HL Deb 25 June 1957 vol 205 cc130-220

3.55 p.m.

Debate resumed.

LORD GLYN had given notice of a Motion to call attention to the increasingly widespread misunderstanding of the respective functions and powers of the Security Council and of the General Assembly of the United Nations; to the grave danger to international peace arising out of the uncertainty as to the precise nature of these functions and powers; and to the urgent need of clarification by means of some form of authoritative pronouncement from the United Nations organisation itself; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to introduce my Motion, in conjunction with that of my noble friend Lord De La Warr. I should like to draw attention to the limited points in the Motion which stands in my name, which deals with the functions of administration at present exercised by the United Nations, and I also want to deal with one or two aspects of the finance of the United Nations. As I have indicated, this is a very limited Motion. It occurred to some of us that there was grave misunderstanding as to the respective functions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and that the more light that could be thrown on to the limit of the functions of both these bodies the less likelihood there was of a misunderstanding.

I think that none of your Lordships will disagree that nothing is more dangerous than to believe you have a screen which is effective but which is, in truth, quite ineffective, because it means that you base a great deal of your hopes and desires on something and then it turns out to be a mere paper or tinsel screen; and the result is that all your hopes for effectiveness are dissipated by the reality of the uncertainty of the strength upon which you are relying.

I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the purpose of the Security Council as originally set up. I think that has been forgotten; and it is well worth while to read the sixth volume of Sir Winston Churchill's book, which deals with the Yalta Conference and all that took place in regard to the establishment of the Security Council, and why it was laid down that it would never do for the General Assembly to have powers in excess of their proper function, which was to discuss matters. It was clearly laid down that if any matter was under consideration by the Security Council, that matter should not be the subject of a resolution by the General Assembly. That was deliberately done, and it is quite clearly stated why it was done. But there is no doubt that there has been a departure from that principle; therefore, I think it is important to clear up that matter.

The next point that I think is of importance is that the power of decision of the Security Council was always intended to end with the unity of the Great Powers after the war. As we all know, the tragedy is that that unity has been dissipated; there is not, in fact, unity between the Great Powers. Therefore, we see a system of "ganging up", as Mr. Menzies called it, by members of the General Assembly which tries to bring, and in fact does bring, a good deal of influence to bear in the various groups to which my noble friend Lord De La Warr referred.

There is another matter in this connection which I think is worth mentioning. To-day, I believe, the General Assembly numbers eighty members (I think it is actually seventy-eight who are effective), and a two-thirds majority is needed for any decisive resolution—that means fifty-two. There are twenty-one American States south of the Canadian border. Western European countries, plus Canada, Australia and New Zealand, add up to twenty. There is thus a total of forty-one, which is eleven short of the required number. It does not require much imagination to realise the amount of lobbying that goes on in regard to those eleven. As we all know, there is nothing so bad as Parliamentary lobbying. Mercifully, we do not have in this country, what is called "log-rolling", or the approach of "You back me on this and I will back you on something else". That is going on all the time in these lobbies in New York. It is a kind of seething mass of corruption, with some trying to get what they want at the expense of what is wanted by the rest of the world. That is something on which we should not rely. It was never intended; and though the words I have used may sound harsh, they are true. One has to realise that the time has come for reality.

On the other side of the picture we have the Soviet group, numbering, with the satellites, ten; and the Arab countries, numbering eleven, making a total of twenty-one; added to which there is the Afro-Asian group. As my noble friend Lord De La Warr has stated, the Afro-Asian group number fifteen, but I believe that four of those adopt an attitude of independence and do not always vote as a group. From our point of view, those four are therefore very important, but I do not for a moment suggest that we should enter into the field of lobbying to try, by improper means, to get their support. The real matter turns on the fact that there is now a situation almost of stalemate in regard to the powers and functions of the Security Council, which is a situation that no noble Lord wants. Those of us who believe in the necessity of something in the nature of the United Nations want to see an effective body, not an ineffective one. We therefore want to wipe out all those things which are wrong and detrimental to the great cause in which we all believe—something in the nature of a world-wide organisation.

There is one other matter which I believe is of importance. The United States recently introduced a motion which was carried. That was done without any revision of the Charter. In the opinion of some people, that led to a change of status as between the General Assembly and the Security Council. I do not believe that it did, nor do I think it was the intention of the United States Government that that should be the effect. But, so far as I know, the supreme authority of the Security Council has never been challenged; and the Charter has never been amended, so that, whatever that action may have been, it in no way altered the original conception that power should rest with the Security Council and not with the General Assembly.

The next point I want to take is that in these circumstances it is surely ludicrous for any of us to call the United Nations a "World Parliament." One too often sees it quoted as such in the newspapers. It is less like this Parliament than anything that has ever existed. It has no powers of procedure that we understand; matters are put before the General Assembly without any adequate time for consideration, and are sometimes rushed through in the hope of getting a decision. That is not the way in which the British Parliament works. The complaint usually is that the procedure of the British Parliament is almost slow, but it would be a very good thing for the United Nations if it could adopt some of our procedure and take more time to consider matters before voting upon them; because to-day there is danger in these rushed votes, carried out as a result of "ganging up."

Another matter which is not without interest is something which has been going on, quietly, steadily and all the time, in spite of, or because of, the United Nations—that is, the gradual building up, outside the United Nations, of a number of world-wide organisations. Added up, to-day they become a very formidable number. They are all dovetailed in, and normally work closely in conjunction with the United Nations. If we go through the dates on which those different organisations were formed, we get a kind of diary of crises in which the world was faced with some appalling risk, when there was an immediate dash into the idea of creating another organisation or some other group of States which would work and function together. If the United Nations was an effective organisation, that kind of thing would not be necessary. It is because of the ineffectiveness to-day of a body which we want to see effective that all these world organisations outside the United Nations have grown up.

First of all, there is the International Co-operative Administration, set up in 1947. Then there is the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, also set up in 1947, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which came into being in 1949. Then, as everybody remembers, the Brussels Treaty was signed in 1948. There was the Colombo Plan of 1951. There was the Organisation of American States which, in fact, was in existence before the United Nations, on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine; and there is the Arab League. It may be (though I do not say that it will happen) that in the future those bodies will coalesce together and may become a joint and efficient organisation without destroying the United Nations—and I think it would be a disaster if that should happen. I believe that people who talk about abolishing the United Nations do not realise the risks that they are proposing. What we want to know is how to make that organisation better and to make it a reality instead of a sham.

The last point to which I want to come is a matter on which I believe we have been very slack—the finance of the United Nations. I do not know whether your Lordships have seen the budget of the United Nations for 1957, a copy of which I have here. During the time I was in another place I spent a good deal of time on the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee, and I can assure your Lordships that we should never have passed these accounts in either one form or the other. I believe that it is very bad for a world organisation to have no auditing body or authority to check its accounts, because that situation leads to a grave danger of people getting jobs which they are not particularly qualified to hold and creating investigations which involve a large proportion of these people. I do not think it is generally realised what very large sums are involved, both directly and indirectly. There is also the fact that, so far as I can find, never since the United Nations was set up has there been any outside review to check over this expenditure and to make suggestions for economies.

The expenses of the Secretary General's office alone amount to 28,462,800 dollars for 1957, and if we analyse that sum we find some very extraordinary things. Then all kinds of committees have been set up, some of which do not seem to be very effective but all of which have a contingent of members who sit and get a certain number of dollars for attendance. And such a session may last a fortnight, a month or more. The list of these committees is an extraordinary one. There is one on the status of women, a subject which has been argued since Adam and Eve. That consists of a very large number of members who are expected to sit for five weeks this year, for which they will gain a good many thousand dollars; and what the result will be I do not know. At any rate, we pay our contribution towards that, and the annual increase of expenditure each year since the United Nations has been set up is something that I think deserves inquiry, because if you do not inquire into these things a scandal undoubtedly results.

Lastly, my Lords, I want to mention one thing with which I had to deal a little time ago. It is a very difficult subject. Your Lordships will forgive me for dealing with it now, but I think it is a good example of the lax way in which financial administration is exercised by the United Nations. All those who know the East and the Middle East have, for a long time, felt guilty about the misery suffered by the Arab refugees. Those of us who know the country and its history feel that it is a real blot that we should allow these people to suffer in misery, without expectation of something better. But I am afraid it is largely because of the lax administration of the United Nations that this happens.

The United Nations Relief and Works Organisation is in the ludicrous position at the present moment of preventing refugees from doing any active work The one hope for these poor Arab people and for their children who are coming on, is for them to be given work. Yet, under these regulations, that is barred. These refugees get a certificate, which is the only form they have to show what they are and what their life can be. But as soon as a refugee accepts work, his relief is cut down proportionately to the salary he receives for the work, so that he is no better off when working than when idling. Should he accept work at a salary which is locally equal to that of a non-refugee and is supposed to be adequate to maintain himself, his certificate is taken away and he loses all nationality and becomes a Stateless person. That is done under the regulations of the United Nations Relief and Works Organisation. There is no hope for that man of getting back to the position he was in before, and still less hope of his life in the future.

I know, my Lords, as we all know. that this is a political scandal which has been kept going because certain Arab countries want to have this misery in existence for political purposes. Surely, if the United Nations take the responsibility for these refugees, is it not the business of the great Powers—if it is right to call anybody that nowadays—to inquire how the administration is being carried out and what extra misery is being imposed on these people? There has been no inquiry since the mission which was appointed, I think, six or eight years ago, and which made definite recommendations about the re-settlement of these people in the Tigris Valley. There is no reason why that should not be done, if we had the will to do it and woke up to the misery that inaction is causing to these poor, wretched, defenceless people.

EARL JOWITT

May I make a suggestion to the noble Lord? I am largely in agreement with him about this matter; I have seen the thing on the spot. It is a matter well worth discussing, but would it not be well that he should put down some substantive Motion dealing with it? He will agree that the Motion he has on the Order Paper contains no reference or hint of this subject at all, and no one has come prepared to deal with it.

LORD GLYN

I quite agree. I am at fault in this matter, but I mentioned it as an example of the need for some oversight of the way in which the money of the United Nations is being misspent. But I agree that there is nothing in my Motion about it, except that it is time there was a definition of the functions and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and I include in that the need for an inquiry into the way the finance of the United Nations is spent.

So that I do not make another slip and very rightly get checked by the noble Earl opposite—I apologise to the House for riot having put down anything about Arab refugees—may I say one thing in conclusion? General Smuts, in the discussions in September, 1944, was largely responsible for the shape of the United Nations. On September 26 in that year he said: Whilst a world organisation is necessary, it is equally essential that our Commonwealth and Empire should emerge from this ordeal as strong and influential as possible, making us an equal partner in every sense for the other Big Two. I think that when General Smuts stated that, when the war was just coming to its end, he recognised that the United Nations, which he so strongly supported, could exist only if it was effective and strong and supported by those Powers who stood together in the Great War.

4.18 p.m.

THE EARL OF DUNDEE had given notice of his intention to move to resolve, That this House deplores the decision of the United Nations requiring Israel to withdraw her forces from Gaza and Aqaba without any guarantee against future aggression and interference with shipping, and that this House considers that no confidence can be placed in the authority of the United Nations until that institution has proved itself willing to enforce all us decisions impartially upon all its members. The noble Earl said: My Lords, the first two Motions which we are discussing together are of great interest, and I think they would have been equally interesting at any time. I am grateful that my own Motion should have been selected as the third one to be debated. I did not expect that it would be, because it is obviously a Motion which was rather more topical when it was put on the Order Paper last February, than it is now.

I certainly do not want to distract attention from the wider questions which have been raised by my two noble friends who have preceded me. I entirely agree with both of them that the United Nations Organisation, like your Lordships' House, can do a great deal of good by publicly discussing all matters of public interest, and that it probably ought to be reformed, but I think that the reform of this House may very likely happen long before the reform of the United Nations Organisation, about which it would be even more difficult to get people to agree. I think that for the time being, at least, we have all got to try to make the best of the United Nations as it is now.

The United Nations Organisation was not designed to deal with a permanent cold war between two gigantic Powers, one of which tries to base its policy on the United Nations while the other has not the slightest intention of ever accepting any United Nations decision except when that decision should happen to suit the designs of Communist aggression. However desirable it may be—I am sure it is desirable—to reform the United Nations Assembly, I do not think that any constitutional reform of this kind would have a great deal of effect on the world struggle between Communist tyranny and human rights which dominates every other question in foreign affairs.

My own Motion refers to Israel, and I have always thought that the history of Israel is a good example of the dangers to peace which may result from trying to base your foreign policy on an international authority which is always obeyed by one side and never obeyed by the other. The modern State of Israel was a creation of the United Nations, which did not approve of the British endeavours to establish peaceful co-existence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine itself, and which obliged us to surrender our Mandate. As soon as the new State had come into being, it was immediately invaded on all its frontiers, and the United Nations was utterly incapable of protecting its own creation. It was like a maternity nurse who helps to bring a baby into the world and then, when the baby is attacked by a savage dog, retires into a corner and whispers to the dog that it is not behaving quite properly.

But this Jewish baby happened to be a good fighter: it was capable of looking after itself, and the Jews not only inflicted a humiliating defeat on all their enemies but also expelled, or at least caused to emigrate, about one million Arab refugees who have since been living in conditions of the utmost misery and destitution. I certainly hope very much that, as the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, suggested just now, there may be a separate debate on this subject, because it is an example of a matter in which the United Nations have greatly failed in their responsibilities, and I do not think that we have time to pursue it properly now. What has happened is that there is now, so far as we can see, a permanent condition of the most implacable hostility, armed hostility, between the Arabs and the Jews.

However much we may sympathise with the more liberal elements in Arab nationalism and however much we may want (as we all do) to help the Arabs towards greater freedom and greater prosperity (which we all want to see), we cannot promise the Arabs the one thing that they want above all others—that is, the extermination of Israel. But Russia can, and has promised to give them that. It cannot be too often repeated that the principal object of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East is to draw Middle Eastern oil into the Communist orbit by helping the Arabs to destroy the State of Israel. The Russians are good strategists, and it is a principle of good strategy to strike where your opponents are weakest. In Western Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance is not entirely weak, not entirely divided. In the Middle East it is both, and if the Russians can gain their objective there, where their opponents are weak, they will then have won the cold war without ever having had to strike in Europe at all.

I think that I should probably be right if I added this—that the political strategy and the military strategy of Russia, with very extensive military preparations, is now giving priority to the Middle East over all other objectives, both in Europe and in Asia; and it may well be that if Russian policy in the Middle East should fail, the regime in Russia may collapse. I have always held the view that the Israel-Egyptian War last Autumn was really a Russian war in which Egypt was the tool of Russia. But, however that may be, the United Nations, again, were not only entirely incapable of stopping this war but they did not even begin to understand what the war was about. When the war was temporarily stopped by French and British action, the United Nations promptly intervened, not to save Egypt, but to save Russian policy from total defeat—in which they were entirely successful.

And I am afraid that everything which has happened since then has tended to re-establish the dangerous position which existed last Summer. I have often asked the Government whether they can give me information about the extent of Russian arms now being sent to Egypt or which have been sent there within the last six months. The Government have not been able to give any precise information. I do not know whether they have any more now. But your Lordships have no doubt seen reports in yesterday's editions of The Timesand the Daily Telegraphof the review of the Egyptian Army which took place on Tuesday—that is, the day before yesterday—in Cairo. It is stated that hundreds of Soviet-built tanks, self-propelled guns, truck-drawn heavy artillery, and other equipment, including a group of barrelled rocket launchers mounted on Soviet-built truck carriers, droned past for three hours in the hot sun. Most of these new armoured weapons for Egypt had been coming in, according to my information, in the last six months. At the same time, Soviet submarines which have been supplied to Egypt, have now been seen following Israeli ships in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Nothing has been done by the United Nations to implement the assurances on which, we understood, Israel agreed to withdraw her forces from Gaza and Aqaba. There are many people in this country who are comforting themselves by telling each other that Egypt's prestige in the Arab world is now declining. I do not know whether that is so or not. But I am afraid that Western prestige in the Arab world is certainly declining, because everything that is happening strengthens the impression among the Arabs that if they back an irresolute and divided West they will be backing a loser, and if they back the Communists, who know what they want and know how to get it, they will then be backing a winner.

I think that we have now got to make the best we can of the United Nations. And may I conclude with one word about what seems to me to be the most hopeful line of policy which the United Nations might be persuaded to follow? One result of the Suez incident was the establishment of a United Nations police force in the area, in whose favour first Britain and France and then the Israelis withdrew. And it should, of course, be remembered that we had always said that it was our intention to withdraw in favour of such a force as soon as it effectively fulfilled its functions. I am told that a fortnight ago a deputation from both Houses of Parliament—with members of different Parties in it—went to see the Foreign Secretary in order to represent to him that the United Nations should be pressed to form a larger and more permanent world police force. I understand that their arguments were favourably received by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. I had nothing to do with that deputation, but the noble Lord opposite, Lord Pakenham, was kind enough to suggest to me last night that I might try to say one word about this matter, since the noble Lord himself, to our great regret, is not able to speak in this debate. I am sure he is right in wishing that the subject should be discussed by your Lordships.

I do not think anyone would suggest that a world police force could have any effect in a world war. Nor would it be able to stop even a minor war, which might have more serious consequences, unless it happened to be there. The Korean War could never have been stopped by the United Nations if the American troops had not been there to begin with, and the Israeli-Egyptian war could not have been stopped by anybody if British and French troops had not been ready stationed in the Mediterranean. Therefore, it would be no use having an international police force stationed say in New York, ready to be sent to any quarter of the world where there was trouble, because by the time the force could be transported to the scene of action, the minor war would probably be finished and the major war might well have begun. Therefore, I think that if an international United Nations police force is to be of any use, it must be permanently stationed in one or possibly two areas in which it is anticipated that trouble is most likely to occur, and in present circumstances I think there is no doubt that this area is the Middle East.

I should like to see the present United Nations Force in the Middle East strengthened and provided with some aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles. It could not be expected to defeat a major act of aggression against Russian armour manned by Russian volunteers, but if preliminary police action, which might prevent a more serious situation from arising, were to be taken by the United Nations Force, it would have an enormous advantage from our point of view, because it could not then be said by any country that this police action was prompted by British colonial imperialism. When Britain has to take police action it is nearly always represented in Asiatic countries, in parts of the Commonwealth and all over the United States that this is an example of British colonialism. I hope that if the Americans have to take any action under the Eisenhower doctrine we shall always support it and not condemn American police action as they have condemned ours. But in the neutralist countries, the Eisenhower doctrine is already being represented as a new kind of American imperialism. I think that a permanent international police force, although it may not be strong enough to defeat aggression, nevertheless might be of the highest value to the cause of peace by removing those misunderstandings and divisions among the free nations which until now have always played into the hands of the aggressor.

4.33 p.m.

EARL JOWITT

My Lords, we have listened to speeches from three noble Lords who sit on the Benches opposite. If I may say so, they are all noble Lords from whom we on this side of the House derive, and have derived, help and whose views we sincerely respect. It always seems to us that they talk good sense and with sound knowledge, though we think that, unfortunately, it is coloured by a wrong political point of view. Having said that, I must say that to-day it seems to me that all three of them have fallen far short of their own standard. In preparing the few remarks that I am going to make to your Lordships, I have found great difficulty in getting to grips with this matter at all. I think the noble Earl who introduced the debate, Lord De la Warr, found just the same thing because he apologetically said that his speech was going to consist largely of platitudes. I feel just the same; I am afraid that my speech will also consist largely of platitudes.

I found little in the noble Earl's speech which was really constructive. That there are defects in the organisation of the United Nations is plain for everybody to see—anybody who does not should have his head examined. The trouble is that it can be amended only by common consent, and at the present moment there is not the slightest chance of getting that common consent. That is the realistic point of view. The noble Earl did not seem to me to be ready to offer much consolation on that particular point. The noble Lord, Lord Glyn, realised what a difficulty he was in, and went boldly right outside the course and jumped a great many hurdles—he jumped very well—which had nothing to do with the competition at all. There is nothing whatever in his Motion dealing with the Arab refugees or with the lack of control of finance. On both these topics, if I may humbly say so, he has my deep sympathy; and if on either of these topics, on a different occasion, he will put down some Motion, I should very much like to take part in the debate. But I have not come prepared to-day, and indeed no-one, reading his Motion, could possibly have been expected to come prepared to-day, to say anything about those matters.

What the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, has done to-day is to suggest that there is great danger to international peace arising out of the uncertainty about the precise nature of the respective functions and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly. That there is an uncertainty is undoubted. Perhaps it is desirable that that uncertainty be cleared up; I will accept that. Somebody recently—I cannot remember who; perhaps noble Lords would be able to help me, but I think it was a distinguished living statesman—said with regard to Constitutions that he thought they should be short and obscure.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Talleyrand.

EARL JOWITT

I thought it was someone more recent than that—Sir Winston Churchill. But never mind. There is much to be said for those who take the view that an unwritten Constitution is better than a written one. But I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, that there is uncertainty, and by all means let us clear it up. But I cannot think that that is the real danger to peace in the world to-day. If we are going to be realistic, surely the danger to peace in the world rises from imperialist Communism, and from nothing else. Whatever force we have, whatever treaties we have, that will be the fact. To the references of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, to Israel, I find myself exceedingly sympathetic. Perhaps I ought not to be, but I am. But I do not at all like the conclusion of his Motion, which seems to me to have the effect of denigrating the United Nations, which, after all, imperfect though it is, is better than nothing; and so I cannot bring myself to accept that.

I think that the long and short of the matter is that there are two schools of thought about this question. There are those who hoped that the United Nations would solve all problems and enable the countries of the world for ever afterwards to live happily together; and there were those of the other extreme school who thought that the United Nations was a mere talking shop, which prevented people from taking any action on their own account and did nothing, and was therefore mischievous. Sometimes, the two points of view are combined in the same person. Sometimes somebody will say that the United Nations was blameful for not having stopped the tragedy in Hungary, and that in regard to Suez, where it had the opportunity of stopping the invasion, it was guilty of acting as a mere interfering busybody.

So, my Lords, it comes to this; that there are some who want it mended and some who want it ended. I think that to-day everybody agrees that to end it would be a disaster. Then, if I may say so, I think the menders are completely unrealistic. Look at the speech which the Foreign Secretary made in another place, a few days ago, on July 10. He said that the Russians had said—and, of course, all their satellites—that any change would be a change for the worse. Well, my Lords, if that is so, they are asserting the doctrine of perfection; and that is a strange doctrine to assert about this or any other human institution. But, equally, it is to my mind quite unrealistic to think that you can talk about changing the United Nations at the present time, which I think I am right in saying involves the consent of everybody. The Foreign Secretary made it plain that he was trying. Let us by all means, as the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr said, get closely in touch with our American friends, and keep closely in touch with them for ever, and see what we can do. But I do not see much chance at the present time.

The maintenance of peace really depends upon the unity of the great Powers, and that we have not got. Of course, if a Power is prepared to disregard its pledged word, and disregard the opinion of the world, then the only way of stopping that is to wage a successful war against such a Power. The only way of stopping Russia from invading Hungary, in the brutal way she did was to declare war on her, and to win that war. I see no other way. If a Power is sufficiently "thick-skinned" and removed from the impact of world opinion that it does not care what people think, what else can be done? All the same, I think that the United Nations was useful. In the Suez case, by a majority of 64 to 5, the Assembly called on us to withdraw. We were sensitive to world opinion, and rightly so; and we withdrew. In the case of Hungary, the Assembly called on Russia to withdraw, in an equally strong resolution.

LORD COLYTON

I am grateful to the noble and learned Earl for giving way. I should like to ask him, on the interesting point he made about what the United Nations could have done about Hungary, this question: If, in fact, the Secretary General had arranged for his team of observers to be flown in during that twenty-four hours or so during which the Nagy Government were in power, would not that have made a difference to the situation?

EARL JOWITT

It might have done; but I doubt it. I am anxious not to say anything controversial. I myself think that it was a Godsend for Russia at that time that the limelight was rather deflected from what she was doing in Hungary by the unfortunate Suez crisis which took place just at that time. I think that if world opinion had been absolutely focused on Hungary there might have been some chance of doing something.

LORD ST. OSWALD

Would the noble and learned Earl agree that the inaction, which he accepts, and the action, which he applauds, both served Soviet Russia?

EARL JOWITT

I do not think the first did. As I have said, I do not want to be controversial, but I believe intensely that our attitude over Suez was wrong and in breach of our Treaty. I had hoped not to have to go into that matter, but if I am right in that view, then I am sure the noble Lord would agree that we should not have acted as we did. It is for this country to keep its obligations, at all costs. But I do not want to go into that.

I would say this. The Assembly passed these resolutions. Do not let us assume too readily that the resolutions are worthless in the case of Russia. The Assembly appointed a Committee; that Committee made a report, and I think that that report shocked the conscience of the world. It is a fact that a week after the report came out Molotov was dismissed. I cannot pretend to say whether one followed from the other, but it is a coincidence. I am by no means sure that, even in the case of Russia, the conscience of the world and public opinion may not have some effect. The noble Lord is laughing at me—well, he may be right. In spite of the fact that Hungary has for years been under oppression, the young Hungarians do not seem to like living under a system of oppression; and in spite of the fact that Poland has for years been under oppression, I do not believe that the desires for liberty are killed in Poland—and I have heard that they may not even be killed in Czechoslovakia. Is it not possible that these stirrings of the human conscience may in time make themselves felt in Russia also? It could be a long time, or it could be a time shorter than that which the pessimists believe. But do not let us belittle the importance of the collective judgment of the world as to what is right and wrong. Therefore I welcome the fact that the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950 did transfer to the Assembly powers which perhaps it did not have before.

I am entirely at one with the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, in saying that the voting system is ridiculous; and no one could say to the contrary about that. But if the conclusions of the Assembly are mere recommendations, does that matter so much? If there is some better system, what is the system to be? Is it going to be based on population? If so, would India, for instance, have seven times the number of votes that we have? How would it be arranged? I follow the noble Lord in saying that the point should be cleared up as to whether the effect of the resolution of the Assembly is a mere recommendation or something beyond that, something to which we have committed ourselves. But it does not seem to me, if it is a mere recommendation, that it matters so much what the system of voting is, so long as a substantial majority—a two-thirds majority, the sort of majority which obtained in the Suez case and in the Hungarian case—is required. Then I think we may fairly claim that that does in some sense mirror public opinion of the world, an opinion which, in my view, cannot be lightly disregarded.

I should like to say a word or two on the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, because I confess that on the particular matter of Israel, which he mentioned, I find myself in a position which is not far removed from his. As your Lordships know, for a lone time past in this House, and particularly when I was Leader of the Labour Party here, I have pressed the Government of the day to give further arms to Israel to offset the arms which were being given to the Arabs. I pressed them to say, categorically and clearly, not merely that they would get together with other like-minded Powers to see what should be done if there was an invasion, but to make it quite plain that, if Israel was invaded, they would all come to her assistance. Unfortunately, those steps were not taken. It is, of course, easy to be wise after the event; but if those steps had been taken, perhaps the action which Israel herself took would not have been necessary.

I have expressed in this House my view that the action which Israel took was justified, faced, as she was, with threats which intimated that the whole State was to be extinguished—thrown into the sea. But I have since talked over this matter with many distinguished jurists, of many nationalities, and undoubtedly the prevalent view is that Israel's attitude was not justified. Article 51 makes it quite plain that the right of self-defence arises in one case, and in one case only; and that is in the event of armed attack. I have not the Article before me, but I shall be corrected if I am wrong. Unless you can say that what Israel had to endure was armed attack (of course, there were the border raids), then it would follow that Israel was not justified in taking the law into her own hands. If she was wrong in taking the law into her own hands, then I suppose it would follow that any judge would have to say thin the territory which she gained by so doing—namely. Sinai and Gaza—should not be retained by her by what, on that hypothesis, was a wrong.

Equally, however, it is abundantly plain that she has the right to pass her shipping through the Suez Canal, and that she has the right to use her own territory, the port of Alat in the Gulf of Aqaba. I saw in to-day's papers, as others of your Lordships did, that a Danish ship had been allowed through the Gulf of Aqaba, and that the one Israeli seaman on board the ship had been arrested and was restored at the other end, so that it could not be claimed that any Israeli had passed through the Gulf. But at any rate the Danish ship, with its cargo to Israel, was allowed to go through.

LORD BIRDWOOD

May I, with great temerity, interrupt for one moment over the question of the position of Israeli ships passing through the Canal? I think we need to be very careful here, because the Egyptian case, as I understand it, is based on Article 10 of the 1888 Convention, which has the effect of excluding those Articles of the Convention which interpret the Convention as allowing complete freedom in peace or war to ships passing through the Suez Canal, even those of belligerents. I think we have to be very careful if we say that the law is against Egypt.

EARL JOWITT

It is not for the noble Lord or me to announce a decision. There is the International Court at The Hague. I would most humbly suggest that the time has now come when the opinion of that Court ought to be taken. It is open either to the Security Council or to the Assembly to ask for an advisory opinion. I readily understand that it might be difficult for Israel to ask for that opinion, but I suggest that it would be a good idea if either the Security Council or the Assembly were to ask for an advisory opinion on two points; first, is Israel entitled to pass her ships through the Suez Canal; and, second, is she entitled to use the Gulf of Aqaba for the purposes of her shipping as she desires? In view of the difficulties we have reached, that seems to me to be the best solution we can take in this matter.

My Lords, I felt that I ought to say what I have said. I want to make it quite plain to the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, that I agree with him in saying that if there is any country which has been exposed to unbearable threats and difficulties it is Israel, and that she has shown great patience in the face of these provocations. I had thought that she was justified in the course she took, but I think l should be right in saying that the majority of jurists would say that in that respect she was wrong, because she could not establish that an armed attack had been made against her.

All that remains for me to say is this. I think it is perfectly true that there are great criticisms to be made of the United Nations—first of all, the elementary fact that the United Nations has no power to right a civil wrong. You may have the Canal snatched away from you in breach of the plainest contract. The United Nations cannot afford you a remedy. All she can say is that you must not take the law into your own hands and provide your own remedy. That, I think, is a weakness. It is a weakness, too, that there is nothing in the United Nations which provides for change or development. Things are constantly changing in this world, and the United Nations, of course, is based on the status quo. But when all these things have been said, I agree with (I think it was) the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, and the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, both of whom said that it is far better to keep what we have got than to go back to the international anarchy which prevailed before we had anything at all. I believe that in that respect we are all at one.

I sincerely hope that the United Nations will grow and develop. I regard it as a living organism which will improve, or may improve, with time. I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Earl, Lord Dundee: I should like to see some kind of a force developed. At present we have an ad hoc force which went into the Canal and did very useful service there. The noble Earl, as I understood him, did not envisage a force that could stand up against one of the great Powers, or anything of that sort, but a force which might be extremely useful in border disputes and the like, with the authority of the United Nations, formed rather on the lines of the French Foreign Legion. I believe that would be valuable.

When the deputation went to the Foreign Secretary the other day, he said that he wanted people to go on canvassing this idea and working it out. That has been done. My noble friend Lord Pakenham, for one, and many Members on the other side of the House have contributed ideas to this, and in the fullness of time it may come about. I will encourage all those things. But just because we cannot get all those things at once, do let us realise that we must keep what we have. We must not jettison what we have, slender protection though it may be. The hopes of those who worked so well in forming this body—my noble friend Lord Attlee, who is with us now; the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who took a most distinguished part; Sir Anthony Eden, who also took part, and many other distinguished public men—have not been realised to the full. That they would admit at once. Their hopes have not been realised because, unfortunately, the unity for which we hoped among the great powers of the world has not been achieved. At the present time, anyone who is completely realistic must recognise those facts. Everybody must recognise that something better could perhaps be evolved. All I would ask your Lordships to do is to show patience and hope, trusting in the ideal that public opinion throughout the world may ultimately have a stronger effect than to-day we can realise. Do not, I urge, jettison what we have, although the sad fact is that the immediate prospect is that there is no chance whatever of amending it along the lines I have indicated.

EARL FORTESCUE

My Lords, I interrupt to inform your Lordships that, as it is probable that we shall go on for some time, dinner will he available in the Dining Room.

5.0 p.m.

The JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF GOSFORD)

My Lords, I should like at this stage to comment on some of the points made by the noble Lords who have already spoken, and in particular those noble Lords whose Motions we are debating to-day. I thank them for their courtesy in having let me know in advance what they were likely to mention during debate.

The Charter of an organisation, like the United Nations, however brilliantly thought out it may be, must in the last analysis depend on the support of its members. The fact that the United Nations organisation has the appearance of having two sets of rules is not the fault of the Charter but of the fact that there are two types of morality in the world to-day. This is no reason for saying that the United Nations is powerless. It is imperative for the peace of the world that it is made to work, and to work effectively. Her Majesty's Government is making, and will continue to make, every effort to this end. The noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, has pointed out some of the defects and has suggested some possible remedies. Although the noble Earl did not specifically suggest reviewing the Charter itself, I should like to take this opportunity to explain the present position.

Your Lordships will recall that on June 6 a Committee consisting of representatives of all members of the United Nations met in New York to consider the organisation, the timing and the procedure of a conference to review the Charter. This was in accordance with a resolution adopted at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly in 1955. Although we and a number of other nations were strongly in favour of holding this conference, the Committee came to the conclusion that all it could do was to recommend to the next Session of the General Assembly that the Committee itself should be kept in being and should report to the General Assembly, not later than its Fourteenth Session: that is, in the autumn of 1959. The reason for this somewhat negative decision was that the Russians and their satellites had at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly made it plain that they would oppose any idea of such a conference. They repeated their objections in the Committee. Their abstention in the vote on the Committee's recommendation was due to the fact that their opposition to Charter review was so firmly rooted that they would not even take up a position on any resolution referring to it.

The Committee's recommendation was accepted by 67 votes to none, with the 9 abstentions from the Communist countries. This is most regrettable, to say the least, but it is no use flying in the face of reality; and we had to agree, as did nearly all the other countries represented on the Committee, that a review conference would be pointless, if not in fact harmful, unless it were to take place in auspicious international circumstances. The fact is that until the Russians change their minds the circumstances will not be auspicious, as no amendment to the Charter can be accepted unless it is ratified by two-thirds of the members of the organisation, which must include all the permanent members of the Security Council. In these circumstances, the Committee's decision was the only practical one to take at the time.

As there is no possibility at present of altering the Charter in order to remove the double standard which appears to exist, let us examine one or two of its faults. As the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, said, the United Nations was extremely effective against Britain over the Suez issue, and in fact backed up Nasser who had by then become an aggrieved party. On the other hand, it has been notably ineffective over Hungary and in other places mentioned by the noble Earl. In other words, it is successful where the countries concerned are willing to abide by a United Nations decision in the case of the Security Council or of a recommendation in the case of the General Assembly. Surely, though, this is not the fault of the United Nations, but of the members who make it up.

In 1950, in Korea, the United Nations provided with reasonable promptness a United Nations Command which was eventually effective in halting the invasion of South Korea by North Korea. True, Russia had at that time withdrawn from the Security Council and therefore was not in a position to exercise her Veto. Nevertheless this is an example of rapid and effective action of which the United Nations is in fact capable, if allowed to do so. Further, we must not forget that the fact that the United Nations was at least trying to promote a settlement made it possible to maintain some measure of control over the turbulent situation in Palestine up to the Israeli attack on Egypt last year, so that for years, despite constant trouble in the area, there were in fact no full-scale hostilities. In the same way, the Kashmir problem has been kept below boiling point, and, while this is due in large measure to the wisdom and moderation of the Indian and Pakistani leaders, a good deal of credit should and must go to the United Nations.

The noble Earls, Lord De La Warr and Lord Dundee, asked whether the possession of a police force might help to give the United Nations the confidence necessary for tackling its problems a little more courageously. Her Majesty's Government have always made it clear that they would like to see the creation of some form of permanent United Nations police force which could be used in emergencies and to keep law and order. That is why we hope that something permanent may develop out of the present United Nations Emergency Force; and in this connection I would refer noble Lords to a statement made by my right honourable and learned friend, the Foreign Secretary, in another place, on July 10. I do not propose to follow the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, into the details of the working of the United Nations emergency force, but I should like to emphasise that this force continues to provide a considerable guarantee of peace in Gaza and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt maintains no troops in the Gaza strip; the frontiers of Israel, with the recent exception of that with Syria, have been relatively free of incident; and the right of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran is at present being exercised.

I should like now to turn to the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Glyn. He mentioned the confusion which exists over the respective functions and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly. I agree that there is misunderstanding, to say the least of it, and that this is dangerous. It is perhaps natural that some misunderstandings should arise, because the functions of the two bodies overlap in certain respects. The United Nations Charter makes it quite clear, for example, that it is the Security Council, where the five Powers have the power of veto, which is vested with the primary responsibility for mainaining international peace and security.

It is also true, as the Charter again makes clear, that the General Assembly has a secondary responsibility in this sphere also. But those who framed the Charter knew very well what they were doing in assigning the primary responsibility to a compact body of eleven instead of to a body designed mainly for debating purposes. There is, of course, another most important distinction which has already been mentioned. The Security Council can take decisions which are binding upon members, while the General Assembly, except in practice in certain administrative and budgetary matters, cannot. The General Assembly can only recommend, and its recommendations are not mandatory. It is the nature of the General Assembly to be a debating forum where ideas are exchanged. It cannot by its nature wield executive authority.

The fact is, however, that the Assembly has lately tended to acquire some of the executive powers which the Charter recognised were unsuited to it. The main cause of this has been the use of the "Uniting for Peace" procedure. This has been used twice since October last year, once in the case of Hungary and once in the case of the Middle East. This procedure, which is described in some detail in the White Paper on the proceedings at the last Session of the General Assembly, was approved by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly in 1950, after the Korean war had demonstrated the danger that, in any emergency, action by the United Nations might be blocked by a Veto in the Security Council. Whether this procedure was properly invoked is not the point at issue. We took the view that it was not properly invoked in the case of the Middle East but was properly invoked in the case of Hungary. Be that as it may, twice recently the General Assembly has had to deal with vital questions concerning international peace and security, in a manner very different from what was foreseen by those who drew up the Charter.

Moreover, the large expansion of membership of the United Nations has, not unnaturally I think, contributed to this tendency by the Assembly to try to increase its power and status where it can. I think this tendency might have been at least partly arrested had it been possible, as Her Majesty's Government wished, to expand the Security Council last year after the admission of the main batch of new members. It is a matter of great regret to Her Majesty's Government that this proposal, which we fully supported, failed because of Soviet opposition: the Soviet Union insisted that there could be no expansion of the Security Council until Communist China was seated in the United Nations.

To sum up, the distinction between the powers and functions of the Assembly and the Security Council is there for all to see, and should be respected if the nations are willing to do so. Once again, we come back to the old, old difficulty, which is that, while some nations are prepared to observe and to abide by the spirit of the Charter, others are not. I doubt, therefore, whether it would be possible to have an authoritative pronouncement by the United Nations itself setting out the differences in the powers and functions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. In a sense, as I have tried to explain, it already exists in the basic United Nations document—the Charter. On the other hand, if it were possible by an amendment of the Charter to make the distinction and differences clearer, in a manner acceptable by those concerned, then such a proposal would have the full support of Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government will do all in their power to have the authority of the Security Council maintained.

The noble Lord, Lord Glyn, called attention to the deficiency of the United Nations' budgetary system and mentioned that it has no equivalent of the Estimates or Public Accounts Committees. It may perhaps be helpful to your Lordships if I explain the budgetary procedure adopted by the United Nations. I think your Lordships will understand from this that it is not perhaps quite so loose as the noble Lord seemed to suppose.

The expenditure of the United Nations is controlled by the General Assembly under powers derived from Article 17 of the Charter. The United Nations budget is drawn up by the Secretariat and appears in its first form as a report by the Secretary-General. This report is considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. After a detailed review, which generally lasts about two months, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions passes its own report and version of the budget to the Fifth Committee, where it is further considered. It is at this stage that individual sections of the budget are considered in detail. Each section gaining a majority in the Fifth Committee is returned to the Secretary-General, who produces a revised section. This is continued until all sections have obtained a majority. The Fifth Committee then submit their report, containing the revised budget, to the Assembly in plenary, where the budget is finally accepted. Budgetary questions require a two-thirds majority under Article 18 of the Charter.

Finally, I turn to the second part of the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee: that the United Nations should prove itself willing to impose all its decisions impartially upon all its members. I should like to say at once that I am not without great sympathy for what he says. The trouble is that the United Nations does not have the means, at present, to enforce its decisions. This derives from the fact that the Charter has never been enabled to operate as its drafters intended. As I said at the beginning of my speech, the Organisation has to depend upon the good will of its members, upon their willingness to abide both by the spirit of the Charter and by the recommendations of the Assembly or the decisions of the Security Council. Until this situation is rectified the authority of the United Nations will undoubtedly suffer. But I am sure that your Lordships, with the world divided as it is now, and the United Nations reflecting these divisions, would not contend that the representatives of the United Nations of a certain point of view, however morally justified, should invariably attempt to impose the authority of the United Nations by force. That, I think your Lordships would agree, in the Hungarian affair could easily have led to nuclear war.

The fact that the Russians should have got away with ignoring the resolutions of the United Nations on Hungary, however reprehensible, is a reflection of Russian international behaviour. That world opinion is flouted is not to say that world opinion is wrong, or that it can always be enforced. Indeed, who knows what effect the attitude of the United Nations over the Hungarian affair may yet have on the conduct of Russian policy in the longer term?

Recent events will have performed a valuable service if they have brought home to members of the United Nations a better understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Organisation. Unfortunately, I cannot say that it follows that steps will be taken to put things right. This requires not only a wide measure of international agreement, but a greater respect for international law. I can assure your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government, for their part, will not fail to support all proposals which would have the practical effect of strengthening the United Nations.

5.20 p.m.

EARL ATTLEE

My Lords, after the speech of my noble friend Lord Jowitt I shall not detain the House for long. I recall that it was a little over twelve years ago that, with others, I was engaged at San Francisco on the work of forming the Charter. On looking back, one can say that there was a certain amount of illusion and lack of a sense of reality at the time. For instance, the view most prevalent at the time in the minds of our American friends was that they and Russia were the two "big boys"; that they would agree and all the world would go with them. We found that influence later. Since then, the Americans have swung right the other way. There was also the illusion, which I never shared, that at that time China was a great Power. It was not. Since then it has become a great Power. Yet at that time China, which was then in a general state of civil war, was put on the Security Council. Now that China is an effective Power in the world she is disregarded.

One has therefore to look and see. In particular, it is all too easy to view the proceedings of the United Nations from the angle of the interest of one's own country at a particular time. For instance, the action of the Assembly over Suez caused quite a revulsion of feeling among a number of people who felt that, whatever might be done by other countries, it was shameful that their country should have acted in the way it did. We must take a pretty realistic view of it. If, as a matter of fact, we were wrong, it is just as well to confess it.

I agree that at the moment there is not a great hope of getting the change we want. It is really quite useless to think that all the wrong is on the one side. I think that Russia has been completely wrong in the way she has used the Veto. I think that Russia is completely wrong in her obsession and fear—it is largely fear—of the West. I think the United States is wrong in her objection to putting China on the Security Council. I think we have a rather better balance in regard to these things—that may be merely a matter of national make-up. Obviously, we want the United Nations, and we must continue to work it. We can only hope that in time it may develop. But I certainly think that a time will come when there must be an overhaul. The Security Council was created at the end of the war. As was natural, the victors in the war were placed on the Security Council. The time must come when that situation must be reviewed. Since then, Asia has attained a much bigger position in the world than before. We have to get away from the old obsession that it is only Europe and people of European descent who matter in the world. China, certainly, and India, I think, must, in time, have a place on the Security Council. No doubt in time we shall also have to consider ex-enemy countries. Therefore, one ought to keep one's mind wide open to changes which are necessary.

I have seen a number of detailed proposals for changes in the Constitution of the United Nations. I do not believe in them much. One could have a wonderful Constitution, but Constitutions do not work unless people want them to work. Our Constitution could break down at dozens of points: it does not do so because we want to work it. Your Lordships' House could not work if it were not for the fact that we want to work it. The United Nations' Constitution does not work logically one bit. Therefore, I think one must view this matter with a calm and judicial air, and must not expect the United Nations to achieve wonders all at once. Progress has been made. After all, there has been great progress in those parts of the organisation of which we hear least—that is, all the non-military and non-quarrelsome parts. That is something to build on.

The actual Motions before us call attention to certain defects. They are there; and I do not think they are the only defects. Therefore, as I say, we have got to work at it. But fundamentally, as things are to-day, the United Nations must depend primarily on its effect on public opinion. Let us remember that, in all the years during which it has been operating, public opinion behind the Iron Curtain has practically never been able to express itelf. Now, a breach has been made there. One has at last begun to get expressions of opinion from people behind the Iron Curtain; and if that relaxation continues, so much the greater will be the effect and influence of the United Nations. As to the rivalry between the Assembly and the Security Council, I do not think there is a serious difficulty there. One thing we should beware of is this tendency to think of the United Nations as a kind of parallel to Parliament. That is perfectly ludicrous. You could not work it, even if you had a vote such as we have at the Labour Party Conference in which the trade unions stand for so many hundreds of thousands of members; it is impossible to equate the different parallels and allocate a vote. It is quite useless to think that you can act by a meticulous consideration of votes and small majorities. It is only when you get a large consensus of opinion that you get something really effective.

My final point is this. Among other matters brought up to-day has been the subject of an International Police Force. I remember being most enthusiastic for that idea in between the wars. Lord Davies carried on a great agitation for that, and I was pleased to associate myself with it. I have always believed that that should be done, and I opposed the kind of criticism made by people who said that you could not get a composite force made up of people speaking different languages. Of course, in the war we had a demonstration of what could be done, by that remarkable army under General Alexander in Italy. Since then, we have had examples of it by what has been done in Korea, and to-day in the Near East. It can be done, and it is a great object lesson.

We have to get away from nationalist rivalries, and have people belonging to a force which is quite definitely serving the cause of peace and humanity, and not one individual interest. Therefore, while I do not profess to suggest for a moment that any major conflict could be settled by an International Force, I believe that where difficulties arise such as we find in borderline places, where law and order have not always been stable, there would be a great advantage if an International Force could be sent to keep the peace, rather than a force belonging to one particular Power, because, whatever is happening in these areas, there is still the taint of imperialism. I remember particularly at the time of the Korean campaign stressing how important it was that any action taken there should command the assent of Asiatic as well as European Powers. That was done. I think, too, that in dealing with any of these minor disturbances we must be very careful that we do not have interference by some Power which, rightly or wrongly, is suspect. That was one of our troubles over Suez. I offer no more than these brief remarks to your Lordships. I think we need to have great patience. We cannot afford to scrap the United Nations. It may be years before we get effective peace, but, after all, we have had centuries of war.

5.30 p.m.

LORD MCNAIR

My Lords, I think I should begin by declaring an interest in this matter, because my pension as a former member of the International Court of Justice depends upon the budget of that Court, which budget forms part of the budget of the United Nations. Several aspects of this debate have gratified me very much. I should like to say a word or two about the proposal for a permanent United Nations Force, which was endorsed by two of the three noble Lords to whom we are indebted for this debate. I believe that such a Force could be created within the limits of the Charter and without breaking the law.

It is most illuminating to examine the process of the establishment of the United Nations Force that operated in the Middle East towards the end of last year and the beginning of this year. It will be noticed that the most meticulous care was taken, in communications between the Secretary-General and the Governments contributing contingents to that Force, to see that everything that was done was legal and constitutional. But the proposal now under consideration differs in one or two respects from the establishment of the Force of a few months ago. The proposal now is that the permanent Force should be formed not by the contribution of national contingents by different Governments but by means of voluntary and individual enlistment; and I attach great importance to that. I believe that we are much more likely to get the kind of men who are wanted in such a Force if they have personally enlisted in it and thus are volunteers in the true sense of the word.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE EARL OF HOME)

My Lords, would the noble and learned Lord explain whether he means that the United Nations should have an air force and an army—armed forces—of its own and for which it pays? I am asking purely for information.

LORD MCNAIR

The proposal which has been made recently by a group of Members of this House and another place, and from all Parties or no Party, does not go to the extent indicated by the noble Earl. The suggestion for the moment is simply that there should be a lightly armed Force of some 20,000 men, available to be flown at short notice to any sensitive spot in the world—not that this Force should engage in warfare in the ordinary sense of the word. In the light of our experience of the last ten years, and indeed the years before that, one can easily imagine that it would be of great value to have a Force immediately available for the temporary occupation of a danger spot, pending, for instance, the conclusion of an armistice, the holding of a plebiscite or the reference of a dispute to some kind of pacific settlement. It was very gratifying to note that quite recently this proposal received a very encouraging response from the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and having regard to the welcome that has emerged in so many speeches to-day, I sincerely hope that those who were responsible for putting forward this proposal will now study it even more closely and endeavour to ensure that it has the fullest consideration in the highest quarters.

If your Lordships will permit an obiter dictum, I must say a word or two about one statement made by the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, which rather surprised me. I am wondering whether he had firsthand information on the point. The noble Lord said that there was no auditing authority in the United Nations. I can speak only from my own first-hand experience in this regard. I know that when I was responsible for the budget of the International Court this question of the budget was each year a quite lengthy and substantial matter. In the first place, it was necessary to send a representative of the Court to appear before the appropriate committee of the Assembly which prepares the budget. There the representative of the Court would have to justify the various items for which he was asking. Secondly, it was necessary to have somebody present during the meeting of the Assembly to appear before the Finance Committee of the Assembly in order again to justify the contents of the budget. But thirdly—and perhaps most important—I recollect that each year the auditors visited The Hague; and they were not officials of the United Nations but responsible financial officials of the Member States who had been seconded for that purpose. Your Lordships will therefore understand my surprise on hearing that statement from the noble Lord. I have never examined the whole accounts of the United Nations. Indeed, my knowledge of accountancy is so slight that they would not convey very much to me.

Another gratifying thing about our debate so far has been the realisation of the fact (I hope I am not exaggerating) that the United Nations is not an external body, a foreign body, seeking to impose its will upon this country and others, but a body in the creation of which we have ourselves played a part. If I may say so it was very well described recently by the Prime Minister, when he said that, like any other human organisation, it is no more than the sum of its partners; and it is only the partners in this organisation which can improve it. It is a good thing that we should have an opportunity of doing a little stocktaking and considering in what way we can suggest improvements to our fellow partners, members in this organisation. I think it is quite possible to do that without holding a post-mortemon Suez, although it is inevitable that Suez should be in all our minds.

If we may attempt to construct a balance sheet of the United Nations in the light of the last twelve years, we find certain items on the credit side, and certain items on the other side, I hesitate to say as much as I should like to your Lordships upon the non-political work of the United Nations. Unfortunately, both nationally and internationally, political activities receive much more attention than the social work of Governments or of any organisation. But we cannot lose sight of the solid progress in these non-political activities that has been made by the United Nations in the last twelve years. I will mention one or two of them very briefly: the prevention of disease, such as malaria, and the improvement of health; the relief of poverty and destitution, particularly amongst refugees; and the control of evils such as the drug traffic and the white slave traffic.

And now I come to labour conditions. I consider that this has been one of the League of Nations and of the United Nations. At one time I had unusually good opportunities of observing the work of the International Labour Organisation. By a large number of Conventions, always preceded by most expert study and investigation, they are gradually enacting a labour code dealing with conditions of labour in the widest sense of the word, in which I include such things as maternity protection, prohibition of night work for women and children, fixing proper minimum ages for the entry into this or that kind of employment, labour inspection and so forth.

The reason why we in this country are so little aware of this aspect of the work of the International Labour Organisation is that most of it has consisted in levelling up labour conditions in industrially backward countries so as to be more approximate to the conditions that prevail in this I country and in half a dozen other of the leading industrial countries. But from the point of view of the workers in the industrially backward countries, I am quite persuaded that this Specialised Agency, the International Labour Organisation, which is, I believe, the only one that has I had a continuous existence since 1919, has brought untold benefits to millions of people who were too weak to do anything for themselves. I would willingly continue on that social theme, because I think it is so important, from the point of view of establishing the moral authority of the United Nations in the world, that there should be the greatest possible public realisation of what is being done in this unsensational social sphere.

I turn now to the debit side, the political side, the political side. There can be no doubt that the high hopes that were formed in 1945 have been deeply disappointed—one must be quite frank about that. I do not propose to deal with any particular incidents marking that decline of hope; I prefer to ask you to look at the three principal things that have brought about this decline. It was, as we all know, intended by the framers of the Charter that the eleven members of the Security Council, five of them permanent, should bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But the discharge of that responsibility has been frustrated by three things: first, the absence of good relations between all the permanent members; and secondly, the abuse of what is commonly called the Veto, although I believe that word does not occur in the Charter but it is the popular method of describing the effect of the provision that in decisions in non-procedural matters there must be an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Your Lordships will notice that I have said "the abuse of the Veto" rather than "the existence of the Veto," because I should be very surprised indeed to see the great Powers join in eliminating this so-called Veto from the Charter altogether. And thirdly, there is the failure of the provision in the Charter which was designed to place armed force at the disposal of the Security Council for use with the assistance of its Military Committee. Those are, as I see them, the three main factors that have brought about this frustration of what we all regarded as the primary responsibility of the Security Council.

Those three things have produced a certain shift of the centre of gravity. I should like to explain that. As to the function of maintaining peace and security, the centre of gravity has been shifted from the Security Council to the Assembly and to regional organisations such as N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., and so forth. As to sanctions for the power of the United Nations, the centre of gravity has shifted from military measures to public opinion—we had a striking demonstration of that not very long ago. One of the main ways in which this shift of the centre of gravity from the Security Council to the Assembly took place is to be found in what is popularly called the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. I do not propose to take up your Lordships' time by examining that resolution, but I would most earnestly direct your attention to what appears to me to be the clearest statement of this "Uniting for Peace" resolution that I have yet seen, and it occurs in the Report of the Proceedings of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, which was presented to Parliament within the last week or two. Your Lordships will find there Annex I entitled "Uniting for Peace Procedure" which gives a clear statement. It is interesting to note that Great Britain was one of the principal sponsors of the resolution that brought about this change, and we are told here that the views of the United Kingdom delegation were closely reflected in the resolution as adopted.

In spite of that frustration, I think any fair-minded person must agree that the Security Council, confronted by one acute problem after another throughout the last twelve years, has, nevertheless, been able, not by the exercise of force but by the exercise of powers of persuasion and negotiation, to bring a large number of those disputes to a successful conclusion, and has been doing precisely the sort of work that the Council of the League was doing. And it will be recollected that the Council of the League had no force at its disposal.

I think it very unlikely, as things stand at the present moment, that there can be any wholesale revision of the Charter. I do not doubt that Her Majesty's Government, who are keeping in close touch with their like-minded partners in the United Nations, will choose the right moment at which proposals for either minor or major revision of the Charter can take place. The framers of the Charter had the foresight to see that the Charter, like any other human document, could not remain unaltered for all time, and they made express provision for its revision after a period of ten years. But, of course, in the present political climate, it would be folly to attempt that.

My Lords, there are only one or two other things that I wish to say. I think your Lordships will all agree with me that the existence of eighty-one independent sovereign States without any closer and more effective organisation than exists to-day is a standing danger to the peace of the world, and that no person of good will can or ought to relax efforts to do everything in his power to make that organisation closer and more effective.

There is one aspect of the Charter (and this is my final point) that has been borne in upon me in my contacts with many foreign colleagues, and I do not think it is fully realised in our own country. We in this country have no written Constitution: there is no single document to which we can look as enshrining our liberties and our main purposes. But though I, for my part, believe that the relevant Statutes and Case Law and constitutional conventions, which together make up our Constitution, suit us better than a written Constitution would, nevertheless the majority of the inhabitants of this world think otherwise, and in most countries there is a single document which they call a Constitution. Notably is that the case in the United States, where, as your Lordships know, the Constitution is the subject of deep reverence. Children receive instruction upon it in the schools, and it occupies a unique position in the general make-up of the ordinary American citizen.

LORD WINSTER

It gets them into great difficulties at times.

LORD MCNAIR

The result of that habit of looking upon a Constitution in that way is that the Charter, with all its imperfections, is looked upon by large numbers of people as a Constitution for the nations of the world.

That habit of mind, that way of looking at the Charter, has produced that degree and that kind of devotion and emotion which in those countries habitually surround their Constitution. Possibly our nearest approach to it is the way we feel about Magna Carta and the Writ of Habeas Corpus. But that widespread devotion to the Constitution is a fact that we cannot afford to forget. And now that the legal ties between the members of the British Commonwealth are weakening, the Charter seems to me to be assuming a new importance for us in our relations with our fellow members of that Commonwealth. Here we have a legal tie with them, in this common membership in the United Nations; and. looking ahead, it seems to me that we are not likely to be able to get the fullest measure of co-operation with our fellow Commonwealth countries, and with the United States of America, unless we can adopt something of that attitude towards the Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution.

One thing we all seem to be clear about; that is, that the United Nations is quite indispensable. No one has proposed that we should leave it. I would go further and say that I think it would be a disaster, both for us and for the United Nations, if we were to give the impression that we were dragging our feet in our allegiance to it and our co-operation with it. It has been very gratifying to me to hear so many noble Lords speaking in such a way that it is clear how important, both to us and to the United Nations, the continued support of this country is.

5.58 p.m.

LORD BIRDWOOD

My Lords, my first duty is to offer my profound apologies to the noble Earl who is to reply for the Government for my inability to be here at the close of the debate. When the date of the debate was changed from July 24 to July 25 it found me with an engagement in the country which I have to keep. In the circumstances, I can only offer my apologies and also thank the noble Earl opposite, Lord Lucan, who has so kindly allowed me to speak now. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, referred to the difficulties that the first three speakers had had, perhaps, in getting to grips with their problem. That all the more emphasises the difficulties that subsequent speakers have in delving into a rather large bran-pie.

So far as the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, is concerned, it dealt specifically with the case of the Middle East, and I should like to try to redirect our minds to the position of the United Nations in regard to both the Israelis and the Arabs. It seems to me that the case is always presented as the United Nations operating so as to assist the Arab cause at the expense of the Israeli cause. To give but one example, the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, has said that the modern State of Israel was created by the United Nations. I submit that that is not quite correct. The United Nations created something considerably less than the modern State of Israel, which created itself in 1948. In fact, the United Nations created a partition, in November, 1947, which represents less than the modern State. That is an example of the way in which the operations of the United Nations are invariably interpreted as assisting the Arabs at the expense of the Israelis. If we were to delve farther back in history, I could quote some telling examples where the United Nations had operated to frustrate justice, as the Arabs interpret it. I suggest that when we attempt to show the United Nations as always acting to the detriment of Israeli interests, it operates as a boomerang.

I shall not attempt to follow the three noble Lords who, with far more authority than I can command, pushed deeply into the difficulties of the United Nations. We might remind ourselves that it is not so much the machinery which is at fault as the mechanics who work the machine; and if we were to follow that sidewalk off the main road, we should be in the realms of philosophy and metaphysics. So I do not propose to follow that kind of argument. I propose to confine myself to the issue, which has been referred to several times, of the prospect of a permanent United Nations Police Force and, secondly, to refer to a matter of theory, where it seems to me I shall be ploughing a completely lonely furrow and on which I would ask your Lordships to reserve judgment until we come to the way my mind operates on our association with the United Nations in future.

Whilst we all recognise the defects well enough, instinctively we regard the fortress as impregnable. I am going to put forward the view that in certain circumstances the fortress is not impregnable. I would put it this way. The noble Earl said that anyone who can deny the need for some such organisation is not a realist. I would put it in a different way, and say that we all recognise the need for such an organisation but that the realist may be the one who believes that the only way it can ever be effective is to make a fresh start. That is something a little different from what the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, referred to when he spoke of deliberate sabotage.

The idea of a United Nations permanent Police Force is of course as old as time. It owes much to Sully, King Henry of Navarre, and the late Mr. Davies, in our own country. It is one of those matters the logic of which is quite indisputable but the practical difficulties of which seem to me to be equally overwhelming. All the familiar analogies can be deployed: the policeman, the court, the criminal and his victim—I will not repeat them. I come straight to the practical creation of such a Force, and I take as the basis of my argument the Report, which has been referred to, of the Commission set up, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, under the auspices of Federal Union in combination with our own Parliamentary Group for World Government, which was published on May 27. I agree with much of that Report, which well repays reading, but I would select one or two points on which I am in disagreement.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, reminded us, the Commission discussed whether the Force should take the form of contributions by national contingents or of individual enlistment, and they come down heavily on the side of individual enlistment—a view which the noble and learned Lord supports. High qualifications of education and character are advocated, and, wisely, it is laid down that no one member of the United Nations shall command more than 10 per cent. of the total Force, the idea being to obviate the possibility of the Force coming under the control of one particular Power. But the main argument they produced for such a Force, which seems to me to bear some resemblance to the French Foreign Legion, is that the withdrawal of a national contingent on instructions from its own Government would not arise, because in a system of individual enlistment the individual would be insulated from politics. I am not convinced by that argument. Certainly individuals can be isolated in time of peace, when they are training; but it seems to me that directly the Force is put into operation, a national Government could demand the withdrawal of individuals just as easily as it could demand the withdrawal of a national contingent.

Here we are up against the old type of problem in which the best is the enemy of the next best and the practical. We have to ask ourselves: "What works?". The fact is that in two world wars we have seen national contingents do not too badly. They won two world wars; and the same applied to Korea. To-day, the whole conception of the North Atlantic Treaty is based on national contingents. Anybody who visits Paris recognises quickly what a high degree of successful co-operation naticnal contingents have been able to reach. Even the much-maligned United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai, a modest and very cosmopolitan symbol of belated United Nations solicitude for international justice, was put on the ground within twelve days of the Canadian resolution of November 4 which was responsible for its creation. And though it may be said that that Force could be by-passed by either Israel or Egypt, supposing they so wished, since its inception there has been no major land incident in the Sinai Peninsula. I think the fair way to regard such a Force is to regard it as a 6 lb. baby which will one day, perhaps, grow into a vigorous adult.

I should like to comment on this question of the size of the Force. We have been reminded that the Commission concentrated on a small force of 20,000, because they foresaw that that was the only type of Force which the United Nations would be prepared to accept. I would suggest, however, that a large Force is not necessarily the answer, provided, as noble Lords have pointed out, that the Force set up can be moved into, or near to, the probable area of operations and can be interposed between prospective belligerents. If I may use an analogy, before it is born a baby hardly needs much force to stop it from being born; but once it is born, a much larger force is needed to prevent it from growing. My mind moves back to Palestine in 1948. At that time, if we had had a Force of some 15,000, well-led and well-trained, they would, apart from saving the life of a very gallant international servant, Count Bernadotte, in my opinion, have brought the whole of the Palestine situation under control. It is not so much the size of the Force as the representation in the background that matters, the knowledge that he who attacks the Force attacks the world.

I would criticise one feature of this interesting Report—that is, the presumption that a Force could enter a country only with the consent of the Power concerned. I am not quite sure whether the implication is "with the consent of" or "at the request of"; there is a subtle difference between the two. The situation, if it is "at the request of," is not so outrageous, because it could be argued that any real victim of aggression would not hesitate to invoke an international force to come to its aid.

But is that always the case? Suppose, for instance, that in the case of Suez we had not acted, and an Anglo-French force had not gone on to the Canal; and suppose that there had been an international force available to go: would Egypt have asked it to go? I very much doubt it. All the indications are that Egypt would have turned to her neighbours in the Arab League and would have far preferred their assistance to that of an international force. In other words, it is not sufficient, to my mind, to depend upon the invocation of aid by the State concerned. But, in any case, I submit that the whole concept of a force which has been set up by the United Nations being allowed in only on the consent of the nation concerned is also linked to the right to demand the same force to go out; and immediately you admit that, the Security Council, in its rôle of custodian of international peace and justice, becomes a mockery. I would say that a force which cannot be ordered in by the responsible United Nations authority is not worth the creation.

It is here that we face a dilemma. It is quite easy to create an effective and foolproof force, to organise it on a regional basis, and to have all the plans ready to bring it to any part of the world by air or sea. Any group of officers in the War Office or in the Imperial College could in a month or so thresh out a perfect plan on paper. But, when all that is done, are you going to risk placing that force at the disposal of an international dispensation in which international democracy has gone completely mad? By all means let us continue to think out ways and means of improving this force; let us recognise that the ideal is a force on the basis of individual enlistment. There will be other Koreas and other Suez situations, and it would be folly to abandon the idea of collective United Nations action. But let us remember the long-term problem implied in the prospects of its misuse, or a refusal of its use, by the wrong authority at the helm.

In conclusion, I would turn to the theoretical side and refer to my ideas of this long-term problem. To my mind, it all depends on a grave decision: are we going to view the future progress of the international family in terms of expediency or in terms of morality? If the former is to be the pattern of the future, then, remembering that the Charter revision requires separate ratification by eighty-one Powers, we can drift on for a century or so in coexistence, watching international injustice thrive in successive situations. I can give an example that passed unnoticed the other day but which is extremely significant. In April of this year the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, after much argument, adopted a quite innocuous resolution concerning the right of asylum of refugees in a foreign country—and, of course, the case of 120,000 Hungarian refugees was in mind. Hungary was not specifically mentioned in the debate, but the Soviet representative was quick to assume, and quite rightly, that Hungary had been in the mind of the Commission, and therefore proceeded completely to frustrate and obstruct the proceedings. I am sorry to say that he was supported by the Indian representative, and in the words of The Times this gentleman also objected that extraneous matters of political consideration should not be included in the resolution; and in a spirit of compromise the offending phrase"— that is, the phrase referring to Hungary— was eliminated. In other words, a moral issue—and let anybody who doubts that go and seek medical advice—was interpreted as a political issue at the behest of a minority of the Commission and was therefore discarded. Justice in terms of morality was negatived, and the compromise was hailed as a success.

My Lords, I submit that continued recognition of that kind of process is utterly degrading for a great Power to accept as a permanency; a Power which has twice in this century risked its existence in discarding expediency and supporting justice. So let us get the United Nations and its future clear in this matter of priorities. I would remind your Lordships that the Afro-Asian bloc and the East-European bloc to-day together command thirty-five votes, sufficient always to block a two-thirds majority. May I, in this situation, revert to a familiar analogy, often given, of the case of a kind of social club to which most of us belong, and I would put it in this way. In 1945 a club was formed and rules were framed for its conduct. Persistently, one influential member of the committee breaks the rules and persuades a number of others to do so with him.

What then happens in your normal social club? In normal conditions the members turn round and expel the offending member. But if the rules have been so framed as to make that explusion impossibie—and in this case it means that Article 18 of the Charter cannot be implemented, because you are never going to get your two-thirds majority—there is only one thing remaining to do in a normal club in our country, and that is for those members who agree that the rules have been broken to leave the club. The subsequent fate of the club may be a matter for regret, but the logic of placing your priorities in their right order, at least, would have been faced.

The United Nations is an instrument to protect principles, and if the instrument fails to protect principles, surely the thing to do is not to scrap the principles, but to scrap the instrument. I am not going so far as to say that the instrument can be scrapped; but what I will say is that if the members who feel that way leave the club, then something. happens: either the club reconsiders its rules or one may see some of these professional international negotiators, who "to and fro" around the world, trying to sort out these situations, get to work and try to persuade the members who have left the club to go back again. In those circumstances, they are in a fairly safe bargaining position to have the rules revised.

These views may seem hardly compatible with a Question that I have down for next week concerning the recall of the United Nations in the case of the Hungarian situation. I would submit that there is a clear line indicating a parting of the ways between a full use of the United Nations and pushing every issue you can lay your hands on into it by a decision when the thing is failing you; and therefore it is perhaps better to leave the club. It is the doubt and ambiguity of the qualified use, or merely using it because it is there, that seems to me so dangerous.

In effect, I am not suggesting the destruction of the Agencies. I am suggesting only a decision concerning the political machinery. I may have shocked some of your Lordships in doing so. If so, I ask those who dislike these harsh words about the United Nations to believe me if I claim that it is far easier to reconstruct from new foundations with no ties with a completely arbitrary kind of past, than to revise an existing failing organisation. The very conception of the Security Council with its "Big Five" is based on a purely arbitrary point in history. In another generation the children may come along and say. "Big Five? Who are they? Why are they?" The whole conception is purely arbitrary.

But do not let us necessarily scrap the Agencies which we have been reminded of, in the cultural and educational sphere, and so on. They have done excellent work. It may be that by keeping them sustained we may find common ground, and perhaps in time the political issues may be overshadowed. Conversely, I suggest that if every time we meet on the political level we disagree, might it not be better not to meet for a time? We should then revert to a laissez faire kind of system, of friends and groups of friends, seeking themselves out, on an international scale, in the kind of game which we used to play as children, known as General Post.

I have not forgotten that the policy of the great United States, implicit in the formula, "Action through and in complete support of", faces up to no question of any showdown. I have also not forgotten that perhaps the question of the admission of Communist China is involved. If I were to follow those two particular alleys we should be talking about other things. I think it was Palmerston who said that we have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. All I have hoped to show is that our permanent interests and the defence of permanent principles are indissolubly linked and inseparable.

6.23 p.m.

THE EARL OF LUCAN

My Lords, I rise to deal with only one aspect of this subject, and I rise as a substitute, because my noble friend Lord Pakenham is the person who is, above all others, qualified to talk about the question of a permanent Force for the United Nations. My noble friend was Chairman of a Commission which was set up by Federal Union to study this question. I think your Lordships should know something of the composition of this Commission, because it was a remarkable essay in all-Party agreement. There were members of the House of Commons; Admiral Hughes-Hallett was Vice Chairman; and there were two Conservative Members and two Labour Members. The noble Lord, Lord McNair, gave his advice. Major-General Lyric, the Chairman of the United Nations Association, was a member, as was Captain Liddell Hart. The Commission, moreover, had the advice of many highly qualified officers and ex-officers of the Services.

The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, gave his views and his criticisms on the proposals for a permanent light Force published by this Commission. The short answer to his criticism is: What more would it be possible to get at the present time? Admittedly, such a Force would in no sense be a means of asserting the authority of the United Nations against opposition, but how many Powers in this world at the moment would give up their sovereignty to the extent of allowing foreign troops on their soil? There is no country, our own not excepted, which I believe would go to those lengths towards world government and the rule of law. We all hope to get there some day, but the study that has been made was done on strictly realistic lines, on the grounds that something in the nature of a token force, or a symbol of United Nations opinion, is better than nothing at all.

LORD BIRDWOOD

Could the noble Earl tell me whether the Commission studied what is the existing situation, as I understand it—that is, that under the Charter as it is at present nations are in a position to earmark certain contingents to be available to deal with an international situ