THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD DILHORNE)

My Lords, I certainly respond to the invitation. I do not think that that is what is said in the White Paper. What is said in the White Paper is that the discussion related to amendments proceeding from the four Governments through the Federal Assembly which is provided for in the Constitution.

§ THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

Am I not right in saying that these amendments are limited to what could be done at the Review Conference, and that the whole subject of discussion was what would happen at the Review Conference? I think I am right in saying that.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The discussion was about what could be raised at the Review Conference and in relation to amendments which could be made by way of the Federal Assembly.

§ THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

As a result of anything that might be decided at the Review Conference. So, my Lords, I think we are agreed about that: that what this White Paper relates to, in the view of the Government, is what could be done at the Review Conference, which would, of course, have to pass through the Federal Assembly.

My Lords, I must say that I myself find this an extraordinary misconstruction of plain English: a misconstruction such as I have never come across outside Alice in Wonderland. May I commend to your Lordships what I read in the White Paper? The subject of the discussion was whether or not the provision for a Constitutional Review of the Federal Constitution would frighten away investors who might fear that the Federation would be broken up as a result of the Review Conference, and the agreed Minute sums up the discussion that ensued. I will, if I may, read to your Lordships the Minute: The general view expressed by delegates was that, since any proposal to terminate the Constitution could only be put into effect 1160 with the concurrence of the Federal Government and all three Territorial Governments, and of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it was unlikely that investors would consider the proposed review clause a reflection on the permanence of the Federation. That was agreed by all the Ministers who attended the Conference, both those from this country and those from the three territories in Central Africa.

My Lords, there is nothing whatever in this Minute to suggest that the required concurrence of the Federal and Territorial Governments was limited to the constitutional Review Conference. Nor is there any qualification of this kind, so far as I can see, in what the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, himself said during the discussion. The noble Viscount will speak for himself at a later stage, and he will tell me whether my interpretation of what he said is correct or not; but, if I may, I will quote one sentence from what he said. It is this: Nothing can liquidate the Constitution unless all four are agreed on it. Again, that does not seem to be limited to what can be done at the Review Conference.

May I also ask the noble Viscount whether he could clear up this point? When he was speaking about "all four", was he meaning the three Governments in Central Africa at the time, the three Territorial Governments, and the United Kingdom Government, which were the only Governments which existed when this Conference took place, or did he intend to refer to the five Governments mentioned in the Minute? That is an extremely important point; because if he was referring only to the four Governments, the case of Her Majesty's Government in paragraph 7 of the White Paper really falls down completely. This was put very clearly, I thought, by Sir Gilbert Rennie, the late High Commissioner for the Federation, in a letter which appeared in The Times this morning.

A little later in the discussion—and this appears in the White Paper—Mr. Greenfield, who is now the Minister of Law in the Federal Government, made the important reservation that the British Parliament cannot be bound. Of course, everyone agrees with that. This was endorsed by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, when he said in a pleasantly graphic manner: You cannot legislate against the United Kingdom Parliament going off its head". 1161 Of course, our sovereign Parliament can override Ministerial pledges, even the most solemn pledges, such as Treaties with foreign countries. Your Lordships will remember there was speculation recently about whether a Labour Government would repudiate the Treaty of Rome in the event of the present Government joining on the wrong terms. But the fact that Parliament can override a pledge does not mean that Ministers do not give pledges, or that when they are given they should not be honoured.

I am not the only person to find the White Paper entirely unconvincing. I ask your Lordships to look at Sir Gilbert Rennie's letter in The Times this morning. It may safely be assumed, I think, that a leader writer of The Times is a man of average intelligence, and this is what The Times' leader said about it last Thursday, in its last sentence: The Government's argument fails lamentably. It does not, of course, follow that they must keep Federation going, or accept Sir Roy Welensky's veto now on their actions … But the pledges cannot be denied". That is the view of The Times.

Further evidence that the pledge about consent was not limited to the Review Conference is contained in a letter from Sir Albert Robinson, the present High Commissioner for the Federation, which appeared in The Times last Saturday. In it, he quotes an extract from the speech of Lord Malvern (who was then, of course, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia) in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament., in which he quotes from an answer by Her Majesty's Government to the British Council of Churches. I should like to read one sentence from the British Government's answer—and perhaps, during the course of the debate, we shall hear which member of the British Government at the time provided this answer to the query from the British Council of Churches. This is the sentence: The United Kingdom Parliament would not be precluded by law from amending the Federal Constitution without the consent of the Federal or Territorial Governments; but as the Constitution will be based on a scheme which has been agreed between the four Governments concerned and will itself be so agreed, it seems to Her Majesty's Government that it would in any foreseeable circumstance be morally and politically indefensible for Parliament to enact amendments which had not been similarly agreed". 1162 May I ask the noble and learned Lord whether the Government deny the authenticity of this answer to the British Council of Churches? But if this communication is authentic, can the Government deny that what it, in fact, means is that it would be morally and politically indefensible for Parliament to amend the Federal Constitution without the agreement of the Federal and Territoral Governments? Does not this make complete nonsense of what another Minister, Mr. Macleod said in another place on Friday last: that no pledge of this nature had been given, in Parliament or elsewhere, in the last ten years?

My Lords, I will not pursue this controversy any further, apart from one final comment. I believe that this Government and the 1953 Government have been gravely at fault. They have fallen below the standards of conduct expected of a British Government. In 1953 a secret pledge of enormous political importance was given to the Federation, and this pledge was not revealed by Ministers when the Bill to set up the Federation was before Parliament. In these days we do not believe in secret pledges or secret treaties. They undermine the basis of our democratic system of government, which is the control of the Executive by Parliament. What Ministers do must always be subject to Parliamentary approval, and they should do nothing behind the back of Parliament.

The present Government have broken a pledge but (though others take a different view) I do not myself blame them for that. The dishonesty lies in not admitting that a pledge has been broken. Why not be frank and honest, instead of publishing this transparent sophistry? If the Government had said that the new circumstances which have arisen in the Federation make it impossible to keep a pledge given ten years ago, when these circumstances were not foreseen, I should have had little to complain about. But the attempt in this White Paper to explain away a promise by verbal ingenuity can only have the effect in the Federation of making the British Government despised as well as distrusted. I very much hope that, after this debate, we shall hear no more of this sterile controversy and that both our Government and the Federation Government will refrain from further 1163 exchanges: because one comment provokes another, and so it goes on. What really matters is, as I said earlier, that we should stop quarrelling about the past. That only makes it harder for us to work with the Federation Government in planning the future of the Federation.

My Lords, may I now turn to the recent developments, already alluded to, in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and to their implications for British policy? In Northern Rhodesia the Legislative Council has passed a resolution asking for secession from the Federation and for a new Constitution. This surely removes any shadow of doubt that the majority of the inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia want to leave the Federation. Do the Government still maintain that there is any difference between the position of Northern Rhodesia and that of Nyasaland? I should like to read one passage from the White Paper about Nyasaland, because it applies exactly to Northern Rhodesia. It is in the last paragraph: In the new circumstances that have arisen, namely, the expressed wish of the majority of the inhabitants of the territory to withdraw from the Federation, it would in the view of Her Majesty's Government be a breach of its obligation to the people of the Protectorate to disregard that wish". Can the Government really maintain that this statement does not apply with equal force to Northern Rhodesia, having in mind the resolution passed in the Legislative Council, which represents the people of that territory?

Mr. Winston Field, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, has made a powerful speech in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament saying that Northern Rhodesia can be kept in the Federation only by force. He expressed the hope that the British Government will let Northern Rhodesia go, so that the territorial leaders can get on with the job of working out new relationships between the territories. Sir Roy Welensky is now a lone voice, with all three territories against him and with no support from public opinion, African or British. Surely, the statement in the Press to-day, that the people of Nyasaland have always been against federation, is hardly an argument to use in favour of preventing Nyasaland from seceding. In these circumstances the secession of Northern Rhodesia must come about sooner or 1164 later; but until the principle is granted, then Mr. Kaunda will be unable to talk to the other territorial leaders about new links between the territories. The longer the delay, the further these territories will drift apart. My plea to the Government is to act and to act quickly.

This plea was put in far better words than mine in the Governor's speech in opening the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia on February 12. I will quote a part: My Government have not advanced the right to secede from the Federation, and have not and will not take any action which will contribute to the demise of the Federation as it at present exists. But at the same time my Ministers are prepared to be realistic in to-day's conditions and hope the First Secretary of State will give early and final decisions so that the Governments affected here may proceed to reappraise their positions and to settle between themselves the nature of their future association. The decision about a new Constitution for Northern Rhodesia is no less urgent. I hope that the Government will invite the parties in Northern Rhodesia to a Conference in London at the earliest possible moment to work out with them a representative Constitution with powers of internal self-government.

May I say a final word, my Lords, about the position in Southern Rhodesia? In Southern Rhodesia there has been a regrettable worsening in race relations. The policy of community development or racial segregation is beginning to take shape. Until now, of course, it happened by custom; at the moment it looks as though it may become enforceable by law. Legislation to provide separate swimming baths and other amenities has been forecast in the Governor's speech. It remains to be seen whether the constitutional safeguards against discriminatory legislation are effective. Mr. Nkomo and several of his colleagues are awaiting trial for offences arising simply and solely from the popular demonstrations that followed their release, and it is not surprising, however regrettable it may be, that disturbances have already broken out in Southern Rhodesia as a result of these arrests.

Worst of all, a mandatory death sentence is to be introduced for offences against property. The Bar Association has protested and public opinion has been deeply stirred. Of course, these are matters for the Southern Rhodesian 1165 Government and we should naturally not dream of trying to interfere, Southern Rhodesia has just as much right as its neighbours have to ultimate dependence. But I hope that we shall make it clear to the Government of Southern Rhodesia that, until it comes to terms with its African inhabitants, we cannot contemplate any demission of our responsibility.

My plea to the Government this afternoon is for an immediate and positive policy, for an end to indecision and drift. The new links between the territories which we hope to see can be forged only between the territorial leaders themselves, but they cannot get together until the Government here have decided to wind up the Federation and accelerate the constitutional advance of Northern Rhodesia. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

§ LORD OGMORE

My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for his Motion and for trying to steer our course through what is becoming more and more a tricky channel. In many ways, of course, this debate is an extension of the debate we held on December 19, also introduced by the noble Earl.

The first point he made was the controversy that there has been, and still is, over the alleged pledge. I fully accept his suggestion that we should not dwell too much on this part of the proceedings, but I feel that we must touch upon it, because it naturally arouses a great deal of feeling, both in Rhodesia and in this country. As your Lordships know, the assertion is made by Sir Roy Welensky—and it was repeated in the debate on December 19 in this House—that pledges were given by Ministers of Her Majesty's Government that no major changes would be made by the British Government, or the British Parliament, without the consent of the four Governments in Central Africa. These major changes were intended to comprise secession and the breaking up of the Federation. Those were the important questions that actuated the minds both of British Ministers and of the Ministers from Rhodesia at that time.

The White Paper, Cmnd. 1948, sets out the British Government's reply. The noble Earl to-day has said that he does 1166 not find it at all convincing—in fact, he used much stronger language that that. Sir Roy Welensky has stigmatised this reply as "an absurdity", and Sir Gilbert Rennie, in his letter in The Times to-day, also rejects it. Personally, I believe that the British Ministers at that time did make a pledge and that they were understood by the Rhodesian Ministers to make a pledge. I do not think that anyone who listened to the debate on December 19 (and I listened very carefully) or who has read the various letters that have appeared in the Press, especially in The Times, since then, can think otherwise. If words still mean anything at all (it is true that in modern diplomacy they are beginning to mean less and less, and that things are said which are intended to be the opposite of what they would appear to mean), there was a pledge.

The first that I knew of this pledge—and I have been closely concerned with this matter of federation since at least 1950—was at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of December 19, and it was a complete surprise to me. I had never heard a word about it before. Therefore it seems to me that the question we have to decide is whether Parliament is bound by any such pledge. I do not believe that this Parliament is bound by it, because we knew nothing whatever about it. It was a secret pledge, arrived at in secrecy; because it was well known at that time that Parliament would never have accepted such a pledge. In fact, the speeches by Ministers in this House and in another place at that time were all against such a pledge as this. We were under the impression that if at any future time there was a strong body of African opinion—or European opinion for that matter, because at that time it was by no means clear that the Europeans in Rhodesia would welcome this Federation—against the continuation of the Federation, then there was nothing in the legislation which would prevent secession from taking place. That is what I understood, and I cannot believe that anybody who heard the debates in both Houses at that time felt to the contrary. Therefore I feel that Parliament is not bound by any secret pledge given at that time, behind the back of Parliament, by people who well knew that they dare not bring it out in public before Parliament, otherwise it would have been 1167 entirely rejected. Having said that, I do not wish to deal further with the past.

Let me deal with the future, because there is one pressing matter with which the Government must deal immediately, and they must not allow any quarrels over the past to interfere with it. While we know that federation is in fact doomed, in spite of Sir Roy Welensky, who will soon be left high and dry with no States at all within the Federation, so far as I can see, it is of first importance that Her Majesty's Government should decide forthwith that there will be a continuing economic organisation to handle the common services of the three territories: posts and telegraphs, airways and railways, the Zambesi Dam and other matters. This is of first importance because credit is now at a standstill so far as the Federation is concerned, and a most serious situation will develop unless Her Majesty's Government jump in at this moment to make it clear that there will be a continuing organisation. So long as they make that understood, the details can be worked out later.

I understand the three territories wish for such a common services organisation. I think that until the details are worked out, the British Government must, if necessary, take over the rights and obligations of the existing Federation for the common services and for the Federal debt. Mr. Winston Field said, in the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia last week, that the two Rhodesias could … stagger on with a deteriorating situation, until the final break-up of the Federation". The alternative, he said, was to make a clean break and open up the way for negotiations on an equal footing as fully independent States, and to attempt to reach agreement for the operation of various common services, with trade and economic agreements, too. I fully subscribe to this statement, which I am sure will have the support of the Governments in the other two territories. I hope that Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the urgency and importance of making such a statement as soon as possible.

The future of these territories politically is very much with us, of course, in view of the impending break-up of the Federation. So far as Nyasaland is con- 1168 cerned, I think that the way is clear. It is unrealistic to suppose that Nyasaland can shoulder its just commitments and liabilities arising from its membership and withdrawal from the Federation"— that is a quotation from a statement made in your Lordships' House on December 19. It will be quite impossible for Nyasaland to shoulder its just commitments and liabilities arising from its membership and withdrawal from the Federation. It has nothing with which to shoulder them. At the moment the territory is quite incapable even of paying its way and meeting its ordinary budget. How on earth this little country, which has hardly any industries and a very difficult agricultural problem, is going to shoulder any obligations which arise from the Federation, I do not understand. In fact, as I say, it is impossible for it to do so. We may as well realise now that it is the British Government, in other words, the British taxpayer, who will have to shoulder these liabilities, and much else. Nyasaland will continue to need a great deal of help in every way after she becomes self-governing.

So far as Northern Rhodesia is concerned, this is the one truly viable territory among the three, and I think the only one which at the moment is able to stand on its own feet, owing to the enormous resources that the territory gets from the Copper Belt. It has an African majority in the Legislative Council, and I feel that we should consent, as it is still a protectorate, to a move towards self-government; and we should also cut out the fancy franchise that it has and go out for universal adult snffrage. Northern Rhodesia needs help of a different kind—or should I say more help of a certain kind—from that required by Nyasaland. It needs technical and managerial assistance. It does not need finance on anything like the scale that Nyasaland does.

With regard to Southern Rhodesia, we have there the new Government of Mr. Winston Field, and an even more fancy franchise than that in Northern Rhodesia. The election was boycotted by the African nationalist parties, and since taking office two months ago Mr. Field's Government has produced legislation imposing the death penalty for a number of offences, increasing maximum 1169 sentences in others and providing for whipping. It also requires any former office bearer of a banned organisation to resign from any other specified organisation. This is surely an impossible way of coming to terms with the African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African People's Union. They are the people who will in future provide the Government of the territory, and now not only are they being banned, but anyone who belonged to them can be required to resign from any other institution. That seems an extraordinary piece of legislation in any country still responsible to the British Crown.

I would suggest that the following action be taken here. I suggest that the British Government should in the near future declare the ending of the Federation. They should take immediate steps to help create a Common Services Organisation, in agreement with the three territories. They should end the fancy franchises in Northern Rhodesia and in Southern Rhodesia, and establish for both territories new Constitions based on universal adult suffrage. They should confirm self-government for Northern and Southern Rhodesia, with Ministry and Legislatures which would undoubtedly be largely African. They should retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defence relating both to Northern Rhodesia and to Southern Rhodesia until they are ready for independence. And after a period of self-government, Britain should grant independence to Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, I hope within the Commonwealth. The three territories are as viable as several of the States which have already achieved independence and a good deal more independent than many of the States which are now members of the United Nations.

I have reason to believe that this sort of policy would appeal to the African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia, who would be willing to extend the hand of friendship to White Rhodesians. I know that they particularly wish to secure the co-operation of the younger White Rhodesians, who I believe will be ready to work with their African compatriots and will not let the dead shadow of their elders blot out the rays of the rising sun. This is, I am convinced, my Lords, the last chance for Rhodesia. With states- 1170 manship, African and European, all will be well. There is a bright future ahead for this part of Africa. I am certain that there is no need for despondency. The younger people will work well together. Let us hope that Rhodesians and the British Government and Parliament will rise up to meet the challenge of the times.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for having introduced this Motion to-day, not only because it gives us this debate but, on personal grounds, particularly because, for reasons with which I think he is familiar, it was quite impossible for me to be present, as I should have wished, on the other occasion. I am glad that the Government have published in full the documents from which quotations have previously been made, although I am bound to say, as a former Commonwealth Secretary, that I hope this will not constitute a precedent, because, if it did, I think a great many intimate discussions between Commonwealth countries might become extremely difficult and much less fruitful than they have been all the time that many of us have been in office.

I think there are really three questions which the House will particularly want to consider to-day. First, is there any convention or pledge which precludes Her Majesty's Government and Parliament from allowing Nyasaland to secede from the Federation? Secondly, are Her Majesty's Government justified legally and on merit, in doing what is proposed? Thirdly—and perhaps this is the most important question, though it has not occupied most of the debate so far—what constructive suggestions can we make in the interests of the territories and of their peoples?

Taking, first of all, the question of convention or pledge, I should like to deal briefly with the suggestion that has been made fairly frequently that there is a convention which affects this. I think any lawyer will agree that, under the Statute of Westminster (which did not make new law, but, as Lord Balfour put it, really stated as law what had been the custom for many years past), the United Kingdom Parliament does not legislate for any Commonwealth country which has attained complete independence—what we should now call an independent 1171 sovereign State—except at the request of the Government of that country. But I think it is perfectly plain that that convention applies only to sovereign States, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is certainly not in any sense a sovereign State. The only convention (if that is the correct term) which can apply in the case of the Rhodesian Federation is the convention that, where powers have been devolved upon the Federal Government and the Federal Legislature, the United Kingdom Governmentment and Parliament would not, in practice, interfere with such matters. But it goes no further than that; and this was indeed clearly and accurately stated in the joint Declaration made by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, who was then Commonwealth Secretary, the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, and Sir Roy Welensky, in 1957. Obviously, the Territorial and Federal Constitutions were not subjects falling within that convention.

I speak only for myself, but I speak now having had the opportunity of refreshing my memory, and I am sure the House will accept my statements because, whatever mistakes I have made, I have been in Parliament for 45 years and the one thing I have never been accused of is trying to mislead the House. Therefore, I am to-day going to tell the House with absolute sincerity what in my opinion—it is a matter of fact—happened regarding the Conference, what I, at any rate, intended by the action which we took, and what I said on that occasion. Of course it is alleged that pledges were given in 1953 which preclude Parliament from legislating to alter the Federal Constitution without the assent of the Federal Government or the Federal Legislature. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, said that he heard of the pledge for the first time on December 19 of last year. I may be wrong in this, and I shall be corrected if I am, but I do not think there was ever anywhere any mention of a pledge or a claim of a pledge, either here or in Rhodesia, until 1962. If such a pledge had been given or intended, it would surely have been inserted in the Federal Constitution.

Was such a pledge in fact given? As I say, I speak for myself, and so far as I am concerned I certainly gave no such pledge. I think it is very important to 1172 distinguish and separate two matters which are indeed wholly distinct and separate: first, was any pledge given to limit or fetter the power of Parliament and, secondly, what were the hopes and intentions of us in the Conference—and, I am sure, of the whole Government in 1953—for federation to endure and prosper? On the first point, that of the pledge, I think it is important to remember what we were discussing in the passages which were quoted. I am absolutely clear about this, and I think my colleagues of 1953 would agree with me. We were not discussing the power of the United Kingdom Parliament, but how the Review clause in the Federal Constitution should be phrased and what it meant. But, even so, far from giving any pledge, made it quite clear that nothing could fetter the power of Parliament.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has quoted words which were spoken colloquially, as one often does speak colloquially, in these conferences; indeed, they would be quite intolerable if one could not be a little colloquial at times, and one certainly does not guard one's language as one would when speaking in this House. Therefore, I perhaps owe an apology to Parliament for saying that, while Parliament can legislate to do anything—Parliament could legislate to-morrow to undo the Federation or to undo the Rhodesian Constitution—you cannot legislate against (and I apologise for the language) Parliament's going off its head. I was trying to make the point that the British Government and Parliament so long as the Government of that time remained in power, would certainly not exercise their powers irresponsibly. By that I meant that they would not do so to defeat, hinder or hamper in any way the Federation which we were setting up.

I say at once—and I make no apology to the House; I think I made it plain, and I am sure my noble friend Lord Chandos did so when he was piloting the Bill through another place—that I made it absolutely plain that we were determined that the Federation should continue and succeed. For my part, I certainly would never have agreed, so long as I was a member of the Government, to the dissolution of the Federation if it had gone forward in the way which we all hoped and intended. That is certainly not a pledge to surrender or fetter 1173 the power of Parliament. Indeed, Mr. Greenfield, who is now a Minister in the Federation, and who was then one of the delegates for Rhodesia—really underlined the same point, equally colloquially. He said: The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. There certainly was not a pledge limiting the power of Parliament, and if there had been I am quite sure that my colleagues and I, and the Government, would have made that plain to Parliament and put it into the Constitution. There was really nothing secret about this.

There has been quoted to-day an extract of a letter which appeared in The Times last Saturday from Mr. Robinson, who is the High Commissioner for the Federation. He quoted the letter referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, addressed to the British Council of Churches. He said he wondered who was responsible for that interesting letter. I can relieve him. I have made it my business to check this morning who was responsible for that letter, and I find I was responsible. I caused it to be written and probably I wrote a good deal of it myself. I think it is a very good letter. Let me point out not only that there was no secrecy about this, but how clearly it supports the argument. I will not read it all. What I said in this letter was this: The United Kingdom Parliament would not be precluded by law from amending the Federal Constitution without the consent of the Federal or Territorial Governments"— those, of course, were the four Governments concerned and referred to— but as the Constitution will be based on a scheme which has been agreed between the four Governments concerned and will itself be so agreed"— these are the important words— it seems to Her Majesty's Government that it would in any foreseeable circumstance"— and I am bound to say that nobody then could foresee the circumstances which exist at the present time— be morally and politically indefensible for Parliament to enact amendments which had not been similarly agreed. So much for this pledge.

Let me come to what were our hopes and intentions; and here, as I have said, I do not think there was anything the least secret. Our intention was as 1174 plainly stated in both Houses of Parliament as in the Conference. Of course we intended that the Federation should succeed and endure. We discussed in Conference whether the Constitution should contain an explicit power for secession. We were all opposed to this.

Sir Roy Welensky has quoted a passage from a speech of mine at the Conference, in which I said that it would be quite wrong to put such a clause in and that there was no Federal Constitution that we are aware of, in the Empire or outside it, which contained such a secession clause. I went on, as your Lordships will see, to point out, in a passage which Sir Roy did not quote, that it would be rather as if, when conducting a marriage service, the minister, having united the couple, wished them well and hoped the union would succeed, then went on to draw their attention most actively to all the facilities for divorce which would be open to them. That was rather a relevant passage and showed that it was perfectly clear that the possibility would be there. I then went on to say, and I certainly stand by it, that of course the Federation must be made to succeed; of course we ought not to have a secession clause in the Constitution itself, inviting any one of the countries to secede from the Federation, because they would not be able to raise any money on the market if they did. I stand by every word of that.

May I add this, on this question of a pledge or undertaking?: that I think the Declaration of 1957 is very relevant. Observe, my Lords, that this was four years later. That was a Declaration made by Lord Home, who was then the Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Boyd of Merton, who was Colonial Secretary, and Sir Roy Welensky, who was the Prime Minister of the Federation. It turned on what were the powers of the Federal Constitution which it had been alleged could be altered without any reference. What the Declaration stated was that, in regard to the convention to which I have already referred, on matters delegated to the Federal Government and the Federal Legislature, the Government and Parliament in this country would not intervene without their request. It then went on to say that it had every hope that the Federation would go on and succeed. That was important at the 1175 time, because it was just about then that the Monckton Commission had either been appointed or was just about to be appointed. But if there had been a pledge to the effect that the Federation could not be touched or altered unless the Federal Government or Parliament agreed to it, surely Sir Roy Welensky would have insisted on having that declaration inserted at that time; and of course no such declaration was made. There is, therefore, I think, no question of a pledge. There was not, other than to accept the pledge or the convention to which I have referred. In fact the Declaration of 1957 really reaffirmed entirely the position of 1953.

To me, and, I am sure, to my colleagues in 1953, the outcome to-day is a sad disappointment. We believed firmly and passionately in federation. We were sure that it would bring great economic benefits, as indeed it has, to all the territories. But, still more, we believed and hoped that federation would create a living, growing, inter-racial partnership. It was a great conception, which I trust may in some way still become a reality. But the fruition of that hope depended on and assumed a steady progress in African partnership and participation. In Southern Rhodesia Sir Edgar Whitehead strove to achieve this and there was real progress. I regret profoundly that he has been defeated. I regret to say it, but I feel I must, that the pace of partnership was quite different in the Federation. It is quite true, and great credit to them for it, that the Federal Government have achieved a great deal on the economic side and they have spent a great deal of money on African services, especially in Nyasaland; but politically and socially the pace has been disappointing. There is one notable exception—the inter-racial university in Salisbury, strongly backed by the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, and owing a very great deal, I know, to Sir Edgar Whitehead, whose work it was after his eyes had given way.

The outcome in all the areas is very different, alas!, from what we had hoped, and we have to face the position as it is to-day. We have the Report of the Monckton Commission, which strongly supported federation. In fact, it says that it would be disastrous if it came to an end, but that there would have to be great changes. Now, there have been 1176 elections in all the three territories, and let us face the simple fact that all three are opposed to federation, at any rate in anything like its present form. It really is idle and unrealistic to say that however much conditions change one must be bound by one's previously-expressed intentions.

I have said, and I hope I have shown, that there was not a commitment or agreement or pledge in the sense that Sir Roy Welensky has claimed; but, even if there had been, there is such a thing as supervenient impossibility, and it would be quite impossible to go on with the Federation to-day. The simple fact is that three of the partners—in fact all three, the three territories—will not play on the old terms. It follows, therefore, from what I have said, that in my opinion Her Majesty's Government are not only not inhibited from acting but were bound to act. I must at the same time say I agree with my noble friend Lord Chandos, as I so often have agreed with him, that it was unfortunate that the First Secretary was not able to meet the four Governments and discuss the matter with them before an announcement was made.

I pass, therefore, rapidly and briefly, to my third point: where do we go from here? I think everyone agrees that the economic benefits of federation have been outstanding, and could not have been achieved in any other way. An enterprise like Kariba must be maintained and developed in the interests of all the territories. There is the whole field of communications, to which the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, referred—railways, airways, roads, posts and telegraphs—and these surely ought to be unified services. And can anybody doubt that a customs union would not only be a common interest but a common necessity?

These are common interests, common services that spring to mind at once; but there must be a good many Federal services, Federal activities, which it would be uneconomic and wasteful to split where uniformity is clearly in the common interest. There are for example, matters like commercial treaties, the regulation of imports, banking, company law, agricultural research—I daresay there are a number of others. It will take a great deal of leadership and 1177 guidance, and, where necessary, direction from the First Secretary to achieve this. But I think he is wise and objective and impartial, and I believe he has already won a large measure of confidence in Africa. If representatives of all the Governments can work with him on what these services should be and how they should be run, much may yet be saved and developed; and it may be that, working together, a new unity will be developed and grow. At any rate, I am sure of this: that, however much we may disagree on some matters, all our good wishes will go to the First Secretary to-day, and not only our good wishes but the determination of all of us to help him in his difficult tasks in any way we can.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, it is, I think, perhaps natural, in view of the urgency of this topic and the importance of the issues involved, that the Opposition should have asked for a debate on the situation in the Central African Federation as soon as possible after Mr. Butler's return, with a view to finding out what developments there have been as a result of his visit to the Federation and the discussions which he has had with the leaders, Federal and territorial leaders, while he was there. I wonder, all the same, with all deference to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, whether this debate is still not rather premature; for the impression one gains from the Press is that nothing very much has yet happened and that there are no developments of any real substance to report.

I do not think that anybody doubts Mr. Butler's good will and courage in taking on, with great public spirit, the most invidious task of trying to find some solution for the appalling mess which has been bequeathed to him by some of his predecessors. But he seems to have gone to the Federation without any very definite plans for the future, for the consideration of the political leaders whom he had to meet out there, and to have come back without any very tangible results. He has indicated, indeed, that he has brought back from his travels what may prove to be the germs of constructive ideas, and I think we shall all agree that that is very good news. But he has not, so far as I know, 1178 yet divulged what these are. He certainly did not do so in his statement in another place on February 7, and perhaps he was wise, at this particular stage, not to rush in with public statements before he was ready.

I have seen suggestions in various quarters—and I suppose that other noble Lords have done, too—of some sort of arrangement under which the Federation as a political entity would cease to exist, but under which there should remain what is always vaguely and rather agreeably described as a "loose economic link". This I take to mean, in plain words, that the two Northern territories should be given complete political independence, but that what remains of the Federal Government—or some other as yet unspecified, central organisation—should be devised for the purpose of bridging the inevitable gap between the meagre revenues which Nyasaland herself produces and the steadily rising costs of administering the country at its present level, bearing in mind, of course, as a principle aim the need to ensure (this is as I understand the proposal) that the sums required, which may be considerable, should not in any circumstances become a burden upon the taxpayer of this country.

It is proposals of this sort that I have heard put forward, and no doubt they are all extremely ingenious. But to me they all have one fatal blemish: that they begin with a complete divorce between responsibility for policy and responsibility for providing the financial resources with which policy is to be carried out. And this, surely, sooner or later, will lead to a row. A central body which is responsible for the provision of funds will almost certainly, sooner or later, find itself in the unhappy position of having to fork out large sums of money to finance policies to which it is fundamentally opposed, or, at any rate, of which it is profoundly sceptical; and at once a deadlock will occur, and the Constitution will begin to break down.

I suggest, therefore, that the Government must face the fact that, once they have agreed that Nyasaland should be allowed to secede (and I think there is no undoing that), and now that it is becoming again an independent State, either her standard of living must fall, if not to 1179 where it was before, at any rate a good deal below where it is now, or Her Majesty's Government will have to be prepared to foot the bill: the bill for the Civil Service; the bill for some, at any rate, of the spending departments, and possibly accept some responsibility for the future of the Federal National Debt. I do not see how the Rhodesias can be asked to pay for an imbroglio which is not of their own creation. This, I am afraid, involves me inevitably in further references to the events of 1953 and the White Paper of last week. I am afraid that that, in its turn, means that I shall have to cover a certain amount of ground which has already been traversed by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and others. But perhaps it may be from a somewhat different angle.

My Lords, there was a time, in 1952 and 1953, when others outside Nyasaland would have been quite glad to have a right of secession written into the Federal Constitution—notably Southern Rhodesia. But it was made abundantly clear by Her Majesty's Government, in the talks that preceded federation, that they would be strongly opposed to that. We know from the White Paper that was published last week that the Government now maintain that they made no binding declarations of broad policy against the principle of unilateral secession at that time. The White Paper makes what I personally regard as a rather unworthy point: that whether or not statements of Government policy were made—and I think it is difficult to deny that—yet, because they do not appear in any published document, they cannot be regarded as binding. Actually—and here I differ a little from my noble friend Lord Swinton—I do not think it is so surprising that the Rhodesians should not have insisted on a specific provision against unilateral secession being inserted into the Constitution. One must remember that their situation at that time was, in one respect, quite different from what it is now. The Rhodesians—I say this with no desire to offend, but as a straight statement of fact—at that time still had absolute faith in the good word of Her Majesty's Government.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, would my noble friend allow me? Perhaps I did not make myself clear. I did 1180 not say "against unilateral secession". I said that if there had been a pledge that the United Kingdom Parliament could not act without the permission of the Federal Government, then that would certainly have gone in the Act.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Then we are not at great difference from each other. They had heard British Ministers say that they were strongly opposed to unilateral secession, and these were down in black and white as saying so in the Minutes of Conference. It never occurred to the Rhodesians that what had been said was not binding. They would not have understood the rather strange differentiation between "public" and "private "declarations of policy to which the White Paper of last week apparently attaches so much importance.

I know Her Majesty's Government do not share my views on this subject. Their contention apparently is that the question of secession cropped up only once in the 1953 talks, when it was raised, I think, by Mr. Eastwood, a member of the Southern Rhodesian Delegation (I think I can say this without breach of confidence because it is in the White Paper) on January 18, and then only in relation to a proposed review of the Constitution of the Federation after seven to nine years; and they argue that any view which was expressed by Her Majesty's Government on the subject of secession must be looked at in that limited context and that alone, and that it had no wider significance at all. In support of this view they rely greatly on the Minutes of the Meeting of January 18, 1953, from which they quote fairly copiously. They describe this—I use their own words—as "the basic document", and they deduce from it that if Her Majesty's Government were bound at all, they were bound only within these narrow limits.

But I think that if they had pursued their researches rather further back they would have come to quite a different conclusion. They would have found that in the 1952 talks—and, after all, as my noble friend Lord Swinton will agree, the 1953 talks were really only a continuation of the 1952 talks, largely with the same delegates (I can give the date, if the Government would like me to do so, but I do not wish to be guilty 1181 of a breach of confidence), the whole broad question of unilateral secession was examined, with no reference to any Review Conference at all. The idea of that had never occurred to anyone at the time. The Conference was concerned just with the broad general principle, and there was a discussion on that subject. I think I ought to know something about this because, if I remember aright, I was in the Chair at that particular meeting.

In the course of that discussion, reasons were given by certain delegates from Southern Rhodesia why they thought it desirable that provision should be made in the draft Federal scheme to permit the members of the Federation to secede from it if they wished. But they got no real support from any quarter. Speaker after speaker in effect said that to insert such a provision as that would be to destroy all confidence in the Federation and, as it were, strangle it at birth. Eventually an appeal had to be made to the delegation in question to withdraw their proposal, and they agreed to do so. That, surely, and the equally firm statement which was made by the British delegate at the beginning of the 1953 talks, ought, if any, to be regarded as the basic documents.

It is perfectly true that Mr. Eastwood reverted to the subject yet once more on January 18, on the limited question of the purview, the ambit, of the Review of the Constitution. He had accepted the view of the Conference a year before, that to insert a provision for unilateral secession in the Constitution itself might well impair the credit and stability of the new Federation. But, he said, would not to allow unilateral secession to come within the purview of a Review Conference after seven to nine years have just the same bad effect in weakening the credit and stability of the Federation? The Conference discussed the point fully, as will be seen from paragraph 6 of the White Paper, but they decided that there was no necessity to modify the existing wording, on the general grounds that there could be no amendment of the Constitution unless all four Governments agreed—and that would, as I understand it, include the Federal Government also. The wording was therefore left as it was; but clearly there was no weakening of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government, or indeed of any of the other Governments represented at the Conference. They were all 1182 against unilateral secession by any of the member States as a general principle, and not one arising merely from the Constitutional Review. The discussions of January 18 to which such prominence is given in the White Paper, did not in fact therefore modify in any way the general decision that had been reached in the 1952 talks and at the beginning of the 1953 talks.

If I am told that all these assurances were given in private and therefore were not valid—and I say this, I think, to Lord Ogmore in particular, who said that they should not bind Parliament—I would refer him and other noble Lords to statements which were made by the then Colonial Secretary, my noble friend Lord Chandos on the Committee stage of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Bill in the House of Commons on June 24, 1953—and that is not a confidential document. I quote his words, if he will allow me to do so in his presence. This is what he said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 516, col. 1973]: It all comes back to whether there is a right of secession under the present scheme. My advice is that there is not". And he repeated this at a later stage on the same day, when he said [col. 1974]: There is no right of secession under the scheme. Indeed, if there were, I think it would be thoroughly retrograde… Why do not the Government quote those passages? Are not those basic statements? I should have thought they were.

In the light of the facts which I have tried to expose to-day, my Lords, how is it possible for the Government to maintain that the debate on January 18 and the limited issues which were discussed there were anything more than, if I may use a Parliamentary expression, consequential on earlier decisions which had been taken in 1952 and at the beginning of 1953? To call the discussions of January 18 "basic" seems to me, if I may be forgiven such a colloquialism, to be mere bunkum.

I may be told that all this is beating the air: for, from the strictly legal point of view, Her Majesty's Government, it may be pointed out—I think it is one of the points made in the White Paper—have legally a perfect right to do what they like about Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This is a point which my noble friend Lord Swinton went into in 1183 some detail. My answer to such a contention would be that that may well be true from the purely legal point of view, but, to my mind, it is entirely irrelevant. The point, surely, is not whether the United Kingdom Government could do what they have done. The point is that they said they would not do it, and yet they have done it. Whether you call that a pledge or not, I really do not know,, but there is no doubt that the United Kingdom Ministers did make unequivocal statements which influenced the other Governments to join in the Federation. That is the gravamen, and the only gravamen, of the charge against them.

My Lords, I fully recognise that the truth about this business may possibly be that the Government—who, like all Governments, have a great deal on their minds—may have forgotten how definitely Ministers had committed themselves in 1953 against unilateral secession when they gave what appear to have been conflicting pledges to Dr. Banda last year. That is quite understandable, even if unfortunate. But, if that be the case, surely it would have been better to say it frankly and to call together a conference of all concerned to try and wrestle things out. That, in my view, would not have been contrary to what had been decided in 1953. For I do not hold, any more than the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, or the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, that what was decided at that time meant that each of the five Governments concerned had an absolutely permanent veto—what I would call a "Medes and Persians" veto—against change of any kind, for ever and ever and ever. One cannot put political change in such a straitjacket as that.

It was always envisaged, I think (and if the Government like to look, they will see that references to this possible situation, even at that time, can be found), that, in spite of all our endeavours, the Federation in fact might run into very rough weather indeed. Then there would have had to be joint consultation on the new situation which had been created. But what was never envisaged, my Lords, was that Her Majesty's Government, after all they said, would themselves, without any prior consultation with the other signatories, announce unilaterally the secession of one of the members—that, 1184 in fact, the gamekeeper should become the poacher on such a very large scale. No one expected that, and I am afraid that many of us must regard it as a grievous blot on our escutcheon. In fact, the impression given—as one can see from the Press—by all this shifting and shuffling, these attempts to defend the indefensible, to conceal what ought not to have been concealed, have been so damaging, I think, to the good name of the Government and of the country that one would have thought the Prime Minister himself would do all in his power to prevent it.

However, over this particular issue the harm has been done, and perhaps it is better that the full facts should come out now, however late, than never. It is better that the people of this country should know what was actually said by British Ministers in 1953 than that matters so vital to the cause of our fellow countrymen in Rhodesia should be concealed from their knowledge in confidential minutes. But, my Lords, however that may be, there is one thing I would put forward most earnestly, and especially to the Prime Minister and Mr. Butler, who were themselves fairly senior members of the Government back in 1953. The Federal Government, having already been victims of what they regard, not without reason, as a breach of faith should not be asked to have unloaded on them the more unpleasant results of that breach. Her Majesty's Government, having allowed Nyasaland unilaterally to secede, must be prepared to foot the bill—unless, of course, they can find a way out of the difficulties that is freely acceptable not only to Nyasaland herself, and to Northern Rhodesia, but to Southern Rhodesia and the Federal Government as well.

My Lords, I should like to turn for one moment, very briefly, to the question of Northern Rhodesia. What do the Government propose to do about that? Having, as many of us may feel, broken faith over Nyasaland, can they find any good reason (I think I asked this question in our last debate on this matter, in December) for adopting a different line over Northern Rhodesia? Having got on this slippery slope, can they pull up anywhere? And what, in particular, do they feel about the Copper Belt? The Copper Belt can in no way—neither in its conception, nor in the money that has been 1185 invested there, nor in its value to the world, nor in any way, except in respect of labour actually being used for its construction and use (I do not think we ought to ignore the importance of that element, because it is very important)—can in no way, I repeat, be regarded as the creation of the African. It is purely the creation of the white man. It is the white man who provided the brains; it is the white man who provided the money to build up these vast enterprises in the wilds of Africa, from which the Africans themselves have so greatly benefited. Are the Government going to take that into account at all in reaching their decision over Northern Rhodesia? Or are they just going to walk out, without any safeguards, and leave it to its fate?

I am not going to ask for an answer to that question this afternoon. I do not believe that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who is to reply, could possibly give the answer at this time. But it is probably the most agonising question that Mr. Butler and the Government have to decide, the one most likely to give them sleepless nights. For on the decision of the Government on this particular point must depend not only the future of Northern Rhodesia and the great copper industry there, but the very existence of the Federation itself, and, maybe, the whole future of the white man in Central Africa.

I feel that it is a matter which must be giving Mr. Kaunda, too, furiously to think. There are so many respects, as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, knows, in which Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia are, one might say, indissolubly linked: the railways, the Kariba project, the trade that passes to and fro across their borders. We have seen the declarations of Mr. Kaunda and Mr. Winston Field that they, in effect, regard the Federation as at an end. To me personally, and I am sure to many of your Lordships, that would be a very real tragedy. The creation of a great State in the very middle of Africa, as big as the Union and actuated by British ideas, was one of the great imaginative conceptions of the twentieth century. If it dies before it reaches maturity, the world, I believe, will be very much the poorer.

But, my Lords, even should it die, in its present form, something, I am sure, as between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, 1186 must be found to take its place. It will be a task of the highest statesmanship on the part of Mr. Butler, Sir Roy Welensky, Mr. Winston Field and Mr. Kaunda—and here I warmly agree with what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel—to find that thing; and it will be very greatly to the interest of Northern Rhodesia, just as much as to Southern Rhodesia, that it should be found. But I am certain that the search must be started here, by Her Majesty's Government in this country; and that efforts to find a basis must begin at once. It is a matter of the very greatest urgency. Time must not be allowed to slide away, otherwise we shall only see happening again what has so often happened before, and the one precious moment when agreement could have been reached will be irretrievably lost.

I know that there are those who feel it would be better to break all the links now, and then start again to forge new ones. I am not sure that Mr. Winston Field himself did not say something of the kind. But, if I may say so with very great deference, while breaking old links may not be easy, joining them together again is infinitely more difficult still. There are all the barriers of national pride and national prejudice which stand in the way. Better far than that, I submit, will be to preserve whatever links remain; and to try to find ways and means of strengthening them and broadening them. That is no doubt a task to which Mr. Butler's working committees will be applied. But I beg of him—and here again I agree most strongly with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel—do not let them be too long about it for too long in this case, I firmly believe, will be too late.

§ VISCOUNT CHANDOS

My Lords, I fear I must trespass for a few moments upon your Lordships' indulgence. Since our last debate I have had the opportunity of studying the Government White Paper and also of making a closer study of the transcript of the conversations in which I took part at the time. More of this transcript has been available since our last debate. My noble friend Lord Boyd of Merton is unfortunately prevented from being here this afternoon, but I have given him the gist of what I propose to say, and I have his authority to tell your 1187 Lordships that he agrees with the gist; although he must not, of course, be committed to any infelicities of language of which I might be guilty.

I believe the claim advanced by Sir Roy Welensky that Her Majesty's Government were pledged—and that is the operative word—not to legislate for Central African Federation matters save with the agreement of the other four Governments goes too far. Such a pledge, as the White Paper shows in paragraph 9, would have given not to one Government only, but to any of the four Governments, a perpetual veto upon the actions of Her Majesty's Government. Such a pledge could not be, and, in fact, was not given. I might at this point say that what we were thinking about at the time was a Federation, and there is no secret in saying that, when we said a Federation, we meant a Federation.

May I, for one moment, turn aside to try to answer—which I cannot do properly—a point made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in opening the debate? He asked me whether in the conversation ten years ago I referred to four Governments, meaning, the four existing Governments, or Her Majesty's Government and three others. I can only say with Mr. Disraeli that, just as travellers remember more than they have seen or see more than they remember, so I really cannot give an answer. I cannot remember. I do not want to be put down as one who has remembered more than he has seen. Having said that, may I say that I regard Sir Roy Welensky as entitled to feel aggrieved and injured, and even enraged. Speaking once again from memory, and my noble friends will confirm this, I think no hint was ever dropped at the Conference that the British Government would themselves dream of breaking up the Federation. Nothing could have been further from our thoughts.

All our preoccupations at that time were centred upon preventing one of the three Provincial Governments from having the right to secede without the consent of the other two and of the Federal Government itself. Everything we said, in public or in private, at the Conference seems to bear this out. In fact, so far were we from expecting action against the Federation to be 1188 taken here, that at the time we regarded Her Majesty's Government in this country as the cement to bind together the emerging Federation. We never dreamt that Her Majesty's Government would turn out to be the gelignite to blow it up. Sir Roy was left in the lurch, my Lords, by an act of policy, and not by the breaking of a legal pledge; and I think Sir Gilbert Rennie in his letter to The Times bears out what I have said.

I find all this very distressing, because there seems to have been an obvious course that Her Majesty's Government could have steered in these matters—steered before any act of secession was in fact taken. That course was to have called a Conference of the five Governments concerned—the Federal Government, Her Majesty's Government and the three Provincial Governments. There are reasons for supposing that the Rhodesias would have consented to the secession of Nyasaland, and, even if the Federal Government had sought or demanded guarantees which could not have been given, at least the whole subject could have been discussed with sobriety. For example, the very real difficulties concerning the Federal debt, to which some noble Lords have referred, and that part of it incurred for the benefit of Nyasaland, could have been resolved, as could many other questions besides. I think that Sir Roy Welensky would have helped at that Conference. It is quite ridiculous to regard him as a firebrand; he is a very far-sighted man. If that Conference had been called, and if the Federation had had to be buried, it at least would have had a decent funeral without the mourners being seen squabbling around the grave as they now are. Whether these hopes would have been dashed or realised is, of course, mere conjecture. The act of secession has now been taken, and it appears futile to rake over the embers of the past. Rather we must turn our eyes to the future.

No student of African affairs, I believe, would deny the very solid, indeed massive, advantages that the three States of the Federation have gained during its life; and none as much as Nyasaland, the poorest of the three, and the one most in need of the help, the money, the credit and the skills of the Federal Government. Under the Federation the advances in 1189 industry, agriculture, power generation and education have been truly striking. It is therefore our duty to see whether any new association can be built upon the ruins of the old. I should not despair of success. Whether our hopes or our fears are dominant, another attempt must be made if the damage to our conscience is to be repaired. No one wishes Mr. Butler or Her Majesty's Government success in the future more fervently than I do.

§ LORD WALSTON

My Lords, we have been treated already, in the excellent, interesting speeches we have had, to various quotations from The Times newspaper, and I myself may make use of some of them in some later remarks; but I should like to descend for a moment from the lofty pinnacles of the Establishment newspaper to the editorial of one which speaks very often with a similar voice though in different language, and to remind your Lordships of an editorial to-day in the Daily Mirror, in which it refers to the recent Conference this weekend of the Young Conservatives, at which various of Her Majesty's Ministers made pronouncements. In particular, it quotes Mr. Henry Brooke, the Home Secretary, as telling the young Conservatives that what were needed most at the present time were three things—humanity, vitality and sincerity. I think it is worth looking to see how our actions, how Her Majesty's Government's actions in Central Africa, have in fact measured up to these virtues of humanity, vitality and sincerity. Because we all remember well the remarks—and we remember many of them—of the noble and learned Viscount who leads the House, that it is no good trying to lead this country with pious platitudes (I hope I am not misquoting him) but that we need to put those qualities into effect.

Let us first of all look at vitality. Have we seen very much vitality in our actions in Central Africa in the last years? The main complaint of practically every one of your Lordships who has spoken to-day, apart from this question of pledges, has been the dilatoriness, the slowness of action and the need for action at the present time, and the disastrous effect upon the economy of those three territories if things are allowed to drift as they are drifting at the moment. There, my Lords, is a clear example of lack of 1190 vitality, lack of energy. The result is not simply that things go on drifting in present circumstances, nothing getting better, nothing getting worse: the result is that things definitely become worse at an ever-increasing pace. We know that the Federation as a whole, and Southern Rhodesia in particular, is suffering to-day from a lack of investment, from a lack of confidence and even from a withdrawal of existing investments. The result of that can mean only an arresting of the standard of living, which should be rising; and the result of the failure of the standard of living to rise can mean only further discontent, further political unrest and a further desire to change Governments by whatever means are in the power of the people. So, my Lords, I think that we must regretfully agree that, at least so far as vitality is concerned, the present Government have failed signally to show this quality in their dealings with Central Africa.

Now let us have a look at sincerity. We have heard a great deal about that, my Lords, from many speakers to-day—speakers who have had a very intimate knowledge of what has been going on during the past years. I approach this matter, perhaps, from a somewhat different angle from that from which many other noble Lords who have spoken approach it. I am possibly somewhat split in my prejudices—and I think we must all admit that we have prejudices in anything of this kind. On the one side, I cannot deny the fact that it is rather an entertaining and pleasing situation to be in, to find Her Majesty's Government being strenuously attacked, with knowledge and experience, as well as force, by many of those who normally support them. There is some enjoyment in that, but that enjoyment is tempered, as it must be, very severely by the unhappiness at realising that not only Her Majesty's Government but this country as a whole is now being looked on by the outside world—and the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, when we discussed this question before Christmas, made this clear—as a country whose word cannot be trusted. That, my Lords, is something which, on whatever side of the House one sits, whatever one's political views, one cannot listen to happily with detachment or with pleasure.

Thirdly, the difficulty which arises, certainly in the case of my noble friends 1191 on this side, is that the action of Her Majesty's Government in breaking up the Federation is something we consider right, something which should be done. So we cannot criticise the Government for doing that. But I feel very strongly that there are ample grounds for criticism of the way in which this has been done. We have listened to-day; we have listened before; we have read and studied the White Paper, and we have read the articles, the leaders and the letters in newspapers. Whatever conclusion one eventually comes to, whether one comes to the conclusion that the case is not proven or whether one comes to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Government gave no pledges at all, I believe that one cannot escape the conclusion that the impression given to the other signatories of the original Agreement—to the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, Sir Roy Welensky and the others—and the impression intended to be given at least by some of Her Majesty's Ministers who signed that Agreement, was that the Federation should not be broken up—certainly not if it were humanly possible to avoid it—by any act of Her Majesty's Government themselves. Therefore, my Lords, without attempting to enter into any of the legal niceties, without attempting to defend on legalistic grounds, there Is surely a very serious charge that can lie against the Government in respect of the way they have handled this matter.

In his speech the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, referred to a letter which had been quoted in another letter to The Times, and which he himself admitted having written—he made no bones about it. The words, as I wrote them down, were these: that …it would in any foreseeable circumstance be morally and politically indefensible for Parliament to break up the Federation. My Lords, "in any foreseeable circumstances". The noble Earl himself said, "But, of course, the circumstances which have now arisen were unforeseeable". That, my Lords, surely, needs a little more thought. It cannot be lightly dismissed. I would produce only one piece of evidence, but I think it is an important piece of evidence. It comes from the Report of the Monckton Commission, which, as your Lordships will remember, was set up only some six years after the Federation itself 1192 was started. On page 16 of the Report, right at the beginning of paragraph 27, appear these words: The dislike of Federation among Africans in the two Northern Territories is widespread, sincere, and of long standing. It is almost pathological". My Lords, if the Monckton Commission was able to discover, only six or seven years after the setting up of the Federation, that dislike among the vast majority of people in two of the three countries concerned was not only widespread, sincere and pathological but also of long standing, surely no responsible member of Her Majesty's Government in 1953 could possibly say to-day, or at any time, that the conceivable break-up of the Federation was unforeseeable.

So, my Lords, I would suggest that, at the worst, on this ground the Government stand convicted of a breach of faith, and at the best they stand convicted of a highly reprehensible lack of foresight. Better Governments than this one have resigned for less serious reasons than either a breach of faith or lack of foresight in a matter of such great importance. It is too much to expect that Her Majesty's Government will try to retrieve their reputation by taking that honourable course. We can only console ourselves with the knowledge that they have not many more months or years to run.

Now let me turn to the third of these characteristics, these virtues, which Mr. Henry Brooke told his Young Conservative audience they should practise—that is, humanity. How are we putting into effect, in the territories that were formerly the Federation, this belief in humanity? How are we fulfilling our responsibilities as the Power who has the final say in what should go on in these places? My Lords, in the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, now some two years old, there is a Declaration of Rights. That is an admirable document which goes a long way—indeed, I would say all the way—to ensuring that humanity is in fact practised, at least in Southern Rhodesia. If I may, I will read two small extracts from this Declaration of Rights: Whereas it is desirable to ensure that every person in Southern Rhodesia enjoys the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed … to each and all of the following, … life, liberty, … the enjoyment of property 1193 and the protection of the law; freedom of conscience, of expression, and of assembly and association, … and so on. That spells out very clearly indeed what is being attempted.

Then on a later page, in paragraph 11, under "Protection from discrimination by written laws", it is enacted that: (1) No written law shall contain any discriminatory provisions. (2) For the purposes of this section a provision shall be regarded as discriminatory if by or as an inevitable consequence of that provision, Persons of a particular description by race, tribe, colour or creed are prejudiced—

1. (a) by being subject to a condition, restriction or disability to which persons of another such description are riot made subject; or
2. (b) by the according to persons of another such description of a privilege or advantage which is not accorded to persons of the first-mentioned description, and the imposition of that condition, restriction or disability or the according of that privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable to the description by race, tribe, colour or creed of the persons concerned."

Those are admirable sentiments with which I am sure all your Lordships would entirely agree. But, in spite of that, your Lordships will remember that in Southern Rhodesia to-day the Land Apportionment Act quite specifically and deliberately enacts that certain areas of the territory shall be reserved solely for people of a certain race, tribe or colour and shall be prohibited to people of different races, tribes or colours.

I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is not on the Woolsack, because should have been happy if he could have explained in his reply how the provisions in the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia in the Bill of Rights, are reconciled with the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act—an Act which, had the previous Government won the elections, I understand would have been repealed but which the present Prime Minister has expressly determined will not be repealed. I do not want to appear to be misrepresenting the Land Apportionment Act. In its original intention it was admirable. It was correct in the early days of the Colony, and even before that, to make certain enactments to protect the native tribes of those areas from victimisation, encroachment and swindling by Europeans or Asians and people from outside that particular area. That was the intention of the forerunner of the Land Apportionment Act. But as time has gone on it has changed very significantly, so 1194 that we come to a state of affairs where the approximately quarter of a million Europeans in Africa now own, or are entitled to own, approximately 50 per cent. of the total land of Southern Rhodesia, and the 2¾ million Africans—ten times as many as the Europeans—have somewhat less than the other 50 per cent.

My Lords, that is hardly consistent with the original intentions of the Act and hardly likely to lead to a feeling of good will, happiness and co-operation between the Africans and the Europeans; because we must remember that, particularly in countries such as those one finds in Central Africa, the ownership of land is of enormous and overriding importance. It is not only actual wealth but the symbol of wealth at the same time. To my mind, there is something even worse than that now taking place in Southern Rhodesia, which is still, although self-governing, a Colony. I am quoting from The Times of February 13. The Governor, in his speech from the Throne, said that the policies of the Government aimed: to allow each racial community and in rural areas each tribal community to develop within its own area in its own way at a speed largely governed by its own initiative. That, at first sight, may sound admirable, liberal, freedom-loving and all the rest, but if we look at it a little more carefully what, in fact, it means is that the tribal and racial distinctions in Southern Rhodesia will be perpetuated, if these desires bear any fruition at all. Certain tribes, certain sections of society and certain communities, by reason of their own ability and their own effort, will rise fast; others, because they have less of either the natural or the acquired advantages, will remain at their present low level. That cannot be good for any country.

We are worried enough in this country when we have the threat of "Two Nations"—the North-East, the depressed, and the somewhat more prosperous South and South-East. We are giving great thought how to equalise that. We do not take the line that it is right that the communities of Jarrow and Tyneside should reach only such economic prosperity as they may be able to reach by their own efforts and that the economic communities of London and areas to the South of London should also be left free. We 1195 believe we are one country. We believe the welfare and the unhappiness and hardships of all sections of people throughout the whole country are the responsibility of the rest of the country. Surely, my Lords, we must hope that in Southern Rhodesia the same attitude will prevail and that there will not be a perpetuation of this division of the country—not only into whites and blacks, into European, Africans and Asiatics, but into the different tribes which, as we have already seen in Kenya, leads to so much trouble.

I turn aside from that and return once more to this overriding question of racial discrimination as it exists to-day but as it should not exist under the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Let us not forget that Southern Rhodesia is not all that far removed from South Africa and that the fears of what is happening in South Africa are very real in the minds of many of the Africans of Southern Rhodesia.

Again, let me quote from a leader in The Times which gives in a balanced and unbiased manner, as I am certain your Lordships will agree, a description of what is happening in South Africa to-day. It is called "The Turn of the Screw". To people who know the labyrinth of South African racial legislation it must have seemed almost impossible to devise fresh laws to add to the regimentation, harassment and humiliation of the black man. The relentless logic of apartheid theory, however, has triumphantly come up with further refinements. … And later on: The truth is that the new Bill would provide the South African authorities with better machinery to force all unwanted Africans back to the poverty-striken reserves and to make loss of employment the equivalent of a sentence of banishment for those who are allowed to stay on a purely migratory basis. It is easy to see how this strengthens the hands of employers as well as police. It is another step in the fateful process of reducing the Africans to a modern helotage. If The Times can write that, it requires not much imagination on our part to realise how the happenings in South Africa must be looked on by the political and nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia to-day. Nor should it require very much imagination on our part to realise the effect that it must have on the eventual working together and co- 1196 operation of all people and all races in that country. What is going on in Southern Rhodesia to-day, and what is seen and thought to be going on, cannot measure up to our responsibilities in the realm of humanity, the third of those virtues which Mr. Brooke so recently recommended to the Young Conservatives.

The future in all of the three countries which we are discussing to-day can rest securely and prosperously only on co-operation; it cannot rest on hatred or mistrust. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, mentioned the wealth coming from copper in Northern Rhodesia and said, and said rightly, that it was due to European brains and European capital. But he did not say that, without African labour, all the capital and brains from Europe would not have extracted an ounce of copper from Rhodesia. There must be that partnership between capital, brains, skill and labour, and labour must be encouraged ever increasingly to provide from its own savings, capital, and from its own education, brains. Only therein can lie the future of what has until now been the Federation of Central Africa. We must work towards that. We must use, not only our encouragement and exhortation, but also the power that surely still remains with Her Majesty's Government over at least two of these territories, to make sure that nothing is done at the present time which is going to make their present and future co-operation more difficult, and that everything is done to ensure that the hatreds and mistrusts, that the barriers which exist already, are broken down and are replaced by the desire of Europeans, Asiatics and, above all, Africans, to work together for the good of their country.

§ LORD MOLSON

My Lords, the Federal Government has argued successively that it has the right of imposing a veto upon any alteration and amendment of the Constitution, first, on the Statute under which the Constitution was set up; and, secondly, under the Convention of 1957; and just recently, and thirdly, in December, 1962, as a result, as it alleges, of pledges or promises given by British statesmen with whom it negotiated in 1953. I think that it has been made quite plain and there is no doubt that the arguments 1197 advanced under the Act of 1953, and the Convention of 1957, are not sound.

Your Lordships have been privileged this afternoon to hear the extraordinarily interesting and, I think, very frank speeches by three ex-Secretaries of State, who have told us what they had in mind at the time those conversations were taking place. It was interesting that the views expressed were slightly divergent, as one would expect when people are frankly and truthfully relating what they remember of conversation that took place ten years ago. But two things, I think, emerged from what all three said, and I think that they go a long way towards explaining what all this trouble is about.

They all three said that no pledge was given that no amendment or repeal of the Constitution could take place without the consent of all four African Governments.

As I think all three ex-Ministers said, to have done so would have been to give each one of the Governments an absolute veto upon any amendment of the Constitution. They all three also said that at the time they were full of hope, of confidence, and faith in the future of the Federation and therefore it was natural that they should not, in the graphic words of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, at the time of the wedding ceremony talk about the arrangements for divorce.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords—if I may interrupt my noble friend—I did not say the words which he put into my mouth. I did not say, obviously, "We all agree that there should be a complete, absolute and permanent veto"; that would be impossible. What I intended to say was that in the event of there being a violent disagreement or difficulty, they should get together and discuss it. I did not mean that any party to disagreement should be able unilaterally to convert it. Perhaps my noble friend did not mean that, either.

§ LORD MOLSON

My Lords, what I was seeking to do was to draw from the three slightly divergent speeches of the three ex-Secretaries of State what I think they have in common and what must be an accurate statement of what happened. It is that no pledge was given which gave to the Federal Government an absolute veto on any amendment to the Constitution to which it did 1198 not agree, and, secondly, that the general atmosphere at the time when this great and imaginative experiment was being launched was one of hope and confidence. I was just going to add, before my noble friend Lord Salisbury interrupted me, almost exactly what he said about it—namely, that I think they agreed that, although this Government might be obliged to take action for the amendment of the Constitution without the agreement of the Federal Government, all felt that perhaps the Government might have had one more Conference with the Federal Government in order to try to get agreement. I hope I have established from these three speeches that Her Majesty's Government have not been guilty of a breach of an exact pledge, but that these three ex-Ministers are slightly critical of the way in which it has been handled. I hope that I have begun, at any rate, by making a contribution to the settlement of this controversy without too much acrimony.

At the time federations were very popular in the Colonial Office. It was about that time that the Federation of the West Indies was launched—and that has broken up. I very much fear that the same is going to happen in the case of the Federation in Central Africa. Whatever might have been said in the past, it is surely important to realise that great nationalist movements cannot be controlled by pledges given by Ministers in the past, any more than they can be by constitutions, which are broken by revolution, or by treaties which are broken by revolts. I think that it is relevant to remember that while the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, for good and logical reasons united Holland and Belgium, such were nationalist feelings that the country broke into two. Sweden and Norway were united and although that unity lasted until 1905, again nationalist spirit resulted in breaking it up.

I do not think any fair-minded man could possibly blame the statesmen of 1953 for not having foreseen what has happened. There are two things that could not have been foreseen: first, the speed of the European withdrawal from Africa; and secondly, the narrow and illiberal policy that has been followed in the Federation. As regards the first, let me give these striking figures to your Lordships. In 1953 there were 1199 only five African States that were independent; the whole of the rest of that great continent was under white control. In 1963 (and I have just checked this), by chance, it is five which are still dependent and not on their way to independence, chiefly the colonies of Portugal and of Spain.

The second thing is the failure of the Federal Government to practise that partnership upon which Federation was founded. Indeed, I think the only kind of partnership was that which was described in an unfortunate witticism by the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, when he was Prime Minister, as the partnership of a rider and his horse. I think that the blame which rests upon the United Federal Party as a whole especially rests upon Sir Roy Welensky. It is not altogether to be wondered at. A man in politics is what he has been created by his career and his constituents. It is worth remembering that his first public work was as secretary to a white railway trade union, and one of the main objects of that trade union was to reserve all skilled work to white Rhodesians. It was that trade union that was largely responsible for a most unfortunate event—namely, the importation of Europeans, many of whom could not speak English, into the Federation to work as stokers in order that Africans should not be trained for that skilled work.

Afterwards as a politician he has been responsible to primarily white constituents. We all know in this country how a trade union official is somewhat inclined to regard economic problems from the point of view of the union which he represents: and I think we have all, especially if we have sat in another place, found ourselves tempted to regard political problems a little from the point of view of our own constituents. While I think it is true to say, as my noble friend Lord Chandos has said, that Sir Roy Welensky is a farsighted statesman, I believe that he suffers from the optical handicap of colour blindness and he is not as well aware of the great black majority as he is of the white minority upon whom he is dependent for his political power.

During the first seven years of federation a number of events happened which 1200 checked what I believe was the happy promise of the Federation. The first thing was the passing of the Federal Franchise Act in 1957. That was generally regarded by Africans as a deliberate attempt to alter the franchise in order to delay their advent to political power. It was the view taken by the African Affairs Board that it was discriminatory against the Africans. I regard it as being an error on the part of Her Majesty's Government that they supported the Federal Government and overruled the African Affairs Board. So far from considering, as Sir Roy Welensky does, that Her Majesty's Government have been insufficiently sympathetic to the Federal Government, I think they have erred on the other side.

The next event was the Southern Rhodesian election of 1958. Mr. Todd, rightly or wrongly, had been regarded by Africans as a very liberal statesman. The effect of the election of 1958 was that the United Federal Party, having represented itself as being as liberal as Mr. Todd, managed to destroy the United Rhodesia Party which he led. What was extremely significant was that on the first counting of the votes, before the single transferable vote was applied, it was the Dominion Party which had a majority of the votes. Only a few months afterwards the United Federal Party fought the Federal election on the issue of Dominion status for the Federation as soon as possible, and represented itself as being indistinguishable from the Dominion Party. Again they were more successful against the Dominion Party than they had been in the previous election. All these things have come to be regarded by Africans as a clear indication that the United Federal Party, especially in its Federal capacity, is not sympathetic to the advance of Africans.

This was the situation when the Monckton Commission arrived in Southern Rhodesia. Here I should like to reply to the charge made by the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, on December 19 against the Prime Minister when he complained that the Prime Minister of this country had not restrained the Monckton Commission from making the recommendations that they did. Here I can speak of a matter of which I have personal knowledge, as so many other Members of your Lordships' House have done this afternoon. The Prime Minister 1201 was not asked to interpret the terms of reference. That is the duty of any Commission that is set up, and having regard to the eminence of our legal members there is no doubt that the interpretation that was put upon them was correct. We included three ex-Conservative Ministers from this country and the representatives of the four Rhodesian Governments and we unanimously found that After seven years African distrust has reached an intensity impossible to dispel without drastic and fundamental changes, both in the structure of the association itself and in the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia. It was our first objective to try to preserve some political association. In order to do that, it was necessary to persuade the Africans to give a fair trial to some amended Federation or other kind of association. Since it was obvious that they were demanding immediate dissolution of the Federation, we proposed that they should be asked to exercise patience while a fair trial was given to a new kind of association likely to be more acceptable to them. The best inducement to them to exercise their patience and to give it a fair trial was that, if they were still dissatisfied after the lapse of a fair period of time, then they would be allowed to secede. So far from this