4.16 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. David Mellor)

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

It is appropriate that we should be considering this Bill in what has been a very significant week for arms control, and for the development of East-West relations generally. As the House will be aware, the Bill was given its Second Reading on 22 October, and subsequently considered in Committee. The debate on 22 October and the Committee stage gave wide opportunities not only for discussion of the main provisions of the Bill, but for a wide-ranging review of arms control issues generally. I thank my colleagues on both sides of the Standing Committee for the insights and contributions that they made. I should particularly like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire, Moorlands (Mr. Knox) for his exemplary and good-humoured chairmanship of the Committee.

I am sure that the House will not want me to cover the same ground as my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State in his speech on 22 October. However, it might be appropriate briefly to recapitulate the purposes of the Bill. I hope after that, if it is consistent with the rules of order, to say a few words about the historic agreement on the removal of the INF missiles signed in Washington on Tuesday, to explain both the main provisions of the Bill as they affect the United Kingdom and how it may be employed to give effect to the INF treaty.

As it now stands, the Bill is intended to give effect to the outcome of last year's Stockholm conference on confidence building and disarmament in Europe. The conference called for privileges and immunities to be extended to inspectors carrying out on-site verification, and to observers invited to military exercises notified under the terms of the Stockholm document—which is itself a major confidence-building measure between East and West. We believe that it is a significant and rather underrated development.

The United Kingdom's representatives have carried out one inspection in the German Democratic Republic this year and have observed 15 exercises since the document was signed. Eight of those observations were in Warsaw pact countries and seven in other NATO countries.

For the first time, we had an opportunity to play host to observers from Stockholm signatory states, including all the Warsaw pact countries except Romania, during Exercise Purple Warrior in Scotland last month. The observation programme passed off smoothly and attracted compliments from East and West observers on the efficiency with which it was organised and on the commitment to openness and transparency that it demonstrated.

The Bill provides for privileges and immunities to be conferred by Order in Council, to give effect to arrangements superseding the Stockholm document or to furthering arms control and disarmament generally—for example, the INF agreement, to which I shall return in a moment.

The purpose of extending the Bill by Order in Council is to ensure that, so far as possible, we avoid the need for primary legislation each time there is a new arms control agreement. The verification arrangements of such agreements might involve the granting of privileges or immunities. I assure the House—I hope that I made this clear in Committee — that such extensions will be performed under the affirmative resolution procedure, which will give hon. Members a full opportunity to debate any order. I believe that that is a sensible way to proceed, and that it will reduce the administrative burden on the House.

A number of probing amendments were tabled in Committee, the effect of which would have been to limit the granting of privileges and immunities to the Stockholm document alone and require the introduction of fresh primary legislation every time that a new arms control agreement was implemented. I am pleased that, in the light of some discussions, sponsors of the amendments agreed to withdraw them. The fact that no further amendments were tabled on Report suggests that the framework that was set out in Committee is acceptable to the House. I am glad about that, as these issues should, so far as possible, not be the subject of partisan considerations but should command the confidence of everyone.

I should like to make one point clear. The Bill does not make any changes in the privileges and amenities that are given; they remain exactly as set out in the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. All it does is extend for a very brief period the category of people who are entitled to enjoy those privileges and immunities. In practice, this will have little effect on people who are here for a very short visit and very limited in numbers. For instance, under the Stockholm document, inspectors—a maximum of four per inspection team — and observers — a maximum of two per country — will enjoy, among other things, inviolability of the person, immunity from criminal jurisdiction and, with some minor exceptions, immunity from civil and administrative jurisdictions. Those privileges are enjoyed by diplomats who are currently accredited here. Many of those observing exercises in the United Kingdom — this was the case with Purple Warrior—will be service attaches accredited here. Many of the small Stockholm signatory countries send no observers at all.

In the case of inspectors, the time limits are clearly specified in the Stockholm document, and no inspection may last for longer than 48 hours. It is envisaged that inspectors will bring auxiliary personnel, as the British inspection team did when it went to the German Democratic Republic in September. Auxiliary personnel are equated with administrative and technical staff at diplomatic missions in London and will enjoy inviolability of the person and immunity from criminal jurisdiction. Such immunities will be limited to acts performed in the course of their duties.

In Committee, questions were asked about the hypothetical extension of the Bill to a range of potential arms control agreemens. I assured the Committee., and I repeat my assurance to the House, that at present we envisage the extension of the Bill to only the INF agreement, in so far as it affects United Kingdom territory. We intend to avail ourselves of clause 1, which provides for its application to other arms control agreements, in this respect. I am unable to tell the House precisely when we shall do that, because much will depend on the timing of the Bill's remaining stages, and other matters relating to the ratification of the INF treaty, which we hope will occur in the new year. I hope that it will be completed in time to allow an Order in Council to be tabled speedily. Indeed, we would want to table it before the treaty comes into force.

I said earlier that the INF agreement was signed on Tuesday after much painstaking negotiation and considerable difficulty. Despite the doubts of Left and Right, which were expressed at different times, the two super-powers have achieved what their negotiators have long had in their sights — the global elimination of United States' and Soviet longer and shorter range intermediate ground-based missiles.

Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton)

While the Minister is on this subject, will he say when the INF treaty will be available to the House? Is the text available now? Has the Minister seen a copy of it, and will it be available in the Library?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean)

Order. Before the Minister deals with that point, may I say that I am sure that he will bear in mind that his remarks must be related to the content of the Bill. We cannot broaden the Third Reading debate into a general debate, or anything like as wide a debate as we had on Second Reading.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Without intending any discourtesy to the Minister, surely what my hon. Friend has asked for is highly relevant. The Bill confers privileges and immunities on Soviet inspectors who will be coming here in fulfilment of the provisions of the treaty. If we are conferring privileges and immunities on foreign inspectors coming to Britain, to the constituency of, among others, the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson), surely we have a right to see the text of the treaty under which the Bill will confer privileges and immunities? Surely, therefore, it is highly relevant to this narrow Third Reading debate to ask to see the treaty?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I wanted to remind the House that the debate cannot be broadened to a general debate on the treaty; it must relate to what is in the Bill. I have heard nothing out of order yet, but I thought that it might be helpful to fire a warning shot.

Mr. Mellor

The principal treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States was signed on Tuesday. The basing country agreement between the United States and Britain regarding inspections on United Kingdom territory at the two areas where missiles are deployed will be signed tomorrow. Subsequently, a document between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union will have to be signed, whereby the Soviet Union will agree to abide by the arrangements that have been entered into, and that will not be done for some time. With regard to the first two documents, we shall make them available as soon as we have clean texts. We have copies of the text, but they are not in clean form.

We have been kept in touch with the drafting as it has gone on, and as I have explained to the hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson), all the arrangements affecting the United Kingdom had to be cleared with us before they were accepted. A clean copy of the treaty in proper form will be deposited as soon as possible. —[Interruption.] I am sorry that the hon. Member for Hamilton finds this funny. It is typical of the hon. Gentleman to start carping on a day when all of us—

Mr. Robertson

Don't be rude.

Mr. Mellor

It is all very well the hon. Gentleman telling me not to be rude; it is like the kettle calling the pot black. This treaty should be a cause for rejoicing. We have no interest in keeping it a secret document, and when we have a proper copy of the text available from Washington it will be disclosed. At the moment, copies come in the form of diplomatic telegrams of a kind that we would not wish to deposit in the House of Commons. A proper copy will come very quickly, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no great secret that he needs to have uncovered.

Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli)

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Mellor

In a moment.

Mr. Davies

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Mellor

In a moment.

Mr. Davies

On the same point—

Mr. Mellor

In a moment. I have told the right hon. Gentleman that I shall give way when I choose and not when he stands at the Dispatch Box, in breach of the rules of order of the House, and shouts at me. I shall make my point and then, if the right hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene, I shall give way—but not before.

As we intend to introduce an Order in Council that would permit inspectors diplomatic immunities and privileges under the Bill, pursuant to their work on the INF treaty, I shall give some details of the verification arrangements as they will affect the United Kingdom, if right hon. and hon. Members on the Labour Front Bench will permit me to do so.

Mr. Davies

The hon. and learned Gentleman talks of verification arrangements. Will the note agreed between the United States and the United Kingdom set out the number of cruise missiles at Greenham Common and the number to be removed? The Minister will have seen the report in today's Independent, which seems to give the impression that there are more cruise missiles at Greenham Common than the Government knew about. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman tell the House the figures? Are there 24 launchers and 96 missiles, or 29 launchers and 101 missiles? How many missiles and launchers are there at Greenham Common and how many will be removed?

Mr. Mellor

That is well wide of the mark, and I shall not deal with that point. I think that I have the assent of the Chair in saying that. The Bill deals with privileges and immunities for inspections. There will be draw-down arrangements to provide for the missiles to be removed at a certain period. I am not here to answer Ministry of Defence questions about how many missiles there are. The right hon. Gentleman, who purports to be shadow Secretary of State for Defence, knows that that is a Ministry of Defence matter and not a Foreign Office matter.

Mr. Davies

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Mellor

I shall not give way. The right hon. Gentleman can stand there till doomsday and I shall not give way. The right hon. Gentleman knows that, if he wants that information, he must seek it in a proper way and not from a Foreign Office Minister speaking on a quite different matter.

The INF' treaty has proved that to negotiate from strength and maintain Alliance solidarity is the way to achieve arms control agreements. The agreement has established the principle of asymmetrical reductions —heavily asymmetrical, as it turns out—with the Soviet Union coming down from much higher levels. It will eliminate the threat of SS20s, SS 12s and SS22s to our cities and airfields. For the first time in the nuclear age, nuclear weapons will be reduced. The verification regime is the most stringent to be put in place by any arms control agreement so far and will set new standards for future agreements. The inclusion of on-site inspection represents a considerable breakthrough. If it is faithfully implemented, the agreement will help to build up the trust between East and West without which no lasting improvement in relations is possible.

I come to the verification regime, which we hope the House will permit to take place under the privileges and immunities set out in the Bill. How will the INF inspection regime affect the United Kingdom? The details of the inspection arrangements, which are the same for all the countries concerned, whether they are associated with United States or Soviet Union INF facilities, are set out in an inspection protocol appended to the principal treaty. As I said, tomorrow in Brussels the United Kingdom, along with other basing countries, will sign a basing country agreement with the United States. This will establish the practical procedures and provisions necessary to enable the United States to discharge its obligations under the treaty in respect of facilities not on United States territory.

Under the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union, which will be signed shortly after the basing country agreement, the United Kingdom will grant the Soviet Union the right to conduct inspections on United Kingdom territory. In return, the Soviet Union will undertake to comply with United Kingdom laws and procedures, thus establishing the triangular nature of the legal relationship which is crucial to the respect for United Kingdom sovereignty which we wish to maintain, as well as playing our full part in—

Mr. Denzil Davies

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Mellor

The right hon. Gentleman is being grotesquely discourteous. He is not even allowing me to finish my sentence.

Mr. Davies

It is a simple point.

Mr. Mellor

Any question that the right hon. Gentleman asks is likely to be simple, but that does not mean that I wish to give way to answer it.

The basing country agreement and the exchange of notes will guarantee the United Kingdom direct powers to ensure observance of United Kingdom laws and sovereignty, and any future changes in these arrangements that affect the United Kingdom will not be agreed by the United States without our prior approval.

Mr. Denzil Davies

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Mellor

Before I give way to the right hon. Gentleman, let me say this. Throughout the Second Reading debate we were pestered to give details of the verification arrangements under the treaty. I was unable to give the House those details, for the perfectly straightforward reason that the treaty had not been concluded. Now that it has been concluded, and I am giving the details, we have these monkey-house noises from Opposition Members who have no desire to listen but who are interested only in making their own debating points gleaned from a 15-minute reading on the tube of the latest wild speculations in today's newspapers. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to reveal more of his morning reading, I shall give way to him.

Mr. Davies

I do not know why the Minister is being so tetchy. I was merely going to ask him whether the treaty or the basing agreement to be signed by Britain and the United States — I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman has seen the treaty—sets out the number of missiles and launchers at Greenham Common and therefore the number to be removed. Does the treaty say that?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I do not want to be difficult with the House, but it is my job to see that the rules are observed. I am sure that the Minister will bear in mind the scope of the Bill in answering the question that has been put to him. Mr. Mellor.

Mr. Mellor

Mr. Deputy Speaker—

Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth will be dealt with in the verification proposals in the treaty, so they are perfectly within the scope of this discussion.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

That is not the subject of the Bill. We had better get on with the debate.

Mr. Kaufman

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. It would be better if the House left it to me to judge whether remarks are in order.

Mr. Kaufman

Further to the point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. However brief the debate may turn out to be, it is important for us to clarify at the outset the limits within which it can take place. As I said on an earlier point of order, the Bill confers diplomatic privileges and immunities on Soviet inspectors who are to come here. The Soviet inspectors will operate with the privileges and immunities conferred by the Bill, but under the terms of two documents, and it is impossible for us to debate the Bill adequately without discussing those documents, which the Minister alluded to but which are not available to the House. We are being asked to provide powers on which no satisfactory information is available.

One of the two documents to which the Minister referred is the inspection protocol. We are dealing with privileges and immunities to be conferred on inspectors. I do not begin to see how we can adequately debate a Bill under which we are to confer powers under an inspection protocol, not one word of which is available to this House. Furthermore, the Minister said that tomorrow the United Kingdom would be one of a number of countries signing a basing country agreement. That basing country agreement will affect the soil of this country. It will affect two constituencies. One is that of the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) and the other is the constituency of the Chief Secretary. Yet we are asked to confer powers, as a Parliament, under a basing agreement—

Mr. Mellor

No, we are not.

Mr. Kaufman

Yes, we are. This is Parliament. We are asked to confer diplomatic privileges and immunities. It is Parliament that is doing this, not the Government. We are still a parliamentary democracy. We are being asked to do that, and those powers will be conferred under a basing country agreement. That is an agreement to which the Government are a direct signatory. Yet there again we do not know the agreement under which we are conferring the powers.

It seems to me that the debate ought not to proceed in this way, because we are being deprived of important material in which we are conferring powers.

Mr. Mellor

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean)

Is it further to the point of order of the right hon. Member? If not, let me answer the right hon. Gentleman's point.

The right hon. Gentleman has really answered his own point, in the first part of his point of order, when he said that he conceded that this debate is comparatively narrow, in that it deals with the powers of the inspectors and the extension of those powers. Of course, it would be appropriate for passing reference to be made to the documents in the context of this debate, but it would not be in order for the details of the document to be debated on the Third Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Kaufman

I am grateful for your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but your response highlights the problem. We cannot refer to the details of the documents, since no one on the Opposition Benches has seen a word of them.

Mr. Denzil Davies

The Minister will not even answer questions on them.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I think that it would be better to let the Minister get on with his speech.

Mr. Mellor

If I may say to the right hon. Gentleman, I assume, having great respect for him, that this is a deliberate rather than an accidental misunderstanding of the situation. The point that he put to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, is wholly erroneous. The Bill as drafted deals only with allowing inspectors and observers under the Stockholm arrangements the privileges and immunities confirmed by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. Any subsequent privileges and immunities to be granted will only be granted by permission of the House once an Order in Council has been laid and an affirmation resolution has been sought from the House.

If it be objected that the privileges and immunities sought in relation to the intermediate nuclear force treaty arrangements are wrong, the proper time to make that point is when the affirmative resolution is debated in the House.

Mr. Kaufman

rose—

Mr. Mellor

In just a moment.

Here one sees the error into which one falls if one tries to be accommodating in one's approach to debates in this Chamber at the request of the Opposition. When initially we sought in Committee simply to deal with the Stockholm arrangements, on the proper basis that other future arms control agreements lay outside the immediate scope of the Bill and that parliamentary procedure was provided for that to be done, that was regarded as unhelpful, a bad spirit developed in the Committee and in the end we agreed, with the kind permission of the Chairman, to be allowed to discuss in little modules wider arms control matters within the context of the privileges and immunities that might in future be granted under this Bill.

In that same spirit, although the Bill as it passes into law will confer no rights or entitlements whatever on any inspector who might be appointed under a treaty that has yet to be ratified and will not come into force for a number of months, I thought that it would be helpful to the House to have an opportunity of setting out, since it would be our intention to use the Order in Council procedure provided for under this Bill in due time, so that inspectors might enjoy privileges and immunities when going about the business of the INF treaty inspection, to give details of the arrangements.

Instead, we find ourselves plunged into an even worse thicket, in which an attempt is made to suggest that we are now taking the debate forward without documents being available. This is the logic of the asylum, not of a parliamentary Chamber.

Mr. Kaufman

May I make it clear to the hon. and learned Gentleman that I do not criticise him for the way in which he has come equipped to the debate this afternoon. I think that he has been placed in an extremely unfortunate position because he has been asked to request the House to give a Third Reading to a Bill two days after one of the agreements which will trigger off the Order in Council procedure. Without in any way belittling the hon. and learned Gentleman— I have regard for him, as he knows — the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ought to have come here this afternoon in order to present to the country, on the first available occasion, his thoughts as Secretary of State on how this Bill will operate. I say that in no way belittling the hon. and learned Gentleman. This is a very important debate, despite either the length of the Bill or the length of the debate.

Mr. Mellor

I am grateful for the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman makes his point. I am happy to say that my right hon. and learned Friend has the same confidence in me that the right hon. Gentleman has been kind enough to express. Be that as it may, I want to assure the House that all the arrangements pursuant to the Stockholm agreement are in the public domain. That is the area in which privileges and immunities are directly conferred by the Bill as drafted. Any matters that need to be considered, that are novel in relation to the INF agreement, can be considered when the affirmative resolution procedures come to the House. In the interests of preparing the ground for that, I am happy, consistent with the rules of order, to give such information as I can about the nature of the inspection regime. I was beginning to do so when we were taken into the interesting highways and byways that we have been following for the past few minutes.

Going back to an earlier point, the INF treaty itself will provide for the draw-down over a three-year period of all intermediate-range missiles, including those stationed at Greenham Common and Molesworth. Some six flights, consisting of 96 missiles, will be removed from Greenham and one flight consisting of 12 missiles from Molesworth. It is these two sites in the United Kingdom which will be liable to inspections, and these are the United States-operated facilities that I have already mentioned.

Under the terms of the treaty all the cruise missiles—I have given the numbers—will be eliminated within three years of the treaty coming into force.

There will be four types of inspection at Greenham Common and Molesworth. First of all, there will be a baseline inspection between 30 and 90 days of the treaty's entering into force, to verify the data exchange; secondly, there can be short-notice challenge inspections until missiles are eliminated, and inspections in the United Kingdom will be part of an annual quota of 20 such inspections in the three years of the elimination period; thirdly, close-out inspections, when all missiles have been eliminated; and, fourthly, continuing short-notice challenge inspections for 10 years after the end of the three-year period — in other words, extremely rigorous verification. It is, therefore, a period of 13 years altogether.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury)

I understand from the details of the treaty which are published in The Daily Telegraph today that there is to be a special verification commission. Will that come within the remit of this Bill, and will its members be able to come to any of the Royal Air Force bases in the United Kingdom that may be involved if there were a dispute over the question of verification?

Mr. Mellor

As I understand the position—but I will write to my hon. Friend in more detail on this point—the purpose of the commission is to ensure that these arrangements are carried through smoothly, and all relevant assistance will be given to those who need to do that. Precise details of this, of course, and the arrangements under which they would come here remain to be worked out.

I should just like to make one point in relation to what I said about the flights at Molesworth. Contrary to what I said, it is 16 missiles at Molesworth, not 12.

Mr. Kaufman

As the hon. and learned Gentleman has had to correct himself, it would be helpful if, for the sake of clarity and for the information of the people in the country, he will tell us how many missiles will be removed from each site.

Mr. Mellor

I gave the figures and I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman, who either interrupts and ask questions or jibbers from a sedentary position, seems determined to be profoundly unhelpful. It is not a convincing performance. Ninety-six missiles will be removed from Greenham Common and 16 from Molesworth.

So far as the last category of short-notice inspections is concerned, there is an overall annual quota of 15 Soviet inspections for the first five years after elimination and 10 for the next five years. No more than 50 per cent. of the inspections can be made in any one basing country.

All inspections in the United Kingdom will begin with the arrival of a Soviet aircraft at RAF Greenham Common, and a maximum of 10 Soviet inspectors will be involved.

There are strict time limits. A single inspection could last for up to 90 hours from entry into the United Kingdom to departure, but most will be shorter than this. United Kingdom authorities will be informed immediately by the United States of Soviet requests for inspection. As little as one hour's notice will be given to clear a Soviet flight plan. How soon after this Soviet inspectors will arrive will depend on the point of their departure. United Kingdom and United States officials will jointly meet the aircraft carrying the Soviet inspection team and will form part of a permanent escort of Soviet inspectors during the period of inspection.

All inspection personnel will require United Kingdom visas. Inspectors will be drawn from a list approved in advance, about which the United Kingdom will be consulted. United Kingdom customs procedures will apply at the point of entry and British officials will then join their United States counterparts in examining equipment introduced for the purposes of inspections, to ensure that it is within the agreed limit.

Mr. Cohen

rose—

Mr. Mellor

I shall not give way to the hon. Gentleman.

While carrying out their inspection duties, the inspection personnel will be granted privileges and immunities. It is for this purpose that the Government will seek an Order in Council to apply the terms of the Bill to INF inspectors. These privileges and immunities will be consistent with, and in some respects more limited than, those granted by the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations of April 1964, and they will be set out in an annex to the basing country agreement, which will be made available to the House shortly, together with the INF treaty and protocols and the United Kingdom-Soviet exchange of notes.

Although the negotiations are behind us, we cannot, nor should we, put the INF agreement out of our minds. It must be ratified by the United States Senate. We Europeans must leave the United States Congress in no doubt about our support. It must be implemented and the verification provisions must be shown to work. We and he other European basing countries will be closely involved in this. This process will provide the backdrop to future arms control negotiations. We hope that this will cover 50 per cent. reductions in strategic weapons, eliminating the conventional imbalance and achieving a global ban on chemical weapons.

The Government hope that the INF agreement signals a sea change in the prospects for realistic, multilateral, verifiable disarmament. We shall play our part in ensuring that the opportunities offered by it are exploited to the full. Successful arms control can help to build trust and confidence between East and West. Verification of arms control arrangements through on-site inspection is a tangible piece of glasnost. The Bill will facilitate this and I have no hestitation in commending it warmly to the House in the hope that it will receive a speedy passage in the other place.

4.55 pm
Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton)

I apologise to the House because, if the debate goes beyond 6 pm, I shall be unable to remain for the closing stages. I have to take part in a public encounter with the right hon. Member for Chingford (Mr. Tebbit), during which we shall no doubt discuss the Bill.

I repeat, in the same spirit in which I made an earlier intervention, that it is wrong that the Foreign Secretary is not here to tell the House how the Bill will operate under the INF treaty. It is particularly offensive because he has distributed to every hon. Member a letter, via the Letter Board, in which he talks about making an early statement. This letter is the early statement. It is offensive to the House of Commons that the Foreign Secretary should write a circular letter to individual Members of Parliament, rather than stand at the Dispatch Box and answer questions across the Floor of the House, which is what parliamentary democracy is about.

The Minister has given us some details of the verification procedures under which the inspectors will be operating, under the privileges and immunities conferred by the Bill. It is a long-term piece of legislation, even under the first of the Orders in Council. Ten years plus three years makes 13 years, which will take us into the 21st century. If we get a strategic arms reduction treaty within the next few months, as all hon. Members hope, that will be taken further as the verification proceeds and as more inspectors are given the privileges and immunities under the Bill to carry out that verification.

We are not being provided with the information required to debate the Bill adequately. The Minister has told us how many missiles will be moved from Greenham Common and Molesworth. He has had to correct himself, although I do not blame him for that. On a matter such as this, the Minister must be briefed, and there was a mistake in the briefing which aroused some uncertainty about the accuracy of the material. Several newspapers —I have here The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph—make estimates about the number of missiles.

The Bill will be enacted by Parliament and will operate on our soil—that is particularly true in the cases of the two constituencies involved which are represented by Conservative Members — yet we were given the information about the number of missiles to be inspected under the scope of the Bill after the Soviet Union had been given the information. It is unacceptable that a foreign country, involved in a treaty to which we are not party, should be given information about how the Bill will work before the House of Commons, which is being asked to enact the measure, receives such information.

Until the Secretary of State for Defence told the House the other day, we did not know that there were missiles at Molesworth which will be inspected. The Soviet Union knew about that before the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, into whose constituency these missiles were surreptitiously slipped. It is not possible for the House properly to debate the Bill. As a Parliament, we are making a law and conferring powers on people from overseas who will be given privileges. It is totally unacceptable that we should be asked to debate a Bill without simple statistical material being given to Parliament before it is given to the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, I say again, as I said on a point of order when I intervened in the Minister's speech, we are conferring privileges and immunities which will operate under the Bill. The Minister is mistaken in saying that they will operate under the order and that therefore we have no locus to debate that today, because the order-making power is made by clause 1(2) of the Bill. Until we pass the Bill and until it is given Royal Assent, no order-making power will be available. That being so, for us to discuss what will happen under an order which the Minister has already said the Government intend to make under the Bill when it is enacted is germane to our discussion. Therefore, the Government should have postponed this debate for a few days so that we could have had the two key documents — the inspection protocol under the treaty, and the basing country agreement.

The Minister says that there is not a clean text, but there is a text of the treaty which contains, or has added to it, the protocol under which the Bill will be triggered. Before the Bill came before the House of Commons for Third Reading, the Government should at any rate have laid the inspection protocol before the House so that we might know under what terms the privileges and immunities will be conferred.

The Minister said that later this week the Government will sign the one document to which they are a party—the basing country agreement. I say again, these privileges and immunities are being conferred under the Bill in accordance with the basing country agreement, to which the Government will be a signatory. The Government must surely have that document in their possession. It must have gone through the Ministers' boxes and through the Prime Minister's box. I cannot imagine that such a major agreement would not have been thoroughly inspected throughout the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister's Private Office and the Cabinet Office. I cannot imagine that it has not been available for weeks now. It may not have been available in final form, but the drafts must have been going through those various offices. It is unacceptable that we should confer on people from other countries powers to carry out inspections in constituencies represented by Members of the House without our being able to see the basing country agreement under which they will operate.

Mr. Mellor

I do not want to spoil the right hon. Gentleman's debating point. I simply say to him again that no power is provided in the Bill until an Order in Council is laid and until there is a debate in the House and an affirmative resolution is passed. By that time, all the documents will be available. I am sorry to disappoint the right hon. Gentleman on one matter. It is right that at every material point the text, as it affects the United Kingdom, has been subject to the most scrupulous examination, but the idea that a clean, or even a substantial, copy of the treaty must be available for weeks is wide of the mark. The negotiators were working until the day before the treaty was signed and completed, and that is the basis upon which all this has been done. As I made clear in Committee, it was a race against time to finish it. When the clean text is available, it will be shown to the House. The right hon. Gentleman is sufficiently good at finding good points that he does not need to dwell on what I am afraid is a bad one.

Mr. Kaufman

It is a bad point only because the Minister misheard what I said. I was not talking about the treaty. Clearly the treaty has not gone through all those offices and been gone over in the way that I described—although I would have hoped that the Prime Minister might have had a peek at it before she entertained Mr. Gorbachev. I hope that she saw the treaty before she saw the lunch menu at Brize Norton.

I was referring not to the treaty but to the basing country agreement — the document to which either the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Defence, or possibly both, will append their signatures. That document must have been going through the Government machine for weeks. If it was not, the Government were damed irresponsible in not looking at it carefully since it relates to activities that will take place in Britain. That document, to which the Government are a party, should have come before the House of Commons and it should have been on the Table for us to see before the debate started.

Mr. Mellor

The right hon. Gentleman is not doing himself justice. How can we lay before the House a document that has not yet been signed? He suggests that the basing country agreement has an existence independent of the principal treaty. That is true only in part. Of course, the basic formulation—the content—does not relate — [Interruption.] May I have the right hon. Gentleman's attention? It is difficult for him to hear what I say and for me to say what I want to say if I am subject to constant interruption. The right hon. Gentleman, as I know well enough after four years at the Home Office, does not need that much briefing.

The basing country agreement is available and known in its bare form, but its contents follow the contents of the inspection protocol, which is part of the principal document. Therefore, the basing country agreement cannot he concluded before the principal agreement and its inspection protocol are completed. All those arrangements fall together.

I am saying this in order to be helpful. If the only consequence is to stir up further recriminations, I shall not trouble further. In the hope that the right hon. Gentleman is concerned about the reality, I can tell him that he will get the document at the earliest opportunity, and that can only be after it has been signed tomorrow.

Mr. Kaufman

It is not satisfactory that the House of Commons should see a document, which is not controversial, only after it has been signed. The House of Commons has been asked before now to give its assent to treaties. It is a peculiar proposition that only when the Government have signed something should the sovereign Parliament of Britain be allowed— [Interruption] —Parliament is sovereign—to have a glimpse of it.

I had better explain this clearly to the Minister. He talks as though the order to which he refers with regard to clause 1(2) is an entity, complete, entire and free-standing. It is not. It is a subordinate piece of legislation made under the Bill when it becomes an Act and which cannot be made until that time. Therefore, it is completely relevant for us to refer to the potential content of an order which can be made only when the Bill receives Royal Assent.

I say this to the Government, I say it to the Minister, and I wish that I could say it to the Foreign Secretary who, I repeat, should be here. The Opposition completely support the Bill. There is no problem about it going through the House and there is no problem about it going through the House of Lords when it has completed its stages here. On the other hand, in so far as we are referring to the order-making power under subsection (2) with regard to this week's INF agreement, the Bill will not be triggered until the United States Senate has ratified the treaty. That means that, although we are perfectly happy to facilitate the Bill's passage, there is no tumbling hurry. The Bill could easily have been debated in the first week back after Christmas, when we would have had the relevant documents. As I said, the Government have seriously mishandled the matter. In addition, they have created a difficult position for the House of Commons.

I agree with the Minister when he praises the agreement. As I said on Second Reading, it is the most hopeful development for humankind since the atom bomb was exploded at Los Alamos in 1945. The Government are trying to dodge the implications of the agreement under which the Bill will operate. It is totally absurd for the Minister, and for the Foreign Secretary in his word-processed letter, to claim that somehow or other, what they call the twin-track approach is responsible for the treaty under which the Bill will be brought into action. The idea that the Russians are so terrified of 400 cruise missiles that they are ready to destroy 1,600 missiles gives us a very interesting sidelight on what the Government believe is the Russian inferiority complex. If the Russians have such an inferiority complex, I do not understand why the Government are so afraid of them. If the agreement under which the Bill is to operate were a tit-for-tat agreement, an agreement to destroy 400 for 400, or 1,600 for 1,600, the Government might have had some claim that the twin-track route had worked.

The agreement that will be policed in Britain under the Bill is a tribute to the good sense of the United States and the Soviet Union coming to a rational agreement that will benefit all. It has nothing to do with the Government allowing cruise missiles openly into Greenham Common and secretly into Molesworth. The Government had better get off the silly point—the only point on which they can hang their hat—of trying to pretend that somehow or other they had any role, except as a bystander, in an agreement under which the Bill will allow foreign observers and inspectors to come to Britain.

We are delighted that that is happening, but the fact that it is happening owes nothing whatsoever to the policies of the Government. Indeed, we all know that if the Prime Minister had had her way, she would have stopped the agreement coming into force.

We have been discussing properly the consequences for the implementation of the Bill of this week's INF agreement. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union are this week in Washington — to our great satisfaction—continuing discussions which we all hope — and there seems to be a reasonable amount of optimism — will lead to a 50 per cent. reduction in strategic nuclear weapons—a giant step forward — in addition to the modest but epoch-making step forward which occurred this week.

Of course, the provisions of the Bill will stand to he implemented again if there is a START agreement, because the inspectors will be coming — with their privileges and immunities—under a separate and much wider arrangement. We have to consider the implications of a START agreement, in view of the fact that, under such an agreement, the Soviet inspectors will also be given the opportunity to come here. They cannot inspect Polaris, because Polaris is an independent British deterrent. We own the warheads and the missiles and we are capable of servicing them.

That will not be the case under the Trident agreement, because we will not own the Trident missiles. They will come from a pool at King's Bay, Gerogia. There will be implications for inspection if the United States reduces the number of its Trident missiles in King's Bay, Georgia, because such an inspection will include the inspection of our missiles when they go back for servicing. Even though we will not be a party to the agreement, the missiles which we are leasing from the United States for seven to eight years will go back to the pool at King's Bay, Georgia.

If the Soviet Union and the United States come to an agreement under which those missiles are reduced by half —as we all pray they will—the missiles temporarily in the possession of the United Kingdom, as our independent nuclear deterrent, will be subject to inspection at King's Bay, Georgia, under powers parallel to those in the Bill. That demonstrates the total emptiness and hypocrisy of the Government when they claim that the successor to Polaris will be an independent deterrent. It will be part of the American deterrent, which we will be allowed to borrow temporarily at a cost of £10 billion to the British taxpayer, and which, of course, we will never be able to use independently, if there is ever the folly for it to be used at all.

The Prime Minister is obsessed with the possession of nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union and the United States sensibly acknowledge the destructiveness of possessing such weapons. She is now a unilateral nuclear armer when the Soviet Union and the United States are becoming nucler disarmers—and all praise to them.

Although the Bill and the powers conferred by it demonstrate that the Government are merely spectators of the marvellous process that is taking place in the world they are in no way activists, catalysts or assistants to it.

Mr. Mellor

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kaufman

No. These are my last two sentences and it will spoil the flow of my speech.

Although the Government demonstrate that they are out of step and out of date, in terms of world processes, the Bill fits well into the policies that the Labour party will be advocating throughout this Parliament and at the next general election. That is why we wholeheartedly welcome it.

5.16 pm
Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury)

I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), for whom I have considerable respect, finds it so difficult to give more than a grudging welcome to the Bill, which is such a vital accompaniment to the INF treaty which marks the first reduction in nuclear weapons in the history of the world since 1945. Although it is a small Bill, in its own way it is extremely important. Since you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, have allowed the debate to go a little wider than the Bill itself, perhaps you will allow me to go a little wider, to the extent of putting my remarks into a context for which I believe the Bill allows.

I wish to remind the House that on 18 June 1980 the then Secretary of State for Defence told the House that cruise missiles were to be deployed at RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth as NATO's response to the Soviet Union's deployment of SS20 missiles, and to the threat that those arms posed to Western European security.

On 15 November 1983, the first cruise missiles arrived at Greenham. Throughout the four years that have elapsed since then, the Government, their defence policy and my constituents have been under almost continuous attack from the Opposition, from CND and from those women who describe themselves as Greenham peace women, who have had a squalid encampment at Greenham Common regardless of the nuisance that they knew they were causing to my constituents. Those three groups — the Opposition, CND and the Greenham peace women —have tried to inform the nation that they are the people who care about peace, disarmament and humanity.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I have allowed the hon. Member a preamble, but he must now relate his remarks to the Bill.

Mr. McNair-Wilson

I was about to do that, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Those groups argued that we on these Benches and our American and NATO allies were the warmongers determined to maintain the arms race. Today, four years later, the Government have brought forward the Arms Control and Disarmament (Privileges and Immunities) Bill for its Third Reading.

The Third Reading comes at a fortunate time, because it means that the INF treaty, can be implemented as soon as it is ratified by the United States Senate and the Supreme Soviet, and that those who are to be authorised observers for the Soviet Union will have diplomatic immunity to enable them to discharge their duties. As a result of the Bill and the INF treaty, we in west Berkshire will no doubt be welcoming Russian personnel, as we have welcomed American service men, on the same basis as we accepted cruise missiles — to play our part in maintaining the peace and security of Europe.

As I understand it from the outline of the INF treaty printed in today's Daily Telegraph—nobody has suggested that that outline is inaccurate — under article 11 observers will be arriving at RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth within 30 days, and not later than 90 days, after the treaty comes into force. The outline of the treaty in the Daily Telegraph states: each party shall have the right to mount 20 inspections a year in the first three years, 15 in the next five and 10 in the last five. Since the article also states that the right to inspect applies not only to Molesworth and Greenham Common, but to support facilities — and clearly effective verification must involve those facilities—can my hon. and learned Friend give any indication of how many establishments in the United Kingdom are likely to be involved? Will all those who come from the Soviet Union be accompanied wherever they go by RAF personnel?

The Bill refers to inspectors, observers and auxiliary personnel, all of whom will enjoy diplomatic privilege. My hon. and learned Friend the Minister seemed to suggest that that would not mean an increase in Soviet personnel in the United Kingdom who enjoy diplomatic immunity. Has the Soviet embassy stated whether it will want to increase its staff by the numbers suggested in the Stockholm agreement, or are all observers, inspectors and auxiliary personnel to be flown in and out to perform their verification duties without any long-term residence in the United Kingdom? Perhaps that last question is peripheral to the Bill.

Nobody will argue that effective verification is anything but essential to the INF agreement. The Bill shows that the United Kingdom is willing to play a full part in that. It will involve Soviet inspections of INF missile deployment sites in the United Kingdom, and it underlines the fact that the Government are working in close consultation with the United States. The United States will be responsible to the Soviet Union for obligations in the treaty, but United Kingdom sovereignty and security will be fully respected through the agreements with the United States and the Soviet Union to which my hon. and learned Friend referred.

I said that the Bill was an essential accompaniment to the INF arms agreement. We all appreciate that that arms agreement is a good deal for NATO. We will lose missiles and launchers capable of delivering fewer than 400 warheads. The Soviet Union will surrender similar systems capable of delivering almost 1,600 warheads. We will accomplish more than we set out to accomplish when we demanded in 1979 that the Soviets withdraw their SS20s from Europe.

In addition, the Bill provides for effective verification, including, for the first time, on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. Because the INF treaty requires the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, verification will he made easier. The treaty and the Bill vindicate the difficult decision to deploy intermediate range missiles taken by NATO in 1979. It will prove conclusively that strength, not appeasement, influences Soviet behaviour. As such, it should guide Western defence strategy and serve as a model for future arms negotiations. I commend the Bill and its intentions.

5.24 pm
Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton)

I welcome the Bill, as do hon. Members on both sides of the House. I thank the Minister for his co-operation. After the first session in Committee, at which we had to force information out of him by long speeches, he did co-operate and gave many details to the Committee about the various stages of negotiations as they were taking place. He gave the Committee and the House some worthwhile information.

The Bill is about privileges and immunities for Soviet inspectors who, will inspect INF missile sites on United Kingdom territory. You said earlier, Mr. Deputy Speaker —I noted it down—that it would he all right to make a passing reference to the INF document. In my preamble I should like to make some reference to that document, which was signed in Washington by the United States and Soviet Union.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I did say that, but the emphasis was very much on the word "passing".

Mr. Cohen

Yes, indeed.

The treaty is a welcome beginning. The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence sent a joint letter to all hon. Members prior to this debate, obviously to influence the debate. In that letter they call the treaty a historic agreement because for the first time ever the number of nuclear weapons in the world will be reduced by treaty. We are not sure of the figures, but I believe that the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons will be reduced by between 3 and 7 per cent. That is a welcome start, but we have to move on to further reductions, not increases.

The Minister and the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) said that the agreement came from strength. I do not believe that. The agreement came about for various reasons. One of those reasons was overkill. There is a vast number of nuclear weapons in the world. I believe that there are 60,000 with a capacity that greatly exceeds that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Another reason is the pressure applied by the peace movement and the Greenham peace women. They have applied continual pressure on Governments, to which they have had to respond. Another reason is the over-stretched and crumbling economy of the Soviet Union and the West. There is pressure on those economies mainly because of the burden of defence spending.

The joint letter from the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence says that the agreement shows the possibility of negotiating an effective means of checking that neither party to an arms agreement is able to cheat. That is right. Verification is about checking to ensure that there is no cheating. Therefore, I welcome the rigorous verification process. It is the most rigorous that we have yet seen in an international agreement. However, I should like to see more details about that process.

The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence referred in their letter to cheating. It is important that neither the Soviet Union nor the West cheats on the agreement. As has been said, the Bill facilitates the INF agreement. Therefore, it was disturbing to see the Secretary of State for Defence at Monterey looking for ways around the treaty, for compensatory measures, and for what the Prime Minister calls modernisation, but which is really an increase in nuclear weaponry outside the INF agreement. Cheating is outside the spirit of the INF agreement.

The Secretary of State for Defence had meetings with his French counterpart to consider the Eurobomb. The Eurobomb would be a worrying development, and I hope that the Government will not go along with it.

The Secretaries of State were right to talk about cheating in the context of the Bill. I hope that the verification process, especially with the use of satellites and other high technology, will stop cheating. But cheating will stop if both sides approach the matter in the spirit that brought about the agreement in the first place.

The Minister mentioned the 96 missiles at Greenham Common and the 16 missiles at Molesworth. I understand that many missiles, particularly those at Molesworth, were installed only last week. They were rushed in so that they would be in place before the INF agreement was signed. That was wrong and a waste of money. I asked a question about the cost of Molesworth and Greenham to NATO and the British Government. The figure is £174 million. What a monstrous waste of money. Missiles have been at Greenham for only four years.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman is straying wide of the Third Reading debate. He was addressing his remarks to inspections and inspectors" powers. He is straying from that matter now. He must refer to the Bill.

Mr. Cohen

The point that I want to make is that the missiles at Greenham and Molesworth, which are subject to verification and inspection by Soviet inspectors, will be in place for a maximum of another three years. I put it to the Minister that they should be taken out as soon as possible to prevent the waste of any more money. The Government are just throwing money down the drain.

I wished to raise a matter by way of intervention, but the Minister would not allow me to do so because he was concluding his remarks. He referred to the lists of inspectors, over which Her Majesty's Government will have a say. That remark raised a serious worry. Presumably, expulsions could take place. They have taken place in regard to other diplomatic lists. There is a tit-for-tat aspect, and it would be worrying if it arose out of the arrangements and applied to inspectors. If we expel some of the Soviet inspectors, and if the Soviets expel some of the United States inspectors, what will happen to the treaty and the verification arrangements? I realise that the matter is hypothetical, but it is not so outrageously hypothetical that that could not happen. It is appropriate for the Minister to respond to that point. I hope that such expulsions will not take place. President Reagan said "trust but verify". I hope that we can have trust and verification.

There was discussion in Committee about the need to ratify the treaty in the Senate. We pressed the Foreign Secretary to urge the Prime Minister to tell recalcitrant conservative Senators that they should ratify the treaty without delay. We have still not had a response from the Prime Minister. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will say how his discussions with the Prime Minister have gone on that matter. It is about time that we had a statement in clear, unequivocal language from the Prime Minister that she will not give conservative Senators a hostage to fortune and will say that the treaty should be ratified without delay.

Conservative Members cannot claim triumph for the treaty. It is a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Any claims about triumph, particularly in respect of cruise missiles, sound hollow. Conservative Members are saying that they had put cruise missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth. That is where the inspections will be held and to take them out and put them at, perhaps, Holy Loch if they are air-launched in order to get around the agreement does not sound like much of a triumph to me. It would have been a triumph if the Government had included British-owned nuclear weapons in the process. They could then have been subject to similar verification procedures. If the Trident system, which has a minimum of 512 warheads more than Polaris's 128, had been scrapped, or at least brought into the verification process, that would be a triumph.

I welcome the treaty and the verification process. It is important that the Government become involved in arms reduction and do not stand aside, as they have done, by not involving British-owned nuclear weapons. They must become part of the arms reduction process.

5.36 pm
Mr. James Hill (Southampton, Test)

Conservative Members have been amazed at the churlish way in which Opposition Members are reluctant to congratulate not only my hon. and learned Friend the Minister but also the Prime Minister on the significant role that she played in acting as a go-between for the two super-powers. It was only obvious that NATO consulted our own Peter Carrington and that the Prime Minister was kept fully informed at all levels by the Soviet side and the United States side.

The shadow Foreign Secretary was wrong on one point. He said that the treaty must be ratified by the Congress and by the Senate. It must also be ratified by the Supreme Soviet. Mr. Gorbachev himself is not so confident that he can get ratification just on the nod. He is making tremendous progress in his own country. He put forward a plan that could not be visualised even a year ago. He is moving carefully forward. The churlishness of Opposition Members could not reflect on his performance in his country. We must watch that we do not expect too much from Mr. Gorbachev. When he succeeds, we must be wholeheartedly behind him in what is the most difficult job any Russian General Secretary has ever had to do.

The Bill must act almost as a photocopy for other countries that have cruise and Pershing missiles on their soil. I refer, for example, to Holland, Germany and Italy. The more rational way to play the verification process is to make sure that the cruise and Pershing missiles that were flown in by the United States air force are flown to one central verification point. It is nonsense that there will be many verification points throughout Europe. At the moment we are concerned only with Europe. The missiles concerned are movable and adaptable to air freight transport.

I should have thought that, if only for simplicity and the maximum use of limited manpower, a verification team could be used at a verification centre. It emerged in Committee that inspectors and observers are not numerous and have not had much work to do. Even the verification staff of the Western European Union have not had a lot of work to do on the verification of stockpiles of weaponry. There must be some co-operation between the countries that have used cruise and Pershing, so that there can be a verification centre.

I am worried especially about the number of inspectors and observers who will be available. Up to now, we have been talking only about Russian inspectors and observers. We know from experience that they will be existing diplomatic staff from the various embassies throughout Europe. Indeed, they will probably have a dual role as members of the KGB and inspectors or observers. However, we do not know; that is one of the little problems that one encounters when dealing with the complete change of heart that Mr. Gorbachev has brought about.

Verification by human beings must be backed up substantially by verification by satellite. This is probably not the debate to raise this, but we have heard little or nothing about the percentages and performances of verification by satellite. That is important, because all the missiles in the verification process are extremely movable. At a moment's notice, they can be dispatched from one end of Europe to another. I am thinking especially about behind the iron curtain. In our future debates we need to know exactly how effective is satellite verification and the sort of processes that will be involved. We need to know about accuracy and the state of our existing satellites for high definition verification.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. As the hon. Gentleman has rightly said, that is not the subject of this debate.

Mr. Hill

I raised a query in Committee about verification by human beings, but I am not completely reassured. Although my hon. Friend had obviously done his best, the question that I asked is hypothetical. It concerned the number of countries and the numbers of back-up staff to the inspectors and observers who would be involved in the verification process. Many people are afraid that hundreds of iron curtain warriors will tread the by-lanes of Newbury and Molesworth. I have also heard it said that they will sit at the gates with the peace women. I hope that that is not true, because I can see all sorts of national problems in that. Knowing the numbers of nuclear warheads that will have to be verified and dismantled — no-one has yet mentioned dismantling, although it is in the Bill—we need to know the number of people who will be required to carry out the inspection and dismantling process.

I have been conscious that, if one considers the problem as a quid pro quo, it would not work out. We are giving up 400 nuclear warheads, but it is a statement of fact that the USSR will give up about 1,600 warheads. We do not know whether the warheads that the Soviet Union is to give up are at the end of their life span. The SS20, for example, has been a major weapon in Eastern Europe for some considerable time. We do not know—although the figures are out of balance — whether the equivalent destruction values are approximately the same. It might be as well to know those things, as that would certainly hearten those who are a little in doubt, such as Opposition Members, who have been terribly nervous about it. They seem to think that the balance is wrong and that perhaps we should give up 1,600 nuclear weapons to balance those 1,600 SS20s.

The main thrust of the Bill does not go into great detail on what the INF agreement is about. We are told that that is in the Daily Telegraph and, apparently, The Independent has an extremely good article on it. I am pleased to see that the shadow Front Bench read the better press because that is another move to the middle ground. The Daily Telegraph has always been my favourite reading and I am pleased that it is also the favourite reading of the shadow Foreign Secretary.

At no time in Committee did we mention that we did not have a draft INF agreement before us. We did not go into the nitty-gritty. We considered the positive plan to give diplomatic immunity to those people who will have to verify. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister enjoys a tremendous reputation in Europe for being on top of his job, especially in this area. We have talked almost constantly about the Russians coming into the United Kingdom, but we could say the same about the Russians going into Holand, Germany or Italy.

However, what will be the diplomatic immunities for those who will have to go behind the iron curtain? I am thinking, for example, of the travel restrictions there. We do not have such restrictions in Europe. Inspectors and observers behind the iron curtain will be closeted all the time and we should consider that fact. I was going to say that they may be followed by men in large trilbies and long black leather overcoats. However, when I watched my television last night, I realised that they were all in Washington, so that danger does not exist.

We are too myopic when considering conditions for the inspectors and observers. I hope that many will be inspectors and observers from the Western European Union. I always boost that wonderful institution, which has been involved in the verification process for many years. I hope that we shall go further and find out exactly what plans and immunities are being put forward to safeguard the inspectors and observers who come from western Europe.

5.48 pm