South Africa

§ Mr. Speaker

I have selected the amendment in the name of the Prime Minister. So far, no fewer than 16 right hon. and hon. Members have expressed their interest in this important debate. No fewer than five of them are Privy Councillors. I appeal for brief contributions.

§ Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East)

I beg to move, That this House, recognising the danger to the Commonwealth if Her Majesty's Government continues its policy of trying to prevent the imposition of strict sanctions against apartheid, calls on Her Majesty's Government to support the adoption of effective economic measures against the South African Government, as recommended by the Eminent Persons Group, in order to exert strong pressure and thereby promote the ending of apartheid, which is essential to preventing a bloodbath in South Africa with all the misery and political, social and economic chaos which would accompany it. We are now in the final stages of a drama, the implications of which for Britain, South Africa and indeed the Commonwealth seem to be spreading almost every day. It is the last act of that drama, an act that began less than three years ago in New Delhi when the Prime Minister joined the other Commonwealth Heads of Government in setting the objective of what she apparently then hoped would be a common policy for the whole of the Commonwealth. The objective was defined as the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. I fear that the Prime Minister has sometimes forgotten those words in some of her recent statements about the objectives of negotiations.

All the members of the last Commonwealth summit in the autumn agreed that sanctions should be adopted to help to achieve that objective, but the Prime Minister's veto led to the setting up of the Eminent Persons Group to report within six months and, failing a satisfactory report, sanctions would be considered at the next summit, which is now under two weeks away.

It is just over a month since the House agreed unanimously a Government amendment to an Opposition motion, calling on Her Majesty's Government to work actively … for effective measures which will help achieve a peaceful solution in South Africa". In winding up the debate, the Minister of State said that the measures taken must be effective. They may not be limited to economic measures … There is no point in introducing measures unless they have a significant effect on the South African Government."—[Official Report, 17 June 1986; Vol. 99, c. 980–90.] It was that statement by the Minister of State that led the Opposition not to oppose the Government amendment.

Since then the European Community has held a summit conference at The Hague at which the Prime Minister herself endorsed a statement that a national dialogue with authentic leaders of the black population was essential to halt a further escalation of violence, and that such a 1014 dialogue required the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and the lifting of the ban on the African National Congress and other political parties. The same summit meeting asked the Foreign Secretary as the Presidency Foreign Minister to visit South Africa to establish those conditions.

Meanwhile, the Community would consult on further measures that might be needed, covering, in particular, a ban on new investments, the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. However, the moment that that conference was over, the Prime Minister followed the precedent that she set at the Nassau meeting by rubbishing its conclusions. The chairman of the summit, the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr. Lubbers, told the press immediately after it closed that all the members of the summit had agreed to impose that list of sanctions as a minimum if the Foreign Secretary's mission failed. But the Prime Minister immediately said that that was not true; there was no commitment whatever by any of the Ministers to impose that list of sanctions. She stuck to her story, although Mr. Lubbers, as chairman, was confirmed in his account by the Danish Prime Minister and, indeed, by President Mitterrand. Moreover, it was confirmed in the House a little over a week ago by the Prime Minister's own Secretary of State for Energy, who told us in an answer to a question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy): The action on South African coal has been agreed by the European Community". The right hon. Gentleman also told my hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract and Castleford (Mr. Lofthouse): the European leaders have agreed upon an approach to South Africa which after three months would include action on a number of materials, including coal. That is the right approach"— an echo, I suppose, of some propaganda by his party in the past— and I hope that it will have some influence on negotiations in the coming months."—[Official Report, 7 July 1986; Vol. 101, c. 3–7.] Some hope. The Prime Minister sent the Foreign Secretary on his mission, to quote the hon. Member for Christchurch (Mr. Adley), up the creek without a paddle and then brought home without a canoe. Many of us on both sides of the House will think that, though colourful, that was an accurate description of the fate to which the right hon. Lady condemned her Foreign Secretary.

We all know that the Foreign Secretary never wanted to go at all. He had an altercation with the Prime Minister on the matter as he was entering the aircraft on the way to The Hague. According to one of the newspapers that overheard, she told him, "If that's the way you feel, perhaps you had better not come at all." But he went.

§ Mr. Andrew Hunter (Basingstoke)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

§ Mr. Healey

The Foreign Secretary finally agreed to be the fall guy for the Prime Minister's policies.

§ Mr. Hunter

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

§ Mr. Healey

No, I shall not give way.

What all of us in the Opposition want to know is that if the Prime Minister was really determined on that mission of appeasement, why did she not follow the precedent set by her predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, 1015 and go herself? The South Africans themselves have said that if anyone was likely to influence their position, it would be the Prime Minister, whose common sense and sterling qualities they have recently praised in lavish terms.

As it was, the right hon. Lady sent the Foreign Secretary. Almost from the moment when his aircraft left the tarmac at Heathrow, she drove nail after nail into the coffin of his mission with an astonishing series of interviews, which, I heard this morning on the "Today" programme, were described yesterday by the leading Singapore newspaper as a series of provocative statements that seemed designed to destroy the Commonwealth games. If that were their purpose, they certainly seem to have had some success.

I doubt whether any Foreign Secretary in British history has been deliberately exposed by his own Prime Minister to such a series of humiliating snubs from so many Governments. First, we had the casual refusal of President Botha to see the Foreign Secretary at the beginning of his mission. Then we had the refusal of all the leading blacks in South Africa, from Bishop Tutu to Nelson Mandela, to see him when he went there. We had the refusal of the African National Congress to meet him in Lusaka and then a series of humiliating rebuffs from Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Indeed, I think that he will agree that the only comfort that he had on that ill-starred mission was the offer of prawns by the Marxist leader of Mozambique.

Since then the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Mulroney, has given the Prime Minister herself a piece of his mind and told her that if she will not join the rest of the Commonwealth in sanctions Canada will act unilaterally. The Prime Minister of Australia has given her the same message. The fact is that she has not now one single friend left in the Commonwealth and scarcely one left in the European Community, either. The only friend that she has made by her astonishing behaviour in the past few weeks is the President of the apartheid regime in South Africa. No doubt the praise that she received from him was responsible for her nostalgic regret that South Africa was not still in the Commonwealth.

All that, however, was water off a duck's back to the Prime Minister, who told the world, "If I am right and everyone else is wrong, what does it matter?" It matters a great deal to all of us. She has already wrecked the Commonwealth games and we regret that as much as anyone. Far more serious, however, she now risks wrecking the Commonwealth itself and creating a constitutional crisis of major dimensions involving the Palace itself. Events have reached such a stage that newspapers reported today that several of her senior Cabinet colleagues had been warning the press in the past 24 hours about such a constitutional crisis.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister's arguments have become wilder and wilder. At first, she stuck to the Foreign Office line, arguing against comprehensive sanctions. More recently, however, she has been arguing against any kind of action which might have any effect on the South African Government. She has proved an assiduous acolyte of the Botha charm school in recent weeks. She has accused Bishop Tutu, Archbishop Hurley and the Synod of the Church of England of immorality. She has wept crocodile tears at the potential suffering of blacks in South Africa, but there has not been a murmur 1016 of complaint from her about their actual suffering in the past 30 years. Having met some of the church people in South Africa who have made great sacrifices in the fight against apartheid, including a young Catholic priest who has been tear-gassed eight times in the past few months conducting black funerals, I believe that the Prime Minister should apologise in the House for her disgraceful and totally unmerited accusation of immorality.

We have seen the Prime Minister's eyes brim with compassion at the prospect of unemployment in the United Kingdom arising out of sanctions against South Africa, but we now hear that at most 20,000 jobs might be lost if mandatory comprehensive sanctions were introduced immediately. Yet through her own policies the Prime Minister has created 2 million unemployed in this country in the past few years without batting an eyelid. Her display of compassion has deceived no one. As Foreign Minister Botha has said, her policy is determined not by political or moral considerations but by commercial consideration—no doubt a reference to the fact that nearly half the Conservative party's funds, or more than £1 billion, is contributed by firms with operations or estate in South Africa. [Interruption.] I am sorry—£1 million.

The Prime Minister's worry about the impact of sanctions on the British economy is misplaced. It has been argued with unassailable logic by the Eminent Persons Group—a group which included Lord Barber, who has a major financial stake in South Africa and great knowledge of South Africa through his position as chairman of the Standard Chartered Bank—that unless the outside world imposes sanctions there is no chance of the dialogue without which apartheid cannot be brought to an end and without which there will be an inexorable slide into a bloodbath worse than anything since the second world war, to quote Lord Barber himself, in which all Britain's commercial interests as well as all her political influence would be lost. No one has argued that point more strongly than the Conservative ex-Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, whom no one could accuse of not being a hard-headed Conservative.

The point made by the Eminent Persons Group, which has also been made time and again within and outside the House, is that sanctions are not an alternative to negotiation but the only means of promoting the conditions in which a meaningful dialogue can take place. Nothing, however, can dent the Prime Minister's unassailable complacency and the inspissated ignorance from which it springs. The other day she told the House that the United Kingdom was doing more than any other country in sanctions against South Africa, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock) listed in a letter to her 16 countries which were doing more. Yesterday, the Prime Minister told my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson) that many Commonwealth leaders opposed sanctions as she did, but she could not name even one. She is even rewriting history, quoting Wilberforce of all people in her support the other day for his success in stopping the slave trade. Wilberforce's opponents in the Chamber — the West Indians in Westminster, as they called themselves—used exactly the arguments that the Prime Minister is now using, claiming that the ending of slavery would damage Britain's commercial interests and would be bad for the slaves themselves. In fact, slavery was finally stopped by a naval blockade. The Prime Minister may care to reflect on that precedent.

1017 In her recent series of interviews, the Prime Minister referred time and again to the Rhodesian settlement as a settlement by negotiation which she would wish to follow in relation to South Africa.

§ Mr. Hunter

rose—

§ Mr. Healey

I will give way in a moment.

The Rhodesian settlement took place only because the Prime Minister reversed the policy on which she was elected, and she did so under pressure from the Commonwealth at a conference attended by the Queen against the Prime Minister's firm advice. The Prime Minister may care to reflect on that analogy. She advised Her Majesty not to attend the Lusaka conference on Rhodesia, but the Queen subsequently issued a statement saying that she had noted the advice but regarded her duty to the Commonwealth as taking precedence over accepting the advice of the Prime Minister.

§ Mr. Bowen Wells (Hertford and Stortford)

rose—

§ Mr. Healey

On that occasion, the Prime Minister continued to apply sanctions as a basis for a settlement. The other factor in producing a settlement was a large scale guerrilla war in which at least 12,000 people lost their lives in the preceding 12 months. As we know—those who do not may care to read an interesting book by Mr. Miles Hudson, then adviser to the Conservative Government—the major influence in getting the Prime Minister to reverse her position was Lord Carrington. Let us hope that his successor will follow his example and have equal success in getting the Prime Minister to reverse her position.

There are some signs of movement. Contrary to what the Prime Minister told the House only last week, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) has made a speech saying that the Government should take active measures to restrain South African trade which could culminate, if necessary, in a trade blockade. If he catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, he may make further remarks along these lines this afternoon.

The right hon. and learned Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr, Brittan), who, until the Foreign Secretary, was the Prime Minister's most eminent fall guy, made an interesting speech last week. He said—and I hope that his colleagues on the Conservative Benches will ponder his words—that if the Foreign Secretary is to stand the remotest chance of success he must go armed with the necessary authority. Whatever their disadvantages, international coercive measures, whether formally labelled as sanctions or not, are one of the few weapons in our arsenal against the citadel of apartheid beyond mere persuasion … The world must know of our readiness to have recourse to stronger measures against the Pretoria regime in the event of the failure of Sir Geoffrey's mission. Without that knowledge, the mission will not be just, as is inevitable, formidably difficult, but utterly hopeless. This is a growing feeling among all in this country and outside who watch the Foreign Secretary's lamentable journey.

§ Mr. Bowen Wells

What does the right hon. Gentleman think should take place? Does he want to impose a blockade o r South Africa, and, if so—

§ Mr. Healey

That is the point to which I am coming.

§ Mr. Wells

If he is coming to it, will the right hon. Gentleman spell out what repercussions that would have on the economy, and particularly on the black people of South Africa?

§ Mr. Healey

I was unwise to give way, because this is precisely the series of points to which I am coming.

The question left is what sort of sanctions are most likely to be, to use the Prime Minister's word, effective — not signs and gestures, the latest phrase that the Prime Minister has produced as a surrogate for sanctions. When she discussed in an interview with Mr. Hugo Young the possibility of signs or signals and gestures, she made it clear that they are not effective, and she is right. I believed before my visit to South Africa—and I said this in the House a month ago—that a gradual escalation of sanctions by stages is the best way to approach the problem. However, since my visit I have changed my mind. I found that every person to whom I spoke in the black community, both inside and outside South Africa, and those business men in the white community — a small minority, some of whom I met in Lusaka and Johannesburg—believe that sanctions are necessary, and that by far the best would be comprehensive mandatory sanctions because they would bring the matter to a head faster. It is no good the hon. Member for Luton, North (Mr. Carlisle), the West Indian on the Government Back Benches, wagging his head—

§ Mr. Bowen Wells

West Indian?

§ Mr. Healey

I am talking about the West Indians who supported slavery and used the same argument as the hon. Member for Luton, North, which is that to abolish slavery would damage British commercial interests and the interests of the black slaves.

The people with whom I talked, the black leaders, the church people, the members of the United Democratic Front, trade unions, members of the ANC, members of the Zambian Government, all thought that comprehensive mandatory sanctions would be best because they are quickest and sharpest.

The Commonwealth Secretary made a speech yesterday that I hope that all hon. Members will take the opportunity to read, because sneering at the Commonwealth will not save us from a constitutional crisis if the Prime Minister destroys the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Secretary argued—and there is a good deal in this—that there is a case for something less than comprehensive sanctions. They can be kept as a deterrent against South Africa retaliating on the front-line states againt something less than comprehensive sanctions. I see that the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Wells) sees merit in that. I am glad that this measure commends itself to at least some Conservative Members.

If we do not go all out for comprehensive mandatory sanctions, which would require the acquiescence of the United States Administration and the Security Council as well of the British Govenment, Mr. Malcolm Fraser is 1,000 times right when he argues, as he did in yesterday's international Herald Tribune, that The purpose of sanctions would not be to destroy the South African economy. They would need to be constructed in such a way as to give the economy and the white population in particular a real body blow. It is not a question of turning the screw gently and steadily, it is a question of a hard blow". He is right and all those who have come to accept the case for sanctions, with whom I have discussed the matter inside South and southern Africa, take the same view. It would be better to concentrate on banning key South African exports because that is a very much more simple problem than restraining all South African imports. 1019 Without the currency earned by exports, the South African Government's capacity to import is severely constrained. That would include measures on gold, diamonds and minerals.

The Prime Minister has argued that to do anything on gold would help the Soviet Union. That would be true of a ban on gold exports from South Africa, although such a ban might be evaded to some extent by smuggling, not least from the middle east. If the Governments of the Western world took seriously their often stated desire to de-monetarise gold, the easiest way to achieve this objective would be for the countries with large gold stocks to start selling them off so as to depress the price of gold. This would be beneficial to the monetary system in the Western world, and would hurt South Africa and, incidentally, the Soviet Union.

A ban on all investment is desirable, but it would have little effect beyond what will happen anyway. I have not met anyone recently who is prepared to put a penny of new money into South Africa if he can help it. Most of the big multinationals in South Africa have already begun withdrawing or have withdrawn. For example, some are selling off their machinery abroad. That has happened in several cases. There is a steady drain of trained professional people with marketing skills. I am sure that the Chancellor will be unhappy to hear that, of 160 auditors in South Africa a year ago, 60 will have left by the end of the year. The trickle of whites who left Zimbabwe after independence are returning, because they see the prospects as being far more hopeful than staying in South Africa.

I agree that whatever package of measures is finally adopted must be the subject of collective action of a large number of states, one hopes through the United Nations. I hope that the Prime Minister was being serious when she told Mr. Malcolm Rutherford of the Financial Times in an interesting interview published about a week ago that she would some day go to the United Nations for mandatory collective sanctions, although not comprehensive sanctions.

Whatever package is chosen must be strict and swift. It is no good the Prime Minister thinking that she can put off decisions now beyond the Commonwealth conference, as she told one interviewer during the bizarre burst of reflection to which she treated us 10 days ago. To seek delay now would mean that decisions would come too late and at stake now is not just the fate of the suffering millions in South Africa but the fate of those in the frontline states who are under constant attack and threat from the apartheid regime. At stake is the Commonwealth and the British constitution. I appeal to hon. Members on both sides of the House who value those things to apply all possible pressure to the Prime Minister before it is too late. I ask the House to approve the motion.

§ The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe)

I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: `reasserts its commitment to the Commonwealth and the goal of peaceful change in South Africa through negotiation; does not believe that general economic sanctions would help to secure that objective; notes that the Government is committed by the Nassau Accord and the Declaration by the European 1020 Council at The Hague on 27th June 1986 to consultations with the Commonwealth, the Community and other allies on further measures which might be needed; and welcomes the efforts of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in his capacity as President of the Twelve to establish conditions in which negotiations can take place.'. As so often on these occasions, it would not be fruitful for me to try to follow the hyperbolic and fanciful course charted by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey). He has roamed far and wide in his reminiscences about my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, with whom he seems to be continually and astonishingly fascinated to the point of hyperbole. He found himself drawn into anecdotage of every kind, finally embarking upon the proposition that we were committed to £1 billion from South African funds. [Interruption.] We recollect his days of mathematical accuracy.

I am concerned to discuss what contribution Britain, as a member of the Commonwealth, of the summit Seven and of the European Community, can make to the prospects of peace, prosperity and freedom for the 32 million people of South Africa. We in Europe should approach the subject carefully because European history is not free of racial conflict. We have no right to strike a self-righteous pose on the subject. European history has taught the world tragic lessons about the evil of discrimination against human beings on grounds of creed or race. So it would be a step forward in our discussion of South Africa if we were to approach that desperately difficult problem with a little less emphasis on our own self-righteousness and a great deal more emphasis on the practical objectives that we should pursue.

If Europe understands this, as it does, and if it understands, as it does, the full strength of the case against apartheid, so too does the Commonwealth. I quote: United in our desire to rid the world of the evils of racism and racial prejudice, we proclaim our faith in the inherent dignity and worth of the human person … We reject as inhuman and intolerable all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation, or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior of inferior. Those words come from the Lusaka Commonwealth declaration which, far beyond the myths peddled by the right hon. Gentleman, my right hon. Friend helped to frame in 1979 as the foundation for the success of the Government that she leads in securing the independent freedom of Zimbabwe. That is the reality of the position of the Government of my right hon. Friend. Those words are the very foundation of this Government's policy towards South Africa.

It is unacceptable to us that the rights of minorities should be suppressed by majorities, whatever their colour. That is why Britain has so often, and even today, provided a refuge for men and women who face oppression at home —from Africa as well as from other continents. By the same token, we cannot accept that the rights of the black and coloured majority in South Africa should be subordinated to those of the white minority in the name of Christianity, civilisation and Western values. It must be said that it is not Christian, not civilised and certainly not in the interests of the West that such a system should survive.

So, too, it must be said that explicit recognition by the South African Government leaders that apartheid must 1021 end is an important step in the right direction. We have had just such explicit recognition from the President of the South African Government himself.

What the world now wishes to see—and there should be no difference between both sides of the House on this — is a decisive movement towards a system that will command the approval and consent of all the people of South Africa. [Interruption.] Some hon. Members may be dismayed to hear me asserting these truths, but we hold these views to be most important. We understand something else as well. We understand, and it is right that we should, the fears of some South Africans which act as a constraint on change. We say that those fears are more likely to be fulfilled if grave decisions are not taken to bring about change rapidly enough.

It must be recognised that the decisions that have to be taken will require great bravery. For that reason, we approach the matter with sympathy and understanding. That is why the European Council meeting at The Hague last month underlined the urgent need, not for violence, but to promote dialogue in South Africa and to achieve peaceful change. The European Council fully recognised the importance of the work done by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group to promote the same objective. That group came into existence not because of the obduracy or intransigence of my hon. Friend but because my right hon. Friend, with other Commonwealth leaders, was able to reach a common position upon the desirability of such a group. It should be acknowledged that that group has been a unique creation which only the Commonwealth could have created. Its work was of enormous importance.

It was because the European leaders had the desire to renew the momentum of the work of that group that they asked me, as President of the Council of Ministers, to undertake a fresh mission on behalf of the 12 European nations. The European Council set precise objectives for that mission. Its objectives were the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and other political parties. I do not underestimate the difficulty of that task but I have no doubt that it is right that this further effort should be made.

That is why last week, as the first part of my mission, I was glad to consult President Kaunda, President Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe. I had full, effective consideration of all the issues with those Heads of Government. This morning, I also consulted President Masire of Botswana. It ill becomes the right hon. Gentleman to talk about rebuffs and exchanges of that kind. I have undertaken the mission with the authority of the European Community. Those missions have been of great value and I am most grateful to the Heads of Government whom I have met.

§ Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton)

I am not arguing against the Foreign Secretary's mission although I do not think it will meet with success. Suppose that he does everything humanly possible to argue the case with the full backing of the Twelve, but at the end South Africa says that it is not prepared to do anything about getting rid of apartheid, what do he and his Government intend to do?

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

If the hon. Gentleman can contain himself in patience, he will hear the answer in due course.

1022 Let me tell the House the first of the five important propositions that I put to each of the leaders that 1 met. First, apartheid must give way to a non-racial, fully representative society. Secondly, it would be wrong not to acknowledge that change in South Africa has taken place, but there must be more change and it must take place more quickly. Thirdly, negotiation still remains the best and quickest means of bringing apartheid to an end. Violence will prolong the process of change and prolong misery. The right setting for dialogue and change should be the suspension of violence on all sides.

Fourthly, I made the point that comprehensive mandatory sanctions would not, as some people like to believe, bring down the South African Government. It is not on the verge of collapse. Finally, for all those reasons, we must continue to identify and exploit every chance and opportunity for dialogue.

Three things emerged from those discussions. First, there was complete— I repeat the word "complete"—agreement about objectives. Secondly, there were significant but understandable differences about the means, including differences between the four leaders whom I met. Thirdly—and this is important—there was a greater readiness to accept the sincerity of the mission that I am undertaking.

I was also able to remind the three leaders of some of the practical and positive actions that we are taking to help to surmount specific difficulties in southern Africa. For the front-line states, these include measures to improve rail and road transport to the outside world and to enhance protection of those links by training for their armed forces, and for the black people of South Africa, the European code of conduct for employers, recently revised, and educational programmes for black South Africans and black trade unions. At The Hague we announced our intention to enhance this programme by £15 million over the next five years.

In the context of The Hague agreement to consult other industrialised countries, a point to which I have already referred, I shall be going to Washington tomorrow for talks with Secretary Shultz and Vice-President Bush. I shall be consulting, as seems to me to be entirely sensible. to see how wide is the common view about the future cooperation. A senior official from my office has already visited Canberra and Tokyo on my behalf, and, as the House knows, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has consulted the Prime Minister of Canada.

Next week I shall go again to southern Africa. I expect to see President Botha at the beginning and at the end of this visit and Mr. Pik Botha, the Foreign Affairs Minister, soon after my arrival. The key to progress in South Africa is self-evidently the position of the South African Government.

I shall use those meetings to explore the intentions of the South African Government to take measures to further the dismantling of of apartheid, to urge on them the need to act rapidly and decisively in this direction, if further tragedy is to be averted, and in particular, and most urgently of all, to press on them the need to release Mandela and other political detainees and to unban the African National Congress and other political parties as an essential prerequisite for any dialogue at all.

§ Mr. John Carlisle (Luton, North)

When my right hon. and learned Friend sees President Botha, will he be careful not to impose on the President and the Government of 1023 South Africa an absolute timetable of measures that my right hon. and learned Friend expects to be taken? Particularly in relation to the National Party Congress which is to be held in South Africa in early August, will he ensure that he does not ask the South African Government to impose conditions that they will be unable to deliver until they have consulted their own party and their own people?

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

I shall be presenting the points that I have just described to the South African Government in the context of the definition of my mission arising from The Hague European Council. These discussions will take place against the background of important international meetings that are to be held following my visit. While I am in South Africa I shall seek to meet a wide range of people of all colours, representing all opinions throughout South Africa.

I recognise, of course, that so far there has been reluctance on the part of some South African leaders to meet me in the context of my mission, but, whether or not they agree with our approach, I cannot believe that it is wise for them to withhold their advice at this stage from the mission that I am undertaking. I hope that, on reflection, they will be able to accept the sincerity of the mission that I am undertaking on behalf of the European Community.

The House should recall that this Government, more than any previous British Government, have implemented fully and conscientiously, together with our Commonwealth and European partners, a whole series of measures that are designed to make clear our view of the imperative need to bring apartheid to an end. These measures affect the economic, sporting and cultural relations between this country and South Africa. They have been listed to the House by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and they have this common feature: they have been calculated not to threaten, not to destroy, but to encourage and promote the change, about the need for which we are all agreed.

I wish to leave the House in no doubt about where we stand on the question of possible further measures to achieve that objective. Commonwealth Heads of Government at Nassau agreed that in the absence of adequate progress they would consider the adoption of further measures. At The Hague last month, the European Council committed the Community to enter into consultations with the other industrialised countries in the succeeding three months on further measures which might be needed. As my right hon. Friend said at the subsequent press conference: All agree that further measures are not excluded. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister also told the House on 1 July, certain contingency plans that were outlined in The Hague communique are being made. She went on: We are not negotiating from weakness. We are negotiating in a way which we believe will have the best chance of success." — [Official Report, 1 July 1986; Vol. 100, c. 822.] It is precisely in the same fashion that I am conducting the mission that has been entrusted to me.

§ Mr. Healey

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman clear up a point which I know created consternation when 1024 news of the European Community decision reached Africa, because I happened to be in Lusaka? The Prime Minister suggested that it would be a good thing if the Commonwealth summit took no decisions whatsoever on sanctions. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman now suggesting that this matter should be left over for a further few months until there can be a meeting of the European Community, or is he prepared to fulfil the obligation which the Prime Minister accepted at the Nassau meeting to consider and take decisions on possible further measures at the Commonwealth summit in a fortnight's time? If not, I warn him that he is in for very, very serious trouble indeed.

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

I have no doubt that at the Commonwealth meeting at the beginning of August and at subsequent Community meetings the commitments we made in each of those respective places to consider further measures will be undertaken. Consideration will be given to them.

However, it is important to understand each of the points that the right hon. Gentleman challenged. There was, and there is, no concept of automaticity about any further measures. There was no misunderstanding about this at The Hague meeting.

§ Mr. Healey

At The Hague there was misunderstanding.

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

No. Let me tell the House what the Dutch Foreign Minister told the Dutch Parliament on 2 July. There is no doubt about it. He said that not all countries had committed themselves to the package of measures set out in the declaration of 27 June and that there was therefore no automatic obligation on the Community to take further European Community measures in three months' time. That is the position. It was agreed that each of us would consider measures when the time came for consideration, after the three-month process. It was also agreed that no country would rule out any of those measures and that consideration would take place. That is the position.

§ Mr. Healey

The right hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware that the Dutch chairman of the summit conference, Prime Minister Lubbers, met the press immediately after the conference was over. I have the video tape of his interview. He said that it was agreed by the Heads of Government that measures would be taken if the Foreign Secretary's mission failed. That was endorsed by the Danish Prime Minister, although President Mitterrand said that it was a gentlemen's agreement. Whether that was intended to exclude the right hon. Lady I am not sure. But there is no question that the impression of at least the chairman and other members at that meeting was that a commitment was made, whether formal or informal. Is that the case?

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

I am trying to set the right hon. Gentleman's mind at rest, and I shall try to do so again. Let me return to the words of the communiquée. It was agreed that in the next three months the Community will enter into consultations with the other industrialised countries on further measures which might be needed. They were identified. It was agreed that in that consideration no country would rule out any of those measures but that the consideration would be honourably 1025 and fairly undertaken. It is true that different comments were made about that at subsequent press conferences on that day. It was as a result of that that the Dutch Foreign Minister was asked to clarify the position as his Government saw it, and it was in those circumstances that he said what I have just read out: that not all countries had committed themselves to the package of measures set out in the declaration.

Mr. Heifer

He was talking about your Government.

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

If the hon. Gentleman wants to have the position clarified, he must listen to the clarification given by the Dutch Foreign Minister, as Chairman of the European Council. The Dutch Foreign Minister went on to say: There was, therefore, no automatic obligation on the Community to take further European Community measures in three months' time.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

Would my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it would be very wrong for major steps to be taken before Parliament has been consulted?

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

One of the reasons for this debate — and the reason for the debate that we had some weeks ago — is to embrace such consultation with Parliament. I cannot give my right hon. Friend a firm commitment in the light of the Government motion passed by the House, without opposition, prior to the European Council meeting. The interest of Parliament in this matter is understandably intense and that is why we are discussing the matter in detail now.

§ Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington)

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

I shall not give way again.

There was and is no concept of automaticity about further measures. However, we have agreed to consider these measures. I am engaged in a mission to southern Africa, not to promote measures, but to seek changes and commitments to progress which are desired by hon. Members on both sides of the House, the European Community and the Commonwealth. It must be recognised that I may not achieve those changes. If the mission does not procure tangible and substantial progress in South Africa, I would regard agreement on further measures as likely to be necessary.

§ Sir Ian Lloyd (Havant)

My right hon. and learned Friend has raised a fundamental point. So far this afternoon he has implied that there is a trip wire which immediately, or soon after his return, can generate substantial further measures. He also implies that there are conditions which he expects to achieve when he reaches South Africa. Is it not of the most fundamental importance that these conditions are known and clearly defined?

We are talking about the end of apartheid. What precisely does that mean? Does it mean merely the elimination of all the discriminatory legislation which has appeared on the statute book since 1948? That has always been the definition that we have been asked to accept in this House. Alternatively, does it now mean something more profound — a change in the basic social and economic conditions in that country? If the latter is the case, that applies not only to South Africa but to many other countries in which such social and economic 1026 conditions may be found today. There is no basis on which we can discriminate against South Africa in the latter case as opposed to the former.

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

One of the areas of common ground in this debate has, sadly, been the need to deal separately and distinctly with the case of South Africa. That has been the characteristic of meeting after meeting of the international community and of meeting after meeting of this House.

I understand the importance of my hon. Friend's wide-ranging inquiry, but the objective of the mission — as agreed at The Hague —is for me to visit southern Africa in a further effort to establish conditions under which the necessary dialogue can commence. The necessary dialogue will allow negotiations leading to a truly democratic and non-racial South Africa. According to The Hague communiqué: This dialogue cannot take place as long as recognised leaders of the black community are detained and their organisations are proscribed. That is the importance of the two objectives about which I have reminded the House on several occasions. That is the nature of the mission and it is clearly defined.

§ Mr. Robert Adley (Christchurch)

Like my right hon. and learned Friend, I share the view that few of us believe that economic sanctions in themselves are a cure-all. Equally, not many of us believe that no further measures should be considered and most people of goodwill would support my right hon. and learned Friend in what he is trying to achieve.

The other day we debated an Opposition motion on this subject and the Government removed the word "economic" from the motion, leaving open the proposition that other measures could be considered. Will my right hon. and learned Friend consider a point which has not been raised so far today? While the political power in South Africa is largely in the hands of the Afrikaners, much of the economic power still lies in the hands of British South Africans, many of whom enjoy the right to a British passport—even though many were not born here—which they use to travel around the world. In his future consideration of measures, will my right hon. and learned Friend consider that point?

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

My hon. Friend's point is not lacking in ingenuity and it raises some difficult questions. He may have an opportunity to elaborate upon it in a further intervention.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East underlined the point conceded some weeks ago by his right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley), the deputy leader of the Labour party. That belief is at the heart of the speech made by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East. It is that a policy of general economic sanctions would not be in the interests of the British peoplee or the people of South Africa. If that is common ground, as I take it to be from the right hon. Gentleman's speech, it is an important point that should be recognised. That point was at the heart of the speech made today by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East, it was at the heart of the point made by the deputy leader of the Labour party and it is on that basis that I would address myself again to my mission.

§ Mr. Neil Kinnock (Islwyn)

Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman leaves that point, my hon. Friend the 1027 Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) asked what would happen if the right hon. and learned Gentleman's mission did not achieve its intended success. That point has not been answered despite the undertaking that it would be. As the Foreign Secretary is representing the EEC, if the absolute conditions of the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the equally unconditional unbanning of the ANC do not happen as a consequence of his second or first meeting with P. W. Botha, what will the Secretary of State do? The Secretary of State's earlier statement that he will be prepared to consider further measures will not impress the Afrikaners or the rest of the world.

§ Sir Geoffrey Howe

The right hon. Gentleman has failed to take note of what I have already said. It is beyond doubt that, within the Community and the Commonwealth, consideration will be given to the question of further measures on the basis of the objectives that I have described repeatedly in the course of my speech. That appraisal will be undertaken on the basis of the further important point that if the mission does not procure tangible and substantial progress, I would regard agreement on some further measures to be necessary.

Before I was interrupted, I was embracing the common ground that I thought had been established. The Opposition, neither in the motion nor through the speech of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East, will not press us to make general, comprehensive economic sanctions. That is an important advance.

There are many families in this country with a real human interest in the future of South Africa and there is also interest in the rest of Europe. In Africa, the human interest in the future of South Africa is even more intense. All these people want a future of peace and justice in South Africa. My mission is not easy but it has a chance. With the support of this House, I will continue to strive for the success of that mission.

§ Dame Judith Hart (Clydesdale)

I begin with the assumption that follows on from the Foreign Secretary's last words that, between now and the next opportunity that the House has to debate the subject, matters will have moved on and the Prime Minister will have had to appreciate the need to take further measures. That is not an unreasonable assumption. The Foreign Secretary went as near as he could to admitting that that will be the case and that during the next two months, during the Commonwealth summit meeting in London, and then in preparation for further meetings, the Government must move towards fuller consideration of further measures.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) mentioned some of the measures that he believes would be effective. He mentioned coal, gold and arms. He said—as we have all noted today—that South Africa has just announced the manufacture of a new aircraft, which means that until now the arms embargo has been ineffective. It has allowed South Africa to develop its manufacturing capacity for arms, its oil and its air flights.

What distresses me — I say this to my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East as well as to the Foreign Secretary — is that we are not devoting the 1028 essence of the debate to considering precisely which sanctions are likely to be the fastest acting and most effective, but will, at the same time, have the least effect on the front-line states and will be totally enforceable. I emphasise the last point because, from my experience when trying to deal with sanctions against Rhodesia, too many commercial buccaneers are supported by their Governments, as was the case with the United States and West Germany and their evasion of the sanctions against Rhodesia in respect of minerals, especially chrome. One must be certain that whatever one does is enforceable, otherwise it becomes nonsense. One must be certain that the measures one takes are effective. If the aim of sanctions is to produce a negotiated settlement and peace instead of a bloodbath, they must be rapidly effective.

It disturbs me that the outstanding area where all of this could be achieved has not even been mentioned in the debate. That is financial sanctions. I draw to the attention of the House, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East and of the Foreign Secretary the simple fact that, in the United States, as most of us know, the lobby and the passion of public opinion on South Africa is infinitely greater than it is in Britain. The Congressmen and Senators must heed public opinion and behave accordingly on the issue.

In 1975, the House of Representatives passed a Bill, and in April of this year the Senate passed a Bill by a majority of over 90 to 3, which has now gone to the Senate Finance Committee. Of course, anything can happen to it there and, ultimately, President Reagan could veto it. Nevertheless, it has gone through the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Bill is highly specific. It calls for a total embargo on financial relationships between American financial institutions and South Africa — that includes an embargo on new investments, new loans and the rolling over of loans—and on any more of the negotiations that took place in January and February this year which rescued the South African economy. At the same time, the Bill calls for the entire disinvestment by transnational corporations based in the United States.

If there are to be rapidly effective sanctions, it is important, as the Foreign Secretary said, that the Security Council of the United Nations reaches agreement on this. To do that it is important to have the support of the United States for whatever is agreed. There is no better starting point for that support than a Bill which has gone through Congress and the Senate and is sitting in the Finance Committee with overwhelming support of public opinion in the United States. Not only that, but the Bill has met no great resistance from the American business community, which seems to be more capable of recognising its long-term interests than is the British business community.

If one looks ahead, whether to negotiation or a bloodbath, it is historically evident that in the not too far distant future the world will deal with a black South Africa. Any business interest, such as the South African Chamber of Commerce, which, as I mentioned in the previous debate, gave evidence to the panel of which I was a member, must recognise that its future lies in coming to terms with that simple fact.

It is ludicrous that the House does not give more attention to studying the ins and outs, the pros and cons and the problems and the advantages of introducing early severe financial sanctions. Let me take a possible 1029 disadvantage. What would happen to the British interests in South Africa? The Bank of America recently pulled out of South Africa completely with apparently no grave disadvantage. Barclays Bank has retreated and has transferred its interests in South Africa.

The Foreign Secretary, as far as I know, has in his economic relations department only three officials and a couple of boys capable of considering the economic aspects of the issue. He might have called in masses of people from the Treasury, but I doubt whether they would be terribly helpful. If one considers the self-interest of the British banks, it is doubtful whether any bank has extended its operations in South Africa to the extent where withdrawal would cause it any problems. The position is not the same as the over-extension of some British banks during the debt crisis in Latin America. I doubt whether the self-interest of British banks presents an insuperable barrier to their going along with us. Indeed, they would have to if legislation was introduced for withdrawal, no new loans, no rolling over of loans and no rescheduling of loans to South Africa.

Why could that be important? We do not have much experience to go on. However, we can mention one experience. In August last year, South Africa was in a difficult financial position. It was seeking rescheduling of loans, new loans and a rollover of loans. The rand took a tremendous tumble. By January and February, with the assistance of the Swiss hanker who raced all over Europe to try to whip up support for rescheduling, but who has now withdrawn because he says that not as much progress has been made as he understood would be made, the crisis was over. But between August and then when the rand was under tremendous pressure and when South Africa was desperate about its financial position, we saw some of the smallest but most dramatic moves forward in the attitude of the South African Government towards making concessions on apartheid.

In January or February rescheduling was agreed and everything was wonderful. It appeared that there was no more need to worry about South Africa's financial position. From that date began the events leading up to the state of emergency and all that has happened since. That is only a short period historically, but people cannot quote anything else in evidence and it is strong evidence.

The greatest influence on political change in South Africa, as in every society which is basically capitalist—I use the word not pejoratively but factually—will come from the business community. If the business community is worried, there will probably be the pressure for change. If the Foreign Secretary wishes pressures to achieve negotiation, the business community is priority number one. I do not understand why, in all the talk about general economic sanctions and comprehensive mandatory sanctions, we are not analysing closely what could be done and what measures would be likely to be the most effective.

I mention again briefly the role of the transnational corporations, because the Bill that has gone through the House of Representatives and the Senate calls for complete disinvestment by them. That is presumably something on which we could agree with the Americans to go to the Security Council. We would not be starting from scratch. President Reagan may not like it any more than the Prime Minister would like it, but it is at least a starting point for agreement with the Americans without which no sanctions can be effective.

1030 During the consideration which the Foreign Secretary will give, on his forthcoming visit to South Africa, and I would suppose during the weeks that follow, when precise support for some sanctions must be forthcoming from the British Government, the financial sanctions so much neglected in the discussion on South Africa should be given a first and important priority. Out of all of the possible measures, I would pick that as being of top priority in terms of effectiveness, being enforceable, creating the least damage to the black South African states and achieving the process of political change.

§ Mr. Edward Heath (Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have listened with great interest to the right hon. Member for Clydesdale (Dame J. Hart). I hope that the right hon. Lady realises that in the United States the Rev. Leon Sullivan and his principles have had a big impact on Congress and on American business. That is understandable because Congress represents a large black population in the United States. At the same time, the United States percentage of interests in South Africa is limited, and they have been able to bring about a situation in which Congress has led business initially to suspend further investment and, secondly, to consider complete withdrawal from South Africa.

I do not agree with the right hon. Lady that British firms are unaware of the issues and that they do not feel deeply about them. My experience is that the great majority of British firms in South Africa have done an enormous amount to try to improve conditions, certainly in their own plants. This is certainly true in Namibia, where they have been remarkably successful in removing so many discriminatory practices. Rio Tinto-Zinc has, for example, been able to end the custom whereby black workers return to their own homes for six months and then go back to Namibia. All such families now live and work permanently in Namibia. RTZ has also been able to deal with the problem of the differences in promotion prospects between coloureds, blacks and whites. In so doing RTZ has achieved a considerable amount.

§ Dame Judith Hart

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman is right about how many British firms have applied principles similar to those of the Rex. Leon Sullivan. However, I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that RTZ is operating illegally in Namibia.

§ Mr. Heath

I do not understand the right hon. Lady's point about that company operating illegally in Namibia.

§ Dame Judith Hart

The United Nations resolution makes it clear that the exploitation of minerals in Namibia is illegal unless done under the control of a popularly elected Government.

§ Mr. Heath

I realise the import of that resolution passed by the United Nations. I was talking about the worthy efforts made by British firms to remove entirely discrimination in Namibia.

The situation in South Africa is absolutely abhorrent and the British people who see it night after night on their television screens loathe what they see and everything connected with it. The situation is now one of the utmost gravity and time is short. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will realise this when he visits Washington and Pretoria.

1031 At the same time as loathing what it sees in South Africa, the country is also confused and the Government must take responsibility for this. The House is in the same situation tonight. We are debating this most important and complex situation on the basis that Opposition Members are arguing for effective deterrents, and the Government are arguing for "not overall" deterrents. Do "not overall" deterrents exclude effective deterrents? The Government have emphasised that they have already taken eight actions and the Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that some are economic. The denial of oil to South Africa is an economic action as is the denial of dealings in the Krugerrand. However, we are told that there must not be economic sanctions because they are not effective. This confusion is leading to a completely false situation and is, I regret to say, giving the impression that it is only with the greatest reluctance that the Government are considering the situation in South Africa and taking action on it.

I wish my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary well in his difficult mission. He is right not to be frustrated by attempts to deter him. I hope that he will recognise the need to take effective action and to make it plain that such action will be taken. Therefore, he must deal with the very important point that the South African Government believe that, when it comes to the crunch, whatever and whenever it is, they will always have the support of the American Administration and the British Government, The South African Government are firmly convinced of this because they believe that they can always use the Communist threat as the argument with which to handle Washington and Whitehall. Whenever one reads the speeches—

§ Mr. Amery

What about Simonstown?

§ Mr. Heath

I disagree with my right hon. Friend. I think that we always disagreed about this. There was a time when I thought that Simonstown was important in world strategy and East-West relations. It is no longer important. Nor do I believe that South Africa is of any importance in any possible East-West arms clash.

The irony of the situation is that the longer South Africa continues its present policy, the more it drives its black population into Communist hands and the more it is encouraging the other black states in Africa to move towards a Communist outlook. We must deal with this ironic situation. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will impress, not only upon the Secretary of State in Washington but upon the President, whom he is bound to see, that every time it is said that South Africa is a bulwark against Communism, the South African Government's policies on apartheid and the political development of South Africa are reinforced. Until that argument is completely wiped from our minds we shall be unable to make any progress with negotiations.

This progress may come about only after further action on sanctions has been taken. We must get away from the confusion of whether such actions are measures or whether. they are sanctions. The purpose of them all is to persuade the South African Government to change the situation.

A myth has grown up about Rhodesian sanctions. It is not true to say that sanctions had no effect on Rhodesia. They did take a long time, but they had the effect of 1032 inducing Mr. Smith to negotiate with my noble Friend Lord Home, when he was Foreign Secretary, something which Mr. Smith had previously refused to do.

§ Mr. John Carlisle

indicated dissent

§ Mr. Heath

It is no good my hon. Friend shaking his head. He was not here at the time and knows nothing about it. Negotiations did take place, and if Mr. Smith had been prepared to move further and then get the support of the black population in Rhodesia a far better situation would now exist in that country. This is another lesson which I hope can be brought home to the Government in Pretoria.

Another lesson to be learned is that, as a result of Mr. Smith not being prepared to go so far, there was then an internal crisis of revolt. This was, of course, fed from outside the country and that will happen in South Africa, too. The consequences will also be the same. There will be ghastly bloodshed, the Government will be swept away, and the white population will be in a worse situation than if they had developed properly today. I am sure that this is right and I am glad to see the Foreign Secretary nodding his head.

§ Sir Ian Lloyd

My right hon. Friend implied a few moments ago that the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia were wholly responsible for bringing Mr. Smith to the negotiating table. Does he agree that, at that time, the most significant role was played by the South African Prime Minister who was unwilling to see that situation continue on his northern border, and who therefore brought great pressure to bear on Mr. Smith which was far more effective than any sanctions which the United Kingdom was able to impose?

§ Mr. Heath

It was because of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia that the South African Prime Minister saw a situation developing which he could no longer tolerate. That is why Mr. Smith agreed to negotiate. It was a combination of both facts.

When will the President of the Republic of South Africa and his Ministers recognise that their country is now in the same situation as was Rhodesia when he told Mr. Smith to negotiate? That is a key question, and I suggest that the Foreign Secretary must bring about a recognition from South Africa that it is now in the same situation as was Rhodesia.

The Commonwealth is in great peril, as is our position with our European allies. In part, that again is due to the Government's emphasis, which appears to be negative, on what they will not do instead of being forthcoming and emphasising what they have already done. They should emphasise that the purpose of the visit is to secure a negotiating position and, if it fails, further action will be discussed and taken.

In saying that further matters will come under consideration, the Foreign Secretary opens up the gravest doubts among everybody as to whether the Government are serious. The Government can say that after consideration they will decide what further action they will take. [Interruption.] The Foreign Secretary said that it was for consideration. If they say that after consideration they will take further action, that is a positive attitude, and by now the Government must have had time to work out what steps they will take.

I agree that there is a great deal of room for moving along with financial arrangements. If the right hon. 1013 Member for Clydesdale talks to the banks, I think that she will find that very few are prepared to regard South Africa as creditworthy and therefore they are not taking action. But it is possible for the Government to agree to take action about the banks in South Africa. Of course, it is possible for them to agree, as has been suggested, about the withdrawal of consular representation. It is possible for them to take action about airlines which, as has been suggested by the leader of the Social Democratic party, might in some ways be very effective. It may be that we shall have to give notice of when we shall cancel those airline arrangements and do that legally. If that takes time, it is hanging over South Africa that unless it embarks on serious negotiation there will be that interference with its communications.

On trading questions, agriculture is probably the best subject on which to start. Of course, each of those measures will cause hardship to people and one cannot estimate how great that will be. But if we are determined to deal with the problem of South Africa internally, its apartheid and its political position—its democracy or lack of it—it is necessary to recognise the consequences of pursuing such policies.

§ Mr. John Carlisle

My right lion. Friend talks about the consequences of further economic sanctions and offered to the House the example of soft fruit. Does he not understand that at the moment, because of the limited sanctions that have already been imposed by other countries, including Britain, dole queues are lengthening in eastern Cape and there is now hunger and starvation in that part of Africa? If the measures that he advocates, particularly in relation to soft fruit where the majority of the labour force is black, came into effect, there would be widespread misery in that part of the world. Is he willing to have that on his conscience?

§ Mr. Heath

And the Government may be changed. Of course I realise what is going on. The main purpose is to get the Government to change their policy or to change the Government. We must be frank about that. That is what the whole question is about. Those who are genuinely concerned about apartheid and the political institutions in South Africa recognise that that is the situation and there is no point in hiding it.

Industrial goods are a more difficult matter to handle. But all these things must be done in conjunction with the Community, the United States and Japan, and, if possible, with as many other countries that are involved as possible. One of the things that worries me most is that Congress will use its powers, the President will be forced to go along with it, and we shall then find ourselves still more isolated unless we too are prepared to take further action in that respect. To be isolated from the United States, in the Community and also in the Commonwealth, is the worst possible situation in which we could find ourselves.

My hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North (Mr. Carlisle) raised the question of those who are already starving. Of course, I know about that. It has been on every television screen, as have the poor whites who are unemployed as well. That is the consequence of having a Government who behave in this way. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] What is necessary is to ensure that the neighbouring African states have a full realisation of what is involved in each of the actions that we are taking. That is another of the differences between Rhodesia and South Africa.

1034 During the days of sanctions against Rhodesia, large supplies went through Rhodesia to the African states. They would never admit it and we have never troubled them with that publicly, but it went on. What will happen in this case when the original right of entry is closed? How will they be kept supplied and how will they deal with their trade? Has that been discussed with them? We do not know whether my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary discussed that with them during his recent visit, but it is of crucial importance because they will no longer have the channel of supply, in and out, which they had in those days.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has said that I mentioned a blockade. If one comes finally to having to go for full sanctions, I do not see how they could possibly be enforced without a blockade. Therefore, we should recognise at the beginning that that is what it would come to. If my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North wants to deal with apartheid, as I assume that he dues, and with the political situation there, he must face up to that fact because that is what is required.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East discussed the questions of sanctions being immoral. I do not quite understand the argument about sanctions being immoral.

§ Mr. Healey

The Prime Minister did.

§ Mr. Heath

I should hate to think that my right hon. Friend and her colleagues on the Front Bench who sat in the Cabinet between 1970 and 1974 when we had sanctions against Rhodesia thought that we were indulging in orgies of immorality. That really would grieve me. I do not think that my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary feels that today or felt that then. No, these are measures which one is loath to take, but one must balance the pros and cons.

On trade and industry, 40 per cent. of capital investment in South Africa is British and we are likely to lose that unless we show those who are the majority and who will one day have power that we recognise that fact. A large part of our trade is with South Africa, but we must also recognise that we have twice as much trade with black sub-Saharan Africa as we have with South Africa. If black Africa decides to act against us on this question, our trade with it will suffer far more than our trade with South Africa.

§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

As a former Prime Minister, would the right hon. Gentleman care to comment on what he sees as the role of the Palace in this situation?

§ Mr. Heath

I regret that the role of the Queen— let us use the proper terminology in this matter—has been brought into public discussion. The Queen is Head of the Commonwealth and in that position she understands fully her responsibilities in a constitutional situation. I have no doubt about that and it is not necessary for anyone to bring the Queen's position into this question.

We shall all regret it if countries leave the Commonwealth. At least, I shall certainly regret it immensely because the Commonwealth still performs a useful function. I regret the withdrawal of countries from the Commonwealth games in Edinburgh. But my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and members of the Government are the last ones to complain about that. Look at the political pressure that they used in 1981 to 1035 stop our teams going to Moscow after Afghanistan. That was a political question and this is a political question. I saw some of the inside work on that and why the British sailing team did not go, so we had better be a little modest in our attitude towards withdrawals from the Commonwealth games and just regret them and hope that they can be prevented.

This is a grave situation, moving with great rapidity. I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary will carry out his task with the utmost determination but we must be realistic and appreciate that he may not succeed. We must then be prepared to follow that up with the policies that we are discussing today and I hope that he will be well prepared to do so and can give confidence to the Commonwealth and to Europe that the British Government will play their part in dealing with this increasingly dangerous situation. If that is the fact, we must, as far as possible, try to achieve unity in Britain on what we are going to do.

We lived through 15 years of Rhodesian sanctions and we all saw the disunity that was caused then in some parts of our country and in some parts of the Conservative party in particular over that matter. The last thing that we want is to have a similar argument across the Floor of the House about the measures that we are taking. We should do the utmost we possibly can to reach agreement about this to deal with apartheid and the political institutions in South Africa so as to bring about peaceful change as speedily as we can. The responsibility is on us, Government and Opposition and all Members of the House, to ensure that the country understands the issues and the reasons for the action being taken and that it is as united as possible behind them.

§ Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I am sure that if only the Prime Minister would overcome the resentment that I fear she still harbours and listen to what the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) has just said she would follow his advice.

The Foreign Secretary had an opportunity this afternoon to undo some of the damage that has been done by Government statements, especially by the Prime Minister's statements, during the past few weeks. I fear that he did not succeed. He might have been able to undo some of the damage if he had confined his speech almost entirely to the sentence which ran: If my mission were to fail, I would regard agreement on some further measures as likely to be necessary. That is not the form of words that I would have chosen, and it does not go quite as far as the form of words that the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup suggested, but if that had been the general signal of his speech, it would have led to a great deal more hope and set at least some minds temporarily at rest around the Commonwealth. It would have given the impression, which I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants in his heart to give, that he enters the Commonwealth meeting at the beginning of August determined to take that line.

However, the right hon. and learned Gentleman's speech had so many deferences and so many obeisances to the views of the Prime Minister that the signal that he might have been giving was hopelessly confused. The right 1036 hon. and learned Gentleman travels about on his flying missions giving the impression increasingly that he is endowed with no more authority than the Queen's Messenger who carries Foreign Office bags from capital to capital or the cabin crew pouring the drinks on the plane. For that to be true of a Foreign Secretary who is universally liked, widely respected and generally thought to have the best interests of the Commonwealth at heart is ludicrous and humiliating. If that proves to be his position at the end of his mission and when the Commonwealth leaders meet at the beginning of August, I hope that he will not allow himself to remain in that posture.

It must be very difficult to give up the office of Foreign Secretary. It is a very noble office, but there is a level of humiliation to which that office ought never to be brought and to which no occupant of it should allow it to be brought. I hope that that will be firmly in the Foreign Secretary's mind in the little time which remains before the meeting of Commonwealth leaders.

It is not the Foreign Secretary who is the problem in all this. While he whispers about possible measures, the Prime Minister screams her defiance. Any signal which the Foreign Secretary gives is wholly overborne by the message that she gives. She has appeared day after day on television screens. She has given long interviews, and her message has been seen and heard in every part of the Commonwealth and the rest of the world. She responds in a seemingly uncontrolled manner, expressing her violent disapproval of sanctions and even of some of the more modest measures that have been discussed today. When the people of the Commonwealth and others see her, they can draw only one conclusion—that she is not prepared to contemplate any measures which she thinks might bear heavily on South Africa.

Standing out of the Prime Minister's interviews is an anger, an emotion and a zeal, one fraction of which, if it appeared to be dedicated to the cause of ending apartheid, might get us somewhere. The Prime Minister's emotion and anger is, however, directed entirely at the measures which the majority of people and countries suggest should be used to deal with apartheid. I have never seen the Prime Minister expending in a television or radio appearance the type of anger and emotion on the issue of apartheid that she expends on the means of which she disapproves. That is what leads me to believe that the proportion is all wrong —her emotional commitment is about the means and not the ends. Whatever views the Prime Minister may hold about the evils of apartheid — I take her at her word when she says that she disapproves of it and wants it to be changed—her emotion is expended not upon those evils but upon the issue of which means are to be used.

§ Sir Ian Lloyd

Surely my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is entitled to hold vehemently the view, as she does, that if sanctions will produce not the end of apartheid, which we all want, but the destruction of the South African state, they are undesirable.

§ Mr. Beith

But not one atom of that vehemence is directed against what is happening in South Africa now. I acknowledge that she disapproves of apartheid, but her emotions seem gravely misdirected.

What is the Prime Minister saying about sanctions? She says that she does not believe in general or total sanctions —some of the time because she does not think that they 1037 will work and some of the time because she thinks they will do harm. There is considerable inconsistency between those two views. Half of the time she is implying that the effect of sanctions would be negligible because many countries will not participate, and half of the time she is implying that their effect will be so strong as to harm those parts of the population which we are most anxious to help.

I shall leave that inconsistency aside, however, to consider the more immediate issue, which is that the Prime Minister never allows herself to be questioned on specific sanctions and measures. Every question that she has answered i