I may say so, that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, was not equally wise.

If he were to achieve success on this group of Amendments, what would happen? He would certainly have killed the Bill, because I have no doubt at all that this House would reject the Bill, with this Amendment, on Third Reading. That would be a most idiotic result after all the work we have put into this question. Surely what we ought to do now is to face the fact that we can get agreement on a way of dealing with what may be called the Stansgate difficulty. All parts of the House can get agreement. We cannot get agreement on the wider question. Let us leave that alone to a later period.

§ LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH

The word "blackmail" has been mentioned. Is this a little attempt at blackmailing the House as to how it should vote in this Division?

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I do not think it is an attempt at blackmail to say what will certainly happen. I am not threatening anybody. I am only telling the House what will happen; and everybody knows it will happen.

§ LORD WALSTON

May I briefly support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, in his Amendment? It seems to me this issue, in its small aspect, as we shall look at it, is a very simple one. A hereditary Peer has certain privileges. The one at issue is the privilege of sitting in your Lordships' House. He is now being given under this Bill, quite rightly in my view, an additional privilege—the privilege of deciding whether, in fact, he will sit here or attempt to sit in another place. So the issue is what price he should pay for this additional privilege which he is being given. The price this Bill suggests is renunciation for his lifetime of the right to sit in this House again unless he is re-created a Peer. Lord Boothby's Amendment suggests that the price should be a higher one, and I feel that, in view of the very great additional privilege which is being proposed, he should pay the higher price.

§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

He will not pay it: his descendants will.

§ LORD WALSTON

The noble Lord correctly says it is not only the Peer renouncing who will pay the price; he is making the decision on behalf of the people who come after; and it is a very difficult decision to make. But, after all, anybody who is fortunate enough to inherit anything, other than good health or good looks or good intelligence, does have, in addition to the advantages that inheritance gives him, the responsibility of deciding how he shall use those things he has inherited. He may inherit a great business; he may inherit a great estate; he may inherit simply vast wealth.

Many people (your Lordships know them well) have had to make the decision whether, in their own personal circumstances, they will continue to enjoy these privileges—or, as is often the case be overlaid by them: preserving them, to their own personal disadvantage, and often unhappiness, for the sake of their descendants, not yet born, maybe—or divest themselves of them. We can all think of friends of ours, Members of your Lordships' House—or it may have been their fathers—who have divested themselves of their ancestral estates, of their businesses, or even, on occasion of their wealth, to the detriment of people who come after them. They have done it, having thought about it carefully and decided, on balance, that it was the right thing to do for their own personal amenities: not their own pleasure, but because they feel they can make a greater contribution to their country, as their ancestors did before them, and also because they feel, often, that it is going to be better for their descendants, to put it simply, to stand on their own feet.

While I cannot say that those who have made that decision have necessarily in every case made the right decision, one respects them for having faced these facts and for having made the decision. But I do not think these people should never have to make that decision; that they should be able to feel they can divest themselves of the responsibilities which go with certain inheritances, but can do it relatively lightly, only for themselves. They must regard it—particularly those people who believe in the hereditary principle—as something in regard to which they have a personal responsibility towards the people who will come after 1472 them. Simply to be able to say, in what in effect is a selfish, though a public-spirited, way, "I do not wish to be burdened with the responsibility of my estate, my business, my fortune or my title. I shall get rid of them and act as if I had none of these things. But I am not going to take the responsibility of deciding for the people who come after me. So they can carry on if they so wish"—that, I think, is too light a price to pay. This is a serious decision for anybody to make, and one must make it in full recognition of the fact that one's decision is not a personal one, a selfish one, but must affect one's whole family in future generations. For these reasons, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby.

§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

I think we have had a most interesting discussion. We have had views from all quarters of the House. I was glad that Lord Boothby moved the Amendment. I think perhaps that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, did not intend to suggest it, but it might have been interpreted as if the Amendment, when moved in the Joint Select Committee, was not really within the original terms of reference. I do not think he intended to convey that, but he may perhaps be interpreted in that way by some people who may read it in print.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I did intend to convey that the wider issues of the composition of the House were outside the terms of reference. The noble Earl may say that I was wrong, but that is my view.

§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

That is fair enough. But we were certainly allowed to put it forward by the terms of reference of the Joint Select Committee, and we moved it there. The other matter is that the noble Marquess is quite right in being anxious that we should not do anything that we think likely to injure the future progress of this measure. That view is held on this side as strongly as anywhere else.

We not only took this view in the Joint Select Committee, but this proposal was moved in another place, and there is no reason at all why your Lordships should not be allowed the same privilege of voting upon it in this House. We made 1473 our position perfectly clear. There is no doubt at all that in the country at large a large section of the community—exactly how large I do not know, but large—is not in favour of the hereditary principle at all. On the other hand, we, as a Labour delegation to the Joint Select Committee, put our case and we voted on it. But I think in the interests of the further progress that we wanted to make in this direction, we signed the Report without signing a Minority Report. Since then this point has been debated and voted upon in another place, and there is no earthly reason why we should not vote upon it, too. I hope we may keep to that principle.

§ LORD BOOTHBY

I should like just to say a further word. I have no doubt at all about what will be the result of

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble Earl has made very clear what he wants to achieve by this particular Amendment. I must tell him that, as I see it, the Amendment as now drawn would have very much greater consequences than he suggests in the course of his speech in moving this Amendment. The omission of Clause 1(3)(a) which he proposes would have this result: that if that were omitted, Clause 1(3) would give sitting Peers twelve months from succession in which to disclaim. So that would mean that any Peer who had succeeded more than a year before the Bill came into force would be deprived of the opportunity of disclaiming the Peerage. I am perfectly certain that that is not a result that the noble Earl desires in the least, but that is what in fact this Amendment would do. On that ground I am going to ask the noble Earl not to press 1477 this Amendment, which in fact goes far beyond achieving the object which he put forward.

I do not know what reasons prompted the Joint Select Committee to arrive at the conclusion that, in the case of sitting Peers, the period of time should be six months. The Joint Select Committee recommended, by a majority of one, if I may remind your Lordships, that the Bill should apply to sitting Peers, and the Motion which was carried was that such Peers should be given an opportunity to disclaim within a reasonable time. I do not know—I cannot tell from reading the Report—why it was felt by the Joint Select Committee that six months was in this instance a reasonable time. There are, I think, arguments for saying that, in the case of a Peer who is not a sitting Member of this House at the time of succession, a period of longer than six months is desirable. Some time may elapse before he has been able to discover whether he has, either certainly or probably, succeeded, and while all sitting Peers are alerted to the implications of the change in the law created by the passage of this Bill, when the interest in this Bill has died down a person succeeding to a Peerage may well not know at once what his rights are, and may not perhaps start to consider his position seriously until several months have elapsed. That may be an argument not relating directly to whether the six months now in the Bill for sitting Peers should be extended or not, but it appears to me, on consideration, to be a possible explanation for the different periods recommended by the Joint Select Committee.

I will say quite frankly that I should like to have more time to consider the noble Earl's proposal, and to consider what would be the appropriate Amendment to give effect to that proposal. If the noble Earl were to put it down at a later stage I should like to hand it to him in an appropriate form, because I am sure it is not his desire to have the adverse consequences that the Amendment in this form has. It is for those reasons that I would ask the noble Earl to be good enough, if he thinks fit, to withdraw this Amendment, it being clearly understood that it will be perfectly open to him to put down 1478 an Amendment which would, if carried, achieve his object at a later stage.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am much obliged to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. Of course, the purpose of my Amendment, as I stated it in the language of my speech, was fairly simple. Apparently the language of my Amendment was inappropriate. I said on Second Reading that I thought it would be a very good thing if the Government would draft the Amendment, as they were better draftsmen than I was. However they did not draft the Amendment; they left it to me. I have not been successful in my purpose and now the Government will have to do my work over again. However, on the clear understanding that the Amendment should be agreed in a form which will give effect to what I have put to the House in moving it, and that that Amendment can go down either in my name or the name of the Government on Report, then I think it would be for the convenience of your Lordships if I asked leave to withdraw the present Amendment now.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I should like to make it clear that I want to have an opportunity of giving further consideration to the question, making it quite clear that I will certainly secure that the Amendment is properly drafted and will hand it to the noble Earl so that he can put it down. I want more time to consider this question, for the simple reason that I should feel very grave reluctance in deciding rather rapidly, perhaps, to depart from the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee. If it is withdrawn now I shall have that time, and in any event I can give the noble Earl the Amendment in the proper form.

§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

Before the noble Earl finally asks leave to withdraw his Amendment, I would say that I am much obliged for the statement of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. We shall all require to look very carefully indeed at any Amendment of this kind. I remember very well the decision in the Joint Select Committee on this point. There were a good many speeches on it and different views were expressed among the parties concerned. I hope that we shall not come to any major decision on this matter without very careful reflection, 1479 because it is the sort of thing that might hold us up again in another place.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am quite content. I did not mean to assume that the Lord Chancellor would necessarily accept the Amendment. But provided it can be drafted by the Parliamentary draftsmen in a form which will give effect to it, then I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment and I will certainly put it down again.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble Lord has made quite clear his object in moving this, the first of three Amendments dealing with the same particular point. His purpose, as I understand it, is to guard against the risk of a successor to a Peerage losing his option to disclaim without ever having realised that the occasion for its exercise had arisen. Now I think that in this context there are really two cases to consider. First, there is the case where the events which caused the succession are well known but the entitlement of the heir, or it may be of the previous holder, is disputed and not readily ascertainable. If I might give an example of that, there is the case of the younger brother of a Peer whose elder brother dies leaving a widow who may be pregnant. In that case, the entitlement of the heir will not be readily ascertainable at least for some time.

In that type of case I do not think there will be any difficulty, because, although a particular individual may not be sure that he is the heir to a Peerage, he can, if he wishes to stand for the House of Commons, disclaim without suffering any penalty at all. If it turns out that he is not the heir, then the disclaimer becomes a nullity and no harm is done. If, on the other hand, he has succeeded, the disclaimer takes effect at once, as soon as he has executed the necessary documents, so that he can retain his seat in the House of Commons, if he is already a Member, or stand for election to that House if he is not a Member of it. I think that there is no difficulty in relation to that type of case; and, in substance, the Bill thus carries out the recommendations contained in paragraph 6(i) of the Joint Select Committee's Report.

The other type of case that might arise is where the events giving rise to the succession may themselves be unknown 1481 —for instance, where the previous holder of a Peerage is a distant relative who dies abroad, it may be under a different name, so that a considerable interval of time elapses before the heir gets to know about it. I must concede straight away to the noble Lord that this type of case could, in theory, cause the heir to lose his opportunity of disclaiming. The practical position, though—and I think the noble Lord would agree with me here—is that such cases are likely to be extremely rare, and the only heirs likely to wish to disclaim (that is to say, those who are Members of Parliament or who have Parliamentary ambitions) will take good care to keep themselves informed of circumstances which may cause a Peerage to devolve upon them.

The noble Lord has said that he finds no indication in the Bill dealing with this particular point, and he might have gone on to say that he did not find in the Report of the Joint Select Committee any recommendation dealing specifically with the case of ignorance, as opposed to one of disputed succession. The Joint Select Committee rejected a suggestion for a board of appeal, with power to allow the time limits to be extended on compassionate grounds, and it is to be inferred from that, I think, that they would have rejected the noble Lord's proposal. But the Bill, as the noble Lord no doubt has noticed, does to some extent depart from the strictness of the Committee's recommendations by allowing an extension of time in cases of infirmity, and I hope that that particular proposal will meet with the noble Lord's approval and obtain his support.

There are these objections to the noble Lord's proposal. First, it is clearly right, I would suggest to him, that, so far as possible the terminus a quo of the limitation period should be certain, and any additional departure from this principle is to that extent undesirable. Secondly, I would suggest that to allow an extension of time on the grounds of ignorance would discourage the successor to a Peerage, who might be in no hurry to come to a decision, from ascertaining his true position. Indeed, I think it would be necessary, if the noble Lord's proposal were acceptable in principle, to guard against this by excluding from its benefit any successor who had not taken 1482 reasonable steps to find out the truth. But once an inquiry of this nature had been embarked upon, the position of the Lord Chancellor, as the adjudicating authority, would, I think, become increasingly difficult. Indeed, one would have to conduct a miniature trial, and one might find oneself in the unfortunate position of having to resolve issues which were far from clear-cut and which might, in the case of a sitting Member of Parliament, involve the Lord Chancellor in a considerable amount of political controversy.

Whilst I must concede that there is a theoretical case in support of the noble Lord's proposal, the difficulty he is trying to meet is, I suggest, unlikely to occur; and I submit to your Lordships that, on balance, the disadvantages of introducing yet another factor making for uncertainty in the length of the limitation period outweigh any possible gain. I am glad the noble Lord has raised this point; that it has not escaped his attention. I hope that he will be satisfied, at least to some extent, by the reply which I have given.

§ LORD SALTOUN

I have listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord's explanation, but I am bound to say that I am not satisfied, and for this reason. Here we have a special clause which allows a gentleman with infirmity of body or mind—and mark that particularly, "of mind"—to have an option in this matter, whereas a man of vigorous mind who is at the height of his career may be debarred from continuing that career by the fact that it is completely impossible for him to know that he has succeeded to a Peerage. The noble and learned Lord pointed out that this circumstance must occur very seldom. Mercifully, great cataclysms do not occur very often; nor do great wars. But great wars do give rise to precisely this kind of circumstance, and I hesitate to suggest to your Lordships that there will be no great wars in the future. It seems to me that there is here a clear injustice being done.

I do not say that the words of my Amendment are perfect, and I would very gladly change them. As a matter of fact, I had it originally in mind to insert right at the end of this Bill a little clause saying that the time should not 1483 begin to run until it was known, or, in the case of a disputed succession, declared by a court, that the succession had taken place. That would be just as good from my point of view, and it would remedy an injustice. But I think the Government should hesitate before doing something manifestly unfair and manifestly unjust. I do not propose to press my Amendment this afternoon. I propose to take it ad avizandum and perhaps propose some other Amendment later. I believe it is important; and I do not think we should, without proper consideration, do something which is manifestly unjust.

§ LORD MOYNE

Would the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor agree to look at this matter between now and Report stage and see whether some word such as "unavoidable" might not cover the position? The noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, will be thinking about it between now and then; and if the noble and learned Lord Chancellor is also directing his thoughts to this subject which seems to have a possibility of unfairness in it, then I should feel much happier.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If my noble friend will look at what I have said he will see that the insertion of the adjective "unavoidable" would not resolve the great difficulties that arise in this matter. I am, of course, always willing to look at something again; and I will. But I cannot do it with any commitment or really with any hope of finding a solution to this really theoretical difficulty.

§ LORD SALTOUN

I am afraid that I know cases where it is by no means a theoretical difficulty. But, as I said, I will take it ad avizandum and see whether I can find another Amendment for a later stage. In those circumstances, with the leave of the Committee I will withdraw my Amendment.

§ THE DUKE OF ATHOLL

May I say a word on Clause 1? As one of the younger Members of your Lordships' House, I feel that I probably have a slightly better recollection than some noble Lords—and particularly some of 1484 those on the Joint Select Committee—of what one's thoughts are like at the age of 21. It worries me very much that a person who succeeds to a Peerage as a minor has to make up his mind whether he is going to disclaim it or not by the time he is 22 years old, allowing for the twelve months afterwards. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, moved an Amendment in the Joint Select Committee that the age should be changed to 25, plus a year's grace, making it 26. This Amendment was, I think, rejected by a small majority.

I should be very interested to know the reasons why this particular Amendment was rejected; because I feel that having to make up one's mind by the time one is 22 would have one of two effects: either people will disclaim their Peerage because they think they have political ambitions and think they may wish to go to another place later in life, say at 30 or 35 years; or else they immediately waive the disclaimer because they know that they have no political ambitions. They may not even know what it entails; they may never have been inside your Lordships' House or, for that matter, inside the House of Commons at that time. So I think it would be interesting to know why Lord Silkin's Amendment was rejected on the Select Committee.

§ LORD SILKIN

May I offer a conjecture to the noble Duke? It is the one he himself put forward: that in the majority of cases it was a very long time since we were 21.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I cannot help my noble friend since I was not a member of the Committee.

§ LORD CONESFORD

May I ask my noble and learned friend why there is a distinction between two classes of minors? One has twelve months and one only six months under the Bill as it stands. I think that some of those minors will have twelve months under subsection (2); but some will have only six months under subsection (3)(a). Is it right that there should be a distinction between various classes of minors?

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will certainly look at that point, but I do not know whether my noble friend is right about it.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

With respect, is the noble Lord on the right Amendment? As I understand it, this Amendment leaves out the word "titles".

§ LORD SALTOUN

Yes, that is right. My noble friend the late Lord Winterton stood as Lord Winterton; and there is nothing in this Bill to prevent anybody in a similar position from doing the same thing. I may be wrong. I am willing to be instructed. It seems to me quite reasonable to put everybody on the same footing; and so I thought I would move this Amendment and see what happened. I beg to move.

§ THE EARL OF SANDWICH

The noble Lord, Lord Saltoun has already referred to Iolanthe and it is probably permissible to introduce the name of another doggerel poet. I regret to tell the Committee that I made a mistake or Second Reading in referring to the Earl of Potamus's son 1486 as "Lord Lucky". It was in fact, as you would suppose, "Lord Hippo" who suffered fearful loss by putting money on a horse, which he had been told if it were pressed would run far faster than the rest. But on the morning of the race it only took the seventh place. Then followed financial disaster, and finally his sire, the Earl of Potamus, sent for him and bitterly addressed him thus: We had intended you to be, the next Prime Minister but three; but, as it is, my language fails. Go out and govern New South Wales.

§ THE DUKE OF ATHOLL

I think my noble friend's Lord is Lord Lundy, who was easily moved to tears.

§ THE EARL OF SANDWICH

There is a Report stage of this Bill when I shall have the opportunity to get the situation even more muddled. My qualifications for being "next Prime Minister but three" I must judge as being very poor indeed; and I have no desire whatever to go out and govern New South Wales.

§ LORD CONESFORD

For Lord Hippo and the Earl of Potamus the story ended much more happily. He received a telegram at dinner to say that he had backed a winner.

§ THE EARL OF SANDWICH

That is what I hope will be the prospect of this Amendment. I merely seek some clarification from the Lord Chancellor as to what the phrase "all titles" means. The object of this Amendment is to make the clause read—and I will leave out a number of words: The disclaimer of a peerage by any person under this Act shall be irrevocable and shall operate … (a) to divest that person … of all right or interest … in the peerage, and … all rights, offices, privileges and precedence attaching thereto … There is another Amendment later dealing with the omission of privileges, which is a separate question. This is a matter of leaving out the reference to "all titles", which is going to get us into some considerable state of anxiety and distress.

My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, and other members of the Government in another place have told us that they cannot legislate for courtesy titles. Now it seems to me that the phrase "all titles" catches up the 1487 courtesy title idea, and if we are to legislate to exclude all titles from the Peerage then that includes courtesy titles as well. Only by leaving out the phrase "all titles" can we do justice to what has been said by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor and by other members of the Government—that is to say, that no legislation can take place about courtesy titles.

It seems to me to be most sensible, if Peers are returned to the House of Commons or remain in the House of Commons, that they use their former names. I am going to cite a few, without any suggestion that they are intending to do one thing or the other—Lord Dunglass, the Honourable Quintin Hogg, Lord Lambton, Lord Balniel, and so on. But here there is a further danger, if this were acceptable, because a confusion might arise if a son, or even a grandson, refused to go down one (to use a colloquial expression), if it was the wish of his father to return to the other place or remain there. It would be very confusing, indeed, if there were two Lord Hartingtons, or even two Lord Burling-tons, whether in the other House or generally at large throughout the country.

My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor referred, at column 1007 of Hansard the other day, to persons in the entertainment world calling themselves "Lord This" or "Duke That". He said that there was no reason why these persons should not call themselves "Lord This" or "Duke That". But are we not in some danger of running up against the law as it may be when these words "all titles" are enacted? There is in another place a very admirable younger Member of Parliament entitled the Earl of Dalkeith. He may one day become the Duke of Buccleuch. He may not wish to leave another place. Is he entitled to call himself Duke Buccleuch—like Duke Ellington—without running up against the law?

I should like to ask my noble and learned friend point blank whether the title "Earl Sandwich, Esquire" or alternatively "Victor Montagu, Esquire, commonly known as the Earl of Sandwich", could be disputed at law following the enactment of Clause 3(1)(a)? There has been inconsistency, and some flippancy, in Government answers so far in both Houses, and I do 1488 not believe the Select Committee thought this matter out at all. There has been no authoritative judgment advanced either from the Government or from the authorities of this House, or from the College of Heralds, the Editor of Debrett, the Palace or whoever happens to be concerned—nothing whatever. A cat-and-mouth game is being played, and the fact that two of the mice are potential Prime Ministers renders it all the more undignified. If this word "titles" were taken out, I believe that it would at least give individuals an opportunity of basing their decision on what to call themselves in future in conformity with the law and not at variance from it.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I have listened with interest to my noble friend's speech in support of this Amendment. The first thing to get clear is precisely what the Bill does. It does not purport to take away from anyone something to which he is not in law entitled. The difference between a courtesy title and a title which is not a courtesy title is that there is in fact no legal right to a courtesy title. All we are seeking to do by Clause 3 is to secure what are the effects of a disclaimer. Clause 3(1)(a) therefore seeks to divest that person (and, if he is married, his wife) of all right or interest to or in the peerage, and all titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedence attaching thereto … It is operated only to divest him of those titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedence to which he is by law entitled. Therefore, it does not touch at all upon courtesy titles. What a Member of another House may call himself when he is inside or outside that other House is, I think, not really a matter for me. I said, in moving the Second Reading, that, provided there is no dishonesty attached to it, it is the law of this country that a person can call himself by what name he likes. All this Bill does is to make clear, so far as legal rights are concerned, what is the effect of a disclaimer. The legal right to "all titles" means, and means only, the titles to which a person is legally entitled. I think I made that perfectly clear in relation to this matter on Second Reading—at least I hope that I did. Though I dealt with it quite shortly, I endeavoured to make it clear.

§ LORD MOLSON

May I elucidate one point? Suppose the holder of an Earldom 1489 disclaimed it and thereby deprived himself of his courtesy title. Would his son still be entitled to the courtesy title? Surely he is entitled only if his father holds by law that title. Therefore, if the father has disclaimed, surely the son will be deprived of his courtesy title as well?

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

A courtesy title is a courtesy title and when the noble Lord talks about anyone being entitled to a courtesy title, it is a contradiction of terms. That is the short answer to the noble Lord. I hope I have made that quite clear. I was just going to say to the noble Lord who moved this Amendment that I was sorry to interrupt him, but the noble Lord has an Amendment down later dealing with Irish Peerages and I was a little confused by his reference to the noble Lord, Lord Turnour, whom we all know, because, of course, this particular clause deals only with the consequences of a disclaimer by a Peer. If we took out the word "titles", I do not know that it would materially alter the position, but I think that, from the point of view of drafting, it is desirable that we should have it in the clause, to make it as clear as we can what is the legal position, that we are dealing with titles to which Peers have legal right and with precedence, privileges and offices which are all matters of legal right.

§ LORD MOYNE

May I plead my ignorance, in order to draw further on the wisdom of the noble and learned Lord on this question? I am probably wrong, because I do not know much about this, but I have always understood that titles were in the father and that the word "courtesy" came in only as regards the courtesy of letting the son use one of his titles. I may be quite wrong about that, but I think that is what many people believe.

§ LORD SALTOUN

The noble and learned Lord rather knocked me off my perch, and I should like to explain my position to your Lordships in moving this Amendment. It is the case that an Irish Peer does not give up his title, if he stands for the House of Commons, and therefore Irish Peers are in a different position to other Peers in this respect. From time to time, we have heard many opinions expressed upon the 1490 Peerage from all quarters of the House, some of them, to my inferior intelligence, a good deal of nonsense, if I may say so. It seems to be felt by some people that elevation to a Peerage is a kind of trans-substantiation and makes you a different kind of person. That this is felt by some noble Lords when they become Peers is made fairly clear to me by some of their declarations. I have known noble Lords accept a Peerage and tell all their friends that it would make no difference: in fact, rather like Humpty Dumpty, they almost fell off the wall in their efforts to shake hands with Alice in order to show that they were not proud. I do not think that any person can be in your Lordships' House for very long and retain opinions of that kind.

If I were to take advantage of this Bill I should be ready to go back and call myself Alexander Fraser. The Alexander Frasers have done things of which I am just as proud as any that any Lord Saltoun has done. But the trouble is that as I have always gone about Scotland a great deal and am fairly well known I should find that people would always call me Lord Saltoun just the same, and I should find it impossible to divest myself of the title I bear, even if I took advantage of the Bill. I could not do it without a certain amount of bad manners. That is a point on which I think your Lordships are sensitive, because I know so many of your Lordships who are famous for your good manners. I feel I should find myself embarrassed if I had to correct everybody I talked to by telling them that I was not Lord Saltoun, but only Alexander Fraser. That was at the back of my mind when I moved the Amendment. I do not think it matters two straws, but I wanted to put it to your Lordships.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I rise on a point of clarification. I am still not clear about this courtesy title position. Mention has been made of the Earl of Dalkeith. The Earl of Dalkeith, I understand, has no legal right to that name at all, but he is known as the Earl of Dalkeith, not only outside the House of Commons but inside the House of Commons as well, as I was known before my father died by the name which I understood he had lent to me. Suppose the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, proposed 1491 to masquerade in the House of Commons under the alias of his own name, would that be all right? Not only that, but would he be referred to by Members of the House of Commons as "the noble Earl", or how would he be addressed?

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I endeavoured to anticipate that sort of question by saying that I thought this would be a matter for the other place to decide.

§ VISCOUNT GAGE

Arising out of that, suppose a Peer, having disclaimed, was described on election posters at an election by his present name, would that be a ground for being unseated if he should win?

§ THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

Surely, this is an attempt to get it both ways: that is to say, for a noble Lord to give up his seat here and go to another place but still be known by his title. If the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, chooses to give up his seat here after this Bill becomes law, and finds a constituency to adopt him, and he is elected and goes to the other place, there is nothing to prevent him from changing his name by deed poll and calling himself the Earl of Sandwich—and whether the Sandwich in the new form would be more digestible to the House of Commons remains to be seen. I think this is an attempt to have the best of both worlds. As has been said by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, no one is entitled to a courtesy title. The courtesy title is a subsidiary title held by the Peer himself, which at his discretion he may let his son use. In Scotland, it is sometimes not even a son. A cousin may use the courtesy title of "Master", because that in old Scottish law might mean something—

§ LORD SALTOUN

I beg the noble Earl's pardon, but perhaps he will allow me to interrupt. The title "Master" is not a courtesy title. It is not held by the holder of the main title. It is a real title on its own.

§ THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

If my noble friend had not interrupted me, I was going on to explain that that was the actual position, in which the so-called holder of the title of "Master" was, in 1492 the old Scottish Parliament, entitled to vote instead of his father or kinsman, as the case may be. It was applied to the next heir. That I believe to be the fact. But now we are having it brought forward that someone is to leave your Lordships' House, go to another place and still be known by the title which he used to bear here. Quite frankly, as I say, I think that is having the best of both worlds, and some way ought to be found of preventing it.

§ VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN

I am still in some doubt about the case of a Peer who disclaims but also happens to be a Baronet.

§ THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

May I draw the attention of my noble friend to Clause 3(1)(a), where it says: to divest that person … of all right or interest to or in the peerage, and all titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedents attaching thereto, The words, "attaching thereto" would, I think, cover the point.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I can confirm what my noble friend Lord Mansfield has said. I was going to draw the attention of my noble friend Lord Stonehaven to the fact that he had not read the concluding words of the paragraph.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Does not this discussion expose the absolutely ludicrous character of the Government's proposal? Would it not be much better to allow the man to keep his title legally, as he is going to use it anyway, rather than to lay the Government open to all the absurd possibilities which have been adumbrated? It seems to me that we are going to get into the most terrible difficulties. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that it will be a matter for another place to decide. I really think it is a matter for the Government to decide.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble Marquess put forward this proposal before the Joint Select Committee, and it was rejected by a majority of 15 to 4. The noble Marquess, quite rightly, at an earlier stage of our discussion today made a powerful plea to the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, with regard to his proposal, which had been discussed by 1493 the Joint Select Committee and was rejected by them. He then drew attention to the possibility that if the change proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, was carried into the Bill it might well have the result of the Bill being lost. I pray in aid those words of the noble Marquess in dealing with this particular Amendment. The word "blackmail" was used in relation to what the noble Marquess said. I do not wish to put pressure on any noble Lord—it would not be right for me to do so—but I think I should draw the attention of your Lordships to the possibility, to say the least, that if the decision of the Joint Select Committee on this by 15 to 4 against the noble Marquess was reversed by your Lordships' House, I do not think I should be putting it too highly to say that it would seem to me likely that this would put the Bill in peril.

Sometimes Bills are not entirely logical; and sometimes we leave these matters to people's discretion. I rather drew attention to this when I moved the Second Reading of the Bill and I pointed out that the effect of Clause 3 was to divest a Peer of all those titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedents to which he was by law entitled. I did comment on and draw attention to the courtesy titles, and I suggested then that I really thought it was quite impossible to legislate in relation to courtesy titles, but I thought it unlikely that anyone who was a Peer, and had of his own act deliberately divested himself of that Peerage, whether a Member of another place or not a Member, would