Bosnia

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael Morris)

Before I call the Foreign Secretary, I must remind the House that Back-Bench speeches are restricted to 10 minutes.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Portillo)

The House will be familiar with the many tragic events that have led to the present crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Thousands of lives have been lost and countless families have been displaced. Night after night, we have witnessed harrowing scenes on our television sets. We are witnessing a bloody war, in part a civil war and in part a war of aggression. It is a characteristic of civil wars that civilised behaviour rapidly gives way to the basest of acts.

Like all civil wars, this one is extremely complex. It is not, simply, three distinct groups fighting it out. In some areas, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims are together opposed to Bosnian Serbs. In other areas, Bosnian Muslims have been fighting Bosnian Croats. In yet others, Bosnian Serbs have assisted Bosnian Muslims. In one way or another, all the parties have degraded themselves, and they have degraded humanity with the ferocity of their actions. No faction is blameless, but in the enclaves, the Serbs have behaved with a savagery that has appalled the world.

In the former Yugoslavia, we have seen European man at his absolute worst. All sides have been guilty of slaughter, rape and other atrocities. I said "European man", because this civil war is happening in Europe, and that is a fact that we cannot ignore. I wish to make it clear to the House that the Government believe that what happens in Europe touches on this country's vital national interests.

Ms Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood)

The right hon. Gentleman said that it is partly a war of aggression and partly a civil war. He then went on to talk as though all the parties are equally guilty. Surely that is profoundly wrong. The Serbs are the aggressors, and they have been responsible for ethnic cleansing, the mass use of rape and torture and so on. To talk as though there were two equal sides is to distort the analysis from the very beginning of the debate.

Mr. Portillo

I do not think that the hon. Lady does justice to what I said. I said that there have been atrocities on every side, and also drew attention to the particular savagery of the Serbs which we have witnessed in the enclaves. The record will bear out that that is the way I expressed myself.

Into all this chaos, the United Nations is trying to bring succour, relief and sanity. What the United Nations cannot do is end this war by military means. In practice, it can be ended only by a political solution.

The United Nations and the European Union have toiled to achieve peace through diplomacy. A history of broken promises and broken ceasefires now lies behind us, but those efforts must continue. We firmly support the efforts of Carl Bildt, the European Union's negotiator, to negotiate a recognition of Bosnia by Serbia and 1741 Montenegro, and to reopen a dialogue on the contact group plan, which we urge all parties to accept as the starting point for negotiations.

The international community deployed forces to the former Yugoslavia for the best of all possible reasons. The world could not stand aside from the slaughter. Countries from around the globe have sent troops. Britain felt the call of duty particularly strongly. We are Europeans. We are members of the Security Council of the United Nations. We understand our obligation to defend our humanitarian values, and we are privileged to have superb armed forces.

There has been from the start a serious risk that this conflict could degenerate into a regional war, setting light to the Balkans and bringing into play highly dangerous international forces. The west has a vital interest in containing the conflict.

Mr. John Townend (Bridlington)

When I was studying history, it was always a maxim of British foreign policy that one did not get involved on the ground in a Balkan war. May I remind my right hon. Friend that Germany is not involved with troops on the ground? It is surely not in our interests to have our troops there. Many people in this country feel that we should bring them back forthwith.

Mr. Portillo

Germany is not a member of the Security Council of the United Nations; Britain is, and Britain feels her responsibilities acutely. As I shall point out to my hon. Friend, we are not in Bosnia to fight a war; we are there to save lives. That is the essential difference that my hon. Friend will, I hope, recognise. We have always seen that the United Nations is there to be the peacekeeper. Our forces are equipped not to make war but to move among the local population bringing food and medicine and confidence and security wherever we are able to do so.

UN forces in Bosnia are not a combatant force. We obviously cannot stop all the horrors, but that does not mean that we can do nothing. Indeed, we have achieved a great deal.

Mr. Max Madden (Bradford, West)

Since the United Nations, NATO and the international community have vividly demonstrated their unwillingness and inability to intervene militarily in a way which would bring this war to an end, and as the Bosnian Government naturally resist a political settlement resting on genocide and territorial gains made by external military aggression, will the Secretary of State, who does not come to this issue with any political baggage, make it clear that it is now time for the arms embargo to be lifted and the Bosnian Government to be given the means to defend their people and their territory against external Serbian aggression?

Mr. Portillo

I shall come later to the question of the arms embargo, but I must say that I do not think that the hon. Gentleman speaks realistically. To bring this war to an end militarily would require the commitment of hundreds of thousands of men, equipment and armaments, at enormous risk to those forces. I do not believe that it is possible to commit those forces to this theatre.

Even if we did, our chances of success would be remote. The hon. Gentleman must recognise that the only way that this war can end is by political settlement. But 1742 there is a two-pronged approach: a political approach to try to achieve a settlement, and military forces doing what they can to bring security as and when they can.

Mr. Quentin Davies (Stamford and Spalding)

rose—

Mr. Ken Livingstone (Brent, East)

rose—

Mr. Portillo

I shall give way first to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Davies

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the one thing that he cannot possibly do in this situation is respond to Bosnian Serb aggression against UN-designated safe areas with an ignominious retreat of our own forces? Does he agree that it is vital that we do nothing to undermine the credibility of NATO, the Western European Union, or, indeed, international law?

Mr. Portillo

I hope that my hon. Friend will forgive me, because I shall of course come to those important matters, but I must do so as I make progress through my speech, and I must do so in a considered way, for reasons that will become clear.

Several hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Portillo

I want to make progress, but I said that I would give way to the hon. Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone).

Mr. Livingstone

How will the Secretary of State explain to those outside this building, who see that the west mobilised hundreds of thousands of troops when its oil interests were threatened, that the Government are not prepared to take the same stand to stop the slaughter and mass rape of tens of thousands of ordinary people?

Mr. Portillo

The hon. Gentleman makes a comparison which has often been made before, but which none the less I regard as fatuous. In the case of the Gulf, we intervened because there was an aggressive nation on the loose that had attacked Kuwait and threatened the entire region. In Yugoslavia, we have positioned our troops to do what we can to bring peace and save lives, and that is a noble ambition.

Mr. Calum Macdonald (Western Isles)

Will the Secretary of State give way?

Mr. Portillo

No, I am going to make some progress. I shall possibly give way later.

We have achieved a great deal, and the House should remember that.

Croatia and Serbia have not been at war since 1991. The Bosnian Federation of Croats and Muslims has brought peace to central Bosnia, which has witnessed the rebuilding of civil government and the return to normal life, where before there were scenes of slaughter. Tens of thousands of lives have been saved. In 1992, the Bosnian war claimed 130,000 lives. In 1994, that was reduced to 2,500.

Today, the UN provides support for 2.7 million people; 153,000 tonnes of aid were airlifted into Sarajevo between July 1992 and April 1995. British Royal Engineers have built 42 km of road, and they keep open nearly 1,000 km of supply routes. British troops have rebuilt kindergartens, restored essential services, and taught children how to look out for mines that, for years to come, may threaten to blow them to pieces. Fourteen British soldiers have died playing their part in this operation to save others' lives.

1743 For all our soldiers, peacekeeping brings not only danger but frustrations. We must operate with consent in a land of village apparatchiks, empire builders and local warlords. The peacekeeper must learn to negotiate without showing that frustration. But I flatly contradict those who claim that there is humiliation in what the British forces are doing. The saving of human life is noble and dignified, and I feel extraordinarily proud of the British men and women who have achieved so much.

Mr. Winston Churchill (Davyhulme)

I am sure that the whole House shares the pride expressed by my right hon. Friend in the wonderful work done by British forces in Bosnia. However, given the peculiar responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, who sponsored UN resolution 836 to establish Gorazde as a safe haven, could he say whether, when that was done in the spring of 1993, it was our intention to take steps to make those safe areas safe, or was it just intended as a form of words?

Mr. Portillo

I will come to that later, but I will say to my hon. Friend—

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours (Workington)

That is the third time he has said that.

Mr. Portillo

I am making a speech, and I have ordered my thoughts, as the hon. Gentleman should consider.

I shall come to the point that my hon. Friend raised, but I say to him now that the UN foresaw a need for 36,000 troops, and put out the request to the international community for them. In the event, 7,500 were forthcoming.

The deteriorating situation in Bosnia, especially after the taking of the hostages, showed that UN forces needed more protection. We sent artillery and armoured engineers immediately, and French forces and 24 Airmobile Brigade have followed.

I must make two points. First, there has been no change in the UN's mandate. The extra forces are not there to make war, any more than those who were there before them. Secondly, we remain bound by the need for consent for their arrival and deployments through Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are sovereign nations, and we are peacekeepers, not invaders.

At no time has the UN authorised its troops to fight a war; nor are they equipped to do so. Indeed, the UN has been under-resourced to achieve even those objectives authorised by the Security Council in its resolutions. As I have just told my hon. Friend, 36,000 troops were envisaged for the enclaves. The Dutch, the Ukrainians and the British responded, but the UN's request resulted in just those 7,500 troops being committed. The safe areas, like so much else, have depended on consent.

Srebrenica has now fallen. Zepa is under attack. Once more, the civilised world has been appalled by the barbarism in the Balkans. Once again, the UN has responded. They have built tented accommodation and provided basic services for 6,300 people at Tuzla air base. They have also organised logistic support for supplies to arrive from Split.

Our own special interest lies with Gorazde. We have there nearly 200 men of the Royal Welch Fusiliers. An UNPROFOR convoy with supplies for our troops got into Gorazde this afternoon. Like others in these operations, 1744 our soldiers are equipped with neither tanks nor artillery nor heavy arms. They are in Gorazde to play a humanitarian role.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

As a former member of a national service tank crew, may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman does not think that it would be wise in the new circumstances to provide the Welch Fusiliers with some armoured cover, because in all that we were taught, armoured cover is essential in any dangerous situation?

Mr. Portillo

Again, the hon. Gentleman anticipates me; I am coming to that point in the immediate paragraphs that follow. [Interruption.] I repeat, I am coming to that point in the immediate paragraphs that follow.

Each of the options on Gorazde before the international community carries its own risks. To withdraw the troops would leave the Muslims in the enclaves at the mercy of the Bosnian Serbs, and would provoke resistance from the Muslims, who would claim a gross dereliction of duty. Reinforcing the troops poses significant practical problems. We do not have the men or the guns anywhere in former Yugoslavia to stave off a determined onslaught by many thousands of Bosnian Serbs.

The road from Sarajevo to Gorazde passes through hostile territory, and has 26 bridges and eight tunnels. It poses a hazardous route for reinforcement. To reinforce by helicopter carries possibly greater risks. The aircraft are vulnerable to attack unless air defences are destroyed by a massive pre-emptive attack, with all the risks of military escalation.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Portillo

Not at the moment.

The United Nations could use NATO to deploy its air power to deter or repel an attack, again with the risk of escalation. The Royal Welch Fusiliers have adequate supplies of fuel, food and water, and they are in good order. In its history, the regiment has proudly stood in many a perilous situation, and has emerged with honour. The safety and dignity of those men is of paramount importance to this country. I want to make it absolutely clear to the House that anyone who harms them will be held personally responsible by the Government of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East)

Will the Secretary of State give way?

Mr. Portillo

I will not give way.

None of the options on Gorazde that I have set out is appealing, but we must choose among them. The decision must be a joint one, involving the UN troop-contributing nations, NATO and the United States.

Mr. Wilkinson

Is it not the case that the United Nations and NATO have at their command a decisive instrument, which is available and is within the theatre, yet not within the land mass of former Yugoslavia? I refer to their air power, which is off the coast and on Italian air bases. Cannot this be used if appropriate precautions are taken by the troops on the ground, both to deter future attacks on the safe havens and as a punitive reprisal to any barbaric acts of aggression by the Serbs? A civilised 1745 community has a duty to influence events within the theatre, and not just to let things slide down a slippery slope towards humiliation and withdrawal.

Mr. Portillo

I listed the options to the House, and I included in those options the use of air power. Now I shall explain why I did not want to be drawn on these matters earlier.

I have to be responsible about what I say about these matters. There are those who would like to know which way our minds are turning and we have to be very careful about what we say about these matters. Therefore, I have set out in my speech precisely what I want to say on these options, and I am not prepared, even in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson), to be drawn any further on those options for our defence.

This Friday's conference in London has been convened by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to settle our common positions.

Mr. Faulds

Will the Secretary of State give way?

Mr. Portillo

I will not give way at the moment.

Mr. Faulds

Will the Secretary of State give way on Gorazde?

Mr. Portillo

I will not give way.

Mr. Faulds

This is very important.

Mr. Portillo

All right.

Mr. Faulds

I am most grateful for that reconsideration. Very courteous. The right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] If you will be quiet, you will hear what I have got to say. I do not mean you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but the others. The right hon. Gentleman made the assertion a little earlier that the British troops in Yugoslavia had done a magnificent job. None of us disputes that. He said that there had been no humiliation of British troops. Will he maintain that, if British troops are driven out of Gorazde, the word "humiliation" will not apply to that operation?

Mr. Portillo

I have said what I am prepared to say about the military options. I have made it perfectly clear that the British Government will hold responsible any who harm our soldiers in Yugoslavia.

This Friday's conference in London has been convened by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister so that we may settle among the nations concerned our common positions. Since last Sunday, intensive discussions have been under way to establish the military options and more broadly to concert our policy on former Yugoslavia. I must attend a further meeting this evening in connection with those options, and I very much hope that the House will forgive me if I am not here throughout the debate.

In the run-up to Friday's meetings, I can think of nothing more unhelpful than to indulge in megaphone diplomacy. I will not do so. Nothing could be more dangerous for our men in Gorazde than to rehearse the detailed merits of the military options, or to strike public postures.

Friday's meeting must chart the way ahead, but I offer these thoughts. First, the United Nations went to Bosnia and Croatia to save lives. It has done so; it is doing it still. It is becoming more difficult now, but the United Nations 1746 should stay for as long as it can do good. This operation has to be conducted with some humility. Our first concern should be with saving lives. Secondly, the real focus is on the political process. The military operation can help the political process by offering security where a ceasefire is agreed, and it can buy time for the political process. To abandon the chance to buy time is a big step.

Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey)

Will the Secretary of State give way?

Mr. Portillo

Thirdly, withdrawal will have its consequences. It may be militarily hazardous, and it is likely to lead to a more intensive and possibly wider conflagration. The humanitarian disasters that lie ahead could dwarf the horrors that we have seen to date. The war could spread wide, posing unforeseeable threats to the near east and Europe, and so to British interests.

Mr. Keith Mans (Wyre)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Portillo

Fourthly, we have often said that, if the arms embargo on Bosnia is lifted, the United Nations must withdraw. I reiterate that today. Equally, if the United Nations is obliged for any reason to withdraw, the United Kingdom will not oppose the lifting of the embargo.

The time is now ripe for decisions, for the warring factions to contemplate the stark reality of the withdrawal of the United Nations and for the nations involved in the peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia to decide on what terms they are willing to stay.

Mr. Robin Cook (Livingston)

This is the third occasion in three months when the House has debated Bosnia. Each time we debate Bosnia, the situation on the ground appears more grave. At the outset, I pay tribute to the courage and professionalism of the British troops who face the gravity of that crisis on the ground. Like the Defence Secretary, I have visited our forces in Bosnia and I was impressed by how, in a difficult situation, they maintained high standards of morale and of commitment to their job. If there have been failures in Bosnia, they are not failures that we can lay at the door of our troops. They are failures for which we and the other members of the international community must accept responsibility.

There have been failures. We do not do justice to the gravity of the crisis if we deny that there have been failures. The international community has failed the refugees of Srebenica to whom we gave a commitment that there would be a safe area. That was the first commitment to a safe area made in Bosnia and it was at Srebenica that that commitment was broken. If the reports on tonight's broadcasting media are correct, it looks as if we are about, in the same way, to fail the refugees of Zepa.

What has shocked many of our constituents is to see the photographs of the flood of survivors from Srebenica and to discover, two years after we had condemned the barbarity of ethnic cleansing, that it was being practised as brutally and callously as before, only this time, in areas that the United Nations had declared to be under its protection. This is not a failure for which we can pass the parcel of blame between the political parties. We all have a share in the responsibility for the failure of the international community.

1747 There was much in the Defence Secretary's speech with which I would agree. I particularly agree that it would be entirely wrong if we were now to turn the failure in Bosnia into a defeat by withdrawing in the face of that failure. There are more than 2 million civilians throughout Bosnia who depend on the UN presence for food and fuel in winter. The UN troops do more than simply provide escorts to allow that humanitarian relief to get through. The military has turned on the gas, electricity and water throughout central Bosnia. The military often even collects the rubbish in the towns. Civil society in much of present Bosnia under the present circumstances would collapse if the UN were to walk away.

There would be military consequences for the area if the UN were to withdraw. One of the major achievements of the UN presence in Bosnia was the negotiation of a ceasefire between Croat and Muslim forces in a conflict which—at the time—was providing more casualties than the war with the Serbs. That ceasefire is still policed by UN forces—particularly British forces—who daily still inspect the ceasefire line between the two forces. If the UN forces withdrew, there is a real danger that that ceasefire would rapidly unravel.

Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough and Horncastle)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that whatever else may divide the House on party-political grounds, one thing that does unite us is the belief that British public opinion would not tolerate our troops in Gorazde being treated with contempt, brushed aside and disarmed so that humanitarian excesses may take place?

Mr. Cook

I wholly concur with the hon. Gentleman. British public opinion has been much more robust than some Members give credit for, and there is a willingness to see through the mandate. I also entirely agree that it does not serve the interests of our troops, this House, or the people of Bosnia, if we turn the issue into the kind of party-political dispute which it unfortunately appears to have become in Washington.

Withdrawal would have consequences of a profound character well beyond Bosnia. I find it difficult to see how we could contemplate withdrawing the UN presence from Bosnia without there being immediate demands for a withdrawal from Croatia. Such a withdrawal would leave the UN protected areas in Croatia unprotected and would reopen the prospect of President Tudjman renewing the military campaign against the Krajina Serbs. That would raise the danger of the restoration of a full-scale war between Serbia and Croatia, both of whom are—if anything—better armed than they were last time.

Nor would the consequences of withdrawal be confined to the Balkans. Throughout central and eastern Europe, there are many borders—mostly drawn on the map at Versailles in 1918—which divide ethnic communities from each other and throw together other ethnic communities. If Europe permits the borders of Bosnia to be redrawn by military force, we will send a profoundly destabilising message across central and eastern Europe. Moreover, if the consequences of abandoning Bosnia encourage conflict in any of those countries, there would be no UN expedition to contain such a conflict because, in the wake of a retreat from Bosnia, the UN may not have the authority to mount a similar peacekeeping exercise for a generation. That is what is at stake.

1748 Yesterday, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Sedgefield (Mr. Blair) addressed the House at Prime Minister's Question Time, he said that we have a duty to uphold the UN mandate. A number of Conservative Members interrupted at that point to say that we did not have that duty. Away from the more charged and partisan atmosphere of Prime Minister's questions, I hope those Members will reconsider their response. I must say that I agree with the Defence Secretary—we do have a national interest at stake in the Balkans. That national interest is in upholding the principle that borders must not be changed by force.

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury)

Is not the point that Bosnia was a part of an internationally recognised country called Yugoslavia until just four years ago, when the international community chose arbitrarily to recognise it as an independent country against the wishes of a large number of its citizens?

Mr. Cook

One of the things that I have learnt in the past nine months is that if only one could go back to the appropriate point in history, it would be entirely possible to resolve the problems we face today. I would counsel the hon. Gentleman against saying that because the borders have existed for only four years, and are therefore not inviable. There are many borders across Europe which have been created in the past four to six years following the collapse of the Warsaw pact and the Soviet Union. Whatever doubts there may be about the wisdom of the original recognition of Bosnia, the fact is that it was recognised, and we cannot withhold from that recognised Government the right to inviable borders that we insist for ourselves and for any other independent country.

Mr. John Townend

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Cook

The hon. Gentleman has intervened already, but I shall give way on this occasion. I am anxious not to take as long as might be normal. I appreciate that it is a three-hour debate and that other hon. Members wish to speak.

Mr. John Townend

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the borders of Croatia and Bosnia have been redrawn despite the presence of the United Nations? The UN has not prevented that from happening.

Mr. Cook

As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that we should now acquiesce to what military action has delivered to the Karadzic Serbs. My argument is that if we appease on this occasion, we will face similar problems across many parts of eastern Europe, and Members must not imagine that we can then stand back in isolation from those problems.

I put it to the hon. Gentleman that the Conservative party has a proud record of upholding that principle during the past 16 years it has held office, both in the south Atlantic and the Gulf. It would be perverse if this country were now not to uphold that same principle when it is challenged within Europe.

A commitment has been made by British forces in the fulfilment of the UN mandate in Bosnia. I find it a rather curious feature of some of the discussions about the crisis in Bosnia in the past few weeks that some people refer to the UN as if the UN were somebody else. They talk about the UN as if it were some other country, whose 1749 Government are to blame for the problem. The hon. Member for Bridlington (Mr. Townend) did that himself, in a way, when he intervened a moment ago.

The UN is ourselves. It is made up of countries such as us. Indeed, Britain has a leading responsibility in the UN as a member of the Security Council. We ourselves supported in the Security Council the very mandates that we are now fulfilling within Bosnia. We cannot put ourselves forward as that leading member of the UN if we do not also accept the duty to fulfil the mandates.

If our commanders on the ground, of their own volition, were at any time to say that it was simply too dangerous for our troops to stay, there must be no alternative in the circumstances but for us to withdraw the troops. But those are the only circumstances in which we should abandon our mission in Bosnia. Those who demand withdrawal in any other circumstances must ask what message that would convey to the Karadzic Serbs. I may say here that I hope throughout to refer to what are commonly called the Bosnian Serbs as the Karadzic Serbs. There are many Serbs who support the Government of Bosnia, and there are some Serbs in Pale who do not support Karadzic.

I submit that the message we are in danger of sending to the Karadzic Serbs by talking of withdrawal is that if they apply a little more pressure, we will pack up and get out of the way. If I am right, the demands for withdrawal do not serve the interests of our troops there, but make it all the more likely that they will come under that extra pressure.

Our response to the setbacks in Bosnia should not be to accept defeat and pull out, but to show a new determination to carry out the UN mandate. Two months ago, the international community demonstrated unity and resolve in demanding freedom for the UN troops taken hostage. We must now show the same unity and resolve in delivering freedom from fear and oppression to Bosnia's civilians. The fate of the eastern enclaves raises doubts about the resolve of the international community, and doubts will have been raised in the minds of the Bosnian Government and the Karadzic Serbs.

Mr. lain Duncan Smith (Chingford)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Cook

I have some hard questions to ask, but I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman first.

Mr. Duncan Smith

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; I know that he wants to make progress. He advanced a powerful argument for delivering an ultimatum to the aggressors—in this instance, those whom he has described as the Karadzic Serbs. What if that ultimatum is not accepted? Does it follow that one of two things must then happen? Must we be prepared to support such an ultimatum militarily? Failing that, does the hon. Gentleman accept that the alternative is to give the numerous troops on the ground—the Bosnian Government troops, that is—an opportunity to support the ultimatum by allowing them to arm themselves with heavy weapons?

Mr. Cook

I am at one with the Secretary of State for Defence on the question of lifting the arms embargo. I see no way of lifting the embargo without immediately pulling out the United Nations presence, with all the consequences that I have just paraded before the House. As the hon. Gentleman has raised the issue, let me take 1750 this opportunity to issue a plea to the United States Congress not to make such a decision, and in particular not to make it unilaterally. Unilateral action by the United States to lift the arms embargo would have profound consequences not only for Bosnia and the United Nations presence there, but for the legitimacy of United Nations resolutions on any conflict around the world that the United States had chosen to set aside.

I said earlier that some hard questions must be answered. The first is this: was there no intelligence warning of the attack on Srebrenica? Those of us who saw the photographs of the attack noted that it involved heavy artillery attacks. Did no one observe the build-up? If we knew that an attack was coming, why was the Dutch garrison at Srebrenica left at half strength? Why was there no formal protest of the kind that the Secretary of State has just made, with a warning to Mr. Karadzic? Why was there no attempt to involve President Milosevic in pressure to make the attackers back off?

It is reported that the Dutch troops requested close air support, and that their request took four days to process in Zagreb. That suggests that the pace of bureaucratic decision-making in Zagreb is wholly out of step with the urgency of the military conflict on the ground. If our response is to be more robust, and if the dual-key mechanism is to continue in its present form, we must ask whether the current UN civilian leadership is capable of the response—and the speed of response—that the military requires.

Of immediate concern to the House and the British people are the hard questions that now arise over Gorazde and the safety of the Royal Welch Fusiliers and other units of the British forces in that town—and also the safety of the tens of thousands of civilian refugees whom it is their mission to protect. The gravity and isolation of their position is underlined by the fact that in the past 24 hours they have found themselves protecting Ukrainian troops who were themselves there as part of the UN protection force.

I understand that the situation in Gorazde is now serious. Only one food convoy has gone through in the past seven weeks. The function of our troops was to observe whether the two sides were adhering to the observance of the safe area; for the past two months they have been unable to man the observation posts lest they themselves be seized as hostages. The danger is that the entire contingent will, in effect, become hostages as a result of being based in a camp at the bottom of a valley ringed by Serb artillery.

In those circumstances, I find it puzzling that over the past week it has been the French Government who have demanded the strengthening of the British garrison, while British Ministers have explained the difficulties in the way. Having heard the Defence Secretary rehearse those difficulties, I must ask why we have had British troops in such an isolated and exposed position for a year with, apparently, no prior contingency planning of what practical means could be used to strengthen their position if they came under threat—particularly in a conflict such as this. There is ample historical reason for suspecting that- the Karadzic Serbs would not remain committed to the paper undertaking that they gave not to attack.

Mr. John Redwood (Wokingham)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Cook

I will, but this must be the last time if I am to make progress.

Mr. Redwood

What is the hon. Gentleman's message to the Royal Welch Fusiliers in Gorazde, and what action does he recommend to strengthen their position or provide them with additional cover?

Mr. Cook

The message from the House to the Royal Welch Fusiliers is that they have our full support for their mandate and their mission. Our second message must be to the Government—that every possible practical means must be found to strengthen the position of the Royal Welch Fusiliers.

The right hon. Gentleman's intervention brings me conveniently to my next point. If the Government have no practical means of reinforcing the garrison, I hope that there are contingency plans to remove the soldiers from Gorazde if they cannot sustain their position. If reports that that is being examined are correct, I hope that withdrawal will be accompanied by an agreement allowing the orderly evacuation of refugees, so that the refugees in Gorazde are not abandoned—like those in Srebrenica—to the mercy and charity of the Karadzic Serbs.

I want to raise a final issue about the military position. It arises from our last debate, when the Prime Minister announced the establishment of the rapid reaction force and presented it as a new capacity for the United Nations protection force.

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Cook

No. I said that I had given way for the last time; many hon. Members wish to speak, and I am anxious to make progress.

As I was saying, the Prime Minister presented the rapid reaction force as a means for the United Nations protection force to protect itself. It may well be that the relief of Gorazde is not an appropriate or realistic mission for the rapid reaction force, but it must be able to make some useful contribution to the deteriorating military situation in Bosnia. After all, we have an obligation to Sarajevo, which is now receiving one sixth of the amount of food that it requires.

I noticed yesterday that the Prime Minister did not rule out the use of that force to secure a land route into Sarajevo. If that is militarily feasible, I urge the Government to issue a valuable signal to residents of Sarajevo who are under siege that there is material assistance for them, and a clear signal to the Karadzic Serbs that the international community has the will to enforce the UN mandate where it has the capacity. That would also help to dispel some of the accusations that the rapid reaction force is little in evidence in Bosnia, because its real purpose is not to strengthen the UN presence but to assist in the removal of that presence.

The really worrying issue is that we have already committed a large quantity of our troops to the Bosnian theatre with no clear idea of what they are meant to do, and without the capacity to carry out much of what we ask of them. That is unfair to our troops and damaging to the UN, whose authority is diminished as a result. It also encourages the Serbs every time they discover that we have not the capacity to deliver on our threats or fulfil our promises.

1752 Our future strategy in Bosnia—for I believe that we must remain in Bosnia—should include four guidelines. First, we should clarify what are the feasible military objectives, and ensure that we provide the military assets to achieve those objectives. Equally, we must ensure that we do not make commitments to objectives that we do not regard as militarily feasible. Secondly, we must show resolve in securing the objectives that we define as achievable. It would therefore be helpful if those who speculate about what those objectives might be did not in the same breath speculate about the possibility of withdrawal.

Thirdly, we must back every possible diplomatic and economic sanction to oblige the parties to the dispute to reach a political settlement. In view of clear evidence over the past two months of the support that President Milosevic has given the Karadzic Serbs, there must be no more talk in the immediate future of relaxing sanctions on Serbia. That does not mean that we should not be prepared to lay on the table now a programme of economic reconstruction for the post-war period, which might help to concentrate the minds of those in the Balkans on the enormous destruction and lost opportunities that the conflict has cost the economy.

That brings me to my final guideline. As well as containing the military expression of ethnic hostility, the international community should engage more actively in the propaganda war that manipulates that hostility.

The control of national television and press gives Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman weapons more powerful than their tanks or aircraft. The people of Serbia have never seen the candid pictures that we have of the horrors done in the name of greater Serbia in Srebrenica because, the night after that event, the news was filled with a half-hour bulletin about the record harvest in Serbia, with President Milosevic gathering it at the wheel of a combine harvester. That totalitarian control of the media is part of the reason why nationalist politicians can prolong the war, regardless of the cost to their people.

Some progress towards increasing the pressures for peace might come if a modest fraction of our effort in former Yugoslavia went into providing and supporting access to alternative pluralist news media.

There is one central message which it could offer to the peoples and the politicians of former Yugoslavia. That is that, in disappearing into their own history in search of justification for present hatreds, they are turning their back on the Europe of the future. The modern Europe is about bringing down barriers, building bridges on the economic ties that cross ethnic and cultural divisions. What is happening in the former Yugoslavia is a challenge to the values of that new Europe, to equal democratic rights, to religious tolerance, to ethnic pluralism—values which are not the monopoly of any party in the House, but are common to both sides of the House.

That is why we cannot walk away from Bosnia; not only because to do so would be to abandon civilians there to humanitarian catastrophe, but because to do so would be to walk away from our own values. There must be no doubt about our commitment to those values and that is why, in Bosnia, we should take every practical step to support and defend those values.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I remind hon. Members that all speeches are now restricted to 10 minutes, with the exception of that of the official spokesman for the Liberal Democrats.

Mr. Douglas Hurd (Witney)

The last occasion on which the House discussed Bosnia was when my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary made a statement a week ago. Some of the press reported critically on the exchanges across the Floor of the House that followed. I thought that those exchanges reflected reality, as have both the speeches to which the House has just listened.

The House feels very strongly about Bosnia but, with relatively few exceptions, it discusses Bosnia now with a very bitter sense of realism. In that, I believe that it is in tune with the view of the public in the country, perhaps more than some of the comments in the media.

Everyone who has followed this tragedy from the beginning, or has come to it lately, feels distressed, angered and frustrated by the suffering that we are now witnessing again. Everyone can now see that that is largely the responsibility of the Bosnian Serbs. I think that, overwhelmingly, people believe that Britain should, with others, do what we realistically can to soften that suffering and bring about a settlement.

We know that all, or almost all, those who are fighting in Bosnia have homes in Bosnia because they are Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Muslims. That is to say, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said, we are dealing with, essentially, a harsh civil war, originally supported from outside, with confused fighting lines, in which cruelties and lies abound.

No solution can be imposed from outside except in one circumstance—except if we had sent a large international army on what would have been, essentially, an imperial mission, to fight, to take casualties week by week in those mountains and valleys and to stay indefinitely while the solution that we had imposed took hold.

Many commentators in many countries have overflowed with rhetoric, as though it were because of a failure of the international community that that has not happened. But the House knows that no single country has at any time suggested that that could, or should, be done. What has been much more commonly expressed is the idea that a total answer could have been achieved by lesser military means. I believe that that is, frankly, flannel.

Ms Short

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Hurd

I shall give way once, to the hon. Lady, and then I should like to make progress.

Ms Short

Is not the problem the pretence that we must choose between an all-out ground war and no use of force at all? Could not the UN have used force defensively, to protect the safe areas, to get the supplies through? That is the failure, and I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman is partially responsible for it.

Mr. Hurd

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has discussed that argument. Resolution 836 and, indeed, the earlier one on Srebrenica, established safe areas and appealed for troops, which were not then forthcoming, to deal with them. I do not believe that any shame attaches to this country because, as my right hon. Friend said, we were one of the three countries that responded specifically to that request.

1754 However, I am discussing the belief that the hon. Lady has often expressed—the idea that, somehow, by lesser military means than the total imperial mission, peace with justice could have been achieved by a few bombs in a few weeks, by a little extra equipment for the Bosnian Government, by a few extra million dollars. I really believe that that is flannel.

Mr. Andrew Hargreaves (Birmingham, Hall Green)

Would my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Hurd

No. I have only a short time and I have given way once. I would rather get on and conclude.

There is a role for air power, as Her Majesty's Government have acknowledged for two years now, and in the next few weeks there may well again be a role for air power to deter Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde or Sarajevo. But I do not believe that it is possible, from the air, to bomb the Bosnian Serbs into coming to the conference table and reaching a peaceful settlement.

However, although most people in this country accept that we cannot do everything, they do not go on to conclude that we should do nothing. They support the substantial efforts that we have made—perhaps more pre-eminently than any other country, counting the aid as well as the military side—and want that effort to continue for as long as it can. As long as it can, Mr. Deputy Speaker—that is the rub.

I conclude with two short points about that. I believe that the next two or three months may be the climax in deciding whether it can. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said, UNPROFOR depends on a minimum of consent which does not at present exist. If there is no substantial improvement, we may, by the test of the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook)—by the judgment of our military commanders—have to withdraw.

I have felt, for a bit now, that it might be right to be a little more specific about that, and to say that, unless specific improvements on the ground are achieved, unless consent is restored, it might well be the judgment of our military commanders that we could not continue. UNPROFOR might then have to withdraw. I believe that then the arms embargo would have to be lifted; the logic of what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said about that is clear.

I do not believe that either side really wants to be left alone with the other side in that bloodstained cockpit, knowing that their opponents—and that would be true of both sides—would be able to draw indefinitely on the very large quantities of weapons that are available in a world awash with arms.

I understand the operational difficulties of withdrawal, as I am sure does the House. A scheme for withdrawal that involves introducing a large North Atlantic Treaty Organisation force to help the withdrawal of a relatively smaller United Nations force will have a seismic effect on the ground, on the region. It will powerfully change the position in a way that military planners, whether in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe or in London, cannot be sure of in advance.

Unless circumstances can be improved—unless the minimum consent can be restored—withdrawal may be inevitable because, in the judgment of military commanders, the force could not continue. That is not 1755 inevitable, but it is a real danger, and I believe that we can use that real danger to bring about the improvements that are necessary.

I conclude by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on his appointment, on the speed with which he has visited the troops in Bosnia and on the admirable and effective speech that he has just made.

Some speak as though there were some system of international order which already exists, some glass palace of peace which has already been built and which is being shattered by what is happening in Bosnia or in west Africa or the former Soviet union, where similar horrors are occurring. But there is no such thing. There is no new international order. Man's cruelty to man continues; the tragedies multiply. What does happen is that people try to avert the tragedies, try to prevent them and, when they occur, try to reduce them.

Some of those efforts succeed. They have succeeded in Namibia, they have succeeded in Mozambique, and they have partly succeeded in Cambodia. Some fail, such as in Somalia and Rwanda. Bosnia now hangs in the balance, unfortunately tilting the wrong way. On many occasions, Britain does not and should not take part; we cannot be even a part policeman everywhere. But sometimes it is right to join in the effort, as we did in Rwanda and as we are doing in Angola and in Bosnia. I am sure that it is right that we should do so for as long as that is possible, but I think that we should use the possibility of withdrawal to secure that minimum of agreement on the ground that would enable us to continue.

Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli)

I shall address my brief remarks to the situation in Gorazde, where one of my constituents has a son serving with the Royal Welch Fusiliers.

Despite what we have heard today, I do not know whether the House is fully aware of the real danger facing the 200 Royal Welch Fusiliers and the Ukrainian contingent in Gorazde. The British contingent has a Bosnian Serb military force at the front gate. In its garden, which is a Bosnian Muslim hinterland, there are Bosnian Muslim forces. It has been said—I do not know whether it is correct—that attempts have been made to mine the area behind the British contingent to prevent its withdrawing into the hinterland. There are also reports that there may be an ammunition factory in the hinterland producing weapons and armaments.

Gorazde is situated in a valley and is therefore surrounded by hills. There is little or no protection from the air and the 200 Royal Welch Fusiliers have very light armaments. The Secretary of State mentioned a convoy that had gone through recently, but there have been very few convoys in the past few weeks. They are dependent, probably entirely, on the consent and the permission of the Bosnian Serbs. As I discovered from meeting the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, the contingent must take its drinking water from the river Drina and that water must be purified. Getting in food parcels and letters is also dependent on the consent of the Bosnian Serbs.

As we know, the tour of duty comes to an end in early September. Britain has provided three tours of duty in Gorazde and it was hoped that the next would fall to the 1756 Ukrainian forces. It seemed that the Ukrainians were keen and happy to do that. However, I no longer think that that is the position in view of what the Bosnian Muslims are reported to have done to the Ukrainian soldiers, including taking their commander hostage and threatening him perhaps even with death. To leave Gorazde in September would again require the consent and the permission of the Bosnian Serbs. That might be forthcoming, but the Bosnian Muslims may have something to say about it also.

The stark reality is that 200 British troops are trapped: they cannot go forwards and they cannot go back. They have very few resources with which to defend themselves, they are vulnerable from the air and they are surrounded by two warring armies. There is the added danger that NATO will decide to bomb in the vicinity in an attempt to deter the Bosnian Serbs from attacking.

When this wretched war is over, perhaps some questions will be asked—such as, who put British soldiers in such a vulnerable position? They are highly trained soldiers from what is probably one of the best armies in the world. They are not peace corps volunteers. If they are put in danger—that is the nature of soldiering—we owe it to them at least to ensure that their orders are based on a rational and sensible military assessment of the dangers that they face.

We face an extremely difficult position and there are no glib answers. The Secretary of State mentioned some of the options. First, we could do nothing. We could wait, and perhaps the Bosnian Serbs might not attack. The British contingent could then leave in early September as planned. I do not know whether the Bosnian Serbs would allow our soldiers to leave. Perhaps they would. I do not know whether the Bosnian Muslims would allow them to leave. There is also a possibility of air strikes. I do not know whether that is a real option.

Secondly, there is the question of reinforcements. I suppose that it would be possible—although the Secretary of State poured cold water on the idea—to fly in a large number of troops in Black Hawk helicopters. They also would be very vulnerable and I do not know how many troops would be needed. Even if they could be brought in, they would still have to receive food and water. The logistic problems would still have to be solved and the troops would still face the possibility of spending a long Balkan winter with the Bosnian Serbs at the gate.

Thirdly, we could sit down now and attempt to negotiate with the Serbs—and, I suppose, with the Bosnian Muslims—the removal of the 200 British troops. I do not know whether that is feasible, but the consequences of that option would be quite considerable for the entire strategy in the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo.

It would be silly to pretend that there are easy answers or easy solutions. I simply ask the Secretary of State for an assurance that the welfare of British troops will be considered to be as important as the legitimate interests and welfare of other people in the Bosnian theatre of war. If our forces are asked to engage in dangerous movements or manoeuvres, their orders must be based on a proper military assessment and not upon some grand gesture designed to save the face of international bureaucrats or politicians.

Mr. David Howell (Guildford)

At the outset of the debate we heard two very fine speeches from either side of the House. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the new 1757 Secretary of State for Defence on what he had to say. It was a very fitting beginning to his time in that high office. He comes to this problem at what appears to be the final part of a miserable series of developments, with the overrunning of Srebrenica, the imminent overrunning of Zepa and great fears among many people that the worst is yet to come.

My hon. Friend said not to press him about what might be done to prevent those gloomy predictions from becoming reality; and we must not press him. However, his comments gave me new confidence that there may be ways of ensuring that Sarajevo is not strangled and that perhaps Gorazde can be saved from the ghastly horrors and tragedies that we have seen in Srebrenica and that we are now seeing in Zepa. Let us not press my right hon. Friend tonight, but let us be confident that he will, and must, find ways of stabilising the short-term situation and preventing a repetition of the miseries of the past few days.

The United Nations has a mandate to protect the enclaves. Of course, that cannot be done against a massive and determined assault by thousands of the enemy—that would be impossible. But a serious attempt can be made to fulfil that mandate and to hold the further enclaves by getting reinforcements there in one way or another. I believe that that can be done. When it is, I hope that it will be done with the consensual support of the other major allies, possibly including the Russians. Certainly the Americans will have to decide between their two policies—the one on Capitol hill and the other in the White House—because one way or the other, the Americans will be drawn into events if the situation is to be stabilised.

My plea concerns not so much the short term. We have all seen the agonies and have armchair recipes, but my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has to bear the brunt with his other Ministers and with their opposite numbers in allied countries. My plea is that anything that we do to stabilise the short-term situation, to halt the terrifying sense of drift, is combined and interlocked with a new medium-term strategy, to prevent finding ourselves in a similar situation again—that despite a mass of good intentions, we are in an even worse position than now.

The new strategy—which must be intertwined with what is done now, whatever is being planned—should incorporate two vital, realistic elements. I do not want to see the UN humiliatingly withdraw totally. I am uneasy with the language that says that there is an absolute choice between staying and fighting and total withdrawal. The UN has done brilliant work throughout the world. It is doing brilliant work in Bosnia, although we do not hear much about it, in saving lives and safeguarding convoys. It was not necessary to send vast armies into Ethiopia to start to save lives there. I do not know whether Angola is coming right, but the UN did not send vast armies in there. There were a lot of troops in Cambodia, but a lot of work was done. As the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) rightly said, the UN is only the sum of its parts. It does not exist as an entity in space.

The UN, through the support of its members, has done good work and there remains an agenda for United Nations personnel—civilians and the brave blue-helmeted soldiers who protect them—in the Bosnian and Balkan region. Having said that, I would not want to see a complete withdrawal. One is obviously vulnerable to the argument, "In that case, are you asking the UN forces to stay to do a job that they have not succeeded in doing?" They have not 1758 maintained the safety of the safe enclaves. They have been unable, because they are unequipped, to defend and to fulfil the trust placed in them by the wretched and tragic refugees of whom we have all seen pictures.

There must be yet another part to the strategy but it is not one that yet carries my right hon. Friend, although I drew some hope from his remarks. That part has not carried hitherto the grandee policymakers of Paris and London or the White House—although it has received almost too vigorous support in the US Congress. If we cannot provide the forces on the ground to halt the atrocities and violence of the Bosnian Serbs as they fulfil the Greater Serbia agenda, which they are determined to do, we must examine gradually and carefully, perhaps not overnight, the forces who could do that job but have been denied the weapons so far. I refer of course to the Bosnian presidency troops, who outnumber the Bosnian Serbs two to one. They are excellent fighters but at this moment do not even have enough bullets, let alone heavy weapons, to defend themselves. They do not have the trucks to deploy their forces in such a way as to add to their current desperate efforts to save Sarajevo from total starvation and strangulation.

Parallel with the saving and, I hope, holding of Gorazde—and beyond that the dignified withdrawal in due course of UN troops—should go not merely a reluctant recognition that the embargo must be lifted if we pull out, as my right hon. Friend said. I differ with him. Together with the pattern of holding Gorazde and Sarajevo in the short term must go a medium-term intention to ensure that the Bosnian presidency—the legitimate army of the legitimate Government of that hapless country—has the weapons, and maybe in due course the artillery and tanks, to defend itself. Back always comes the pat reply, "That will mean a vast escalation of the war."

That cliché gets traded around, but it has not been carefully examined. If Bosnian Serb force were met with force, I wonder whether the Bosnian Serbs would not immediately realise that the time for easy games—for walking into towns and murdering Bosnians, and the rest—is over. They would face a determined enemy and there would be a kind of stalemate. Of course it would be a bloody stalemate, but we are seeing that already. Of course it would be difficult. Of course it would be a brave decision, but there might come a morning when the two sides would say, "For neither of us is it worth fighting on. For both of us it is worth sitting down and negotiating. However agonising the negotiation and the partitioning, we must sit down and negotiate." If we go along the path that I indicated, that point could be reached.

We must we ensure that any winding down of the UN's activities is accomplished with dignity. We must ensure that UN civilian and some military operations remain, to save lives in the area. We should not just petulantly withdraw everything. Finally, beyond that withdrawal with dignity or winding down, we let the Bosnian presidency troops and the presidency government have the right and the dignity to defend themselves to show the Bosnian Serbs that there can be no winner and that they should stop the killing and negotiate. That is not only the best. way forward but, I believe, the way that events will dictate. I believe that there are no other options. Although we talk grandly of options, there is only the path that I have described, and that is the one that statesmen should now pursue.

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East)

Like the right hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell), I have some sympathy with the restraint that the Secretary of State for Defence displayed in deliberately avoiding enumerating the possible military options. As I think he said, at least by implication, to do so might be to provide information of advantage to those against whom some of the options might in due course be exercised.

With all due deference to the Secretary of State, the debate takes place to some extent in a vacuum. At the end of our deliberations we shall take no decisions. We all know, however, that even as we conduct the debate serious decisions may well be taken in Washington, where the Foreign Secretary has gone to have discussions with the United States Government and, I hope, with members of Congress, although some of the press reports suggest that he may find that a little more difficult than perhaps he would wish.

The debate takes place to some extent in the abstract. The fact that the Foreign Secretary has felt it necessary to go to Washington—I make no criticism of that because I believe that his judgment was correct—serves only to underline something which we have seen in the history of events in the former Yugoslavia over the past two or three years. It is that where the United Nations seeks to embark on a major operation without the wholehearted support, political and military, of the United States, its activities are necessarily inhibited. Some of us may not like that but the events of the past two or three years demonstrate it eloquently to be the case.

What else do the events of the past two or three years tell us? They tell us—I suspect that this is a lesson not yet learnt—that it is necessary to establish clear political objectives and then to provide sufficient military resources if we wish to implement Security Council resolutions.

If the strategy has been one of containment, that strategy has succeeded to some extent. We are obliged to ask ourselves, however, how long that will be the position. If events continue to take their present course, can the relative calm in Kosovo and Macedonia be maintained? If the strategy has been to feed as many people as possible, that strategy too has substantially succeeded. That is especially so in central Bosnia. If the strategy was to drive the participants back to negotiation, we would be right to acknowledge that it has been a comprehensive failure. Why has that been so?

We can track through the history of this matter and the path of the international community a lack of resolve that almost month by month, and sometimes week by week, has done nothing to increase the willingness of the Bosnian Serbs, or the Karadzic Serbs as perhaps we may now call them, to take advantage and to call the bluff, if we like, of the UN.

The House will recall that we declared a no-fly zone. It was several months, however, before we put aircraft over the former Yugoslavia to enforce it. I understand that combat air patrols are no longer being flown over the land mass of the former Yugoslavia, although they may be still be being flown over the Adriatic. We declared an arms embargo, but it was more than six months before there was an adequate fleet in the Adriatic to seek to enforce it.

1760 Already, in the course of the debate, we have heard cries of withdrawal. I wonder how many people who cry for withdrawal have actually been to the former Yugoslavia and made any effort to assess precisely what would be involved in withdrawal. It is a country which consists, as many will know, of a lot of valleys with poor roads at the bottom of deep slopes. The idea that there is some easy withdrawal to be effected in a matter of a few weeks frankly does not stand up to even a moment's consideration if one has regard to the country's geography.

If we were to withdraw, there would be damage to the reputation of the United Nations. Some have rightly talked of the long-term consequences of withdrawal. In my judgment, however, that would be nothing compared with the short-term risk to the civilians who occupy the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia in particular. Which of us believes that, if there was a withdrawal, hostilities would cease?

As I believe is now generally acknowledged—the Secretary of State said so expressly—if there is a withdrawal there would be no legitimacy in seeking to maintain the arms embargo. A stalemate may well come about, as the right hon. Member for Guildford said a moment ago, but one must have regard to what the consequences and circumstances would be from the moment of withdrawal and the lifting of the arms embargo until the point at which that stalemate was achieved. I beg to suggest that those consequences and circumstances might be very severe and damaging indeed.

Then we must ask ourselves: what purpose can be served by the United Nations remaining in the former Yugoslavia? Like others, I have used the illustration from time to time, that the relative calm and the return, albeit grudgingly and with difficulty, to normality in central Bosnia continues to provide a rationale for our remaining. But I begin to doubt if that is enough.

With regard to Zepa, one must be blunt. There seems little enthusiasm for or prospect of Zepa being successfully defended against a Bosnia Serb advance if that is what they choose to do. As to Gorazde, I do not—nor, I suspect, do any of us except those sitting on the Treasury Bench—have access to sufficiently adequate intelligence and information to determine whether Gorazde can be defended. Even if we were to decide that it could be defended, we would have to ask ourselves the subordinate questions: does that defence apply only to the United Nations forces who are there or, if we were talking about the defence of Gorazde, do we mean that we will defend any civilians who may find themselves under attack as well?

I do not yet hear or understand there to be any clarity in a decision of that kind. It could be argued that the mere fact of sending large numbers of troops to Gorazde, whether by helicopter or otherwise—I suspect by helicopter only because, since the road from Kisseljak to Gorazde is substantially in Bosnian Serb hands, helicopters are probably the only means of doing so—would be deterrent enough. Like other hon. Members, however, I do not have the information which would allow me to reach a certain judgment on that matter. I therefore ask myself again: what is there that we can do that we can have some assurance about?

We can say that we will not allow Sarajevo to be strangled and that we will open and maintain, with military means if necessary, a route for humanitarian 1761 relief over Mount Igman to Sarajevo. I say that for the obvious self-evident reason that we cannot have the strangulation of that city, with all the consequences for the people who live there.

The second and perhaps more long-term element of that is to say that that would show in a dramatic and forceful way that the United Nations is possessed of resolve in these matters and that where it is militarily possible it is prepared to take steps in order to ensure that the resolutions by which its presence in the former Yugoslavia is justified can be implemented robustly.

Mr. Dalyell

The hon. and learned Gentleman talks about military means to keep a road open. What is his estimate of the size of that military means and would it involve arming?

Mr. Campbell

On the issue of armour, I do not think that there is any doubt that it would be difficult to transport it over Mount Igman, not least because one would have to bring it up by road from Split. But I am satisfied that the rapid reaction force, properly deployed—particularly its first element which, as the hon. Gentleman knows, contains artillery—plus the full repertoire of NATO air power, would be sufficient to keep open such a route were it to be established for humanitarian purposes. I have some corroboration for that as that view has been expressed on a number of occasions in the recent past. From conversations that I have had, I believe that that view carries a certain amount of authority among those who may be responsible for making the ultimate decision.

Some say that we should not do any of those things and continue to fulfil what is sometimes called, rather inelegantly but perhaps very descriptively, the muddling-through option. The muddling-through option will inevitably lead to withdrawal and it offers no clear policy objectives. It puts our forces on the ground in an impossible position—one that will be increasingly untenable. In that connection, I think that the House would want to know, within the constraints that the Secretary of State suggested at the outset, the precise role of the rapid reaction force. What are its terms of reference at this moment and what will its rules of engagement be in general terms? When may we expect it to be fully deployed and operational?

Phrases such as "defining moment" and "turning point" have been used so often in the descriptions of what is taking place in the former Yugoslavia that they have lost their ordinary meaning. But one can say without over-dramatising the situation that the future course of events in the former Yugoslavia may depend acutely on the decisions taken in the next few days. More than that, those decisions may signally affect the relationship between Europe and the United States of America and may signally determine the credibility of the United Nations in a post-cold-war world.

The resolutions of the Security Council can be enforced in a restrained way or in a robust way. Until now, the policy has been to show restraint, but I do not believe that that restraint has brought the international community—or, more importantly, the people of Bosnia—much satisfaction. The chilling image of the 20-year-old girl, anonymous and alone, who hanged herself out of desperation and hopelessness should haunt us all. That image should not drive our policies, but it should remind us of what the consequences of our policies may be.

Sir Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South)

I shall begin with some brief congratulations. First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook), who made an excellent and perceptive speech. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. We all understand why he is not here now. Again, I was much impressed with what he had to say. May I also say how nice it is to see my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor) on the Front Bench in his new post as Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I look forward to his, I trust, robust reply to the debate.

I am glad that the summit is to take place on Friday. I have made about a dozen speeches on this appalling situation over the past three and a half to four years and, in the past 18 months, I have called many times for a summit. I would, admittedly, prefer it to be at head of state level, but the fact that a specific summit is being called with this subject as the sole item on the agenda gives me some encouragement. It gives me encouragement that, at long last, a more co-ordinated, cohesive, united and resolute approach is on the cards.

The sad, deplorable story of the past three and a half years has not been one of the failure of British troops. Their bravery is unsurpassed, and we all rightly pay tribute to them every time we debate this subject. No one seeks to criticise—I certainly do not—the motives or credentials of our Government or the Opposition. But I have often been haunted by the remarks of Edmund Burke who said in this place so long ago that all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. I do not suggest that good men have done nothing, but it is manifestly clear that they have not done enough.

The hon. Member for Livingston, who spoke for the Opposition, did not seek to absolve himself of a degree of culpability, and in that he spoke for us all. The honour of the House is at stake far more than it was in the debate that we had earlier today. It is crucial that this situation in the centre of Europe does not become a cauldron that boils over into a European conflagration. That remains just as much a possibility as it did in the early hours of that December morning in 1991 when I drew a Consolidated Fund debate on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and for the first time the House turned its attention to that.

I am sorry that the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Hurd) is not in the Chamber. He spoke about there being no new world order. We accept that, but it is no excuse for not seeking to build one upon Europe's disintegrating old order. That is absolutely essential.

The hon. Member for Livinston was right when he spoke about the signals that will go out if the Yugoslavian situation results in ultimate disaster. A number of us have made similar observations in the past. Irrespective of whether it develops into full-scale war, drawing in America and Russia backing opposite sides, those signals will be a recipe for international anarchy. Without the rule of law in a country there is no civil order, and without international law and respect for it, there can only be international anarchy.

1763 We have agonised in public for far too long about the difficulties. Of course, whatever course is adopted is fraught with risks—far more so now than it would have been if those air and naval patrols had been put in when Dubrovnik was being shelled. The risks have increased as vacillation has led to the Serbs calling people's bluff time and again.

Let us consider for a moment what we are debating. President Milosevic has publicly repudiated Karadzic. He has not done enough, and there is much more that he can should do before there is any question of lifting sanctions. But he has dissociated himself from the activities of the Karadzic Serbs.

It has been said often recently in the House that the Karadzic Serbs—I think that I was the first to use that specific term—do not represent the whole Serbian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina: far from it. At most they represent possibly 50 per cent. and probably fewer. That is the group of people we are debating. They have in effect declared war on the United Nations. That is what has happened. It is not a question of embarking on a war or throwing our weight around in that sense, but of the United Nations not allowing its mandates to be set at naught by a gang of brigands.

We must therefore display determination and resolution. It must be made absolutely plain to Karadzic that Gorazde will not fall, and that Sarajevo will be relieved. Not a hair on a single Serbian head needs to be touched, but should they persist in their appalling actions and attitude, punitive action will be taken from the air and elsewhere. Of course it was right for the Secretary of State for Defence to be vague on that subject—one does not announce in advance precisely what one is going to do.

There must be no doubt in the Karadzic Serb mind that the international community means business and is not going to see its rule flouted in this appalling way by those who have despoiled villages and towns, raped women and caused mayhem.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) spoke about the lifting of the arms embargo. It has always been morally indefensible to have recognised a sovereign state, yet neither allowed it to defend itself nor defended it. My right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary once used unhappy words about "level killing fields". Far better that there should be a level killing field than a field of slaughter, with all the heavy weaponry in one pair of hands and none in the other.

I do not want to see a quick move to lift the embargo—that will not be necessary given the resolution I have called for. There should be absolutely no doubt, however, in the Karadzic Serb mind that ethnic cleansing will not be allowed to pay off, and that those Serbs will not be allowed to alter international borders by flouting international rules.

It is essential that, during the summer recess which we are to begin tonight, there should be no question of a great European city, which is Sarajevo—a model of multi-ethnic co-operation until a few years ago—being allowed to fall. That must not be allowed to happen, and the seige must be lifted in the interests of the new European humanity about which the hon. Member for Livingston so eloquently spoke.

1764 If there is any major change in policy, there must be no question but that the House must be recalled to discuss it. I hope that there will be no faint hearts on the Conservative Benches or in any other part of the House, and no flinching from our country doing its duty. This is a great nation; a leading member of the European Union; a permanent member of the Security Council and a founder member of NATO.

In the very year when we commemorate the ending of the second world war, are we going to see our proud history of the past 50 years and our country's reputation besmirched by being defeated by the sort of people who are holding men and women to ransom in Bosnia tonight? I do not believe that we are. I have every faith in the Prime Minister. I hope that the summit on Friday will produce a resolution and determination and I look forward to that.

Ms Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood)

Our failure and that of the international community—Britain has played an enormous part in that, in which we are all implicated, as we all agree—to stand up for what is morally right and right in international law in Bosnia has created a nightmare there, that will haunt Europe for a long time to come. It has created unbearable suffering for the people of Bosnia. The United Nations has been humiliated; NATO has been humiliated, and any petty dictator seeking to acquire territory by force must feel encouraged by what has happened in Bosnia.

Bosnia is a multi-ethnic state, recognised by the world community as an independent nation and a member of the United Nations. The population is predominantly Muslim, but it is mixed—23 per cent. of Bosnian families are a mix of Serb, Croat and Muslim. It is profoundly interesting that so much of the talk is about Serbs, Croats and Muslims, and always assumes that the Bosnian people are Muslim only.

We know that Serbia has been trying to whip up a Muslim bogeyman and suggest that Muslim people cannot have a state in Europe. We are talking about a secular Muslim European people, but there is an attempt to blackguard them as unacceptable people. The language that is used so often by the commentators, which does not refer to Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim, or Serb, Croat and Bosnian, is playing that game. That, too, is dangerous for the world. If the world is to divide and find a new enmity between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world, that would be dangerous for all of us.

There is a deep and profound feeling of anger among Muslim people throughout the world that the world community does not extend to them the rights under international law that they expect. I saw in the press, either today or yesterday, that, when the Prime Minister of Bosnia was asked why he thought the world community had not protected Bosnia, he said, "It is because we are a Muslim people." That is profoundly wrong, and profoundly dangerous.

Following the world's recognition of Bosnia as a full state under international law, Serb aggression took 70 per cent. of Bosnian territory and 30 per cent. of Croatian territory—a grave breach of international law, trying to change internationally recognised boundaries by force. Following that came the most vile ethnic cleansing, as we have learnt to call it—slaughter, torture and mass and 1765 deliberately organised rape aimed at driving people from the land in which they have lived for generations. Those are profoundly serious war crimes.

It seems to me that the constant suggestion from British Foreign Secretaries that it is a civil war, and that the task of the United Nations is merely to supply humanitarian aid with the consent of the parties—as though the two parties are on an equal footing—is profoundly wrong in principle. It accepts that boundaries can be changed by force, and serious war crimes permitted. That has been the approach form the start, and that has been the error. Under the Vance-Owen plan, there was a willingness to change boundaries, although force had changed those boundaries. There was a willingness to appease ethnic cleansing. The contact group plan does exactly the same.

I admit that, at first, I used to think that the reason for the weakness of British policy and UN strategy was a lack of resolve—a weakness and a fudge about which I was ashamed. I now think that our Government cannot be so incompetent. I believe that there is a hidden s