NUCLEAR WEAPONS

§ Mr. Speaker

Before we begin the debate I remind the House that a large number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak, and brevity will be a virtue.

§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Francis Pym)

As the House knows, this debate is an occasion which I much welcome. Nuclear defence issues are of the gravest moment for Britain and for the world. For a variety of reasons they must be much in our minds at present, and the opportunity to put the Government's views forward for discussion by the House is therefore timely. I am right in saying that this debate will be the first for 15 years in the House on this subject. Therefore, in those circumstances, I judge it right to devote my speech to nuclear issues and nuclear policy, because they are important, and because I recognise the more frequent opportunity the House has—and will have again next Monday—to discuss more immediate issues of foreign policy.

This subject is one which naturally and rightly arouses deep emotion, and about which people hold strong views. We are all acutely conscious of the real anxieties that are felt about nuclear weapons and, at the same time, aware of the very great responsibility that must attend any consideration of them. I believe strongly that the arguments surrounding nuclear strategy neither should be, nor can be, taken for granted. They require constant rethinking and restating, and I feel sure that it is right for the House to play its part in that process.

I propose to remind the House of NATO's basic concepts of nuclear deterrence, and then to set within that essential framework the two particular issues of policy—Alliance theatre nuclear force modernisation and the future British nuclear contribution.

For good or ill, we live in a world where nuclear weapons exist. We seek increasingly to control them in various ways, but we cannot disinvent them. The fact of their existence is built into the entire structure of security and deterrent 673 balance between East and West. Horrendous though the instruments are, that structure and balance have made a crucial contribution to keeping the peace in the NATO area for half a lifetime now, and they have kept peace, not just nuclear peace. I think we sometimes allow the comfortable-sounding word "conventional", which has settled into the vocabulary of defence debate, to blur our memory of what non-nuclear war was like. In the six years from 1939 that "conventional" war took its immense toll of something like 50 million lives. The scars of that remain today. NATO needs to deter all kinds of military aggression. The Alliance's nuclear armoury is part of an interlocking system of comprehensive deterrence, not just a counter to the Soviet nuclear armoury. This armoury is vital if the Alliance is to present to a would-be aggressor, before he starts any aggression at all against NATO, a clear chain of terrible risk.

It is all the more necessary in the face of a potential adversary who has built up and is continuing to build up a vast—and offensively structured—apparatus of military power at all levels and in all fields; and furthermore who has, within the last month, brutally demonstrated that his willingness to wield that power is little inhibited—if at all—by the rest of the world's concept of peace, freedom and justice. That being so, its possible use against the West has to be inhibited by other means—by deterrence; that is, by fear. That is what NATO's own nuclear weapons crucially help to do.

I should dearly like, as I believe the whole House would like, to see the world kept in peace and freedom by a security system which had less need to possess such awful instruments in reserve, or, better still, no need. To desire a new system is one thing; to make it real, effective and dependable is quite another. We are not yet in sight of that, unhappily, and perhaps we are further away than before. The Government are not prepared to dispense with, or weaken, the structure which shelters us now.

Let me make it clear to the House that NATO's nuclear concepts do not assume that the Soviet armoury must be matched weapon for weapon. NATO seeks only that provision which its own deterrent strategy requires. That strategy is not one of trying to win a military victory 674 by nuclear exchanges at any level. Such a victory would have no meaning even if it could be achieved. What, above all, NATO seeks to do is to work upon the minds of the Soviet leaders. Deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we may think.

The Soviet leaders have often shown much caution when faced with evident resolve and evident military capability. They have also shown by their words and published doctrines, by their military provisions and deployments, and by their international actions, that they do not think in terms of restraint or defensive strategies or minimum force. Their massive and expanding forces are a plain indication of how they evaluate the role of military power. NATO deterrence has to convince men who hold those views, not a mirror image of our own views. It has to show them, even before they embark on a military adventure, that, wherever and however they might pitch their agression against NATO, the Alliance will always have within its reach effective options for retaliation rather than accepting defeat. That is our fundamental aim. That is what the strategy of flexible response means and it is not feasible without the possession of nuclear weapons.

§ Mr. Bob Cryer (Keighley)

Would it be fair to say that NATO, having used its flexible response, would, rather than face defeat, use the deterrent to blow up the world?

§ Mr. Pym

I shall come to the relationship between the various component parts of this flexible response later.

Against that broad background, I want to come to NATO's modernisation programme for its long-range theatre nuclear forces. I made a statement to the House about this on 13 December immediately on my return from the NATO meeting, and the House will not wish me to go into details again. However, I wish to emphasise some general points.

For many years NATO has had the capability to threaten deep nuclear strike, reaching as far as the Soviet homeland, with systems based in Europe and separate from the main strategic armouries. This is an important element in the chain of deterrence. Strategic 675 nuclear parity between the super-Powers, if anything, heightens the need for it.

At present NATO's land-based systems for this purpose are simply the United States F111s and United Kingdom Vulcans, all stationed on airfields in England. They are ageing—particularly the Vulcans—and their vulnerability is increasing, both on the ground and in the air. So in any event something would have to be done about this.

The need was very sharply heightened by the fact that the Soviet Union showed, and proved, that it was not content with the advantage that it already had in this category. It set about increasing it with formidable new systems such as the SS20 mobile ballistic system fitted with a MIRV warhead and the Backfire supersonic bomber. These did not merely increase Soviet preponderance in a general way; they particularly increased the direct pre-emptive threat which the Soviet Union could pose to NATO's armoury—that is, the aircraft that I have mentioned.

In these circumstances, to do nothing would have been to accept the potential neutralisation of part of our deterrent. That is why NATO had to act and why the Government warmly welcomed the collective decisions of 12 December. The United Kingdom played a positive role in supporting those decisions and in developing them through long and careful preparation. I would like, if the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) will allow me, to pay tribute to the preliminary work put in train and carried forward by him.

The House will know that it was a key aspect of Alliance policies, which again we supported strongly, that the modernisation decisions should be accompanied by a major and related arms control effort. Despite events last month, that still remains a key aspect. But the House will also know that the Soviet Union has rebuffed that initiative, at least for the present. A grave responsibility rests on Soviet leaders for this reaction, which I am certain the whole House regrets.

It may be claimed, I suppose, that the Soviet Union had already made an offer of its own. I refer to the speech by President Brezhnev on 6 October. It is worth recalling what that offer really was. President Brezhnev already has a 676 TNF modernisation programme. It is far larger and further advanced than ours and continues unabated. He did not offer to halt any part of it, still less to reverse it. The only offer he made in relation to TNF was an offer to reduce an unspecified number of unspecified systems in Western Russia. It was an offer that had some superficial attraction. But even if it were discharged, the SS20s, the Backfire bombers and even some of the older nuclear systems could still easily reach anywhere in NATO Europe from east of the Urals.

Looked at more carefully, the offer is completely empty. It was a piece of spurious propaganda. In essence, President Brezhnev's proposal was this: "You must not start your programme; I will not stop mine. From those respective positions, let us talk." He was saying "Heads I win, tails you lose".

There is a domestic aspect of the TNF programme on which the House will expect me to say something. Within the programme, which needs to be looked at as a whole, the Government have agreed to accept the deployment in the United Kingdom of 40 launch vehicles with 160 ground-launched cruise missiles. They are to be owned and operated by the United States within the long-established framework of the agreements between our countries; agreements which cover any use of United Kingdom bases in war, and which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister recently confirmed to the House. We are now having detailed discussion with the United States about where the new systems might best be located and I shall make a statement about our conclusions on that in due course.

Obviously, defence considerations must predominate in the ultimate decision, but I assure the House that we shall take the fullest account we can of other factors which I know hon. Members would regard as of great importance. We shall be ready to explain our choices and decisions as fully as we can, and to discuss their implications with the local authorities concerned. We wish to achieve the greatest possible degree of understanding and support and, as our national security is at stake, I hope that the House will agree with that. Let me just add, in case there is any doubt about it, that there is no intention of practising missile flight from United Kingdom 677 bases, and no intention of training in off-base deployment with live missiles, let alone live warheads.

§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian)

The Secretary of State has referred to long-established practices. Some of us may be ignorant about it, but does not the long-established practice include the power of veto by a British Prime Minister of any American actions?

§ Mr. Pym

The agreement which applies, of course, to times of emergency is that the use of United Kingdom bases would be a matter of joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. It is a long-established convention that has, I believe, survived for many years under Governments of both parties.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

Is it not a fact that there is only one key to the missiles? Is it not also true that during the recent world-wide alert by the American forces the British Government were not informed until after the event?

§ Mr. Pym

The arrangements which involve both countries have survived for a long time to the satisfaction of the Governments of both countries and of both parties in each country.

§ Mr. Douglas Jay (Battersea, North)

Am I correct in thinking that the Secretary of State said joint "decision" and not joint "consultation"?

§ Mr. Pym

Yes, I did use that word.

§ Several Hon. Members

rose—

§ Mr. Pym

I have had enough interruptions and I must move on.

§ Several Hon. Members

rose—

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Richard Crawshaw)

Order. The right hon. Gentleman has already indicated that he is not giving way. Hon. Members must resume their seats.

§ Mr. Pym

I have much more to say.

I turn now to the issues of our own direct contribution to NATO's nuclear deterrence—the systems which are in our own ownership and ultimately in our exclusive operational control. At all levels, whether classed as strategic of theatre, 678 all our systems are fully committed to the Alliance and to its deterrent strategy. We support, and conform to, the concepts worked out in the highly successful joint forum of the Nuclear Planning Group.

It follows from this that we see our contribution essentially as part of Alliance deterrence and a reinforcement of that deterrence. Public debate and learned discussion over the years have conjectured various possible themes of justification for British nuclear capability—political prestige, our status in the Alliance or a comparison with France. One hears sometimes an argument made out for the concept of a "Fortress Britain"—some kind of insurance policy concept should the United States go isolationist or the Alliance collapse. What weight there might be in such ideas I leave others to assess. They all miss what is for me and for this Government the main point, the decisive consideration: we think that Britain needs to be a nuclear Power primarily because of what this contributes to NATO's strategy of deterrence and, through that, to our own national security.

Our strategy seeks to influence Soviet calculations fundamentally and decisively. It seeks to guard against any risk of Soviet miscalculation. The United States, by its words and deeds, has constantly made clear its total commitment to come to the aid of Europe, and to help to defend Europe by whatever means are necessary, without exception. No words or deeds in advance could make that more crystal clear. But we are, of course, dealing with possible situations that would be without precedent in history and of unique peril.

The decision to take nuclear action at any time would be vastly hard for any President of the United States to take. In recent years I think that it has become even harder, if that is imaginable, because of the fact of super-Power nuclear parity. The British Government have the greatest confidence in the weight and reality of the United States commitment. We cast no shade of doubt upon it. What matters most is not what we think but what the Russians think. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister once said, when considering international matters, the important thing is to look at other nations not as if we were standing in their 679 shoes but as if they were standing in their shoes.

The Russians cannot be assumed to look at the world as we do. They cannot be expected to look at the interplay of power and interest, at the importance of principle, promise and loyalty, in the way that we do. They look at it quite differently. That hardly needs explaining. In a crisis, Soviet leaders—perhaps beset by some pressures of turmoil in the Soviet empire, perhaps looking out upon a NATO Alliance passing through some temporary phase of internal difficulty—might conceivably misread American resolution. They might be tempted to gamble on United States hesitation.

The nuclear decision, whether as a matter of retaliatory response or in any other circumstance, would, of course, be no less agonising for the United Kingdom than for the United States. But it would be a decision of a separate and independent Power, and a Power whose survival in freedom might be more directly and closely threatened by aggression in Europe than that of the United States. This is where the fact of having to face two decision-makers instead of one is of such significance.

Soviet leaders would have to assess that there was a greater chance of one of them using its nuclear capability than if there were a single decision-maker across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would be inescapably higher and less calculable. That is just another way of saying that the deterrence of the Alliance as a whole would be the stronger, the more credible and therefore the more effective.

§ Mr. James Kilfedder (Down, North)

The Secretary of State has been singing the praises of the United States of America coming to our aid at a time of crisis. We have a crisis. The reality is that the United States is showing nothing but hostility to us. It refuses to supply pistols to the RUC in Northern Ireland to defeat the terrorists who are murdering innocent British citizens and British soldiers. The reality is that the United States looks after its own interests and is prepared at any time to betray its friends.

§ Mr. Pym

The fact that we are able to have this debate and that parliamentary 680 democracy is still able to survive to such an extent round the world is due to the defence capabilities of NATO and other alliances. By far the largest contribution to NATO is made by the United States. Its contribution is 60 per cent. of the whole. We do well in the Alliance to recognise the enormous responsibility that our friend and ally, the United States, takes.

The contribution which we in the United Kingdom make to the Alliance in this way is unique. France has a substantial nuclear capability, but there is no sign of her accepting the degree of engagement to NATO which is cardinal to our own approach. No other Alliance member is even remotely a candidate. In particular, and over and above the binding prohibitions that they have freely accepted under two separate treaties, the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany have often made clear in the firmest terms their recognition that Germany does not contemplate nuclear status. There are and always have been special considerations in Germany's case. So what I am saying is that, if it is accepted that deterrence is helped by the existence of a second centre of nuclear decision-making in NATO—and our allies so believe—we alone can provide it.

I come now to the specific content of our contribution. As I have implied, this is comprised of more than one element. It has both strategic and lower-level components, inter-related. A strategic component alone and by itself would not contribute adequately to overall deterrence, because the chain which links it to other levels in a flexible response strategy would be defective. A theatre component alone and by itself would lack credibility, because the awful logic of deterrence requires that the nuclear decision-maker should have the evident and perceived power to go all the way to the strategic level if the aggressor will not desist.

§ Mr. F. A. Burden (Gillingham)

Do the Government intend to improve and increase the nuclear potential of the Royal Navy?

§ Mr. Pym

No. At the moment we have no intention of altering the proportion of our nuclear capability within our total defence effort.

§ Mr. David Young (Bolton, East)

Will the Secretary of State indicate which nuclear weapons are in existence in Britain, and those that are proposed to be instituted in this country? Will he also indicate under whose specific control these nuclear weapons are?

§ Mr. Pym

I have referred already to some of those weapons when talking about theatre nuclear forces. I am about to deal with the strategic system.

I want to say something at this stage about the role of our four Polaris submarines and what they contribute to our defence effort. The force that we have possesses immensely formidable striking power and is effectively invulnerable to pre-emptive attack. It is run by the Royal Navy with great skill and dedication. In the decade or more of its operation, covering now 114 individual submarine patrols, there has never been a moment's intermission in its standing readiness on station. It is difficult to imagine a higher tribute than that to the professionalism and the efficiency of the Navy and our submariners.

The strategic environment in which they operate and the whole Alliance operates, is not static. Without breaching the provisions of the 1972 treaty on anti-ballistic missile defence, the Soviet Union has continued to upgrade its ABM capabilities, and we have needed to respond to that upgrading so that we can maintain the deterrent assurance of our force. The previous Conservative Government therefore pressed ahead with a programme of improvements to our Polaris missiles, which our immediate predecessors continued and sustained. The House will, I am sure, understand that I cannot go deep into detail, even to correct the widely mistaken assertions which have sometimes appeared in public, but I think the programme has now reached a stage where I can properly make public more information about it.

The programme, which has the code-name Chevaline, is a very major and complex development of the missile front end, involving also changes to the fire control systems. The result will not be a MIRVed system, but it includes advanced penetration aids and the ability to manoeuvre the payload in space. The programme has been funded and managed entirely by the United Kingdom with the full co-operation of the United States 682 Government, including the use of some of their facilities for trials and tests.

Some American firms have been employed, but most of the work in industry has gone to British firms. We have had a very successful series of flight trials and development is close to completion. Deployment will begin soon afterwards, and that will maintain the full effectiveness of our strategic deterrent into the 1990s.

It has been a vital improvement. I do not think the House will be surprised that it has also been costly. The programme's overall estimated cost totals about £1,000 million.

It is a major improvement. For at least another decade we can be confident that our strategic force is equipped absolutely to fulfil its deterrent function. But, for a variety of technical and operational reasons, we cannot sensibly or responsibly plan on its continuance much into the 1990s. We intend to ensure that our strategic deterrent remains effective for a long time thereafter. Knowing how long it takes to design and procure new strategic forces of the complexity now needed or, indeed, any complicated weapon system, we must decide before long about Polaris's ultimate replacement.

The matter was touched upon in broad terms when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister held discussions with President Carter on 17 December, and the subsequent communiqué shows clearly that the United States Government support the maintenance of our strategic deterrent capability and Anglo-American co-operation in providing it.

It is not possible to say exactly what a new force would cost. That would depend not only on the system chosen but on other decisions not yet taken and negotiations not even begun. But the question of the likely impact on our defence programme as a whole is, of course, of the greatest importance and interest. I should like to offer the House some general comments on this aspect.

For this purpose and in illustrative terms, I think we can accept it as reasonable to discuss the matter on the basis that a total capital cost in the range of £4,000 million to £5,000 million at today's prices might be a realistic estimate. It would be of that order of magnitude. The spending of this vast sum would, of course, be spread over a long period, 683 some 10 or 15 years, and the peak rate of annual expenditure would probably come towards the end of the 1980s. How big a proportion of the whole defence budget it would absorb depends on several factors that no one can be precise about, including, obviously, the size of the defence budget several years ahead. But I judge that even during the years of the main capital spend the acquisition of any new system would be unlikely to absorb much more than perhaps about 5 per cent. of the budget on average, and in other years—that is, the years that were not those of major capital spend—the figure would be less.

That is, of course, still a massive demand on our limited resources, but we must keep it in the perspective of what modern defence provision inescapably costs. The amount we are talking about would be of the same order of magnitude as we are spending on the Tornado programme, both in overall total and in peak rate. If anything, the strategy system might be slightly less. Even 5 per cent. of the budget—if it were that—would, incidentally, be much lower than the proportion reached during the build up of the V-bomber force in the 1950s. It is far less—several times less—than we spend on any of our three major conventional roles in NATO.

§ Mr. Churchill (Stretford)

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that this substantial sum of money would be likely to safeguard Britain's freedom and security for some 30 years after its introduction into service?

§ Mr. Pym

That would be the purpose of what I am talking about.

§ Mr. Cranley Onslow (Woking)

I should like to ask a slightly more difficult question. My right hon. Friend is concentrating wholly on the replacement of one ballistic missile with another ballistic missile. Will he say something during the helpful briefing that he is giving to the House about the possibility, sometimes canvassed, that one could re-equip with a cruise missile system that would nevertheless be rateable as strategic in certain respects? If the public are to have full information on the opportunities available, it would be helpful to hear about that.

§ Mr. Pym

I appreciate what my hon. Friend says. That was one of a wide range of options that we considered when we addressed our minds to what would be the possibilities in the post-Polaris period. As we have not yet reached the point of coming to a conclusion, it is not right for me to pursue in detail any of the particular options. I assure my hon. Friend that this was one of them and that when we began nothing was excluded.

§ Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline)

Will the right hon. Gentleman indicate a timescale in which he thinks a decision might be made? The whole importance of this debate is that we know, one way or the other, that the time scale is now becoming very short.

§ Mr. Pym

We have no particular timetable for it, any more than our predecessors did. I would say the fairly near future. But we are not pressing ahead on a timetable with a fixed end to it. What is important in taking a decision of such difficulty and complexity, which depends on judgments as much as anything else, is to do everything one conceivably can to get it right. We are not saying to ourselves that we have to decide by March, or June or September. We shall decide when we are ready to decide.

I have tried to put the cost into proportion, and it is clear to everyone that it is enormous. But it needs to be looked at in perspective and as a proportion of our total defence effort. At the same time, the crucial role that it fulfills in our defence ability has to be appreciated. I am very clear that it would be gravely harmful if sustaining our nuclear contribution to the alliance meant emasculating our non-nuclear contribution. That would amount to lowering the nuclear threshold. I assure the House that that is not in our minds.

Operating our present strategic nuclear force is exceptionally economical in Service manpower. That is significant because constraints of manpower may in future be at least as important as constraints of money in shaping our defence effort. I do not think that there is any prospective alternative defence application of the same amount of resources that would bring Britain and NATO a bigger dividend in security than this one.

§ Mr. Keith Best (Anglesey)

rose—

§ Mr. Pym

I hope that my hon. Friend will allow me to continue. I have given way on a number of occasions and I have nearly come to the end of my speech. I do not want to continue for too long.

I have sought to put the Government's views on these grave issues of policy clearly and frankly before the House. Like it or not, we believe that NATO has no prudent or responsible alternative but to maintain the strength of the nuclear elements of its deterrence—that is deterrence to any sort of military aggression or pressure.

We supported wholeheartedly the Alliance's modernisation decision and the parallel effort on arms control. We believe that Britain's own nuclear effort makes a key contribution to Alliance security which no other member in practice is able to make. The perspective in which we must view the national decision on our strategic force which is ahead of us is not whether that special contribution is a good thing in the abstract, but whether we should now plan to abandon it after making it and sustaining it without a break for a third of a century.

The Government's judgment is that we must continue with it. To do otherwise, especially in today's harsh and dangerous world, would be an act of grave irresponsibility which would heighten the risk to all those values and freedoms that over the centuries we have managed to protect and preserve.

§ Mr. Delwyn Williams (Montgomery)

rose—

§ Mr. Pym

I am about to come to a conclusion. I ask my hon. Friend to for give me for not giving way.

I ask the House to support us in these views and to support the deterrent strategy that has won for Europe a peace that has endured now for 35 years. Of all the responsibilities of this or any Government, peace and the safety of the nation are at the top. If there is to be a Division at the conclusion of our debate, I ask the House to make clear in its vote its wholehearted endorsement of our discharge of that responsibility.

§ Mr. William Rodgers (Stockton)

As might have been expected, we have had a 686 powerful speech from the Secretary of State. I congratulate him on what was his maiden speech as Secretary of State, apart from a short intervention late at night. The right hon. Gentleman knows that I am not grudging when I say that we all wish that the debate had come earlier. We are approaching it at a time when a decision on nuclear modernisation in NATO has been made and announced in the House, and when, on the right hon. Gentleman's own account, a decision is being approached by the Government on a Polaris replacement. I think that there is good reason for the House to complain—I do not place the responsibility necessarily at the right hon. Gentleman's door—that we have not debated defence much earlier than today.

Although we have a title for our debate, in theory the debate could go much wider. As the right hon. Gentleman said, it is difficult to develop an adequate theme over the complete range of our concerns in a short, one-day debate of this sort. Therefore, I hope that we shall have another opportunity at an early date to discuss other defence aspects.

For example, had it been appropriate, I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would have wished to pay tribute to those who are serving in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. We heard only at lunchtime of some of the special risks that they run. Whether it is in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia or in Northern Ireland, both sides of the House must always continue to pay tribute to those who serve in the Armed Forces, often in difficult and dangerous situations.

In 1974 we debated defence on three separate occasions between May and December. We can all reflect upon the enthusiasm of the then Opposition for debating such matters and their lack of enthusiasm as displayed since May 1979. I say to the right hon. Gentleman in the presence of his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that I hope that that will be remedied in future. There were a series of events in the latter part of 1979 that would have justified a debate at a much earlier stage.

§ Mr. Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton)

Surely the distinction is that during the period to which the right hon. Gentleman referred Britain's defence capability was steadily being run down whereas in this period it is being built up.

§ Mr. Rodgers

I shall come to that. I hope that when the Minister replies we shall hear in what way, to what extent and at what cost our defence capability is, as the hon. Gentleman says, being built up. Consideration must be given not only to how much we spend on defence but to the challenges that we face. Both factors are relevant to the decisions that the Government make.

In the autumn of 1979 there were many matters of considerable international concern, apart from theatre modernisation, which justified discussion. There was widespread discussion among not only hon. Members but the public about remarks made by Dr. Henry Kissinger at the beginning of September. On 6 October we had President Brezhnev's initiative. The right hon. Gentleman dismissed it today, and I believe that in many ways it was an attempt to call NATO's bluff. However, it was an important initiative, and in other circumstances it should have been debated in the House.

In the view of the right hon. Gentleman—he has expressed this view today—there was slow progress being made in the SALT II debate in Washington. Both sides of the House were concerned at the possibility that the Senate would not proceed with ratification. Surely that is another reason why we should have debated these issues in their broad international context at that time.

§ Mr. Pym

The last issue to which the right hon. Gentleman referred is a matter for the United States. I rise to make a minor point, although the right hon. Gentleman is making rather a meal of it. During the period to which he was referring the then Conservative Opposition chose to debate defence. Today's debate arises from the Conservative Party's initiative in Government. At no stage have the Labour Opposition decided to debate defence. They could have done so at any stage. I make that clear to avoid any misunderstanding outside the House.

§ Mr. Rodgers

The right hon. Gentleman will discover that the debates to which I referred in 1974 were not all on Supply. In any event, it is the responsibility of the Government of the day to make time available if issues are great enough to warrant doing so. That is the view that the right hon. Gentleman 688 shares. He said before Christmas that he wanted the debate that is now taking place. He indicated that the debate had been denied to him. I hope that there is some agreement between us on that.

I turn to the problems that a debate of this sort creates and the need to have more informed debate on defence issues. I think that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that the debate on defence in Britain is ill-informed by the standards of the debate, for example, in the United States. We seldom consider these issues in the House. Outside, there is not the attempt to search for truth from which I think we would all benefit. I said to the right hon. Gentleman only the other day that it is often necessary to go to Washington to discover what is happening in Whitehall. Although we sometimes hear false stories, more often than not what we learn in Washington is what is concealed from the House and from the public in London and elsewhere. I hope that we shall move forward in that respect.

I shall refer later to the information that the right hon. Gentleman has given the House about the Polaris replacement. The House will be grateful to him for what he has said about that today, but there is inadequate information upon which to discuss the options and to decide whether the Government have made the right decision when that time comes. That is why I attach especial importance to the work of the Select Committee on Defence. I know that Select Committees are not always popular with some of my elders and betters. I expect that during the course of this Government they will become increasingly unpopular with the Prime Minister and her right hon. Friends.

The nature of our debate today and the extent to which we shall not wholly satisfactorily explore the issue before us show the need for a Select Committee that is not only probing into the decisions of the Executive but making information available to the House as a basis for debate.

For the most part, the information available to right hon. and hon. Members about these nuclear questions is found mainly in the evidence presented to the Select Committee at the end of the previous Session, and printed in the sixth report for 1978–79. I greatly welcome the 689 decision of the new Committee to inquire into the future of strategic nuclear weapons, policy relating to them, and their implications in the light of the decisions that the Government will be making. I only wish that it was not so much a long-term endeavour on the part of the Committee. It is highly desirable that the Select Committee should consider many questions of this sort and make its views and the evidence available to the House, when we could have a better-informed debate than would otherwise be the case.

As the right hon. Gentleman has said, any decision about Polaris must be seen against a clear perspective of the Government's intentions for defence as a whole. Certainly the figures that he has given us this afternoon of between £4,000 million and £5,000 million as the likely capital cost of a new weapons system have to be set against the whole course of public expenditure during the period when the cost will be borne.

I think that he would readily agree that it is not a question of spreading that evenly throughout the period. There will be a year, perhaps more than a year, in which that spending may reach 7 or 8 per cent., which is a much larger figure to accommodate in a defence budget in which many items are pre-destined a long time ahead.

§ Dr. John Gilbert (Dudley, East)

Does my right hon. Friend accept that it is not merely a question of 7 or 8 per cent. of the defence budget, but 15 or 16 per cent. of the equipment budget? That is a more serious matter.

§ Mr. Rodgers

As my right hon. Friend knows from his experience, it is a serious matter. It was a point made by Lord Carver in a debate in the House of Lords before Christmas.

We do not know what the Government plan to spend on defence in the year 1980–81 and how it compares with the previous Administration's planned expenditure. As others have said, Cmnd. 7746 is a thoroughly inadequate document. The short paragraph 16 on defence is also rather badly drafted.

I wish to know how the figure of £8,062 million at 1979 survey prices compares with £7,394 million at 1978 survey prices, which is the figure that appears in Cmnd. 690 7439. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, it has been widely said that the represents evidence of the Government's intention to spend £115 million less in 1980–81 than the previous Administration intended to spend. Perhaps the Minister will be kind enough to confirm or deny that figure when he replies. A great deal of authority has been given to that figure. If it is untrue, the House has a right to know what figure will be put in its place.

§ Mr. Burden

As the need for improving and expanding our defences has increased as a result of events in the past few months, would the right hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that he, and the Opposition, will give the Government their support in any additional defence expenditure that may be needed?

§ Mr. Rodgers

The previous Administration made a firm commitment out of their NATO obligations to increase expenditure in real terms by 3 per cent. in two successive years. The point that I have been making, to which I should like a reply tonight, is whether the actual figure to be spent in 1980–81 is £115 million less than the previous White Paper indicated.

§ Mr. Pym

I am glad to respond to the right hon. Gentleman at once. Yes, the figure published in our White Paper last November was a lesser figure than that published in the previous year by the previous Administration for its planned expenditure.

Between the publication of the previous Government's White Paper and the present time there was a general election. During the course of that election the Labour Party made it clear that it intended to reduce the defence effort as a proportion of gross national product. When I inherited my office, I found that sufficient resources and money had not been allocated for the previous Government's existing programme. We have added to our cash limits £545 million in the current financial year.

§ Mr. Rodgers

A number of the points made by the right hon. Gentleman in his intervention will be dealt with subsequently in the debate. I am grateful for his confirmation that, in practice, the Government will be spending £115 million less in the coming financial year than the previous Government had intended to spend.

691 I turn to the two principal issues that are before us today: first, theatre nuclear modernisation and, secondly, a Polaris replacement. As the House knows, when the right hon. Gentleman made his statemen on 13 December, we accepted the need to move ahead on the proposed timetable. It was the view of the previous Government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essential, and that is our view today. But there are genuine anxieties that should not be lightly dismissed.

As I mentioned on 13 December, the new weapons, especially the cruise missiles, are a major step forward in technology, as is the SS20. They are not tactical weapons in the way previously understood. The gap between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is constantly narrowing. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman would deny that it is important that, in making decisions of the sort made by NATO in December, the overall nuclear balance should be considered within the overall military balance. One of these should not be considered in isolation.

There appear to be doubts about the technology of the cruise missile. There are certainly persistent and reliable reports of major testing failures. No contract has yet been placed for its manufacture. Obviously, that is of great concern to the House. It will be of concern to all who have a proper anxiety about the location of the missiles. I should like some explanation of the Government's understanding of that position.

I welcome the right hon. Gentleman's remarks about consultations on where the missiles will be located. He would not dismiss lightly, as I shall not dismiss lightly, the very genuine anxieties that exist. Everything should be done by way of explanation and discussion to relieve the anxieties.

§ Mr. Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds)

If the right hon. Gentleman is placing the official Opposition behind the Government in the modernisation programme, may I take it from him that Labour supporters in the country, who seek to oppose and resist the programme, would be speaking against the wishes of the Opposition Front Bench?

§ Mr. Rodgers

Either the hon. Gentleman is being rather naive or his comments 692 reveal a considerable lack of feeling about the views of those who may be directly affected by the location of missiles. It is entirely understandable that those who know that missiles will be located in their locality should have a special anxiety. Whether or not they are supporters of my party, it is reasonable that they should express those anxieties, even if it involves opposition. I have stated very clearly the view of the parliamentary committee of the parliamentary party, and I have no wish to depart from that in any way.

The fourth item relates to consultation. The right hon. Gentleman went rather further today than on previous occasions in explaining what was involved. I am grateful to him. However, there is still a certain amount of doubt about what the previous arrangements were. The fact that they are long-established and have worked well does not seem to me to be an adequate reason for failing to give a fuller explanation at this time. As I understand it, the right hon. Gentleman said that the use of United Kingdom bases was subject to a joint decision. But, as he knows, cruise missiles will be mobile, and it is not at all clear to me whether they will be located at their bases at a time when a decision on their use has to be made. I should like a much fuller explanation, if not today, on an early occasion, as to exactly what the joint decision will involve. I should like a reassurance that the joint decision is a decision to use the missiles and not simply to locate them at United Kingdom bases.

§ Mr. Churchill

rose—

§ Mr. Rodgers

I must continue, otherwise I shall take far too long and many other hon. Members want to speak.

I turn to the question of the Polaris replacement. This is an area in which strong beliefs are vigorously held, and it is perhaps unfashionable to be agnostic. But I am not the slightest bit ashamed to say that at present I have not been convinced by the robust certainty of others. First, there is the question whether it is wise to replace Polaris at all. To me, that remains an open question which should be subject to debate. I have a nagging feeling that it would be a wise insurance policy for the next century. I do not like the idea that the only weapons in Europe might be in the possession of France alone. On the other hand, I was 693 deeply impressed by the clarity of the arguments of Lord Carver in another place, and we must consider very carefully indeed in a hard-headed fashion the overall case for replacement.

Secondly, if a decision to replace is made, we should not take it for granted that the right course is to replace Polaris by Trident. There are strong arguments, which I would not choose to deny, for continuing with a submarine-launched missile if we are to continue at all. However, there are other options which the Government ought to consider, including in particular the option of retaining Polaris in new boats beyond the 1990s.

There is a good deal of evidence that this would be not only a practical proposition but less expensive. If we are concerned to prevent the continuing escalation of a nuclear arms race there are times when it is right to replace adequate weapons with adequate weapons rather than go for weapons that are more complicated, expensive and effective than they need be within the whole context of deterrence. When the time comes I hope that that will be a serious option and that the House will be presented with the figures upon which it can judge a decision.

The right hon. Gentleman said that the plans to replace Polaris would not emasculate spending on conventional arms. He must not assume that we shall take that for granted in the absence of argument and costed options. I am sure that he will agree that he has given a very broad figure about the capital cost of replacing Polaris with the weapons that the Government might choose. I hope that before a decision is made, costed options will be made available to the House so that hon. Members can form their own view, not only about the wisdom of replacing Polaris but about the alternatives that are available and the effect of any decision on the defence programme as a whole as well as our obligations within NATO.

Parliament and people must be trusted with far more information than they have previously had. Security is a cloak devised not for the convenience of Government but for the protection of our people. A cloak should not be thrown lightly over issues of great public concern unless there is overwhelming evidence that security considerations are uppermost. I 694 should tell the right hon. Gentleman and the Prime Minister that it would seriously undermine the validity of the final decision—whatever it may be—and support for it if that information were not made available and the Government relied merely upon glossy handouts and smooth public relations as the basis upon which the argument was conducted.

The events in Afghanistan have cast a dark shadow over East-West relations, as the Lord Privy Seal's statement this afternoon shows. It has been a massive blow to confidence and, inevitably, a sharp check to detente. I believe that President Carter had no option at the present time other than to withdraw SALT II from the Senate, and I shall say a further word about that in a moment. In that sense, today's debate takes place in a somewhat different atmosphere from that of the debate we might have had a month ago.

However, anxiety is a dangerous mood from which to calculate the wisest course, and anger is no substitute for cool appraisal in these very difficult matters. It is essential that we continue the pursuit for peace through agreed measures on arms control, disarmament and detente, and do not throw away the idea of progress in Europe. The Lord Privy Seal made some interesting remarks about that this afternoon, and I feel that the House approved them. I believe that we should go further and make clear that, whatever the problems arising from Afghanistan—and although the need to maintain our proper defences is clear—at the same time the pursuit of peace should continue.

The decision that was taken in December to deploy new nuclear missiles and the knowledge that that deployment cannot take place until 1983 provide a valuable breathing space. I hope that there will be a positive initiative during that period by the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friends, as well as within NATO, to endeavour to reach an agreement on the firm limitation of the deployment of those weapons, associated properly and inevitably with decisions on the part of the Soviet Union to withdraw the SS20 and to provide for proper verification.

I am not seeking to put forward a formula for these complex matters, but they are bound up with SALT III, and the sooner the negotiations begin, the 695 better. I also hope that real progress will be made with the MBFR discussions in Vienna. I know that these can easily be a cause for cynicism, because they have continued for a long time and yielded limited results. But, here again, there is scope for examining whether the initiative taken by President Brezhnev on 6 October has any real content. Those proposals should have been launched and put on the table at Vienna, but they were not. However, there is no reason at all why we ought not to use that forum to seek to make progress in this important sphere.

Thirdly, there must be full and active support for a comprehensive test ban treaty. The discussions should be brought to a conclusion and all possible measures should be taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in support of the 1968 non-proliferation treaty. It is difficult to put our minds to those matters in the present mood. A massive responsibility lies with the Soviet Union to rebuild the confidence which is necessary to achieve progress and to reach détente. The search for peace must be unremitting, and that search must go on, whatever decisions may be necessary from time to time to ensure that Britain within NATO has adequate weapons and manpower to meet its proper responsibilities.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State most heartily on his firm and unequivocal commitment to the maintenance and prolongation of the British nuclear deterrent. I should like also to acknowledge the essentially bipartisan speech of the right hon. Member for Stockton (Mr. Rodgers). This was as it should be.

The first nuclear weapon was invented by the Churchill-Attlee coalition, and developed jointly by Britain and the United States. We have no reason to be ashamed of the work we did then. It shortened the war against Japan by at least two years and—I agree with my right hon. Friend—it has prolonged the peace since 1945 in a way that conventional weapons might never have done.

Of course, so long as the United States had the monopoly, and, later, overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, the peace would no doubt have been pre- 696 served without any other country embarking upon nuclear weapons. But in their wisdom the Attlee Government, the Churchill Government and their successors recognised that that situation might not continue indefinitely. They knew that the development of weapon systems was a lengthy business. In spite of strong opposition from the Labour Party, many hesitations from the Conservative Party and strong American pressures not to embark on nuclear development, sucessive Governments stuck to the course of making sure that Britain had an effective independent deterrent.

I warmly congratulate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on having secured at last the endorsement of the White House for the British nuclear force. The wisdom of successive Governments has been confirmed by events. American supremacy in nuclear weapons is gone, and will not return. In the context of nuclear parity between the super-Powers—I put it a little more brutally than did my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State—no one could expect the United States to commit suicide in defence of an ally.

I do not need to labour the argument. Dr. Kissinger developed it very eloquently in Brussels last September. He is no longer in office, but in my knowledge of him he is a man who does not speak lightly. In any case, the logic inherent in the situation supports his argument. That knowledge and understanding is one of the reasons why the policies of Paris and Bonn today are perhaps a little more equivocal than we should like to see.

The conclusions are clear. Britain must have an effective nuclear weapon system of its own, capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on an enemy, and as far as possible invulnerable, and, therefore, available for a second strike.

Having had some personal responsibility for the V-bomber force, for the missile end of the Polaris project and for the production of nuclear weapons, I know how difficult and complex is the decision which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has to take in prolonging the nuclear force in this decade and the next. I shall not, therefore, presume to give him advice on which weapons system to adopt. However, I join with the right hon. Member for Stockton in saying that we would be 697 grateful for as much information as can be given within the bounds of security about the options open to him.

I welcome the decision to station American cruise weapons in Britain. The deployment of the SS20 and the Backfire bomber in the Soviet Union left us with no alternative but to agree to that request. I congratulate the Government on the lead which they have given to our European colleagues in NATO on the subject.

The decision raises two issues, one of which was raised by the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun). This is not the first time that we have had American missiles in Britain. We had them within Bomber Command in the shape of the Thor. In those days—I was responsible at the time—the Americans could not fire without our agreement, and we could not fire without theirs. I accept, to a degree, that American bombers in Britain do not require our mechanical consent before they operate. Are aircraft and missiles on the same footing? Is there a difference? I am not sure, although I suspect that there may be.

The second question is the reverse of the first. I do not put American co-operation in doubt today, but can we be sure that in all circumstances in the future the White House would be prepared to give the order to fire when we might think it necessary? The logic of the argument which makes us feel that there shoud be two centres of control for the strategic weapon applies to this intermediate weapon. It will be costly, but I find it difficult to escape the conclusion that we should have cruise weapons of our own, with their own British warhead.

I should like to say a word about battlefield weapons. It is difficult to imagine any situation in which the British Army in NATO would stand alone and would need its own battlefield weapons, but in military matters such things can never be foreseen with certainty. The United States may not always deploy its forces in Britain. We may be called upon to deploy forces outside NATO, in areas where battlefield nuclear weapons would compensate for smaller numbers. After all, under the CENTO treaty we deployed tactical nuclear weapons to the sovereign base areas in Cyprus in support of CENTO.

698 The financial pressures on my right hon. Friend will be hard. I do not underrate them. I am not saying that battlefield weapons are the highest priority, but I should like an assurance from the Minister when he replies that there will be a research programme on the subject and that we shall look into the possibility of consulting the United States and France—I note that France is reported to be considering the possibility of developing so-called neutron weapons—so that we shall not be left out of the field should the need arise.

§ Mr. Frederick Mulley (Sheffield, Park)

Although the debate is essentially about nuclear weapons within our defence forces, it will be agreed that the subject can be examined only in the context of our total defence and security policy. In the interests of brevity I shall not fully deploy my arguments, and I hope the House will understand if I speak in a form of verbal shorthand.

For over 30 years, under successive Governments, defence policy has been firmly based on the NATO Alliance. I have never accepted—nor do I think that the majority of hon. Members accept—that we can have a sensible defence policy outside the Alliance neutrality; nor that it makes sense to take a pacifist position. I refute—on the evidence of human experience and history—the arguments of those who claim that if we had no defence forces, we would be totally immune from attack by a potential aggressor.

Membership of the Alliance confers obligations as well as benefits. NATO is entirely defensive. Its policies are based on the twin pillars of deterrence and detente. To be credible in its deterrent policy, NATO must have nuclear weapons, both theatre and strategic, at its disposal. No ally, consequently, can be opposed to nuclear weapons in principle, because we all depend upon the totality of the NATO defence system.

It is against that background that we need to examine the programme of theatre nuclear weapon modernisation. Deterrent policy is simple in theory. It is to deny a potential aggressor the possibility of easy gains, so that before resorting to war he knows the enormity of the risks that he runs for himself and, indeed, for the 699 world. But in practice it becomes difficult and sophisticated, because the question we have to ask is: how much do we need to have to be able to deter?

Arguments about the throw-weight, range and vulnerability of nuclear weapons and the relative strength of conventional forces all come into the argument. But it is more complicated than that, because in the ultimate what is sufficient to be credible to a potential aggressor is the subjective judgment of that aggressor himself.

I accept in the present circumstances the need for TNF modernisation, and it is worth stressing two points. As I understand the position, the outcome will mean fewer rather than more nuclear weapons in Europe and within the Alliance, because the withdrawal of the antiquated weapons will make it possible to reduce the numbers. I hope also that there will be a reduction by a withdrawal of atomic weapons in the ground to air and perimeter defence roles. Secondly, as I think the Secretary of State made clear, at least three years are necessary from the time of a decision before the first of these weapons could be in position. Therefore, a case has been made for the modernisation of the Alliance in this regard.

I wish to make absolutely clear that I do not believe, and never have believed, that it is feasible to think that there are some scenarios in which one could hope to expect to use theatre nuclear weapons without a very grave risk of an escalation up to the strategic level. It is absolutely essential that the same measure of strict political control should be exercised over theatre nuclear weapons as over the strategic weapons. In this country I would have preferred to have the air-launched rather than the ground-launched weapons, but that might have created problems within the SALT II agreement.

The key argument in all this—it was the argument in the Assembly of the Western European Union and in various parliaments in the Alliance; I do not know whether it arose in the NATO Council—was not whether we should modernise but whether we should modernise before seeking a possibility of arms control agreement with the Soviet Union in this area or whether we should first take the decision and then seek negotiation. As at least three years must pass 700 before any weapon can be deployed, it was reasonable to take the view that there was time for serious negotiations if the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies wanted to have the negotiations. I therefore accepted that the NATO decision could not be further delayed.

A key to any further progress in arms control is the ratification of SALT II. The prospects did not look too good in early December. Although we welcome the statement that I understand President Carter has just made, endorsing again his commitment to SALT II, there is a big problem now as a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While I understand the attitude of the Senate in present circumstances, I am bound to say that I feel that President Carter and Her Majesty's Government are in danger of over-reacting to the events in Afghanistan. It is absolutely vital that SALT II ratification should take place as soon as possible, for only then can we have meaningful negotiations on TNF or any real progress towards MBFR in Vienna, as well as, one hopes, a start on progress to halt further nuclear developments, in SALT III.

The Secretary of State today explained that successive Governments had taken steps to ensure that the Polaris force would remain effective into the early 1990s. There is no question but that the arrangement should continue on that basis. I warmly endorse the very proper tribute that the Secretary of State paid to the Royal Navy for the way in which it has sustained that force at 100 per cent. readiness. I am sure that it will do so in the future, as in the past.

I believe that there is no hurry at all to take a decision on technical grounds, and even less on policy grounds, with the possibility of SALT III having a bearing on the future nuclear weapons within the Alliance. There is a good argument on military grounds why the Polaris force should not be replaced. It provides a useful but very marginal contribution to NATO's nuclear capability. We acquired Polaris on very favourable terms. It is worth remembering that the first boat was on station within six or seven years of the agreement being signed. I do not know whether it will be possible to buy a successor from the United States on such a favourable basis. If—and I stress the word "if"—we decide to go ahead 701 with a replacement, it seems most sensible that it should again be submarine-based and a successor to Polaris, such as the Trident.

§ Mr. Anthony Nelson (Chichester)

The right hon. Gentleman may recall the advice that Sir Ronald Mason, as chief scientific officer, gave to the small committee that was set up under the previous Administration to consider the most appropriate launching system Did the committee arrive at the conclusion that the submarine-launching system was the most appropriate replacement, or was it the right hon. Gentleman's own conclusion from all the evidence that he has assembled?

§ Mr. Mulley

It is my own conclusion. The previous Government, as the Secretary of State acknowledged, had not reached any decisions in that area. As I was explaining, I do not think that it is an urgent matter in terms of the time scale. The cost will be substantial, and I do not dispute the range of magnitude that the Secretary of State indicated. It is at least arguable that that kind of money could be better spent in Alliance terms on conventional forces than on a replacement of Polaris.

The biggest problem facing our Armed Forces and the nation is how we are to be able to discharge the very substantial duties and obligations that we undertake within the Alliance, both on the central front and particularly in the Atlantic. We do not, incidentally, get enough credit for what we do in that respect. No matter what party is in power, and no matter whether our economic position improves, as we all wish it to do, I have very great doubts whether the necessary money can be found to give the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force the equipment with which fully and properly to discharge the very heavy obligations that they have within the Alliance at the moment.

The Secretary of State referred to the Tornado. New tanks are necessary. As well as possibly replacing the Polaris missile the Royal Navy will need many new ships to deal with the anti-submarine problem, the mining and many other problems, all of which will require substantial equipment costs. The sum of £4 billion or £5 billion is a large slice of the money for any Government to make available for equipment in the foreseeable future. 702 It is also difficult to imagine a scenario in which we would wish to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons outside the NATO framework. The argument for the retention of a British nuclear capability is, in my view, essentially political and not military. The Secretary of State stressed—though I would not give it quite the same emphasis—the provision of an extra centre of decision-making which is, of course, a factor within the Alliance. Secondly, in the European context, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Stockton (Mr. Rodgers) explained, it is important to consider whether it would be right that France, which is at present outside the full defence integration of the Alliance, should become the only European Power with a completely independent nuclear capability. All these factors need to be considered.

Before I came to a decision I would need to know more about the views of our allies on the replacement of Polaris and the various conventional tasks that we may have to reduce in the future. We ought to know what proposals the Government have for reducing some of our other tasks within the Alliance, and we should like to see what progress, if any, is made on arms control, both for conventional and nuclear forces. I would reserve a decision until matters are clearer on these points. I do not think, as I have said, that we need to take a decision for a year or two, on technical grounds,

§ Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay)

Not just because of your appeal for brevity, Mr. Speaker, because there are many who wish to contribute, but because I find the issue a simple one, I shall respond quickly and give not only my own point of view but that of many in this country who are not necessarily advanced in their technical knowledge about all the possible options that are open to us.

I do not propose to devote any of my remarks to the type of change that we might make, by replacement, to our independent H-bomb armoury. I hope that in the not-too-distant future there will be another occasion when we can debate this subject, dealing with the method that we should adopt to replace our major nuclear weapon. I believe that a decision has already been taken, despite what the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) said, to replace our 703 sovereign nuclear capacity in our present nuclear submarines. I am not qualified to say, nor would I wish to say, which precise method we should adopt. I believe that there will be at least one more—probably several—occasion on which this matter will be debated.

I want to concentrate on the position as I see it. I hope that those who follow me will contradict me if I have given any incorrect information to the House.

At present, if we are concentrating on theatre nuclear weapons, there are at least 200—probably more—SS20s ranged against us. They are mobile, and nearly all, if not all, are triple-headed. These missiles can be moved freely anywhere within the boundaries laid down in the Warsaw Pact. They are capable of destructive power up to and beyond the west coast of Ireland. I do not believe that there is any argument about that.

The warheads of each one of these 200 or moremissiles—the Russians, it is said, introduce one new missile every week and it is impossible to keep pace with the growing size of this threat—have at least the destructive capacity of the bombs dropped on Nagasaki or Hiroshima. They are all capable of destroying the whole of Western Europe or causing great damage right up to and beyond the west coast of Ireland. As I said, if I have over stressed the destructive power of these weapons I stand to be corrected, but that is certainly the information that I have obtained.

If we leave Backfire on one side—another dreadful weapon that is coming into the weaponry of the Soviet Union—what have we at our disposal to match this threat? The only theatre nuclear weapons that we deploy within NATO at present are those which, at best, can reach and destroy targets within the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

It does not make much sense to me to stand with a weapons system that is not capable of reaching an aggressor but is capable merely of causing destruction of life and property in satellite States which have no wish to be in their present position. It seems an odd form of strategy to have only weapons that can kill people who are our reluctant enemies and our potential allies in the future. Yet that is the present position.

704 I want to concentrate on the possible scenario of a war in Europe. Already the Russians have greatly superior conventional forces right across the board. The last defence White Paper published by the outgoing Labour Government showed this convincingly. I have no doubt that the White Paper published by the present Government will show that this situation has certainly not improved but has probably worsened.

The possible scenario that I want to put forward is that the Soviet Union—with its superior conventional forces and without, at that stage, resort to theatre nuclear weapons, which would be held in the background as a threat—may decide that the moment has come to launch an aggressive war in Europe.

In such circumstances these greatly superior forces could smash through Europe and reach the Channel ports. I ask all my colleagues what would be the position that faced us, with a Western Europe occupied by a victorious Soviet army using conventional forces? The only response would be for the Americans to launch an inter-continental thermonuclear retaliatory strike. Whom would that help? Would it help the people of Europe who would live in already occupied countries, or would it help the Americans who, in such an event, would undoubtedly invite a vast retaliatory strike with similar weapons against themselves? That is a policy of mutual suicide and mutual destruction.

In those circumstances, the scenario is such that we are left in no doubt other than to seek, to the best of our ability and within the limits of our resources, to contribute towards that not happening. The best way to do that is to prevent that scenario being regarded in the Kremlin as feasible.

First, with our allies, we should concentrate the maximum limit of our resources on improving our conventional forces to restore some of the balance that used to exist but has now largely been lost. Secondly, from bases within NATO we should as soon as possible deploy theatre nuclear weapons that can, with massive effect, hit targets within the Soviet Union and not be limited, as now, to targets within the satellite States of Eastern Europe. If we do that we shall have a convincing, not an aggressive, 705 deterrent force. No one, unless he is entirely prejudiced or mad, believes that NATO has the will, the capacity or the intention of launching a war against the Soviet Union or Europe.

We should then be able to convince those in the Kremlin that adventures, such as those entered into in other parts of the world, will prove unsuccessful and extremely painful to them if they yield to the real temptation to take advantage of Europe's weakness in both conventional and theatre nuclear weapons. We must try to reach a stage at which that real deterrent is restored. I do not think that any hon. Member will think that that aim is not worth striving for and achieving.

§ Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich, East)

I start with the question of theatre nuclear modernisation. It is a pity, but perhaps understandable, that when NATO announced its decision last December all attention concentrated on the decision to modernise the weapons systems and to deploy the Pershing II ballistic missile launchers and the ground-launch cruise missiles. I thought that two other parts of the NATO announcement were equally, if not more, important.

First, there was the Americans' willingness to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe and not to replace the 572 warheads associated with the modernisation programme. That struck me as a gesture that should have been taken up. I hope that despite the difficulties—we all understand the increased tension as a result of the Afghanistan situation—our Ministers will encourage the Americans to continue the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from Europe.

Secondly, there was the United States offer to start negotiations with the USSR on the limitation of long-range theatre nuclear systems to be based on equality on both sides—bilateral negotiations between the USA and the USSR, but involving a special NATO consultative machinery to monitor the results.

I think that there would be almost total agreement in the House on the urgent need to limit these incredibly sophisticated and horrible theatre nuclear systems. In the tension that has arisen as a result of what has happened in South-West Asia, this kind of initiative has inevitably been lost sight of, but, despite 706 the original Soviet rebuff, it is vital to press on with those negotiations. I hope that our Ministers will press NATO to ensure that the negotiations start as quickly as possible.

I understand the view of many of my hon. Friends that that is a reverse way of tackling the problem. They argue, with sincerity, that we should have delayed the decision to produce and deploy the missiles until we had seen the results of the limitation negotiations. I understand the force of that argument, but it ignores what I regard as the growing threat of the Soviet systems.

We know that the SS20 is a more sophisticated, accurate, powerful and mobile system than anything that has gone before or anything currently in the West. Figures have already been quoted of the numbers available. The most conservative United States estimate suggests that there are now between 60 and 75 SS20s targeted on Western Europe. But given the current rate of increase, it is suggested that by 1985 no fewer than 200 of these missiles will be targeted on sites in Western Europe.

There are now between 40 and 60 Backfire bombers assigned to the European zone. By 1985 that figure will have risen to about 100. As we have heard from the Secretary of State and other speakers in the debate, the NATO response is largely geared to ageing and vulnerable bombers, or to the land-based Pershing I missiles, which cannot reach targets in the USSR.

I understand the argument about the