3.36 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Heseltine)

I beg to move, That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983, contained in Cmnd. 8951.

Mr. Speaker

I have selected the amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Heseltine

In presenting my first White Paper to the House, I am conscious that the whole subject of defence has become a matter of profound public interest and concern. That is hardly surprising, for at no time outside the conditions of world war has mankind consumed such massive resources in the purchase of armaments and in the financing of military strength.

The NATO Alliance spends an average of 5.2 per cent. of its national output on defence, this country spends 5.1 per cent., the United States 6.6 per cent. and the Soviet Union between 14 and 16 per cent. No state, however impoverished, takes the first fledgling step to nationhood without adding its own demands to the existing world armament trade of about $50 billion a year. In world arms sales the United States sells about $181/2 billion per annum, the Soviet Union $13 billion, France $61/2 billion, this country $3 billion and Israel $1.2 billion.

I start with these figures because they reveal most clearly the simple fact that our defence policy does not exist in a vacuum. We deal neither with an ideal world nor with a world over which we on our own could have more than the most minor of influences. Each of those statistics is the product of countless decisions by sovereign nation states. They articulate the real world in which we live. It is against these that we have to make the judgments and determine the resources that are necessary for our own defence.

To these we must add not only an historic perspective but our views about the motives of other Governments across the world. The responsibility to protect our national sovereignty is so absolute, so central to all our other freedoms, that the task of Secretary of State for Defence must be based on assumptions of the most extreme caution.

Defence is centred on the realities of the world as it is and not as we would wish it to be. We cannot close our minds to the confrontations, tensions and opposing ideologies which exist. We cannot ignore the massive and frightening level of armaments. We certainly cannot ignore the military power of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Whatever one's interpretation of their motives, the indisputable facts are that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are more powerful today than they have ever been, and in every field of defence.

There are those who see the Russians as a deeply conservative people who feel threatened by an aggressive and alien Western culture. In this view the Soviet Union maintains massive forces to defend the Russian homeland. They also have their history—a history of invasion of Russian territory and massive loss of life in the Napoleonic and first and second world wars. I have no doubt that these feelings are part of the cultural inheritance of the leaders in the Kremlin, but equally I am sure that we cannot give them the benefit of the doubt. They have shown that their intentions are not only defensive; they have shown that they are prepared to sacrifice the economic well-being of their people by maintaining a level of military force that goes far beyond the requirements of self-defence. They have time and again, most recently in Afghanistan, used military force to subject a sovereign nation.

As Defence Secretary, I cannot ignore the continuing and dramatic modernisation of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. Since 1970 they have introduced three new types of intercontinental strategic nuclear ballistic missiles and at least three new submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The United States, on the other hand, has put only two new submarine-launched ballistic missiles into service. In the area of intermediate range nuclear forces, the imbalance between the Soviet and NATO longer-range missiles and aircraft continues to grow. So far as the conventional balance is concerned, NATO tanks, artillery and aircraft are outnumbered by factors of between two and three to one. Under Admiral Gorshkov the Soviet navy has been forged into a major force able to operate worldwide.

The policy in the White Paper is primarily designed, along with the policy of our allies to meet the risk that this threat presents. The purpose of the Government's defence policy is to preserve the peace and freedom of the British people through the collective security provided by our membership of the NATO Alliance of free Western nations.

There can be no coherent strategy to defend Europe without America. There is no more evident manifestation of American support for this view than the 500,000 service men and their families serving in Europe. I believe it of particular significance that we should reaffirm our welcome to the 60,000 of them who are based in Britain. NATO is a defensive alliance of mutual convenience. There are no aggressive plans within the NATO Alliance. No democratic Government and no electorate would tolerate such a prospect.

In the execution of this strategy we set ourselves four main defence roles. The first, is the defence of the United Kingdom home base. In any major crisis our island role would be no less critical than in earlier times. We would need to reinforce the land base of Europe and keep open the life lines of the Atlantic. We shall continue to enhance the defence of these islands by expanding the Territorial Army from 70,000 to 86,000 and creating a home service force to guard key installations. We shall maintain the major planned improvements in the air defence of the United Kingdom. The first of our fleet of Nimrod mark 3 airborne early warning aircraft should become operational next year. The air-defence version of Tornado will enter service in the mid-80s. The programme to modify 72 Hawk aircraft to carry sidewinder AIM 9L missiles is under way. We shall continue to improve the defence of our home waters by adding new minesweepers and hunters and introducing modern torpedos—Stingray—and active sonars with a better shallow water performance.

For our second role, on the central front in Germany, the BAOR and RAF Germany are the tangible evidence of Britain's commitment to the Alliance strategy of forward defence. In this year alone the Challenger tank, tracked Rapier and the Tornado aircraft will all enter service.

The third role is to provide the strong naval and maritime air forces that are fundamental to NATO's sea defences in the eastern Atlantic and the channel. We plan in this financial year to spend about £750 million more in real terms on the Navy than was spent in the year before we came to office. We shall still be spending more on the conventional navy, even when expenditure on modernising the strategic deterrent is as its peak, than we were in 1978–79.

An extensive modernisation programme for the fleet is in hand. In the last year, orders have been placed for four type 22 frigates, a nuclear-powered fleet submarine; two Hunt class mine counter measures vessels and 10 fleet minesweepers for the Royal Naval Reserve. In all, 33 warships have been ordered since May 1979, valued at £1,875 million.

My predecessor announced that all the ships lost in the south Atlantic would be replaced. In the case of the destroyers and frigates, orders for three of the replacement ships have already been placed. I now intend to invite tenders for the fourth replacement and for an additional frigate beyond those already authorised. I shall be inviting tenders for these two frigates from the British shipbuilders yards of Cammell Laird, Swan Hunter and Vosper Thornycroft.

Lastly, there is our independent contribution to the strategic and theatre nuclear forces of the Alliance, about which much has been said in recent weeks. The Government are committed to the replacement of Polaris by Trident in the mid-1990s in order to sustain this essential element of our defences.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

Can the right hon. Gentleman say anything about the negotiations that are taking place with Brazil on the possibility of importing from Brazil 150 Embraer training aircraft? What about these discussions?

Mr. Heseltine

My hon. Friend the Minister of State might be able to expand on that matter when he speaks tomorrow. I believe that there are no such negotiations and that the requirement that would be the basis of such negotiations has not been finalised in my Department. If there is anything that my hon. Friend wishes to add to my reply, I am sure that he will take the opportunity of doing so tomorrow.

I have set out the four principal roles that we set ourselves. Inevitably, they add up to a formidable defence budget, this year amounting to nearly £16 billion. This is an increase in cash, after the adjustment I announced last week, of some £1,300 million over last year. A defence budget of such a scale has implications beyond the nation's defence. Our industry and technological base is profoundly influenced by this budget, which by its very scale must involve a social responsibility too. Defence expenditure sustains well over 1 million jobs in the services, their civilian support and in the defence industries. There is a continuing need to provide our armed services with the latest advanced technology, much of which is bound to be developed by our allies. Despite this, about 95 per cent. of the defence equipment budget is spent with British industry.

Naturally I hope to see this continue, but I must ensure that a natural desire to protect a strategic industrial base does not lead to assumptions and practices that produce avoidable cost and inefficiency. I intend to pursue on a wider scale the stimulus of competition in defence procurement and to open up opportunities wherever I can to small and emerging companies.

There has rightly been comment recently about the scale of research and development expenditure within the defence budget. We are spending this year over £300 million on research and some 1³6 billion on development. Together they account for 1.9 billion or over 10 per cent. of our total budget. This is by any standards a major part of the nation's total activity of this sort.

I do not intend to expand at length on my views on this subject save only to make these general observations. First, it is essential that defence research expenditure should be subject to rigorous appraisal to ensure that it will have a military pay-off. Secondly, it is important that wherever practical the national asset that this research represents is exploited for commercial purposes. Thirdly, it must be an appropriate objective of Government policy that, to the maximum extent possible, defence research and development is undertaken by private companies so that there is a general enhancement of the research and development resources of those companies themselves. Fourthly, we must ensure that our development expenditure is not being driven by over-ambitious or gold-plated requirements and that there are adequate incentives to the companies involved to keep down costs.

I mentioned the social opportunity within my Department. I have already announced a services youth training scheme which will provide a year's training with the services for some 5,200 unemployed young people, who will join one of the services for 1.2 months, part of which will be spent in formal training and in gaining some work experience. I can now tell the House that I intend to proceed with a parallel scheme in Ministry of Defence civil establishments which will provide training for a further 2,000 youngsters. We are talking to the unions about arrangements and intend to commence the scheme this autumn.

No one can approach the task of managing the Ministry of Defence without an awesome appreciation of its scale. In keeping with the Government's objective of introducing a range of new management practices to Whitehall and the recommendations of the report of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, we have already introduced the management information system MINIS to the Department. Over the medium term I would expect significant change to flow from this innovation.

A fundamental misconception exists in the minds of those who describe our defence capability, or portray it, as an aggressive force. Nothing could be further from the truth. As its name so clearly states, mine is a Ministry of Defence, and defence in today's world is largely about deterrence. The theory of deterrence is simple. It rests on the need to convince a potential aggressor that no attack by him could gain advantage for him. It is not necessary to be able to deploy superior forces against an aggressor at every level of military capability, but it is necessary to convince an opponent that one has the range of weapons in every class to give one a flexible capability to respond to any attack. One must have a range of weapons systems sufficiently interrelated for an enemy to believe that escalation from one weapon system to another is credible and possible. Not only is such a range of weapons systems needed, but they must be modernised with every advancing generation of technology to ensure that they remain credible against the advancing technology and counter measures of an opponent.

The Opposition amendment refers to a nuclear freeze. But what happens if our opponents do not freeze? Increasingly, our deterrent loses capability as our opponents widen the technological gap between us. What happens if we both freeze to the point that nuclear deterrence is rendered incredible by the advancing technology of counter measures and protective systems, thus leaving only conventional deterrence, where the Soviet Union has a vast superiority?

Equally, a "no first use" declaration by NATO would be an abandonment of flexible response. Flexible response does not imply a commitment to the early use of nuclear weapons, but it means that the Soviet Union must reckon with the possibility that NATO would be prepared if necessary to use nuclear weapons. Deterrence would be gravely weakened if we signalled to the Soviet Union that it could fight a conventional war in Europe without putting its homeland at risk. If NATO ever reached the point of having to consider the use of nuclear weapons, the objective would still be the same: to send a clear and unmistakable signal to Soviet leaders that they had miscalculated the Alliance's resolve to resist and that by continuing the conflict they would be running unacceptable risks. The "no first use" in which I believe is the no first use of any weapons, and the best insurance for that policy is the maintenance of the policies that have kept Europe's peace for nearly 40 years.

As part of flexible response, we must ensure that the Soviet Union would never come to believe that it had such predominance at any level of force—whether nuclear or conventional — that it could terminate hostilities at a point of its choosing. That way deterrence would fail and war would be much more likely. For that reason, we must maintain an adequate capability in intermediate range nuclear forces.

The NATO Alliance, in its twin track decision of 1979, gave the Soviet Union the clearest warning that if it did not withdraw its intermediate range missiles, four years later, in 1983, NATO would deploy its own deterrent system — Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. When that warning was given the Soviets deployed about 120 SS20 missiles, each with three warheads. Today the figure is more than 350. Two thirds of those missiles are targeted on western Europe, so that the number of SS20s aimed at western Europe has trebled since we first issued the warning in 1979.

During that time the NATO RAF Vulcan force has been withdrawn. No responsible British Government could stand aside from this evident and growing threat, especially since the Fl11s based in this country will become increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defences and counter measures. We should not forget that, even if the full deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles were to take place, they would still represent less than half of the number of warheads already deployed on the Soviet side.

But let the House understand one thing with absolute clarity. Today there are no cruise missiles in Europe. There are no Pershing 2 missiles in Europe, and if the Soviet Union had responded to our zero option initiative there was absolutely no need for them to come here. It is still not too late, but all the indications are now that the most optimistic outcome from Geneva would be an interim agreement not to avoid deployment, but to limit its scale based on equal numbers of warheads on both sides. The Government would welcome that, especially if it led to further deployments that ultimately approached the zero option.

In all that I have said so far, I am merely retracing and updating the policies of every British Government since the second world war. No British Government since the second world war have pursued policies that were significantly different from those that I am presenting to the House today. All Governments identified largely the same threat, and they all responded approximately and appropriately in much the same way.

There are those who define the process of deterrence in the pejorative language of an increasingly uncontrolled arms race. No one, regardless of party, can escape the pressures within every country and every alliance that tend to propel military expenditure remorselessly upwards. President Eisenhower, in a perceptive speech in 1961, referred to the dangers of the military industrial complex. It serves no purpose to single out the senior officers of the world's military establishments or the chairmen of the armaments companies. Each has a clear duty either to ensure that his armed services have the finest equipment they can afford, or that his work people are employed and his company profitable. There is a relentlessness about that process. Every commander is continually searching for the latest technological advance, while every chairman must look to the markets of tomorrow for the sales upon which his company depends. The only way to break into this seemingly relentless process is by political initiative on both sides.

Of course, our people want peace. They would support a reduction in the massive nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world today, but only on terms that are compatible with the peace they have enjoyed for nearly 40 years and not on terms that might destabilise that peace.

They recognise that one cannot negotiate peace with the calculating realists in the Kremlin from a position of weakness. They believe that one enhances the prospects of peace more by remaining strong than by becoming weak. However, they expect us to deploy every energy in the pursuit of balanced, verifiable and fair arms control. They expect that of us, and we have every intention to live up to that expectation. Every aspect of armament control is now the subject of detailed negotiation by the political leaders of the world. To that extent, simply because we are talking the opportunity is as great as it has ever been.

I shall outline to the House this agenda for peace, because it is comprehensive. In the strategic arms reduction talks, which cover United States and Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapons, the United States proposes a reduction in warheads on strategic missiles to 5,000 on each side. That would reduce existing deployment by about one third from present levels. If those negotiations were to lead to a substantial breakthrough, we have made it clear that Britain, in reviewing the future size of its irreducible minimum deterrent, would not stand aside from such a breakthrough. In the intermediate range nuclear weapons talks—

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport)

When the Secretary of State uses the words "would not stand aside", is he saying that we would reduce substantially the number of Trident missiles and warheads and that we would be prepared to put the Trident missile system into the negotiations and effectively take it into account in such a substantial reduction of strategic weaponry?

Mr. Heseltine

I thought that the right hon. Gentleman would understand that what I am saying is that, if in the strategic arms reduction talks there were to be a substantial breakthrough in the scale of world deployment, that would be taken into account by the British Government in deciding their own irreducible level of deterrent in the new context that would then exist. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will welcome that statement.

Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

Will my right hon. Friend make it clear that there is an irreducible minimum and that, however much the Soviets and the Americans reduce, we could not go much lower than what is now proposed?

Mr. Heseltine

My right hon. Friend will have noticed that the word "irreducible" is clearly enshrined in my speech.

In the intermediate range nuclear weapons talks the Alliance proposed the zero option but has indicated that it is prepared to consider a reasonable interim settlement based on equal numbers of warheads. We have gone further. If an interim agreement is concluded after deployment has started, we would seek to extend it further by offering to withdraw those weapons already deployed if the Russians will do the same.

Our proposals in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks for conventional forces in Europe would reduce the number of troops stationed by either side within the area concerned to 900,000 on each side.

On chemical weapons, in March Britain took an important initiative of its own in support of Western moves to bring about a global ban. It has always seemed to me that one of the most exposed positions of those who argue for one-sided gestures of disarmament lies in the experience that we have had with the Soviet Union on chemical weapons. After the second world war, we gave up our capability. The Russian response has been to build up a massive offensive capability. That was a one-sided gesture. Sadly it remained one-sided.

I have no doubt that in private, behind closed doors, there are those in the Soviet Union who fervently wish that the resources of armaments could be redirected to the peaceful pursuit of material well-being. No one can doubt that that is the wish and aim of the Western world. So it must be our responsibility, not only to remain strong against the dangers of failure but, equally, to pursue with every endeavour the prospects of arms reduction and control by negotiation. That is why the genuineness and consistency with which we pursue this agenda for peace are so critical.

It is perfectly true that a basis of trust with the Soviet Union does not at present exist. But let us also understand that it will feel something very similar about us. The quality of diplomacy is measured by the attainment of lasting, verifiable and balanced agreements between nations that do not always share a common trust. We may not succeed, but it would be unforgivable not to try. Many in the world today could point to the need for common survival as the best ground for the development of a common trust. The White Paper sets out our commitment to both.

4.3 pm

Mr. John Silkin (Lewisham, Deptford)

I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: believes that the plans outlined in the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983 (Cmnd. 8951) do not provide the United Kingdom with a viable defence against aggression; regrets the Government's failure to take any initiative to stop the escalation of the nuclear arms race and, as a first step, to support a nuclear freeze; notes that the Government plans would require the United Kingdom, which already spends more oil the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation both in terms of gross national product and per head of the population than any other member of the Alliance, to increase that spending still further; and therefore calls upon the Government to work within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for a strong non-nuclear defence policy and, in particular, to cease its reliance upon Trident and the deployment of Cruise missiles within the United Kingdom. When the first atomic bomb was dropped in 1945, The Manchester Guardianwrote: Man has at last discovered the means of encompassing his own destruction. The other day I was looking through a collection of letters that I wrote to my parents when I was a young naval officer during world war 2. One in particular caught my attention. It was written from HMS Formidable, the carrier in which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) and I served. On 9 August 1945, the day that the second atom bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, I tried to describe the feelings of the British Pacific fleet, then off the coast of Japan, about the dropping of the atomic bomb. I wrote.

I can only sum up the general feeling best if I say that only a strong international authority can save the world from destroying itself. The tragedy of our time is that, having set up that international authority, the allies of 1945 denied it the real power necessary to create permanent peace. Some 20 years ago another opportunity was lost. The disarmament committee of the United Nations approved the working document agreed by both the United States and the USSR, based upon their agreed principles for disarmament negotiation. That document envisaged a directly recruited United Nations peacekeeping force leaving to the national forces of every country in the world only such forces as might be necessary to defend their territories from aggression.

It was not proceeded with, but such a policy cries out to be undertaken in the increasingly dangerous world of 1983. Why do the Government do nothing about it? After all, throughout modern history the defence of our country has rested upon our ability to survive ourselves until a grand Alliance could be formed that was strong enough to vanquish our enemies. We were never able to do so alone. Global collective security is only an extension of that principle.

The trouble is that the Tory Government have always had an ambivalent attitude to the United Nations and an indefensible policy on arms control. There could not be a better illustration of that than their attitude to the nuclear freeze. I thought that the Secretary of State's attempts to justify the Government's arguments was in the fine tradition of total weakness of argument.

On 13 December 1982 there was a resolution of the General Assembly, which was sponsored jointly by Sweden and Mexico and adopted by no fewer than 119 votes to 17. It called for a nuclear freeze. The Government opposed it. There could not be two weaker excuses than those given on page 8 of the statement. The first is that a freeze would perpetuate and legitimise Soviet superiority". What does superiority in nuclear weapons mean, when both the United States and the Soviet Union have the power to destroy all life on this planet several times over? That is defence provision gone mad. Even using that insane basis, the White Paper reverses the mathematics. The right hon. Gentleman talks in terms of nuclear warheads. Apparently it is a good thing that at last the Russians are prepared to count in nuclear warheads rather than in missiles as such, but the Russians possess 20,000 nuclear warheads and the Americans possess 33.000. That is the gap between them.

The second excuse is that verification would be difficult. I recommend the Secretary of State to visit the Pentagon. When I was there last year, I was assured by the American Under-Secretary of Defence that verification was easy and involved no technical difficulties. In that event, why in the White Paper is it stated that verification is difficult? Why the inaccuracies and why the weasel words of the Secretary of State in answer to his right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Arnery)? I do not agree with the right hon. Member for Pavilion. We have not agreed for a long time. He has his views on the possession of nuclear weapons for our country. He was entitled to ask his question. He got the standard evasion of a Secretary of State who has not the slightest desire to negotiate a peaceful end to nuclear weapons.

Dr. Keith Hampson (Leeds, North-West)

The right hon. Gentleman did not listen to the speech.

Mr. Silkin

I did. I listened carefully. That is exactly what the Secretary of State said.

Some years ago, the British were principals in these negotiations. Today the Conservative Government leave these negotiations entirely to Reagan, even to the extent of refusing to include Polaris, let alone Trident, in the talks, although many influential members of NATO say that that is the right and sensible thing to do at this point. In the service of Reagan's America, Tory Britain has voted us out of the negotiating chamber and helped to cut our influence for peace in the United Nations. If the Government have ignored the opportunities offered in the United Nations—

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme)

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain the current position of the Labour party on disarmament? Some of us got the message that his party was in favour of disarmament. Now he tells us, as does this amendment, that his party favours a nuclear freeze. This is completely different, because it would require no measure of disarmament by the Soviet union and it would let them off the hook.

Mr. Silkin

No wonder the hon. Gentleman was so ineffective during the general election campaign. He did not read our defence policy, our manifesto or our speeches. He does not have the ability to understand exactly what I am saying and what I intend to continue to say.

Dr. Hampson

He has just listened to the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Silkin

I will send the hon. Gentleman a copy of our defence policy to read, if he can read.

If the Government have ignored the opportunities offered in the United Nations, what about those alliances that are based on the United Nations charter? It is too often forgotten that the NATO Alliance was founded by the Labour Government in 1949. It came into existence not to challenge the United Nations charter, but to fulfil it. That is why the preamble to the NATO treaty reads: The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the U.N. charter and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments. The preamble continues: They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It is an unhealthy sign that Turkey, with its repellent dictatorship, is a member of such a democratic organisation. Human rights shall be considered not only in Madrid; there is every reason to consider them in Ankara as well. If the Tory Government believe that NATO is about defending democracy, they should be forcing that dictatorship to take account of human rights. Instead, as the resources of aid are cut, the proportion given to the military dictatorship in Turkey increases.

Is that because the Tory Government are so wedded to the Reagan Administration that they are as willing to champion tyranny in Europe as Reagan has done in Latin America? Are the Government frightened that, unless they support the stupidest or most reactionary policies pursued by the Americans in NATO, Reagan will leave the Alliance?

I was interested to hear the Secretary of State talk about the resumption of chemical warfare studies by the Russians. Does that account for the fact that there has not been a whimper of complaint from the Secretary of State about Reagan's decision to resume chemical warfare studies? In this arena there is nothing to choose between the two super-powers, and the Government should be as firm with the United States as they are with the USSR. Both should be called upon—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman wants the United States to continue chemical warfare.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. John Stanley)

Disgraceful.

Mr. Silkin

I want them both to give it up.

Mr. Heseltine

In the interests of accuracy, the right hon. Gentleman will be fully aware that the Soviet Union has a fully developed chemical warfare capability, which it has used. The United States has largely forgone this. Only recently it took a decision to continue investigations into this matter because the Soviet Union has shown no concern or interest about the relative imbalance of the West in chemical warfare capability.

Mr. Silkin

The right hon. Gentleman confirms what I have been saying — that both super-powers are to blame. Why do not the right hon. Gentleman and the Government protest about them both doing it? If it is right for us to abolish it, it is right for them to do so also. The Government need not worry. There is no fear that Reagan will leave the Alliance. Reagan needs NATO as much as, if not more than, we need Reagan.

The British fleet safeguards the freedom of the United States by protecting the Atlantic approaches and the eastern seaboard of America—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The British fleet, which is the third biggest in the world and the most efficient, guarantees American independence, as it has done for 200 years. As President Roosevelt put it: The best immediate defense of the United States is the success of Great Britain in defending itself. The protection given to America is enjoyed by every other member of NATO.

In addition, the United Kingdom is NATO's paymaster. In terms of GNP and per head of the population, the United Kingdom spends more on NATO than any other member, not excluding the United States. The Labour party has pointed out consistently the unfairness and lack of wisdom of such a policy. That is why we believe in a policy that is not just more in accord with our global objectives but is also more cost-effective. It is time that the burden of defence expenditure—

Dr. Owen

does the right hon. Gentleman remember that in 1978 the Labour Government increased defence spending in line with the NATO commitment of 3 per cent. per year in real terms? I do not seem to remember that he was against that then.

Mr. Silkin

There is nothing wrong with saying that. It is absolutely right. However, the right hon. Gentleman must face up to precisely what has happened to national resources under this Government. During the past four years, since the Government came to power, the gross national product has decreased by over 15 per cent. In those circumstances, the proportion of resources spent by this country on NATO has increased. That is precisely what I was saying. It is time that the burden was shared more fairly.

Instead, the Secretary of State in his press conference on the publication of the statement—he did not talk about it in the House, but he had a press conference—envisaged an increase in our spending on NATO regardless of what our allies might do. I was waiting for him to tell us where the cuts would come. As we all know, cuts have been enforced by the Chancellor. I am sorry that he did not tell us, but perhaps we shall receive more information during the course of what is, after all, a two-day debate.

Mr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

He does not know himself yet.

Mr. Silkin

That is probably true. Are our European allies so wrong to believe, as most of them do, that NATO cannot afford a strategy based on the use of nuclear weapons in Europe? Earlier this year, in the latest war game of several—this one was called "Wintex '83"—as always, NATO rehearsed world war 3.

The war game began, as usual, with a Russian invasion of West Germany. It ended, as always, with NATO firing nuclear weapons first. The West went nuclear because its armed forces could not prevent the red army from overrunning western Europe. Instead of stopping the Russians in their tracks, firing nuclear weapons brought the NATO exercise to an embarrassing halt. No one needed to guess what would happen next. Far from Russia being warned, as the Secretary of State tells us it would be, in this war game, Russia, as it has always said it would, retaliated in kind and attacked with nuclear weapons. A worldwide nuclear war became unavoidable.

That exercise showed the flaw at the heart of NATO's present deterrent strategy, which is based upon the proposition that NATO could not withstand a conventional attack by Warsaw pact forces by conventional means alone. Far from possessing cruise and Pershing 2 missiles as purely retaliatory weapons after an assault by SS20s, NATO would first loose the dogs of nuclear war.

The decision to deploy American cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe was made for political rather than military reasons. It has created a crisis more dangerous than any in the past 30 years, and not just in East-West relations. The proposals have created considerable tensions within the Western Alliance itself, as the debates in, for example, Denmark and the Netherlands have shown. In Denmark, against the express wishes of the Danish Government, the Danish Parliament has voted for the installation of cruise and Pershing to be held up pending discussions with the Russians. In the Netherlands, an uneasy Government with a hostile population are busy trying to avoid having to make up their mind. The other members of the Alliance grow steadily more concerned. Instead of cementing the Alliance, the proposals to site cruise and Pershing in Europe have deeply divided the peoples of the Atlantic Alliance.

These weapons solve nothing. They merely prove that if there is war in Europe it is the United States President who will make the final decision as to whether nuclear weapons should be used, whatever kind words may have been inserted to help the Prime Minister pretend that she has a say in their use.

Mr. Amery

The right hon. Gentleman is assuming, if I understand him, the possibility of a conventional Russian attack in Europe. What other way has he in mind of deterring that, apart from Western nuclear strategy? Is he prepared to go for an increase in conventional forces that would match that?

Mr. Churchill

No, surrender.

Mr. Silkin

I fought in the world war, which is more than the hon. Member for Davyhulme (Mr. Churchill) has done. I am in favour of a conventional response and therefore I believe in meeting a conventional attack, if such an attack were to come, with conventional forces. I do not believe in nuclear forces.

Mr. Amery

The right hon. Gentleman has said that he wants to meet conventional with conventional, but if we do not have adequate conventional forces to meet the attack, what are the choices? They are either nuclear or surrender.

Mr. Silkin

The answer lies in two facts. First, we have the conventional forces available. I do not have much time, but I recommend that the right hon. Member for Pavilion — I am not being patronising, as I mean it seriously —reads a book that has cone out recently, which he may not have seen. It is called "Not over by Christmas" and is by Colonel Dinter of NATO and Dr. Griffith, the military historian. That puts the case as well as it can be, and should be read. Apart from that, there is all the new technology, which the White Paper also mentions.

Again, the proposals assume that the Russians will not increase the use of nuclear weapons. However, such an assumption is naive. The decision to site Pershing in Europe means that, for the first time, missiles that can reach Moscow in six minutes will be sited on German soil, which is a major change that is bound to affect the Russians and their view of the West's intentions.

The Secretary of State rightly said that, deep in the Russian folk memory, is the vulnerability of Russia to foreign invasion. Tyrants whose eyes were fixed upon Russia have arisen in the West from the lime of Napoleon to the time of Hitler. The results have always been the mass destruction of Russian territory and the loss of Russian lives on an appalling scale. More than 20 million Russians died in world war 2, safeguarding their independence and that of other countries. Nobody who has visited Moscow can have any doubt that the Russian Government and people are united in their determination that this shall not happen again. This folk memory accounts for—I do not say excuses—the building of a satellite empire from the Baltic to the Black sea to prevent the full initial force of an attack being felt on Russian territory.

Mr. Heseltine

What excuse does the right hon. Gentleman have for Afghanistan?

Mr. Silkin

I have no excuse for any aggression, wherever it may be. I have no excuse for Afghanistan, Vietnam or aggression by anybody.

The trouble is that the Russian strategy was originally based on the need for protection from tanks, but missiles travel faster than tanks. The siting of these missiles on German soil inevitably promotes fear and suspicion, and the first results of this are now being seen. Many people fear that Russia will soon locate missiles in other Eastern bloc countries, even though the countries may not want them. Thus, the nuclear stockpiles in Europe on both sides may be increased, and hence the risk of nuclear war will increase as well.

In the face of all this, the Government's decision to increase the installation of cruise missiles on British territory is the reverse of a real defence policy. Such a stance is not resolute but irrational. What is equally irrational is that the Secretary of State appears to welcome a nuclear confrontation. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] In Defence Questions on 12 July this year, the Secretary of State was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) whether he would at least delay the installation of cruise missiles pending the negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman touched on that in his speech today. His reply then was: Conservative Members think that four years is adequate if the Soviet Union has any intention of negotiating."—[Official Report, 12 July 1983; Vol. 45, c. 759.] As the intermediate nuclear force negotiations began not four years ago, but only 18 months ago, and are only now in a position to make any progress at all, it is obvious that neither the Secretary of State nor his Cabinet colleagues have the slightest intention of entering upon honest negotiation.

According to page 20 of the White Paper, the total number of SS20 launchers deployed throughout the Soviet Union stands at 351 on latest estimates. The addition of cruise and Pershing missiles to the proposed United Kingdom Trident deployment is equivalent to 500 SS20s, which is a further example of overkill. There is no doubt that the Government are in a small minority. Not even their own supporters are in favour of pushing ahead with Trident. Apart from anything else, the cost is frightening. The Secretary of State, doing what we have seen him do in other Departments, is trying to massage the figures—he is well versed in the practice.

On page 7 of the statement he says: There has been no change in the estimated cost of the Trident D5 system since last year other than for … general inflation and exchange rate changes. At average 1982–83 prices, the estimate is approximately f7½ billion. However, the cost was put at £7.5 billion in 1981, although most observers at that time thought it more likely that the true figure was £10 billion. Leaving that aside, how is it possible to discount inflation of about 15 per cent. since those days, together with a fall in the exchange rate from $1.82 in September 1981 to $1.52 and come up with the same figure as in September 1981? Only the Secretary of State knows, and he is not telling us.

There is another cost that is more dangerous and more difficult than that. To pay for Trident, our country's conventional capability will be destroyed. Our real defences are being starved to pay for a nuclear status symbol that nobody would dare to use in any circumstances. What is certain is the high cost of Trident. During the peak years of the Trident programme, it will cost about 10.5 per cent. of all equipment, will be the equivalent of 20 per cent. of new orders, will be 30 per cent. of the Royal Navy's budget and the equivalent of more than 50 per cent. of new orders for Royal Navy equipment. That is the real cost of Trident, and it is not the end of the story.

We have seen the beginnings of further expenditure cuts, as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer gets into the saddle. Those cuts will increase and will bear more and more heavily on the defence budget. The dilemma is not new. It faced the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) when he was Secretary of State for Defence. The House will recall that he wanted both Trident and an effective conventional defence policy. He was not able to get them both. The then Chancellor rightly pointed out that that would be impossible. When the right hon. Gentleman refused to accept that painful truth, he was replaced by Mr. John Nott, as he was then.

Mr. Nott's recipe was to slash the Navy and delay Tornado—one-sided disarmament of the most crucial nature. The Secretary of State has an additional source of expenditure which he has recently increased—fortress Falklands. When the new Chancellor asks for more cuts, where will the Secretary of State make them? What will be first for the axe? There are four choices. There is the protection of the United Kingdom. There is the Navy and its commanding role in the eastern Atlantic. Perhaps it will be the troops in Germany. Or will it be the abandonment of fortress Falklands?

No doubt we shall see a reduction in all those, but in the end it is the crippling expenditure on Trident that will force the Secretary of State's successor to abandon the nuclear status symbol. I say his "successor" because the Secretary of State cannot afford a review as radical as will be required after this White Paper and yet survive in office.

Even the Secretary of State's bitterest critics cannot deny that when it comes to the art of public relations he has a head start over all his colleagues. Indeed, that would appear to be the only reason that he got the job in the first place. Certainly the White Paper requires all the arts of public relations to make it credible, let alone new or radical. We have a right to expect something better.

The Secretary of State succeeded a predecessor, who, by general consent, was the worst defence Minister since Ethelred the Unready and whose own White Paper was characterised by the then—

Mr. Churchill

Cheap and nasty.

Mr. Silkin

Does the hon. Gentleman find that what the then First Sea Lord said about the White Paper— a con trick and a collection of half truths"— is also cheap and nasty?

The White Paper is a mere rehash of the last one. It is a pathetic contribution from a pathetic Minister. We deplore the opportunity that has been missed to take a new look at defence in the interests of Britain and of the world. That is why we have tabled the amendment.

4.31 pm
Mr. Julian Critchley (Aldershot)

The nicest thing that can be said about the speech of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Mr. Silkin) is that the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) was happily absent. It would probably have been rather too much for him.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, not only on his appointment but on the introduction of his first White Paper and on having enjoyed a good war. By that, I mean a good election in which the quality of his argument enabled him to defeat, for a time at least, the forces of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. But now his real problems start.

I am convinced that speeches in the House are far too long and I propose to ask only a series of questions of the Minister in the hope that he will respond to at least one or two of them when he replies. I remind him that because of the nature of the debate that will follow his reply this evening he will have a larger audience than he might otherwise have had.

My first question is addressed really to the Foreign Secretary. When will my right hon. Friend the Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) and, indeed, the Foreign Secretary, visit Moscow? Throughout the past four to five years the only Conservative Minister to visit Moscow was the Under-Secretary of State, now the Minister of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Mr. Rifkind)—a welcome visit it is true, but right at the end of a five-year period. It is important that either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary sooner or later should pay a visit to Moscow because our lines of communication must be kept open.

I understand that Mr. Ken Livingstone is to visit Moscow. I never believed that Mr. Ken Livingstone existed. I believed that he was invented by the Conservative Central Office. But if it is true that he was not invented by Saatchi and Saatchi and that he is going to Moscow, it is something of a rebuke to us.

I want to direct the following questions specifically to the Minister of State. First, the 3 per cent. additional expenditure entered into in 1978 is to end in April 1986. Will it be extended? Please may we have a response to that tonight?

Secondly, the additional cost of the Falklands will be paid for by the Treasury until April 1986. Will that extra payment be extended?

Thirdly, will our independent nuclear deterrent eventually be included in a START negotiation and, if so, to achieve what Soviet concessions? Will that be verification or inspection? If we are to reduce our independent nuclear deterrent under those circumstances, are we right in assuming that there would be, for example, a reduction in the number of Trident warheads?

Fourthly, will any additional expenditure be allocated to our conventional forces in Europe in order to raise the nuclear threshold à la General Rogers? Most of the calculations that have been made suggest that over and above the 3 per cent. we need an additional 1 or 2 per cent., depending on which calculation is used. It is all very well for the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford to talk about the need for a conventional defence of Europe when deterrence has failed, yet at the same time to be the spokesman of a party which would reduce our financial expenditure by a third. That is utter hypocrisy.

Mr. Silkin

That is quite untrue. If the hon. Gentleman cares to read our programme, he will see that it is untrue for several reasons. One is that the reduction depends entirely upon NATO's ability to defend itself on a nonnuclear basis.

Mr. Critchley

Such an intervention is not worthy of a response. That failing in the Labour party's policy was one of the real reasons why it failed so lamentably even to hold on to the the residual support that it had had for so long.

My fifth question links up with my point that if we are to raise the threshold in Europe we need to spend more money on conventional equipment and men. Is the best that we can hope for in Europe a policy of no early first use?

In every Parliament in recent yeas we have had a fundamental review of defence policy. I suspect that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will be faced with a similar problem before long. We have only to look at the threatened reduction in Government spending and the implications for defence—already, we have seen some cuts in defence spending; and sooner or later in the 1980s we shall be faced with very hard choices indeed.

Therefore, my sixth and final question is, faced with such choices, which way will the Secretary of State and the Government go? Would they prefer a NATO-based strategy or a more maritime one, or would they resist the temptation to make hard choices and muddle on by carrying out all sorts of commitments rather less well than we might otherwise do?

I have asked what I think are the important questions in defence. The answers will be left to the Minister of State and many will be waiting in the hope and expectation of receiving at least some glimmer of an answer.

4.38 pm
Mr. Ken Maginnis (Fermanagh and South Tyrone)

It is not inappropriate that I should speak for the first time in this House, in a debate on defence. From both a family and a constituency point of view I find it easy to identify with our security forces. It is a tradition in Ulster for people to volunteer to serve in the security forces. There has never been conscription in Ulster, not even during the last war. In my own family, an uncle who was a captain in the Royal Ulster Rifles was killed in Normandy in the last war, and when terrorism reared its head in Northern Ireland it fell to me to join the newest and largest regiment in the British Army—the Ulster Defence Regiment—and to serve with it from its inception on 1 April 1970 until June 1981.

Historically, the main market towns in my constituency —Dungannon and Enniskillen—are garrison towns, the latter having given its name to the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, now incorporated in the Royal Irish Rangers, and also to the Royal Inniskilling Dragcon Guards.

For reasons that will be apparent to most hon. Members I shall not refer to my immediate predecessor, who did not attend the House, did not hold dear any aspect of British democracy and went to the electorate with a ballot paper in one hand and an Armalite rifle in the other. His absence meant that no one from the constituency ever paid tribute in the House to the last working Member, the late Mr. Frank Maguire. Although I did not share his political ideals and he did not often attend the House, I know that he served his constituents. I hope that I shall serve them equally well. I hope also to contribute to the workings of the House, as have other predecessors such as Colonel Robert Grosvenor, James Hamilton and Harry West.

Having commanded part-time and full-time soldiers in the UDR, and having had under my command soldiers from the Regular Army, I understand and appreciate the sacrifices that we demand of our fighting forces. Only last week four members of the UDR died in a land mine explosion in my constituency. The stress that has lasted for 14 years is difficult to put into words. The excellent discipline of our forces in Northern Ireland is remarkable when one considers what they have had to endure in their efforts, working within the law, to keep and uphold the Queen's peace.

In 14 years, 500,000 regular soldiers have served in Northern Ireland on four-and-a-half-month tours of duty. There are now 8,000 serving members of the UDR out of a total of 32,000 who served at some period since 1970. That means that in Northern Ireland there are now 32,000 members or ex-members of the UDR who are targets for the IRA, 24 hours a day, every day of the year.

Thinking of those soldiers, I am greatly concerned about how the Government intend to cut up the financial cake for the Trident programme, the nuclear programme and our conventional forces. Last week cuts were announced in the defence budget. Where will they fall in relation to those three areas? I believe that the conventional forces are likely to get a smaller share of the cake and to suffer more cuts than any other programme. That makes me sad.

I listened carefully to the Secretary of State, as any new pupil should. He said that defence was based on the principle of deterrence, and he developed various ideas about what might happen in relation to our nuclear programme, finishing with a situation in which nuclear forces were equally balanced. I was sad to hear him say that our conventional forces would be inadequate in relation to potential enemy forces. Sometimes we seem to look too much to the future and to forget the lessons of the past. For almost 40 years we have depended entirely upon our conventional forces in maintaining peace throughout the world, most recently in the Falklands campaign and currently in Northern Ireland.

The Secretary of State talked about Government determination and strength. We all subscribe to that, but I am left to ponder the lack of Government determination and strength in the past 13 or 14 years. It was not our conventional forces which let us down in Northern Ireland or in any other theatre. It was the Government alone—a succession of Governments of both parties—who bowed the knee to terrorism during that period. I need not emphasise the point by listing all the mistakes that were made, such as flying terrorists to London and giving special category status to terrorist prisoners.

Irrespective of Trident and the nuclear programme, if we cannot defend our own frontiers effectively, how on earth can we hope to contribute to world peace? Does the Minister realise that there are no firm patrol bases left in the west of my constituency? They have been removed for a variety of alleged reasons, but the real reason is clearly that money can be saved by not keeping troops in a fixed position to defend the frontier with Eire where the terrorists cross. It is the equivalent of asking troops in the first world war to leave the front line trenches at night and come back in the morning hoping that the enemy has done nothing in the interim.

My constituency badly needs more firm patrol bases close to the frontier. Their absence puts enormous pressure on the security forces. The dread that that absence inflicts on the community is greater still. Wives, daughters and mothers sit in their homes at night wondering whether their husbands, sons or fathers will return safe, having successfully avoided marauding bands of IRA raiders.

Expenditure is important to our forces in Northern Ireland. What a difference just one small increase in the number of helicopters deployed against the terrorists would make. It is generally recognised that helicopters are essential in the fight against guerrilla forces. I have personal experience of the difficulty of acquiring helicopter hours to transport my troops around the area that I commanded. Commanders are then left with the choice of sending their soldiers in Land Rovers along dangerous roads or across dangerous countryside where there is inadequate security. They have every chance of driving over a land mine, as happened to four young men last week.

By their courage and discipline, the security forces should have earned the House's support. I beg the Secretary of State to keep our conventional forces, and my hard-pressed constituents, in his mind as he shares out the financial cake. I hope that I have shown my own and my constituency's gratitude to and concern for our armed forces. That is not all that those who elected me would want me to convey to the House on their behalf. They would also want me to convey their loyalty and obedience to the House and their steadfastness to their British heritage. Those members of the UDR with whom I have had the privilege to serve are a living example of that dedication. We ask only that hon. Members and the Government never allow that fact to escape them in their debates and deliberations.

4.52 pm
Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath)

The House has listened closely and with great interest to a distinguished maiden speech from the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. Maginnis). He is able and articulate. We especially welcome his kind words for the British Army's contribution to the defence of his constituents. His call for helicopters was an updated version of Nelson's endless calls for more frigates. The hon. Gentleman spoke with great sincerity, knowledge and conviction. We look forward to his taking part in many more defence debates. His predecessor made himself famous through his absence; I trust that the hon. Gentleman will make himself famous through his future contributions to our affairs.

The temptation for politicians, realising their lack of knowledge about defence matters, is to speak with great caution. I advise my new hon. Friends not to be unduly cautious. It was, after all, a general who came up with the famous comment, "There will always be a place on the battlefield for the well-bred horse." I refer, of course, to Field-Marshal Haig.

This year's defence White Paper is to be commended for its style, colour and content. I also draw attention to the calibre of our defence team. The new Secretary of State has shown an astonishing grasp of detail over a highly complex and technical subject in a short time. I cannot help contrasting our team's performance with that of the previous Labour Governments' defence team. Only a few years ago The Times felt moved to draw attention to their lack of ability and chided them for their weak performance.

The Labour party is in hopeless trouble on defence. That was one reason for our election victory. The one-sided gesture of disarmament hangs around the Labour party's neck like an albatross. If it gives it up, it also gives up a number of its general management committees. Labour is divided into three groups. The first is those who genuinely want to improve our conventional forces. They are as rare as hen's teeth in my part of the world. The second group comprises those who wish to cut our conventional forces by reducing defence expenditure in line with that of our allies. The third group contains those who would invite the Girl Guides in tomorrow without a qualm.

The Social Democrats are present in their usual strength. They have a remarkable nuclear policy. I describe it as a policy of wear-out and rust-out. Briefly, one trots out on platforms throughout the country all the arguments in favour of an independent nuclear deterrent and then one day a chap in a white coat with a screwdriver says that the thing is U/S—unserviceable to those who have not done national service—and instantly one trots out all the arguments against Britain having an independent nuclear deterrent.

The threat is ably described in the White Paper. Like all my right hon. and hon. Friends, I fear that the aged leadership in the Kremlin is out of touch with its people and world events. We are sometimes told by the younger generation that it is not arming against the West but has its eyes on China. However, if one examines the capability of its equipment—especially electronics—it is clear that it sees Western Europe as the likely area for action. Communism is for export. It is for insertion even during a period of so-called detente. The Soviet leadership has made it clear that it does not want to use violence, but it is not prepared to allow the lack of it to stand in the way of its political objectives. For most of my lifetime, we have witnessed that violence. I served as a soldier in Berlin when the wall was going up. We have also seen that violence in the snowy wastes of Afghanistan, whence millions of people are now refugees.

What are the Soviet leadership's aims and intentions? Baluchistan perhaps? Or will it be Iran to forestall what the Russians would see as a possible move by the Americans? Will it be Yugoslavia? It is highly likely that the Soviets will attempt to pull that country back into the fold. The sheer weight and intimidating numbers of Soviet conventional forces are a cause for great concern. Professor John Erickson has written: The near frantic rate of military production as well as naval building suggests something akin to a war tempo". I draw attention to the wise words of Lord Home who, with minimum rhetoric, achieves maximum effect. He recently said: War is not inevitable. But the life of the democracies may well hang on whether they have the will to strengthen NATO with conventional arms. And to do so to a point where all temptation is removed from the Soviet High Command to launch a surprise attack and face the West with a fait accompli. Time allows me to touch on only a handful of topics in the White Paper. Our strategic deterrent contributes an entirely independent centre of decision-making within NATO, and thus greatly strengthens the NATO Alliance. A potential adversary finds it much harder to forecast our likely response. Just in case the Soviets should doubt the total commitment of the United States, surely it is prudent for one European country, totally committed to NATO, to hold a strategic nuclear deterrent. To me, Britain is the obvious candidate.

The NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles in Britain and Europe is one of the most critical decisions of this decade. Deployment will redress the serious imbalance in theatre nuclear weapons. I remind Opposition Members that Britain has been a potential nuclear target for the Soviet Union since that country fiat acquired nuclear weapons, back in the 1950s. It will of course remain a potential nuclear target, whether or not cruise missiles are here.

I turn to the vexed subject that has cropped up so often in these debates, NATO's southern flank, the tropic of Cancer. Defence outside the NATO area could become just as important, if not more important, to NATO in the future. I detect a Maginot line approach. In those days, much money was spent on the Maginot line. Today, much money is spent on the close defence of central Europe. Surely, the military lesson of history is that the flanks are the more likely target than the centre.

The quality and quantity gaps between NATO and the Warsaw pact are closing simultaneously. It is vital that we keep one step ahead of the Soviets in research and development. I therefore welcome what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said earlier. By keeping ahead with our technology, we are making the best use of our limited but highly trained manpower. In particular, we must concentrate on improving our surveillance systems and our precision guided missiles. It has been said, "If you can find it, you can hit it. If you can hit it, you can destroy it."

I should like to say a brief word on another important topic, maritime versus continental. The Secretary of State's predecessor dutifully told us over and again about the disadvantage of adopting the so-called maritime approach. I only hope that the Secretary of State will not set his face like flint—to borrow a phrase—against such an approach in the long run. Over the centuries the Royal Navy has proved our particular and appropriate champion. Since the time of Marlborough we have not liked having a standing army in western Europe.

Mr. Dalyell

I heard the hon. Gentleman give courageous and informed evidence on the BBC's "You the Jury" programme on Saturday night. Does he agree with Lord Lewin that there should be a south Atlantic strategic vantage point for NATO? What does the hon. Gentleman say to the argument that was adduced by the person who called him in witness, my hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes), that much of the Navy was being taken out of its proper role?

Mr. Townsend

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to make another speech on an entirely different aspect of defence policy. I wanted to quote the words of the Select Committee on Defence, and in particular paragraph 16, which says: Any sustained and substantial commitment to defend the Falkland Islands will affect the contribution of HMG to NATO, already strained in terms of manpower and equipment. We have pressed the Ministry of Defence to indicate where current and planned deployments have stretched resources and altered the declarations of forces to NATO and we are not completely satisfied by their reassurances. We cannot disguise the fact that there will be substantial problems and that there will be effects on NATO capabilities". Those words are worth further exploration during this debate. I have always made it clear that we have no alternative but to defend the Falkland Islands at present. However, I do not believe that we should attempt to set up a strategic stronghold for NATO based on the Falkland Islands in the immediate future.

In a troubled and turbulent world, we must have a Government who deal in conciliation from a basis of strength. We have just elected such a Government. Their defence policies should be supported in the interests of peace.

5.4 pm

Mr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East)

The hon. Member for Bexleyheath (Mr. Townsend) referred to unilateralists, and to three types of unilateralists in particular. I do not know where I find myself in those types, but in my experience very few supporters of unilateral nuclear disarmament — indeed, a very small fraction — are pacifists. Indeed, the overwhelming majority, including myself, strongly support the defence of this country and are as committed to defending it and our way of life as are Conservative Members and hon. Members on the Opposition Benches who oppose unilateral nuclear disarmament.

I shall not rehash some of the arguments—some of which did no credit to anyone — that were adduced during the general election campaign. Nor shall I take this opportunity to restate the fundamental case, as I see it, for a non-nuclear defence policy. Instead, I shall look at some of the common ground that exists on defence and try to explain to Conservative Members why we are so alarmed about the road down which the Government are taking us on defence.

We all agree on the need to defend this country. I was pleased to see the Government say in the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" that the Soviet Union was not planning an immediate attack. Of course not. Equally, of course, we have to be defended against the possibility of any future attack. We know that. However, we must also recognise that we are now in the most dangerous period of human history and that the overriding objective of this Government's policy in foreign affairs and defence—the two are, of course, closely related—should be to seek to avert the ultimate conclusion of the nuclear arms race, a conclusion which is bound to lead to the devastation of civilisation in Europe as we know it. The threat of a nuclear holocaust is very much on the increase.

I know that the Secretary of State for Defence does not want a nuclear war, any more than I do. However, I am appalled at times by the statements that are made by people in high places, who seem to fail to recognise the enormity of nuclear war. I shall give three brief examples. I listened with great care to the Prime Minister's speech at the Conservative party conference, which was televised live last year. I still remember, as if she said it yesterday, her reference to the two atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan.

The right hon. Lady said: I want to see nuclear disarmament. I want to see conventional disarmament as well. I remember the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I remember, too, the bombs that devastated Coventry and Dresden. There is no comparison between the nuclear weapons that are now deployed in this country and Europe and their effects, and what happened in Coventry and Dresden.

At the beginning of this year I read an interview with John Mortimer which the retiring permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence gave in The Sunday Times. He said that people go on and on about nuclear war; millions and millions of people died in the 1914 war, it just took longer to kill them, that's all. What an incredible statement. How could anyone in that position compare the devastation of nuclear war and its implications, not just for our forces but for our whole society, with what happened in the first world war?

Recently an appalling circular was sent by the scientific research and development branch of the Home Office to the regional civil defence advisers, seeking to discredit the British Medical Association's report on the effect of nuclear weapons. I hope that hon. Members will read that report, because it represents a balanced view of what nuclear war would mean to this country. It concluded that civilised life as we know it, and the human values and ethical standards on which the practice of medicine is based, would cease to exist in vast areas of these islands.

We are terrified by the statements made by people in high places in this Government—even more so in the Reagan Administration—in which they do not seem to realise that nuclear war, as opposed to conventional war, is a wholly different ball game. In the Secretary of State's speech today—and this applies also to the "Statement on the Defence Estimates"—there was no recognition of the present dangerous escalation of nuclear weapons.

The right hon. Gentleman said a lot about deterrence. We all understand the policy of mutually assured destruction and the idea that the Soviet Union will not unleash its nuclear weapons against the West because it fears the consequences of the West unleashing its nuclear weapons against it, but how on earth could the Secretary of State address so many of his remarks to the policy of deterrence without once referring to the real and justified fear that the development of counterforce weapons and of a counterforce strategy undermines deterrence?

Hon. Members must recognise that. It is one thing to deploy nuclear weapons against population centres and to have a policy of mutually assured destruction, but nuclear weapons are now being developed that have the accuracy to take out the other side's nuclear weapons. Thus, the risk of nuclear war becomes much greater, because the other side fears that we will use our nuclear weapons first to take out its weapons, and vice versa.

I am surprised to see the Minister shaking his head. Many men who are much more distinguised in military matters than hon. Members—such as Lord Carver and Lord Zuckerman— share that view. In their hearts of hearts, hon. Members know that a counterforce strategy represents the most dangerous escalation yet of the nuclear arms race. This country has decided to deploy the Trident 2 D5 weapon system which is specifically designed to be accurate enough to take out Soviet missiles. There is also cruise, which is a counterforce weapon. It is true that the SS20s represent a major advance on the land-based weapons that the Soviet Union has deployed in Europe, but there is hardly any comparison between the next generation of SS20s and the cruise and Pershing missiles, which are much more accurate than the SS20s.

In any consideration of nuclear balance, accuracy must be taken into account. Prominent spokesmen in America and leading experts on nuclear arms will acknowledge that there is a broad balance between the arsenals of the United States of America, NATO and the Soviet Union. The increased fire power and explosive power, and the higher number of megatons that the Soviet Union certainly has by comparison with the West, is at the very least offset by the technological lead of American weapons over those of the Soviet Union.

The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Geoffrey Pattie)

The hon. Gentleman does not seem to take into account in his weapon for weapon consideration the fact that the counterforce strategy is fundamental. It is inconceivable that a country should have a counterforce strategy when it cannot take out all the weapons on the other side. A significant number of them are submarine-launched, and thus housed in submarines that cannot readily be discovered.

Mr. Strang

That is a fair point, but, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the United States of America is going down the road of anti-submarine ballistic warfare. Military planners fear that if all the land-based nuclear weapons were taken out that would substantially reduce the ability to respond. It is important to bear in mind not only the purpose of the weapon, but the fact that the other side knows that a weapon system has a certain capability.

We are appalled by the way in which the Government do not seem to give any lead to those forces in the world who want to end, or at least to reduce, the present risk of a dangerous escalation in the nuclear arms race. In the White Paper there is an interesting section on a number of nuclear disarmament initiatives. I was interested to read those passages in the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" which have a blue background and which are described as outlining the Government's thinking on important general issues. I could not help but feel that the view expressed was more that of the Conservative party than the more balanced view that may exist on some of these issues in the Ministry of Defence.

The comments on the various initiatives proposed on nuclear disarmament make very sad reading. No one is suggesting that the nuclear freeze is an end in itself. However, many people in Britain, Europe, the United States of America and elsewhere suggest that it would be a useful starting point. Of course it does not solve anything, but it would be a useful beginning if we were to agree to freeze the development and deployment of additional nuclear weapons.

Of course it is true that the Russians have more land-based theatre nuclear weapons, but the overall balance is broadly equal between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Therefore, it is reasonable to put forward that proposition as a tentative stepping stone towards securing real negotiations and reductions in nuclear arsenals.

The next item on the Government's list is the "no first use" of nuclear weapons. That is very important. The document discusses the new technology developed, in particular, in the United States of America, which will enhance the conventional capability of NATO forces, and enable us better to resist a conventional Soviet attack, but, depressingly, it says that if such weapons were developed and deployed there would not be any alteration in the policy of a flexible response. I understand that to mean that there is no question of the Government conceding that NATO will abandon its policy to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That is a deplorable state of affairs. One of the Government's overriding objectives should be to enable NATO, as quickly as possible, to respond positively to the Soviet Union's undertaking that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Of course, that is not an end in itself, but it would represent a great step forward. The Secretary of State says that he would like a policy of not being the first to use any weapon, but that fails to recognise the enormity of the gulf between the conventional and nuclear weapons. We hope that there will never be another conventional war in Europe, or another war in which Britain is involved. However, at present we do not have a chance of avoiding a war that will automatically lead to a nuclear holocaust and to the total devastation of these islands.

Time does not allow me to go through all the initiatives that I have in mind, but the White Paper refers to nuclear-free zones. Surely the arguments against such zones are appalling. Of course they are not an end in themselves, but if all the battlefield nuclear weapons were removed from central Europe, and if no nuclear weapons were deployed both east and west of the divide, it would represent a great advance. However, the Government are just not interested. Their record at the United Nations is terrible. On occasions only two countries out of more than 100 —Britain and the United States of America—have voted against every initiative to halt the terrifying escalation of the nuclear arms race.

Mr. Churchill

Surely the hon. Gentleman would be the first to recognise that if we were to agree to such a nuclear-free zone it would not have any relevance, because nuclear missiles can be fired into that zone from outside, and even from behind the Urals. If the SS20s were moved back that far, they could still strike with impunity at any point in western Europe. That is why it is so important to achieve a reduction in those weapon systems, instead of making absurd geographical no-go area.

Mr. Strang

That is a point that the Government make. Of course I want to see a reduction in those weapons. However, at the very minimum I should like there to be agreement on a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, because it would be a confidence-building factor. Of course that is not an end in itself. It is certainly not a substitute for getting rid of Polaris, Trident, MX, SS20s and so on. It will take us some time to get rid of the nuclear weapons belonging to the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The real danger is of a limited nuclear war that will escalate into all-out nuclear war in Europe. Anything that can build confidence between East and West and give those of us who are terrified of the policy that the Government are pursuing some assurance that something is being done to avert that disaster will be a positive development.

I conclude by quoting, as I did during the defence debate on 1 July 1982, from a memorandum issued by distinguished retired NATO commanders and NATO Ministers. I make no apology for quoting it, because it is important to get it through to hon. Members that the views that we are putting forward are the views not of a small minority, the hundreds of thousands of people who have taken to the streets in Europe against nuclear war, but the views of more and more military people who are becoming more and more concerned about the road our leaders are taking us down in relation to the development of nuclear weapons.

The memorandum said: The armament logic of former decades which said that a more extensive war potential implied an increase in national security is not valid anymore however. Nowadays, more security can only be obtained through less armament. This reversal is not an easy process, but a feasible one. A decision like this demands as much political wisdom and statesmanship, courage and cultivated leadership qualities as did formerly the doctrine of the use of military force in order to maintain national independence, sovereignty and freedom.

5.21 pm
Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough and Horncastle)

I