FIRST DAY

§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Tom King)

I beg to move, That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991 contained in Cm 1559.

§ Mr. Speaker

I must inform the House that I have selected the amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition.

I reiterate what I said a moment ago—that no fewer than 38 right hon. and hon. Members have sought leave to speak this day, and that does not take account of all those who have sought leave to speak tomorrow. I must impose a limit of 10 minutes on speeches between 7 and 9 pm. I ask those whom I call, and also the Front-Bench spokesmen, to bear that limit in mind, in consideration of their colleagues.

§ Mr. David Ashby (Leicestershire, North-West)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Although I know that your selection of amendments is final, I ask you to reconsider, because an alternative amendment that reflects the true policies of the Labour party has been tabled and should be debated.

§ Mr. Speaker

Order. That is a matter that might be raised during the debate if the hon. Gentleman catches my eye.

§ Mr. King

The whole House takes seriously your injunction, Mr. Speaker, that we should be as brief as possible. However, since we last debated the defence estimates there has been a transformation of the threat that we face, and with it the most significant change in our position since the second world war. We must also remember that since we last debated the defence estimates we have witnessed the invasion and liberation of Kuwait and the subsequent events surrounding that conflict, together with many further and continuing developments. There is a great deal for the House to discuss.

I hope that it will be for the convenience of the House if I outline how we intend to structure ministerial speeches in this two-day debate. In opening the debate, I intend to refer to the overall background and to the developments on the international scene. In particular, I shall report on the latest position in Iraq and the significant developments there. I shall report briefly on the conclusion of the Gulf war and the initial lessons that we have drawn from it.

I shall also report on the development of NATO strategy and the interaction with the European Community. I shall speak about the latest nuclear 51 developments. On Wednesday I shall attend a meeting of NATO's nuclear planning group, when there will be announcements of major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. I shall report on the NATO reductions, on the reductions in our own forces, and on our progress with the new proposals for the Navy, the Air Force and the Army. I know that many hon. Members are interested in the Army, and especially in the infantry. The House will understand why I wish to refer in some detail to that and it will also understand that there are a number of other important issues that I must cover.

My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State will respond to the debate this evening, and he will refer to further developments in the Ministry of Defence, where substantial reorganisation is taking place. He will also refer to certain new initiatives and to other important, detailed issues that come within his areas of responsibility, and which will be of interest to the House.

Tomorrow, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement will speak about a number of matters relating to procurement developments arising both out of the new proposals for our defences and from lessons drawn from the Gulf conflict. He will also refer to certain nuclear issues. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, as well as responding to issues arising from the debate, will deal in particular with personnel and the issues affecting people in the armed forces. I know that those issues are of great concern to some of my right hon. and hon. Friends—and, indeed, to Members throughout the House—and not least the issues of housing and redundancy.

§ Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North)

Is the Secretary of State aware that I welcome the agreement reached for my constituent Sean Povey and his two colleagues, to whom compensation of £105,000 each is to be paid—and rightly so? I wish to pay tribute to those hon. Members who helped to get that compensation.

Will the right hon. Gentleman pay tribute to Sean Povey and his two colleagues, who lost their legs through no fault of their own and were refused compensation? Indeed, the Government refused to budge on that matter. If those three soldiers had not been so single-minded and so determined that justice should be done, they would not have received any compensation, and they deserve a tribute.

§ Mr. King

We are pleased that after such a tragic accident an agreeable settlement has been reached. As the hon. Gentleman knows, it was reached after prompt consideration of the legal processes involved. It is quite untrue to say that the Government refused to budge. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State had to take a considerable amount of flak because he had to stand up and maintain his responsibility for the legal processes. I pay tribute to him for the part that he played in reaching a fair settlement. A number of hon. Members took the easy opportunity to throw flak at my right hon. Friend, but he had the responsibility for ensuring that a fair settlement was reached in a proper and correct way.

§ Mr. Jonathan Sayeed (Bristol, East)

rose——

§ Mr. King

Mr. Speaker has asked for brief speeches, so I hope that my hon. Friend will allow me to proceed with my speech. There is a tremendous amount of ground to cover.

My remarks are set against major changes in the world. The planners who serve me deal not only with the major changes in the outlook, but with the real reductions in the forces that we face. Any one of the items that I have mentioned could be the subject of a major speech, such is the measure of the changes now taking place. First, I shall deal with German unification and the spread of democracy in eastern Europe, and I want to point out the military consequences of those welcome changes.

The Warsaw pact has gone, and because the satellite countries have removed their forces from any alliance with the Soviet Union there are now 1 million fewer troops facing us from those countries. The progress of Soviet withdrawal from those countries means that all 150,000 Soviet troops have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The number of Soviet troops in Poland has been reduced from 45,000 to 25,000, and the number in Germany from 350,000 to 250,000, with the remaining troops withdrawing completely by 1994. That means that 250,000 Soviet troops—half of their total numbers—have withdrawn during the past year to a position some 600 miles behind their previous forward positions.

The position in the Soviet Union has changed significantly since the House last met. There has been the continuing emergence of the republics as independent centres of authority within what was the Soviet Union. The independence of the Baltic states has been recognised. I remind the House that at the heart of the tensions that arose within the structure of the Soviet Union was the issue of conscription. The House may recall the scenes of Soviet forces two years ago when they went to seize Lithuanian conscripts trying to avoid the draft. The growing independence of the republics strikes at the heart of the whole structure of the Soviet armed forces. They have been reduced by half a million and in their most recent statement on the timing of changes to the Soviet nuclear strength, President Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin spoke of a proposal to reduce the country's forces by a further 700,000 men. The impact of those changes on the republics has brought pressure for further reductions.

In addition, the Soviet Union is under economic pressures. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister delivered politely but firmly and clearly, as chairman of the Group of Seven, the message that the economic support from the western economies for which the Soviet Union is looking will not be forthcoming if it is to be used for continual expenditure on arms and military equipment. We see evidence of the Soviet Union's early response to President Bush's proposals for reductions in nuclear weapons.

§ Sir Jim Spicer (Dorset, West)

Will my right hon. Friend mention briefly the morale of the Russian forces —particuarly those left in Germany?

§ Mr. King

A short time ago there were many reports of desertions and of begging at the railway stations and in the market places. There were also reports of some members of the Soviet forces trying to sell their weapons on the black market for any currency that they could get. I have no recent reports, but I am led to believe that morale has improved, and today there was a report that certain troops 53 had refused to move because they had little confidence that there would be any accommodation for them, other than under canvas, when they return to the Soviet Union.

I have spoken of the encouraging positive develop-ments against which we can plan our changes. What are the counterweights? The first of them must be the attempted coup that took place on 19 August, after the House adjourned for the summer recess. Welcome as the triumph of democracy over those who plotted that coup was, it must be said that it was about the world's most incompetent attempted coup ever. If it had embodied the kind of ruthlessness that typified other coups, it might have succeeded. However, it carried with it a sharp reminder of how quickly things can change. We know that there are warnings in the air in Moscow now of the risk of another possible coup. Underpinning the dissatisfaction that there may be in that country is the failure to resolve the future relationship between the centre and the republics—and one must comment, using the most modest language that one could use, that the Soviet economy is not going very well at this time.

§ Mr. Stephen Day (Cheadle)

Does not my right hon. Friend understand that the concern felt on these Benches about "Options for Change" is that when that review was undertaken it could not take account of the very events that my right hon. Friend has just described? We appreciate that our forces must be restructured, but that exercise must take account of the points that my right hon. Friend is making. I hope that he will give an assurance that it will do so.

§ Mr. King

If my hon. Friend will study the catalogue of events, he will find that things have gone even further than we anticipated. We took nothing for granted; we took nothing on trust. In the assessment that was made for "Options for Change" on 25 July 1990, we made no assumption of the collapse of the Soviet centre, and we saw no emergence with such rapidity of the republics or the collapse of central power and of the Soviet Union in the way that seems apparent now. We did take account of the collapse of the Warsaw pact and of disaffection within the satellite countries. The situation is that events have developed further than the basis on which we planned.

§ Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South)

rose——

§ Mr. King

If my hon. Friend will forgive me, if I continue to give way I will be on my feet until the close of play. I have a number of important things to say, and I must address issues concerning the Army and the infantry.

Other considerations challenge us when considering the future defence needs of our country. Earlier, my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, set out the current situation in Yugoslavia. I am not sure whether he mentioned casualties, but I have heard it suggested that there have already been 2,000 casualties. As I recall, the number of casualties in Northern Ireland is 3,000 after 10 years, and that brings home just how vicious is the conflict in Yugoslavia.

We have considered the way in which we might play our part in Yugoslavia, but we do not believe that military intervention would be an appropriate response at this time.

54 As to further assessments of the strategic balance and requirements of our defence, we estimate that by the year 2000 a considerable number of countries will have ballistic Missiles, and some will have nuclear weapons.

That brings me directly to the question of Iraq. In the White Paper "Statement on the Defence Estimates", we set out the story of the Gulf war. Enough tribute has been paid to what was, by any standards—and I am pleased that the Select Committee endorsed this—a superlative job by the British forces and the others involved. It was remarkable in its planning, logistics and execution. Sadly, lives were lost—but very few, when one considers the scale of the action.

We are well advanced in analysing the lessons of that campaign, on which I hope to report more fully in coming months. I will, however, address some highlights now. The first message that comes through clearly is the need for Governments carefully to co-ordinate their objectives. The last such enterprise, in Korea, was dogged by disagreement over the aims of that operation.

There has since been debate, and there will be more, about whether the coalition forces should have gone beyond the liberation of Kuwait. In considering that question, right hon. and hon. Members will remember the challenge that was posed in maintaining the unity of the coalition and of being sensitive to those of its members who were critical of the launch and maintenance of United Nations support, which placed certain restrictions on our freedom of action at later stages.

I stress the crucial importance of proper logistic support. I shall have a number of things to say shortly about infantry regiments, but I may comment now that those regiments are no use unless they have proper logistic support. One of the lessons learnt from the Gulf was the importance of the totality of the military effort. Had it not been for the incredible efforts of the Royal Corps of Transport in keeping ammunition and other supplies coming and of the ordnance, engineers, and Royal Artillery, and the remarkable scale of the opening barrage, the role of the armoured and infantry forces would have been much more difficult.

My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement will talk about the importance of the quality of modern technology, and of the part that it played in the Gulf. In a recent speech elsewhere, I made mention of the completely new inventions that were available to our forces in the Gulf, but which were completely unknown to those who fought at El Alamein. Every tank troop and every infantry platoon had satellite navigation available to it, and there were also laser bombs, the multi-lauch rocket system, the artillery target acquisition devices, and the ability to fight at night. Ensuring that our forces have the right quality of equipment is a vital consideration in our future plans.

§ Mr. Patrick Thompson (Norwich, North)

I accept totally my right hon. Friend's comment about the importance of logistic back-up, but does he not agree that the morale of our infantry and of other branches of the services is equally important? When considering numbers in the infantry and in the Territorial Army reserves, should we not take into account the future morale of our service men and women?

§ Mr. King

Certainly, and I will have something to say about that as well.

55 One of the other initial lessons from the Gulf that came through very clearly was that it was a television and radio war, with reports being broadcast by the media before they could come back through the command chain. It was a major challenge to the relationship with the media, and we shall certainly have to give further effort to that.

Another aspect was the quality of intelligence. The efforts of the United Nations special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to bring forward every day fresh information about the scale of the military machine is no secret to the House and much of that information was not available to us in anything like that detail.

I shall report to the House the latest evidence that we have established that has come from that team, which includes a significant British contribution. Our inspections have so far established that Iraq has consistently under-declared, misrepresented and concealed its capabilities in all areas—nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missiles—and is far more advanced in some areas than we had supposed. We have uncovered the covert military orientation of Iraq's nuclear programme which it always previously denied. The most recent nuclear inspection has shown conclusively that Iraq was well advanced in a programme to develop implosion-type nuclear weapons, that links existed with a surface-to-surface missile project and that it could have had a working explosive device by 1993. More than 2,000 documents have been recovered, and are being translated and analysed.

Iraq originally denied that it had a biological progamme and went to considerable lengths to obliterate all traces of one. Under the inspections that have been carried out Iraq has admitted to the programme and the fact that it has offensive military applications. Inspections have now revealed that Iraq has a vast germ warfare capability.

As regards the chemical side, inspections and subsequent Iraqi admissions have revealed that the initial Iraqi declaration misrepresented the size and extent of the chemical programme as only a quarter of what we have now identified. Iraq originally declared 52 ballistic missiles, but that falls hundreds short of what we believe remains—it did not include five types of missile or the super gun.

The inspection team that was operating in western Iraq has now returned, using special Commission helicopters for the first time—about which there was considerable obstruction which has now been overcome. We have discovered further undeclared launch sites, we have destroyed elements of a 350 mm super gun and a further team, which includes United Kingdom members, is back in Iraq preparing for the destruction of elements of a 1,000 metre diameter super gun——

§ Several Hon. Members

One thousand metres?

§ Mr. King

That is rather big and is closer to the length of the gun, which is between 130 and 150 metres. The other super gun has a diameter of 1 metre and we are seeking to destroy elements of it which existed.

§ Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East)

Does the Secretary of State agree that what he has just said, especially about the attempts to gain a nuclear capability, only underlines the validity of the judgment that action 56 had to be taken to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and that it would have been unwise, to put it mildly, to wait and see whether sanctions would have worked?

§ Mr. King

I do not think that any hon. Member would wish to be reminded that they once held that foolish view. I agree entirely with the hon. and learned Gentleman. The evidence is absolutely clear that sanctions would not have worked. I remind the House that sanctions are still being imposed. The idea that we would have let it happen and that we would have somehow found a solution to prevent the continuing agony of Kuwait has no credibility among any serious commentators.

§ Mr. Allan Rogers (Rhondda)

I thank the Secretary of State for giving us details of the information that the team has found out. Will he give the House an assurance that he will publish details of Britain's contribution to Saddam Hussein's armoury?

§ Mr. King

We are pursuing every aspect of the matter, because there is no doubt that there was a major conspiracy and a successful concealment whereby a lot of equipment that could have had a peaceable application was covertly obtained from around the world. Thank goodness that, because some countries did not wait to see whether sanctions would work, we have not only liberated Kuwait but passed Security Council resolution 687. I claim that the United Kingdom played a major part by insisting on passing resolution 687, which stated that after a ceasefire we would seek, identify, assemble and destroy Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. It is because of that programme and resolution 687, brought about largely with the United Kingdom's initiative and as a result of the courage of members of the teams including scientists from a range of countries under United Nations auspices, whom hon. Members have seen on their television sets working bravely in Baghdad and other places pursuing those awful weapons——

§ Several Hon. Members

rose——

§ Mr. King

I am sorry; I shall not give way.

Nor should we forget that in addition to the work by UN teams in Iraq against weapons of mass destruction, in September I announced that we would send Jaguar aircraft to Incirlik in southern Turkey to help to support the air shield over northern Iraq and to continue the effectiveness of Operation Haven. I know that the House will join me in paying tribute to the Royal Marines who have now returned but who played such an outstanding part and saved hundreds of thousands of Kurdish lives because of the reassurance that they gave during that difficult initial period.

§ Several Hon. Members

rose——

§ Mr. King

I want to protect the interests of other hon. Members.

I shall turn to our defence strategy, viewed against the background of the developments and changes that have occurred in the world. I take seriously the comment made in the Select Committee report produced in the middle of August. I understand why, due to the shortness of time available—the Select Committee was generous enough to say why the report could only be produced as late as it was in this remarkable year—we have not set out our strategy as clearly as the Committee thought necessary. Therefore, I shall seek to clarify that briefly. We shall certainly seek 57 to amplify that in any way that we can so that there is no uncertainty about it. The strategy and changes that I have proposed are based on careful assessment with our allies —of course we work closely within NATO—over a long period of time of the risks to our country and its wider interests in the years ahead. Principally, we consider the changes in the armed forces ranged against NATO, the abolition of the Warsaw pact, the reduction in Soviet armed forces and their withdrawal from eastern Europe. I have given the figures to the House already in my speech. Shortly they will amount to 2 million troops ranged against us and the Soviet front line—if it still has one in that sense—is about 600 miles further back than it was.

Those developments, which have taken place against a background of freedom and democracy for eastern Europe and perhaps increasingly within the Soviet Union, do not always mean stability. That is clear from the events that are taking place in Yugoslavia. In our assessment, we must be mindful of the fact that local conflicts can spill over into other countries. that neighbouring states may start to take sides and that the patchwork of different nationalist groups provides a continuing source of possible flare-ups.

We do not believe that the Soviet Union, under its present leadership—or the emerging loose grouping of republics—has an aggressive intent. Even after all the reductions have been implemented, however, super-power forces will still be there, much larger than all the forces belonging to all the rest of what were the European members of NATO combined. We must include in our plans the possibility that the command of those forces could, at some future time, fall into the wrong hands.

More widely, we must be ready, with our partners, to meet aggression where it threatens British interests, or the interests of our friends and allies, or where—as in the case of Kuwait—the United Nations needs to act. The nature of such risks is changing. We no longer face a threat of surprise attacks from massive Warsaw pact forces across a wide front. Under CFE—the conventional forces in Europe arrangements—there will be limits on Soviet forces in the 1,000-mile wide area from the western border to the Urals. The huge disparity in equipment will be eliminated, although we shall need to keep an eye on what forces remain to the east of the Urals.

That means that we shall have much earlier warning of a major attack. A small attack could still be mounted within a few days or weeks. but a major attack of the kind that NATO traditionally feared would be months, perhaps years, in preparation.

The security of the United Kingdom itself will continue to be bound up with that of the European mainland. As NATO evolves in accordance with the new circumstances, those links are becoming even closer. We see an increased role for the Western European Union, as set out in an important Anglo-Italian paper that was put to the European Foreign Ministers on 6 October. That paper foresees that the nine-member WEU will become a bridge between the EEC on the one side and NATO on the other, with the longer-term perspective of a common European defence policy compatible with the common defence policy that we already have with our allies in NATO.

Our future strategy will be based on five key elements within NATO and the WEU. The first relates to nuclear deterrence. Two weeks ago, President Bush launched an important western initiative to reduce the number of nuclear weapons; we are pleased that President Gorbachev has responded positively. We can now look forward to an 58 era in which many thousands of short-range nuclear weapons will disappear. Many hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons at sea will also be withdrawn. As long as the Soviet Union and other countries possess nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom will need them as well; the scale of our force can, however, remain small.

As the ultimate safeguard of our security, we need the Trident system. As in the Polaris era, our aim in procuring four submarines is simply to ensure that, reliably, there is always one on patrol at sea. The number of missiles and warheads needed to overcome anti-missile defences, and still present the prospect of damage that no one contemplating an attack on the United Kingdom could consider acceptable, is the determinant. The size of our force is not determined by the number of missiles or weapons that other countries have. Even after START —the strategic arms reduction talks—and the further steps proposed so far by Mr. Gorbachev, the Russians will retain about 20 times the number of ballistic missiles that the United Kingdom can deploy.

As for the theatre nuclear forces, I have already announced that we will entirely give up the short-range nuclear capability of the Lance system, and that the 50th Missile Regiment Royal Artillery will disband. Similarly, we shall give up our nuclear artillery capability. In recent years, we have reduced the number of nuclear depth bombs that are carried at sea in peacetime. In future, neither those weapons nor the free-fall nuclear bombs for our Harrier aircraft will, in normal circumstances, be deployed at sea; instead, they will be held in central stores. However, we still see an important, continuing deterrent role for a small number of air-delivered weapons. In his statement, President Bush noted that such weapons had an essential role to play in European security; that was underlined earlier in last year's NATO summit declaration.

In a world of the unexpected, in which Saddam Hussein was getting closer to a nuclear capability than anyone thought, it must be sensible to keep up a small but effective force below the strategic level. The current free-fall WE 177 bombs will approach the end of their safe and effective life around the turn of the century. Following a recent review, I can tell the House that we shall be making a substantial reduction in the numbers in coming years, as part of the overall cut in NATO's air-delivered stockpile. I expect that to be announced later this week at the meeting of the nuclear planning group.

I have mentioned the out-of-area need—the need to deal with circumstances in which the Saddam Husseins and others are trying to develop a nuclear capability—in connection with maintaining a sub-strategic capability. The key point, however, is that the credibility of strategic nuclear forces depends on the existence of a credible sub-strategic deterrent to provide the link with conven-tional forces. The fact that ground-launched weapons are now being scrapped puts increased emphasis on the need to ensure that the air-launch element is kept up to date.

§ Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan)

Given that our present mininum deterrent is to be increased with the introduction of the Trident system, with more warheads and missiles, would it not be sensible, in keeping with that minimum deterrent, to have only the same number of warheads and missiles on the Trident boats as on the Polaris boats?

§ Mr. King

As the hon. Gentleman will see if he reads what I have said, this has to do with the ability to penetrate modern anti-missile defences. We need a credible deterrent. There is no point in a deterrent that is not credible; it must have the capability to penetrate and to threaten to inflict such damage, having penetrated, to make it an effective and credible deterrent. The most extravagant and ludicrous waste of money would be to pretend to have a nuclear deterrent when that deterrent did not actually work.

§ Dr. John Reid (Motherwell, North)

Will the Secretary of State give way?

§ Mr. King

Next time round.

Nuclear deterrence, then, is the first key element of our strategy. The second is the capacity to respond to a land attack on an appropriate scale and at an appropriate speed. Small forces must be available quickly, and more must be available after an appropriate period. We shall provide a major contribution to, and leadership of, NATO's rapid reaction corps, which must be capable of prompt deployment anywhere from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, in response to any threat to NATO's security of frontiers.

We shall contribute a heavy armoured division—the most powerful division that we have ever mounted—based in Germany, and a second, more flexible division based in the United Kingdom. Those reaction forces will be supported by flexible air power based on Tornado, Jaguar and Harrier aircraft. United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious forces will continue to be available; behind those will come what NATO calls augmentation forces, based mainly on reserves, capable of building up over a longer period to match any recurring threat to NATO.

Thirdly, we need sufficient naval forces—helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft—to counter, with allies, any attempt by submarines, surface ships or aircraft to interrupt the sea lanes of the NATO area. The size and capability of the fleet will still be determined largely by the power and sophistication of Soviet naval power. Fourthly, we need forces for the defence of the United Kingdom homeland against conventional air attack, mining of our ports or other threats to shipping, and an effective home defence force. Fifthly, we need garrison ships and aircraft to meet our remaining responsibilities for the defence of Belize, Cyprus and United Kingdom dependent territories, including the Falklands and—until 1997—Hong Kong.

§ Mr. James Molyneaux (Lagan Valley)

The Secretary of State will have noticed that a reduction of some 19 per cent. nationally in the strength of the Territorial Army has been proposed. Is he aware that the proposed Northern Ireland reduction is 40 per cent? In view of his deep understanding of the problems of Northern Ireland, will he undertake to have another look at that figure?

§ Mr. King

To anticipate some of my hon. Friends, who may raise issues about the Territorial Army, the matter is still under consideration. However, I take note of the right hon. Gentleman's point. I am aware of it, but no decisions have been taken. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will have enjoyed the clear commitment to the defence of the United Kingdom homeland which I set out as the fourth of our objectives in our strategic assessment.

Our forces for the future were determined by a careful assessment of the risk that we face under these headings 60 and by the need to maintain the flexibility necessary to respond to the unexpected. They were the basis upon which the defence budget was settled in the autumn of 1990. What it represents, against a reduction of 20 per cent. in service and civilian manpower, is a reduction of some 6 per cent. in real terms in expenditure over the three-year period. In the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and many parts of the Army, the changes are now well under way. Thirteen older submarines and ships have already been paid off, although currently new ships are coming through, with seven type 23 frigates currently under construction. Three long-established RAF squadrons have been disbanded, with appropriate ceremony but with recognition of the need for change, as the United Kingdom has in part handed over its share of the responsibility for the air defence of Germany to the Germans.

I know that there have been some concerns about the size of the Army, where decisions had to await NATO's conclusion on the rapid reaction corps. Some of these criticisms may be said to be Army-wide, although certain of them are of particular concern to the infantry. I have heard certain comments that the changes have been made in a headlong rush, but they are being phased in over a period. A number of them will not happen until 1994. Their impact, therefore, will be in 1994 and 1995. That is not an unreasonable period of time. We are trying to move steadily and realistically, taking account of the uncertain-ties of the world. Some may feel that we are moving too cautiously. However, it is wise to be more prudent, more cautious or, to put it another way so that it does not sound pejorative, slower than most of our allies who have faster time scales for greater reductions. We believe that it is right, with our other commitments, to move more slowly.

If there is not to be a headlong rush, because the changes are to be phased in over a reasonable period, the other criticisms are that the Army will be too small and that there has been no change in the commitments. The changes have been criticised within the Army. Do some rather selective quotations from a letter written by the Chief of the General Staff to me, correctly advising me on attitudes and concerns in the Army, undermine what we have sought to do? Even if we can answer those points, it is said that we have anyway chosen the wrong regiments to change.

To take those issues one by one, the first criticism is that the Army will be too small. The implication is that my right hon. Friends and I went into a corner, got out an envelope and wrote down the first number that occurred to us. That shows little understanding of the structure for taking decisions within the Ministry of Defence. At one time there were separate service Ministries. That led to competition and to each service Ministry fighting its corner. No one can be criticised for that. Under the new structure, there are the individual chiefs of staff—the Chief of the General Staff for the Army, the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff. Then there is the Chief of the Defence Staff who is my principal military adviser. He has with him a tri-service team, with tri-service military and civilian defence planners working together. They, together with the chiefs of staff and the Office of Management and Budget, try to bring together the best proposals that they can and to make the best assessment for the overall range of Britain's defences. Their responsibility is to give advice to me on that basis. I take full responsibility, however, for 61 the decisions that I announce, but I make them on good advice, on the best advice and against a number of considerations that I now want to spell out.

The Army would like to be bigger. Similarly, the Royal Navy would like to be bigger and the Royal Air Force would like to be bigger. Contrary to one or two very mischievous suggestions, at no time have I suggested that the Army Board volunteered or proposed these reductions. Once the defence staff, in consultation with and working through the tri-service approach of the Ministry of Defence, put forward their proposals, the role of the Army Board is critical in determining exactly how they should apply within the Army. I accept entirely that the Army Board, as well as the Royal Navy Board and the Royal Air Force Board, would like its own service to have more resources for its activities.

May I say a word about the Chief of the General Staff's letter. I do not intend to comment about what I believe was incredible disloyalty and disservice to the Chief of the General Staff in selectively leaking extracts from his letter, but I shall say a word about what the letter contains. It contains genuine, honest advice to me about the most difficult changes that the Army has to face. One word used was that the Army was cynical or skeptical—that it thought that what was being said, in particular about smaller is better, might be a bit of a con trick. The letter is quite old. I took that advice, as did my right hon. Friends, very seriously indeed. We have in front of us a major challenge. It is our determination to ensure that smaller is better. However, the Army is entitled to say, as are the other services, "We have had promises before; there have been reorganisations before and it was all going to be wonderful. However, we shall believe it when we see it."

My hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Mr. Thompson) asked me a fair question about morale. The Army, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force face difficult challenges. Despite the disappointments, however, they are getting on with their work. The Chief of the General Staff has always made it clear to me that the Army, as a whole, will do the same—that it accepts the situation and will make the best of it, but that it will give its comments and criticisms and make clear any feelings that it may have. At the end of the day, however, it will ensure that it makes a success of it. I know that that is the feeling throughout the Army as a whole.

I thank the Chief of the General Staff for the honest messages that he gave me. Anyone who knows Sir John Chapple appreciates that he is a man of absolute integrity and that he is honestly tackling an extremely difficult job. The challenge that he puts before us—to see that we honour the commitment that smaller is better—is absolutely right. He is right to lay it starkly and clearly before us and also to warn the Government, Ministers and the country that people are waiting to see whether that undertaking is discharged. Part of that undertaking will involve resources; part of it will depend on how we handle the changes in the redundancy and housing arrangements for those who may no longer belong to the Army. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces will comment specifically on the help that we are offering with those matters, which we take seriously.

The Select Committee drew attention to the fact that those matters will depend on resources. We shall have to await the autumn statement from my right hon. Friend the 62 Chancellor to see whether we have the resources that can help in achieving the smaller but better Army which is our ambition.

§ Mr. John Browne (Winchester)

Will my right hon. Friend give way on that point?

§ Mr. King

May I deal with this point? I want to make it clear.

There is scepticism in the Army about whether the smaller Army will be able to meet the commitments that have been set out. That point will be made by many hon. Members. I accept that the Army is still concerned about that matter. We still have much to do to make people understand the significance and the implications of the changed scene and how those commitments can be addressed.

I should briefly like to give the House some of our thinking. By 1997, the commitments that the regular infantry will need to meet will reduce by one third. This results from reductions in the British Army of the Rhine —seven battalions—in the garrisons in Berlin—a further three battalions—and in Hong Kong—a further four battalions. The increased warning time, which is extremely significant in military planning, means that five of the 21 regular battalions previously committed to military home defence can be replaced by the Territorial Army. That makes a total reduction in commitment, as the Army understands it, of 19 battalions. The number of regular infantry battalions will reduce by only 17 and two additional battalions will be available to the rapid reaction corps as extra reinforcement.

Hon. Members know that the peacetime situation is of particular concern to the Army. Increased warning time in peacetime is a significant factor in permitting greater flexibity in the use of the Army. Although we shall maintain appropriate levels of readiness for NATO tasks, under the NATO strategy it will be possible for infantry units based in Germany to take a greater share of emergency tours in Northern Ireland and elsewhere than when we faced the threat of surprise Soviet attack. The increased availability of 3 Commando Royal Marines means that broadly the same number of battalion-size units will be available to undertake emergency tours as there are today. Units of other arms will also be better placed to take on a share of those tours—as they do at present—thereby further reducing the burden on the infantry.

To anybody familiar with the problems of the Army, this is a critical point: I have heard people talk about the difference between 55 battalions and 38 battalions. The reality is that our current strength is nearer 51 battalions because they are not fully manned.

§ Mr. Michael J. Martin (Glasgow, Springburn)

Will the Secretary of State give way?

§ Mr. King

May I finish this point?

The key factor in the new structure will be to ensure that all battalions are fully manned. That important component of the plan is often overlooked.

To answer the point made by the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Molyneaux), we foresee a relatively increased role for our reserve forces. Some reductions in the Territorial Army will follow from the reductions in our forces needed to defend Germany. The Territorial Army will take over roles from the regular Army—the TA's 63 traditional role now—such as military home defence in the United Kingdom. The final size of the TA will depend on how many want to join; we shall not wish to turn away any willing volunteers. I envisage that its long-term future strength will settle at between 60,000 and 65,000, compared with 75,000 today. We are engaged in a comprehensive consultation exercise with the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve and others. I plan to announce final decisions on the shape and structure of the TA later in the year. The TA offers an important way of preserving local links. The Army Board will sympathetically consider any proposals for the identities or cap badges of amalgamating regiments to be retained by TA units.

May I summarise the approach to the Army? It is important that we have sufficient numbers, that the units in which they serve are fully manned and that, in the new situation, they are properly equipped.

§ Sir Nicholas Fairbairn (Perth and Kinross)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

§ Mr. King

May I answer this?

Although I disagreed with certain comments made in the Select Committee's report, I was grateful that it drew attention to the fact that, under our plans, Britain's Army will be outstandingly well equipped. The lesson shining through from the Gulf and from other challenges faced by the Army is the importance of units being properly equipped.

We have a considerable number of regiments, some of which are undermanned and a number of which do not have the range of equipment, support and spares that a modern Army should have.

§ Mr. Michael J. Martin

Will the Secretary of State give way?

§ Mr. King

No.

Tackling those problems is at the heart of our proposals for a smaller but better Army.

That is the approach to the size of the Army. If we are to ensure that the Army is smaller but better, the difficulty is how those changes are made. Some units will have to be amalgamated and some corps will have to reduce. How is that to be done? The executive committee of the Army Board—I pay tribute to it—sought as fairly as possible to make proposals that ensure that we have fully manned, fully effective regiments.

§ Mrs. Ann Winterton (Congleton)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

§ Mr. King

I will in a minute.

Those are difficult decisions to make, but the executive committee of the Army Board, in an appallingly difficult situation where there is deep loyalty to every regiment, approached it as fairly and reasonably as it could. I give way to my hon. Friend.

§ Mrs. Winterton

rose——

§ Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman (Lancaster)

Does my right hon. Friend——

§ Madam Deputy Speaker (Miss Betty Boothroyd)

Order. One at a time. The Secretary of State gave way to the hon. Member for Congleton (Mrs. Winterton).

§ Mrs. Winterton

Is my right hon. Friend aware of the dissatisfaction that is felt in the House about the Army Board ignoring the criteria that it laid down? Is he aware that the Cheshire Regiment is one of the best recruited in the Prince of Wales Division?

§ Mr. William Cash (Stafford)

And the Staffordshires.

§ Mrs. Winterton

It also retains those recruits, as does the Staffordshires. Therefore, logically, they should not be amalgamated. Furthermore, will my right hon. Friend tell the House when the Army's objective of having a 24-month gap between unaccompanied operational tours will come into effect, and how he believes that he can achieve that if the number of battalions is reduced from 55 to 38?

§ Mr. King

Of course, I understand my hon. Friend's point. The Army Board sought to address those issues as fairly as it could. Every regiment has compelling reasons to explain why it should not be affected. We considered this matter, and the executive committee of the Army Board examined it as objectively as it could. It made recommendations, which were unanimously accepted. I understand that the decision does not give my hon. Friend any pleasure. I am not sure whether she heard my earlier remarks, but I think that she will understand that, as long as I am Secretary of State for Defence, the commitment to Northern Ireland will not be forgotten; nor will we forget the debt that we owe to those who serve there and the importance of ensuring that the tour interval is reasonable. I assure my hon. Friend that during the exercise I frequently asked about the tour interval and I can give her the answer, which she may not have heard. At present, we do not maintain a reasonable tour interval. We hope to be able to do so in future.

§ Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman

rose—

§ Mr. Michael J. Martin

rose——

§ Mr. King

I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Dame E. Kellett-Bowman).

§ Mr. George Galloway (Glasgow, Hillhead)

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Is it in order—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down."' Why not listen to what I have to say? Is it in order, Madam Deputy Speaker, for the Secretary of State to give way persistently to Conservative Members, yet flinch in the face of the cold steel of the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Springburn (Mr. Martin)?

§ Madam Deputy Speaker

As the hon. Member knows, it is for the Secretary of State to determine to whom he will give way. That is not the responsibility of the Chair, thank the Lord. Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman.

§ Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman

When my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State discussed the permanent regiments, he and his colleagues clearly stressed the importance of the link between the permanent forces and the Territorial Army. Will my right hon. Friend please bear that link firmly in mind when deciding on the TA's future?

§ Mr. King

I note my hon. Friend's concern, and I know of her close interest in this matter. When there is a far greater warning time, the most effective deployment of reserves becomes increasingly significant.

§ Mr. Michael J. Martin

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned undermanning, yet he knows that there is no undermanning among the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the Royal Scots, the Gordon Highlanders and the Queen's Own Highlanders—there is excellent recruitment. Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the TA that he will not do away with the 15th Parachute Regiment, the only Scottish Territorial Army parachute regiment?

§ Mr. King

Having made that devastating intervention, the hon. Gentleman knows that recruitment is one criterion and that past amalgamations, likely recruitment profiles and a range of other matters provided the basis on which the matter was approached. That is the basis on which the authorities sought to achieve their difficult objectives. My mailbag already reflects some interest in the parachute regiment to which the hon. Gentleman referred. As I said to the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley, there is continuing consultation about the Territorial Army.

§ Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

§ Mr. King

If my hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I had better carry on.

The issues that we have had to face are set against the background of a full strategic assessment of the defence scene and the most appropriate response that we could make. I entirely understand why, for many, this is a sad and difficult time. We sought to address those issues and shall continue to do so. Many of those difficulties will continue. We have a duty to all those who serve and to all those who, after considerable years of service, will perhaps find that their services are no longer required. We are conscious of our duty and responsibility. We sought to approach the matter as carefully and prudently as possible. I do not believe that a single hon. Member would suggest that, against the background of extraordinary changes in the world and the transformation of the threat that faced us, there is no need for a response and for significant changes. That is what we now seek to carry out. I commend those changes to the House.

§ Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan)

I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: welcomes the continuing improvement in East-West relations and the development of NATO and the CSCE to accommodate these changes; recognises the opportunities now available for further reductions in defence expenditure; calls for the maximum co-operation with our European partners to re-examine the roles and commitments of our armed forces; welcomes the successful negotiation of the START Treaty., calls on the Government to seek the establishment of further talks on strategic nuclear disarma-ment and then to secure British participation in such discussions; and urges the Government to provide assistance for defence industry diversification and expand the provision for re-training and re-housing ex-service personnel.". I am not sure whether we need to intrude on the Government's private grief this afternoon, because it seems that there will be as many critical speeches from Government ranks as are likely to come from the Opposition.

On a day when we have spent much time reviewing the prospects for developments in our defence planning and our international arrangements for security, we could forget that only 12 months ago our armed forces were 66 engaged in Operation Granby, the largest and most complicated deployment of international forces since the second world war. We could also overlook the sacrifice that our young men and women made at that time—the 47 who died in the operation as a whole and those who still bear the physical and deep psychological scars of post-traumatic stress disorders.

The skill, bravery and professionalism of all involved bear testimony to the quality of the training and the justifiable pride in the uniforms that these men and women wear. If anyone thought that sanctions alone would have been enough, the progress towards nuclear weapons made by the Iraqis suggested that it was right for us to go in when we did. When the military judgment of the authorities considered it appropriate to go in, both sides of the House backed them. I make that point because the Government Front Bench has a tendency to insinuate in debates of this kind that the Labour Front Bench and Labour Members were less than fulsome in their support. That view was implied by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces in a debate on the Army. I take the opportunity offered by this debate on the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" to repudiate the charge which was made then and which has been insinuated elsewhere.

§ The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Archie Hamilton)

Does the hon. Gentleman admit that, although the Opposition Front Bench gave full support to our troops when they went into Iraq, the fact remains that the view of the Labour party, as enunciated by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), was that we should wait for sanctions to work? On that basis, we would still be waiting now.

§ Mr. O'Neill

The right hon. Gentleman's interpretation is as wrong as his interpretation of the analysis of the information that was given on "Options for Change".

It is the responsibility of all hon. Members in such a debate never to forget that the men and women in our services undertake dangerous and demanding tasks on our behalf. They do so without question and, consequently, we must never ignore our duty to make our decisions clear and our policies justifiable. When we fail to do so, we are breaking part of the social contract between those who seek to govern and those who volunteer to defend.

In this first debate since the publication of "Options for Change", we have the opportunity to search for the rationale behind the cuts and the regimental amalgamations and to examine in detail the Government's proposals for British participation in the European rapid reaction force. The House is entitled to expect a clear indication of how these British decisions sit alongside the wider decisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the forthcoming alliance summit in Rome, where the new strategic doctrine will be unveiled.

Furthermore, we should have been told in this latest estimates debate—the last one before the general election —the direction of Britain's nuclear doctrine. The Secretary of State referred to it, but greater elucidation of the approximate size and composition of the arsenal is needed. It is a measure of the poverty of the Government's thinking on defence that so few of these issues have been addressed. My list has made no reference to the Government's admission of the need for a programme of 67 emergency aid to help those works, firms and communities that have been affected by the decline in demand for defence products.

I believe, however, that an announcement has been made—for Scottish consumption—that something is to be done about Scottish factories and Scottish defence manufacturers that have been affected by the cuts. It remains to be seen whether this is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry or the Scottish Office. Perhaps that will be unveiled when the Minister of State replies. This is evidence of the Government's indifference to those who supplied equipment, to those who worked so hard and who were so successful in getting our troops out to the Gulf. Now that their services are no longer necessary, they were not even mentioned in the Secretary of State's remarks.

No mention was made of the development of the defence industrial strategy, which would involve com-panies and workers in the restructuring of that part of the manufacturing base for which there will be a future in defence production. Neither has there been any reference to the scope for British initiatives in the nuclear disarmament process that have emerged since the failed coup of 20 August. None of these references was expected since past statements and ideological prejudice preclude such possibilities.

I had hoped, however, that the Secretary of State would break new ground and come out with some original thinking in meeting his responsibility to the troops for whom no tasks remain. Perhaps that could have included an initiative involving longer training for ex-service personnel. Perhaps we shall be given some news on the housing front. We would like to hear the Government's proposals for education for the families of the service personnel who are no longer to remain in post. The House knows that these responsibilities lie with the Minister of State. As my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) has said, it is clear that there are few members of the Government who will more stubbornly refuse to recognise responsibilities to service personnel than the right hon. Gentleman. These personnel include nuclear test veterans. He has responsibilities also for widows' pensions, plus payments for those in the Gulf and recompense for those who have been injured. The right hon. Gentleman will not wake up until he is kicked. He will not move unless he is dragged. He will not act until it dawns on him that his indolence and brutish insensitivity has finally placed his job on the line. The entire House knows that. It is sick and tired of the manner in which he callously disregards the legitimate claims of those who work in the defence industry and of service personnel.

§ Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport)

The whole House appreciates the hon. Gentleman's concern for those in the armed forces, and I know that my constituents will appreciate it. However, will he take the opportunity to apologise to members of the armed forces whose pay was held back by the Labour Government, which meant that it was necessary, as their first act, for the incoming Conservative Government to increase service pay by 32.5 per cent.?

§ Mr. O'Neill

The selective memory of the hon. Gentleman has probably caused him to forget that it was the Labour Government who instituted the pay review procedures on which the Conservative Government have acted. They have not always, however, acted in respect of the conditions in which service people live. There is a £350 million deficit in the housing budget. There is a £350 million deficit in the programme for the improvement of service housing which is one of the greatest and most legitimate complaints of the armed services. Before the Government start to take credit for paying wages, they should reflect on the conditions in which so many service personnel are having to live.

§ Mr. Ian Bruce (Dorset, South)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

§ Mr. O'Neill

No. I want to make some progress. The debate has continued for more than one and a quarter hours, and the Secretary of State's speech took most of that time. I shall take some interventions, but first I shall get under way. We shall then see whether the interventions are relevant.

For the best part of two years, hon. Members on both sides of the House and those in the defence community have advocated a proper defence review. First, there was a clandestine study of the implications of the conventional forces in Europe negotiations. That study finally came out of the closet as "Options for Change". To that was added the implications of the collapse of the Warsaw pact, along with the Treasury's claims for its share of the so-called peace dividend and the lessons to be learnt from Operations Granby and Desert Storm. The outcome was the confusion and muddle that passed for action in the MoD.

The Secretary of State's speech was significant in that he did not deploy the usual diversionary tactics of attacking the Labour party. It is significant that we no longer hear about the impact of suggested Labour cuts on defence employment or the assertion that under a Labour Government we would see rising unemployment in defence centres and the Tories' marginal constituencies. The Government cannot talk of such things during a year in which unemployment in defence marginal constituencies has increased by more than 50 per cent. There were feeble attempts by the Government to conjure up figures for defence cuts while forgetting their own programme, which will result in 30 per cent. cuts in the defence share of gross domestic product from 5 per cent. to 3.5 per cent. between 1985 and 1994.

There was also that usual last gasp of a Tory defence policy, which is the abuse of members of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition's family over past membership of disarmament organisations.

These arguments have not been advanced tonight because there has been a different battle to fight, and that is the Secretary of State's battle with Conservative Back-Bench Members. We would have preferred the battle to take place on the hustings rather than in the House. If that had happened, the people outside would have been able to hear once and for all the tired and tarnished thinking of Conservatives on defence.

On taking office, a Labour Government will institute a full and wide-ranging assessment of our defence needs. We shall take account of the roles and responsibilities that we have in mainland Britain, in the north of Ireland, on the 69 Falkland Islands, in Hong Kong and in Oman, the Caribbean, Cyprus and Belize. Commitments to fellow citizens, dependants, former colonies and friends a re our highest priorities and they must be honoured for as long as that is deemed necessary.

The welcome changes in eastern and central Europe combined with the requirements of the conventional forces in Europe agreement have enabled the announcement of many of the proposals in "Options for Change", and we welcome them. It is not surprising, however, that these go further than the CFE treaty, which was based on the assumption that there would still be a Warsaw pact military structure. Its disappearance, combined with the changes in the former Soviet Union since the failed coup, mean that both the forces ranged in eastern Europe and their deployments have changed. Perhaps the Minister of State will tell us how he sees NATO responding to this at the meeting in Rome.

It is important, as part of the western approach, to appreciate the views that are being expressed by the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. I listened to what the Secretary of State said about the possibilities of the Western European Union being used as a sounding block. It is the Opposition's view that the WEU's status has not always been of the highest. We recognise that A may be foolish to try to reinvent the wheel at this stage and that there may be a case for using the WEU as a bridge between the countries of the east and the countries that are not members of the European Community and are still nominally neutral.

It is important that we should listen to countries such as Austria and Sweden. Countries that are not members of the WEU or of the EC might well be included in the listening process. There is a long way to go and it might have been helpful if the Secretary of State—perhaps the Minister of State will be able to do so, if he will pay attention for a moment—had told us of the outcome of the talks that took place yesterday with his French counterpart on this matter. It seems that French co-operation in such a proposal is central. If there is a French veto, it is likely that all the hopeful talk that we have heard this afternoon—we are listening carefully, examining it and not discounting it—will be just so much hot air. That will he the position if the French choose to exercise their veto. There is an ambitious programme and we wait to see what happens. We are keen that it should be successful.

We must recognise the fact that the new democracies in central and eastern Europe do not wish NATO to follow the example of the Warsaw pact. They certainly do not wish NATO to wind itself up; indeed, it can be said that the new democracies wish to join our alliance. I do not think that that is either possible or necessary at present but, above all, the new democracies need to be confident that NATO is aware of their security concerns and, in particular, that the removal of Soviet troops from Germany will continue as planned.

We applaud NATO's decision to afford the armed services of the new democracies training and consultative facilities and we join the Government in welcoming them to our staff colleges and training courses. We hope that increasing numbers from the former Soviet army will be able to sit down with their western counterparts in an attempt to forge real co-operative security in our continent. It would be wrong, however, to blind ourselves to the dangers stemming from the instability in eastern and 70 central Europe. Germany, the new democracies and the low countries all seek the continued presence of multinational forces in central Europe. The nature of their tasks will differ.

As the Secretary of State said, there is no longer concern about a rapid massed advance from the east. If such a possibility were in prospect, the numbers involved would be far smaller and the warning time far longer. The doctrine of flexible response in nuclear terms is irrelevant in those circumstances, and we welcome recent initiatives from Presidents Bush and Gorbachev that recognise that fact.

The multinational forces, which will still have a major United States component, nevertheless incorporate the concept of a distinct European contribution along the lines of a rapid reaction force, and that is a concept that we support.

§ Mr. Ian Bruce

The hon. Gentleman seems to be losing his voice a little. Perhaps he will now reflect on the words on the Order Paper. The first amendment to the motion embodies the unofficial Labour party view and carries his name, calling for further reductions in addition to those proposed in the defence estimates now before us. The second embodies the official Labour party view, as advanced by a number of those on the Opposition Back Benches—the conference's view that spending should initially be cut to the European average but as a first step towards even larger reductions. Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House what those cuts mean to the brigades and regiments and in terms of Britain's aircraft and ships, instead of waffling on about what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State seeks to do in the defence estimates?

§ Mr. O'Neill

Those remarks illustrate the foolishness of allowing hon. Members such as the hon. Member for Dorset, South (Mr. Bruce) to intervene in the debate. Despite the efforts of this year's Conservative party conference to grope towards democratic debate and discussion, the Conservatives do not properly appreciate how a real political conference operates. [Laughter.] Any political party that is so confident of its own ability to conduct discussion and debate