HL Deb 23 April 1953 vol 181 cc1135-218

2.37 p.m.

LORD HENDERSON rose to call attention to the International Situation; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper, I should like to take the opportunity to express our sympathy with the Foreign Secretary who is incapacitated, and to hope that he will make a speedy recovery. I have no doubt that he is chafing at the fact that he is not able to attend to his responsible duties at this very important period. We all hope for his speedy return, fully restored to health.

Since we last surveyed the world situation, in two great countries there has been the end of an era. The inauguration of Mr. Eisenhower as President of the United States has ended the era of Democratic Administrations which lasted twenty years. In the Soviet Union, the era of Stalin's rule, which lasted even longer, has been ended by his sudden death. Both of these are momentous events which cannot fail to influence the course of history. Because we are all, I think, agreed that close co-operation with the United States has been, and must remain, a cardinal point of British policy, many of us felt some apprehension at some of the pronouncements that were made during the course of the American election campaign. But, as all free democracies know, allowance has to be made for what may be said in the heat of an electoral battle, and when the American electorate had made its choice we were all ready and anxious to establish the same friendly relations and the same cordial understanding that had existed between successive Governments of this country and the old Administrations. Moreover, the new President is a man whom we have reason to admire, to respect and to trust.

However, I think it should be said frankly that in the early weeks of the new Administration some of the omens did not seem propitious. Apprehension was renewed by some pronouncements in a similar vein to those made during the election campaign. There was to be a new and dynamic foreign policy: the policy of containment was to be superseded by a policy of liberation, and some of us were not sure what was meant and what would be involved. The neutralisation of Formosa was ended. There is no question that the United States Government were entitled to take this action. The American Government had put the fleet there; it could also take the fleet away. Nor did it seem that this action, by itself, would significantly affect the situation in the Far East. What was disturbing was the possible implication that this might represent a new departure in the foreign policy of the United States which would resurrect the great debate which had raged over General MacArthur.

On the question of the Government of China, we have not seen eye to eye with the United States. We on these Benches are gratified that Her Majesty's Government have continued the policy initiated by their predecessors with regard to the Government of China, because it is the only one which fits the facts. For the same reason we hope that the differences between ourselves and the United States on this point will eventually be resolved, because, as the current negotiations demonstrate, it is with the Pekin Administration that a Far Eastern settlement will have to be reached. I will come to this point again later.

That brings me to the developments which have taken place in the Communist camp since the death of Stalin. In this connection, let us beware of the argument, "Post hoc, propter hoc." I have heard that some circles in the United States have allowed themselves to be misled by this fallacy, and argue that, because the recent developments in the Communist camp followed some new departures in American policy, to which I have referred, those developments have been caused by American policy. Similarly, there is a tendency to assume that, because those developments followed the death of Stalin, it was his departure from the apex of the Communist hierarchy which caused them. In my opinion, there is more substance in the latter view than in the former; but the true cause, or at any rate the main cause, lies deeper. The main cause is to be found, I believe, in the policy of building up the defence strength of the free world by means of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The departure of Stalin seems to have occasioned the new developments and may well have been a contributory factor; but let us not lose sight of the remarkable achievement of the West in creating conditions which seem to have caused the Communist rulers to think again. The developments in the Communist camp appear hopeful. I seem to recall a phrase used, I think, by the Prime Minister about a certain development during the war, which he described as "the beginning of the beginning." Maybe we are at "the beginning of the beginning" in a new process that will bring the world into a new and happier era.

In making an assessment of developments to date, there is one striking feature which may be more than a coincidence. It is that on the Pekin account there are several definite items—the release of civilian internees, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and the agreement to negotiate about the remaining prisoners, apparently accepting the principle of voluntary repatriation. As this was the sole obstacle to the conclusion of a truce, the prospects of an end to the fighting in Korea are much brighter. On the Russian account to date the items are less definite. There is the use of their influence to secure the return of the British internees. There is their support of the United Nations resolutions on Korea. There is their support of the appointment of a new Secretary-General of the United Nations. There is their expression of regret at the loss of lives due to the wanton shooting down of an unarmed British plane over Germany. There is the cessation, for the present, at any rate, of vituperative propaganda against the West. There is also the declaration by Premier Malenkov that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government consider that the most correct, essential and just foreign policy is a policy of peace amongst all peoples based on mutual trust, on realities, and on facts, and supported by facts; and his further statement that in the present, and in the future, there do not exist any troublesome and unsolved problems that cannot be solved by peaceful means. It is, I say, in the Far East that the definite steps towards peace are actually being taken. I should like to mention just two points in this connection. One is that the Indian Government seem to have had reason to believe that their recent proposals on Korea, which were endorsed by the vast majority of the United Nations, would, be favourably received by the Pekin Government, and that it was the Soviet Union which first rejected them. The other is that, even in the lifetime of Stalin, Mao Tse-tung ranked almost equal in the Communist hierarchy, and there is none amongst Stalin's successors who can claim seniority over the ruler of China. Other points could be mentioned which also suggest that the Moscow-Pekin axis is not necessarily so firm as it has seemed in past years. If Western policy were based on the assumption of complete identity between Pekin and Moscow, it would be in danger of making serious errors which might have grave consequences. I submit that such an assumption should not be made unless and until such an identity has been conclusively proved to exist.

I mention this point because it may have some relevance in the light of the momentous statement made by President Eisenhower last Thursday. I feel sure that I shall be expressing the sentiments of the whole House in saying that the President's speech was worthy of the man and the hour; and that it expressed the deepest hopes and aspirations not only of the American people but also of the whole free world. The theme of the speech was true and total peace throughout the world. It makes clear that in the view of the West also there is no disputed question that cannot be solved by peaceful means. It points a highway along which all peaceful nations can travel together, and indicates successive steps that could be taken along that highway. The Prime Minister has associated Her Majesty's Government with President Eisenhower's ideals and aims, and we are led to understand, from the statement that he made in another place, on Monday, that he is going to make his own contribution to the top-level declarations which are commanding the attention of the whole world. We welcome this intention. It is important that Britain's voice should be heard and British initiative displayed at this juncture, because this country also has a responsibility to play its own distinctive part in efforts to lead the world to a more secure and brighter future.

One thing is clear, and that is that the President delivered his speech in no "take it or leave it" spirit. It is to be regretted, therefore, that on the following day the United States Secretary of State, should have made the remarks attributed to him in the Press. He is reported to have said—here T quote from The Times of April 18—that the speech created:— a situation where it is very obvious that unless there is a very prompt response by the Soviet Union it will be quite apparent it will be necessary to move ahead on all fronts…. Frankly I do not know what that means; but, whatever it means, I suspect that it was an unfortunate utterance in present circumstances.

As I have said, the theme of the President's speech was true and total peace. The keynote was an appeal against the waste of resources imposed by the necessity for rearmament, and a clarion call to dedicate the energies, resources and imagination of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war—a war on the brute forces of poverty and need. Surely it was impolitic, to say the least, to follow this moving appeal the very next day with an implied threat. However, I do not want to give undue weight to an obscure remark couched in an unfortunate manner. Of outstanding importance, in my view, is the tone and tenor of the President's statement, particularly the stress which he placed on the need to tackle energetically the economic problems of the world and the prospect which he held out to the poor and needy under-developed countries of a place in the sun of economic prosperity and social welfare.

My Lords, I have said that we may be at the beginning of the beginning. Certainly it has been made clear on both sides of the Atlantic that Communist overtures will be met half-way. All of us will agree with the Prime Minister that nothing should be said anywhere which will check or chill the processes of good will which may be at work. The Prime Minister went on to say that his hope is that they may presently lead to conversations on the highest level, even if informal and private, between some of the principal Powers concerned. Whether the Prime Minister had in mind conversations with Premier Malenkov, or also with Mao-tse Tung, is not clear, but I do not propose to ask the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who I understand is to reply to this debate, to elucidate the statement, because I have no doubt that the Prime Minister will himself elaborate on this and other ideas that he may have in mind when he speaks in another place next week. There are, however, a few observations which I wish to make.

I do not believe that there is any disagreement that the first great step must be the conclusion of an honourable armistice in Korea. President Eisenhower restated the United Nations aims when he said that this means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea. He also said that it should mean the end of direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indo-China and Malaya. It cannot be doubted that the invasion of Laos could not have been undertaken by Viet Minh without the arms and assistance which they have received from outside Communist sources. There cannot be an over-all peace in the Far East so long as Communist aggression and armed invasions continue in any part of that region. What we all want to see is the end to fighting, bloodshed, and the human misery it causes.

But peace in the Far East will call also for decisions by the free nations. There are two matters that will have to be faced. The first is the question of China's seat in the United Nations. We can be sure that in peace discussions Pekin will demand the recognition of her claim to occupy China's seat. The final decision will rest, of course, with the Member States of the United Nations. But what should be the attitude of Her Majesty's Government when the matter comes up for discussion in the political negotiations? Hitherto, the British Government, while recognising Pekin's right in principle, have not supported Pekin's claim, on the ground that she was named an aggressor by resolution of the United Nations and because we could not agree to a Government "shooting its way" into the United Nations. But when a Korean peace settlement has been agreed, hostilities will have ended and aggression will have ceased. Surely it is both logical and a recognition of the factual position in China that the Pekin Government should be accepted to occupy China's seat in the Security Council and to take her place in the United Nations' Assembly. This, so it seems to me, would be in harmony with two of President Eisenhower's five precepts—with No. 3, which states that any nation's right to form a Government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable, and No. 4, which declares that any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of Government is indefensible. Her Majesty's Government recognise the Pekin Government, and there can surely be no doubt that, following a Korean peace, it is the Government's intention to support the admission of Pekin representatives to the United Nations.

The second problem, the problem of Formosa, is more complex and presents special difficulties. The Pekin Government claim it. The Chinese Nationalists occupy it. It may be that the Formosan population, as distinct from the Chinese Nationalists, have their own views about the future of their island home and may claim the right to self-determination. I have also seen the suggestion that Formosa should enjoy a period of trusteeship under the United Nations. What, in fact, will be the future status of Formosa is a matter which will be settled in negotiations for a Far Eastern peace, but if peace throughout Asia is to be (to use President Eisenhower's words) "true and total," one clear decision seems to be called for—that is, that Formosa cannot be allowed to continue to be used as a Chinese Nationalist base from which to carry on civil war and to build up and launch armed attacks on the Chinese mainland. I hope, therefore, that when this matter comes up for decision, Her Majesty's Government will oppose any such use being made of Formosa, and that they will support the neutralisation of the island in this respect as part of a Far-Eastern peace settlement.

Let me turn now to Europe. President Eisenhower has said that there are certain specific actions which the Soviet Union could take as evidence of its sincerity, instancing the signature of the Austrian Treaty and the release of prisoners-of-war still held in Russia. I feel sure we shall all concur with these views. In the case of the Austrian Treaty, the Western Powers have long ago gone much further than half-way. The draft Treaty is ready for signature and for years the Western Powers have been ready to sign it: only the Soviet Union has held it up. There can be no doubt that Russia would give cause for much satisfaction if she were to put her signature to the Treaty and thereby make this small country free again, after years of occupation going back to the pre-war period. I hope that a new and early effort will be made to bring this matter to completion.

The problem of Germany is more complex. Our policy has always been the creation of a unified democratic Germany, for which the essential condition is free and secret elections throughout Germany—by which is meant Federal Germany, Berlin and the Eastern Zone. President Eisenhower restated this objective in his speech. Because this, too, has been blocked by the Soviet Union, and because of the need to strengthen Western Europe, the six countries—France, Italy, Benelux and Federal Germany—with more or less encouragement from the other Western countries, have gone ahead with the creation of a limited Federal Union among themselves. They have set up the European Coal and Steel Community; they have signed the Treaty for the European Defence Community, which is awaiting ratification; and they are considering a European Political Authority.

President Eisenhower in his speech stated that the free and equal partnership of Western Germany in the European Defence Community—here I quote— for Germany is the only safe way to full final unity. While I sympathise with the intention of this statement, and feel strongly that nothing that has happened so far warrants any relaxation of our efforts towards European unity—on the contrary, it confirms the rightness of the policy that the West has been pursuing—I wonder whether the logic of this statement will be immediately apparent, particularly to the Germans. I was interested to read that the prospect of Four-Power discussions with Germany has prompted Herr Ollenhauer, the Leader of the German Social Democratic Party, to say that the Government and Opposition in the Federal Republic should, if possible, agree on a programme for Four-Power negotiations. He regarded it as crucial that the Federal Republic should be brought into the preparatory stage of the negotiations proper. This seems to me to be a wise suggestion and a proper claim.

Supposing the Russians do put forward new proposals on Germany, in which they offer to agree to free all-German elections under international supervision, it is not unlikely that one of them will be that a unified Germany would not be bound by any existing obligations to either the East or the West. In other words, a united Germany would not be able to be a partner in either the European Coal and Steel Community or the European Defence Community. In that event, what would be the response of the Western nations? If it were merely negative, they would be in danger of appearing, above all in German eyes, to be obstructing the reunification of Germany for the sake of Western defence and Western integration.

The real problem, as I see it, is this: Is a reunited and democratic Germany, following free elections, to have equality of rights? Or is it to be a sort of second-grade nation, with special restrictions on its sovereignty? It seems to me that the problem of Germany will not be satisfactorily solved until that country has obtained a status of full equality, including membership of the United Nations, and freedom to enter into other international agreements that are in conformity with the United Nations Charter. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Federal Government and the Opposition will be able to agree on a programme that can be regarded as expressing the point of view of Western Germany, so that there can be no doubt what they consider to be an acceptable basis of reunification. It is important that German democracy should be strengthened and not weakened—important not only for Germany, but for the whole free world. I cannot imagine, therefore, that there can be any doubt that the Federal Republic will be brought into direct consultations at the preparatory stage of negotiations.

My Lords, I said in the Defence debate last week that nothing, in my view, has occurred yet to lessen the need to carry on with the building up of the planned defence of the West. It seems to me that the question of Western defence, in all its aspects, as also the question of Communist military power, can be dealt with only under the ægis of a Treaty for disarmament on the lines suggested by President Eisenhower, or on other lines that would be equally effective. Such a Treaty would be in the interests of all nations, Eastern and Western alike, Communist and free. I know of no other way by which the present oppressive burden which growing armaments impose on the peoples can be reduced or lifted. The progressive easing of world tensions by political conferences and negotiations will gradually restore confidence and increase the sense of security throughout the world; but true and total peace can become a reality only when both East and West are convinced that neither side has the means to commit aggression. Protestations of good intentions will not satisfy either side, and the West have learned from experience that unilateral disarmament is perilous. I profoundly believe that President Eisenhower is both right and realistic when he urges that, as world trust and confidence are strengthened by political agreements, we should proceed concurrently with the task of reaching solemn agreements for the reduction of the burden of armaments.

He asked this question: Is the Soviet Union prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals. Mr. Malenkov has said at least twice since he became Prime Minister that the Communist world and the free world can co-exist. If they can live together in peace, and there is no unsolved problem between them that cannot be settled by peaceful means, there is surely no need for the massed armaments that are being accumulated, at a staggering cost, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. How will Mr. Malenkov answer the President's question? A favourable reply from him, and the United Nations Commission for Disarmament can get down to the serious business of preparing the details of disarmament programmes.

I should now like to turn for a moment to another troubled area of the world—namely, the Middle East. We on these Benches welcome the agreement which has been reached with Egypt on the right of self-determination for the people of the Sudan. The acceptance of this principle was what the Labour Government continually sought to obtain from successive Egyptian Governments, and I congratulate Her Majesty's Government on having succeeded in achieving agreement with the present Egyptian Government on this matter. We all realise, of course, that even with this agreement difficulties may arise in its application. Indeed, there have already been differences in interpretation of the meaning of independence, and it is well that this question has been clarified. There may be other difficulties in the transitional period. It now seems unlikely that preparations will be complete, or that the Electoral Commission will make recommendations for the holding of elections before the rainy season sets in, which would mean the postponement of the elections until some time in the autumn. This may be a pessimistic view, but perhaps the noble Marquess, when he comes to reply to the debate, may be able to tell us what are the prospects about the elections. If there is to be delay, the interim period is likely to be a trying one in some respects, especially if the negotiations with Egypt on the other major issue do not go smoothly or expeditiously.

With the conclusion of the Sudan Agreement, we have got, as it were, halfway, or nearly halfway. The question of the Suez base and the general defence of the Middle East constitutes the outstanding part of the problem. In this connection, the Suez Canal itself no longer seems to hold the position it once occupied in Middle East strategy. We were deprived of its use in the last war and managed to get along without it. There seems to be a consensus of opinion that it is very vulnerable. Nor does the Suez base appear to give us any effective say in the passage of shipping. Egypt has for some time closed the canal to cargoes bound for Israel, and representations have had no effect. The question, therefore, turns on the value of the base itself.

I think, looking back, there will be general regret that the Sidky-Bevin Agreement was lost, mainly because of our inability to get the Egyptians to agree to a separate settlement on the Sudan. Clearly, the most desirable outcome would be to relieve Britain of the sole responsibility for this commitment, which we can ill-afford, and, by obtaining recognition of the true function of this base in the general defence of the Middle East, transform it into an international commitment. A Middle East defence organisation, based on the Charter, which would include as equal partners Egypt and the other Middle Eastern countries, is still the right answer. However, negotiations are about to open, and I do not want to say anything which may have any sort of prejudicial effect. What we should welcome would be an agreement in which the special Egyptian point of view and the international defence considerations were reconciled, to the mutual advantage and satisfaction of all concerned. In following this course, the Government may be charged by some of its extreme supporters with "scuttling," but we hope that they will not be deterred thereby from getting a practical and constructive settlement, in harmony with the realities of the situation. What has to be kept in mind is that time is running short. The Treaty expires in three years. We on these Benches support the efforts of the Government to obtain an agreed solution of the questions at issue now, and we hope that the negotiations will be successful.

Let me say this in conclusion. Our hopes are being raised by the top-level exchanges that are taking place in public. We must all trust that we are witnessing the opening stage of a genuine peace offensive that will bring concrete results. But I am sure we all realise that a difficult road of hard negotiations lies ahead. Progress, if it is made, is likely to take the form of a series of limited advances from one agreement to the next. We should not expect too much, too quickly. What we can and do expect is that Her Majesty's Government will seize every opportunity and spare no effort to get fair and just agreement on some of the problems to be solved. In that effort they will have our encouragement and support. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.15 p.m.

LORD LAYTON

My Lords, every one of us must re-echo the hope expressed by Mr. Churchill in his statement, which was read in this House on Monday that the processes of good will…may…lead to conversations on the highest level…. If they do take place, there is more reason now than at any time in the last five years to hope that they may lead to an easing of the tension between East and West. For my part, I base a very cautious optimism on what has happened inside Russia, rather than what has happened internationally. A change of attitude towards the West might be—I do not say it is going to be—very short-lived, but events such as the release of the fifteen doctors, accompanied, as it was, by blunt condemnation of the methods hitherto adopted under the Stalin régime to extort confessions, must seem like a revolution to the people inside Russia.

There almost appears, one dares to say, to be a gleam of hope of a little individual freedom, some slight lifting of the ever-present fear of arbitrary arrest. Even the Soviet Charter of 1936 has been brought out of the pigeon-holes and dusted. All this suggests strongly that the Russian people have been feeling more deeply than has been commonly supposed the pressure of the régime, and at all events that Stalin's successors evidently think that a loosening up of the tyranny is the surest and best way to gain the popular support which they need to reinforce their new régime. But whatever the motive of recent events, it certainly is devoutly to be hoped that we are witnessing a permanent change of front; for unless we can find the way to a state of peaceful co-existence we face for an indefinite period the prospect of a state of twilight war wasting the world resources, imposing an intolerable strain of high taxation and poisoning international relations, even if it does not blaze up into a full world war. We must be very careful, therefore, in this debate, to follow the Prime Minister's advice and say nothing which might prevent or in any way check these conversations.

Mr. Churchill also said that it is…as yet too soon to consider any relaxation of our efforts for collective defence. I do not think this view will be challenged—indeed, it was supported in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. It is surely self-evident that the present approaches would not have been made had not the Western World taken steps some three or four years ago to strengthen its own defences. Our best chance of peace is to carry on with our preparation until we can meet with Russia on more equal terms, and if by negotiation the level of these more equal terms can be lowered, then indeed there will be hope for mankind. But the salvation of the free world is not to be found in military strength alone. We have still to build the peace on firm foundations, and the core of this problem of building the peace, for both political and economic reasons, is to put an end to the chronic weakness that stems from the divisions of Europe. After all, if that problem can be solved, and adequately solved, it will ease every other international problem throughout the world.

The emphasis laid by President Eisenhower, in that eloquent and inspiring speech to which Lord Henderson has paid worthy tribute, on the need for European unity was timely in that respect, for the change in Russia's attitude may weaken the will of the Western countries of Europe to press on with unification and, in particular, may prevent the linking up of Germany with the West. Indeed, this may be its real purpose. Now, I would comment in that respect on a few sentences of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. There are before Germany many options; one or other of them may emerge from the Four Power Talks. It may be that West and East Germany may remain divided: that Western Germany may join the West without the East. It may possibly happen that they will join with the East—but if I were a Western German I should hope beyond everything that the thing that would not happen would be that Western Germany should be drawn into such a position that it could not join with the West. We surely must not do anything to bring that situation about.

LORD HENDERSON

I hope there was nothing in my speech to create such an impression in the noble Lord's mind.

LORD LAYTON

I did not imply that the noble Lord had any clear intention of that kind, but I was just expressing the various possibilities, because I wish to emphasise most emphatically that we must make it possible, whatever may happen in these discussions, that Western Germany, if it so decides, may join with the West here and now.

LORD HENDERSON

I hope the noble Lord will allow me to say that that is precisely the burden of my own argument. I put it, I thought, in the clearest terms.

LORD LAYTON

I was not controverting the noble Lord but I wanted to underline and emphasise the point I was making. It may be that the Russian move may delay that—and it may be even that that was one of its main purposes. With French public opinion in its present mood, this could conceivably happen. But it must not be allowed to happen. If we are to be given a temporary respite in Europe we must make use of it. If, to quote Malenkov's own words, we are in fact about to enjoy a period of peaceful competition between the Communist and Capitalist worlds". we must see to it that we are really in a position to compete. I am convinced that in Europe we shall find the way to do this only in the movement towards union which has provided the main if not the only constructive stimulus to international affairs in Europe since the war. The way of integration may affront vested interests and call for new methods of behaviour by Governments, but it is the only way that fits the times. It is only up to date in the sense of being historically up to date, sensible, international policy. I have spoken several times on this theme and I shall not weary your Lordships with another dissertation on the subject but I wish to suggest today that this is a moment when the Government can help forward this crucial development.

I should like to explain why I say that. It is common ground that it is desirable to bring the E.D.C. into operation. The Minister of Defence said that very emphatically in his speech in this House last Wednesday. It is common ground that E.D.C. is needed as an integral part of the North Atlantic Treaty organisation. That statement has been made again and again by the Council of N.A.T.O. But France still hesitates and puts the blame on the aloof attitude of Great Britain and Scandinavia. Unwillingness to go forward without Great Britain is certainly widespread in France. But this objection sometimes conceals quite other reasons for France's delays, based on her long history as a sovereign Power and her national pride. We in this country fully understand and respect these sentiments but we also understand the compelling force of the other considerations that led France at the outset to take the initiative in these matters three or four years ago.

The E.D.C. and the Coal and Steel Community, however, are only component parts, though they are very important parts, of any complete organisation for Europe. There is wide agreement—it was evident from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, that he shared it—that these specialised organisations, in any sound, practical, efficient organisation of Europe, must be responsible to a single European political authority, and that the immediate task is to see whether it is possible to bring into being a political authority of the right kind. The draft Statute that was completed at Strasbourg a month ago is a carefully considered answer to this need. Though it can no doubt be improved in detail, its basic principles are sound and its purposes much more fitted to to-day's mood in Europe than any previous scheme of similar scope that has been put forward since the war. In the first place, it does not attempt to set up any-think like a fully-fledged Federation, but embodies what is called in the jargon of Paris and Strasbourg a "minimalist" solution—that is to say, a solution which brings only the minimum association and action that is necessary for certain purposes; and in doing that it is right, because Europe will advance quickly on the road to unity only on the basis of an acceptable compromise between international authority and national sovereignty, and it is that compromise which the draft Statute seeks to find.

For example, the lower House of the proposed new Parliament, the new People's Chamber, is to be elected by universal suffrage. On the other hand there is also to be a Senate appointed by the existing national Parliaments, in which it is expected that national viewpoints will be strongly represented. The two Chambers are to have exactly similar powers in legislation and it is the Senate, again representing the nations rather than some new force, which is given the right to nominate the President, or, as one might call him, the Prime Minister of the new Constitution. Again, the Executive, which will be nominated by the President, just as the Prime Minister appoints his Cabinet, will be a Cabinet for Europe. But by its side there will be a Committee of national Ministers with many important and clearly-defined powers, including control of the Budget. If you look at the functions of this body, again you see the same kind of compromise. Its most specific function is to absorb and direct the Defence and Steel Organisations. The Coal and Steel Organisation has some supra-national characteristics, but on the other hand international affairs will be treated by the new grouping, not in any way involving any supranational control of international policy, but giving the new body responsibility to organise constant, regular, and permanent consultation on international affairs. The Authority is in certain cases given definite powers; in others it is a purely consultative body. In short, the draft is in no sense a theoretical construction but a realistic attempt to fit an organisation to the actual state of Europe and to the state of national opinion.

EARL JOWITT

I should like to ask one question, to get the matter quite clear. Is the noble Lord advocating that we should come into that organisation?

LORD LAYTON

I was going to give an answer to this question. My first point is that here is a creation which is a deliberate attempt to meet the complicated state of Europe. A second and equally important purpose of the Statute is to create an institution with which States who are not ready to become full members of the authority can become associated by sharing some of its tasks; and, where the link-up is of sufficient importance, sharing also in the formulation of policy and in control. For example, that has already begun at Luxembourg where a British delegation has gone to reside at the seat of the Coal and Steel Pool. We do not know exactly what the form of that particular association is going to be, but it is evolving. When an agreement of association has been made, it is provided that in appropriate cases representatives of the associated countries may sit in the Senate with "full or partial powers," according to the nature of the association. Thus, this system brings associated powers as well as those who accept full membership into the political authority.

Finally, there are a series of most important provisions which will keep this "Little Europe" and its institutions under the umbrella of the Council of Europe, though I will not detain your Lordships by referring to them in detail. I would only say that, if full use is made of the system of association, it should give France, Italy and Benelux confidence that they will not be over-weighted militarily and economically by Germany; and the clauses regarding the Council of Europe guarantee that Western Europe will not be further split. This issue will be put to the test almost immediately, for this draft will go on May 12 to the Committee of Ministers of the six countries who may decide; and, indeed, the guess may be hazarded, with some assurance, that they will send it to a full-dress conference of the six Governments. I feel sure that Her Majesty's Government, like the American Government, take a favourable view of this conception. They are fully cognisant of what has been going on, and there is no doubt that an expression of approval would have a very considerable influence on the course of events in May.

At the final session of the body which drafted this Statute for a Political Community, the Conservative British observer, speaking for his Socialist and Liberal colleagues as well as for himself, expressed approval of the draft for the reasons that I have just given to the House. He thanked the Assembly for the helpful and constructive efforts they had made to meet the British point of view and, in particular, welcomed the fact that the door to association had been left wide open. These opinions in no way commit Her Majesty's Government, but the appreciation with which they were received made it quite clear that there is still a widespread belief in Europe that the British Government are not really in favour of this Six-Power development. Only an official declaration can remove that suspicion. It would also be most helpful if it were made known in the proper quarter that Her Majesty's Government, if invited to do so, would be ready to send an official observer to the discussions of the six Foreign Ministers in May. It is, I think, generally agreed that it would have been of benefit to this country, as well as to the six Member States, if Britain had been parties to the negotiations at which the Schuman Plan was drawn up, instead of making terms with the Pool after it was set up. The argument applies with redoubled force where it is a case of drawing-up the political Constitution of Western Europe.

To exercise our full powers and influence, however, we must not only approve in theory; we must also show by our actions that we intend to be as closely associated as circumstances permit. What are we prepared to put into this bond? It would go far to convince our neighbours that we meant business if it were known that we desire in principle to share in the common European market for coal and steel, by conforming to the rules adopted by the High Authority. And lastly, on the side of defence, I would repeat the suggestion I made a year ago that we should attach at least a token force to the European Army. We have already taken very far-reaching commitments in the matter of defence which will in any case put us in the category of a close associate of the Defence Community. But if there were some part of our military forces, however small, that could be removed from Europe only after the same process of consultation that applies in the case of other members of the Defence Community, the psychological effect would, I am sure, be very far-reaching. I hope that the noble Marquess who will reply for the Government will be able to say that Her Majesty's Government may take some steps in those directions.

The Russian developments carry with them, as I have said, the danger that a weary world will sit back and let things drift; but I believe that by action of a kind such as I have suggested, Her Majesty's Government has it in its power to see that Europe does not miss this time the tide that should be taken at the flood.

3.39 p.m.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

My Lords, I feel that I owe your Lordships some apology for taking part in this very important debate. I am well aware that the essence of debate is the discussion of the different points of view of those who join in it, so that, by the clash of controversy, the real nature of the problem and its solution may be disclosed. My contribution to that process is necessarily limited. I cannot pretend to argue what I understand, mainly by guesswork, to be the points of view urged by the noble Lords, Lord Henderson and Lord Layton; I am sure that I shall not be able to do them justice. Still, I have thought that so long as I am a Member of this House I have a duty to communicate to it any result of my experience which may seem to be of service.

Let me begin, then, by saying that it is still the case, as it always has been, that in foreign policy the greatest of British interests is peace. Nor is that true of this country alone. On the contrary, peace is the greatest interest of every civilised country in the world; and, as we all agree, there is no more urgent obligation on the Government of this country than that of maintaining peace. That does not mean that I am against what is called rearmament. So long as other powerful nations continue to build great farces, we should be mad if we did not make it clear that such forces can be used for attack on us only at very great risk to themselves. That is the first precaution we can take against war, and it follows that, large as the preparations may be for a possible attack, our precautions must follow suit. But, by itself, rearmament is not enough. We want peace, and not only victory. That is why for centuries past men have sought for some international organisation by which peaceful settlement of international disputes should take the place of war. Indeed, it may be said that after every considerable war in recent times some proposal of that kind has been made. That was the origin of the League of Nations, and when that failed it was followed by the United Nations Organisation.

The central problem, however, remained unsolved. How can prevention of war be combined with recognition of national sovereignty? The scheme of the Charter was to prohibit aggression by requiring all the United Nations to combine against an aggressor. For this purpose, your Lordships will remember, a Council was created consisting of five permanent member nations and six other elective members, with the responsibility of using the elaborate permanent machinery which was to be in the Charter, though in fact it has not been set up under the Charter, for preventing war by forcibly stopping aggression. To prevent misuse of this formidable power, and for other reasons, it was provided that all decisions of the Council except on procedural matters should require the agreement of all the five permanent Powers. That precaution was inserted, I believe, on strong representations made by more than one of the five. Its effect, of course, has been to give to each of them a Veto on any proposed decision of the Council, except matters of procedure, and it is thought by some people to have deprived the Council of any practical power under the Charter of preventing aggression.

To my mind, that is a misapprehension. The truth is that no sovereign, independent nation can be compelled to take action of which it disapproves, except by one thing, and that is war. The Korean struggle illustrates this proposition. In that case, for reasons which have never been fully explained, none of the five permanent nations resisted the application of forcible prevention of North Korean aggression on the South. But, in actual fact, such preventive action has been taken only by those nations which approved of it. Indeed, Russia and China have done their best more or less covertly to assist the North Koreans, and no one has suggested the practicability of using the machinery of the Charter to compel those two countries to take an opposite course. That result does not depend on the construction on any particular provisions or phrases of the Charter, but on the broad fact that independent, sovereign nations cannot be compelled to take any action they disapprove, except by war. It is true that they may be persuaded or induced, by economic or moral pressure, to modify the attitude which they have taken up in particular cases; but that must be a matter of persuasion rather than compulsion. It is obvious that to try to compel them by force of arms to take military action against their will is rarely a practicable proposal.

To my mind, therefore, it was unnecessary to insert in the Charter elaborate provisions to compel all the United Nations to take action against an aggressor. It would have been better to have condemned aggression in terms, as indeed is done in Chapter 1 of the Charter, and to have authorised, but not compelled, those who accepted the Charter, to take steps necessary in particular cases to make that condemnation effective. Your Lordships will remember that the same difficulty faced the League of Nations. There was nothing in the Covenant of the League which set aside the old proposition of international law that a sovereign and independent nation cannot, except by war, be compelled to take action in accordance with the opinions of other countries. Indeed, by the Covenant no decision could even be made by the Assembly or Council of the League except unanimously. When, therefore, early in its career, a certain proposition was approved by a majority of the Assembly, but not unanimously, the President declared that the result must be regarded not as a decision but as a recommendation by those who voted for it, and it was left to them to carry it out.

On those lines the League carried on its work for several years with, as I think, a considerable measure of success. The members of the League were not compelled to stop aggression, and, I must admit, the system eventually failed. Why? Because the countries that composed the League were not prepared to give it their support. I will not try to discuss why that happened. It is enough for me to say that, quite apart from the history of the League, it is of the essence of national sovereignty that independent nations cannot be compelled, except by force of arms, to take action of which their Governments disapprove—and that remains true, whatever may be the terms of any general agreement they may have made. No elaborate or ingenious organisation will alter that fact

Does that mean that the international organisation of peace is useless? Not at all. It enables the nations which join it to take action against an aggressor without incurring the reproach that by so doing they are themselves being guilty of aggression, as, of course, happened in Korea; and the general condemnation of aggression remains as a warning to all the world to keep the peace. It is a powerful argument by which world public opinion may be concentrated against an aggressor. I venture to say that that is a very valuable force. But it is—and so long as the nations which have formed it are sovereign and independent, it must be—in the domain of persuasion, and not compulsion. It is, of course, possible for certain of those who form the United Nations to join, as has been done in the case of the Atlantic Charter and is proposed in the case of the European Defence Community, in more express obligations of mutual defence. That, indeed, may be or become simply a revival of the old device of alliances supporting the balance of power. From this point of view it might have been preferable to have a more direct connection between the Atlantic Powers and the United Nations.

But there is another point. In essence, any plan for the international organisation of peace must rest on a foundation of common agreement, the strength of which depends on the acceptance of certain basic propositions which together form the way of life we know as Christian civilisation. That, to my mind, is the feature essential to any successful international action for peace. There must be some fundamental agreement on which it can be based. For that reason we must recognise that we are in the presence to-day of a great crisis, not only in our own history but in the history of the world. For the last two thousand years we have seen the gradual growth in Europe, Asia, America, Africa and Oceania of a way of life which we know as Christian civilisation. Its growth has been imperfect and irregular, but it has never stopped.

In this year of rededication we British especially insist that in our own country, from the days of King Alfred to the present time, Christian civilisation has been responsible for every improvement and every advance that has been made Certainly there have been pauses and even setbacks, but I believe most people will agree that, comparing each century with that which preceded it, the health and happiness of our people have improved. More than that, I think we may say, without undue nationalism, that other countries have followed our example in basing their policy on the same general principles. And now, for the first time, a formidable attack has been made, not by fanatical savages, but by a highly developed community, upon the very corner-stone of our system. For that is what the Russian dialectical materialism really means. Unless recent events have changed it its central tenet is that there is no such thing as the spiritual nature of man, or, if there is, it should be ignored or stamped out as speedily as possible; and this view is said by some people to have been adopted by the present Government of China as well as Russia.

It seems to me a pity that we talk so much of Communism, which I understand to mean the abolition of private property. That embodies an economic theory which I believe to be dangerous and impracticable, but it is quite a different thing from dialectical materialism. If you ignore or abolish the spiritual nature of man, you destroy the foundation on which rests all truth, justice and freedom, except such as can flow from the love of money or what money can buy. It is the very antithesis of the saying that the love of money is the root of all kinds of evil. This, then, is what I believe to be the central doctrine of Bolshevism; and it has been put forward—do not let us forget this—with all the apparatus of a new religion. Its creed is, I understand, alleged to be contained in the writings of Marx and Engels as developed by the teaching of Lenin and Stalin and now by the present Government of Russia. Its familiar name is the "Party Line," and any "deviation" from it is treated as heresy. "Deviations" by any Russian Government official, whether in Russia itself or in any of what are called the satellite States, has been a capital offence, and even though abjured by the most abject self-confession it used to be punishable by death. It is, nevertheless, true that from time to time interpretations of the party line are put forward by the infallible authority of the Russian Government. Obviously you have here many of the worldly attributes of a religion, though a godless religion.

One of the consequences of this system is greatly to increase the executive power of any Government which adopts it, and that power is not only used against the freedom of its individual subjects but is also applied to the strengthening of its military forces. To defend ourselves, we and other non-Bolshevik countries have adopted, quite rightly, as I have said, a policy of rearmament. That is the only way to prevent the menace of immediate attack. What the extent of rearmament for that purpose should be is more a military than a political question. But to fulfil its object it should evidently be too much rather than too little. However that may be, the policy of rearmament is subject to this old-fashioned limitation: that force is no remedy. Force may be a protection, but it will not be a cure. What more, then, can be done? Here there is grave difficulty, and I can only say that I wonder whether we have proclaimed clearly enough the position which we hold. After all, we have a tremendous case, as I tried to indicate just now. We live in a small Atlantic island. At the beginning, we were repeatedly overrun by Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans. We developed a fine race and a still finer civilisation. We thus survived, and then, largely by the help of our Constitution and our Sovereigns, we produced a literature, an industry and a wealth which stretched throughout the world.

Do not let us forget that this splendid structure was built on what I have called Christian civilisation, with its fruits of truth, justice and freedom, not for this or that race or nation but for all mankind. And Christian civilisation is the only real alternative to dialectical materialism. It seems true that Russian policy has been recently modified, and, with President Eisenhower, we all rejoice at and welcome that change. But the principle of materialism, as far as we know, remains. Unless and until some radical change is made in that principle we may hope that greater co-operation between East and West may be possible, but I do not see how we can have any permanent security for peace.

3.58 p.m.

EARL JOWITT

My Lords, it is a responsibility and a privilege to rise immediately after the noble Viscount who has just spoken. We have missed him, in the last few months, from our debates in this House. He knows full well that when he comes back here he is greeted with affectionate regard from all quarters of the House. There is no other man living who has contributed as much to peace as the noble Viscount, and we are all proud that we have the opportunity of listening to him and of learning from him. Speaking for myself—and I am sure for all of us—I entirely believe with him that the real solution of our difficulties, and the difficulties of the world, is a closer and more constant application of the Christian ideal. And I suppose it is the fact that if we try to set that forth in our lives, in our national life too, there is a better chance that it may spread to all quarters of the globe. I am sure that I am speaking for the whole House when I thank the noble Viscount for addressing the House to-day and giving us such an inspiring message.

The next thing I should like to say is a word of affection and good will to the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Eden has many admirers on this side, as well as on his own. We think that, broadly speaking, he has the right instincts—indeed, we feel that the time may come when we on this side may have to defend him from the extremists on his own side. I am sure that, here again, I speak for the whole House when I express the hope that he will soon be restored to full health. I should like the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, to take a message from this House—at any rate from this side—for his rapid and complete recovery.

It is common knowledge to those who take part in debates on foreign affairs that for those who speak for the Government that there has never yet been a convenient moment for a debate on foreign affairs. Mr. Bevin used to tell me that such a moment would never arise. I must say, about the present debate, that I cannot imagine one more unfortunately timed for the noble Marquess who is to reply. Recently, there have been happening events of great pith and moment, and next week the Prime Minister is to make some pronouncement on these matters. Moreover, only a day or two ago, in another place, he said that he did not want to be hurried into making that pronouncement; that he wanted to give due care and consideration to exactly what he should say. Therefore if the Prime Minister is not prepared to make a pronouncement now, I think it is unlikely that the noble Marquess will be prepared to make any announcement to-day. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for us to expect that he should do so.

On the other hand, it is fitting that we should have this opportunity of a debate, for it is long since we had our last foreign affairs debate. In my view, debates in this House can be of great value, if only for the reason that we have speeches from noble Lords with vast experience, such as that to which we have just listened. It would be wrong to criticise the noble Marquess on this occasion if he cannot say very much, but, having said that, I must add (though this charge might well have been levied against me) that I think in this House Ministers in charge are too frightened to make any pronouncement in case they go wrong. We may get into the position of the man who is so frightened of putting his foot wrong that he cannot move at all. That would be a misfortune, because in the past debates in this House have been of great value.

I want to-day to raise one or two matters, in order that they may be considered. I have not given the noble Marquess notice of them, and therefore I shall not be surprised if he cannot answer. On the last occasion that we had a debate of foreign affairs, on November 6 of last year, I asked a specific question to which the noble Marquess was going to reply. That question was about the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty. Your Lordships will remember that that Treaty, to which this country is not a party, and which was brought into being during the lifetime of the last Government, imposes a defence obligation relating to the Pacific. The noble Marquess knows the circumstances in which the last Government had to assent to it. Australia and New Zealand are perfectly free to make what Treaties they like, but I, for one, expressed the view that it was unfortunate that that Treaty should have been made without our being a party to it. After all, the relationships between this country and New Zealand and Australia are so close and intimate that it was a sad thing to me that we were left out of that Treaty. When I asked the noble Marquess this question on the last occasion he said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 179, col. 145): I will say nothing beyond this…the Foreign Secretary is proceeding to-morrow evening to New York. No doubt he will be meeting there the Ministers of External Affairs of New Zealand and Australia and may well hope for, and obtain, opportunity to have talks together. If the Foreign Secretary had any talks with them, and if he has anything to tell us about that meeting I, for one, should be glad to hear it. I think it is a matter of some importance.

On that last occasion the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, made a most interesting speech. He raised a point which has not been raised to-day but to which the noble Marquess may now be able to give some answer. The noble Viscount stated (I am paraphrasing what he said) that the weakness of the United Nations was that their membership was not complete enough. There might be good reasons for it, but the Russian satellite States were not members, because they were obviously in breach of Treaties that contained provisions about civil rights, and there were various countries that we sponsored who were not members. Altogether, there are a considerable number of States who are not members. The noble Viscount said that we ought to take a definite stand on that matter. That seems to me a matter of first importance. On the last occasion that there was a vote on this matter in the United Nations Assembly—in February, 1952—when a resolution was put forward proposing. substantially, that all countries which had been excluded from the United Nations should be allowed to come in, thirty-two votes were cast for the resolution, twenty-one against; and there were sixteen abstentions. Among the abstentions was this country. I very much hope that the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will be able to tell us that, if and when that matter comes up again, this country will not be among the abstentions, but will be amongst those who vote for it, because, though I do not seek to condone wrong things that have been done, I am certain that the United Nations are more likely to achieve the peace of the world if all the States are there represented round the table. I believe that to be a matter of absolutely prime importance, and I hope that on this matter we shall take a line.

I do not want to talk about Korea because my noble friend Lord Henderson, in a speech of extraordinary ability, has already dealt with this matter, and it would be foolish of me to add a few ill-considered words to what he has already said. I would, however, say one word about Burma. Before now, I have pressed the noble Marquess to do what he could to secure the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist troops from Burma. I believe that to be a matter of great importance, and I observe with no little satisfaction that within the last few days the United Nations, the Nationalist China and the American authorities have all expressed the view that everything should be done to remove these troops. I am sure that if that is done one source of real anxiety and danger in the Far East will go.

In regard to the Middle East, my noble friend Lord Henderson spoke about the Sudan. I wish we could hear that elections were likely to take place very promptly. We must not drag our feet in this matter. I do not think we wish to, and we must not appear so to do. I wish that the noble Marquess could give us some words of encouragement—I think the situation has in some respects brightened—with regard to the relationship between the State of Israel and the Arab States surrounding it. That is a grave danger point at the present time and one which we should try to clear up.

I should have said very little about Europe had it not been for the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Layton. I very much hope that the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will not commit himself too deeply to the fly which was so attractively placed before him by the noble Lord, Lord Layton. I have been about Europe a good deal, and I have said that I do not believe this country will ever adopt, or accept, a federal solution—when I say "ever," I mean for a very long time. I believe that our history, our connections and the fact that we are an island make it impossible. If the federal solution is not accepted, then I feel it is much better to say so, as Her Majesty's Government have done, and not leave an ambiguity, or leave people thinking that we are prepared to accept it. So far as I have gone, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Layton, will agree with me, because he said so. I think he said so a little reluctantly, but he did say so, and I am satisfied so far.

LORD LAYTON

If the noble and learned Earl will forgive me for interrupting, I have been making that case at Strasbourg for the last five years.

EARL JOWITT

I am glad to hear it. But having heard the noble Lord a good deal, I still feel that, though he may have said so, he said so very reluctantly. If the noble Marquess does not accept the federal solution, I hope he will not have a kind of pseudo-federal solution. I hope he will not get us into all kinds of organisation where we have nothing precise to do, so that people may think that, after all, this has the facade or the appearance of a federal solution. I do not think that is the way to treat our European friends. I believe that if the Government are going into the thing they must go in with both hands and both feet. Otherwise, they should get out of it altogether; there should be no ambiguity about it. But having said that, if we do not accept the federal solution, what I would accept entirely is the fullest co-operation. I believe that to co-operate is what we have done, what we are willing to do and what we should do in the future. It is on those lines that I want to say a few words at the present time.

The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, talked about Germany and the position of Germany, and I should like to say something about that matter also. Before doing so, I would say a few words about France. France is an old Ally. The disasters that overtook Europe were due to the fact that we and the French got out of step and out of sympathy. Let us learn from that lesson. Let us, whatever we do, so far as we possibly can, carry the French with us. In so far as we are talking about co-operation, I would agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Layton, said, if only he would leave out all this talk about the European Army, which we are not going into. To put it much more simply, I should like to ask: Is it possible or practicable that we should agree that a proportion of our forces—for instance, those forces at present stationed in Germany—should be committed on the Continent, their partial or total withdrawal in peace time being conditioned, except in the case of emergency in British territories overseas, by an agreement with the appropriate organs of the European Defence Community?

On the other hand, by all means let British representatives sit on the various organs of the European Defence Community, and let them have a full vote on all matters concerning common interests. I believe that that is the right method of approach. There is not much difference between the noble Lord, Lord Layton, and myself in the result, but there is all the difference in the way in which we arrive at the result. I would have nothing to do with our troops being part of the European Army, but I would have everything to do—subject to the considerations which may override this—with co-operation, and giving security and satisfaction to France, so that France may not feel undue anxiety about the future position in regard to Germany. That I believe to be something which we might well bear in mind.

What is the position in regard to Germany? I have travelled there, and I have found. I suppose naturally enough, an immense desire to have again a united Germany. After all, Germany is in two, and if any of us were Germans we should want to see Germany united. There is one thing we must not do: we must not appear in any way whatever to be standing in the way of Germany's being reunited. That would be a profound mistake. If Germany is to be reunited, I take it that it will be a democratic Germany; it will be a Germany who is a member of the United Nations; and it will be a free Germany, able to work out her own destiny and make her own agreements. I sincerely hope that that Germany, free and united, will decide to take her part, freely and voluntarily, as a good neighbour, in supporting the peace of Europe. But I do not think we can have any illusions that we should condition our consent by what she will do, or anything of that sort; I believe that that would be unreal. In the present emergency I believe that we have got to trust to the good sense of a German democracy. I can hardly expect the noble Marquess to make any pronouncement on that matter to-day, but f thought it might be useful if I told him what I believe to be the views of a considerable number of noble Lords on this side of the House.

President Eisenhower has, within the last few days, made one of the great speeches of all time; it is a speech which may be remembered and put side by side with the speech of President Lincoln—the Gettysburg Oration. There is one other man who is of the stature and capacity to make an equally great speech, and that is our Prime Minister. I sincerely hope that within the course of the next few days, the Prime Minister will make some comparable speech, so that this country may regain the initiative—because, believe me, my Lords, this country has a profound part to play in the present exceedingly difficult times. I sincerely hope that the Prime Minister is going to make such a speech, so that at long last the hunger for peace, to which President Eisenhower referred, may come to this sorely stricken world.

4.19 p.m.

LORD KILLEARN

My Lords, the thought has passed through my mind, as it has, no doubt, through the minds of many others of your Lordships, whether, in the light of recent developments at the highest level, a debate to-day on foreign affairs is entirely prudent. That thought has already been expressed by other noble Lords. Personally, I think it is right that we should have this debate; but there is no doubt that what is stirring in what I may call the political stratosphere does dominate the whole situation. In addition to that, I believe there is to be a debate in another place next week, and that, too, certainly affects the whole of this discussion to-day.

I have three specific points which I wish to bring up to-day. The first is in connection with the Far East, particularly in connection with Japan. I have been looking up facts and figures, and I think I am right in saying that four-fifths of the population of the British Commonwealth live in countries which touch the Indian Ocean, or in the islands in the Indian Ocean. For that reason, if for no other, the question of the Indian Ocean is one of vital importance to us strategically, politically and also economically, for there you have the main source of the world's supply of jute, copper, tin, rubber and so on, which come to us through that waterway. I need not labour the importance of the Indian Ocean as a Commonwealth waterway; it is perfectly clear to all of us.

In the past a fundamental of our policy has been the maintenance in the Indian Peninsula of a military strategic reserve. I have again been looking up figures, and I find that before the war there were 57,000 British troops in India, and 159,000 Indian troops, making a total of 216,000. Now, unfortunately, as we all know, there are differences of view and public policy in India. In the old days, this strategic reserve there had to be employed for the protection of Indian and British interests. Now, the situation is very different, and, most regrettably, there is a division of interest in the Peninsula itself. We no longer have these forces available, not automatically, anyway. The first thing we must all devoutly hope is that any differences between India and Pakistan will be smoothed over. The present disagreement drags on and on, and until in some manner or other that is overcome, I do not think that on that we can look for any real durable organisation on the lines of participation in an organised system for the preservation of the peace and security of this Imperial waterway—the Indian Ocean.

I may also mention that we used to have Indian military units as part of the permanent garrisons in Malaya and Hong Kong, and that, of course, is no longer the case. I mention these points to work up to my main point: that we must look at this matter from a realistic angle. Taking it from that point of view, surely you are inevitably driven to look up further North East, to see what is available and what the potentialities there are. We have been engaged in the West, and have been doing so for a long time past, building up a protective system of self-defence. I often feel that people here in Europe do not realise that the issue in the Far East may be just as important as the issue here in the West. Personally, I sometimes think that it may be even more so, because the spark, if there is to be a spark—which God forbid!—might just as well start there as here. True, it is a long way off, and people here do not even know the names of many of the personalities out there, or, indeed, the names of the countries concerned.

Be that as it may, there are great similarities in many other ways. We are very busy building up here in the West a system of self-protective collaboration with Germany; I maintain that we should do the same with regard to the Far East, with Japan. I know that that idea may not be acceptable to a great many people, but unfortunately we have to be realists and not sentimentalists. Japan's past could not be worse—let us put it that way. I believe that they are conscious of it. And I fully sympathise with the A.N.Z.U.S. Pact—that is to say, the guarantee given to New Zealand and Australia by the United States, one of the conditions which led to the signature of the Peace Treaty with Japan by Australia and New Zealand. I believe that in that, Australia and New Zealand were wise and correct, if I may say so, for it is perfectly natural that they should be nervous on the score of Japan. There has been a suggestion of a little soreness in Great Britain, that we have not been included. I personally share that view, but I can understand why. The Pact was concluded for a specific purpose. If it had been open, others as well as ourselves—the Philippines, the French and others—might have claimed to be included. So that, although one may be regretful, one can understand why. However, to come to the point, my argument Is that what applies to the inclusion of Germany in our protective system in the West applies with just as great force to the inclusion of Japan in the Far East. I will leave it at that. I do not doubt that these things are being fully considered, but having the opportunity to mention it, I do so. I do not doubt that the Government are paying attention to this question of bringing Japan in on the same ideological side as ourselves in the Far East. That is made all the more important by the defection of China—that is not the right word: by the absorption of China with the other side.

The next item I wish to mention is the question of the Sudan. The Agreement has been signed and came into force on the date of signature, about which, of course, some of us were a little sore. We thought we should have had an opportunity for Parliamentary discussion which we did not get. Surely, the important thing now, we should all agree, is that the election should be held at the earliest possible moment; that the Sudanese, through their own constitutional organisation, should decide for themselves what they want, when they want it and how they want it. The House will agree on that. At the same time, I doubt whether any noble Lord here is entirely happy at the way in which the Agreement was put through. If ever there was a case in which we had a perfect case, it is in the Sudan—fifty years of hard, solid work, a record which, in all our proud record, has never been surpassed anywhere. It does not do any good to cry over spilt milk, but at the very end we were hustled and bustled and shot into something which, somehow or other, left a nasty taste. The resultant Agreement is a patchwork affair—I think everybody will agree on that. It is a very involved document. If you wanted to shoot it to pieces it would not be difficult to do so; but we do not want to do that. The important thing is to make it work—to back up the local officials, the Governor-General, and the people who have to work the Agreement, and make it as easy for them as we can.

I do not think we should normally be proud of it, or of the manner in which we were hustled into it at the last minute. It is not what it is; it is the way it was done. For it guarantees to the Sudan people what we promised them years back. In 1922 we made Parliament a formal declaration of British Government policy which was summed up in the statement that: They"— that was, the Government— have contracted heavy moral obligations by the creation of a good system of administration; they cannot allow that to be destroyed; they regard their responsibilities as a trust for the Sudan people; there can be no question of their abandoning the Sudan until their work is done. That was our Trusteeship. We declared our rôle as trustees. I hope we shall find that this recent Agreement carries out that self-appointed task. We must certainly all try to make it do so.

Before I leave the Sudan, there is one specific point I should like to ask, and I ask it for one reason—that it would ease the position in some respects. Under Article 10 of the Agreement there is a provision as follows: Detailed preparations for the process of Self-Determination, including safeguards assuring the impartiality of the elections and any other arrangements designed to secure a free and a neutral atmosphere, shall be subject to international supervision. The two contracting Governments will accept the recommendations of any international body which may, be set up to this end. The point I should like to put to the noble Marquess is this: supposing it were to prove that after the three years allowed for complete Sudanisation the Sudan Government themselves wished to continue in office certain specific officials of the existing régime, would it be possible for that to be done'? I do not know whether the noble Marquess can answer that question; it is rather a technical one. I know that at the time the Agreement was signed there was a good deal of interest shown in another place on this point, and it would be helpful if he could say something on the subject.

The last point I want to touch on is the Middle East. In its widest sense what is our policy in the Middle East? It is obviously to have an area that is stable and peaceful. Unfortunately, and it is a tragedy, that is not the case. We have only to look to the Arab States and their neighbour Israel to see the hostility, a hostility that is not even veiled, towards Israel. What a tragedy it is! So far as one can see there is no vestige of daylight; no let-up at all. And yet, surely, we want to be the friends of both. We do not want to take sides. One thing we must avoid in foreign policy is to have our attitude labelled as "govvy-govvy"—to teach other people what we think they should do. Nothing can be more irritating whether it is done publicly or privately. Meantime, there is a blank. We have arrangements with. Turkey; then we come right down to Egypt, and in the interval there is a blank which is dangerous from every point of view It is not only regrettable; politically it is very dangerous.

That brings me to Egypt, and here I want to say just a word or two. There is not a member of your Lordships' House or of the British public who did not heave a sigh of relief when General Neguib came into office and took over after his successful coup. There was a general feeling that the whole situation was eased, that it was taken out of a state where everything was chaotic and corrupt, and that really Egypt was going to have a good chance. I would say that up to date, by and large, that feeling is still maintained. What one hopes and prays is that General Neguib will not overplay his hand—it is an easy thing to do; it has been done so often before—especially just now, when a very contentious matter is coming up.

I am in two minds whether I should talk about this matter or not, but I have no present responsibility and I hope I am not going to say anything harmful. I refer to the question of the Canal. In law we have a case which cannot be refuted under the Treaty—it is one to which I would commend your Lordships' attention, and to two Articles in particular. The first is Article 8 of the Treaty of 1936, under which our troops are there and which provides that they are there with full authority, without any impairment of the sovereignty of Egypt. We know that. The second Article which is currently so much talked about is Article 16, that is the one providing for the duration of the Treaty. It is commonly assumed that the Treaty automatically expires twenty years after it came into force. The ratification took place on December 22, 1936, so that brings us to December22, 1956. It is currently assumed that if it is not renewed, it automatically lapses. I do not claim to knowledge of international law—I am not a lawyer—but surely it does not mean anything of the kind. What it says is this: At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the coming into force of the treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate.… In case they are unable to agree: …the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present treaty or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree. Then—and this is a significant phrase: It is agreed that any revision of this treaty will provide for the continuation of the Alliance between the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles.… So that when the Treaty was signed it was certainly never contemplated that it was going to lapse, automatically or otherwise. I make that point because the law is the law: and expediency and policy are sometimes not quite the same thing. There may come a point where politics dominate. But at the same time it is surely an enormous strength to know that you are right, morally and legally.

I do not want to say a word which is going to make the task of our negotiators in any degree more difficult. Far from it. After all, who wants to have an antagonistic Egypt? Who in his senses can want it? I speak with feeling, for in the last war I was in Cairo. In the previous war to that—that of 1914–18—I was not. In the 1914 war Egypt was hostile, but in the last one—that of 1939–45—Egypt was friendly and an Ally. It makes all the difference. Who in his senses, then, could want unnecessarily to rub up the backs of the Egyptians or hurt their susceptibilities or otherwise disturb them? No; on the contrary; what we want is a friendly agreement with Egypt. Sometimes we think we have more common sense than others have. That is a common failing. But it is the fact that in 1936 we were able to come to a perfectly friendly and willing agreement and it was signed by the leader of every political Party in the country: thirteen of them. When they say—as they sometimes now say—that it was dictated, it is just not true. I should have thought and most certainly hoped, and even believed, that there was still an opportunity of coming to some workable and acceptable solution of this extremely difficult problem. But I cannot believe that the way to do that is to throw on the table at once all the cards you have in your hand and give up—or, to change the metaphor, to allow the other man to drum you out of it. That is not the way of negotiation with anybody; nor in this present case.

I repeat, I particularly do not want to say anything which will make the task of the negotiators more difficult; but I hold that we should not give any indication that we are prepared to give up our rights until we are offered something which is at least equally good, or, if one may be optimistic, something which is better. I am not convinced that there may not be such a thing. Who knows? The whole conception has changed. But the protection of that particular area remains as vital as ever. Incidentally, I was very sorry when the offer made to Nahas Pasha with regard to the Middle East Command was thrown in the mud without its having even been looked at.

It is easy to speak when one is not in office, and has no authority of any kind, but if I may venture a word of advice, I would certainly show no signs of giving up a single right until the other side show they are going to meet us in a proper spirit, and until they stop rattling she sabre. That, I am sure, is not the way to achieve success. My Lords, I have spoken quite long enough, but there is one further point that I should like to make, apropos of the Sudan. The other day I was reading that classic, The River War, a book which was first published, I believe, in 1899. I was reading a reprint, published in 1932, and came across some very arresting words in the last paragraph of the introduction to this reprint of 1932. Perhaps I may be allowed to read these words to your Lordships. They are as follows: It is my hope that the story which these pages contain may be of some help and encouragement to those young men and women who still have confidence in the destiny of Britain in the Orient. They may learn from it how much harder it is to build up and acquire, than to squander and cast away. The date and place of the writing of those words was Chartwell, in November of 1932; and the signature at the foot was that of Winston S. Churchill. In my opinion, my Lords, those words are just as true to-day as they were twenty-odd years ago.

4.44 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I have listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, with the eager attention which his great experience and knowledge must inspire; and I think there is general agreement with most of what the noble Lord has said. I do not want to discuss either Egypt or China at any great length, because there are negotiations in hand in Egypt and events are going forward in Korea. I want to make two points very briefly. I think it is a great pity that General Neguib, who seems to be a man who can be very reasonable inside the conference chamber—it seems to be possible to negotiate and do business with him quite well inside the conference room—should, when he gets outside the conference room and is in the presence of a large and possibly excited crowd, tend to lose his discretion and coolness and address meetings brandishing a sword. It seems to me very difficult to carry on negotiations in those circumstances. I wish very much that General Neguib would realise that when negotiations are going forward the duty of all the negotiators is to keep the temperature as equable as possible.

In regard to China, the only comment I wish to make is this. I hope that at no very distant date we shall arrive at some degree of reality concerning China. The present situation seems to me to be utterly unreal. Her Majesty's Government are in relations with a Government of China which resolutely declines to have anything to do with us and is not represented in the United Nations. The American Government, on the other hand, is in communication with what I regard as a pseudo-Government of China, which is represented on the United Nations but which is completely unable to speak for China in any respect. It seems to me that this situation is completely unrealistic, and I hope the time is not far off when we shall achieve some reality in this matter.

I noted the remark of a previous speaker to the effect that Foreign Affairs debates are rarely opportune. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has encountered a great many difficulties—inevitably, he will agree—in bringing forward this Motion. I sometimes wonder whether the Foreign Office have ever considered a Foreign Affairs debate to be opportune. I think they would like to conduct the foreign affairs of this country walled up like Chinese students in that wonderful Palladian building of Palmerston. I remember a man who said that fox hunting was the finest of sports if it were not for the hounds who were always getting in the way. I sometimes feel that the Foreign Office regard both Houses of Parliament as a grave drawback to the interest which they would otherwise feel in conducting our foreign affairs. But they are foreign affairs: they are not private affairs; and, strange though it may seem to the official mind, I am sure that foreign countries find it quite as important to know what public opinion thinks as to know what the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office officials think. In fact, on more than one occasion there have been unfortunate results owing to the misjudging of the situation by foreigners because of their ignorance of what "John Citizen" was thinking about it.

As regards the general outlook in foreign affairs, I am bound to say that there are not many signs of improvement on the horizon, There are some: Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia have entered into better relations. I was particularly glad to hear—and I do not regard it as a small matter—that the question of Greek children abducted into Yugoslavia is on the way to settlement. Yugoslavia and Austria, too, seem to be getting on better terms. I do not know whether the subject of Malaya is relevant to this debate, but I must say that when I was listening to Mr. Eden's last broadcast there was too much "We hope" in it for my taste: "European Defence Community Treaties—we hope"; "A N.A.T.O. for the Middle East—we hope"; "The Persian Oil Dispute—we hope"; "Trieste—we hope"; "Israel, and the Arab States—we hope." All through that broadcast these words were on Mr. Eden's lips on every turn. But, my Lords, hope tells a flattering tale, and you cannot build up a settled world on hopes.

The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said something about "the end of an era." I think we have seen the end of one era: we have seen the end of the era of gunboat diplomacy. We heard the last splutter of it here in this House. When the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, as Lord Chancellor, said something from the Woolsack about Abadan, it was apparent in some countenances opposite that he had raised hopes that perhaps we were going to have an exhibition of gunboat diplomacy. But the noble and learned Earl quickly showed that a wrong construction had been built on his remarks in regard to Abadan; and, with that explanation, as I say, I think we saw the end of gunboat diplomacy. We must admit that gunboat diplomacy had its victories, but it is a technique which cannot be practised by a pillar of the United Nations. The trouble about it—in fact, I think this trouble runs persistently through our foreign affairs at the present moment—is that we have to deal by enlightened methods with some very unenlightened nations which understand gunboat diplomacy and very little else. But there can be no justification for our reverting to that particular technique.

The other day a most experienced observer, after a tour of Europe—I must say, he is supported by much evidence—said There are emerging again all the old sectionalisms, jealousies and national rivalries. I was very depressed to read those words. I could not reconcile them with the recent assertion by Mr. Eden: There has been a steady sense of improvement in the security and confidence among us. With all my heart I wish that that were true, but I am afraid there is not much evidence to bring in support of that statement. We shall not get peace without the political consolidation and military unity of Western Europe. The Prime Minister who, when in Opposition, was a red-hot European, seems to me to have cooled off, and the decisive lead does not come from him. There is one argument I should like to put to the noble Marquess. I am never quite clear about what I would describe as Mr. Eden's view that we must "hold our horses" in Europe—I quote his words— because our interests are world wide. We are first and foremost members of the Commonwealth and Empire. Let me say at once that that does not seem the argument which inspired those who concluded the A.N.Z.U.S. Pact on the other side of the world. I am not putting this argument forward in a spirit of criticism, but I should be genuinely grateful to the noble Marquess if he had time to say something which would clear my mind on it, because no doubt it is my own stupidity which leads me into a misapprehension.

Surely these "world wide interests." of the value of which the Foreign Secretary has spoken, may be compared with a chain—and a chain, of course, is no stronger than its weakest link. Marshal Juin considers that Europe at this moment would lie helpless before Russian aggression, and, if that is so. Britain would go under with the rest, after getting the full weight of nuclear weapons in the process. It seems to me, therefore, that we are not a very strong link in the Commonwealth chain; and what becomes of the Commonwealth if this link snaps? Surely Mr. Eden's "world wide interests" would be served, and not disserved, by our doing all we could to strengthen European morale and buttress European defences. For the life of me, I cannot see how that in any way weakens our connections and relations with the Commonwealth. I should have thought that the stronger Europe was, the more we lent our weight to make it a stronger Europe, the better would be the result to the Commonwealth and those "world wide interests."

Mr. Eden spoke of a triple thread—first, Britain in the Commonwealth; secondly, Britain in Europe; and thirdly, Britain in the Atlantic Community. It seems to me that we go rather slow on numbers two and three—Britain in Europe and Britain in the Atlantic community—in favour of the first: Britain in the Commonwealth. Surely each strand of a three-stranded rope must be equally strong or the rope will never stand the strain. As I say, I cannot for the life of me understand why buttressing the position in Europe should in any way conflict with our links with the Commonwealth. We are sometimes told that we are the bankers of the sterling area. I have always understood that a banker owes it to his clients to keep his premises as secure as possible; and only by wholehearted co-operation with Europe can we make our premises as secure as possible.

Now one or two words about Russia. Really the Sphinx of Moscow is making the Sphinx of Egypt look like penny numbers. The Sphinx of Moscow is certainly not Oscar Wilde's "sphinx without a secret." But what is the secret? I am not sure that it is not largely a waste of time to try to guess what the secret is. I think that Russia conducts her affairs in the most inscrutable manner, and it is hard for us to understand or to follow the mentality which influences the conduct of her affairs. But Stalin did not follow in Lenin's footsteps and it is most unlikely that Malenkov will follow in Stalin's footsteps. He had quite evidently planned several new moves long before Stalin died, and the breath was hardly out of Stalin's body before Malenkov put them into execution. It may well be that, while Malenkov is as cool and as cunning, as resolute and as ruthless, as was Stalin, he may also be much cleverer than Stalin; he may be a much more intellectual type than Stalin and, therefore, may prove the more dangerous man.

When looking at the assorted bundle of olive twigs which are being offered to us at the present moment, I think we shall do well to recall Mr. Dulles' recent reminder that the Soviet Union remains a heavily armed totalitarian State which knows no moral restraint, and nothing has happened which lessens the danger of the Russian threat to the free world. We may remember also that her history shows that Russia more than once has thrown a policy into reverse in response to some inward tension of which the remainder of the world has been in complete ignorance. I think that our line should be not to smack Russia down every time she makes a move, or to bustle her unduly. After President Eisenhower's speech, I thought that Mr. Dulles made a mistake when he said that Russia must "get oh with it" and give us an answer practically over the counter. That is not always the way to deal with the Oriental and, in any case, you do not encourage a child's first faltering footsteps by urging it to run.

I think we must methodically take each proposal or move in good faith at its face value and test it out. If we do that, it seems to me that the Russians will, to some extent, be put into a cleft stick. The moves will be found either to be perfectly bona fide and genuine, in which case the Russia of Lenin, Stalin and Marx has gone, or they will be found to be the old "double talk" and Russia will remain the dangerous wolf, bent on the violation of all human rights and on aggression, in the pursuit of the enslavement and domination of other races. Only by taking the proposals at face value and testing them out honestly in that way shall we arrive at what Russia is really after at the present moment.

I doubt if it will be found that Russian objectives have very much changed, but I think that the strategy and the dictates by which Stalin pursued those objectives may be found to change in the hands of Malenkov. But, after all, substituting Malenkov for Stalin will not resolve overnight those internal schisms which Stalin could not or would not heal. The Party and the Government machines are not suddenly going to begin to synchromesh, any more than the Army and the Police will suddenly become "old buddies" together. The new and the old Bolsheviks will remain oil and water. Russia is not a national unity; it is a country which seethes with racial hatreds, and at any moment the internal tensions may become very fierce. Stalin seemed to be able to handle all this. He was very tough. He boasted that he slept better at night if he disposed of an enemy during the day. He was what Tolstoy always said that he feared—Genghis Khan plus a telephone. Even so, it took Stalin fourteen years to become unquestioned dictator, and finally to become a god.

Malenkov has a long way to go to achieve the same position, and it would be rash to assume that his position will not be challenged. Lenin warned his disciples not to start guillotining each other after his death. But that is not advice which rings like sweet music in a Russian leader's ears. There may be those who see great point in resorting to the guillotine where rival leaders are concerned. There is one last point I think we should consider in regard to Russia. China and Russia now represent such a vast area that Malenkov can afford to smile at a policy of containment. The Communist world is now far too large to contain, and if it can hold on to what it has got, then it will have won. If there is any hope anywhere in the matter, it is more in the policy of liberation than the policy of containment.

My Lords, I should like to associate myself with the messages of respect and affection and good will which have been conveyed to the Foreign Secretary. Once again the Foreign Secretary has proved that, above all things, he is a most admirable negotiator. He deserves the greatest credit for the way in which he has handled the negotiations about Korea which have resulted in the release of prisoners of war. I think that the credit for that result is almost entirely due to Mr. Eden and his fine powers of negotiation. In fact, I must make the noble Marquess blush by saying that I think that at present we have got a very good team indeed at the Foreign Office. They are sometimes a little hesitant, sometimes a little indecisive. There have been times when the Foreign Office has reminded me of a story Sir Henry Drummond Wolff used to tell, of a constituent who wrote to his Member of Parliament at a time of indecision in the last century, when we were trying to hold Russia off Turkey's prostrate body, without any very great success. This constituent wrote to his Member of Parliament to ask if he could tell him where Lord Palmerston was buried, because, he said, he wanted to dig him up and present his backbone to the British Government.

It is perhaps not for me to intrude my comments about how foreign affairs should be conducted, but on reading a book on the late Lord Salisbury, who was three times Prime Minister of this country, I see that he used to say that if there was anything he despised it was a meddling and ineffective foreign policy. These were his words: In foreign policy what we have to do is simply to perform our own part with honour; to abstain from a meddling diplomacy; to uphold England's honour steadily and fearlessly, and always to be rather prone to let action go along with words than to let it lag behind them. To those words I would add two or three words from the late Lord Rosebery, who, of course, was also Foreign Secretary. He laid down another guiding principle. He it was who laid down originally the principle of Party unity and continuity in foreign policy, for he said: Foreign statesmen and foreign courts"— there are not so many of them now, but this is speaking of some time ago— should feel that they are dealing, not with a Ministry, possibly fleeting and possibly transient, but with a great, powerful and united nation. My Lords, so long as we adhere to the principles laid down by those two great statesmen, Lord Salisbury and Lord Rosebery, I feel that, in spite of all the difficulties with which we are confronted, the Foreign Office will bring us safely through and restore this country to her great position of influence and prestige.

5.6 p.m.