Defence

§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott)

I beg to move, That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982, contained in Cmnd. 8529.

§ Mr. Speaker

I have selected the amendment in the name of the party below the Gangway.

§ Mr. Bob Cryer (Keighley)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I request that you are a little more precise because of the nature of the people who have suddenly discovered an arresting interest in prayers, which they never betrayed when they were on the Labour Benches, and then litter themselves on what is traditionally the Tribune Bench, which is part of the Labour Party.

§ Mr. Speaker

Although this does not directly relate to my ruling on the amendment, I would have thought that the House welcomed anyone who took a new interest in prayers.

I have selected the amendment in the name of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen).

§ Mr. Nott

The opening words of the White Paper on defence policy last year were The first duty of any British Government is to safeguard our people in peace and freedom. That duty rests on three defence commitments. The first is the maintenance of a credible strategic nuclear capability to deter nuclear blackmail by our enemies. My hon. Friend the Minister of State will say more about that in the second debate next week. The second is the collective security provided through our contribution to NATO of strong naval, army and air forces for the defence of the West. The third is a force structure, within the NATO framework, which has the balance and flexibility to enable us to respond to a challenge to British interests at home or abroad.

The events of the past few weeks have concentrated all our attention on the third commitment—our ability to respond in defence of uniquely British interests—although our determination to resist aggression will have strengthened the whole deterrence strategy of the West. In these past few weeks we have seen British power projected over 8,000 miles into the South Atlantic to restore the rights and freedom of British citizens.

I must single out for a special mention at the outset the Royal Navy: putting the Fleet to sea in such a short time and sustaining it over such a long distance into the South Atlantic have been a remarkable achievement. The many essential refuellings and transfers at sea in often appalling weather required seamanship of the highest order. When the historians come to write about the operation I believe that achievement by the Royal Navy will have a special place.

Our armed forces conducted themselves at every stage with great gallantry under intense attack and in the most hostile climatic conditions. A major amphibious landing has been successfully conducted; a major and decisive land battle has been fought by the men of 3 Commando Brigade, 5 Infantry Brigade and the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment against great odds over the 1057 most inhospitable terrain, thus writing another historic page in the annals of the Royal Marines and the British Army.

Incidents of individual courage, initiative, and also compassion, on the part of our forces have been shown at every level and at every stage of the operation. I pay my tribute from this Dispatch Box to the men and women of all three Armed Services and to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service, the Merchant Marine and to the many military and civilian personnel who provided support for the task force. A special place in our thoughts will remain for them and most particularly for those who were injured, and for the families and friends of those who gave their lives that others could be free.

Our forces in the South Atlantic were for the most part equipped with weapons, ships and aircraft which had been optimised under successive Governments for battle under very different circumstances. Some, such as our amphibious force, amply demonstrated the advantage that their inherent flexibility confers. The quality of our men and equipment on sea and land and in the air was amply proved.

Let me give a few examples. Twenty-eight of our 32 Sea Harriers were deployed to the area and they achieved at least 28 kills without a single loss in air-to-air combat. There were more than 2,000 operational sorties from the carriers, and one of the most remarkable features of the whole operation was the 90 per cent. availability of all aircraft embarked.

The first order that I intend to place following the Falklands crisis is for new Sea Harriers. All seven Sea Harriers lost will be replaced—and I intend to fund out of the existing programme, rather than out of replacement funds, a further seven Sea Harriers, making an immediate new order of 14 in all for British Aerospace.

The crisis showed that flexibility, adaptability and the imaginative use of national resources were crucial to the success of our operation. Particularly notable was the extensive use made of air-to-air refuelling. Seven Hercules and 13 Nimrods have already been adapted for it, and that will greatly enhance our capability. Hercules regularly made, and are still making, 25-hour, 8,000-mile round trips from Ascension to drop supplies to the task group around the Falkland Islands. Nimrods flew more than 110 maritime surveillance sorties—including regular air-to-air refuelled flights of 19 hours to the Falkland Islands area. RAF Harriers were flown to Ascension direct on a nine-hour, air-to-air refuelled mission and then—almost miraculously—four were flown non-stop to the deck of HMS "Hermes", another nine-hour flight.

The performance of the Victor tanker forces was outstanding and six Vulcans and four Hercules are being converted to the tanker role. We will be devoting increased resources to in-flight refuelling as a major force multiplier—it will be particularly valuable in the United Kingdom air defence region, extending our ability to maintain combat air patrols over the North Sea for long periods and it gives us the ability to extend dramatically the flexibility and scope of the projection of our air power. The first VC10 tanker for the RAF had its maiden flight a few days ago.

One notable feature of the Falklands campaign was the enormous contribution made by shipping taken up from 1058 Britain's merchant fleet and its Merchant Navy crews. At peak, more than 50 vessels were involved. The campaign has proved beyond a shadow of doubt that necessary modifications, such as fitting helicopter platforms and at-sea refuelling facilities, can be made quickly and efficiently. From the container ships not only did helicopters successfully carry out limited operations, but Sea Harriers made several flights in the vertical take-off mode from those ships.

As part of the studies of the campaign, we shall be taking another look at such use of civil resources in wartime. The Ministry of Defence does not claim to have any monopoly of good ideas in this area and I hope that organisations and individuals will come forward with their own suggestions—a point I made when identifying the importance of this area in chapter 2 of the defence White Paper in the section on the use of national resources.

§ Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline)

On the Merchant Navy, is it not a fact that if we are to get this type of resource it is essential that we retain the standing of the British flag fleet and ensure that replacements for the "Atlantic Conveyor" and other ships are built in the United Kingdom?

§ Mr. Nott

I share the hon. Gentleman's wish that the maximum number of our merchant fleet, now and in the future, should be built in British yards. I do not need to say that the ultimate choice is for the shipping company concerned.

During the whole Falklands operation, our helicopters all performed magnificently. They flew round-the-clock in all weathers to provide anti-submarine warfare support for the task force, to carry out reconnaissance and to carry troops, stores supplies and men. The assault helicopters were most successful in the ground attack role. Our experience during operations in the South Atlantic has demonstrated clearly that helicopter support is vital in the land battle. It is difficult to see a situation in which there could ever be too many helicopters available to our forces.

I intend to authorise immediately the placing of new orders for helicopters to replace losses during operations and also to strengthen our reserve holdings where necessary. We recently ordered five Sea Kings; that order with be increased to 16—eight in the ASW role and eight in the commando role. In addition we shall purchase three Lynx and up to five Gazelles, and we shall replace all three Chinooks lost in the "Atlantic Conveyor". These and other equipment orders that I am announcing today will, of course, be subject to satisfactory terms of contract, including price.

At this point, I should also like to confirm to the House that HMS "Endurance" will continue in service, and after a refit she will continue to deploy to the South Atlantic. I shall return to the Falklands crisis later in my speech, but I must first touch on other matters.

When I published the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" last week, I said that it would serve partly as a reminder and also as a tribute to our Armed Forces who are now engaged elsewhere than in the Falklands. Their tasks may not have attracted the headlines in the past few weeks, but their work has been no less important.

Regrettably, the internal security situation in Northern Ireland still requires the presence of substantial numbers of Service men. They continue to play a vital part in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in containing 1059 terrorist attacks and bringing their perpetrators to justice. Their task is frequently dangerous and disagreeable, but their presence is an essential part of our efforts to ensure that the people of Northern Ireland can be freed from the fear of terrorist violence.

Further afield, our forces in Hong Kong, Cyprus and Belize continue to contribute to the maintenance of peace. Our relations with countries in many parts of the world are also strengthened by the military assistance that our Armed Forces are able to provide. Their professionalism and technical skills are rightly held in high regard. This year Service personnel are on loan to 30 overseas Governments.

That aspect of the work of our forces attracts little public interest, but it is nonetheless very important in helping to maintain peace and stability around the world.

§ Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead)

In view of the news that we have received today from Belize, is my right hon. Friend satisfied that we have sufficient forces there to deter an aggressor?

§ Mr. Nott

I am satisfied that our forces there are adequate at the present time. We are giving assistance to the Government there in the training of their defence forces. That is an important feature for the future.

It is to our NATO contribution that I must devote the major part of my remarks, since the main threat to the security of the United Kingdom remains the nuclear and conventional forces of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. In last year's White Paper we stated: The Central Region is the Alliance's heartland in Europe; the forward defence of the Federal Republic is the forward defence of Britain itself. I make no apology for reiterating those words; none is required, given the realities of the threat. Those who argue the case for renegotiation of the Brussels treaty, the further reduction of our continental commitments, or our withdrawal, ignore three elements in our current strategy.

The first is the straight military fact that there is no adequate substitute for in-place forces. None of our allies is ready to fill the gap; they are already committed and extended to forward defence. A reduction in our commitment would not strengthen the security of the United Kingdom; it would weaken it. Exercise Crusader proved that our reinforcement plans work, but it also demonstrated that there are finite limits to the size of reinforcements that we could sensibly hope to deploy in the warning time available.

But our contribution is not just military—its political significance is equally important. What lessons would the Soviets draw from any reduction in our commitment on the central front at present despite events in Afghanistan and Poland and in advance of any mutual and balanced force reductions agreement? Similarly, what effect would it have on the perceptions of our allies, not least the Americans who expect—and quite reasonably so—to see the Europeans as committed to the forward defence of Europe as they are themselves? The United States maintain, 200,000 army personnel in Germany, as against our commitment to 55,000 men. Isolationism may be dormant in the United States, but none of us can be sure that it is extinct.

Finally, it would cost us more in the short and medium term to bring back our forces, to house them, to create training areas in the United Kingdom and all the necessary support and infrastructure than it does to maintain them in 1060 Germany. We would need more money for such a change, not less. Nor could we afford to disband elements of our Army. The planned size of 135,000 for the Army is the minimum needed to meet our peacetime and wartime commitments. By maintaining a strong land-air capability in Germany we are pursuing the wisest military, political and financial course.

However, we must ensure that our forces on the central front are structured in such a way as to produce the most balanced, effective and powerful deterrent to a potential aggressor. That is being achieved by the reorganisation of BAOR into three larger and more powerful in-place divisions, which will provide the corps commander, by the middle of next year, with what he needs to fight the immediate tactical battle, if necessary in a short-warning scenario. It will also produce a credible corps reserve. As part of this reorganisation a non-mechanised infantry battalion and a FH70 artillery regiment will be relocated in the United Kingdom.

Since the Government took office, as the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" makes clear, we have transformed the capability of our land forces on the central front. The number of manned tanks has increased by over one quarter in the past three years and a ninth armoured regiment has been formed. I can now announce that the introduction of Challenger in the mid-1980s will permit two additional armoured regiments, the tenth and eleventh, to be formed and the provision of a full complement of Chieftain tanks as a war maintenance reserve.

At my request, the general staff has recently been studying the role of the infantry in the 1990s. I am anxious that in all our defence planning, particularly in procurement with its very long lead times, we should look forward to concepts of operations a decade from now when electronic and missile technology will have taken another leap forward.

The infantry will need to operate and keep pace with the tank formations for which they will require more heavily armoured vehicles than we now possess, with intrinsic firepower. The sheer weight of conventional firepower to be expected in the initial battle also requires all our forward infantry to be protected by the latest armour, as well as the mobility to fight in depth. In a relatively small Army like ours, we need forces that are both mobile and flexible to offset the greater numbers of the Warsaw Pact. We are, therefore, looking at a new mix of vehicles for our mechanised infantry in the 1990s, including MCV 80, as well as derivative and alternative vehicles.

Our forward air defence capability also needs enhancement. It will be increased by the entry into service over the next couple of years of self-propelled Rapiers. Sufficient have been ordered to equip three batteries. The delivery of the Blindfire Rapier missile system to 1 British Corps for the towed version has been completed.

To deter, 1 British Corps must be modern and effective, but I am no less concerned at what I would call our "second line" Army and the reserves. The balance of strength and the quality of equipment as between 1 British Corps and the rest of the British Army is a vital issue.

§ Mr. Anthony Nelson (Chichester)

My right hon. Friend has referred briefly to the importance of air defence in the central European region. In regard to tanks, he mentioned the importance of looking 10 years forward. Will he do the same in regard to air defence and recognise 1061 that when the Jaguar squadrons become obsolete, we shall need a replacement for this tactical combat aircraft and many of us hope that it will be the P110.

§ Mr. Nott

I recognise my hon. Friend's great interest in the P110 programme. We should be able to say more about this in the debate on the Royal Air Force Estimates. I recognise that, at the moment, we are not planning for a Jaguar replacement in our programme. I shall be saying more in a moment about air defence in Germany.

§ Mr. John Morris (Aberavon)

On armour planning on the central front for 10 years ahead, will the Secretary of State say to what extent we shall be able to see eye to eye with our allies in Europe on the same operational requirements and the same provision? Or are we as far away as ever from having the same kind of tank to fight the same kind of battle?

§ Mr. Nott

I regret that standardisation of equipment on the central front is far from being what it needs to be. There is still no agreement—I take one example—on the Franco-German tank. There has been disagreement on that for years. I share the right hon. and learned Gentleman's concern that there is inadequate standardisation. We shall continue to try for it. In the end, it comes back to the industrial interests of each member country of NATO and those industrial interests seeking naturally for equipment to be built by their own people in their own factories. I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman's general point.

We must defend the United Kingdom base, not just as the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Alliance but also as the principal source of United States and United Kingdom reserve forces for the Continent itself. The increase that I have proposed in the size of the Territorial Army, the formation of a new home service force, three additional Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment squadrons for the ground defence of operational airfields, and the formation of a new reinforcing division, 2 Division, here at home, with its headquarters in York have all been announced in the past year. We have also recently, on the subject of the reserves, announced tenders for the first batch of a new class of minesweeper for the Royal Naval Reserve.

On current plans, a number of naval Wessex 5 helicopters may become surplus to requirements as new Sea King 4s are delivered to the Royal Navy over the next few years. These plans will need to be reconsidered in the light of our Falklands experience, but if they are confirmed, I would like to examine the use of one squadron of Wessex 5s here in the United Kingdom in support of the predominantly TA reinforcing division.

I would not wish to raise any false hopes in this regard but we shall examine, if this proves possible, whether the Wessex 5 helicopters with the TA reinforcing division might be flown by pilots of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force thereby giving the RAF reservists a flying role again.

I come now to the RAF. We station 12 squadrons in Germany as part of NATO's second tactical air force. They are an essential part of the forward defence of the Alliance, but they also provide a crucial contribution to the defence of these islands since our own defence is integrated into the airborne early warning system and ground-air defence of the Alliance. Enemy air forces will be attacked early and well forward so facilitating, in depth, defence of the United Kingdom home base.

1062 We intend to provide for the United Kingdom itself a much improved and resilient air defence system, with the introduction of the air defence variant of the Tornado, greatly enhanced by air-to-air refuelling, the entry into service of the Nimrod airborne early warning aircraft, and the modernisation of the United Kingdom air defence ground environment.

§ Mr. Robert Atkins (Preston, North)

Is my right hon. Friend able to give any indication of when the decision on the Rolls-Royce RB 199–67 R engine, the uprated version for the Tornado ADV, will be made, bearing in mind the discussion that has taken place about the possible lack of thrust of the ADV?

§ Mr. Nott

We have made forward provision in our programme for the improvement of this engine. I agree with my hon. Friend that this is an important matter that we shall have to consider shortly. It is a very expensive programme. I am conscious of its need.

Turning now to aircraft, we intend to acquire 60 advanced Harrier GR5s—the AV8B—for the Royal Air Force. The RAF Harriers lost in the Falklands will be replaced by additional Harriers in due course. The virtues of the existing Harrier GR3 have been amply demonstrated in operations in the South Atlantic. The GR3s were equipped successfully with Sidewinder and now have an air combat capability to add to their principal ground attack weapons. Our decision to retain a VSTOL capability to the turn of the century by the acquisition of the GR5 Harrier with much increased range and payload has been fully vindicated. I expect orders for some initial production items to be placed by the end of this year.

Meanwhile, work continues on the Tornado programme which will result in the re-equipment of about half the RAF's front line. Authorisation has just been given to the United Kingdom element of the fifth batch of Tornado production aircraft which will complete the RAF's order for 220 GR1 aircraft and will carry its F2 order—the air defence version—to the 70 mark.

I come now to our maritime-air capability. The adaptability of the Nimrod airframe and its advanced electronics and radar capability make it a quite remarkable aircraft, and if I could find the funds I would dearly like to reopen the Nimrod production line as a major defence and sales priority.

In the past few weeks, we have been fitting Harpoon to the Nimrod maritime reconnaissance fleet. The Harpoon, coupled with the Nimrod Mark 2's Searchwater radar will enable surface ships to be identified and attacked at ranges of the order of 70 miles, more than double the range of Exocet.

Our decision to purchase the Sea Eagle anti-ship missile for use by the Buccaneer, the Sea Harrier and possibly the Tornado is unaffected, but we will retain Harpoon on the Nimrods, for the time being. We are equipping some of our submarines with Sub-Harpoon giving them an anti-ship missile capability, as well as the new underwater guided weapon, the heavyweight torpedo, to which we have allocated very substantial funds in the past year.

§ Mr. Keith Best (Anglesey)

I am sure that the House welcomes what my right hon. Friend has said about Nimrod and the fitting of Harpoon. Does he not accept that, in many circumstances that some of us can postulate, there would be insufficient bases for the effective 1063 operation of Nimrod? Is he satisfied that there are sufficient bases available to ensure that Nimrod could be used in any future conflict?

§ Mr. Nott

I think I am relatively confident about giving my hon. Friend an assurance in that regard. After all, Nimrods have been performing 19-hour flights with air-to-air refuelling down to the Falklands from Ascension. In my part of the world, in Cornwall, there are many stand-by airfields as well as St. Mawgan. The Nimrod is an adaptable aircraft and can be operated from many airfields. I feel relatively sure that my hon. Friend need have no concern.

§ Mr. John Gilbert (Dudley, East)

Bearing in mind the intelligence assessment of the threat from Soviet surface ships, with which the right hon. Gentleman will be familiar, will he explain why he is concentrating on arming Nimrods—I assume he refers to the maritime reconnaissance Nimrod and not the AEW—with air-tosurface weapons rather than air-to-air weapons for self defence? Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to put air-to-air weapons on the AEW aircraft so that they can defend themselves?

§ Mr. Nott

During the Falklands conflict we carried out tests by fitting Sidewinder missiles to the Nimrods. That can he done, and there is no reason why Nimrods should not carry Sidewinder missiles as an air defence weapon. However, the Nimrod's radar capabilities, and the manner in which it operates, are such that it should not be under threat from enemy fighter aircraft. The way that Nimrod uses Harpoon keeps it out of range of enemy fighters. That is one of the great merits of the aircraft.

Right hon. and hon. Members will note in the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" a section on the maritime balance. This is to some extent relevant to what the right hon. Gentleman said. It shows an adverse trend in the balance of forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel, an area of crucial importance to the United Kingdom and its allies. To judge the maritime balance accurately, however, it is also necessary to take into account the different maritime requirements of the two alliances. Should the Soviet surface fleet ever venture out into the North Atlantic it will meet the growing capability of our modern anti-ship missiles, particularly from land-based aircraft such as the Tornado, Buccaneer and Nimrod, where we have the geographical advantage over the Soviets.

I turn now to naval affairs. Over the next few months we shall be considering ship replacement orders following the Falklands operation, but in the meantime I have decided to order, within the already planned programme, another type 22 ASW frigate—the ninth of its class.

It will not be easy in the next few years to sustain frigate numbers because of the losses suffered in hostilities, but we shall press ahead as rapidly as we can with the current construction programme, bringing forward all existing plans as fast as possible. I also intend to retain the County class destroyers "Fife" and "Glamorgan" and the type 82 destroyer "Bristol", which were planned for early disposal by the mid-1980s.

Looking to the future, I am glad to inform the House that I have recently endorsed the general configuration for the type 23 frigate and that we are now ready to undertake detailed development work. We shall shortly be placing a design contract with Yarrow Shipbuilders Ltd. I hope 1064 that the first order will be in 1984. Our aim is eventually to achieve an order rate of three new type 23s per year—and this is provided for in our forward financial plans.

§ Sir Frederick Burden (Gillingham)

It was assumed that the type 23 prototype would be available in 1988. Can we be absolutely assured that all the lessons—and there are many—connected with the Falkland Islands and the vulnerability of shipping under war conditions have been taken fully into account before the order is placed?

§ Mr. Nott

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. In the next few months, as the factual data come back from the Falklands, we must ensure that any changes needed to the type 23 are incorporated in the design. As my hon. Friend knows, we intend to place an order as soon as possible in 1984 so that we can have the type 23 in service by 1988. I should like to see it in service earlier, but 1988 still seems to be the date.

The type 23 will be a general purpose frigate—suited to operations outside the NATO area, but fully able to conduct anti-submarine warfare operations in the harsh and operationally difficult environment of the North Atlantic. The type 23 will, therefore, be equipped with the most advanced hull-mounted sonar as well as the latest towed array for detecting submarines. Its armaments will include two separate trackers for the Sea Wolf point defence missile system incorporating the latest improvements now under development, an anti-ship missile capability, self-defence torpedo capability against submarine attack and a light gun. For quietness to maximise detection ranges on her sonar her main propulsion will be diesel electric, supplemented by two of the new Spey marine gas turbines for high speed boost. We are determined to keep the costs of the type 23 down, but it must be designed to meet essential needs in full. Thus, while the price is now likely to be rather more than originally forecast, it will still be around £90 million at September 1981 prices, against around £135 million for the type 22. I believe that in terms of fighting power it will offer excellent value for money. The type 23 will have a ship's company of about 150 officers and men against up to 250 for the type 22.

The most important feature of the type 23 for antisubmarine warfare will be a specially designed platform for a new helicopter—the Sea King replacement. This will be heavier than the existing Sea King, but it will be very much more agile, enabling it to operate safely from small ships in foul weather. It will have a much greater load-carrying capability and will carry Sting Ray torpedoes as well as advanced sonics. In this respect it will have some of the characteristics of the Nimrod which will make it a formidable ASW system. It will provide a full capability in one helicopter both to detect and kill enemy submarines at longer range.

The intention is to develop the helicopter in collaboration with Italy and jointly with industry. Good progress has been made with the Italian Government—I discussed the project with my Italian colleague as recently as this Monday—and I hope that a joint contract can be signed early next year. Commercial and military versions of the helicopter are also planned to increase numbers and keep down unit costs.

The type 23 will be able to operate as an independent unit with its embarked organic air capability for considerable periods, without support.

§ Mr. Keith Speed (Ashford)

That is encouraging news on the type 23. Am I right in assuming from what my right hon. Friend said in connection with the E101 helicopter that the type 23 will have a hangar rather than just a flight deck? That appears to be inherent in what my right hon. Friend is saying.

§ Mr. Nott

The type 23 is planned to have a hangar which will take the new Sea King replacement. We may also lengthen it slightly so that it is capable of taking the existing Sea King, although clearly the existing Sea King is not a suitable aircraft for landing on decks in bad weather, as my hon. Friend knows.

The House will know the importance that I attach to increasing the submarine flotilla. With its long endurance, speed and modem sonars, the SSN—the hunter-killer nuclear submarine—is a vital part of our armoury of weapons for dealing with the threat posed by the Soviet submarine and surface fleet. SSNs neutralised the whole of the Argentine fleet. Four SSNs are currently being built. We plan to order another—SSN 17—later this financial year, with a further order—SSN 18—following in 1983–84 in order to meet our aim of achieving a force level of 17 later in the decade. If resources permit we also hope to place an order for a further SSN—SSN 19—before work starts on the Trident submarines.

To complement our nuclear-powered submarine fleet we need a successor to the current very successful Oberon class of conventionally powered boats. Quieter than the SSNs, they are particularly difficult to detect and are in many ways superior to an SSN in shallower waters.

Work on the new type 2400 class is now well advanced. I am glad to inform the House that we are going out to tender today for the first of this new class, with a view to placing an order next year. This is a major step forward in an important field and I am sure that the House will welcome it.

I come next to HMS "Invincible" which has given such invaluable service in the Falklands conflict. The House is aware of the characteristically generous offer from the Prime Minister of Australia. We have taken up his offer of discussions and I hope to make a full statement on the subject in due course.

A significant enhancement of our capability would be an airborne early warning radar on our carriers. We are, therefore, as an interim measure fitting a maritime search radar—modified significantly to give it an airborne early warning role—in Sea King helicopters for deployment to the South Atlantic in order to respond to our immediate AEW needs. For the longer term we are conducting urgent studies into the overall need for shipborne AEW.

I must now talk briefly about money. Some of the comment in recent weeks has been conducted as though we could somehow enhance our defences yet further, within the 3 per cent. target, either by robbing one capability or one NATO role to pay for another or by re-organising our procurement processes. There will always be some savings to be made from greater efficiency—we have introduced new procedures throughout the MOD this year—but to suggest that in greater efficiency there is a crock of gold that will finance major new defence capabilities is quite frankly nonsense.

Nor do I believe that any of the capabilities that I have so far described can be safely reduced or eliminated. If we gave up one capability—to shelter under the protection of our allies—what would happen if we found ourselves on 1066 our own again, as we have in the past few weeks? If Great Britain ever abandons a balanced mix of forces—Navy, Army and Air Force—we shall ultimately rely on someone else for a key part of our defence and ultimately we shall be vulnerable to someone else's blackmail.

As I have already announced, warship and equipment losses during the Falklands campaign will be replaced—not necessarily on a like for like basis—out of moneys in addition to the 3 per cent. commitment, and the same applies to the cost of a garrison, although it is too early to say what that cost will be. I have taken note of a motion on the Order Paper signed by some of my right hon. and hon. Friends, which urges a significant increase in defence expenditure in real terms over and above the cost of the Falkland Islands expedition and garrison.

Of course the Government will be considering in the annual public expenditure survey whether more can be made available for defence beyond our commitment to meet the 3 per cent. NATO aim in full plus the Falkland additions. But I would be failing in my duty if I were to propose a new defence programme—based on additions to our existing capability—either before we had studied the lessons of the Falklands or without the cash to pay for it. That way lies chaos.

I have noted the criticisms of the Labour Opposition, some of which have been widely voiced, about the size of the surface fleet. But the facts are that we are spending nearly £500 million more in real terms on the conventional naval programme than the previous Government in the year before we took office. We shall still be spending more on the conventional Navy, at the peak of Trident expenditure, than when the Labour Party was in power. It is true that I have made a switch in emphasis in our forward plans from ship platforms to naval weapons, but I made it clear that our force structure must be one that we can afford to sustain with modern weapons and equipment and with proper war stocks. That is less glamorous than maximising the number of large and costly platforms in our armoury but it is far and away the best way of spending money for real security value.

I hope that I have not made a controversial speech—[HON. MEMBERS: "You have"] It is controversial in the defence sense but not in the political sense. I have just seen the new policy document that the Labour Party's National Executive will submit for approval to the Labour Party conference. It repeats the motion on which the Labour Party voted last year: Labour will reduce defence expenditure to the average proportion of the gross domestic product spent by the other European NATO countries. Such a commitment—

§ Mr. John Silkin (Deptford)

Will the Secretary of State read the proviso?

§ Mr. Nott

The proviso is: bearing in mind the need to avoid widespread and precipitate redundancies for which no alternative work has been provided, and Britain's need to provide adequate conventional defence forces. Last year the Labour Party voted to reduce defence expenditure to the European NATO average. Such a commitment would reduce our total planned defence budget by about one-third. In the planned 18-year procurement period of Trident, the reduction implied in such a commitment would be equal to about 11 Trident programmes.

1067 A study of the conflict in the South Atlantic and the lessons of it will necessarily take some time. On their return we shall be debriefing the operational commanders at all levels who took part in the campaign. There is, naturally, keen parliamentary and public interest in this exercise. Until we have done so, it would be wrong for us to rush forward in the next few weeks with a preliminary statement of our conclusions. Some aspects, such as the effectiveness of individual weapon systems, will remain operationally sensitive for some time and others will require considerable research and analysis before the facts can be established and the right conclusions drawn. I shall publish a White Paper on those conclusions and what they imply for the future towards the end of the year.

§ Mr. Cryer

The Secretary of State will have seen reports that HMS "Sheffield" carried nuclear weapons and that there may be contamination of the South Atlantic. There have been denials from the Ministry of Defence, but can the Secretary of State say categorically that the reports are untrue and that no nuclear weapons were carried?

§ Mr. Nott

We never confirm or deny rumours about the carriage of nuclear weapons on any of our ships or aircraft. I have no intention of being drawn further on the subject.

§ Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow)

Does the Secretary of State accept that if we provide all the additional conventional equipment that he has suggested and continue with Trident, we must sustain a vast increase in the defence budget? Is there not a strong case for reviewing the Trident programme and excluding it completely from our future defence plans? That would still enable us to have a reasonable conventional defence force.

§ Mr. Nott

The programme that I have outlined, including Trident, can be contained within the planned amounts that the Government have announced—the 3 per cent. growth in the defence budget.

It is already clear that, by any historical standard, the ships of the task force and its aircraft performed a magnificent feat of arms. The Argentine fleet was largely bottled up throughout the conflict in port or in home waters by our nuclear submarines. Our destroyers and frigates in the front line showed great courage in ensuring that the landing at San Carlos beachhead was achieved with such success. In such dangerously exposed conditions we could not have expected to achieve that objective without losses and damage to our ships.

Repair work to the damaged ships will be undertaken as a matter of urgency. In the immediate future much additional work must be done to repair battle and weather damage and, equally important, to catch up with the normal programme of repairs, dockings, and maintenance periods disrupted by the Falklands crisis. It is not yet possible to assess precisely the extent of the task or how it will affect the rate at which we move towards a naval operating and maintaining base, which remains the intention for Portsmouth, but I can say that no further compulsory redundancy notices will be issued at Portsmouth before 1 January 1983. The 180 redundancy notices already issued before 2 April will also, for the time being, be withdrawn. We should be in a position by early in the New Year to announce a firm plan for the rate of manpower reduction at Portsmouth. The planned expansion of Devonport and Rosyth will continue.

I have considered whether there are grounds for retaining the hold that was put on redundancy notices at 1068 Chatham. However, our conclusion is that the work required on the surface fleet as a result of recent operations can be accommodated at the other dockyards, including Portsmouth, where many of the ships are based.

Chatham has a nuclear submarine refitting load to complete but while we have re-examined the future nuclear work load in view of the proven importance of the SSN fleet, it is with regret that I must confirm our previous plans for the closure of Chatham dockyard and naval base by April 1984. That will also allow for the transfer of specialist staff from Chatham to Devonport to be resumed, which is necessary for the build-up of capacity there.

Gibraltar dockyard may take some of the less complex work arising from the South Atlantic operation, but there are no plans to reverse the decision for it to close next year. In discussing its possible future commercial operation with the Gibraltar Government we have proposed and they have welcomed the possibility of a continued naval work load.

§ Sir Frederick Burden

Is my right hon. Friend aware that HMS "Swiftsure" has already been at Devonport for nearly three years, and it is not believed that she will become operational after refit until next March, so that she will have been there for three and a half years, whereas Chatham is the only Royal Naval dockyard that has so far refitted, refuelled and produced seven operational SSNs? Therefore, how can my right hon. Friend possibly place at risk the future operational efficiency of the SSN fleet, when not one SSN has yet been produced at Devonport, and he stated in the last White Paper that it is the most important naval weapon that we possess?

§ Mr. Nott

The recent record of Chatham in the SSN refit has been excellent, and I have nothing but praise for the work that the men in Chatham have undertaken. It therefore makes it all the more distressing for my hon. Friend, and for myself, to insist that it is necessary to close Chatham. It cannot be kept open within the resources that we now possess.

I should like to have a fall-back insurance nuclear refit capacity if I could, but I am afraid that within our resources it is better to build up the assets that we have at Devonport and Rosyth, and proceed in that way. I regret that I must confirm this closure. I knew that it would upset my hon. Friend, but I am afraid that that is the way it has to be.

§ Sir Frederick Burden

Disgraceful.

§ Mr. Roger Moate (Faversham)

My right hon. Friend will be aware of the widespread anger in the Medway area, and the tremendous disappointment at his announcement. However, will my right hon. Friend tell us how many SSNs were engaged in the South Atlantic operations? Must not the intensive use of the SSNs in that campaign have an affect on the refuelling and refitting programme? Surely the expansion of the submarine programme must make it common sense for my right hon. Friend to consider his plans for the dramatic cutback on the refitting and refuelling capacity for our submarine fleet.

§ Mr. Nott

I cannot reveal the number of SSNs that were participating in the Falkland operation. We never reveal matters of that kind. We hope to have 17 SSNs in the Fleet by the end of the decade, and the programme for their refit can be done in Rosyth and Devonport. My hon. Friend does not believe that that is the case, and I respect his judgment, but that is the decision that we have had to come to.

1069 The manpower plans of the Royal Navy too will, of course, need to be reviewed in the context of decisions on ships and equipment and the consequential effect on naval shore posts. This review will take a little time to complete, since it must take account also of our studies in depth of the Falklands' campaign.

The "Statement on the Defence Estimates" which I present to Parliament today represents, in the same form and covering the same period as its predecessors, the defence programmes and the activities of our Armed Forces in the period leading up to the beginning of this financial year. I believe that the continuity of these statements is important, and has proved of value to Parliament over many years. That the statement contains the names of ships tragically lost or of matters overtaken in the events of the past few weeks does not negate its value, particularly with reference to the main threat to the United Kingdom from the Soviet Union.

It was, I believe, in accordance with the general mood of the House that publication of the statement was delayed at the outset of the Falklands crisis. Our debate today therefore takes place several weeks later than is normal. In the intervening period our Armed Forces have been engaged in one of the most brilliantly conducted military operations of recent times.

By their bravery and by their skill, by their heroism and by their sacrifice, they have restored the liberty and rights of the Falkland Islanders. In so doing, they have demonstrated the principles for which we as a nation stand, and for which we are prepared to fight. Let those who might seek to attack our freedom, and that of the Western Alliance, be warned. Our defences are strong and it is our earnest intention to strengthen them further, year by year.

§ Mr. John Silkin (Deptford)

I am glad that the words in the foreword issued by the Secretary of State to the statement on the Defence Estimates, in which he praises the professionalism of the Armed Forces used in the Falklands campaign, have been amplified by him today. I happily join him in congratulating our troops on their skills and heroism and in mentioning, because this will be the will of the House, not just those who died and suffered in the campaign but those who may be permanently injured. May we never forget what they did.

The defence statement is out of date and irrelevant. The Secretary of State, if he had wished, could simply have given us a single statement in which he said, "I shall spend a few months—I or my successor—looking at the lessons that have been learnt, and I shall bring the Defence Estimates up to date". That is what he should have done, because this defence statement is out-of-date. It has no real relevance.

§ Mr. Robert Atkins

Why?

§ Mr. Silkin

I am about to explain, if the hon. Gentleman listens to what I have to say, as I am sure he will, with the courtesy that we all know is part of his nature.

It is because the defence statement is about as relevant as a punctured balloon that the Opposition do not intend, unlike the minority parties below the Gangway, to table an amendment. There seems to be no possible reason why 1070 we should try to reconstitute a punctured balloon. We are simply against the defence statement and I propose to give the reasons why.

First, has the Secretary of State—have all of us—learnt lessons from the Falklands campaign, and, if so, what lessons? The one lesson that I hope that the House has learnt applies to present and previous Governments. It is something that we could, with due humility as a House of Commons, understand and learn. The subject comes in paragraphs 404 and 409 of the Estimates. I quote from paragraph 409: We shall also be paying greater attention to the sales potential of projects and programmes authorised for the Armed Forces… We estimate that defence sales transactions will reach £1,800 million in 1982/83. That is a lot of money, and it may be a lot of jobs, but it can also be, as we have learnt to our cost, a number of lives, and a number of British lives.

The same thing happened in the Second World War, when many arms supplies were sent to Japan and Germany and later used against us. If we have not learnt that lesson, all Governments should learn it in the future. I should have preferred the Secretary of State to say something about arms sales, and at least to have told us that he and his successors intended to be much more careful about where the arms were going, as I hope we shall when the Labour Party is in Government.

§ Sir Frederick Burden

I was concerned to note that, when it was stated that the type 23 frigate would be used as a replacement, it was also stated that it would have considerable export potential. It occurs to me to wonder, if it is to be such a vital part of our defence in the future, why we should make it available to a potential enemy.

§ Mr. Silkin

I was about to say that the Secretary of State and all right hon. and hon. Members should consider to what extent we are trying to produce arms for export which are not necessarily suitable for our own defence purposes. That is not necessarily relevant to what the hon. Member for Gillingham (Sir F. Burden) said, but it has a general relevance, and is something of which we should all be aware.

Second, in the foreword, the right hon. Gentleman rightly pays tribute to the professionalism of our Armed Forces, and we join him in that tribute. It says that evidence that our force structure is adaptable enough to permit an effective and timely response to developments both within and outside the NATO area is demonstrated by the Falklands campaign. That is a most extraordinary comment. Had the Argentine Fascists not been so impatient and had they waited a year or two, it would have been demonstrably false. That is a lesson that I should have thought the right hon. Gentleman had learnt.

The third reason relates to the query that was raised by the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins). Here again, the foreword says: The framework of that programme"— that is, the previous programme in Cmnd. 8288— remains appropriate". How can it possibly remain appropriate, in view of the difficulty of sending a fleet 8,000 miles across the world, and when that fleet, in the Secretary of State's own plans, would be decimated in a year or two?

§ Mr. Robert Atkins

The right hon. Gentleman provoked me somewhat by saying that he thought that the defence White Paper was a punctured balloon, although he has not yet proved that statement. As 98 per cent. of the 1071 defence White Paper concerns the Warsaw Pact threat, such as it is, and the threat from the Eastern bloc, to what extent has that changed, except to increase, since we debated the matter, and before the Falklands campaign had its effect?

§ Mr. Silkin

I am coming to that matter in the few minutes in which I hope to be allowed to address the House on this important question.

We and every generation have to learn the lesson that we have been told over and again, that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. Each generation learns that. Here I should like to quote the Labour Party's defence policy—more fairly than the right hon. Gentleman did—hoping that the House will bear with me: The central objective of Labour's defence policy is the promotion of peace and security. Britain should have sufficient military strength to discourage external aggression and to defend ourselves should we be attacked". I hope that every hon. Member will agree with that proposition. It is the framework of the Labour Party's defence policy.

There are three elements in any defence policy, and certainly there are three elements in the present Government's defence policy. The first is our policy in the area outside NATO. According to the Secretary of State, the framework in Cmnd. 8288 is appropriate. Despite what he says, much of the surface fleet was laid down in the days of the Labour Government, and it is coming to fruition now. However, the right hon. Gentleman proposes a cut in the active fleet. The fleet of destroyers and frigates is to he cut from 56 to 42. I am glad that we are to replace, although we do not know in what way. I gather that like for like is out. We are not certain how it will be done. What the Secretary of State has told the House this afternoon deserves much more study.

It is also true that, since the start of March, nine ships have been reprieved. "Fearless" and "Intrepid" were reprieved in March. We are glad to hear about "Endurance", but that news came rather late, after the rather contemptuous reply that the right hon. Gentleman gave on 29 March to a question from one of his hon. Friends, and the contemptuous reply of the Prime Minister to my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), the former Prime Minister. "Falmouth" and "Londonderry" are already operational, and "Berwick", "Tartar", "Gurkha" and "Zulu" will be operational by the end of July. So that is all right. Nevertheless, we still have a fleet which looks considerably smaller in the years ahead in this decade than it was when the Government came to office.

The hon. Member for Preston, North asked, "What about the Russian threat? What about NATO? Why should we bother outside NATO?" I looked for a moment at the strains that had been put on the Fleet over the past few years, under both Labour and Conservative Governments. There was the Beira patrol and the cod war, and there still is the Gulf patrol. There is the Caribbean frigate and—very relevant today—Belize and the guard ships that are necessary there. There is also, for the future, fortress Falklands. No one has said for how long that will be necessary. The Government have not told us. If the Prime Minister had her way, no doubt it would go on for ever. No doubt the Thatcher-Nichols correspondence will be a gem for naval historians for years to come, but if anyone 1072 were to tell me that 75 marines were sufficient to deter aggression, I would not believe it. We shall need a fleet, and we shall need a surface fleet.

There are other bases too. If any part of the world wishes the British Fleet to continue and wants to have its protection, that area is the Third world. There are good reasons for that. The Third world does not trust the superpowers. It does not trust the United States or the Soviet Union, but curiously enough, it has a great belief in the ability and willingness of the United Kingdom and the British Fleet to protect it.

One day we shall have something else to reckon with. It is all very well for us to say, as we often do, that the United Nations is a powerless and impotent institution. The truth is that the United Nations needs to come into a crisis before war breaks out. It has proved a failure as a viable force when it comes in after a war has been declared or after it is over, merely as an occupying force. For example, when it was in Sharm E1 Sheikh in 1967 it really stopped Middle East wars, and the succession of Middle East wars that followed 1967 owe much to the United Nations forces having been removed from Sharm E1 Sheikh at that time.

All this leads to another consequence. One day there will have to be a directly recruited United Nations police force. It need not be very large, but it should be capable of great mobility and of going to any area in the world. If it is to do that, it needs to be backed up, and it would need to be backed up by a force such as the British Fleet.

§ Mr. Geoffrey Rippon (Hexham)

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that one of the most regrettable decisions was the premature reduction of British forces in the Gulf by the Labour Government in 1967? Would he and the Labour Party consider it right that there should be an allied naval force in the south Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, since we cannot have a United Nations force?

§ Mr. Silkin

I do not agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon), and it would be futile of me to say that I did. Moreover, that is not relevant to the debate. I am prepared to argue with him about history any day he wishes, over that glass of cognac which he once said enabled all arguments to be settled, but not in the House on this defence debate.

§ Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath)

rose—

§ Mr. Silkin

May I be allowed to proceed? Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will intervene later.

If we are to fulfil the obligation of keeping the peace outside NATO, we need a surface fleet. There is a great deal to be learnt about sea-to-air missiles, decoys, electronic counter measures, Sea Harriers and helicopters from the Falklands crisis. There is also a great deal to be learnt in general terms.

I agree with the Secretary of State about the effect that the hunter-killer submarines had during the campaign. They certainly kept the Argentine navy in harbour. In doing so, they saved many lives, British and Argentine. However, they could not protect the merchant ships, the landing ships, the marines who served so gallantly during the war, or the troops who landed there. Only "Hermes" and "Invincible" could do that, and only "Hermes" and "Invincible" did. We were lucky to have other makeshift decks. We were lucky to have "Atlantic Conveyor". 'We were lucky to have the brave men of the Merchant Navy.

1073 It was my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East who, when he was Prime Minister, saw that we had the merchant shipping register. I think that that was about 1978. Would we have been in a position to send the merchant fleet train into the Falklands area if he had not done so?

We must learn that such an expedition needs to be protected by a surface fleet. I have tried to show that such a crisis can happen anywhere in the world at any time. The moment that one destroys that capability, the possibility of our being able to act is destroyed.

Again, I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he has learnt that lesson. I doubt that he will be in the same position 18 months or two years from now. However, if he were, could he mount that expedition to the Falklands again? Of course he could not, and he knows that he could not. That should have been the main lesson that he learnt.

§ Mr. Cyril D. Townsend

If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to create a balance in this matter, should he not also draw attention to the incredible vulnerability of surface ships, both to conventional bombing and to advanced missile technology? Does not that highlight one of the basic points in the White Paper that we must gently tilt the balance in favour of our underwater fleet?

§ Mr. Silkin

The terrible vulnerability of warfare is that ships are sunk and people get killed. That has happened in every sea battle. Of course, there may be technical lessons to be learnt. However, the lesson is not that surface vessels should be abandoned. If that were done, how could the fleet train be sent out? With the best will in the world, it could not be done with SSNs. I agree, they are good, but that is not the way to do it.

§ Mr. Ioan Evans (Aberdare)

The White Paper has been overtaken by the Falklands crisis. My right hon. Friend referred to the intervention of the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) and the intervention in the Trident debate—which must be spelt out again—when the Secretary of State was asked why £3 million could not be spent to defend the Falklands yet the Government were prepared to spend £8,000 million on Trident. Did they not make a complete hash of Britain's contribution to Western defence and is that not why we should have a new White Paper today?

§ Mr. Silkin

That is right. My hon. Friend is merely underlining what I say.

I said that three elements should be considered. The second of those elements is our position inside NATO. NATO has now been in existence since 1949–33 years; a generation and a half. It is after an event such as the Falklands war that we should reconsider the relevance to NATO of the lessons that have been learnt.

The Labour Party is right to say that our first duty is to defend our island and to deter external aggression. Our first duty should be to protect the United Kingdom and its air region.

Let us consider what is happening inside NATO now—the Russian threat that the hon. Member for Preston, North mentioned. Seventy per cent. of the naval forces guarding the eastern Atlantic and the Channel are British. One quarter of our defence budget is spent on achieving that defence. Ten per cent. of the troops are 1074 British. The Secretary of State gave the figure of 55,000 and over 40 per cent. of the budget is spent on them. The cost of manufacturing investment forgone, the cost of research and development channelled into military rather than civil projects, bears heavily upon Britain.

The Secretary of State made much play, some of it teasing, of the Labour Party's defence programme. He arrived at astronomic savings which would result in a negative figure for defence. Although he was asked to do so, he did not fully quote the extract from the National Executive Council's defence programme.

The right hon. Gentleman never tells us, although it happens to be true—it was denied at one point but I believe he accepted it later—that the amount of GDP spent by Britain in NATO is a greater percentage than that of any other NATO power, not excluding the United States. We have always talked in terms of Germany and "?France" which is both in and out of NATO. Incidentally, on a technical point, why does the right hon. Gentleman exclude France from NATO in this Cmnd. Paper whereas in Cmnd. 8288 he included France? It would be interesting to know what curious mechanics resulted in that.

Britain spends more of its GDP than any other NATO power defending NATO—more than the Americans. It would not be a bad thing if the burden was shared. I fully accept that defence inflation in all countries—West Germany as much as ourselves—is greater than ordinary inflation. That is one reason why more is being spent by the Government on naval defence—as the right hon. Gentleman so often tells us—than was spent under the Labour Government. However, that is no reason why we should have to bear the lion's share the whole time. There should be a more equal distribution.

I do not know what the basis of such a review might be, but, taking the figures given by the right hon. Gentleman in the defence statement, there are about 70,000 British troops and RAF personnel; 10,800 in the RAF and about 60,000 in the Army. Of course, there is a huge backup. About £650 million in German deutschemarks is spent on local German personnel and on their housing. However, France contributes 51,000 personnel.

France is, and always has been, a continental power. We are not. For centuries, our policy has been to use our island as a floating platform for landing troops on the Continent and for sending them wherever they are needed. Why should France contribute only 51,000 personnel, when we contribute 70,000? Sometimes France is in NATO, and sometimes it is not. However, it is part of our defence and an ally of NATO. That is the truth of the matter. Therefore, there is much to be sorted out and settled between us.

Is it right that we should welcome the arrival of cruise missiles in Britain next year?

§ Mr. Best

Both World Wars involved Britain because of treaty obligations that contained a commitment to Europe. Were those obligations wrong? Does the right hon. Gentleman really think that Britain would have had a better chance of survival in those two world conflicts if it had waited for the aggressor to march up to the Channel?

§ Mr. Silkin

It was not wrong to enter into such obligations, but if the hon. Gentleman had listened to me he would not have thought that I wanted to withdraw troops from West Germany. I sought to find a more equitable balance, and that is a different matter. 1075 [Interruption] To do that, I would discuss the issue with our allies. What are allies for? I would point out something that the Government have never pointed out. I would say that we are the paymaster and that it might be right to share the burden a little more equitably.

During Question Time on Tuesday the Minister spoke about cruise missiles and said that they were intended by the United States, at the request of Europe, to demonstrate its commitment to the defence of Europe."—[Official Report, 29 June 1982; Vol. 26, c. 738.] In other words, the Minister thought of it as a political, rather than a military, commitment. Millions of people all over the world are rightly querying the use of nuclear weapons, and have come to the conclusion that there should be a freeze on them and that their use should be limited as quickly as possible. When I was at the United Nations for the second special session, I saw many people demonstrating. There may have been 1 million, although I do not know if the figure was that high. There have been demonstrations all over Europe. We should be talking the matter over with our allies. We should be considering the matter as part of our policy review.

Let us examine our commitments both outside and inside NATO. What we are talking about adds up to a very large proportion of our budget and to heavy expenditure on defence. That must be so. That brings us to the third element in the defence budget—Trident. I do not know whether the Secretary of State wants to bring his figures up to date. He says that Trident will cost £7.5 billion at September 1981 prices. On reflection, he might care to re-examine that figure. After all, the pound is not worth as much as it was in September 1981. The figure usually quoted for Trident is about £10 billion. That is probably the right figure.

As we always have this argument, I shall put the matter quickly, and if I may, slowly, to the Secretary of State so that he has a chance to disagree with me. [Interruption.] I shall go through the arguments statistic by statistic. The right hon. Gentleman needs to be told slowly, because he always gets things wrong. [Interruption.] By "slowly" I mean slowly in words. During the peak years of the Trident programme will it not cost 10.5 per cent. of all equipment?

§ Mr. Nott

About that.

§ Mr. Silkin

Is it not a fact that during the peak years the cost will be close to 20 per cent. of new equipment as opposed to all equipment?

§ Mr. Nott

I understand the right hon. Gentleman's point, but we do not have a concept of "new equipment". Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will define what he means. At the beginning of every financial year 90 per cent. of the continuing defence budget is committed. We have never had a concept of "new equipment". The right hon. Gentleman is trying to coin a new concept.

§ Mr. Silkin

I am trying to coin a practical concept. I am talking about new orders. Perhaps I was speaking too quickly for the right hon. Gentleman. If he studies the matter, I think that he will find that my figures are right and that Trident will cost the equivalent of 20 per cent. of new orders each year during the peak years.

§ Mr. Nott

That could be right. Is the right hon. Gentleman not in favour of re-equipping the RAF with Tornado? This year and next year Tornado will take up a 1076 far larger proportion of the existing equipment budget—and, if the right hon. Gentleman likes, of the new equipment budget—than Trident will take up at the peak.

§ Mr. Silkin

I am in favour of Tornado, but not of Trident. I have been trying to tell the right hon. Gentleman that for a long time. We cannot have both and that is the truth of the matter. Let us continue with the statistics.

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that Trident will cost 30 per cent. of the Royal Navy's budget during the peak years? Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will check the figure. He will find that I am right. Does he also agree that Trident will cost the equivalent of more than 50 per cent. of new orders for Royal Navy equipment during the peak years? That is what it is all about.

§ Mr. Nott

The Royal Navy is in favour of Trident and believes in it. I have not heard the Royal Navy say that it would rather not have it.

§ Mr. Silkin

If the Royal Navy was asked to choose between having a surface fleet and Trident in the knowledge that there was a limit, the answer would no doubt be different. I fully understand the views of those Conservative Members who say that they should try to get the money for everything they want. However, that is not the way things go. There will be cash limits of a sort, because there have to be.

Trident represents the Secretary of State's attempt to turn Britain into a super-power. That is the whole purpose of Trident.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

Earlier, the right hon. Gentleman made an eloquent defence of sending the task force to the Falkland Islands. He went on to say that we should think in terms of being able to operate, in addition, outside the NATO theatre. However, if he had been Secretary of State for Defence, would he have dared to send a task force 8,000 miles away unless we had our own deterrent to guard against nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union, or from any other quarter? I could understand if the right hon. Gentleman was simply arguing that there was some better or cheaper system than Trident. However, that would be a difficult argument to sustain. Nevertheless, if we are to play a role outside NATO—as we have recently done and as we might have to do again—we must have a deterrent force to guard against nuclear blackmail.

§ Mr. Silkin

I have always had great respect for the right hon. Gentleman's views on defence, but this is where he and I part company. There is no meeting of minds on this subject. I do not believe that our own nuclear deterrent would have the effect that he says. There is no agreement between us on that point.

§ Mr. Churchill (Stretford)

rose—

§ Mr. Silkin

In paragraph 102 of the White Paper the right hon. Gentleman says that the cost of Trident is equivalent to that of 300 tanks. He then says that the 300 tanks would not be worth having because of the thousands of tanks in the Warsaw Pact countries.

Let us try another comparison. Trident would be the equivalent of two dozen "Invincibles". It would be the equivalent of over 50 type 22 frigates. It would be the equivalent of 21 more hunter-killers. There is no fairer comparison than that. Therefore, the right hon.

1077 Gentleman's policy is wrong. His policy as defined in the White Paper does not make a suitable or appropriate framework for defence.

§ Mr. Michael Mates (Petersfield)

rose—

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill)

Order.

§ Mr. Silkin

I thought that you called "Order", Mr. Deputy Speaker. That is why I sat down.

§ Mr. Mates

rose—

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I did call "order". It was directed to the hon. Member for Petersfield. I was indicating that he should sit down if the right hon. Gentleman did not want to give way.

§ Mr. Mates

But the right hon. Gentleman will give way.

§ Mr. Silkin

No he will not. I am nearly at the end of my speech. I do not want to be diverted from it.

The Royal Navy sailed halfway around the world to resolve a conflict, which, with foresight, could have been avoided. The fleet consisted of men carrying redundancy notices on board ships bearing "for sale" signs. That fleet liberated the islands. It kept the Secretary of State in a job for which he has shown himself to be totally unfit. Above all, the Falkland Islands crisis has proved conclusively that last year the Secretary of State adopted a biodegradable defence programme. In common with certain plastic cartons, it rapidly disintegrates when exposed to reality. We have no confidence in the Secretary of State's policy and we have no confidence in him.

§ Mr. Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton)

This is the first defence debate—I hope that it will be the last—in the immediate aftermath of a brilliantly successful war. Those who gave their lives in the conflict have bought for us by their sacrifice and by their gallantry an inestimable prize, not only in the prestige that they have brought to this country, but in all the lessons that we can now apply to policy and detail of the way in which we defend ourselves.

In the last 20 or 30 years we have been dealing in unrealities, secondhand information and surmise. At last we now have the immediate recollection and lessons of one of the most successful campaigns, one would say the only successful campaign, that has been fought by a member of the Western Alliance since the end of the Second World War. [Interruption.] I hear murmuring behind me. I do not know whether it is acclaim or dissent. I think that I heard one of my hon. Friends mention Malaya, but there is no comparison. This has been a war fought at every level, by every branch of the Services and against every type of conventional weapon. The lessons from it are still being collated. The esteem in which our Services are held throughout the world, not least in the Soviet Union, has advanced immeasurably.

It is a marvellous thing to be able to come to the House of Commons and make those remarks representing a city that played the most conspicuous part in the task force and in the victory. Plymouth supplied more people as a city than any other town in the Kingdom to make up the content of the task force. Its civilian work force played a tremendously important role in the dockyard. Many of us 1078 heard the Commander-in-Chief in the Falkland Islands reproaching those who said that the youth of this country were rotten or corrupt because, in his experience, he had seen that they were absolutely outstanding in quality.

§ Mr. Edward Rowlands (Merthyr Tydfil)

The hon. Gentleman was one of those people.

§ Mr. Clark

I never said anything of the sort. How could the hon. Gentleman say that? He never heard me say that. I challenge him to quote it.

Over the past years many people have said—I am not among them, in case the hon. Gentleman wants to intervene—that the work force of this country has often been bolshie and demarcation-minded. The work force of Plymouth dockyard, which has often been been the subject of oblique criticism if not direct reproach, rose to the occasion brilliantly. All trades worked 16 or 20 hours a day. When 20 welders were called for to go to the South Atlantic when it was clear that it was an extremely dangerous assignment, every qualified welder in the dockyard volunteered to go on the assignment.

The response of the civilian work force in the dockyard was without parallel and was a tremendous encouragement to the wives and families of those who were ser