The Royal Navy

§ The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Ian Stewart)

Even by its own standards this last year has been a busy one for the Royal Navy. Since the Navy debate last year, our ships have made almost 500 visits to a total of 70 countries, among them the first visit for more than four years to Somalia and two highly successful visits to Mauritius. Royal Navy ships have continued to fulfil a vital role in the Gulf, providing reassurance and, where necessary, assistance to our merchant shipping in that troubled area. They have continued to provide a presence in the south Atlantic and in the Caribbean and they also make an important contribution to the prevention of illegal immigration into Hong Kong. In the NATO area, the Navy has continued to exercise and deploy, helping to maintain the peace through its deterrent power and practising the war roles which we hope it will never be called upon to fulfil.

Last September, 20 British warships and RFAs took part in the major NATO maritime reinforcement exercise, Ocean Safari, which involved 150 ships and 250 aircraft from 11 NATO nations. Earlier last year, the Royal Marines, who form our contribution to the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force, participated in another NATO exercise, Cold Winter, in Norway, which proved to be the most complex yet of its series and demonstrated the flexibility and adaptability of our amphibious forces. Not only has there been extensive cooperation with allied navies, in the Gulf as well as in the NATO sphere, but the Royal Navy has also contributed significantly to that much closer relationship between our own three services that has been developing in a most encouraging way in the past few years.

The major improvement of recent years in the ability of the Royal Navy to carry out such a wide range of activities effectively is the direct result of the far greater resources that the Conservative Government have devoted to defence than were provided by our Labour predecessors. After allowing for inflation, defence spending is now 20 per cent. higher than it was in 1979. In practice, that means that we have spent more than £16 billion more in real terms on defence than if spending had remained at the level we inherited, and more than £4 billion extra has been devoted to the Royal Navy.

That additional expenditure is reflected in the comprehensive ship building programme that we have followed since coming to power. During the past eight years, 61 ships have been ordered for the Royal Navy with a cost, at current prices, of more than £6 billion. They include 12 frigates, 11 submarines — including two SSBNs—and 25 mine counter-measures vessels.

In 1987, four new ships joined the Fleet: the SSN HMS Torbay, the type 22 frigate HMS London, the Hunt class MCMV HMS Berkeley and the new RFA Sir Galahad. This year, four more type 22 frigates are due to be accepted from their builders, the first of which, HMS Cornwall, joined the Fleet two weeks ago. The training ship RFA Argus has today been accepted from its builders, leaving 26 major ships and submarines on order, with a value of about £4.5 billion.

§ Mr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

In view of the Minister's criticism of the last Labour Government, will he tell us why, under this Government, the size and numbers of the surface fleet have continued to diminish year by year; why all the latest surveys suggest that the present surface fleet is the smallest in the history of the Navy; and why some who are inclined to support the Government nevertheless ask whether the Navy can any longer meet its worldwide commitments?

§ Mr. Stewart

I shall come to the issue of availability of surface ships later in my speech. It is clear that the destroyers and frigates that we have are fully capable of carrying out the tasks that are needed.

§ Mr. Frank Field (Birkenhead)

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

I have just given way. I shall come to that point later.

Before looking at our naval activities further afield, both in the NATO context and elsewhere, 1 should say something at the outset of the role of the Royal Navy in our home waters. The direct defence of our own islands was a primary task of the Fleet in the days of the Armada, 400 years ago this year, and it has remained so ever since. Not surprisingly, it is a task which has increased enormously in complexity as a result of the huge advances in technology in the 20th century.

Today, the naval defence of our home base is provided not only by ships and submarines in the eastern Atlantic and the Norwegian sea, but in our home waters. The Royal Navy, ably supported by the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Marine Reserve, remains alert to the threat of mines in coastal waters and ready to defend key points, ports and anchorages.

It is worth remembering, too, some of the other roles which the Royal Navy performs at home. Apart from providing a valuable element of our military search and rescue services, the Royal Navy helps to safeguard the United Kingdom's fishing interests and North sea energy resources, as well as supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the difficult but important task of patrolling the Province's 150-mile-long coastline.

Meanwhile, the Royal Navy's contribution to NATO remains the central ingredient—

§ Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan)

The Minister mentioned air-sea rescue in passing. In the RAF debate we received what we assumed to be fulsome assurances about the future public ownership of that facility. Before the Minister leaves the subject, will he comment on the prospective arrangements for Lee-on-Solent, which, I understand, may be different from the impression that the Minister sought to convey in the last debate? What is happening to Bristow's role in Lee-on-Solent? That, surely, has an impact on some of the Royal Navy services.

§ Mr. Stewart

As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Solent is one of the busiest areas for civil shipping and boating. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport has decided that he wants to add extra cover in that area for civil purposes. That does not affect the fact that cover for all military and many civilian services will continue to be provided in the area, but from Portland rather than Lee.

§ Mr. O'Neill

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

My hon. Friend will respond later to the other points that will no doubt be raised during the debate. I think that I should get on with my speech.

§ Mr. Duffy

This is a debate.

§ Mr. Stewart

Yes, but if I give way every moment, it ceases to be so.

Meanwhile, the Royal Navy's contribution to NATO remains the central ingredient of the United Kingdom's maritime defence effort. The successful defence of western Europe, in the event of Soviet attack, would depend on NATO's ability to ensure the safe passage of seaborne reinforcements and supplies across the Atlantic, the Channel and the North sea. Britain provides nearly 70 per cent. of the maritime forces that would be immediately available to NATO in those areas, prior to the arrival of Unites States reinforcements. The Royal Navy would thus make a key contribution to NATO's strategy of forward defence, seeking to contain and intercept Soviet maritime forces in the Norwegian sea before they could reach the wider expanses of the Atlantic.

As in the second world war, the submarine is likely to pose the greatest threat to our reinforcement and resupply routes, and it is in that connection that the massive expansion and modernisation of the Soviet submarine fleet constitutes such a threat to the West. I do not believe that the Soviet Union has any current intention of attacking NATO by land or sea, but, with its history of sudden changes in policies and leadership, we can afford to take no risks.

It is difficult indeed to see the huge build-up of Soviet submarines as part of a purely defensive strategy. In the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet navy has built up a submarine fleet of about 400, of which over 200 are nuclear-powered; and new submarines are still being completed at an average rate of about one every six weeks. However, it is not only the sheer size of the Soviet submarine fleet which poses a major potential threat to NATO. The new classes of SSN, such as the Sierra and the Akula, show clear design improvements over their predecessors; modern Soviet submarines are much quieter, making their detection increasingly difficult. At the same time, older submarines are being modernised and their capabilities significantly improved.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the priority for our major investment in the Royal Navy's equipment has been to provide an up-to-date capability for anti-submarine warfare. For this reason we have developed new weapon's such as the Stingray and Spearfish torpedoes, as well as greatly improved means of detection through towed arrays and other surface ship and submarine sonars.

Many forces contribute to the overall anti-submarine effort. Our nuclear-powered submarines will be crucial in the forward areas, and RAF maritime patrol aircraft will also have an important contribution to make. But surface ships are an essential part of that effort because they can remain on task for long periods, yet react quickly to contacts over a wide area.

HMS Cornwall, the first of the type 22 batch 3 frigates, well illustrates the scale of our investment in that area. Her weapons include a highly capable hull-mounted sonar and a towed array passive sonar that will enable detections of submarines to be made at very long range. She can then prosecute contacts using the Lynx helicopter armed with 1177 Stingray torpedoes. Finally, her comprehensive communication system enables her to assist in the co-ordination of an ASW battle with a variety of other surface, air and submarine units.

§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

Many people will be pleased that the captain of Cornwall is Captain WrexfordBrown. Would he have been given accelerated promotion if in any way he had been responsible for losing his submarine's control room logbook?

§ Mr. Stewart

I do not want to speculate on the processes of promotion in the Royal Navy, but we have many good captains, and he is one.

HMS Cornwall is also well equipped in the anti-surface and anti-air roles. She is the first Royal Navy vessel to deploy the Harpoon anti-surface ship missile, and the first to deploy the Goalkeeper close-in weapons system for anti-missile defence, in addition to the well-proven Seawolf. That element of HMS Cornwall's equipment reflects the fact that the past year has seen a major step forward in the air defence of the Fleet, the universal importance of which has been demonstrated by developments in the Gulf. To that end, we have accelerated our plans for the introduction of Phalanx into the type 42 destroyers, and we also placed an order in January for full development and production of the lightweight Seawolf missile system.

HMS Cornwall is a good example of the point made in last year's Navy debate by my predecessor, that the acid test of the Royal Navy's ability to perform its role effectively is not simply ship numbers, but its overall capability. Nevertheless, as the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) pointed out earlier, there have been suggestions recently that we do not have enough operational destroyers and frigates, and that few of them would be available for the defence of the waters around the United Kingdom.

I am glad to say that the real picture is very different. Of course, some of our ships are engaged in tasks out of area, but they could be recalled in the event of an emergency. We currently have 49 destroyers and frigates in the Fleet, of which no fewer than 43 are available for operational deployment immediately, or within a short perod if required.

In addition to the nine frigates currently on order, we have now received and are assessing tenders for up to four more of the highly capable type 23 frigates. Looking further to the future, in January—

§ Mr. Frank Field

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman as he tried to intervene earlier.

§ Mr. Field

I am grateful to the Minister of State for giving way. Can he tell the House something about the Government's plans in relation to those four tenders? Is it still the Government's intention to order four boats? Will he give the House the assurance that when the Government decide which yards are to get the order, that will be done on the basis of cost?

§ Mr. Stewart

I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a definitive answer to that question, because decisions have not been taken. However, I have no doubt that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence 1178 Procurement will deal with procurement matters, including the procurement of ships, when he replies to the debate, if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. He will have heard the hon. Gentleman's point.

Looking further to the future, in January the United Kingdom signed the memorandum of understanding for the project definition phase of the NFR 90 — the proposed NATO frigate which could eventually provide a replacement for the type 42 destroyer at the end of the century. In doing so, however, we have made it clear to our partners that our continued participation is conditional upon an agreement of a timetable that is both realistic in technical terms and consistent with the time scale for progress with the ship's major weapons systems.

§ Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden)

On the point about the NFR 90, my hon. Friend will appreciate the enormous political significance that is attached to the commitment of the United Kingdom Government to a joint project with our NATO allies. I hope that he will assure the House that technical details — I know that some can be important—will not stand in the way of full-hearted co-operation.

§ Mr. Stewart

I assure my hon. Friend that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Defence fully appreciate the international significance and importance of co-operation with our allies in equipment of that kind. Equally, I am sure that he would not expect us to agree to go full ahead with the project unless it was on a realistic basis, which is the condition that we have suggested.

§ Mr. Jonathan Sayeed (Bristol, East)

Will my hon. Friend tell us the Treasury's view on that matter?

§ Mr. Stewart

Having left the Treasury, I think that I shall leave the Treasury to answer for itself.

The plast year has also provided further proof of the unique capacity of the Royal Navy to support our interests and connections worldwide. Royal Navy ships, and especially destroyers and frigates, can be used for a variety of purposes on the international scene. On the way to and from tasks both in the NATO area and beyond, our ships are frequent and welcome visitors in the ports of friendly and allied states. A ship can be dispatched almost anywhere at short notice, if need be, and provide us with a range of diplomatic or military options. Indeed, history, including quite recent history, is full of illustrations of the usefulness and flexibility of sea power.

The Royal Navy's Armilla patrol in the Gulf is just the latest example. It has been a busy year for the patrol. Since our last Navy debate, seldom has a week passed without news of events in the Gulf, and in particular of the so-called "tanker war". Throughout the year we have seen on television the results of attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf, many of them innocent victims caught in the middle of the conflict. During this period, the Armilla patrol has continued to carry out its task in a quiet but effective way. In 1987, the patrol accompanied no fewer than 405 merchant ship movements through the Straits of Hormuz. No ship eligible for Royal Navy protection has been attacked while in the vicinity of the patrol. That is a record of which the Navy can be justly proud.

§ Mr. O'Neill

We are grateful for the protection afforded by the Navy of British ships in the Gulf. Will the 1179 Minister tell us what is the total number of ships that have gone through the Gulf and what proportion of them were British?

§ Mr. Stewart

I can give the figures, as I have done, for British shipping, but, in view of the large number of foreign ships which have gone through the Gulf, I am not sure whether I can provide an accurate figure. I require notice to reply to that point.

§ Mr. O'Neill

I understand that the information was made available to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and that 80 per cent. more foreign ships than British ships went through the Gulf. Our shipping is in a rather special position, largely due to the efforts of our men who are serving in the area and to whom we must be grateful.

§ Mr. Stewart

I believe that the hon. Gentleman is correct. I particularly welcome his comments about the contribution made by the Royal Navy in that difficult and dangerous area.

The House will recall that, at the end of July, a new threat was posed by mines laid in shipping lanes, one of which was to cause damage to the merchant ship Bridgeton. Shortly afterwards, mines were found off Fujayrah, within Armilla's area of operation. Accordingly, four Royal Navy mine counter-measures vessels were promptly dispatched to the Gulf in support of the Armilla patrol. During their operations to date, our minesweepers have successfully disposed of 10 mines, representing a major contribution to safety of navigation for all shipping in the area. Recently we have been able to reduce the number of our minesweepers in the Gulf from four to three in the light of our experience in operations to date and the very close co-operation which I am glad to say we have developed with allied navies, in particular the Dutch and Belgians.

I know that hon. Members on both sides of the House would wish to join me in paying tribute to the outstanding contribution made by those serving in the Royal Navy in the difficult and demanding circumstances of the Gulf. In recognition of those exceptional conditions of service, I am pleased to be able to tell the House that free aerogramme letters will in future be provided to all those serving in our ships in the Gulf area and to their families at home. I have asked the naval staff to make arrangements to introduce this service as soon as possible, and they expect to be able to do so within the next few weeks.

Last autumn, the Royal Navy's out-of-area capability, as well as that of the other two services, was thoroughly tested during Exercise Purple Warrior, the major triservice amphibious exercise held in the Irish sea and southwest Scotland. A force of 39 ships, including HMS Ark Royal, Illustrious and Intrepid, took part with two brigades and support from over 100 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Twenty thousand service personnel took part, of whom approximately 10,000 were deployed ashore. The exercise was an outstanding success in many ways. In particular, the complex command and control structure of joint amphibious operations was thoroughly tested and proven, and significant benefits were achieved in integration and co-operation between the three services.

Having myself acted as host at a dinner in Stranraer to the 34 observers from 20 states which accepted the invitation to observe aspects of the exercise under the terms of the Stockholm agreement, I can affirm from my own experience the value which I believe those 1180 arrangements have in encouraging personal contact between representatives of Warsaw pact and NATO countries, something which I am sure can contribute to a lessening of suspicion and mistrust between us. Over the years that could prove to be one of the most important elements in improving the security of Europe.

§ Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West)

I apologise for not being present to hear the Minister's initial remarks. Will he tell us whether any reciprocal arrangements might be made to watch the work of the Warsaw pact navies, particularly the Soviet navy?

§ Mr. Stewart

I do not know whether the Warsaw pact countries carry out amphibious operations in the same way as we do, but, as the hon. Gentleman will know, there is an arrangement whereby all exercises over a certain size automatically qualify for reciprocal observation under the Stockholm agreement. Western observers have witnessed some exercises on land during the past year.

Looking much further afield, I was very pleased to be able to announce a few weeks ago that the Royal Navy will be making a group deployment later this year to the far east and Australia. The task group is set to leave the United Kingdom in June, and the focal point of the deployment will be the Fleet review in Sydney early in October. Named Outback 88, the Royal Navy task group will consist of HMS Ark Royal, as flagship, with HMS Edinburgh and HMS Sirius, together with the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Fort Grange, Olwen and Orangeleaf. It was a previous Sirius which led the orginal first fleet two centuries ago and it is fitting that her namesake will be able to represent the Royal Navy at the Australian bicentennial celebrations this year.

Throughout the six months' deployment the ships will exercise with the forces of our friends and allies, including two exercises with nations which are party to the five-power defence arrangements, and also separately with the United States navy and the Royal Australian navy.

The task group will sail and return via the Suez canal and on current plans the first point of call will be Malta. Thereafter, the deployment will include visits to Singapore, Brunei, Hong Kong and Thailand. Those visits will be a valuable opportunity for the Royal Navy to renew links with other navies and with countries which cannot easily be reached during normal operational tasking. They also provide an excellent occasion to display a wide range of defence equipment in a realistic environment, which I hope British industry will be ready to exploit.

While speaking of exercises, let me also say a word about the Falklands —a theatre in which co-operation between the three services has flourished, particularly since the construction of the new complex at Mount Pleasant. Exercise Fire Focus, which takes place this month, will be the first occasion on which we are able to exercise the procedure for reinforcement in line with the policy that we set out in our White Paper after the conflict in 1982. During the past couple of years, completion of the airfield and the development of contingency plans for the rapid reinforcement of the Falklands have enabled us to halve the size of the resident garrison.

Such a substantial reduction of the military presence in the Falklands serves to confirm that our purpose is entirely defensive, but, in the light of recent history, it would not have been a responsible step unless we were in a position 1181 to bring more troops to the islands at short notice in case of need. It is, of course, our profound hope that actual reinforcement of the kind that we will be exercising will never have to be put into practice, and I believe that the very fact that we would clearly be able to do so will help to ensure that such circumstances do not again arise.

Fire Focus will involve the movement of no more than one battalion group and a small number of aircraft, with fewer than 1,000 men in all. Although that is, of course, no indication of the numbers that might have to be moved in a real emergency, it is the minimum required to conduct an effective test of the process of reinforcement. Some of the stories about the scale of the exercise have been so enormously exaggerated, I am not surprised that they have given rise to misunderstanding in some quarters. Therefore, I am very glad to have the opportunity to set the record straight.

§ Mr. Dalyell

Will the Minister explain why, although 23 south American states have come out against the exercise, he has not managed to obtain the support of Washington for the exercise?

§ Mr. Stewart

International reaction to the exercise has been greatly coloured by the exaggeration of its scale. I would merely repeat, for the benefit of those countries where there may have been such anxiety, that we have decided to establish the exercise on the basis of the minimum required to make an effective exercise of the process of reinforcement, which we hope that we shall never have to use for real.

The Royal Navy's most important resource is, of course, its manpower.

§ Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

§ Mr. Stewart

I have given way many times, but I shall do so again.

§ Dr. Godman

Before the Minister leaves the subject of the Falklands, may I ask whether there have been any occasions on which the Falkland Islands Government fisheries protection vessels have called upon naval vessels in support of their operations in policing the fisheries zone?

§ Mr. Stewart

We do not discuss operational matters. However, I have no doubt that the presence of a Royal Navy vessel in the area has contributed to the stability of the Falkland Islands conservation zone for fishery purposes. Incidentally, I think that it has been of great benefit to the Falkland Islands' economy, and that is something that we welcome greatly.

The Royal Navy's most important resource is, of course, its manpower. This country is outstandingly well served by the men and women of the naval services. Currently the Navy, the Marines, the Nursing Services and the WRNS number just over 10,000 officers and about 55,000 ratings in total. During recent years the Royal Navy has progressively transferred manpower and other resources from the base areas to the front line, and fighting ships and their direct support now account for 70 per cent. of the Navy's uniformed strength. The overall result is a much more streamlined and effective Navy than we inherited in 1979, and the drive towards great efficiency continues.

1182 That brings me to the question of recruitment and retention. When one considers the enormous demands made on the members of the naval services, particularly those filling appointments at sea, the retention rate for those very highly trained people is pretty healthy. The level of premature retirement applications has broadly stabilised during the past 18 months at a level far below that experienced when this Government took office.

The retention of trained people is, of course, crucial to our manpower plans, and we are always seeking to improve it. The stress of separation and service at sea are an inevitable part of naval life, but that does not mean that we should take their acceptance by our naval personnel for granted. Much has been done in recent years to consider the needs of the sailor at sea, and we are looking into possible ways of improving conditions of service for seagoers.

§ Mr. Sayeed

Will my hon. Friend confirm that, although what he has just said was true a year ago, the curve has, regrettably, gone the wrong way and that the retention rate of officers and senior ratings with mechanical and electrical qualifications is declining?

§ Mr. Stewart

The figures have been similar over the past 18 months or so. I can assure my hon. Friend that that is not something about which we are complacent.

§ Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood)

Will my hon. Friend confirm that, broadly speaking, the projections for manning in the Royal Navy, as outlined in Cmnd. 8288, have been maintained, even though the numbers of ships have, mercifully, not declined to the extent anticipated? Will he please bear in mind the fact that that causes stresses and strains for the families of men in the Fleet and that everything possible must be done to ensure that the separations are not too long? If he does that, the premature outflow of people will be minimised.

§ Mr. Stewart

I accept entirely my hon. Friend's point about the problems of separation. Indeed, I hope that the words that I have already used will show that we recognise the problems that that can cause.

Last year was one of the most satisfactory for naval recruitment in a long time. We are not, however, at all complacent about that. Like many employers, the Royal Navy is conscious that a progressive reduction in the numbers of young people joining the labour market over the next few years is likely to pose a considerable challenge to recruiting. Many of the young people now seeking employment are well qualified and have high expectations of themselves and of any potential employers. The Navy wants their qualifications, and it provides a well paid and challenging career.

The Government remain committed to expanding the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Marine Reserve. It is to those men and women that the nation would look to provide an important element of our wartime manpower and, in the case of the RNR, to man the majority of its mine counter-measures forces. We appreciate that, with competing demands of work, family and activities outside the reserve, finding time is not always easy, and we are therefore grateful not only for the dedication of those concerned but for the understanding of the many employers who allow the reservists time off work to carry out periods of continuous training.

On Monday, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces announced the funding of a 1183 national television campaign to explain the attractions and importance of reserve service. I hope that will encourage more employers to recognise the debt we owe to those who join the reserves. We should not forget the civilian volunteers in the Royal Naval Auxiliary Reserve, which celebrated its silver jubilee last year. The importance of their potential role at key United Kingdom ports and anchorages in the event of hostilities is fully appreciated.

One of the most demanding, as well as one of the most vital, tasks which our sailors have to discharge is the maintenance on patrol of our Polaris submarines. Throughout the past year, as in every year since 1969, the Royal Navy has continued to maintain at least one Polaris submarine on patrol at all times, thus ensuring the constant readiness of our nuclear deterrent. Although the Government"s policy of maintaining the British strategic deterrent was so emphatically endorsed by the electorate last June, the present Leader of the Opposition is equally determined that it should be abandoned.

I hardly need remind the House that the Labour party's policy of one-sided nuclear disarmament would pose great risks for Britain. It is not only a dangerous policy; it is a profoundly illogical one. For the Labour leadership to claim that they would remain good members of NATO, while repudiating the whole nuclear dimension of NATO strategy, is simply dishonest.

The logical consequence of the Labour party's nuclear unilateralism would be to pull out of NATO altogether, and, as the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) suggests, to adopt a policy of non-alignment in defence and foreign affairs. To do as Labour proposed in the last election—scrap Polaris, cancel Trident, expel all United States nuclear weapons from Britain—in short, to deny the whole concept of nuclear deterrence, but at the same time to take shelter under the protection of the NATO nuclear umbrella provided by the Americans, is a nonsensical policy.

No wonder there is talk in the Labour party of trying to find some form of compromise. One idea is that Polaris and Trident should be negotiated away as part of the wider disarmament process. The fact is that, for the foreseeable future, the British nuclear deterrent is of fundamental importance not only to our own security but to that of NATO as a whole. By providing a second centre of nuclear decision-making, it greatly complicates the assessment of the consequences of aggression against NATO and so makes such aggression itself much less likely.

Another idea canvassed by some in the Labour party is that, regardless of multilateral negotiations, or if such negotiations were not to succeed, a Labour Government would negotiate Polaris and Trident away for equivalent reductions by the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union would still have more than 10 times as many strategic nuclear warheads as the United Kingdom with Trident, even if the proposed START agreement between the superpowers were to reduce their number by 50 per cent., such a bilateral agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union would be worse than uselees.

If there are two parties to a duel, one of them with 10 bullets and the other with only one, it is an unequal contest. But if one has nine and the other has none, then it is no contest at all. In the words of the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore): It would be simply folly for Britain to unilaterally abandon its new Trident fleet. And it would he equally foolish for us to negotiate it away on a bilateral one-for-one basis 1184 with the Soviet Union. The arithmetic is obvious. The possession by both France and Britain of an independent nuclear capability remains a major counter and deterrent so long as the Soviet Union itself possesses nuclear arms. It is good to know that there are still a few voices of sanity on this subject in the Labour party, but it is a sad fact that they are now so heavily outnumbered.

§ Ms. Joan Ruddock (Lewisham, Deptford)

I want to refer to the analogy that the Minister has made with bullets. The hon. Gentleman talked of our having one and the others having nine. What kind of contest would there be with nuclear weapons? How many nuclear weapons does he believe that Britain could use, and in what scenario would we use them?

§ Mr. Stewart

I thought that the hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Ms. Ruddock) was to be one of the voices of sanity among the Opposition, but I despair of that. She knows, as everyone in the House should recognise, that a nuclear deterrent is to deter war, not to fight it. We believe that the effective deterrent that we have maintained for the past 40 years is the best chance of making sure that a war in Europe does not happen again.

§ Mr. Cecil Franks (Barrow, and Furness)

Before the Minister moves to another subject, may I take this opportunity to remind him of the complete contradiction of the Opposition's policies. In their general election manifesto, they committed themselves to cancelling Trident and phasing out nuclear energy, as well as increasing the hunter-killer programme, although those submarines are nuclear-powered. That is completely inconsistent.

§ Mr. Stewart

My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Franks) is quite right about the inconsistency of the Opposition. It will not have gone without notice that whenever embarrassing subjects are raised, all the Opposition can do is to resort to barracking.

§ Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli)

So that we can put the record straight, we have made it clear, in relation to civil nuclear power, that our policy is to phase it out. We also made it clear that, in relation to nuclear submarines and military use, we would retain nuclear generation for conventionally armed nuclear submarines.

§ Mr. Stewart

Let me conclude, as my speech has continued longer than it should have done, on a note that I trust will meet with more general agreement.

In all its roles, the Royal Navy makes just as important a contribution to our defences today as it has done for many centuries. We owe our respect and gratitude to all those whose skill and dedication continues to maintain the highest traditions of the senior service.

5.2 pm

§ Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan)

I start by echoing the Minister's appreciation of the sterling efforts of the senior service. I recognise that it often has a difficult job to do in hard conditions. I am not surprised that the Minister took the opportunity to set the record straight in this debate about Fire Focus. While he was opening this debate, I took the opportunity to read again what he said in the previous debate. Certainly, the small-scale operation in the Falklands called Fire Focus, which we have heard about today, is somewhat different from the first full-scale reinforcement exercise that was described so fulsomely in the Royal Air Force debate a few weeks ago. The Minister 1185 has taken rather a gung-ho approach, however, and his retractions today will not do anything to reduce the anxiety in Latin America, and indeed in the whole of America, about what is at least a gaffe by the MoD in building up the image of a modest exercise.

We recognise that if troops are in the Falklands they must be exercised and trained, but it is evidence of the bellicosity of the Government that the most puny little exercise is blown up by the tinpot generals on the Conservative Front Bench. They take every opportunity to preen and inflate themselves, although admittedly the present Secretary of State does not need the hairnet of his predecessor when he went on these excursions. Nevertheless, the Government take every opportunity to blow up the significance of their military activities, often in a destabilising way that causes far more harm than it is designed to avoid.

To return to the debate, I believe that Opposition Members and those on the Conservative Benches who participate regularly in defence debates—I can see some real kind faces there—value services debates. With the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, it was feared that the identity of the individual services would be lost. I expect that many of my hon. Friends who have served in the Royal Navy or who have constituency interests relating to warship building and other similar industries, always like to argue in these debates for further procurement announcements. Today, I am afraid that we shall have to wait until the Minister's wind-up for reference to the procurement side of the Ministry of Defence. There has been nothing so far, not even an updating or comment on the royal dockyards, which have been operating for 10 months under privatisation. I expect that some of my colleagues will wish to refer to procurement as the debate continues, and I hope that I shall be able to refer to some procurement problems that the Opposition thinks should be aired.

At present, despite the optimistic noises coming out of Geneva and meetings between American Secretary of State Shultz and his Soviet counterparts, there is still heightening tension in the northern waters and problems are being created by what is now generally known as the forward defence strategy. We realise that much of what has happened in the past few days in Brussels has still to be assessed properly, and we might have to wait until the Estimates debate before the outcome is considered.

We hope that the Prime Minister will report to the House the events of the NATO summit. One of the regrettable aspects of the conduct of Ministry of Defence affairs under this Administration has been the failure of Secretaries of State to make a statement to the House when they return from NATO meetings. If the Prime Minister does that on Monday that might be the start of a change in approach, and we might be given more information about what takes place at NATO summits.

Much of the discussion, as I understand it, at the NATO summit has been concerned with central Europe and the modernisation of compensation, call it what you will, for the short-range weapons. It is inevitable that the greatest interest shown by the countries that have been making the most noise will be in relation to central Europe. Nevertheless the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom must be aware that changes in the ladder of escalation, and the removal of some of the rungs of the 1186 INF treaty and subsequent changes will result in a significant heightening of maritime strategy. As a result of that maritime strategy being applied nearer to Soviet bases in the Kola peninsula, there will be increased problems, and dangers, which are recognised by Norway but seem to be ignored by this Government and the United States.

I realise that the capabilities which must exist to meet the perceived threats and challenges are the result of a compromise between resources and needs, but as long as we have the massive expenditure on the Trident programme, anything else we seek to do in the Navy will be gravely limited, which will have a deleterious effect on our contribution to the Alliance and will weaken the overall defence of these islands.

In the 1987 Statement on the Defence Estimates we were told that the Navy had four tasks: the interception and containment of Soviet forces in the Norwegian sea; direct defence of reinforcement, re-supply and economic shipping, in conjunction with US and European maritime forces, and supported by the RAF; anti-submarine defence of the NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic; and protection and deployment of the combined United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force to reinforce the Northern Flank of NATO. The first three tasks indicate a change in strategy. The Royal Navy is now integrated in the United States forward maritime strategy. Instead of using Royal Navy destroyers and frigates as convoy escorts, the vessels, together with the Royal Navy anti-submarine carriers such as HMS Invincible, HMS Ark Royal and hunter-killers, will attempt to fight the next war in the Norwegian and Barents seas. Their task will be to destroy the Soviet fleet, destroy the Soviet means of second strike and their nuclear submarines in their bastions, and to launch attacks on Soviet territory.

United States and Royal Navy ships are armed with a range of conventional and nuclear weapons. Their nuclear inventory consists of gravity bombs, which can be dropped by Royal Navy Sea Harrier aircraft, and nuclear depth charges carried by frigates and destroyers. An increasing number of sea-launched cruise missiles are being fitted to United States ships. In a crisis it is clear that the Royal Navy and US Navy warships would surge forward to apply coercive diplomatic pressure, to contain the Soviet fleet and threaten the Soviet means of second strike.

In peacetime, in order to prepare for the strategy, the Royal Navy and US navy warships are operating in the Barents sea, shadowing Soviet ships and submarines. The danger of the tactic of shadowing ships was illustrated just a couple of weeks ago in the Black sea, when two United States and Soviet warships were in very close proximity. The Royal Navy could be similarly involved in northern waters. While the Ministry of Defence is quite relaxed about that, I have gained the impression from talking to people in the Norwegian Government that they are not quite so relaxed about it and are far more acutely aware of the high-risk strategy in the northern waters.

§ Mr. Wilkinson

Is the hon. Member suggesting that the Royal Navy should deny itself the right of free passage in international waters just because of the risk of accident, collision or some other eventuality? Surely it is necessary that the navies of the free world should exercise their fundamental right in international waters?

§ Mr. O'Neill

The hon. Member is confusing the two issues. If he allows me to answer the question, he can make 1187 up his own mind. It is clear that the long-standing convoy protection and support role and the plugging of the Greenland-Iceland-Norway gap have long been accepted as legitimate tactics and part of the strategy for the defence of these islands and the Atlantic convoys. We are seeing a change in the strategy; a pushing further forward into areas where the Royal Navy is participating in ways that it has not done before.

The United States navy, under the direction of Assistant Secretary of State Lehman, developed the strategy as part of the campaign for the 600-warship navy. The Lehman approach was graphically described in a metaphor, which would probably appeal to the Prime Minister, as "bearding the bear in its lair". That is highly provocative and not greatly appreciated by the people of Norway. It could create problems and dangers in northern waters at a time when we are led to believe, according to "Jane's Fighting Ships" that the Soviet Union is curbing some of its activities in the Barents sea. There is a long report in today's "Jane's" about the way in which the Soviet Union has been reducing its activity. It is not clear what the motives are; seeking to adopt a lower military profile or attempting to save money, co-operation—

§ Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith

rose—

§ Mr. O'Neill

When I finish the point, I will give way to the hon. Gentleman.

The point I am making is that even if we distrust and are suspicious of the Soviets, they appear to be seeking to reduce the tension in the northern waters. Gorbachev has already suggested having talks about reducing the tension. I am not one of those people who embrace everything Gorbachev says. He is not necessarily the kind of man we should do business with. We ought to put his remarks to the test, and the test can only be put in serious discussions. The offers made in Murmansk last October have not been taken up yet or adequately considered by the Alliance.

§ Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith

The hon. Gentleman has raised an interesting point. It is difficult to do justice to it in putting a question to him, but he should tell the House that the idea of moving our submarine force closer to the Soviets, into the Barents sea, is based not just on a provocative view of the Lehman strategy for the Navy but on the fact that Soviet technology has changed. The Soviets have gone further away from the United States with their submarines by developing long-range weapon strike systems. If we are to shadow their submarines, we have to move closer to them. It is a matter of geography and good naval tactics; nothing more or less.

§ Mr. O'Neill

The hon. Member could be answered by the point that we have Trident and the Soviets have their weapons systems. Perhaps if we were to talk seriously—I hope we will—in the context of START, in a year we could say that because of the reduction in the Soviet threat we could talk in a different context. On this point the hon. Member and I will have to agree to disagree.

At a time when there seems to be an opportunity for certain localised initiatives to be taken, it would be foolhardy of us to urge the Alliance to ignore the initiatives. That is the point I have been trying to make in the context of the Murmansk speech by Secretary Gorbachev. Our position is not enhanced by reports such as those in The Times of July last year which showed HMS Superb joined with the USS Sea Devil and USS Bullfish surfacing at the north pole.

§ Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme)

Why should not the Royal Navy submarines surface at the north pole and exercise their right of freedom of navigation on the high seas? It is typical of the appeasement policies of the Opposition Front Bench that just because a couple of Soviet warships in international waters should have deliberately collided with a couple of United States warships, they are now telling us that the Royal Navy should not be allowed to go anywhere close to Soviet shores.

§ Mr. O'Neill

I am sorry that I let the hon. Member in. I did so because I expected something more than the usual old claptrap, but I will respond on this point. Since that time, and since Gorbachev's speech in October, I do not think that such an incident has happened again, and for that I am grateful. I hope that this will mark a better understanding between the Soviet Union and the Alliance, instead of the provocative and—to use the expression I used at the beginning of my speech—gung-ho mentality that seems to pervade the Ministry of Defence.

§ Mr. Sayeed

rose—

§ Mr. O'Neill

No, I have to make progress. The hon. Member will I am sure, be able to catch Mr. Deputy Speaker's eye.

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker)

Order. A lot of hon. Members wish to take part in the debate. Perhaps hon. Members who are waiting to catch my eye would save their interventions for their speeches.

§ Mr. O'Neill

Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We know that Defence Minister Yazov will be meeting Secretary of State Carlucci in the near future to discuss strategy and military doctrine in its wide sense. According to press reports, one of the matters on the agenda will be the very point that the hon. Member for Davyhulme (Mr. Churchill) has made. One of the encouraging things we see in prospect at a discussion of this nature is that problems of this kind will be discussed frankly. I only wish that the Government would assist this process by giving vocal support for this kind of discussion, because we have yet to see from the Secretary of State—who I am glad to see is in his place — any such expression of enthusiasm or support. It is from such informal discussions that the other things that we all want will develop.

I have referred to the forward strategy and deployment of our Fleet in northern waters. This stretches the capabilities of the Fleet and brings into question our ability to discharge our responsibilities in the other parts of the maritime strategy, as laid out in the Estimates. Obviously, the convoy support role is critical for two reasons: first, because we recognise that material has to be transferred in time of crisis from the United States to Europe, and, secondly, because it is with our Royal Navy above all that responsibility for that protection will rest.

We have heard from press and other reports that the Select Committee has been looking into this function and has been taking evidence. I do not think that we are at liberty to speak about this in any context but press reports at the moment. We see that this Fleet protection role is being gravely stretched and strained by the small size of our Navy. Members of the Opposition are not too clear about exactly how many craft are available to the Navy.

Some weeks ago we heard an estimate made by Mr. Desmond Wettern, who has a certain expertise in these matters. Over the years he has caused a fair degree of 1189 discomfiture to the MOD and has tended to require it to be more frank than it would otherwise be. In conjunction with the Maritime League—not an organisation that is noted for its appeasement tendencies, but a non-political organisation made up of people who are very strongly committed to the Navy, and enjoying the support of hon. Members from all parties—he set a figure of 28 ships being operationally available to the Royal Navy.

We have heard today that the figure is now 43. Yesterday morning I heard an official giving evidence to the Select Committee in which he said that the figure was 36, but it now seems that seven have been found overnight. It may be that we shall get another seven before the Estimates debate and get back to 50.

I believe that many Opposition and Government Members will want to come back to this. It is only the understandable, but in this case, I think, culpable, loyalty of many Government Members to their Front Bench that prevents their taking this up with the vigour that they might well show once they get the evidence properly sorted out by the Select Committee and its report comes out. I hope that that report will be available for the Estimates debate later in the year, because this is a matter that exercises the mind of anyone who has at least the best interests of the defence of this country and the maintenance of the good name of our senior service.

The fact that we have a smaller Fleet means that, of necessity, we need to have more people at sea for longer periods. This is one of the most distressing aspects of the impact of the cuts in our Navy, because of the damage that it does to the manpower and the morale of our service men and service women.

It might be said that the Minister's brief was somewhat economical with the truth in relation to figures concerning manpower. He said that they had stabilised. On 15 February I asked the Secretary of State for Defence questions about the numbers of Royal Navy artificers who had left certain branches in each year since 1979. I was told that in 1986, 70 air engineers left and in 1987, 75 left, while in 1979 the figure was 29. The figures for marine engineers were, in 1986, 371 and in 1987, 345. The figures for weapon/electrical engineers were, in 1986, 444 and in 1987, 357.

The numbers leaving prior to completion of engagement have been higher in some years than in others. In 1986, the figure for marine engineers was 189, and in 1987, it was 176. The figures for air engineers leaving before completion of engagement were 18 in 1986 and 22 in 1987.

These figures may well give the Minister some comfort. They may well have stabilised. And, of course, in every debate of this nature we are told what it was like in the days of the Labour Government. In the days of the Labour Government there were at one point 1.7 million people out of work, and by April 1979 that figure was down to just under 1.3 million. We are now talking in terms of 2.9 million to 3.5 million, depending on which set of fiddled unemployment statistics one chooses to base one's argument on.

If there is one rule of recruitment for the services it is that unemployment is the best recruiting sergeant. There must be something wrong with a service with such long-standing traditions, which over the years has had a great reputation for morale and has provided people with the 1190 best possible training, if people are continuing to leave in the numbers that they are, to the detriment of the service as a whole.

If we have strains on our Fleet, if we have a loss of manpower and morale, and if there is a time of crisis, we have to look for additional support for our Fleet, as we had to do in the Falklands exercise. We have to look to the merchant marine.

The somewhat inelegant acronym, STUFT, is a word that I would not normally use in this House, but for this purpose. Ships taken up from trade are the backbone of the support that our navy expects in a time of crisis. Certainly the military requirements are seen solely in terms of ships taken up from trade for direct naval purposes. Yet ships so utilised cannot be used for their primary transport function and could represent a significant drain on our vital shipping resources, especially the fast cargo liners which are vital for reinforcement and re-supply.

There were 193 British-registered large ocean trading vessels, that is container and roll-on/roll-off ships, in March 1987. I understand that the figure this year is expected to be about 130. This deterioration in numbers is significant for more than one reason, the obvious one being, that on the one hand, it denies us naval support and, on the other, the facility for transporting the material. What is also significant is that it denies us skilled naval personnel because, as we lose each ship, so we lose the services and the skills of trained merchantmen.

The de-flagging of ships and the recruitment, by some of the unscrupulous shipping lines, of cheap foreign labour to work in intolerable conditions, creates problems. I cannot see why poorly paid foreign nationals would necessarily want to come to the defence of this country, a country which has done nothing to improve their working conditions and pay.

§ Mr. David Martin (Portsmouth, South)

I hope that the hon. Gentleman makes these points to the National Union of Seamen before it calls its people out on strike and asks them to take other industrial action. There are major problems, and increasingly shipowners will be unable to rely on British crews if we have these strikes. So I hope that he will put these views very strongly to the National Union of Seamen.

§ Mr. O'Neill

If the hon. Gentleman is arguing a case for the low pay of British merchantmen, he can do so in Portsmouth and see what he gets for his labours. Hon. Members on the Opposition Benches believe that our sailors in both the merchant marine and the Royal Navy are entitled to the best possible working conditions, pay and opportunities for reasonable periods of leave at home —because the Government's policy means not just the removal of the opportunity for merchant navy support, but the problem that many of our naval seamen are spending far too long at sea and far too short a time with their families. That is, above all else, the reason why we are seeing this decline in manpower and morale.

The lack of resources can be attributed to the distortion of the defence budget by Trident. In the past few weeks we have had a series of disclosures. We have had the rent-a-rocket scandal. We do not yet know whether we will own all our D5 missiles or just 80 per cent. of them. We have gone through the arithmetic and we get the usual Panglossion stuff from the Minister, that everything is fine and up-to-date. According to reports which appeared in 1191 The Independent about production of warheads, staff shortages and the difficulties with the facility at Aldermaston, it is quite possible that there will be considerable delays in the production of warheads.

I know that the Secretary of State said recently that everything was up to date. This may well be true if he is describing the position that we are expected to be in at present, but we may well find ourselves before too long in the position of having the first submarine but no missiles or warheads; we will probably have missiles if the Americans are prepared to grant us them but not warheads because that is the British part of the operation and we cannot produce them in time.

Perhaps when he replies tonight, the Minister will confirm the position on the production of warheads for the Trident system. Perhaps he will tell us the position regarding the facility at Aldermaston. We have had these arguments before in this Chamber, and somehow the reasons are always based on either commercial considerations or security. It does absolutely nothing for security for the House to be given either evasive replies or obfuscating statements from the Government Front Bench. We want the position clarified. We believe that defence and security matters must of necessity be subject to a degree of confidentiality, but that this Government's desire to cover up and conceal is out of all proportion to the nature of the problems that we are discussing.

We had from the Minister, in the last few minutes of what I imagine he would seek to call his peroration, the apologia for the British nuclear deterrent, so-called. When the Minister replies, will he say to what extent in the Trident programme the Government have considered the consequences of a treaty being produced from the strategic arms reduction talks? If we have a 50 per cent. reduction — and all hon. Members would want such an eventuality—that would not be an end in itself but only a means to an end. We are entitled to some thoughts from the Government on how they would meet their responsibilities in a phase two of START.

It is certainly the intention of the present incumbent in the White House and of Secretary Gorbachev to seek to secure a nuclear-free world. We know that the Prime Minister does not like such talk, that she finds it completely otiose and unacceptable. It seems that other Conservatives in other parts of the world, in Moscow and Washington, are prepared to view this, with some equanimity, as something to be desired. So it will be useful if we can have some indications of the Government's thinking on this strategic matter. It ill behoves the Government to carry on addressing the problems of defence and security in a provocative and bellicose manner which completely ignores the change in the climate of world opinion and denies Britain access to any of the meaningful discussions that take place.

Our reading of the limited reports from Brussels is that, rather than being a triumph for the Prime Minister, the meeting has been a massive rebuttal of the Prime Minister and her Secretary of State — the man who went to Monterrey a few months ago, arguing not for modernisation but for compensation and ending up with "modernisation wherever possible".

§ Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton)

rose—

§ Mr. O'Neill

I am just about to finish.

The Opposition believe that what has happened at Brussels marks a turning point in the attitude of the 1192 alliance to those who seek to jack up the arms race at every turn. What is a matter for regret is the fact that, as long as the Government keep their head in the sand with regard to the Royal Navy we will have to go on raising the questions of the inadequacy of the surface fleet, the poor morale and the drop in manpower.

Hon. Members, not only on the Opposition Benches but also on the Government Benches, who have some affection and respect for the contribution that the Royal Navy makes to the country's defences, recognise that we have the wrong strategy and the wrong priorities. These in turn, cause some of our finest and most committed people to give up in disgust and disillusionment — something that we deplore.

§ Several Hon. Members

rose—

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I see that 20 or more hon. Members want to take part in the debate. Arithmetic suggests that if speeches average about 10 minutes we may avoid disappointments.

5.38 pm

§ Sir Antony Buck (Colchester, North)

I hope that the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) will forgive me if I do not go through what he has said in detail, but one thing I must say because he provoked me somewhat. He must recall the days when we Conservatives took over from the Labour Government and when service pay had sunk lamentably low. The lifeblood of our forces was being drained away, and applications for premature voluntary release were being made—as a former Navy Minister, perhaps I may be allowed this phrase—at a rate of knots.

The first thing that we did on coming to office was to deal with the pay of our armed forces. That at once stopped the outflow of what might have been described as middle management in the armed forces. Many chief petty officers, lieutenants and middle management were leaving, Admirals are important, but I think that all hon. Members would agree that the middle ranks are also vastly important. In the Army, sergeants, staff sergeants and captains are very important. It was the middle ranks who were leaving when we took office.

I am glad that the hon. Member for Clackmannan agrees. I find it a little rich that the hon. Gentleman should take us to task about a problem which has been dealt with in the past. I have every confidence that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will deal quickly with the matter if he thinks that the position is deteriorating. If not, it will be drawn to his attention by many of his hon. Friends and, I suspect, by Opposition Members. We will keep an eye on things to see that nothing too disastrous happens.

It is right and proper that we should continue to have single-service debates. Quite a few of us were worried about the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence when single-service Ministers were abolished. One thing which appeased us and led us not to take too strenuous a view against the reorganisation was that we were assured that time would be made available for the House to home in on each service. I am glad that the procedure has been adhered to. We can deal with matters of some detail though not the minutiae. What would not be appropriate in a two-day debate on the Defence White Paper is appropriate tonight. I welcome very much the fact that the debate is taking place.

1193 We are proud that the Royal Navy is the custodian of our independent deterrent. As long as we remain in government, that will be perpetuated by the D5 unless there is a major breakthrough in the arms reduction talks on both sides of the iron curtain. The chances are that we shall be going for the D5. I look forward to hearing later from the Front Bench, but I understand that we are getting the D5 for the Royal Navy for the same reasons as the Labour party updated the deterrent when it was in power.

The Labour Administration updated the Polaris weapons system by bringing in the Chevaline system. They did so without telling anyone. It is rich for Labour Members to talk sometimes about lack of open government when a former Labour Administration did that. Some of us got wind of it, but we thought that it was not appropriate to blow it because we agreed with what the Labour Government were doing. They had such trouble with some of their own supporters that if we had let it be known that they were updating the deterrent, they might have been forced not to do so. We had a shrewd idea about what was happening but, for patriotic reasons, we did not let it become public. Opposition Members should not criticise us for lack of open government when we consider their track record.

Sometimes people ask if our deterrent is independent. Of course it is. Once it is operational, the deployment of the boats will be under our control. It is appropriate that there should be full co-operation with our allies about deployment, but in the last resort it is an independent deterrent. It might be difficult to paint a scenario in which we would want to use it independently, but it is useful to have it under our control. It is another centre of decision making. The tough men of the Politburo might think that if they were to attack us our American allies would not come to our assistance. While we maintan the capability of inflicting unacceptable damage on the other side, that makes us all the more secure.

I know that the Royal Navy is proud to have the independent deterrent within its control. It will be updated by going for the D5. I hope that in the reply to the debate we will be given more detail about cost. It is considerable, but as a proportion of the Defence Estimates it is relatively small; its importance transcends the small portion of the defence Vote which is necessary.

That might be described as the top end of the Navy requirement. At the other end I should be interested to hear what my right hon. Friend has to say about the number of frigates. There seems to be a muddle about the numbers game. I am not good at numbers; I am rather a matches man. Like Randolph Churchill, every time I see a decimal point I think of those damned dots. Various numbers of frigates have been bandied about. I hope that my right hon. Friend will clear the matter up. The British Maritime League has circulated a document on the Defence Estimates in which it suggests that the total number of hulls is 46 and that it is expected to drop to 41 —far below the 50 major vessels about which we have had oft-repeated assurances. The surface fleet is of vast importance and my right hon. Friend should give us more information about it.

The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), a former Navy Minister, would have virtually done away with the surface fleet because he was hooked on the idea of the hunter-killer nuclear submarine as the 1194 battleship of tomorrow. We need a substantial surface fleet, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will tell us how many vessels he expects will be in service.

This is an occasion when we have the opportunity of mentioning the Royal Marines and their tremendous amphibious capability. They are deployed now, as they have been all along, in Northern Ireland. I think that 40 Commando has just gone there. It is appropriate in a Navy debate that we should pay tribute to what the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines do on the ground in Northern Ireland and what the Navy does through the Granada patrol which prevents gun-running into the Province.

Perhaps in his reply my right hon. Friend will deal, too, with the deployment of the Royal Marines on Carlingford lough, which is very important. That was suggested by some of us much earlier to stop gun-running across the lough. I understand that the ship that was there has recently been replaced. I hope that in his reply my right hon. Friend will tell us how the Royal Marines are operating in South Armagh, which is often known as cowboy country, and will update the position on the Granada patrol. In these debates we can deal in more detail with such matters than is appropriate on the Defence Estimates.

The royal naval school at Holbrook is not often mentioned in the House. I have had the privilege of being on the board for a considerable time. When I was a Navy Minister I was chairman of the governors on the board of management, on which I still serve, together with Opposition Members. I greatly admire that school, which vastly values its connection with the Royal Navy. It is valuable in providing recruits, although not in large numbers, and particularly in providing the children of seafaring folk with a good, sound and fairly robust education. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will have a word to say about that.

It has been suggested that that school should be co-educational, and I think that that would be a very good thing. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy), who is a former Navy Minister, shakes his head. I know that Opposition Members are deeply conservative about these matters. Unlike the hon. Gentleman, I believe in co-education. We have a very good school in Holbrook and it is right to pay tribute to the work that it does.

I promised that I would be relatively brief, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I end as I began, by paying tribute to the calibre of the personnel in the Royal Navy. Whenever I visit a frigate, shore establishment or the Royal Marines, I am amazed at the professionalism, keenness and pleasantness of the young men in our armed forces. One might argue that too high a proportion of our best young people go into the armed forces, but I would never deploy that argument. It is a fault for the good that so many high calibre young people go into the armed forces. I am glad that we can focus attention this afternoon on the Royal Navy, with which we are all very proud to be associated.

5.50 pm

§ Mr. Ted Garrett (Wallsend)

I am probably the only hon. Member to have been on two of Her Majesty's ships in the past two weeks. I refer to the visit to the Tyne of HMS Ark Royal, and, last weekend, HMS Illustrious. Both ships have completed their tour of duty in northern waters and are now making their way south for a short period of leave. I was impressed by the enthusiasm with which the ships were received on Tyneside. Swan Hunter, 1195 the prime shipbuilder in the country, North Tyneside borough council and the Tyne and Wear development corporation made arrangements to ensure that the ships came up the river and were berthed safely and that their crews enjoyed the traditional Tyneside hospitality.

It crossed my mind that in a year or so at least one of those ships would be coming up for a refit. I am sure that Swan Hunter will submit a tender if invited, and I hope that the Minister will consider that tender carefully. If he does, he will not only get the ship into the right place and a good job done on it at the right price but he will get it returned to the service in the time allocated.

The affection of the people in my region for the senior service has long been established. For generations, men have served on famous ships built in the region. Both HMS Ark Royal and HMS Illustrious were built on the Tyne, and when I made my layman's tour of inspection, both ships presented a clean and smart appearance. I shall not dwell on the subject of morale. All