Mr. Speaker

Before we begin the debate, I warn the House that a large number of right hon. and hon. Members have told me that they hope to catch my eye. Even with the two days allowed for the debate it will be impossible to call all hon. Members unless speakers impose self-discipline. Hon. Members who have said that they wish to speak have a good claim, on constituency grounds, or because they serve on a Committee, or because they have a deeply held conviction.

I have selected the amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot).

3.42 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott)

I beg to move, That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1981, contained in Cmnd. 8212. I hope that I shall be forgiven for opening the debate with a quotation from the "Wealth of Nations". In 1778 Adam Smith wrote: arms and their ammunition are becoming more expensive. A musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar than a ballista or a catapulta. Indeed, he was right. I hope that his perception of the problem, some 200 years ago, will be equally understood by the House today. It is reflected in the introduction to the White Paper that is now before us.

An explosion in defence technology has brought with it an explosion in cost. For instance, if we are to increase the flying hours of the RAF's fast jet pilots by one hour only, once per month, it will cost another £8 million a year. That is happening while the massive forces of the Soviet Union continue to grow remorselessly, and are armed with increasingly sophisticated weaponry. The position is grave.

We have a choice. Either we can continue to pretend that there is no problem, that we can wish away the threat or imagine that the United Kingdom can somehow sustain, replace and enhance its operational effectiveness without a fresh look at how we perform our tasks—what we are doing, and why—or we can continue to drift down the path that led, this year and last to cuts in ammunition, fuel, training and deployment, and will lead inevitably in the next few years to increasingly degraded operational ability.

I will not choose the latter course, although it is easiest politically, in the short-term, to take the easy course. We owe it to our countrymen, the defence of the nation, and more especially to the men and women of the Armed Services, to face these issues now and to face them bravely. No one who comes to my office can fail to be heartened by the immense contribution of our Armed Services and all who support them in a civilian role. We must not let them down by avoiding necessary decisions during the next few months.

The work of the Armed Fores is spelt out in the White Paper, and the whole House will wish me to pay tribute to it. I am sure it will not be misunderstood if I single out only one aspect of that work, namely, the contribution of the services in Northern Ireland. The defence White Paper emphasises their determination and skill in support of the RUC in the fight against pure thugs and murderers.

The versatility of our forces has been well and publicly demonstrated during recent days, as alongside their police colleagues they have, with coolness, discipline and restraint, maintained the rule of law while confronted with gangs of rioters armed with rocks and petrol, and nail and acid bombs capable of killing, injuring and maiming—and all the time in the glare of often unhelpful media publicity.

The House will share my outrage and revulsion about the news this morning of the murder of five soldiers in Northern Ireland while on patrol in their Saracen armoured car outside Newry. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families and friends.

I want to say one or two words about the civilian work force. I deplore the intrusion into the Civil Service of tactics in a pay negotiation more usual, sadly, in certain parts of private industry. But the action taken by small numbers of MOD civil servants highlights the immense contribution that the bulk of the work force makes, year in and year out, to the nation's defence. Well over 110,000 of our non-industrials—I want to emphasise that our 117,000 industrial staff are not involved in the dispute—are working normally. Indeed, many of them—some at places such as the Clyde submarine base and Rosyth, where industrial action has been most marked—are working extra hours and applying great ingenuity to ensure that production and repair work continue unhindered.

The vast majority of the Ministry's civil servants are not bureaucrats—they are welders, plumbers and electricians producing tanks and other armaments; they are fitters, boilermakers and blacksmiths, refitting and maintaining ships; they are scientists and engineers researching and designing our equipment; they are teachers of Service men's children overseas. They provide the foundation on which the superstructure of our fighting forces is built. The vast majority are expressing their loyalty to the Department in this present difficult period in a practical way, namely, by getting on with their jobs. The support and loyalty that any person holding my office consistently receives from the defence machine, the Chiefs of Staff and my other principal advisers is one of the most heartening and warming aspects of the job.

I began my speech by mentioning our future operational effectiveness, and how we could maintain it and enhance our front-line capabilities in spite of remorselessly rising costs. I see my task as a simple one, and no amount of special pleading from one part of our defence establishment or another will divert me from it. It is to form a defence view—not a single Service view—of how we can conduct our tasks within the Alliance in the defence of freedom and democracy.

At no time have I contemplated, sought, proposed or recommended—or been asked by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to contemplate, seek, propose or recommend—any cut in the published defence budget of the United Kingdom. Some of the suggestions in the press, especially—and I have never before singled out a newspaper in such a debate—the report by the naval correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, are pure invention. I emphatically deny that the Navy will be reduced to little more than a coastal defence force without carriers, with other parts of the Fleet drastically cut, and the Royal Marines disbanded after 317 years' service. If such ridiculous notions exist anywhere, we have not seen them. They may exist somewhere in the Ministry of Defence, but not in papers that I have ever seen.

Mr. Churchill (Stretford)

The Royal Marines have already been cut.

Mr. Nott

My hon. Friend must speak for himself if he has seen proposals to disband the Royal Marines. I have seen no such proposals.

Mr. Churchill

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that there will be no cut in the strength or capability of the Armed Forces of the Crown?

Mr. Nott

I hope that my hon. Friend will allow me to develop my speech for a few minutes more. I hope that he will then be satisfied.

Mr. Ron Brown (Edinburgh, Leith)

Would there not have been more justice if the Prime Minister had had one or two admirals in and read the Riot Act in relation to the article that the Secretary of State has quoted than in sacking the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed)?

Mr. Nott

My right hon. Friend has had no cause or reason to call in any admiral. In this exercise, about which I want to say more, the admirals, without exception, have behaved with utter loyalty. They have done all that they have been asked to do, and could not have been more helpful in the exercise that I shall describe.

I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will understand the issue, but what I have been trying to do in the past two months during this exercise—I have had the most loyal support from all the Chiefs of Staff in this endeavour—is to build, from the bottom up, the basic structure to which we should gear the equipment and manpower requirements of our Armed Forces for the next 10 years and beyond. The basic structure will represent for each of the Armed Services the most crucial and the most relevant elements of our defence capability. It is not itself—and was never intended to be—a defence programme as such. Its bare cost could never be a proper measure of what our defence budget provision ought to be.

In examining a range of options, in building a series of different models of the possible shape of our forces in the 1990s and beyond we are in new territory. I must not say "uncharted seas". It requires realism about the resources likely to be available in the next few years and, above all, it requires fresh thinking. To describe the results which are coining forward in this exercise as cuts or, still more, to attach alarming figures of many billions of pounds, before the structure is converted into a real-life programme based upon the increasing defence expenditure shown in the White Paper, is either deliberately to misrepresent the exercise, or totally to misunderstand what we are doing.

If I could persuade the doubters to think in terms of change—rather than always talking in terms of cuts, we could sustain the morale of our Services whilst we undertake the necessary exercise for their benefit and that of the whole country.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood)

Will my right hon. Friend reassure one doubter? In an Adjournment debate I drew attention to the fact that 1,400 defence civil servants were being moved from the South-East, where they did their job effectively, to Glasgow, where the Department admitted that they were doing the job at a greater cost and less effectively. Can my right hon. Friend reassure the House that before any cuts in equipment programmes, disbandment of units or other drastic measures of that sort are undertaken, that sort of nonsense will stop?

Mr. Nott

I believe that my hon. Friend is referring to the Hardman report. As far as I recall, that report was produced in the early 1970s and involved the dispersal of civil servants in every Department round the country, in accordance with the widespread demands of every party that that should be part of our regional policy at the time. As far as I am aware, that dispersal process has nearly ended. That should not worry my hon. Friend now, much as he might have been concerned several years ago.

Much informed opinion and discussion has surrounded two of the questions that naturally concern me, namely, reorganising the Rhine Army within the framework of our Treaty obligations, to improve its military effectiveness, and reviewing the balance between the several complementary ways of carrying out anti-submarine warfare in the East Atlantic and the Channel.

Due to security considerations, it is unfortunately not possible to debate all these issues in depth in the widest forum, but perhaps I could give the House an insight into several important issues. It is not disputed—certainly not by me, to give but one example—that the Royal Navy has a major "deterrence by presence" role in the East Atlantic and that it can perform, particularly with the new carriers such as "Invincible", a major role in out-of-area activities, particularly in support of the United States world-wide.

But in the pursuance of anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic a whole new set of questions has arisen and must be considered in any serious study of the future. The situation here is changing. It is not simply that the new class of Soviet missile-firing submarines have great speed, range and endurance, and hence, with the Backfire bomber, pose an increasing threat to the surface fleet and reinforcement, but that sonar technology is improving and the means of countering it as well. Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to argue the merits and deficiencies of active and passive sonar, and of how it might develop in the future, but I can give the House an insight into this fascinating area

There are several means of conducting anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic. Most of them are complementary, but not all are mutually exclusive. The hunter-killer nuclear submarine—that is nothing to do with the ballistic missile submarine, or Trident—has been described by many people, mainly in the Navy, as the battleship of the future. It is essential that we enhance the numbers, if the resources can be found to do so.

The Nimrod II conversion, the most advanced maritime patrol aircraft of its kind—with its Searchwater radar, magnetic Anomaly detector and computer-linked system for plotting and killing submarines by active and passive sonar buoys—carries a very large range of weapons, including, shortly, Sting Ray. It is recognised as a tremendously effective system for conducting area search and for localising its adversary for the kill. I refer here to the Nimrod.

The surface fleet and anti-submarine helicopters are complementary to the submarine and the maritime patrol aircraft. In anti-submarine warfare the principal devices—towed array sonar or dipping sonar, operated from helicopters—are useful systems, especially within a narrower radius than that normally operated by the maritime patrol aircraft. But it is not necessarily true that towed array needs a platform as expensive as a £120 million type 22 frigate. If we have too expensive platforms we shall have fewer resources to multiply our sonar capacity by other means.

Hence the Royal Navy's current ambition—in which my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) has played a major role—to design and produce the type 23 frigate at half the cost of the type 22, as a means of towing towed array. Further down the line we must also consider whether an even simpler and cheaper vessel than the type 23, with sufficiently quietened engines, can perform the function of towed array sonar. That is not as fanciful and ridiculous as some traditionalists may think.

We must consider, too, the platform from which the ASW helicopter is carried. It is not necessary, perhaps, for it always to be carried on an expensive carrier, requiring air defence destroyers as an escort and maybe even the United States strike fleet as well.

A helicopter can be borne, at least in theory, on a relatively simple, crude platform or even on one of the merchant ships that it is protecting from Soviet submarines. Thus, the argument is not solely about numbers, although, of course, numbers count. It is mainly about quality and effectiveness, and how we can best deploy our limited resources in meeting the Soviet submarine threat.

How we do so is both a technical question and a matter of judgment. I assure the House that judgment tends to vary somewhat, depending on who one is. It might be that the submariner takes one view, the frigate captain another, and the maritime aviator yet another. Sometimes judgment varies with rank, experience and background, and sometimes it varies between those who have Royal Navy establishments in their constituencies and those who do not. It has even been known to vary in emphasis between one service board and another, although I would never suggest that any such problem exists at present.

In the end, the buck stops with me. I am the Secretary of State for Defence as well as being chairman of each of the Service boards. When we have finished all our studies and completed the option exercises for carrying out the 101 operational functions that make up our total defence capability, a recommendation—and then a decision—must be made. They will be made not on the basis of sentiment but solely on a judgment of cost-effectiveness, because the country can no longer afford both to defend itself against its enemies and to be sentimental on the way.

Mr. James Wellbeloved (Erith and Crayford)

will the Secretary of State confirm that it remains the Government's policy that co-operation with our allies through membership of NATO is the first fundamental requirement of British defence policy? If that is still the case, will he confirm that the present understanding in NATO is that we keep about 55,000 in troops in Germany and continue to provide 80 per cent. of the readily available maritme forces for the defence of the Atlantic?

Mr. Nott

I have already said that we are considering, as one option, the reorganisation of the Rhine Army to make it more effective within our treaty commitments, I was referring to the Brussels Treaty, which mentions 55,000 men.

Our force declarations to NATO are changing year by year, just as the declarations of every other member of NATO change year by year. They are subject, in the normal way, to discussion and agreement with our allies within the NATO context. Any changes that we make will be subject to the same procedures.

Mr. Donald Dewar (Glasgow, Garscadden)

I accept that the right hon. Gentleman was talking about options and emphasis, but the emphasis of his remarks suggests that the possibility of type-22 orders in the immediate future is extremely remote. Is that a fair deduction and, if so, will he inform us of the time scale in which the decisions will be made and when work will begin?

A total of 5,700 jobs in my constituency depend on naval orders. I am not ashamed of making that as a vested interest statement, and I am anxious because those jobs will start to be lost from next month. We need decisions fast in order to end the uncertainty.

Mr. Nott

The hon. Gentleman asked me that during Question Time. I answered it only an hour ago. I will not repeat the answer, because I have a lot to say.

Mr. Neville Trotter (Tynemouth)

I accept the need for simpler corvette type ships instead of frigates, but is my right hon. Friend saying that our intelligence was inadequate when ships such as the "Ark Royal" were ordered, only two or three years ago? Has the situation changed so much that they may be irrelevant?

Was not one of the roles of the three through-deck cruisers to be the carrying of the Harrier, and was not another an anti-aircraft role in shooting down Russian aircraft that would be used for guiding missiles from long range? If the "Ark Royal" and her sister ships are not to go into service, what will shoot down the guiding aircraft in the Atlantic?

Mr. Nott

I do not know who has ever said that the "Ark Royal" or the carriers are not going into service. I am not aware of having said or suggested that. I said earlier that it seems that the ASW carriers are ideal ships for out-of-area activities. I believe that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) put his finger on the valid point. When the ASW carriers were ordered several years ago—the first was ordered many more than three or four years ago—the situation was not the same as it is today. Any decision that I make as a result of the review will not flow through into the new shape of the Fleet until 1990. The development of the Oscar class submarine—the missile-firing submarine with a 250 mile range—involves a breakthrough in technology. However much we may be using our ASW carriers, I do not believe that we would order them if we were making the decision today. Times have changed. However, I will be going to the launching of the "Ark Royal".

I conclude this section of my speech by saying that in considering the future allocation of resources we must arrive at the right balance between the different roles—both now and in the future—that our forces could be called upon to play—both inside and outside NATO—between manpower and equipment; between weapons, including war stocks, and the platforms that will carry them; between our Regular forces and the reserves—if I can find the money, I want to increase our reserves—and between the different layers of direct and indirect support that our fighting services require.

That study will continue for some time yet and, while it is necessary for me to keep my right hon. Friends informed of progress, I do not anticipate that I shall be seeking any decisions from them about my final proposals before July—whereupon it would be my wish, as I have already told my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, that we should have a full debate on all the issues. The suggestion that I seek to avoid such a debate is only one of the more preposterous imputations that I have read recently in the pages of the press.

Mrs. Peggy Fenner (Rochester and Chatham)

In order to alleviate the misery and apprehension of vast numbers of my constituents, will my right hon. Friend allude to the part of the front page of The Daily Telegraph today that refers to the closing of two dockyards and the fact that we shall have to wait until July for the ultimate decisions?

Mr. Nott

I cannot be drawn into commenting about the quite unbelievable things that appear in The Daily Telegraph every day. I have already referred to yesterday's edition of The Daily Telegraph. Today I read from the same correspondent that my chief scientific adviser enjoys a position that is almost unrivalled in the Ministry and has access to me in a way that is not enjoyed by the Chiefs of Staff. I simply do not understand where that comes from. I estimate that I have seen the Chiefs of Staff three or four times as often as I have seen the chief scientific adviser. Indeed, I have hardly seen him at all. I regret that, because he is an exceptional fellow, but I have just not had the time to see him.

Mr. Frederick Mulley (Sheffield, Park)

As a previous victim, I offer my sympathy to the Secretary of State for what happens to him in The Daily Telegraph. Not only was part of the rubbish that that paper printed when I was Secretary of State for Defence provided by some of the Secretary of State's hon. Friends—I do not think that he was involved—but it was used by Conservative Members in defence debates as though it was biblical doctrine. Perhaps what happens in The Daily Telegraph is the responsibility of some of the right hon. Gentleman's colleagues.

Mr. Nott

I share one thing with the right hon. Gentleman. I am concerned because The Daily Telegraph has a wide Tory circulation, and I am genuinely concerned that anyone should believe what is printed. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I refer, of course to a particular defence correspondent.

That brings me to the amendment of the Shadow Cabinet—or part of the Shadow Cabinet, because there appear to be two rival amendments from the Shadow Cabinet, each bearing the name of a different hon. Member. It is surely unprecedented in a defence debate that two members of the Shadow Cabinet should table two different amendments. It is true—and I am sure that in due course the Opposition will make good fun of it—that my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford and I had a minor difference of view about the speech. However, Conservative Members are united in their determination to maintain the effectiveness of our defences. The Labour Members who opened, for the loyal Opposition, each day's debate in the two-day defence debate last year have now both left the Labour Party, so the defence spokesman for the Labour Party last year no longer belongs to that party. This year two members of the Shadow Cabinet table amendments that partly contradict each other.

Nevertheless, I shall attempt to find a common policy between the rival factions in the Shadow Cabinet. I refer to Trident, because Trident is the single strand that appears to unite both rival factions. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) and successive Labour Governments supported Polaris, and secretly developed Chevaline, which after all, is a modernisation of the missile system—it is hard to understand why we should be criticised for continuing the modernisation process with the Trident missile system, which is the logical successor to Chevaline.

I understand that some people believe that we should run on the Polaris submarines. They should know that we need new submarines anyhow, because the present submarines are nearing the end of their life, and the new submarines for Polaris represent about three-quarters of the cost of the Polaris successor system—Trident. If it was right to preserve an independent strategic nuclear deterrent through all the years of Labour Government—and secretly to update the missile system with Chevaline—what has made Labour Members change their minds?

The Soviet Union now possesses 60,000 tanks. It can field 10,000 combat aircraft of ever-increasing sophistication, range and destructive power. Every six weeks the Soviets launch a nuclear submarine, armed with either a ballistic or a cruise missile system. They have 5½ million men under arms. More important, they are deploying each week one new SS20 MIRV-ed missile, targeted against our cities, and that is two years before the cruise missile is even due to be deployed in Europe.

If Mr. Brezhnev and the Soviet marshals read the amendment tabled by one faction of the Shadow Cabinet about nuclear-free zones in Europe and closing down our bases, they would either jump for joy or regard it with the same bemused contempt as I do.

So I come to the argument about money and the cost-effectiveness of Trident. Of course, money spent on Trident is money that is not spent on something else. However, the only real question that we have to ask is: what is most likely to achieve our sole objective in NATO—the preservation of peace? There is no other objective. Deterrence turns on what the other side thinks—not on what we think. Surely, it is not suggested that if the Soviets were asked their view—and gave an honest answer—they would sooner face an increment to BAOR's armoured strength, when they already have 17,500 tanks to our 600 on the central front—a total of 7,000 tanks for NATO—or more Tornados, when they already have a numerical superiority in modern combat aircraft. Even the expenditure of tens of billions of pounds could hardly affect that one way or the other.

Trident is not just a numerical addition to the nuclear deterrence of the United States; it involves a quite different multiplication of risk to a potential aggressor which we, alone in Europe, are qualified to possess. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] In Europe we have the experience. We had an independent strategic deterrent for many years under the Labour Government. Which would the Russians choose: more tanks, or Tornados, or Trident? I suggest that one has only to ask the question to know the answer.

Finally, the estimated cost of Trident at about £5 billion, representing perhaps that part of a total estimated amount on defence equipment over 15 years of over £80 billion, and most of it spent in this country, is for a whole defence programme—missiles, boats, bases and all, the whole thing. The £10 billion—that is what it would cost at current prices—on our Tornado programme does not include the development of bases, support, and all the complex weapons systems such as JP233, defence suppression systems, and all the other things that go with Tornado to give a true comparison with Trident. The same is true, obviously enough, for the 24 "Invincible" class cruisers, which a speaker in another place recently implied that we could get for the Trident money. He did not compare like with like.

In the end, the comparative deterrent effectiveness is not a matter of alternative costings. It comes down to judgment and common sense. I have some sympathy, surprisingly enough, with the deep emotional abhorrence that the Leader of the Opposition feels for nuclear weapons, because I share it. However, it leads me to different conclusions about what is the safest and best way of stopping the mad nuclear arms race. I share the abhorrence of the whole awful thing. But I find it hard to understand those who argue against Trident on the utilitarian ground of deterrent cost effectiveness. If one asks which will give more pause to an adversary contemplating aggression—Trident or an increase in our conventional forces—the answer is plain.

Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport)

My right hon. Friend has been helpful in dealing with speculation. Will he comment on press speculation that defence expenditure is compartmentalised and that the Trident expenditure will come out of the naval budget thus diminishing other naval expenditure?

Mr. Nott

I cannot comment on that at the moment. I cannot be drawn into answering every criticism of an internal exercise displayed in the pages of the press. Obviously I shall come to the House as soon as I am able to outline my proposals. The House will have the opportunity to debate them.

Mr. Brynmor John (Pontypridd)

Will the Secretary of State come to the House before the matters are decided, or will he merely give us the chance to debate decisions which are already firm in the Government's mind?

Mr. Nott

I shall come to the House as normal with a statement outlining Government proposals. I shall make precisely the same type of statement that any Government of any party make.

Mr. John

Will the Whip be on?

Mr. Nott

We do not normally have Whips on a statement.

I come to the question of arms control. [Interruption.] Hon. Members will have the opportunity of deciding which Shadow Cabinet amendment they wish to support if they are called. They should trouble themselves with that problem and then trouble about my statement when it is made.

Mr. Robert C. Brown (Newcastle upon Tyne, West)

When the Secretary of State makes comparisons between Trident and other systems, that frightens people. The continual assertion that Trident is much better in terms of overall defence expenditure carries with it the inference that the Government are coming round to thinking of using the nuclear weapon, and using it quickly.

Mr. Nott

I understand that that argument is widely advertised by members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and others. the idea that any Western democratic nation could conceive of Trident or any other nuclear weapon as being required for "war fighting" is too fanciful for words. We are talking about weapons of mass destruction. They are required for deterrence and the prevention of war now, as they have been since the war. I must say to the hon. Gentleman, as I have said at Question Time before, that before Hiroshima and Nagasaki 50 million people died in the Second World War. That was before nuclear weapons were used. Since the two sides have had them neither side has come near to contemplating in any circumstances the use of the weapons. In some extraordinary way one must ask "Have they not become weapons of peace?" I just pose the question.

Finally, I turn to the question of arms control.

Mr. Richard Crawshaw (Liverpool, Toxteth)

Not only is CND worried about the scenario of Trident. Up to now we have never been able to visualise anything but a gradual build-up. Can the Secretary of State imagine what might happen, particularly if the naval strength is reduced to any great extent, if the Eastern bloc were able to cut our supplies and yet not make war? If we bank on Trident, we must fire that or nothing. That is what is worrying people who are not members of CND.

Mr. Nott

I understand the argument about the opportunity cost of one weapon system against another. We have estimated that about £5 billion will come out of an equipment programme of £80 billion. For all the reasons that I have given, I believe that it is right to spend that money. The hon. Gentleman has a different view. I take his points about convoys and reinforcement and the ability of the Soviet Union to cut our supply line. That is why earlier in the debate I explained how important it was for the Royal Navy "deterrence by presence" role to continue and why we want an out-of-area capability in the Gulf. Surely that is one of the most likely places where the lifeline of the West might be cut by the Soviet Union if it had any aggressive intent.

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Nott

No. Many hon. Members wish to speak.

I come to the question of arms control. In doing so, I am mindful of the condemnation in the Opposition's amendment about our failure to pursue vigorously disarmament talks". I must set the record straight on that accusation. We believe in arms control. I endorse, as did all NATO Ministers last week, the need for arms control negotiations. Who would not? The present arms race is utter madness. However, arms control can be successful only if we respond more effectively to the threat which faces us.

When the West enters a disarmament negotiation with the Eastern bloc from a position of military weakness, we also suffer from equally serious negotiating weakness. The weakness stems not only from the fact that the West is clearly not in a position to make good existing military disparities—and I have described them—but because there appears very often to be an in-built need on the Western side to keep up the pace of the negotiations; a need which sometimes takes scant account of the military and security risks involved.

Against this, the East appears to have no need to worry about the demands in the process of the negotiations coming from its own public opinion because it does not have one. The result of the differing approaches to arms control negotiations, is that, although the West may enter into the process of negotiation with laudable objectives in both military and political terms, the West has pressures on it to make progress leading to concessions in the face of intransigence and lack of compromise from the Eastern side.

I am not suggesting that the pursuit of arms control is a hopeless task. I pray that it is not, for the sake of all of us. I want negotiations to succeed, but we have to be realists as well as politicians. I am mindful of what a Conservative politician once said: I do see fresh opportunities of approaching this subject of disarmament opening up before us, and I believe that they are at least as hopeful today as they have been at any previous time".—[Official Report, 3 October 1938, Vol. 339, c. 50.] That was Neville Chamberlain—in October 1938.

Mr. Churchill

At least he was rearming-300 per cent. in three years.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale)

That is an old one.

Mr. Nott

It is an old one. If the right hon. Gentleman were to say that, the country would throw him out as well.

It is not necessary for us to be in a position of military superiority. NATO, as a defensive alliance, does not seek such a position. However, we cannot hope to negotiate fair agreements from a position of substantial or growing inferiority. Arms control has a part to play in our security, but fresh initiatives can never be a substitute for necessary defence. We must be guided by our minds as well as our hearts. For that at least is a requirement of any Government, if not that of every loyal Opposition.

4.30pm

Mr. Brynmor John (Pontypridd)

I beg to move to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: regrets that in the current economic climate there are no measures proposed by Her Majesty's Government to reduce the excessive and uncontrolled defence expenditure to the same proportion of gross domestic product as that of the United Kingdom's major European allies; deplores the failure of the Government to review the number and size of defence commitments and to cancel the Trident project which distorts all defence priorities; and, believing that the safety of the world depends on easing international tension and reducing nuclear and conventional alms, condemns the Government's failure to pursue vigorously disarmament talks with the major countries concerned. The amendment encompasses the main points of criticism which we have of the Government's Defence Estimates, upon which we shall divide the House at the end of the debate.

Initially, let me join the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State in paying a sincere and deserved tribute to the members of our Armed Forces. Let me also join him, in a year which has seen an unprecedented amount of sneering at the civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence by hon. Members opposite, in paying a tribute to them. I think that the work that they do in supplementation of the defence forces is worthy of the highest praise. Many of them in the technical branches are retired Service personnel, which makes the jibes at their loyalty that we frequently hear totally grotesque.

If I have to single out a single section of the Armed Services for special mention it must now, as for a number of years past, be those who serve in Northern Ireland. Their courage and dedication—evidenced by the horrific death of five people earlier today, in pursuit of the objectives we give them in supporting the police authority—are admirable. I can neither understand nor share the view of those who lay the blame for the tragic situation in Northern Ireland upon our soldiers. They have acted at all times in support of the police and I hope that the present difficult situation will not reverse the process of handing back responsibility for law and order to the civilian authorities.

As paragraph 503 of the defence Estimates points out, for the first time since 1971 the number of garrison troops in Northern Ireland exceeds the number of those who are there under emergency powers—a fact which again directly contradicts the statements of those who talk about the United Kingdom sending more and more troops to Northern Ireland.

The debate on the defence Estimates is normally the high spot of the defence year. Even in this year, when it was to be a mere preliminary to the decisions which will be taken in July by the Secretary of State, it would have been the highlight. But as in some soccer matches, what goes on on the pitch is hard put to compete with what goes on on the Tory terraces, because the crowd is restive and the Secretary of State was given a comparatively uncomfortable time while he was talking about his own Estimates. He only treated us to a taste of his Woosterish sense of humour when he started to talk about the problems.

I enter the quarrel somewhat diffidently because it is almost like intruding on private grief——

Mr. Robert Atkins (Preston, North)

At least he knew what he was talking about.

Mr. John

Well, I have served in the Ministry of Defence, which I doubt whether the hon. Gentleman, who interjected from a sedentary position, has ever done.

It started off in a gentlemanly enough manner with the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) writing in The Daily Telegraph. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman; I have always thought Tory voters to be deluded and now I realise that the basis for their delusion is their predilection for reading The Daily Telegraph. I think he should attend forthwith to the issue of Queen's Regulations about refraining from reading such wicked lies about this country; otherwise their morale will sink to rock bottom. But the hon. Member for Aldershot had no such scruples about an attractive offer and he wrote very fairly on the possibilities facing the Secretary of State in dealing with the present defence and equipment situation.

This was followed very quickly by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall), who used the time-honoured Tory formula about being sure that no Secretary of State could be contemplating such a step. That was a pretty ominous cracking of thunder, but it was quickly overtaken by the then Under-Secretary of State for the Royal Navy, the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) and his attempt at the weekend completely to torpedo the plans of his own Secretary of State. [Interruption.] Well, he was not dismissed because he parted his hair on the wrong side of his head. He made an uncleared and critical speech on what he conceived to be the possibilities, and at midnight, the witching hour, as I understand it, the Prime Minister dismissed him. It may have been a case of acting with speed and repenting at leisure. May I express my personal sympathy to the hon. Gentleman? I wish him well and I hope that he will feel able to enlighten the House about the motives that led him to take the course he did.

Of course the Government are the victims of their own excesses in this matter because they talked in Opposition about there being absolutely no constraints upon defence except the threat we had to meet. That was reaffirmed by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), who was truly bewildered when the Government of which he was such a loyal supporter suddenly changed their course and were no longer talking about matching expenditure with the threat but about economic considerations and the need to fit defence expenditure within those considerations. Indeed, he is not the only Member on the Government side to have taken the frothy rhetoric of the Conservatives in Opposition as the truth.

What we are up against, and what the Government's Lobby fodder will have to swallow, is that the Government will be planning this summer to cut public expenditure further in many other fields and that in that situation we cannot, in the present state of the economy, bear the present size of defence expenditure.

The Secretary of State this afternoon found yet another formula for disguising a defence cut. He said it was a change in expenditure, it was not a cut. On that basis the Health Service has not been cut, industry has not been cut; the expenditure has just been changed. The fact is that cuts in expenditure and the Budget finance are always understood to be cuts in planned expenditure rather than cuts in the immediate year. There have been very few such cuts, at least before this Government took account of the situation.

What was made clear in the Estimates by the printing of internal memoranda, the authorship of which was attributed—and I say this diffidently—to the Secretary of State, is that the programmes have run ahead of our ability to pay for them. He may deny that that is so, but that is the logic of the situation on which he is acting—that the present size of the projected defence expenditure for the next decade is larger than we can bear.

On this, the defence estimates are studiedly vague. They talk about the need for plans, for ensuring value for money. But the message which comes across quite clearly this afternoon is that for the next decade finance will need to be cut, and by a very substantial amount. There is no doubt about that, because of the economic record of the Conservative Party since they came to office.

This year we are spending upon defence 5.2 per cent. of our gross domestic product. Apart from the United States, that is the highest percentage of GDP of all the major NATO countries. It compares with Western Germany's 3.3 per cent. of its GDP, France's 4.4 per cent and Canada's 1.8 per cent. GDP is the fairest measure of our ability to bear any particular expenditure. Indeed, it is the very measure which the party in Government has used to support massive cuts in public expenditure, so it is hypocritical now to deny that GDP is not such a fair measure.

Mr. Wilkinson

Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that it is extremely significant that of all the European members of NATO we are the only country that does not have National Service or some form of conscripted military service? Is it not therefore entirely appropriate that we should pay a little more for the privilege of not being compelled to bear arms in defence of our country?

Mr. John

The lesson of National Service is that the defence value that we get out of National Service men is not worth the immense training effort we have to put in to get them to a state of readiness. Hon. Gentlemen may shake their heads. I did National Service, so I know at least as much about it as some of those who are shaking their heads.

Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman (Lancaster)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. John

No. I have no doubt that the hon. Lady will not be able to contain herself for long; perhaps I will give way later.

It is not a fair comparison to say that the Allies have National Service, and we are paying extra because we have a professional service. We have a professional service because we believe that the skill and value of our professional forces is so much better, that that is the best way to defend ourselves. I do not dissent from that. I have the greatest admiration for our professional Armed Forces and I believe that they should be kept professional. That does not explain the disparity between our 5.2 per cent of GDP and the 3.3 per cent. of GDP of West Germany.

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman

rose——

Mr. John

My hon. Friends will deal in more detail with industrial matters, but my fear is that with the present rate of decline the primary manufacturing capacity of the country will be destroyed by the Government and all that we shall be capable of is the occasional sub-contracting work. That may be why Tory Members are so effusive in their welcome of whatever the United States is ready to offer us in that line.

My fear is also whether there has been the control over the defence budget that we were led to expect. In the past year we have already had a supplementary budget for £200 million; then we had an overspend of £260 million. Now the Armed Forces pay award has exceeded the cash limit and the money will have to be found from elsewhere in the defence budget. Finally, and most puzzlingly, what are we to make of the episode of the three SSN boats, which came to light not in the defence Estimates but in a Ferranti advertisement? That had not been announced, and the initial Ministry of Defence reaction seemed to be totally at sea—if I may put it that way without offence to the hon. Member for Ashford. That experience does not give me the impression of the rigid control of the budget and the value for money of which the Secretary of State boasted and which we were led to expect.

July will signal the end of that. Whatever the screams of pain, the Secretary of State will have just one attempt to rationalise defence expenditure. He must, therefore, ignore the complaints of his Back Benchers in this debate and the inevitable attempts by each Service to preserve itself intact in carrying out this defence exercise.

I shall not embarrass the Secretary of State by promising our support for him in that exercise. He could probably do without that as he could do without a hole in the head. I promise that we shall judge him fairly by two criteria. First, will the cut be a realistic cut which will achieve our acceptance in the Alliance of a fair burden? I hope that the current newspaper fuss will be neither a deterrent to him nor an indication of that oldest of dodges, certainly by the Conservative Government, in which the worst scenario is first trailed so that there are gasps of admiration when something less is done later.

The second criterion by which we shall judge the Secretary of State is whether the exercise provides within the expenditure available to us for defence the best possible system of defence. It will be condemned if it nibbles at equipment, or if it achieves an equality of misery in the sense of keeping the Services happy by making each equally miserable.

The right hon. Gentleman on this occasion must look at the roles which we fulfil, both as to their number and their scope. Not all the roles we attempt are equally valid if expenditure is to be restricted. To stretch smaller resources more thinly over uncut commitments will mean our doing nothing well. If this role reduction is achieved, the Secretary of State can feel that he has done his task well and he can regard the loss of the Under-Secretary of State for the Royal Navy as a little local difficulty. He may complain about newspapers broadcasting the expectation of large cuts in the defence budget, but if he does not fulfil them, the conclusion will be drawn that he has lost the battle within the Cabinet and within his Ministry. Unless he comes up to scratch his position will be gravely weakened, and he will be held to be a lame duck Secretary of State.

I revert to the question of the opportunity that the House will have to consider these cuts.

Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South-West)

Is the hon. Gentleman's definition of a successful Secretary of State for Defence one who cuts defence massively?

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman

rose——

Mr. John

If the hon. Lady would like to intervene now, it would save time.

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman

Yes, I would. Before the hon. Gentleman concludes his speech, will he give the figure per head of population which France, Germany, Italy and the United States spend on defence? In most cases the amount is considerably larger than the amount spent by the United Kingdom. What is important is not just the percentage but the amount that is spent.

Mr. John

The amounts that are spent by countries and the calculation of how much is spent per person vary according to the criteria. I was saying that with our present enfeebled economy the most valid way of making the calculation was as a percentage of GDP. I stand by that. It is certainly defensible, even against the hon. Lady's hectoring.

The hon. Member for Staffordshire, South-West (Mr. Cormack) asked whether my view of the Secretary of State was that he was a passive cutter. But no one who heard the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon would accuse him of passivity. He believed in what he said. He believed it was time, in his words, to cut through the single Service rivalries and bring about an all-round improvement in the country's defence capability at less cost. The only conclusion that can be drawn from his failure to achieve that is that he has lost the battle in Cabinet, that he has been passive with his colleagues when he has not been passive in his Ministry. [Interruption.] The state of understanding of the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins) is not my business. It is that of his electorate, and his puzzlement will receive its just reward in due course.

I come back to the question of the consideration which the House will be able to give to these proposals. The Secretary of State stated with a bold declaration that these matters would be fully debated by the House in July. At the end of his speech he said that they would be fully debated upon a statement. If I may call upon you in aid, Mr. Speaker, a statement does not enable everyone who wants to make a point to be called. It is a wholly inadequate way of discussing the matter. We do not expect in the last days of July a Government statement and half an hour of questions, followed by three months of recess in which irreversible decisions can be taken.

We demand, on behalf of the whole House, not merely on behalf of the Opposition, that these matters should be the subject of a full-scale debate and that they should be discussed fully and properly. We would consider providing a Supply day but it is the responsibility of the Leader of the House, as the custodian of the rights of the House, to force his colleagues, however unwillingly, to give the time that is proper to a subject. No one can say that this is a frivolous subject. No one can say that it does not deserve the consideration of the House. We are considering a proper allocation of the money likely to be available to us.

This leads immediately and directly to the Trident project, with which the Secretary of State has dealt and with which I shall deal, even at the risk of rehearsing our exchanges of last March. The Secretary of State, according to reports of his discussiona on the defence review he is undertaking, has talked simultaneously in terms of no sacred cows while steadfastly maintaining that there is one sacred cow—the Trident project. In our debate in March, I accepted the Secretary of State's valuation of the project cost although I expressed scepticism of it. My scepticism of the cost of the project has, I believe, been justified.

Whatever the Secretary of State may say now, newspaper reports of a unanimity that is beyond mere speculation place the cost already at £6,000 million. Even though the right hon. Gentleman relates that money to future defence equipment expenditure, it is a substantial part of the new expenditure budget that is likely to be available to the Ministry of Defence. We warned that such an escalation of costs was dangerous to the whole of the defence budget—and it has not yet finished. I understand that no final decision has yet been taken about whether the Trident missile will be the C4 or the D5. The choice will make a tremendous difference. I understand that the British choice at the moment is the C4 missile. A choice has not yet been made by the United States. If the bigger D5 version of the Trident is chosen, we shall either have to pay a further £750 million or lose the commonality of equipment with the United States which is advanced as one of the great merits of the project.

The Secretary of State was uncharacteristically petulant at the last defence Question Time when pressed about costs. Despite his behaviour, or perhaps because it was so out of character, I believe that the £5,000 million estimate that he has given of the cost of the Trident project will prove a gross underestimate when viewed historically. We have talked at the moment only about the financial cost of Trident. The Government have been extremely coy, both in the Chamber and before the Defence Select Committee, which has been examining these matters, about the opportunity costs that will arise—the other projects that will be squeezed out, deferred or cancelled to keep the Trident project in being.

I dealt with this matter in our last debate. I shall restrict myself this time to reminding the Secretary of State that not only The Daily Telegraph, but every newspaper has as its common theme the fact that the post-July Navy was likely to be heavily geared around the hunter-killer submarine. What the newspapers have not realised is that the Trident programme is likely substantially to interfere with this approach. In an answer given by the then Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy on 11 May, it was stated that there was no intention presently to open the Cammell Laird shipyard to accommodate the building of nuclear submarines. That is the only other yard in the United Kingdom capable of taking upon itself such work. All work, I understand, is to be carried out at the Vickers yard at Barrow. This was confirmed by the right hon. Gentleman today.

However, the right hon. Gentleman has failed to tell the House that every Trident submarine built at the Barrow yard displaces the hunter-killer submarine building programme on a one-for-one basis. The right hon. Gentleman is delaying a vital and essential part of his new Navy for many years through the building of the Trident submarines. I wonder how this policy accords with the Secretary of State's cogitation. Despite his remarks today, all these measures are being taken to achieve a marginal addition to the Alliance's nuclear capability. It is a national capability, in the right hon. Gentleman's view. However, no one in his right senses would contemplate its being used independently of the United States deterrent.

For that reason, the whole of the rest of our effort towards the Alliance in military terms will be severely distorted. We have only just begun to see the opportunity cost—or, rather, the opportunity detriment—of the existence and continuance of the Trident programme.

I say sincerely to the Secretary of State that not since the disastrous days of the Sandys White Paper in 1957 will we have had so many defence eggs in one basket. The right hon. Gentleman must seriously consider, and reconsider, even at this stage, the Trident programme to see whether a more balanced defence programme is not a better contribution to our allies.

Mr. Michael Mates (Petersfield)

The hon. Gentleman argues at length against the Government's decision to go ahead with Trident. The Opposition's position is made clear in the official amendment. The hon. Gentleman has, however, failed to inform the House of the position of the official Opposition on the strategic nuclear deterrent. If he argues against the pursuance of the Trident programme, he owes it to the House to say whether the Opposition propose an alternative, what it would cost and whether it would be as effective or whether, as some of us are beginning to suspect, they want us to remain in that business at all. It is time that the Opposition officially came clean.

Mr. John

The hon. Gentleman has not read the debate of 28 March. The burden of my remarks at that time was that we should remain part of the Alliance but that we could no longer afford, due to the displacement of other defence tasks, the national nuclear deterrent. We voted against it as an Opposition last March. I hope that the position is now clear to the hon. Gentleman.

I was discussing the distortion of the other defence programmes which has not yet been appreciated by our allies, especially the new United States Defence Secretary. What the new United States Defence Secretary believes, based upon an exchange of letters that took place, is that the so-called savings on the Trident project would automatically be used to increase spending on force improvements. When he realises, as the Opposition now do, that the Trident project will displace other projects and other capabilities, his disillusion will be as great as that of Tory Back Benchers now and in the next five to 10 years.

There are other ways in which expenditure can be avoided. This explains why I did not initially give way to the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman), although I later did so. I wanted to return to what I regard as the lunatic flirting with a form of military national service for the unemployed. Apart from the other manifest weaknesses and objectionable features of the system, the Secretary of State will know—his chiefs of staff will tell him if he does not know—that it makes no military sense in the modern world for Britain to have National Service as a defence contribution. It is far too costly for the military improvement that it gives. I hope that we hear no more of it and that it drifts off into the amended quasi-voluntary service idea of the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Sir H. Fraser).

Nor does the ill-fated rapid deployment force for Britain make any sense. The very mention of it drew horror from the proposed beneficiaries of the force and it was clear that it could not be used except with their consent, as the right hon. Gentleman acknowledged. We are in the highest degree unlikely to get that consent in the very area in which we want to use it.

Time after time in defence debates we stray almost into the realm of foreign affairs. That is because we try to forecast not only the military but the political environment in the next 10 to 15 years. Before dealing with that and before leaving defence proper, I shall say a few words about the military balance between East and West. We have set out in the tables in the Estimates the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. These are helpful in providing a general indication and I welcome them. However, the Secretary of State must recognise that the tables merely present quantitative figures.

These figures suffer from the weakness that they can be used to prove any argument that one wants to advance. They can be used to prove the argument of those who call for greater defence expenditure. They are often used as a weapon of propaganda rather than to present a realistic balance. They suggest that there is a growing and inexorable imbalance. The Secretary of State, both today and in the Estimates, at paragraphs 300 to 303, has sought to portray an imbalance that is being increased each year.

Ideally we want a balance that is neither complacent nor alarmist. To talk of numbers without attempting to make a qualitative assessment is misleading. I shall give a few examples. On page 17 we are given the balance of soldiers between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We are told that it is 1:1.2. That ignores the poorer quality and motivation of Warsaw Pact troops. Unwilling conscripts who serve longish engagements do not compare with the professional dedicated Service men that exist in our forces. We rightly admire the members of our forces and they can be regarded as achieving more than a 1:1 ratio with their opposition in the Warsaw Pact.

If the recent "World in Action" programme is correct, there are severe problems in the Russian army with racial hostility and drug-taking. That does not take into account the restlessness of the allies within the Warsaw Pact. That must be weighed—the Secretary of State was most remiss in not doing so—in the military balance. If he thinks that the Polish army, the Czechoslovakian army and the Romanian army are as monolithic and allied to the Soviet Union as they were 10 years ago, he is misreading the entire situation.

Secondly, we must bear in mind equipment and roles when we seek to make a qualitative comparison. The right hon. Gentleman talked about submarine warfare. We are sometimes prone to ignore the fact that there are geographical limitations on the basing of Russian submarines, and especially on their points of entry and departure. In addition, we are much in advance of the Warsaw Pact in anti-submarine warfare, as the right hon. Gentleman acknowledged. That is put in some circles as a seven-to-10-year advantage, but in an article in the February edition of Scientific American it is said that it is unlikely to be matched in the foreseeable future. That, too, must give us an advantage that must be weighed in the balance.

It is not much good having a crude balance of equipment that ignores how much is operational and ready for service. For example, the air force balance in favour of the Warsaw Pact is at least partially offset by much better NATO serviceability rates. I refer again to the same article in Scientific American, which states that, on any normal day, only 11 per cent. of the Russian submarine ballistic missile force would be in operation, compared with 60 per cent. of the American counterpart, which makes good the disparity.

Finally, let me end by saying—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Conservative Members are curious people. They profess to be interested in defence and want always to indulge in a great debate. However, when they have the opportunity for such a debate they profess universal boredom. They make the cheap, easy and simplistic points that they used to make in Opposition. They are incapable of leaving them even when they are in Government.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover)

This has been a very bad day all round for Conservative Members. Does my hon. Friend appreciate that there has already been one sacking—the dismissal of the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed)? However, the Prime Minister talked today about working as a team. We have had the resignation of the hon. Member for Bromsgrove and Redditch (Mr. Miller). We have recently been informed by the tape of another resignation. It appears that the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Renton) has packed his bags and gone. No wonder Conservative Members look downcast.

Mr. John

That is why, when it was said of the hon. Member for Preston, North that he had never been a Minister, I said that he should not despair because at the rate that the Government are using up Conservative Members as Ministers he might have an opportunity.

The central feature of the amendment is the search for peace. Although there is an imbalance in conventional terms in favour of the Warsaw Pact, it is not so wide as to disqualify us from undertaking serious and detailed discussions with the Warsaw Pact about disarmament. NATO is concerned not only with a deterrent force but with detente. We believe that we were entitled to look for far more support than the Government have given Chancellor Schmidt in his attempts to persuade the United States to negotiate seriously with the Russians. This morning's edition of The Times describes the plea that the German Chancellor has made to President Reagan to hold talks with the Russians seriously and urgently.

Mr. Churchill

rose——

Mr. John

No, I shall not give way. I am conscious of the groans from Conservative Members. Those groans have been reinforced by some of their interjections.

Our anxiety about the sincerity of this operation has been added to by what Mr. Weinberger said on "Panorama" last night. He seemed to assume that the talks would not be serious or were bound to fail and that SALT II was dead. That latter opinion may be right, to the great regret of the United States. However, efforts to limit strategic arms must continue and so must negotiations on cruise and SS20 missiles. To suggest otherwise is to cast doubt on the sincerity of public pledges to that effect. NATO countries other than the United Kingdom will be giving close attention to current and future statements. In bringing greater pressure to bear to fulfil the accord, Chancellor Schmidt seems to have received little or no public support from the British Government. They do not appear as eager to do so as the German Chancellor.

There is anxiety in Britain about nuclear weapons. That is not confined, as the Secretary of State said, to the victims of a Soviet plot. Nor is it motivated, as Mr. Weinberger says, by a willingness to subjugate ourselves to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we are deeply committed to liberty and freedom throughout the world but not necessarily to the sterile anti-Communism upon which Mr. Weinberger seems intent.

We believe that the world is at risk unless the nuclear arsenal is diminished, and the risk is growing year by year. We cannot ignore conventional arms. The bellicose statements of this Administration and of some foreign Administrations seem to play little or no constructive role. The contrast is stark between Government stridency on the dangers of war and their laryngitis on the possibility of negotiating peace.

The Government do not put nearly enough emphasis upon the effort to negotiate disarmament. We are all well aware of the difficulties involved, but that does not absolve the Government from trying. In neglecting that, they are neglecting—in the widest sense—the defence of this country. Even a catalogue of domestic disasters such as that of the present Government, may, in historical terms, pale into insignificance beside the charge that, despite the difficulties, they failed to be urgent enough in the search for peace and disarmament. In their timidity in that area and in their other shortcomings, they have failed to secure the defence of this country. For that we condemn the Government.

5.11 pm
Mr. Keith Speed (Ashford)

The hon. Member for Pontypridd (Mr. John) will not expect me to follow him down the paths along which he led the House. I disagree with much of what he said, but I thank him for his personal reference to me.

I expected to make a speech today in slightly different circumstances. However, I start by paying a sincere and genuine tribute to the men and women of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, the Women's Royal Naval Service, Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service and all their civilian support, who have given me so much support, friendship and kindness for the past two years. This country is well served by those people. As the outgoing Minister responsible for the Royal Navy I a m deeply grateful to them.

Last week, in Tenterden in my constituency, I made a speech which I regarded, and continue to regard, as representing the policy of my Government, of which I was proud to be a member, and the policy of my party, of which I am proud to be a member. I argued that the dangers that would ensue if there were a downgrading of the Royal Navy were such as to imperil our national security. Some have argued that if I felt that way, I should not say so in a speech but should approach the Lobby or other people behind the scenes. I believe that that is the negation of leadership. I was the Minister responsible for the Service. One should not act in a hole and corner manner if one feels that one is expressing views which I hope all my right hon. and hon. Friends will hold when looking at the world as it is today.

I accept what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said, that no decisions have been taken on the difficult task on which he, my colleagues and I have been engaged during the past few weeks and months. The mixed fleet of the Royal Navy has a role in peace and in war which is fundamental to the security of this island, which depends so much for its existence on seaborne trade—in fact, to the tune of about 96 per cent. of its imports and exports.

In my speech last week I was not arguing for an uncontrolled increase either of defence expenditure or of expenditure on the Royal Navy. I was not arguing that defence expenditure should operate in a sort of economic vacuum. That makes no sense at all. However, I was not elected by my constituents, nor was I appointed by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, to preside over any major cutback in the surface fleet of the Royal Navy. There have been arguments in the press over recent months that that was one of the major options that would be available to my right hon. Friend in the difficult studies that he was undertaking. I reject that option now and will fight it through to the bitter end.

Commentators have remarked on Trident, which has also been mentioned by my right hon. Friend and by the hon. Member for Pontypridd. I was very much concerned with Trident on a day-to-day basis, because my right hon. Friend asked me to do that. I believe that Trident is essential for the strategic and national defence of this country. I do not resile from that for one minute. My right hon. Friend was correct in everything that he said this afternoon. However, Trident is a national, strategic: defence system and therefore should be funded in the same way as Polaris, which is national, and not at the expense of any single Service.

In sharp contrast to 25 years ago, the Soviet Union now has a huge and growing blue water fleet operating above and below the seas in all the oceans of the world. As I remarked in my speech—it is fitting to remind the country of this—the Soviet Union has two aircraft carrier in commission— and we believe that it is building more—two helicopter carriers, a new nuclear battle cruiser— with more to come—probably the most powerful surface ship the world has ever seen, with the exception of the American nuclear carriers, 380 submarines, 38 cruisers, 87 destroyers, 185 frigates, more than 370 minesweepers, hundreds of other vessels and a massive building programme that is churning out submarines and surface ships, as my right hon. Friend said.

If one looks at Russian history and its geography, one realises that by no stretch of the imagination can that fleet be needed purely for defensive purposes. It is not. Admiral Gorshkov was appointed chief of naval staff of the Soviet Union 27 years ago. I have a personal admiration for him, because he has achieved much for the Soviet Union. He wrote: The Soviet Fleet is a powerful factor in creating favourable conditions for the building of Socialism and Communism". He is practising what he preaches. He went on to say: In many cases a show of naval strength without taking armed action may achieve political ends merely by exerting pressures through its latent power or by threatening to take military action. I quoted those remarks in my speech last Friday evening. On Saturday morning the Soviet fleet appeared off Lebanon, doing just what Gorshkov told us it would do. That has happened over the months and years. We have done the same ourselves to a lesser extent from time to time.

I could not tell the House on how many occasions, even since I have been the Minister responsible for the Navy, we have sent ships to different parts of the world to help our friends or to help against the natural disasters in various islands in the West Indies, and so on. That is the great advantage of maritime power. On one day one can have a high profile and the Fleet can be there on the horizon. On the next day there can be a low profile and the Fleet can draw away below the horizon, or it can move in to render first-aid or emergency services. With the greatest respect to my colleagues, that is something which, by definition, standing armies and air forces cannot do.

Much has been said about standard nuclear submarines, which are not ballistic submarines. That is the best antisubmarine weapons system. Those submarines are expensive. Currently the price is about £160 million each. Including those in operation and under construction, we have a total of only 15. Because, inevitably, some are under refit—submarine refitting is important for safety and other reasons—only 10 or 11 are likely to be operational at any one time. Alas, it is two years since we ordered the last one. With the best will in the world, a nuclear submarine cannot be used in the role of a surface ship in the Gulf of Oman, in the Belize guardship in the West Indies, in Hong Kong and in all the other areas where surface ships are used. In addition, being nuclear powered, these submarines cannot sail through the Suez Canal. We must recognise that there are substantial limitations to their use.

Again as I said in my speech, we cannot continue to have frigates costing £130 million a time, excellent though they are. With my right hon. Friend, I repudiate press reports that our modern ships are poor weapons platforms and not properly armed. They are first-class ships, but, frankly, we cannot afford them in the numbers that we need. In the Navy debate last June I advanced the case for the type 23 frigate at half the cost, for the much cheaper minehunter and for seriously considering converting tankers to helicopter carriers for anti-submarine purposes, which is a sensible dual-purpose role for them. All that makes a great deal of sense. Inevitably, the resources that any Secretary of State has are limited. The best being the enemy of the good has all too often been the rack upon which Secretaries of State for Defence have been laid.

My hon. Friends the Members for Rochester and Chatham (Mrs. Fenner) and for Gillingham (Sir F. Burden) and other hon. Members representing dockyard constituencies are concerned about the rumours. For a number of weeks there have been grumblings and problems about the dockyards. I feel strongly about them. I led the study into their operations and activities. I confirm what my right hon. Friend said, that no decisions have yet been made. Reports that decisions have been made are entirely speculative. The rumours were around long before the imbroglio this weekend. There is a blight because of uncertainty—and we are talking about a considerable number of jobs. I hope that as soon as possible my right hon. Friend can remove the uncertainty.