NYASALAND: THE DEVLIN REPORT

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, I was on the point of dealing with the criticism of the Commission that they had referred to Nyasaland as being, at any rate temporarily, a police state. Now there are various types of police states: they are not all alike. It may well be that Nyasaland has not the attributes of all the police states in the world. But the conditions there at the moment, temporarily, have a great many of those attributes, and I should like to mention a few of them. They rely to a large extent on informers. It is the practice to arrest without warrant. People are not brought for trial. People are beaten up. It is difficult to express an opinion hostile or unfavourable to the Government. There is the assumption of guilt. There is the prohibition against being a member of a political Party. I am sure that most Members of your Lordships' House will agree that these things go a long way to establishing the characteristics of a police state.

In another place it was said that if the Government had had anything to hide, they would not have set up this Commission [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 610 (No. 156), col. 434]: 804 Would a Government responsible for a police state have appointed a Commission of this kind, composed of people who could wander freely throughout the country, speak freely to whomsoever they liked, speak to men who are detained, or to their counsel, speak to men whose identity I do not know—and will never know? The answer is, of course, that they would, if they were subjected to a great deal of pressure, as the Government were, to set up a Commission of this kind. They did not set it up voluntarily. Your Lordships will remember that the state of emergency was declared on March 3 and it was not until some weeks later that this Commission was set up, and it was set up only as the result of considerable pressure both in your Lordships' House and in another place. Moreover, it was not set up by the Government of Nyasaland but by this Government. I do not want to take away from the Government such credit as they are entitled to for having set up this Commission, but the fact remains that this Commission has found that Nyasaland has many of the attributes of a police State and I find it difficult to see how that fact can be challenged.

I want to refer for one moment to the White Paper published by this Government. It strikes me as being most impertinent and improper for the Governor of the State concerned, by means of a White Paper, to enter into a debate—which is what he is doing—with the Commission on their findings. If there is to be a debate at all—and I dispute the right of the Governor even to enter into a debate of this kind on a Motion—it should be initiated by the Government themselves. I think that the publication of this White Paper simultaneously with the publication of the Commissioners' Report is highly improper and, so far as I know, absolutely un-precedented. I fear that we are rendering a great disservice to the cause which we all profess to have at heart, the pacification of Nyasaland, when this sort of challenge is made of a Commission which was set up with such high hopes and under such great auspices. This is not only a challenge to this Commission, but a challenge to the authority of any Commission that we may heretofore set up for the purpose of ascertaining facts. If the Government and the Governor concerned can challenge the authenticity of a Commission of this kind, I 805 doubt whether in future there is any value at all in setting up any Commission to ascertain facts.

I have said that there are two aspects to this inquiry—the ascertainment of the facts of the disturbances themselves and of the facts of the events leading up to them. So far as I think necessary, I have dealt with the facts of the disturbances, and my noble friend and the most reverend Primate have dealt with the events leading up to them. I want to say one word, in conclusion, about the future. What is to be the outcome? There is no doubt that not simply the declaration of the state of emergency but the way in which it has been dealt with has created great bitterness and resentment in Nyasaland. Neither I, for one, nor, so far as I know, any one of my noble friends challenged the correctness of the declaration of the state of emergency. We did not challenge it at the time, and we think that the Commission were right in the conclusion to which they have come. But we do challenge the way it has been carried out, and great bitterness has been engendered as the result.

Our first objective must be somehow to restore conditions in Nyasaland which will not only bring peace but also create the climate in which it will be possible to discuss the future. I would submit that the Government might well consider, in spite of what the noble Earl has said, the release of Dr. Banda and a great many, if not all, of those who have been detained. It may be that, if it can be shown that Dr. Banda has committed an offence, he should be put on trial; but if not, I submit that the time has come when he might well be released. After all, a time will come when he will be released, and I wonder how different conditions will be then from what they are to-day. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, said that this was not the time to release those detained. I would ask: What is he waiting for? When does he expect the time will be opportune for the release of those who have been detained? I am sure that it must be a condition preceding any pacification of the country that those who are in the best position to speak for the majority of people in the country, those who are their recognised spokesmen, should be at liberty to talk. You can get no discussions at 806 all if all the authorised, authentic spokesmen are in jail.

Secondly, I would agree very much with the most reverend Primate about the increasing fear of federation, but the most reverend Primate, who I regret is not in his place, said that in 1953 he favoured federation, whereas the late Bishop of Chichester opposed it. He gave us to understand that he had had to think again about it, but he did not say whether or not he favoured federation to-day. I gather that he does not. But I would ask: What is the Government's approach going to be on this question? Are they taking the line, as I inferred the noble Earl does, that, whatever the conditions may be, federation must continue, whether the people of Nyasaland want it or not? I should like to ask whether they really intend to continue Federation against the wishes of the whole population of Nyasaland?

It may well be—and I would not dispute it—in the economic interests of the people of Nyasaland to have federation. It may even be in their economic interests to be entirely submerged by the Federation itself. It is sometimes in the economic interests of a people or an individual to give up freedom; yet people are very reluctant to do so, even with the economic advantages that they may gain. Economic advantage is not the only factor. Unless we can ensure to the people of Nyasaland the opportunity of freedom of the right to govern themselves in their own country; of the right, not necessarily of complete control without recognising the rights of the Asians and the Europeans, but at any rate the right of governing themselves by majority, and give them freedom within the Federation, we shall never get them to accept federation voluntarily.

I would ask the Government: Are they intending to enforce Federation, regardless of the wishes of Nyasaland? Are they assuming that this question of federation is a closed book? I was under the impression that the intention was that the whole question of the continuation of federation, and the conditions under which it would be continued, if it were continued, was to be a matter for discussion in 1960 or within the following two years. But the noble Earl, Lord Perth, gave me the impression that that was not the case; that it was now 807 settled for all time, and there was to be no question of reconsideration of this issue. I should be grateful if the Government spokesman would make that clear.

We have got to think out afresh this question of the free races living in these areas. We have not yet discovered the techniques of Africans, who constitute by far the greatest majority, Asians and Europeans living happily and contentedly together on equal terms, each respecting the qualities of the other, each having the opportunity of the fullest development according to his own rights. We shall never achieve that if we regard ourselves as permanently superior to the African people. The example the most reverend Primate gave of his being rebuked because he had the impudence to shake hands with an African shocked me, as I am sure it shocked a great many Members of your Lordships' House. If that is typical of the attitude we are at present adopting, is it any wonder that we are not gaining the confidence of the people of Nyasaland, and that this great measure for freedom to govern themselves, and being released from the possibility of domination by the Federation of Rhodesia, does not work? Until such time as we can regard these people as being on an equality with the people of Europe and of our particular race, we shall never get peace in Nyasaland.

That, I believe, my Lords, is the lesson to be learned from this Report. And although the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, thinks we ought to confine ourselves to the terms of the Report, the task before this House to-day is to see how we can bring this disastrous state of affairs to an end and create new conditions where all the races can live peacefully together. While, as my noble Leader has said, we may have said hard and bitter things to one another—and I hope that I have not been too bitter—I think it is as well to be perfectly frank about these matters and to say what we think. But at the end of the day let us try to be constructive, and to finish this debate on a really constructive note. I hope it may be possible that that will be the outcome of this debate.

LORD MILVERTON

Before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him to clear up one point? I understood 808 from what he said that he considered it highly improper for the Governor to be allowed to reply, and for his replies to be printed, although his own conduct had been indirectly impugned in the Report and he felt that he was in a position, if the public had to see the Report, to give the public the reply which he would make in reference to the description of his administration having used improper methods and so forth. Apparently, according to the noble Lord, that is highly improper; but for the Government to muzzle in any way an organisation like the African National Congress, which they consider to be preaching a seditious policy, is an act of a police state. Is it not introducing the principle of a police state if the Governor is to be muzzled in this manner——

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Order, order!

LORD SILKIN

The noble Lord has asked me a question, although he will have the fullest opportunity later on of making his speech. I regard it as improper because I regard the Governor as a civil servant who is answerable to his Department. I see no more reason why the Governor should be allowed to issue a White Paper than that any member of the police force, or anybody whose conduct has been impugned, should be authorised to issue a White Paper for publication with a Report. You might equally argue that every member of the police force whose conduct has been attacked, or every member of the military or anybody else, could issue a White Paper and have it published with a Report.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, I do not propose on this occasion to follow the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, into a debate upon federation, although I should always be prepared to discuss federation at the appropriate time, and, I hope, in a non-controversial spirit. I think we have quite enough to debate tonight on this Report. However, I should like to answer what I thought (and it is relevant to the Report) the very odd doctrine which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, set forth. First of all, apparently, there is no right in the Government or anybody to criticise, challenge or answer the findings (or sayings, I had better say, because, if I may say so without offence, 809 there is quite a lot of rather woolly stuff in this Report which I cannot treat as findings of fact; I suppose I should treat them according, to the most reverend Primate, as psychological aphorisms) of the Commission.

The noble Viscount, Lord Monckton of Brenchley, answered effectively the suggestion that a judge could never be challenged on a matter of fact. It really is the most unconstitutional doctrine I have ever heard that, when a Commission have reported, neither the Government nor anybody else is to say anything in answer to it except presumably to stand to attention and say. "Sir", like a soldier who is charged in the orderly room in the Brigade of Guards. Equally odd I thought, was the noble Lord's complaint about the publication of this White Paper which was the Governor's despatch. Cet animal est trés méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend. But, my Lords, the Governor did not volunteer this defence. Right at the beginning of his despatch to the Secretary of State he says that he has been told to come and discuss the Report with him What he did was done on the instructions of the Secretary of State; and if anybody is to be attacked because there is this White Paper, which I think is a very convenient thing to have, then it is the Secretary of State and not the Governor.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear!

THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am glad. But the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was saying how shocking the Governor was. All my public life I have said a lot of rude thinks to civil servants, and even Governors, in private, but I have always taken full responsibility in public for everything they do.

So if there is anybody to be blamed about this it is the Secretary of State or the two Secretaries of State. But as a matter of fact I do not think they are in the least to blame. I think it is most convenient that we should have this document. If we had not got it, what would the Opposition have been saying now?—"What is the answer to all this? What did the Governor do?" I am bound to say that it was not only convenient but, indeed, necessary for a proper judgment to be reached by Parliament that we should have this short, 810 straightforward despatch which the Governor has presented to the Secretary of State, and which the Secretary of State has published to Parliament.

This debate has ranged very wide. I am not surprised, because the Report does, too, but I want to come to one or two much narrower issues which are, I think, the core of the Report. As I take it, the object, or at any rate the most useful purpose, of a debate of this kind, is twofold—first of all, to decide the cardinal point: was the Government justified in the action it took; and, secondly, what are the lessons we can learn for the future? It is very important that we should all remember, in reading the Report of the Commission, that they had the advantage of considering all the evidence and all the facts at their leisure, over a long period of time, after the Governor had to take his decision, after all the events and when much that was obscure in the beginning of March, when the decision had to be taken, had become at any rate a good deal clearer. It is important to remember that the Governor, and the Government at home, had to take rapid decisions in the light of the knowledge then available to them, in the beginning of March—a very different situation from that with which the Commission dealt in their thorough but long-term inquiry. Even so, on what after all is the main issue—the declaration of the emergency—both Governments, the Government here and the Government of Nyasaland, are entirely vindicated. It has become a cliché; but, unlike most, it is a very good cliché: as the Commission put it, "Act or abdicate".

Let the House also observe this. I am not going to say anything outside what is a finding of fact by the Commission, or, if I do, I will say so. I do not want to take up too much time by quoting chapter and verse, but the House may take it from me that everything I say is found in the Report—at least, I think so. By the beginning of 1959, the extremists among the Africans had made up their minds that they would get Congress to adopt a policy of violence. Indeed, it goes back much earlier than that, because as far back as 1955 Mr. Chipembere, who was a principal lieutenant of Dr. Banda, was quite clear that violence was what you had got to have. He said that you will not be able 811 to extract Nyasaland from Federation without catastrophic pressure, and any plan must include something akin to Mau-Mau. We all form our opinions, of course, and the Commission had the advantage of seeing Dr. Banda. It is always said that it is important to see a witness in the box, but after all, the Governor had seen Dr. Banda: he had tried to deal with him, and had failed entirely, although in those times he was not treating him in the least in a hostile way. But the Commission themselves say that Dr. Banda had come to regard some degree of violence as inevitable. On another occasion Dr. Banda said, in an address to his African audience, that moderate leaders are of no use.

We are asked by the most reverend Primate; what had gone wrong? I agree that something had gone wrong, but I think it is only fair to the Secretary of State and to the Government in Nyasaland to remember that, way back in 1955, and since there had been on the part of the Congress leaders—and a relatively few people can get great power in a primitive State—a determination to subvert the Government by violence. How successful they were in the policy of getting Congress to adopt violence is clear from the notes of the meeting of January 25, which the Commission themselves say give as good an impression as can be got of what went on at that critical meeting when the leaders were addressing some 200 or 300 of their principal followers.

Let us also observe this. The violence in the Northern Province, Karonga, Fort Hall, Mzimba, and other places, took place before the declaration of the emergency, and before the arrest of the Congress leaders. I think that is very important, because it has been assumed—and a good deal has been heard both in this House and outside—that all this violence arose because of the declaration of the emergency and the arrest of the Congress leaders. That is not true at all. The worst of the violence which took place was before the emergency was declared at all. What happened, particularly at Karonga (noble Lords will find it in paragraphs 106 to 108 of the Report) shows what happens if action is not taken promptly.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH

I rather think—I am not quarrelling with the general lines the noble Earl is taking—but I think that as a matter of fact, in the period before the declaration of the emergency there was a tightening hold by the Nyasaland Government on administration. They were taking a stronger line about the administration of the law concerning the seeking of permission to hold public meetings. So there were two things: the Congress Party pressing from their side, and the Government from their side.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

It was a very shocking situation. The Government in Nyasaland were enforcing the law. Well that is very shocking! I wonder what would have been said if they had not been enforcing the law and had let things slide, and there had been all this violence and rooting up of airfields. The noble Viscount cannot have it both ways, although he is a great artist at it. I remember the criticisms from that side about Kenya. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore was saying in 1952 why was not the emergency declared earlier? He said that we had risked life and limb and people had been killed because we had not declared an emergency in time. Now we are told how shocking it was that law and order was being enforced; and enforced at a time when Congress had determined by their resolution to embark on a course of violence.

It really seems a little odd to me, who have always tried to be an impartial administrator—at any rate, I have got about as good a record in Colonial administration and African administration, whether at the Colonial Office or the Commonwealth Office or as a Minister in West Africa, as colleagues of the noble Lord or of the noble Lord himself. There are lots of things I can be ashamed of in my life but Colonial administration is not one of them. But let us hear the Commission. They say this: If violence had started in some place and was not checked it would certainly have spread and might have gone very far, and that was the real danger of the situation. The Commission need not have been so conditional, because that violence in the Northern Province was before the emergency was declared, and showed the wisdom of their findings.

813 Now let me come for a moment to this question of the murder plot—I suppose I ought to call it the "so-called" murder plot—which has figured so prominently, and I must say so very disproportionately, to my mind, in all the discussions both in Parliament and out of doors. The Commission come, perhaps rightly, to the conclusion that there was not a formal detailed plot or plan. Well I agree, as I so often have with my noble friend, about rather legalistic distinctions being drawn in this. Even the Commission themselves talk about a plan, so it is rather dangerous when you get into these terms. But I should never have expected a plan in that sense—a plan of the sort that a divisional commander would make, issuing detailed orders to operational troops in the field. What I should expect would be a determination and decision to riot and have violence, to cut throats: exactly what you would expect if you knew anything about Africa; exactly what you would expect excited and emotionally aroused Africans to do.

In fairness, I should like to put two questions to the House. Was there in fact an intention to kill or a prospect of killing? Because I cannot draw these fine distinctions between killing and murder, between cold-blooded assassination and hot-blooded assassination. We have been defining different kinds of murder in an Act of Parliament here and we had enough difficulty about that in the Capital Punishment Bill; but we did not get into these subtle refinements which I find here.

Just as important is to get a fair judgment of whether the Governor at the time was justified in thinking there was such a plan. The Commission think there was a great deal of talk about beating and killing without any dividing line being drawn. Let us consider the meeting of January 25—what I may call, I must not say the minutes of the meeting, but the note of the meeting—which, as I have reminded the House, the Commission say is as good an impression as you can get of what took place. "If Doctor Banda is arrested, start war after two days." I have never known war without killing. I do not know whether it is murder in civil war or in an insurrection which has started, but it does not really matter much to the 814 fellow who is killed, whether black or white, what name you give it. Start war in two days. Destroy everything belonging to Europeans. Hit Europeans, or cut throats. If a Congress member is caught you must fight without fear. Well, if I had been that Governor I would, without hesitation, have come to the conclusion that there was a general plan or incitement to violence and, I will not say to murder, but to killing. At the time he took that decision and made his report, as I think my noble friend Lord Salisbury said, he had other opinions, which may or may not have been accurate, but which he was bound to take into account. Now I venture to speak with some—I will not say authority, but with some experience on this kind of matter. For two years, in the Government of which many of us were members, I was responsible for co-ordinating all security and intelligence, counter-espionage, secret service and the like. It is not an easy job, even with the far-ranging services we had—and I say without hesitation that they were not matched in any other country, enemy or allied. But even with all that, it is not always easy to form your mind as to what are the facts and what is the right conclusion. You must not take too many risks. I think the House has been reminded of it. We were all concerned in Regulation 18B, and at the moment when we thought that this country was going to be faced with invasion, without any hesitation, we proceeded to round up thousands of people whom we had not rounded up before and we put them in the Isle of Man. It took quite a long time to sieve them out and ultimately let some of them—quite a number of them—go. Does anyone say that we were wrong in that?

LORD PAKENHAM

Yes, I certainly do. A lot of silly things were done by rounding up distinguished scholars and putting them in the Isle of Man when they were great friends of this country.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

The noble Lord may say that to his Leader, who was a party to it all and used to sit in on it. The noble Lord is a very delightful controversialist and, fortunately, at that time had no responsibility in Government. I dare say, if he had, he would have had a lot more sense and would not have taken stupid risks. He may say we were wrong and he may be the one 815 person without sin whom he was referring to the other day—I thought rather crudely in the presence of Bishops—who can be the first to cast a stone at us. But, for the rest, it does not become any of us who were concerned with affairs and responsible for affairs at that time to say that in an emergency—and make no mistake of the graveness of the emergency and the risks which there were in Nyasaland at that time—they should not have acted as they did.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH

My Lords, I want to have this quite clear. We accept the whole Report of the Commission and therefore we accept the Commission's Report as regards the declaration of the state of emergency. That is quite clear. What we are wondering about in regard to the fine distinction which the noble Earl referred to just now, is as to what would be the view of somebody like Sir Percy Wyn-Harris, a man of great experience, Commander-in-Chief of Gambia, and with twenty years' experience in Kenya; yet he signs the unanimous Report of the Commission. I think that should be taken into account.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

The noble Viscount has now said that for about the fourteenth time in this debate. I do not challenge it. But even the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, who is going to follow me, will perhaps allow even unfortunate people on this side of the House to make their own speeches.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

I was applauding.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

It is so difficult to distinguish whether the noble Viscount is engendering indignation or affectionate sympathy. I take it in the spirit that it is offered. I really do not think I am differing very much from the Commission in this. What I am saying is that the Governor was bound to decide as he did on the information he had on March 3, and nobody has challenged that he did not come in his mind to an honest decision. Because whatever has been said, by the Commission or anybody else, about the Governor, or indeed the whole Civil Service who were there, whatever can be said, they were deeply sincere people concerned only to come to the right decision and do what they considered their duty.

816 May I say this in passing—I was diverted on this point. It is said "You ought to release all these people". First of all, it is said, "You should bring them to trial". We never brought people to trial in this country under 18B. The crisis here went on a great deal longer that I hope this one in Nyasaland will. We could not bring them to trial. All of us who have been in this business know it. We had an advisory body which was useful, but everything was done in secret and had to be done in secret, because if you did not do it in secret the whole source of your information had gone. With my noble friend Lord Salisbury—and we have both held these offices; I think both of us have been Colonial Secretary and both Commonwealth Secretary—I say without hesitation that you cannot carry on in these territories, and you would be guilty of the gravest dereliction of duty if you attempted to carry on in the Colonial Service, without the best secret and intelligence services that you could have. How quickly these people can be released and who can be released is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the Government. They can be challenged, if you like to challenge them; they will have to justify it. But I dare wager that if the noble Lords opposite should by any mischance come into office in the next few months, we should find that they were carrying on in exactly the same way; they would get into the most frightful trouble if they did not.

At that crucial moment—the moment we have to consider is the few days in which the Governor had to make up his mind—after there had been this great violence at Fort Hall, he had from seven different sources of information reports that murder was being planned: four of them said of Europeans—they were all independent—three of them said of Africans. His Commissioner of Police told him that he must regard these reports and accept them seriously. Can anybody say that the Governor was wrong in believing the report that there was such a murder plot? Frankly, how far he was right as to the nature and character of the murder plans seems to me a relatively minor matter. The outstanding issue is, was he right in what he did? Do not forget that he had the example of Kenya fresh in his mind. He had the criticism of Her Majesty's 817 Opposition that action was taken far too late. He had in his mind the criticism—and this criticism was not unfounded—that in Kenya the secret service, which I knew in the war was extremely adequate, had been allowed to run down and the Government in Kenya was taken by surprise. He had in his ears, I am sure, that knell which keeps on being sounded when these things happen and action is deferred, "Too little and too late". I think that he is fully vindicated. He could do no other.

I come to one other matter. In carrying out their difficult task I have no doubt that the police did use excessive force. It is true the Commission say, and say wisely I think, that it is much more difficult to control ignorant African police than it is to control the London policeman who, as they colloquially put it, can "use his own loaf." I am sure that the Government will profit by the Commission's Report. I am sure that they will introduce any reforms that are necessary in the regulations and in disciplinary control. But this I must make plain: in doing that, do not forget that you must act to maintain law and order and that you must act with sufficient force. Nothing, as Karonga and those other places show, is worse than to try to act with insufficient force. Perhaps one thing is worse, and that is not to act at all. But you must have sufficient force to do the job, and that force, of course, must be rightly used and properly disciplined. But, broad and large, I feel that both Governments, the local Government and the Government here, are vindicated, and they could not have acted otherwise then they have done.

I would add this: I would regret it profoundly if this is made an occasion of political strife. I would only say, frankly, as an old electioneer, that the Opposition will not get much out of it. I do not think it is at all a good political card to play. Any Government would have to act—it may be an alternative Government; I am not betting on it—but whatever Government it is and whoever is the Government and whoever is the Opposition, the worst service that we could do to Colonial government anywhere, and to Nyasaland in particular, would be to leave any doubt that law and order, the greatest boon that British rule has brought 818 to backward countries in a dark continent, will not be preserved. The problems of Nyasaland and of the Federation will have to be solved. Maybe we cannot avoid having honest differences of opinion about them, but surely it is the duty of all of us to seek the greatest measure of agreement in the discharge of a trust which is a trust of every one of us.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, this is an extremely interesting debate and one has learned a great deal from it. I had always appreciated the merits of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, but, until he had explained them himself. I had never had such a firm grip in my mind on the great public service he had rendered. The noble Earl gave us an extra-ordinarily good description of the benefits of a police state. He said that we must have a police state; we must have a police state everywhere. He said that he knew about these things and he had done it. Then he took us to Regulation 18B and, we understood, a universal Regulation 18B would solve the whole African problem.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

The noble Lord is making his own speech, not mine.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

I like to listen, and I shall allow—

THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am so accustomed to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, failing to hear and then giving an entirely imaginary description of the speech he is dealing with that I shall not interrupt him again, but I am sure that the House will not take anything the noble Viscount says about my views as being at all akin to them.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

If I had heard that, I should, I am sure, have been very much amused.

The point about this Report is that usually, when we are dealing with Government action and M.I.5, we are told, "If you knew what I know, you would agree"; but this Commission did know what was done. The Commission had access to all the documents. It saw the informers. It even knew how much money was given according to the "juicy" nature of their information. The Commission knew all about it. Knowing all about it, the Commission came to one conclusion; and it emerges from the 819 debate that the conclusion reached by this Commission of great eminence, in which, up to a certain point, everybody has expressed entire confidence, is not to be accepted, and action is taken in an opposite sense by the Government.

The effect of this on the world at large will be very bad. I quite agree with what I think the noble Earl, Lord Perth, said, that when the world saw charges being made, that we were acting in a brutal way, and when they heard that we had appointed such an eminent Commission to go into the matter and were putting everything at its disposal, our reputation in the world went up. But when people find that the Government are picking out the little bits which support them and rejecting the bits which do not support them, the loss to our prestige will be correspondingly great.

Almost everything has been touched upon, but there were one or two points which I wished to make. I am very grateful to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, because in his speech he asked me to postpone what I had to say until he came back. It is very courteous of him to come back.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I did not ask the noble Viscount to postpone it until I came back. I asked him to postpone it until he made his speech.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

That is right. The noble Marquess said that I should be making a speech later. He said it with a little dramatic gesture of contempt which did not add anything to the force of the argument. I was very anxious to sweeten the memories of the noble Marquess. He said, and everybody has said, that "This is all very sad; we are very sorry that the police went a little too far. These things happen, you know, in our great free land, and you must not make too much of it." I should like to read from the Report and remind the noble Marquess of what happened. I was so surprised at what he has said that I asked him whether he had read the Report. He replied that he had read it. Everybody has read the Report; indeed, almost the whole thing has been read aloud in this House. There will not be the least harm in my reading from it also.

I wish to refer to what happened to a gentleman named Mr. Chikafa, whose 820 arrest took place in the Mlanje district. On page 94 of the Report, it is said: He is a man of about 40 and not strongly built. He is an elder of the Church of Scotland and we have heard nothing to suggest that he is a man of violent habits. I shall now miss something out, but I hope that no one will pick me up about that, because I shall not miss anything which is hurtful to my case. I am trying merely to abbreviate my speech. The inspector did not tell him who he was or what he had come to do but hit him with his baton, aiming for the shoulder… He"— that is to say, the inspector— was a large and powerful man and he next caught hold of Chikafa and threw him towards the door, six or eight feet away, with sufficient force so that he crashed into one of the special constables who says that he was just coming through the door at the time. The constable says that he thought that Chikafa was trying to escape so he hit him on the head with his rifle butt. In his first report of the incident the inspector said that Chikafa was 'strongly resisting arrest'. Chikafa was then carried to the landrover and on his arrival at the police station two hours later he still appeared to be unconscious and was carried into it. We are very sad about that. I am sure that it causes the noble Marquess a great deal of pain to think that, in carrying out a policy for which, until two years ago, he himself also shared the blame, these unfortunate things should happen.

Most of these people were arrested in the middle of the night. This was a thing which people in Nyasaland remembered. Most of us were young men when the slave trade was still being actively carried on in Nyasaland. The general instructions in the Mzimba district permitted arrested persons to be handcuffed, tied at the elbows and at the ankles, and gagged. It must be remembered that these arrested persons had not committed any crime. They were being arrested on suspicion. There may have been a Congress card found in their huts, but the Congress card was not an illegal possession up to 11.59. At 12.1 it was a crime to have a current Congress card. However, I do not want anyone to think that these are criminals about whom I am speaking. They were people being arrested according to the benevolent scheme which saved the British Empire, under the guidance of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton.

On page 98 of the Report we read that a party of four people was taken, 821 still tied up, from the Eutini junction to Mzuzu. One of the four was a Presbyterian minister… I am sorry that the Bishops have all gone, because I should have liked them to hear some of this. I had hoped that one or other of them would have said a word. If we could make Dr. Macleod an honorary Bishop for a week, it would do a great deal of good. The Report goes on to say: One of the four was a Presbyterian minister and the other a village headman. Two of the landrovers were open; the prisoners' condition could therefore be seen. The minister, who was also an active and outspoken member of Congress, was the Reverend Henry Makwakwa who had been arrested at his manse. He had been a chaplain in the K.A.R. for two years and he was described by the camp commandant at Kanjedza, who knew him, as 'a very good front line padre'. These things do not do us any good. They cause sadness to the noble Marquess, but they do not do the reputation of our country any good, if that is the sort of way in which our instructions are interpreted. Does the noble Marquess suggest that it is just a matter for ourselves; that this Report will not be read all over the world, by the coloured people of the world, in every part of the British Empire—in the West Indies, in India, and everywhere where the non-European nations are coming together? This is the sort of thing that will do our reputation harm. It is not an accident. This is the type of thing which naturally follows the Hitler Government model of what is described in the Report as a "police state".

Those four people I have been speaking about were (says the Report): handcuffed, trussed and gagged and loaded into a truck at 5.45 p.m. to go to Mzuzu. The escort consisted of one special constable who was driving.… The journey was a difficult one, as the lorry became stuck in the mud, and lasted until 3.10 a.m. That was nearly twelve hours. The escort said the prisoners became 'restive';"— a bit of subversion, I fear (I wonder what Lord Swinton would say). They got a bit restive after twelve hours drive in the lorry— …they said that because they were tied up they could not sit up properly and were thrown on their faces at the bumps. That is the sort of thing that is going to ruin our reputation in Africa and make any progress impossible—and there is masses of it. I do not want to 822 dwell on the question of the burning of the village. My noble friend was taken up on that when he said that a village had been burned. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, said that it was only thirty-eight houses and that you cannot call that a village. We must leave it at that. But they did burn them, and they burned the possessions of the Africans in them; and they had no legal warrant to do the same. That is as I understand the Report.

Why are the Africans in this state of exasperation? No one seems sufficiently to have pondered on that question. Everyone has talked of maintaining law and order, but no one has asked: why is it that these amiable people—because they were amiable people—are in this state of fury? The answer is quite simple. Over the last five years they have been striving to establish their right to be a free people. In 1939 Lord Bledisloe's Commission reported; they would not have it. In 1949 they would not have it. In 1951 there was a Conference in which I think my own Party were engaged and interested, and the principle of federation was accepted; and in 1953 there was more talk. Dr. Banda right through said that he would not accept it. In 1953–54 there were disturbances. They took to violence. All these causes will be forced to take to violence unless reasonable and constitutional action is permitted. They took to violence and they were defeated. Then they gave it up in 1954. Then there was the election of five people to the Legislative Council. There had been nominees. Every one of the nominees was defeated, and everybody who was elected was a Congressman pledged to resist federation. Then, steadily from here came the word, "You have got to have it; you must have it'". In 1956 the then Colonial Secretary said, "Federation has come to stay". In 1957 people believed, "Dominion status is almost within our reach". In 1958 they were put off and off when they asked for it.

The problem that you have really to consider is: are you going to ram federation down the throats of these people? There are 2¾ million Africans and about 8,000 Europeans in the country. Nobody will deny that the hatred of federation in the minds of the Africans is almost universal. In the Commission's Report 823 they say that they never met a chief—mind you, the chief was not allowed to take part in politics!—who was in favour of federation. The problem that really faces us is: what is going to be done? It is no good having a lot of cloudy talk about "We must reconcile this, and bring together that". These people do not want federation. Dr. Banda, who is a great leader—I am surprised at what the most reverend Primate said about him, because he is a type of Gandhi; I have seen him and have met him—says that they will not agree to it unless they have a majority in their own Nyasaland Parliament that does agree to it. Is that an unreasonable thing to ask? How can you possibly expect to have any result otherwise? It is no good just talking about it. Two things emerge to-day: first, you do not hear the authentic voice of the Nyasalanders; and secondly, you keep under lock and key the one man whom they regard as a messiah—I am speaking in a general political way; he is a Gandhi. Until those things are altered nothing will come of it.

One further point occurs to me. There is no time to do it to-day, but I think one ought to consider the outlook of these people who are governing. The Hola Camp affair has, of course, been a terrible shock. But the outlook of the governing people, who are very pleasantly described in the Commission's Report, is interesting. They say that it is "paternal, dictatorial but benevolent." Here are all these young gentlemen who are doing things about which our parents used to say to us, "My boy, it hurts me more than it hurts you." Are you really hoping to proceed on that basis? There is a terrible danger—it has not been mentioned, but it has come to light—that the African will make fun of them. It is a most dangerous thing when people begin to make fun of the Government. It was done in Ireland. I remember very well, because we were criticising every day in the House of Commons in those days, a regulation by which boys were brought before magistrates for "whistling derisorily at the police." You can imagine what power there is there. But what common sense and statesmanship is there in that? Here, you find Dr. Banda saying about somebody (this is mentioned with tremendous reproof in the 824 evidence of one of the civil servants) "After all, who is the district commissioner?—a boy of twenty-five from Oxford!" I never had the privilege of sharing the inspissated gloom of Oxford. I suppose that most people would regard that as rather a good joke. But it is one of the things you must not say.

Do you notice this about South Africa? I will say just a word about the general picture, and not proceed at length. Do you notice how they laugh when one woman is arrested by the South African police, and fifty women turn up, all with babies tied in shawls over their shoulders, and walk laughing into the police station and demand to be convicted? It is most dangerous when people have so little respect for you and also so much confidence in themselves that they can afford to laugh at your administration. I see the noble Lord, Lord Robins, in his place. He has made several interesting speeches. I wonder whether I could ask him this question: why is it that you want the 2¾ million Nyasalanders? What is the real reason? This is a deficit area. They cost you £3 million a year in subsidies. What is your reason for insisting on that and speaking prematurely (that is over for the moment) about Dominion status? Is it for their labour value? I do not know; I cannot find out. But what Nyasalanders say is that in Southern Rhodesia their condition is so depressed that they fear that if they come into the Federation they will get the same sort of thing. There is a good deal to be said for that point of view.

I think many people have been surprised at the length that federation has gone. Practically before there is a Federation the police come from Salisbury. Salisbury sent in the Royal Rhodesian Regiment, all European, a famous regiment feared by the natives wherever they go. The King's African Rifles are Africans. Then it is the Federal Prime Minister who provides the prisons in which these people are lodged. It is the Federal Prime Minister who forbids Members of the Houses of Parliament, who find the money for this Colony, to go there. He says, "You cannot go without my permission." I notice that the Southern Rhodesian Parliament passed a special Act of Parliament to permit the Commission to sit in Salisbury. Therefore, seeing all 825 this growth of power permeating the Rhodesias, these Africans do not want federation. Until you solve that problem, I am perfectly certain you will get nowhere.

The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, was speaking about the old times. Well, I remember his entry into Parliament very well indeed, and he will remember that just before he entered Parliament we had had a struggle with Ireland—the big struggle with Ireland—and all the things that are said here to-day were said then about Collins and Griffiths: "You cannot negotiate with men like that. Look at their conduct." The violence in Ireland was immense compared to these road blocks and other trifling acts. But they will grow into something worse if you leave the matter alone. If we, as a country and a Commonwealth, with a great deal of experience, cannot adjust our experience and knowledge to this current problem, then I think it is a very sad day for our future.

LORD COLERAINE

My Lords, the noble Viscount who has just resumed his seat has been this evening, as he always is, utterly irresistible, and, as he always is, utterly unconvincing.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

I thought the noble Lord was going to say that.

LORD COLERAINE

But he is at any rate very easy to listen to, if I may say so, and it is a great pleasure to listen to him. At any rate, we know where he stands on this unhappy business. We know, for example, what his definition of a "police state" is. The noble Viscount's definition of a police state is Great Britain between 1940 and 1945. That is not my definition, and I do not think it is the definition that these eminent gentlemen who have reported intended when they described Nyasaland as a police state, "no doubt…temporarily."

The noble Viscount asks: Why is it that these amiable people have been driven to such a frenzy? He gives an answer which may be the right answer. I do not think it is. He gives the answer: because of federation. But it is possible—and this Report does not dissuade me of my conviction—that they have been driven to frenzy by acute, skilful, highly politically educated dema- 826 gogues playing upon a politically immature people. But there is one point upon which I agree with the noble Viscount, even if for different reasons. I think this Report is a great disaster and I do not see how anyone who values the good name of this country, or anyone who cares for the people of Nyasaland, can possibly accept it. The most reverend Primate said that he hoped this Report would mean a new start. I hope there may be a new start, but I cannot see what the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry is going to contribute towards it.

It is often the fate of Reports of this kind that they are put away in a pigeonhole and their fate is oblivion. This may go into a pigeonhole, but I fear that it will continue to poison relations between the two races, black and white, between these two branches of the human race, long after the occasion of it has been forgotten. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, cannot understand why the Government do not accept the whole Report. Well, I cannot speak for the Government, but I know why I could not possibly vote for the Amendment even if the Government asked me to do so.

It seems to me that the grounds for the rejection of this Report are three-fold. First, it is irresponsible; secondly, it is almost unbelievably naïve and innocent; and, finally, it is remarkably disingenuous. I do not know how it has happened. I do not know how it is that men of the eminence and the capacity of these men have produced a Report of this kind. But what I am sure is that this Report is characterised by that peculiar kind of silliness which you can only find in very clever men and by that peculiar lack of scruple which, in my experience, often distinguishes the very high-minded.

LORD PAKENHAM

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord this, as I seem to be acting temporarily for my noble Leader: surely he does not mean exactly what he says. Surely he is not accusing these four eminent gentlemen selected by his Government—our Government; the country's Government—of being unscrupulous.

LORD COLERAINE

My Lords, if the noble. Lord will have patience he will find out exactly what I am accusing 827 them of. I realise that it is the duty of a fact-finding Commission to disclose facts without fear or favour, and certainly the Commission has fulfilled its duty. It has disclosed the facts. Some of them are very disagreeable—I do not deny it any more than my noble friend Lord Salisbury denied it. Some of them are very disagreeable. They are unpleasant to read about; they are unpleasant to think about. It is the duty of a Commission of this kind to disclose the facts, but it is not its duty to draw inferences from the facts, inferences which are not only unjustifiable but which are, in fact, loaded with political dynamite.

It is easy enough to say, "Well, this is a judicial Commission"—which, anyway, it was not—"and it has nothing to do with politics." My Lords, if four supposedly responsible persons are injected into the heart of the most complex, the most dangerous, and potentially the most tragic political problem of our day, surely they have to pay some regard to it. After all, this issue they have been discussing is something rather more important than the case of Mr. Liberace v. The Daily Mirror. It is something that concerns the life, the future, the happiness of millions of people, and concerns the honour, the authority, the power, the reputation of this country.

Much has been made in this debate of the term "police state", and I do not want to labour it further. But I should like to say this. When I first read the Report I asked myself, when I saw this phrase: What on earth do they mean? As I read on, I discovered what they meant. In paragraph 60 they refer back to this statement, and it is quite clear from that paragraph that what they mean by the "police state" is, in fact, the state of emergency, the declaration of which they themselves had approved and held to be justified; and I am sure that if any noble Lord reads through that paragraph, he will find that all they mean by their reference to the "police state" is that there is a state of emergency and that it has some very distasteful factors. If that is what they meant, was it not the height of irresponsibility to launch, on the first page and in the headline, into this damaging, and I think infinitely evil, expression about the police state?

828 Again, my Lords, in their Introduction the Commissioners show to me almost inexplicable signs of innocence. They explain why their hearings had to be held in private. They give a number of reasons. One of them was that the African, through fear of the Government, would not speak the truth if the hearings were in public. I do not know how it strikes your Lordships, but it is almost incredible to me that it never seems to have occurred to the Commission that the African might be afraid to speak the truth at all for fear of the Congress. They explain the witnesses they have seen, and they number them out; but it never seems to have occurred to them that when they saw 1,500 witnesses in groups ranging from half a dozen to 100, it was scarcely conceivable, in the circumstances, that they could get the truth. Of course they could not get the truth—because any man giving evidence in those groups would feel he was being watched and spied upon and reported by the other five or the other ninety-nine. The Report speaks a great deal about intimidation. It admits the fact of intimidation, but it never seems to face the consequences of intimidation. That seems to me to be an example of the innocence of which I spoke.

The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, asked me just now, as he was perfectly entitled to do, whether I accused the members of the Commission of being unscrupulous men. What I said was that their Report was disingenuous, as it seemed to me, and that the only explanation I could give of that was that they had that lack of scruple which sometimes distinguishes those who are far more high-minded than most of us are.

LORD PAKENHAM

Is that particularly ambiguous way of speaking meant to imply that they are honest men or dishonest men?

LORD COLERAINE

If the noble Lord would like it perfectly straight from me, it is meant to imply what I believe—that is, that they are, in their Report, intellectually dishonest. I will, if the noble Lord will allow me, explain to him what I mean. In fact, earlier in the debate my noble friend Lord Salisbury did give one instance of this kind of intellectual dishonesty when he quoted the paragraph which stated how much the Nyasas feared federation and what an evil 829 thing they thought federation to be, and then pointed out that all the Report did was to say, "Of course, we are not allowed to comment on this." As my noble friend pertinently observed, in that case, why mention it?

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Could the noble Lord elaborate that? It is a very interesting point. Does he mean the Commission should not have reported the fact that they found unanimity against federation?

LORD COLERAINE

What I mean, if the noble Viscount will allow me, in stating my case about the attitude of the Commission to these matters, is this: the Commission makes it clear time and time again that they are not offering judgments; they are stating facts. Technically, I think that is true. But time and time again in the Report we find cases where, in effect, they make a judgment and then qualify it by saying, "Of course, we cannot comment on this." I will give the noble Viscount another example of that. It is in paragraph 286. That is almost at the end of the Report, when the Commission are dealing with these very painful happenings to which the noble Viscount, and I think every speaker, has referred in his speech. This is what I should like to point out to the noble Viscount: The Government has not at any time, either before us or, so far as we are aware, to anyone else, expressed any regret for or disapproval of what has been done under these heads. We record this as a fact and not as indicating that any expression of regret or disapproval is necessarily appropriate.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

There is a point here. You see, you must read the Motion that is before the House. It is praising the security forces, and never saying a word of reproof for these happenings.

LORD COLERAINE

I think the noble Viscount—I almost called him my noble friend, and I hope he will forgive me for the possible lapse—has missed the point that I am trying to make. Here I am not criticising the Report for censuring the Nyasaland Government. The basis of my charge against the members of the Commission is that, having said that they are not going to offer judgments, they offer a moral judgment of a very damaging kind, while maintaining 830 the fiction that they are not offering a judgment at all. And in my view that is intellectually dishonest.

LORD PAKENHAM

I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord again, but, in the absence of my noble Leader, may I say how profoundly shocked all of us on this side of the House are at this talk of intellectual dishonesty on the part of the members of the Commission.

LORD COLERAINE

I can only regret that that side of the House is not quite so profoundly shocked by some of the things which are said in this Report.

My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships further, but I should just like to make this comment. I have formed a view of this Report. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, feels that I am not entitled to form it. He is shocked by the view that I have formed. That is his problem. But, as almost every speaker has said, we have got to go beyond the Report. I hope that the evil that I am afraid this Report has done will be forgotten, and I also hope, as so many speakers in the debate have already said, that, by understanding, by appreciating the difficulties of the Central African, and by giving him the assurances which the Government have already given him, it will be possible to persuade him that Federation is in his interest. I hope that we shall be able to realise the idea of a racial partnership, and that we shall not be faced with the horrible and tragic alternative courses: on the one side an immature—and probably, because it is immature, tyrannical—black Empire, and, on the other side, apartheid. I hope that, whatever difference we may have about the Report, it may be possible for us all to work to that end of a racial partnership.

LORD BIRDWOOD

My Lords, unlike so many debates in your Lordships' House, I am not finding this debate an entirely pleasant experience. As I listened yesterday to the debate in another place, and, indeed, as I have listened here to-day, it seemed to me that we are all the time reminded of the many penalties of this cherished Party system of ours. It would sem that there is something amiss in a situation which links the difficulties which a Government 831 experiences abroad with the political welfare of a Party at home and, therefore, perhaps makes those difficulties even desirable for a certain Party. I refuse to believe that there are two breeds of Englishman, the one an enlightened, progressive Liberal, in sympathy always exclusively with African national aspirations, and the other obstinate and out of date, opposing those aspirations. We are, I believe, all together in facing this problem, and yet, with the diabolical play of Party politics, it is sometimes extremely difficult to recognise it.

One could talk, as many noble Lords have done, by picking out quotations from the Devlin Report. It was, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who accused Members on this side of picking out only those extracts which suited them. So far as I have seen in this debate hitherto, Members on the other side have done exactly the same thing, picking out just those portions of the Report which suited them. It was in anticipation that many of your Lordships would have studied the Report in great detail and would refer to it that I thought it would be more appropriate if I attempted a slightly different approach and gave some ideas of mine related to the Indian analogy, in which I received a lead from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, when he took part in the debate on Monday last.

Before I do that, I should like to comment on one point on which the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition laid great emphasis: that is, the question of detention without trial. Nobody likes detention without trial, but there is a valid reason for it. The reason is that if those particular people were not under detention, they would be the focus for operations calculated to bring the operation of law and order to cease; and, as such, they have to be put under detention. It is quite unfair to paint an analogy of men lingering in prison, suffering, waiting for their trial. My experience is that men in that position are in comfort. They are allowed to see their relations and to write books and they are given paper and pencil. That is my experience, certainly in the case of India.

If noble Lords opposite would search the annals of what was happening in 832 1948 and 1949, and even 1950, they would discover that when they were in power, there were many cases in Ghana in which detention without trial was accepted. The Government of India is to-day often held up, quite rightly, as an enlightened and progressive Government, yet it has sanctioned the detention of Sheikh Abdulla for five years without trial. I would merely emphasise that there are many precedents for this kind of approach.

The Devlin Report raised one very important issue. We are all agreed, I think, that the Devlin Commission came to two main conclusions: first, that there was no centralised plan for massacre, and secondly, that there was an emergency and that, therefore, the Governor was justified in taking measures to meet that emergency. I ask your Lordships, on both sides of the House to consider quite calmly which of those two aspects is the more important: the fact that the Governor was wrong in his assessment that there was no central plan, or the fact that the Governor was right in his assessment that there was an emergency.

The absurdity of even questioning the matter is immediately revealed to us in a comment by the Governor on paragraph 168 of the Report, which states: We have found further that there was talk of beating and killing Europeans, but not of cold-blooded assassination or massacre". The Governor's comment on that, in a particularly typical British understatement, is that if it was a matter of distinguishing between beating and killing and cold-blooded assassination or massacre, he and his Government were quite unable to appreciate the distinction. Might I put the situation slightly more bluntly and say that if I were a corpse beneath the ground, I should not worry very much about the particular term that was used to define the process by which I got there.

I have seen emergency situations, not in Africa, but in different parts of the world. I have been at the receiving end. The fact that no death occurs is no criterion whatever as to whether there is need to declare an emergency. I heard yesterday, as if it were a kind of slick debating point, that no white man was killed. Are we to wait hopefully for a death before we decide that the time 833 has come to declare an emergency? Just one moment's reflection will indicate what utter nonsense such an approach is. I suggest that a fair picture of what was happening was that there were a number of incidents, there were riots and there were crowds creating disturbances, and that if there was no centralised plan, at least there was a general effect which came to exactly the same thing, and that the Governor was right. The Commission have said so. In effect, as I see it, the Commission have said that the Governor was right, but for the wrong reason. I submit that all that matters is the fact that the Governor was right.

I come back to the Indian analogy. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, has left his place, because he invoked the Indian analogy, which is appropriate in these situations. I should have liked to do what he himself referred to as "sweeten the memories". The noble Viscount reminded us of his experiences in connection with the Simon Commission and the Round Table Conference. He could have gone a bit further and also reminded us that during his tenure of office, in April, 1930, the civil disobedience movement under the personal direction of Mr. Gandhi was launched. There was refusal to pay taxes, refusal to pay rent, picketing of shops selling British cloth, obstruction of the police, and so on. What exactly did happen? The movement, which under Mr. Gandhi's direction had started as completely non-violent, very quickly got out of hand; and in Bengal in particular, and to a lesser extent in the Punjab, the ugly term "terrorism" was used. British and Indian officials were attacked; bombs and revolvers were used; the armoury in Chittagong was raided; a bomb was dropped in Parliament and I think a bomb was dropped on the Viceroy's train.

On November 7, 1929, in another place the then Secretary of State, the noble-Viscount, in commenting on the general situation, very rightly said: What was alarming was that responsible opinion did not somehow come forward to reprobate crime, and that is a very unhealthy sign. I think some of us might hope that the noble Viscount, whose deep sympathies with the African aspirations we all appreciate, could tender the same advice to Dr. Banda.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

When the noble Lord has finished I should like to say a word on this, but only when the noble Lord is willing.

LORD BIRDWOOD

The next point which emerges from the Devlin Report is that it does emphasise Dr. Banda's timorous and not very admirable hesitancy in condemning terrorism and intimidation. Still following up the Indian analogy following the same story, I would remind your Lordships that the Working Committee of the Congress was declared an unlawful association—and Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru were arrested—after the noble Viscount's time—

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

In my time.

LORD BIRDWOOD

In the noble Viscount's time. There were casualties compared with which the casualties in Nyasaland can be counted on one hand. In the autumn of 1931 those casualties had amounted to thousands and there were by that time about 60,000 people in gaol for creating disturbances. Incidentally, I am not aware that the Government of the day was asked to abdicate or that the Secretary of State was asked to resign or anything of that nature. I certainly think it would have been quite wrong if they had.

There are two points I want to emphasise. First, in a crisis of this kind it is very invidious to single out a party or an individual as having failed or as not having measured up to heavy responsibilities. The difference, as I see it, is in emphasis, and in emphasis only. Secondly, at no time in India was there any overall central plan to murder. Indeed, Mahatma Gandhi was bidding his disciples to control their passions. That is the sort of claim made on behalf of Dr. Banda, and yet in both cases action had to be taken which was in fact just the same as would have been required had there been a real centralised murder plot.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

When you have finished with India, I would just say a word.

LORD BIRDWOOD

I have not finished with India. I return to the political implications. The noble Viscount regretted that it had been impossible in his time to bring representative Indians into the picture at the Round Table 835 Conference. Of course, Mr. Gandhi was at the second session, as a result of what was known as the Irwin-Gandhi Pact. I would say immediately, without qualification, that if we could anticipate human relationship emerging such as was built up by Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Halifax in 1929, if we could anticipate that kind of relationship in 1959 between the Governor of Nyasaland and Dr. Banda, then the future of Nyasaland might be one of real hope. It is not for me to criticise or compare two Englishmen in public life, but with regard to Dr. Banda, it does seem to be clear from the Devlin Report that he in no way measures up to the standard set by Mahatma Gandhi. If it were otherwise, I think we could by now have expected some kind of formal pledge or declaration to have emerged as between Dr. Banda and the Governor.

The noble Viscount put the case very forcefully that in 1929 and 1930 our great difficulty was our inability to capture the Indian mind. I think that was the way he very expressively put it. For me it raises a very important point, the character and calibre of the men we are dealing with—I am transferring the picture now to Africa: the character of the Africans who, on the one hand, have a blind obsession in their refusal of co-operation—I refer to Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chisiza—and, on the other hand, those Africans who, if given a chance, might have the wisdom and courage to work in co-operation towards that true partnership in which we all believe. And these are the men who have been described as "stooges".

In the case of India, it is interesting to note that those men to whom the noble Viscount very rightly paid his great tribute, were the Indian "stooges" at the time, Seitei Bahawar, Mr. Sapru, Mr. Sastii, Mr. Jayakar, Dr. Moorije, and men of the calibre of Dr. Ambedkar, who was largely responsible for the present Indian Constitution. On the Muslim side, there were men such as Sir Mond Shapi and Mr. Jinnah himself, the founder of Pakistan. Setting aside the representation of Pakistan, I doubt very much whether the India of to-day, in the full flush of entering so successfully into the international scene, would care to hear her great servants of those days described as "stooges".

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Have they been described as "stooges"?

LORD BIRDWOOD

No; but their equivalents in Africa have been described as "stooges", and I think we might find that perhaps at that time—

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Never.

LORD BIRDWOOD

—there were people who referred to them as "stooges". It is perfectly true that those men were not representative of mass political opinion in India at the time. Does one for that reason overlook them? In the case of Africa, more particularly Nyasaland, does one just ignore the potential African Sapras and Sastiis of the day?

Within the same context I come to the modern Indian stooges, the members of the former Indian Civil Service. Again, they were never typical of mass opinion, but they have been indispensable to Indian welfare and progress—men such as Bengal Rao, Bajpai, Mahari Singh, V. P. Menon, not to mention about 200 or so Indian district commissioners, men who have been described as the firm foundation of the administration. Again I turn to Africa, and I question which type of these men are we to support? If I may put the matter more accurately, in attempting to meet the political demands of one type, are we to neglect the solid value of the other, in their interests? Because there are these two types. They may aim at the same goal but they are following completely different roads. One I would describe as nationalists, the other as patriots. The one seeks his goal through the monopoly of political power; the other is prepared to take off his coat and do a job of work for his country. That second type has not yet received sufficient encouragement, nor has he yet come forward, perhaps through the lack of any encouragement; and one notes that of the seventeen district commissioners in Nyasaland not one is yet an African. Nor are they likely to be, so long as they are described as "stooges" by those who ought to be encouraging them.

If Africans are not going to come forward for training in administration, how can Nyasaland hope to control her own affairs in dignity and in the service of her own people? Dr. Banda's answer to this question is apparent from the 837 Devlin Report. It seems to be the vague hope that the Europeans will stay on. British officials will reply to that, as I interpret it, that men such as Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chisiza, once in power, will use their power solely to embarrass them and humiliate them. That may be so, or it may not be so; but the fact is that those men believe that, and so they will not stay.

Finally, if I may come again to the Indian analogy, I would say one word about the question of federation. It seems to me that to a Nyasalander there is in federation a political connotation which we ourselves would never see. If Nyasaland is to be relieved of the fear of outside European domination from Salisbury, I would suggest that the Europeans in Zomba, Blantyre and elsewhere are also entitled to be free from the fear of African political pressures from outside Nyasaland.

I do not want to close entirely on a note of a negative character. My more constructive ideas concerning federation and the reactions—very natural ones, as I see them—of Nyasaland African Congressmen, which are aroused by this proposal, are centred round the passage on page 21 of the Devlin Report. Perhaps I may read it, because it seems to me to be very significant. It says: Briefly, the conclusion which was arrived at was that the economies of the three territories had been so inter-dependent that closer association between them in the field of economic planning was essential. This closer association would inevitably lead, it was felt, not only to greater prosperity but to the provision of better facilities for education, health services and social services generally. The immediate result of Federation to Nyasaland in the economic field has been markedly beneficial. We need not go into financial detail but, putting it shortly, Nyasaland enjoys what is in effect a cash subsidy from the two Rhodesias of £3 millions per annum, which is over a third of its annual expenditure. Without the resources of Federation, the Nyasaland Government would not be able to provide the services in health and education which it believes to be essential to the advancement of the African. The Commission assure us that that situation is recognised by the African Congress. The African Congress answer to all that is that nothing matters but political freedom. I would ask noble Lords opposite: do they really agree that all those advantages to be obtained from federation are just to be written off? Would they not perhaps qualify 838 their attitude and support this idea: that in refusing federation Dr. Banda surely should explain how Nyasaland is to forgo this £3 million subsidy? In fact some of us would like, what the most reverend Primate would refuse, not so much a demand for a few more seats in the Legislature and Executive, as an economic and administrative blue print to provide for their country if outside the Federation, a carefully phased plan, which the most reverend Primate apparently regarded as not making sense. Such a plan may not capture the imagination of the African; it may not win applause. But, as I see it, it is a duty and I cannot see that it is wrong to encourage men to do their duty. I would only say that if the day could arrive when, on the basis of Nyasaland being outside the Federation, such a plan was put forward for discussion, then on that day an independent Nyasaland would certainly be much nearer.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hemingford, will forgive my intervening for a moment, because I did not want to interrupt a very interesting speech by an expert. I had the privilege of knowing the noble Lord's father, and we realise his great services to India. No doubt the noble Lord as a young man knew them at first hand. What he fails to see is that we had 60,000 people in gaol and we regarded that as a great defeat. Every time somebody had to be locked up, that was one down for us, because we were trying to get a Government of the Indian people. We got it in the end. The noble Lord misunderstands the situation. He thinks that the Indian interlude of a Labour Government of 1929 was merely a continuation of the Conservative view before and perhaps afterwards. That is quite wrong. It was an attempt to put the engine in reverse, and in the end it succeeded. There is this difference between us. If we turn to Ghana and Kashmir we see tensions, but there is a great difference between an act of dictatorship imposed by a native Government of their own people and an attempt to impose the same dictatorial methods by an outside country. That is my point.

LORD BIRDWOOD

My Lords, I would only suggest that the country described as outside was, in fact, a British-Indian Administration, in which, 839 I think, by 1929, and progressively afterwards, most of the members of the Viceroy's Council were Indians.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

That is true, but we were aiming at getting an Indian Government; and we got it.

LORD HEMINGFORD

My Lords, those of us who propose to go into one Lobby or another have to make up our minds whether we are able to accept the whole of the Devlin Report or only a part of it. In making up our minds on that question, I would suggest that one factor which should weigh heavily is what will be the effect of our action upon the opinions of Africans in Nyasaland and elsewhere, because this is one of the harsh, perhaps the harshest, of the realities that an administrator has to face.

We have heard a great deal about law and order. I would suggest, from the experience of a teacher in Africa, that there are a good many educated young men and women in Nyasaland who have had lessons about law and order, the same kind of lessons that I had to give in other parts of Africa. I had to keep order in the class or in the school. I taught that the first duty of a Government was to govern. And for those reasons I have never said a single word against the action of the Governor of Nyasaland in declaring a state of emergency and I gladly accept the part of the Report which says that he was right to do so. But I taught not only about order; I taught also about law. I taught about the Habeas Corpus Act and why we had striven for that, and why the struggle had been worth while. And I should be very disappointed in my pupils in Ghana and Uganda if they did not immediately see through the 18B argument which has been put here to-day. Of course, there is all the difference in the world between accepting methods—call them police methods, or what you like—by the wish of your own elected representatives, and, on the other hand, having restrictions forced upon you by a Government composed of different people, people who are set on a policy that you hate.

Such people as I have been trying to describe in Nyasaland will be wondering how long the emergency is going to last. What means of judging have they? From whom can they find out the answer to 840 their question? They do not know. It is not a matter which is in any way within their own decision or the decision of any of their people. There will does not count. I submit, as I have submitted at intervals over the last seven years, that the tragedy of Nyasaland since 1952 has been the neglect of African opinion by the British Government. It is this which has made the people angry and determined; it is this which has caused outbreaks of violence. I, as a Conservative, am continually surprised that other Conservatives do not have something at least of the feeling that the late Mr. Bonar Law had about the people of Ulster. There were no lengths to which they might go which he did not feel that he would support. He spoke of a demonstration of theirs as being an expression of the soul of a people willing to lay down their lives for what they believed was their liberty and freedom. Why does no Conservative think of applying similar words to the attitude of the Nyasaland people in 1952 or since then?

We are told that one reason why we should not accept the Report in full is that there is no kind of obligation upon a Government to accept the Report of a Commission which they have set up. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, made this point. He reminded us that there are Reports of Royal Commissions which lie (I am not using his words) collecting dust for years before some of their recommendations are put into force. But I would suggest that there is a distinction between a Royal Commission which is set up to prepare the ground for legislative proposals and a Commission that is set up to find out facts. If you appoint a Commission to consider what reforms should be made in the law of divorce, how suitable it is that their Report should be argued over, considered and sifted over a period of years. But that is quite different from sending four specially selected and highly able people, under the chairmanship of a Judge, to find out facts.

What will the young educated Africans think of a Government which will not accept the Report of a Commission they have set up to find out facts? I think I can tell your Lordships. They will say: "One of the important lessons that we learned at school—from our English schoolmasters, maybe—was that you accept the decision of the 841 referee, even if you think he is wrong." It may be that these able Commissioners have made mistakes—of course they may have done; they are human—but, in my view, the Government would have been more dignified, they would have been more effective in Africa, and it would have helped to create that kind of spirit about which the most reverend Primate spoke so eloquently, if they had accepted the Report in full and if, in accordance with traditions which Conservatives ought to venerate, the Secretary of State had resigned his office. I am speaking in order that such Africans and others may know that there is one Conservative in Parliament who accepts this Report in full; and in saying that I am aware—and I hope that the Government are, too—that there are a good many Conservatives outside this House who think as I do.

LORD TWINING

My Lords, your Lordships may think that there is no part of this Report which has not been dealt with in the speeches in your Lordships' House or in another place, but I have found one paragraph which is of interest. I will not read it, but it is paragraph 83, which is a brief reference to the Accra Conference. The All-African Peoples' Conference, to give it its full name, was attended not only by representatives from all over Africa, but also by strong delegations from the United Arab Republic and from Russia. Although the Africans are said to have been in favour of non-violence, it is known that the Conference was divided on this issue, and pressure to use violence came from non-African delegations. The principal resolution passed at the Conference was in favour of fighting colonialism by positive action, and was, in the words of the Commission's Report, a compromise between those who advocated violence and those who advocate non-violence.

The whole declaration of the Conference is too long to read, but the last sentence is worth quoting. It says: The All-African Peoples' Conference pledges support to those who, in order to meet the violent means by which they are subjected or exploited, are obliged to retaliate. That is not the part quoted in the Report of the Commission but is the end of the declaration passed at the Conference. Dr. Banda attended the Accra Confer- 842 ence, and his conduct on his return was obviously influenced by what had happened there. There have been various other manifestations in other parts of Africa of the positive action demanded at the Conference which have also led to violence, and the responsibility for this must be laid at the Conference's feet.

Those of us who have worked in Africa and have, according to our own lights, tried to help the advancement of the Africans, have an understanding of these people and their problems. They have many endearing qualities and are a good-humoured, friendly and courteous people who have shown great good sense in how to make the best of life in their own environment. They are a proud and dignified people, who normally have a healthy respect for authority and who are sensitive about matters which affect their personal lives and well-being; and should these be threatened, they will react very strongly. Anyone who knows Africa must be aware that, once roused, the Africans are capable of doing things which they would be the first to regret subsequently.

I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I relate a personal experience, which I do only because it is something comparable to the situation which faced the Governor of Nyasaland. In December, 1953, we had intelligence reports which showed that the Mau-Mau in Kenya were infiltrating into the Kikuyu settlement in the Northern Province of Tanganyika, and that they were trying to organise them. Reports which reached me on December 21 of that year indicated that on Christmas Eve there was a plot to murder 500 Europeans and a large number of loyal Africans and Asians, and to burn down offices, garages and other buildings belonging to non-Africans. I consulted my Attorney-General, my Chief Secretary, my Commissioner of Police and the other advisers, and we came to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence on which we could take any single person to court and hope to get a conviction. But we all felt that there was a great deal of truth in this intelligence, and we had to act. We went through the same painful, distasteful experience of declaring a state of emergency in this one particular Province, and of arresting before Christmas Eve as many of these people as we could. 843 There are some differences between that action and what happened in Nyasaland, because there was a violent reaction among the Kikuyu whom we had not arrested, as though we had stirred up a hornets' nest. They murdered the informers and the families who had given this information.

The Kikuyu in Tanganyika were aliens, and therefore I had the advantage of having the African people of Tanganyika behind me; and they acted on my side. In Nyasaland the Governor was faced with a much more difficult position, where he might have had the whole of the population roused against the Government. Had the Governor of Nyasaland not acted as he did, I am quite sure we should not be having this debate to-night, and perhaps he would not be alive to tell the tale. It may be that the noble Earl would have paid his visit and might not have returned from Nyasaland. I am myself convinced that there were Congress leaders bent on violence, and violence inevitably would have led to killings, or what some people prefer to call murder. Whether or not there was a detailed plan which would be called a murder plan is a different matter. If there is insufficient evidence to prove it, there is also insufficient evidence to disprove it. Secret conspirators do not leave evidence about, and it is clear that those on the spot, who were in the best position to judge, were convinced that there was a situation of very real danger. Nyasaland was fortunate to have a Governor who acted as he did, and it seems that sound opinion there recognises this fact.

But we now find ourselves in a dilemma. Action has been taken. Law and order has, we hope, been restored. But we are still faced with finding a solution to the main problem, and the fact that repressive measures have had to be taken may not make the task easier. We may discount the assertion that Nyasaland is a police state. If it is, it must be the envy of all the other police states in the world to-day, for the police there are very thin on the ground and have one of the lowest ratios of police to population to be found anywhere—fewer than 1,800 police to 2,800,000 people, living in 48,000 square miles, or four-fifths the size of England and Wales. The people are probably 844 naturally feeling bewildered and subdued, but it is not an African characteristic to be unduly resentful, as they are realists, and there is a great hope that confidence can be restored.

But we must not pursue a policy of drift. We must show ourselves to be masters of the situation and take the initiative. It is our turn to take positive action. The vital question of federation must be left to the Commission whose appointment has recently been announced, and to the Constitutional Conference which is to follow. But the internal Constitution of Nyasaland requires very special consideration. The Times, in a leading article on July 28, mentions that Sir Roy Welensky has advocated that the next task should be to push on the individual territories of the Federation to assume a greater responsibility for their own affairs, and this policy, The Times says, has been endorsed by the Prime Minister. The Times goes on to say that the realisation that Nyasaland must advance as an African State has been generally accepted.

On July 23, the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State indicated in another place that it was intended to have an African majority on the unofficial benches of the Legislative Council, and to appoint two Africans to the Executive Council, while the life of the Legislature would be extended beyond May, 1960—perhaps for a year. This period must not be regarded just as an opportunity to pause and do nothing. The whole position must once again be thoroughly examined, and it may be that it will be found that the evolution of the traditional form of Colonial Government is not the best way to proceed in the circumstances, and that a new approach may be needed, perhaps even making it necessary to go back to square 1 and to start again. But apart from constitutional progress, we must look at the other factors which stand in the way of a rapid advance to self-government.

In my experience, it is very necessary to keep political, economic and social development in step. If they do not keep in step or in balance, the position gets out of hand. I should like to suggest that machinery be set up to examine the problems which must be 845 solved. There are many, but there are two of major importance—the first, to make the economy of the territory sufficiently stable and viable for it to stand on sound foundations when self-government is achieved, so that it will not be faced with the position of having to seek financial assistance from outside; and the second to produce a sufficiency of local personnel, with the education and training to man the posts in all the activities of the life of the territory. It goes without saying that the African people must be fully represented and associated with any such inquiry which should lead to the drawing up of a programme—not a timetable—which would ensure that the road to self-government was well signposted. I believe this to be a way of teaching the Africans of the difficulties that lie ahead when they have to take up the responsibility of governing their own country.

An eminent student of African affairs, who recently visited East and Central Africa and met many African leaders, told me that one of the questions he always asked was: "Do you really believe that you are in a position to run your own country, and that you have the men available with the knowledge and understanding of the problems?" He said he always received the same answer: "We are not interested in that. We want self-government. If we make a mess of it, it will be our own mess." That is an emotional approach, and does not suggest responsibility or leadership, much less statesmanship. I believe that if African leaders could be closely associated in solving the problems they would earn the respect of their people and would gain in reputation beyond their borders.

May I conclude by saying that I believe we are in good faith pursuing a policy of leading our Colonial territories to self-government on a democratic Parliamentary basis. But if we are to succeed in Africa, the political leaders must play the rules of the game, and not for ever conspire to take short cuts by positive action, be it by civil disobedience or by violence. Such a policy shows political bankruptcy. We support democracy and not demagogy. As I have said, it is for us to take positive action and to show our national genius for solving problems which, at times, seem to be intractable.

LORD LATHAM

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Twining, said that the Africans must be taught to play the rules of the game. Who settles the rules?

LORD TWINING

I think they are well-established rules.

LORD LATHAM

Established by whom?

LORD TWINING

By us, my Lords.

LORD MILVERTON

My Lords, at this late hour of the night, with so many speakers to come, I hope I shall be suitably brief. Indeed, I think we have probably heard almost enough about the Devlin Report itself, and certainly we have had an adequate number of quotations from it. But my chief excuse for intervening at all is the fact that in my own personal career in the past I know what it is like to be faced with an emergency like this. Both as a younger officer and during the period when the supreme authority was mine, I had to make decisions of this nature, and the comments I am now proposing to make are based upon the fact that I have a very good personal understanding of what the atmosphere is like when these decisions have to be made in a time of emergency. The pattern is a very familiar one. Take Dr. Banda himself: this leader who has been brought in and has spent most of his life abroad in this country is so much out of touch with the common life of his people that he does not talk the vernacular. So his speeches have to be interpreted, with all the terrible dangers of that interpretation bearing very little resemblance, as indeed is often the case, to what he has actually said. In addition, after arrival he had been built up by his chief assistants as a sort of messiah, and he accepted that position. The Devlin Report itself tells us that he is a man of considerable vanity, in that he thinks that it is almost inconceivable now that any decision or wish that he could express will not ultimately have to be granted.

I find it extremely difficult to believe that he did not know about this programme of violence. The pattern is a very familiar one, and in Africa especially so: of a leader who has perfected the art of "willing to wound and yet afraid to strike"; a leader who will