DEFENCE

§ Mr. Speaker

Before I call the Secretary of State to start the debate on the defence White Paper, I should say that I have a tremendously long list of right hon. and hon. Members, all of whom have very good reason to be called for their interest in this subject. They will be called only if the speeches of their colleagues are as brief as to make that possible.

I have selected the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun).

§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Frederick Mulley)

I beg to move, That this House endorses Her Majesty's Government's policy set out in the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1979 (Command Paper No. 7474) of basing British security on collective effort to deter aggression, while seeking every opportunity to reduce tension through international agreements on arms control and disarmament. As hon. Members may recall, this motion is in similar terms to that approved by the House last year. It seems to me to summarise the consistent and continuing defence policy of Her Majesty's Government and our efforts to achieve, on the one hand, defence and deterrence and, on the other, as an ultimate enhancement of our security, detente and disarmament.

I do not regard these two objectives as being in any way in conflict. On the contrary, in my view, the highly desirable goal of multilateral disarmament can be attained only from a position of adequate defence forces to ensure deterrence. Equally, we can achieve these objectives only by collective effort, by working in close association with our allies and friends.

It is therefore entirely appropriate that this House is holding its annual two-day debate on defence only a few days before NATO celebrates its thirtieth anniversary, which falls on 4 April. For 30 years the North Atlantic Alliance—a wholly defensive alliance—has kept the peace in Europe. There have, of course, been a number of stresses and strains. It would be surprising in an alliance of 15 sovereign 42 nations if there were not. But it is a matter for congratulation and thanks that, 30 years on, Europe is, in the recent words of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the most secure continent in the entire world, leaving aside Australasia. For those of us with memories of the first half of the twentieth century, this is a profound change.

It is only as part of the NATO Alliance that we in Britain can continue to enjoy freedom and independence in the face of the very large armed forces that are maintained in Europe by the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies. The collective security which the Alliance offers to its members is founded on the firm commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty that an attack within the treaty area against one or more of the members of the Alliance will be considered as an attack against them all.

The past year has been a successful one for NATO, despite the problems that remain in a number of areas, particularly on the southern flank. Perhaps the most significant event has been the Washington summit in May, which reaffirmed the commitment of each member nation to maintaining Alliance solidarity and vigilance and to providing a defence effort at the level made necessary by the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities. At the same time, the summit reaffirmed the Allies' determination to pursue a constructive and positive relationship with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries.

At the summit, the NATO nations endorsed the long-term defence programme begun at the London meeting the year before. The purpose of this programme is to make a reasonable but firm response to the continuing military build-up of the Warsaw Pact and to show our determination to use the defence resources of the Alliance in the most effective way through greater cooperation and longer-term co-ordinated planning. At the same time, the summit reaffirmed the commitment of all the Alliance nations to detente and to realistic multilateral arms control and disarmament.

There is no inconsistency between these two aims of deterrence and detente. The Government are determined to see a reduction in the armed confrontation, across the dividing line in Europe, but 43 we cannot expect to achieve the mutual reduction in forces which is necessary if our security is to be preserved, or as we hope enhanced, if we start from a position of weakness. We must have an adequate defensive force to ensure that our deterrent posture remains credible.

§ Mr. Victor Goodhew (St. Albans)

In view of the right hon. Gentleman's belief in the need to have arms for the country's security, how is it that he mentions, on page 5 of the White Paper, under "Defence and Deterrence", the Government's objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control"? Does he really still believe in complete disarmament in a world in which the Soviet Union is behaving as it is, and arming as it is?

§ Mr. Mulley

The hon. Member should follow the logic of his own argument. One would have complete international disarmament only if the Soviet Union and her allies were equally disarmed, with verifiable arrangements. I should have though that that was a wholly desirable objective.

To achieve this level of deterrence does not require NATO to match the Warsaw Pact tank for tank, gun for gun and aircraft for aircraft, but if we are to sustain the credibility of our deterrent posture, the Alliance must have enough forces to fulfil the strategy of forward defence and flexible response. It must be able to convince any potential aggresssor that the risks of any aggression, at any level, are simply not worth taking.

But it is no part of NATO policy to engage in an arms race in Europe. On the contrary, the Western aim is to reduce the level of military potential in Europe through balanced and verifiable arms control which would provide the same level of security for all. Both sides in the MBFR negotiations are agreed that the objective should be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. We are working for an agreement which would achieve approximate parity, at a lower level, between the 44 forces which NATO and the Warsaw Pact maintain in central Europe.

A successful MBFR agreement on these lines, coupled with the new strategic arms limitations agreement which we hope will shortly be concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, will offer the prospect of a firm foundation for our future security.

I said last year that the key to the MBFR negotiations was the achievement of an agreed assessment with the Eastern side on manpower data. A further year of negotiations has not achieved this, despite the very considerable efforts made by the Western side to find the source of the discrepancy between the figures tabled by the Eastern side and our own estimates of Eastern forces. We will continue to press the East to make a constructive response to our questions on data.

There is, unfortunately, no sign that the Soviet Government and their Warsaw Pact allies intend to reduce their military expenditure. In fact, it continues to rise, and this extra money is almost entirely devoted to the improvement of the quality of their weapons and equipment. This continues to be a matter of great concern to the Alliance.

Faced with these Warsaw Pact improvements, NATO has no alternative but to improve its own forces and devote additional resources to defence, if a credible defensive strategy is to be maintained. The only alternative—which would be quite unacceptable—would be to revert to the old tripwire strategy of deterrence by the threat of massive strategic nuclear retaliation against an attack of whatever kind. The Alliance has rightly rejected this course. Instead, it has agreed to the long-term defence programme, to which I have already referred, which consists of a number of measures intended to improve the readiness and capability of NATO forces in order to strengthen their deterrent posture and to meet the defence needs of the next decade. Britain is playing her full part in these measures, many of which will produce benefits to the Alliance out of all proportion to their cost.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

May I ask my right hon. Friend a question on a very serious matter? In the past two months, have not the Government gone 45 back on their previous commitment? In our election manifesto, we said: We have renounced any intention of moving towards a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons. That pledge has been repeated constantly by my right hon. Friend and others in the House—until 26 January, when, in what was clearly a carefully-thought-out written reply, the Secretary of State said: The time has not yet come for a decision to be taken on whether to proceed with a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons to succeed the present Polaris force."—[Official Report, 26 January 1979; Vol. 961, c. 268.] Is not that a very different position? Either we have or we have not renounced a further generation—a successor to Polaris. Will my right hon. Friend make the Government's position clear? We believe that we should renounce, otherwise there will be great trouble inside the Labour movement.

§ Mr. Mulley

I am sure that my hon. Friend will deploy his arguments at greater length and with his customary persuasiveness when he speaks, as I am sure he will, very soon. He asked about the commitment in the manifesto. It was that we would maintain the present Polaris force as long as it was effective, and it will be effective into the 1990s. In that sense, therefore, it is much too soon to take a decision now about whether it would be right to have a successor, because of all the developments which may take place in the next few years. It is necessary for this to be judged. In any event, the question of replacing an asset is not a serious one until that time is reached. I could not say today that in no circumstances would I be in favour of moving towards a new generation. I accept that the arguments for and against are very finely balanced. The answer depends a great deal on what happens in the next year or two. If I said "Yes" and gave my hon. Friend total satisfaction, that would not prevent someone else from taking a different view in the future.

I was talking about the long-term defence programme and the study, which is still in progress, of the modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear forces. We need to be sure that each link in the deterrent chain that joins NATO's conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic 46 nuclear forces remains sound and credible for the 1980s. We also need to consider the implications of the Soviet decision to strengthen medium-range weapons not covered by SALT with the SS20 and Backfire. This is not just a military problem; it has highly important political and arms control aspects.

In pursuit of our objective of curbing the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, we are also engaged in intensive negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a treaty would be a milestone in arms control and would make a significant contribution to detente.

Unfortunately, there is no escaping the need for the Alliance to devote more resources to defence if deterrence is to be maintained, unless we can achieve significant multilateral disarmament measures. This is why all NATO Governments accepted the aim of a 3 per cent. increase in their defence budgets, in real terms, in each of the five years beginning in 1979.

§ Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow)

Would my right hon. Friend tell the House whether or not all our allies have committed themselves and implemented the commitment to a 3 per cent. increase, as proposed in the present White Paper?

§ Mr. Mulley

I cannot say whether every one has done so, but most of them have. The financial years differ. We do not begin ours until next month, but all the major countries have fulfilled that commitment.

The defence budget Estimates for 1979–80 represent an increase of 3 per cent. in real terms over the defence budget for 1978–79. The size of the defence budget, at Hi billion, shows the determination of the Government that we should continue to make a substantial contribution to the Alliance in resources, manpower and equipment.

§ Mr. Mulley

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I do not want to take responsibility for making a long speech by giving way too frequently, particularly in view of your observation, Mr. Speaker, about the long list of speakers.

§ Mr. Trotter

I refer the Secretary of State to the written answer that he gave me on 5 March. Will be explain how we shall now be spending £83 million less at 1979–80 forecast outturn prices than was intended by the Government in the 1976 public expenditure survey? How does that fit in with a 3 per cent. increase?

§ Mr. Mulley

That 3 per cent. increase is not related to 1976. As I have said, it is related to 1978–79. That is the base on which the 3 per cent. is calculated.

Expenditure on equipment next year will be £3,493 million, approximately 41 per cent. of the defence budget, as compared with the figure of £3,279 million at the same price level for the current year.

About 40 per cent. of spending on new equipment will be for aircraft and aircraft engines and their associated equipment and weapons. We have a very comprehensive programme of new aircraft and weapons. To give some examples, we are planning to acquire 385 Tornado aircraft; we are providing 11 Nimrod early warning aircraft and two squadrons of Chinook medium-lift helicopters. We have acquired a squadron of VCIO aircraft for conversion as air-to-air refuelling tankers. The new Skyflash medium-range air-to-air missile is now entering service. The fuselages of the Hercules transport aircraft are to be stretched to provide additional airlift capability. We are forming a sixth Rapier surface-to-air missile squadron to protect RAF Lossiemouth.

On the maritime side, the new warship construction programme is going ahead rapidly. Last year, we announced orders for a new nuclear-powered submarine, the third anti-submarine cruiser, one Type-42 destroyer, and three Hunt class mine countermeasures vessels. We have also placed an order for 15 Sea King helicopters for the Royal Marines and for a further 10 Sea Harriers. This year, we plan to procure a new class of 12 extra deep armed team sweep vessels for mine countermeasures.

Last September, we announced the decision to proceed with the project definition of a new main battle tank to replace the Chieftain in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, we are developing an improved armour-piercing round for the Chieftain. The Milan anti-tank guided weapon entered 48 service six months ahead of schedule in November 1977 and we have delivered the weapons to infantry battalions in Germany at twice the rate originally planned.

The planned size of the Army has also been increased by 6,000 men and we have formed a new infantry unit to provide a demonstration battalion at the School of Infantry, replacing a cap-badge battalion to augment the numbers available for service elsewhere. We have kept the Gurkhas at five battalions instead of four.

The statement on the Defence Estimates not only sets out the Government's policy for the future but reviews the events of the past year. While the commitment of our forces and our defence budget is now almost entirely to the Alliance, there still remain other areas in which our forces play their part in promoting international security. In particular, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained to the United Nations General Assembly last September, the Government are prepared to make a positive military contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities.

We are at present contributing about 800 personnel to the UN force in Cyprus, together with logistic support for that force and for the UN force in the Lebanon. We have also expressed our willingness to make a military contribution to the proposed UN transitional assistance group in Namibia.

Unstable situations still exist in many parts of the world, which the Soviet Union and some of its allies appear willing to exploit. Disregard of the indivisibility of detente must inevitably put at risk the further improvement of East-West relations. But it would be wrong to look at all these situations purely in an East-West context. We should, instead, encourage peaceful settlement of the disputes through negotiation by the countries and regional organisations themselves.

It no longer makes sense—if it ever did—for Britain to seek to act as a kind of global policeman, to be prepared to intervene with military forces anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, there are ways in which we can help developing countries to secure their own defence by providing places in training establishments in Britain and by offering technical advice on the spot.

49 It is also right that we should be willing to supply friendly countries with the equipment that they need for their own defence, provided that we do not thereby disturb the balance of security in the area. We expect that sales abroad of military equipment in the coming year will amount to about £1,100 million, even after allowing for the cancellation of the orders from Iran.

These sales represent between 70,000 and 75,000 job opportunities in British industry and help us to sustain a comprehensive and effective defence equipment industry in this country which could not be maintained on its present scale solely from the purchases for our own forces. It also reduces the cost of our own equipment.

These figures show that the degree of dependence on Iran of the British defence industry can be exaggerated. Iran was, indeed, an important market, and the collapse of the Shah's regime has brought serious economic, political and industrial consequences for us. We are regrettably faced with an immediate need to reduce employment in the Royal ordnance factory, Leeds, and we are urgently studying how we can maintain the capacity at Leeds and retain the skills there which we shall need when production of the next generation of tank for the British Army, MBT80, begins. We are pressing ahead with development of this tank as fast as we can, but it will not be until the mid-1980s that production of this tank can get under way at Leeds.

§ Mr. Tom Litterick (Birmingham, Selly Oak)

How can the House know that overseas sales of arms reduce the unit cost of weapons systems, since the Government never publish any figures that can tell us anything about the cost of production of any weapons system?

§ Mr. Mulley

I do not think that my hon. Friend is totally right when he says that no figures are given, but it is a matter of common sense that if, having spent the research and development costs of an aircraft or a missile, one spreads that cost over 300 or 400 instead of 200 or 300, which might be our own requirement, the unit cost must be that much lower.

§ Mr. Litterick

If one is selling the same product.

§ Mr. Mulley

If one is selling the same product—which is usually the case.

As to the future of the SHIR tanks, we are looking urgently at the possibility of alternative suitable outlets, and shall take our decisions accordingly. The tanks are, of course, designed with Iranian conditions in mind, and they are not an alternative to 1VIBT80, which will be a tank of later design intended for the European battlefield.

My right hon. and hon. Friends will, if they catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, give the House more information about our re-equipment plans. I should like now to refer to the people on whom the effectiveness of our Armed Forces ultimately depends—the men and women in the Services.

The past year has not been an easy one. The many and varied tasks which have been placed on them have been a considerable burden. Not only have they undertaken their primary task of contributing to peace and security in Europe and elsewhere; they have continued to discharge their heavy burdens in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland, where 13 earned awards for gallantry and 21 gave their lives. I am sure that the House will join with me in expressing appreciation for the devotion to duty which the forces have shown in this difficult task. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

I am sure also that the House will join me in commending the steadfast way in which the Services have stood ready to provide emergency and disaster relief to the civilian community here at home. The disruption to the Service men involved and to their families has often been considerable, but the tasks have been accepted willingly and without complaint, and the community has every reason to be grateful to them.

I am glad to say that the recruiting figures over the year show that the Services are able to attract an increasing number of our young men and women. The number of Service personnel recruited in 1978 was over 5,000 more than in 1977—n increase of about one-sixth. At the end of 1978, however, the total strength of the Services was 6,000 fewer than at the end of 1977. Some of this reduction reflects the defence review rundown, but another cause has been the 51 high level of premature outflow. This has caused particular difficulty, since a large part of this loss has been among the more experienced and highly skilled officers and men.

Of course, there is always a considerable outflow of trained men from the Services into civilian life. This reflects the fact that the Services are largely a young man's occupation. The skills which many men and women acquire in the Armed Forces are very much in demand in civilian life.

The outflow following requests for premature voluntary release, however, is running at too high a level. We are studying the causes of this very carefully and applying remedies where we can. It is my hope that the substantial increase in pay which the Services will be offering from 1 April this year will have a beneficial effect. I cannot say what that increase will be, since it will depend on the recommendations of the independent Armed Forces Pay Review Body, which is due to report very shortly.

The award will, of course, be backdated to 1 April, but I should like to reaffirm the Government's absolute and firm commitment, which we made last year, that in April 1979 the Armed Forces will receive half the shortfall identified by the review body last year—that will be 9½ per cent. on average—plus an updating to reflect the movement assessed by the review body of the earnings of the particular comparators which are used to calculate the military salary and that full comparability should be achieved on 1 April next year.

There are, of course, other reasons besides pay which cause men and women to leave earlier than we like. One factor that undoubtedly has contributed to the outflow has been the turbulence and increased family separation which have been an unavoidable consequence of the reorganisation of the last few years. We are already taking a number of measures to reduce overstretch and family separation.

Perhaps most significantly we have, as the House knows, authorised some increases in strengths—for example, the extra 6,000 men for the Army. These increases are intended both to improve our operational capability and to relieve 52 overstretch. As the Armed Forces get closer to their full strength, the present levels of separation and turbulence will decrease and this in itself will help recruiting and retention further.

Over the last few months we have also been able to introduce various improvements in conditions of service designed specifically to encourage family unity. These improvements have admittedly been of limited scope but they are nevertheless very important to the individuals concerned.

For instance, we have made it easier for families overseas to return to the United Kingdom when their husbands are posted on emergency tours abroad. We have also introduced some improvements in the leave travel arrangements for those whose families live in the Scottish Isles, and we have introduced assisted travel home for those Service men abroad whose wives are expecting a child in the United Kingdom.

Although the level of premature voluntary outflow is still too high, I am glad to say that there are some signs that the rate is levelling off. For example, the latest figures that we have for officer applications show that so far this financial year—that is, to the end of February—777 Army officers and 557 RAF officers applied for premature voluntary release. These figures compare with 851 and 715 for the same period in 1977–78. The Royal Navy figures, conversely, show a slight increase, from 302 last year to 334 this year.

The overall trend looks as though it is levelling off, but we need more evidence of this before we can be sure. To be candid with the House, the position remains worrying. The Government attach great importance to correcting and reversing the trend. It is worth remembering that with the increasing sophistication of defence equipment the Armed Forces require high standards, and the skills that many of the soldiers, sailors and airmen have are much in demand in the community as a whole, where there are still severe shortages of skilled men despite the current high level of unemployment.

We in the United Kingdom can be proud of the contribution we make to the North Atlantic Alliance. The cost of this contribution will rise in real terms 53 next year by 3 per cent. As I have said, our allies are also increasing their contributions. It is no cause for congratulation that these increases should be necessary, nor do they mean that the Alliance is engaged on a great rearmament programme, or that the risks to peace are greater, but the improvements in capability introduced by the Warsaw Pact have made a NATO response necessary if peace and security for us all in the West are to be preserved.

But, as I said last year, we must respond to the increasing capability of the Warsaw Pact forces in other ways as well. The Soviet Union and her allies must understand that constant increases in their military capability pose a threat to detente and to stability. It is for this reason that British defence policy and the defence policy of the whole Alliance rest on tthe twin pillars of detente and deterrence. This is why the Government place equal emphasis on the search for arms control and disarmament on the one hand and maintaining an adequate level of Alliance defence on the other.

It is on this basis that I commend the motion to the House.

§ Sir Ian Gilmour (Chesham and Amersham)

There is a certain sameness about these annual defence debates. Every year we on the Conservative Benches think that the position is so grave that the Government cannot possibly make it worse, yet every year they succeed in doing so. This year the deterioration has been much greater than usual. In spite of that, the Secretary of State has just given us his annual lullaby. His speech was perfectly in tune with his White Paper, which was also his annual lullaby.

The White Paper bears very little relation to the true course of events in the last year. It tries to veil the deperately dangerous level to which the Government have reduced our defence forces. There are only two significant paragraphs in it, and neither reflects any credit on the Government. One of those is paragraph 403, which reveals the shameful, disturbing and entirely unsurprising fact that the disastrous exodus from the forces has continued because of the disgraceful treatment that the Government have meted out to them. Rarely can there 54 have been a simpler or more straightforward case of cause and effect. This exodus is the most damaging thing to have happened to the Armed Forces in peacetime this century.

Any even moderately competent and well-intentioned Government would long ago have taken steps to reverse it, but not this Government. The exodus was entirely predictable, and it was predicted by us and by many other people. That it should have happened while unemployment has been at 1.5 million demonstrates the disillusion and despair that the forces have suffered. The Government stand convicted of neglecting their prime duty of safeguarding our free institutions.

The second paragraph to which I refer is paragraph 147, which indicates that while the White Paper is an extremely unattractive prospectus it is not even an honest one.

Most of my remarks will be addressed to those two paragraphs, but it would be appropriate for me to pronounce the epitaph on the Labour Government's maiming of our defences. The verdict on the Government's stewardship of the nation's security at a time of ever-growing threat and on the Government's treatment of the welfare of the Services can only be wilful neglect on both counts. The Government have given the Services their worst five years ever in peacetime. That is the epitaph on this dying Government's defence policy.

The core of any country's defence policy is the morale of its armed forces. Everything else, as Napoleon well understood, is secondary to that. The Government's greatest delinquency has been their constant sapping of that morale. Far be it from me to detract from the achievements of the previous Prime Minister and Defence Secretary in this respect. They certainly did enormous damage. But their achievement was as of nothing compared to what the present Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have done.

The Government's greatest claim is that their last three years of office have not been quite as bad as their first two. That is not exactly a ringing testimonial, but even that plea in mitigation cannot be made about defence. For the forces the past two years have been worse than the first three. I blame the Secretary of State for not having resigned last year. 55 He has done his best for the forces, but the sad fact is that that best has been nowhere near good enough. The ultimate responsibility lies with the Prime Minister, and for the Queen's first Minister to compel the Armed Forces to suffer such grievous damage is unforgivable.

The Prime Minister is no stranger to failure. He has held all the great offices of State, and he has failed in all of them. Nevertheless, I believe that history will judge—if I may borrow the Foreign Secretary's pomposity for a moment—that his neglect of the Armed Forces has been one of his greatest failures. I acknowledge that that is a high claim, but I believe it to be true.

The morale of the Prime Minister is much less important than the morale of the Armed Forces. The latter depends on the possession of good and sufficient equipment, and the consequent knowledge by the Service man that he is capable of doing his job with maximum efficiency. It depends, too, upon adequate spare parts, fuel and ammunition so that the equipment remains fully usable. It depends upon a reasonable degree of manning so that the Service man does not continually have to work immensely long hours because nowhere near enough people are available to do the work. It depends upon a proper recognition of the importance of defence and, hence, of the supreme importance of the Armed Forces. It depends, finally, upon the Service man being given a reasonable rate of reward for the arduous and dangerous job that he does.

All those conditions must be fulfilled, but, if one or even two of them are not, such is the discipline and dedication of the Armed Forces that morale would probably survive. It is the unique achievement of the Government that they have broken every one of the conditions of service that a man in the forces has a right to expect. In consequence, the forces have continued to vote with their feet against the way in which they have been treated, and men have been leaving in large numbers.

What an appalling commentary upon a Prime Minister and a Government. They have made exiles of their own defence forces. They have driven out men whose one wish was to serve their country.

§ Mr. Newens

I have been following the right hon. Gentleman's argument carefully. Will be tell the House what he would regard as an adequate increase in expenditure? What would be the total level of defence expenditure if the right hon. Gentleman, speaking for the Opposition, had his way? Surely, in view of his criticisms, the House and the Government have a right to know what the right hon. Gentleman considers is adequate.

§ Sir I. Gilmour

The hon. Member must know that until we have seen the books—we have been talking for long enough about the way in which the Government have been fiddling the books, and I shall have quite a lot to say—

§ Mr. Ernest G. Perry (Battersea, South)

Answer the question.

§ Sir I Gilmour

The hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Perry) is normally quite well intentioned in these matters, but he shows his ignorance on defence when he says "Answer the question". It is not a question that any Opposition could conceivably answer, and he should know that. It is an absurd question.

§ Mr. Mulley

The right hon. Member had made a serious allegation about the Government's fiddling the books. I do not know exactly what he has in mind in that context. I think that the House and the country are entitled to something other than just the shrill voice of complaint echoed by yet another Opposition spokesman. What would be the Conservative defence policy? They have not even thought fit to put a proposition before the House on this occasion.

§ Sir I. Gilmour

I can well understand the right hon. Gentleman's anxiety to talk about our defence policy. It is certainly much more interesting, much more relevant and much more important, but that is a subject that the House will be discussing next year, when we discuss the Conservative White Paper. This year we are discussing the Labour Party's White Paper—its last.

§ Mr. Max Madden (Sowerby)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence drew attention to the remark by the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sir I. Gilmour) about 57 the Government's fiddling the books on defence expenditure. The right hon. Gentleman did not see fit to withdraw that remark. Will be now do so, or justify it?

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern)

I did not hear the remark. I shall leave the matter to the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sir I. Gilmour).

§ Sir I. Gilmour

I shall justify it later, as I said I would. That was not the first time that I made such a remark, and it will not be the first time that it has turned out to be true.

I shall deal with the conditions of service one by one. First, I deal with the provision of good and serviceable equipment. Here we have impartial witnesses. The Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee, to which, as in the past, the House owes a great debt of gratitude for its work and for the valuable information and judgment that it provides for us, reported on page 12 of its second report for the Session 1976–77: In our view, the point has now been reached where our forces are being seriously deprived of modern equipment necessary to maintain, with the other members of the Alliance, sufficient conventional capability to deter the Warsaw Pact from acts of aggression, to sustain an effective fighting force in the event of actual hostilities, and thereby to avoid early recourse to nuclear weapons. Then Dr. Luns, in his letter to the right hon. Gentleman, referred to the adverse impact on the United Kingdom front line forces which the Government's defence cuts had created. The Select Committee on Expenditure pointed out last year, in its report on British Forces, Germany, the damage done by the Government's cut of 50 per cent. in the air transport force. There is no doubt that the Government have deprived the Services of adequate equipment.

I turn now to the availability of spare parts, fuel and ammunition. Clearly, if anything the position is even worse. I quoted, in an earlier debate, evidence before the Select Committee on Expenditure to the effect that the Navy could not go at full speed. Nearly every hon. Member will have an example of the shocking state to which our forces have been reduced as a result of the Government having 58 starved them of essential supplies. During an exercise last autumn, in Germany, at least one armoured regiment had half its tanks unusable because of lack of spares. That is as horrific as the Government having last year to put 56 Chieftain tanks in mothballs because there was no one to man them.

The Select Committee in its last year's report on Germany said: We regard the low numbers of antiaircraft and anti-armour missiles held by operational units as profoundly disturbing.… My view is that the position is even worse than people think.

I deal, thirdly, with the questions of manning and conditions of life in the forces. Anybody who has visited almost any unit of the Services will know what a problem that is. The Government admit that and the right hon. Gentleman said this afternoon that it was inevitable. It was not inevitable it was due to the Government. I have been told by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow), who cannot be here today but will be here tomorrow, that, as we know, over 50 per cent. of soldiers are married and that on average they spend about 50 per cent. of their nights away from home.

Part of the turbulence is, of course, due to the situation in Northern Ireland, which is not the fault of the Government. I paid a brief visit to the Army in Northern Ireland recently and, as always, I was struck by the superb way in which it tackles a difficult and dangerous job. No praise is too high for our forces there and we, on this side of the House, associate ourselves with the remarks of the Secretary of State about them. But turbulence is not confined to the Army. It affects all three Services and is largely the fault of the Government because they have not treated the forces properly. Many Service men have been forced to leave and, in consequence, there is now too much work for too few men. Consequently, conditions steadily deteriorate.

Fourthly, there is the proper recognition of defence. The Government have shown what they think of the importance of defence by their cuts, and their planned cuts, in expenditure, which now amount to nearly £12 billion. There is no conceivable justification for such cuts. Even the Government admit that the threat has been growing and, as the IISS has pointed 59 out, for the second year running the pattern is one of the balance tilting steadily against the West.

The right hon. Gentleman always tries to make the balance seem less unfavourable than it is. Last year he suddenly included the French forces, and this year he has equally suddenly reduced the number of Russian tactical aircraft on the central front by 700. I only wish that the Secretary of State were as skilled at weakening the Russian forces as he is at weakening our own. But he has achieved the Russian reduction merely by altering the boundaries.

Our forces have seen the Labour Government progressively weakening this country at the same time as they have seen the Warsaw Pact greatly strengthening itself. The forces also see the consistent attempts of the Tribune group and the Labour Party to weaken our forces still further. Last year the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), who is not here today, complained of my saying that the Tribune group was hostile to NATO, even though, to give it its due, it has made this hostility quite plain. Only the other day the hon. Member asked the Secretary of State: Is he aware that many Labour Members are not enamoured of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO? Is it not time that we had a distinctive Labour Party Socialist policy to deal with these matters?"—[Official Report, 16 January 1979; Vol. 960, c. 1485.] The hon. Gentleman may not have been against NATO last year, but he is certainly against it this year. That point brings me to the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun), who is chairman of the Labour Party this year, and his hon. Friends. Even by their standards, it is a profoundly silly amendment which talks of a "massive increase in military expenditure". By no stretch of the imagination is that true. There is a very small increase. The amendment says that that increase will "add to world tension".

I wish that the Tribune group would explain why, in its view, the massive rearmament programme of the Soviet Union does not add to world tension while the small and inadequate British increase in expenditure adds to world tension. The members of the Tribune group will shortly have to explain to their constituents—luckily many of its members are in mar- 60 ginal seats—why they are always against British defence and are wholly complacent about the vast growth in the offensive military capability of Russia.

The amendment goes on to advocate policies designed to redeploy armaments industries to the manufacture of alternative socially useful products". That is doubly absurd. It is absurd, first, because it ignores the fact that under this Government there have consistently been over 1 million unemployed and that there are now 1½ million unemployed. It is absurd, secondly, because it suggests that the defence of this country is not socially useful. That is not what the constituents of the Tribune group Members believe.

Finally, the amendment reaffirms the Labour Party's commitment not to proceed to a new generation of nuclear weapons. I look forward to reading in Hansard what the right hon. Gentleman said in answer to the hon. Member for Salford, East. I hope that it is clearer there than it has been to me here. Naturally those hon. Gentlemen ignore the fact that the Warsaw Pact has proceeded to several new generations of nuclear weapons. No doubt the Tribune group Members will enjoy, very shortly, explaining to their constituents why the enormously powerful new Russian mobile continental ballistic missile, the SS20, which can reach every city in Western Europe, is a wholly peaceful, unprovocative weapon while any smaller British answer to it is warlike, provocative and intolerable.

Last week the hon. Member for Salford, East made a nasty and silly attack on that very distinguished public servant, the Secretary-General of NATO. Dr. Luns has done a great deal for the West, and I must tell the hon. Gentleman that the credentials of Dr. Luns as a defender of democracy and as a believer in a free society are a great deal better than those of many Members of the Tribune group.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun

I can say for myself, and for other Members of the Tribune group, that we never defended Fascists.

§ Mr. Churchill (Stretford)

Neither did Dr. Luns.

§ Sir I. Gilmour

The commitment of the hon. Gentleman to the defence of a free society is not very clear. In any case, I 61 cannot do better than adopt the judgment of the electrical trade union on the hon. Gentleman and his friends. That union said that it had tried to wreck the nation's defences. Unfortunately, it is still trying to do so. One of the executives of that union said that the antics of the Labour Party executive did not reflect the position of British trade unionists. I am sure that that is true, but that does not prevent the Labour Party executive from doing considerable damage. If by any extraordinary chance we were to have another Labour Government, those people would do even more damage in future.

In view of the bad behaviour of the Labour Government and their shabby treatment of the forces in the four respects that I have mentioned, there would still have been an exodus from the Services even had the Government taken the trouble to pay Service men properly. But of course the Government have made no attempt to do that and, as a result, there has been a stampede out of the Services. I turn to the subject of pay in some detail because the behaviour of the Government has been scandalous. They have treated the Services worse than anybody else. If the Secretary of State can think of any other group that has been treated worse than the Armed Services; the House will be interested to hear of it.

The Secretary of State cannot claim that the difficulties over forces' pay have stolen up on him suddenly or caught him unawares. My hon. Friends and I have been telling him about it for years and he has paid not the slightest attention. He stood in the picket lines for his union at Grunwick, but he has never been anywhere near the picket lines for the people that he is supposed to look after—the Armed Services of this country.

In the debate in June 1977 we told the Secretary of State that the situation then was disastrous. He did nothing. The same thing happened in a debate initiated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) in December 1977. By the time of our debate last year, the fact of the exodus was plain and I told the right hon. Gentleman that there was "an unprecedented crisis of morale." He did nothing whatever to deal with it. The number of captains leaving prematurely had gone up by 60 per cent. in one year. The same was happening in all the Services.

62 In spite of he Secretary of State's promising to give the Services a square deal, he took no action. If the right hon. Gentlemen had been captain of the "Titanic", he would not have noticed that his ship was sinking. He would not have launched a lifeboat; he would merely have launched an inquiry to find out why there was rather a lot of water about and then gone to his cabin for a snooze.

I turn to the most extraordinary episode in the whole disgraceful saga. After the Armed Forces Pay Review Body found that the forces were being paid one-third less than they should have been, the Government decided to move the forces not one inch towards comparability. They further decided that comparability should be achieved only in two years' time.

The Secretary of State has achieved a worse result for the forces than any of his colleagues have for the workers for whom they are responsible. The Secretary of State is far too amiable to deal with his hard-faced colleagues who are against defence. Consequently, he has won the wooden spoon.

Instead of being treated worse than other people, the Armed Forces should have been treated better. They have a unique strategic importance. They do not go on strike. They are not overmanned; they are undermanned. They are used to keep community services running when other workers go on strike. They receive no overtime. For reasons of justice, supply and demand and common sense, the forces should have been paid properly.

Ever since Boxing Day thousands of Service men have been standing by to provide essential services. At one time no fewer than 37,000 Service men were standing by to help the Government and the country in their industrial troubles. The reward for their public spirit is that they have been treated worse than those people who do not show that public spirit. The alarming drain from the Services continues.

Paragraph 403 of the White Paper states that" The total numbers of men and women leaving the Services for all reasons during 1978/79 continued to include an unusually high outflow among the more experienced and highly skilled categories following requests for 63 premature voluntary release. If current rates of outflow from this source continue"— that is dreadful verbiage. The Secretary of State should not talk about these matters as if we were discussing effluent. The White Paper continues: the consequences in the loss of trained Officers and men will be serious for the Armed Forces, and the Government attaches great importance to correcting this trend. The Government attach great importance to it, but they do nothing about it. That paragraph of the White Paper is a piece of self-condemnation and an admission that the decision that the Government took last year not to improve comparability was utterly wrong. The paragraph adds: the Government hopes that, as pay is restored to comparability, the normal pattern of outflow will be resumed. That is even less than what was said last year by the Secretary of State. He said that he hoped that what the Government had done will have the effect of reversing the recent trend".—[Official Report, 22 May 1978; Vol. 950, c. 1152.] We now know that that was utterly wrong. The trend has not been reversed; it has continued.

The right hon. Gentleman made some play with the fact that not so many officers were leaving this year as left last year. We welcome that. But he did not say that the situation was cumulative. About 1,668 left in the first 10 months of this financial year, but, on top of that, 2,000 officers applied to leave last year. Surely that is disastrous. The House will prefer the assessment by the Chief of the Naval Staff, who said that the situation had reached "crisis proportions".

Last year the Secretary of State said that he was watching the situation "very carefully". I have no doubt that that cheered everybody, but what difference did it make to anybody or anything? As the Secretary of State has done absolutely nothing, what difference would it have made if he had watched the situation carefully, very carefully, not carefully or not watched it at all? The answer is, none at all.

The Secretary of State and the Government stand condemned out of their own mouths. They took an unjustifiable gamble that their refusal to pay the forces properly would not lead to an extension 64 of the exodus. That gamble failed, with disastrous results. We welcome the improved recruiting figures, but the new recruits are no adequate substitute for what the Commander-in-Chief, RAF Germany called high-quality, irreplaceable people who have left. Last year I said that the Government should have gone half-way to comparability 12 months ago and achieved comparability this year. I said that that was what a Conservative Government would have done and I pledged us to restore comparability this year. That pledge stands. We shall restore comparability this year. In doing so we shall not be singling out the Services for uniquely favourable treatment. We shall be merely ending a uniquely unfair discrimination against them.

Taking account of what they have proposed and have done, I reckon that the Labour Government have done the Services out of about six months' pay. That is the price of a Labour Government. I repeat: we shall restore comparability this year and we shall see that this type of thing never happens again.

I turn to the only other significant paragraph in the White Paper—paragraph 147. Before I quote from that paragraph, I must explain that I wrote to the Secretary of State last December asking him to make clear that the Government's 5 per cent. policy had no application whatever to the forces. On 22 December he replied: The Government's 5 per cent. policy will only affect the settlement for the Forces next April to the extent that it influences the movemens in the earnings of the Forces' pay comparators. It will not be directly applied to the Forces. That should have meant the disappearance of the 5 per cent. for all purposes. But that was not so. Paragraph 147 of the White Paper states: The provision in Estimates for Armed Forces pay assumes an increase of 9½ per cent. representing the staged increase to which the Government is already committed, and a further 5 per cent. reflecting the limit for the current round of pay policy. The paragraph goes on to say that the Government are committed, and adds: To the extent that the settlement may exceed the Estimates provision the Government will decide, in the light of all the 65 circumstances at the time, whether the defence cash limits should be adjusted to meet any additional costs. I then wrote to the Secretary of State, because the Armed Forces Pay Review Body cannot possibly recommend 141 per cent. It must recommend something between 20 per cent. and 30 per cent.—probably about 25 per cent. So the House will see that the meaning of that paragraph is that the mythical 5 per cent. is now being used not to control the forces' pay increase but to keep down, artificially and inexcusably, defence expenditure. In other words, the Government are saying that the forces' pay increase will probably lead to a cut in the defence budget elsewhere. When the forces receive the pay increase, their equipment is likely to be cut again to pay for that increase

That would be unjustifiable, so I wrote to the Secretary of State to ask why the figure of 5 per cent. appeared in the Defence Estimates. I said that if the paragraph meant what it seemed to mean the White Paper was not worth the paper on which it was written. I said that it was fraudulent, because it tried to conceal a cut of about £200 million in the defence programme. I received from the right hon. Gentleman a reply that was classic, even by his standards. He said: we included in our Estimates an increase of 5 per cent. over and above the already promised 9½ per cent. in line with the pay policy. But the Secretary of State had already said that the 5 per cent. limit would not apply. He added: This seems to me a perfectly sensible arrangement; indeed, it would have been improper of us to try to anticipate the Review Body's judgment by forecasting what they might recommend and making provision accordingly; this would simply have been guess-work and could have been regarded as an attempt to prejudge the Review Body's findings. In other words, rather than run the nonexistent risk of appearing to prejudge the review body's findings, the Secretary of State preferred to include a totally wrong figure as a basis for the Estimates and, as a result, his Estimates were £200 million lower than they should have been. To call such behaviour frivolous would be flattering. For a Secretary of State to want his Estimates to be lower than they should be beggars belief.

§ Mr. Mulley

The presentation of Estimates this year, not only for defence but across the board, is in a new form, following recommendations by the Select Committee on Expenditure. The cash limit is embodied at the outset, instead of increases in pay and prices being taken care of in Supplementary Estimates. We make it clear in paragraph 147 that when we know what the size of the review body's award is we shall have to consider what adjustment to make to the Estimates. There is no question at all of our going back on the commitment to pay what the review body recommends.

§ Sir I. Gilmour

I am glad to hear that—I accept it—but what I am talking about is the defence budget elsewhere. The right hon. Gentleman has not given an assurance on that. However, there is even better to come, because on the question of what the Government would do when the Armed Forces Pay Review Body did report, and showed the estimate to be grossly inadequate, the right hon. Gentleman quoted two sentences from the Chief Secretary. These were: The Government will review each case as settlements are reached. Certain adjustments may be necessary, but for central Government expenditure on manpower, the general principle will be that a substantial proportion of any excess cost above the provision already made will have to be absorbed within the existing cash limit. The right hon. Gentleman's comment was: Equal weight should be given to the two sentences just quoted". That is like giving a traffic direction saying that when a driver reaches a T-junction he should turn both left and right.

Even that is not the end of it. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say: There is no question of making cuts in the defence programme As the House will realise, that is flatly untrue. There is a question of making a cut of almost £200 million in the defence budget.

There is another discreditable aspect of this matter. In increasing defence expenditure next year, the Government have claimed to be responding to NATO's call to increase defence expenditure annually by 3 per cent. in real terms. 67 I pointed out last year that the claim was bogus, and the Expenditure Committee reported, in its eighth report of last year: Although the Government can justifiably claim to be responding to the letter of the call by NATO for an increase in Defence expenditure, the amount by which it will actually rise in 1979–80 is less than envisaged previously. We believe that the House should be fully aware of this fact. That was a considerable rebuke to the Government, but, leaving that aside, the right hon. Gentleman said that the rules had changed substantially because, as he told the House last year: the defence budget is increased to take account of pay and price increases".—[Official Report, 13 March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 58.] Our charge against him is that because the defence budget is exceptionable, and because the forces are not responsible for their own pay increase—it depends entirely on other people—the right hon. Gentleman has once again failed to safeguard the interests of defence. This is especially damaging since one of the most important causes of the exodus, and of the sapping of morale in the forces, is the continuing cuts in defence expenditure and the consequent inadequacy at their equipment.

It is clear that there is an immense amount for the incoming Government to do. The air defence of this country, the defence of the sea lanes, the nuclear deterrent—about which we look forward to hearing further instalments of the argument inside the Labour Party—the reserves, restoring the cutting edge of the front line in Germany, adequate ammunition and spare parts, and many other things, are all necessary. But the first thing to do is to deal with the pay and conditions of the Services. That must now be our overriding priority, because without that nothing else will work. First we should restore morale, and then we should restore material.

In summary, the greatest guilt of the Government in their defence policy over the past five years has been their craven refusal to act on the evidence of their own eyes. This has been particularly serious in two areas—first, in their failure to maintain Britain's defences in the face of a growing threat that they themselves have acknowledged in successive White Papers and, secondly, in their failure to 68 give the forces a fair pay deal and thus stop the disastrous exodus. Labour has done such damage that we shall have a huge task in repairing it. But repair it we must, since, as the Chief of the Naval Staff warned only last week, extremely grave dangers lie ahead". We shall treat the forces as they deserve. We shall see that they are properly paid and equipped. We shall deal honestly and fairly with our allies. We shall ensure a strong Britain and a stronger NATO. Only a stronger Western Alliance can provide security for this country. As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has said, Defence must be our first duty". The Government's failure in defence has been massive and manifest, and I ask the House to reject their policy.

§ Mr. Madden

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. You will recall that in the course of his remarks the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sir I. Gilmour) accused the Government of fiddling the books in relation to defence expenditure. When challenged by the Secretary of State, the right hon. Gentleman said that he would seek to justify the charge in the course of his remarks. As he has failed to do so, I ask you to request the right hon. Gentleman, on reflection, to withdraw his remarks, since to leave it on the record would be not only seriously to mislead the House but also to leave an entirely wrong impression in the minds of the public.

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker

As hon. Members will recollect, I indicated that I did not hear the actual remarks, but I heard the right hon. Gentleman say that he would justify his references to the fiddling of the books. So long as it was a reference to the Government, and not a personal reference to any hon. Member, it would be in order.

§ Sir Ian Gilmour

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I should like to make it clear that it was, of course, a reference to the Government. I would not dream of making any such reference to the Secretary of State, as I think he well knows. I am sure that he did not take it personally.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

I beg to move to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: 'declines to take note of the White Paper because it provides for a massive increase in military expenditure to £8,588 million in the year 1979–80, which will add to world tension, divert resources from urgent social needs and contravenes Her Majesty's Government's election pledge to give active support to policies designed to redeploy armaments industries to the manufacture of alternative socially useful products, as advocated by Lucas Aerospace and other workers; and reaffirms Labour's commitment not to proceed to a new generation of nuclear weapons.' I suspect that Conservative Party leaders are thinking of making Soviet military power, and a still bigger increase in Britain's already tremendous arms spending, an election issue. They will make a big mistake if they do. There are few votes in war talk. The British people are not stupid. They have had a bellyful of war. Therefore, fire-eating speeches from, for instance, the Leader of the Opposition—the "iron maiden" as some people call her—the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sir I, Gilmour) and the militarist hard-liners will increase the feeling that these are dangerous people to have in charge when the hope of the world is to extend détente between East and West.

The British people are being subjected by Conservative Members of Parliament, and by Conservative newspapers, to psychological preparation for a war with Russia. That is the thing about which they talk most. The Daily Telegraph is full of it—for my sins I read it every morning. Today, its defence spokesman indulged in this psychological conditioning.

I am not saying that Conservative militarist hard-liners want war, because no one outside a mental institution wants war, especially today, when a country can be completely devastated in a few minutes of warfare. They do not want to see, as we do not want to see, humanity incinerated. But I believe that they are pursuing a policy which makes that conflagration more likely. They are preparing to win a war against Russia. Surely the aim must be to prevent it. Their ideas are based on the assumption that war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers is inevitable. 70 If one accepts that belief, the third world war will, in fact, become inevitable.

I do not like the Soviet Government any more than I like the American Government, which is precious little, but I do not believe that they want war. In the last war Russia lost 20 million people. I also do not believe that it wishes or intends to bomb or invade the West. It would be no benefit to her if she had service men stationed all over Europe, trying to suppress continual national uprisings. That would be a foolish game.

We hear so much about the Soviet military threat that one might think that the Pentagon had gone pacifist. In most weapon systems, such as aircraft carriers and advanced nuclear missiles, NATO is far more powerful than Russia. Last week the press was full of accounts of two great new Soviet aircraft carriers of 40,000 tons that were being built, but the Warsaw Pact countries have three aircraft carriers and NATO has 25, and several of the American aircraft carriers are each 83,000 tons. We must keep some sense of proportion.

The USSR is trying militarily to catch up with the West, for the same reasons as our war hawks say that we must spend more on arms. We should consider who first developed the atom bomb. America was first and Russia caught up. Next, America produced the hydrogen bomb and Russia followed suit. The American Polaris submarine was a similar instance. If NATO deploys the cruise missile and the neutron bomb, we can be certain that the Kremlin will soon do the same. I repeat that it is America which has made the military running.

There was a remarkable admission by the air correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, Air Commodore G. S. Cooper, on 5 March. He wrote: This report from American sources highlights the success of the United States triad concept, which compels the Soviet Union to budget for defence against three separate methods of strategic attack; from land, sea and air. That means that the American Government positively want Russia to increase its armed forces. They may consider that it will weaken her economically.

The Right-wing Tory extremists are suddenly falling in line with Communist 71 China. That is a touching love affair which deceives no one. Tory Members and their newspapers are hoping that China will fight Russia for them. The Labour Party national executive came out last month strongly against the sale of Harrier planes to China. Our main reason was that it would worsen relations between the West and Russia, undermine the relaxation of tension and ruin the prospects for the disarmament and nuclear arms limitation talks. We agree with trade with China but not with supplying her with weapons, and advanced ones at that. Countries can have non-military contracts with China if they refuse to sell her arms. America and Germany are receiving huge contracts from the Chinese Government and refusing to deal in weapons, and we should do the same. The Far East is a long way from Britain, but if war starts there it could finish up on our doorstep, and that would be far more costly than the loss of an arms deal.

A few minutes ago I asked my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State whether in the past two months the Government have backed down from their previous commitment on nuclear weapons. At the last general election the Labour manifesto said: We have renounced any intention of moving towards a new generation of nuclear weapons. That pledge has been constantly repeated inside and outside this House, until 26 January. On that date, in a written reply, the Secretary of State said: The time has not yet come for a decision to be taken on whether to proceed with the new generation of strategic nuclear weapons to succeed the present Polaris force".—[Official Report, 26 January 1979; Vol. 961, c. 268.] That is back-tracking and a breach of a clear commitment. From what the Secretary of State has said this afternoon, it appears that we have not renounced that new nuclear generation. In reply to my question he gave a completely unsatisfactory reply. He said that it was much too soon to make a decision. A lot more will be heard about this.

I am speaking on the policy of the Labour Party, which has been decided democratically by its delegate conference. We are bitterly opposed to a new generation of nuclear weapons. In the same way as having American nuclear bases in Britain, they make our island extremely 72 vulnerable. If by design or accident a nuclear bomb falls on Leningrad or Moscow, the Russians will not set up their equivalent of a Royal Commission to discover where the bomb comes from. They will wipe out all possible sources. Aneurin Bevan once said that there was no label on a nuclear bomb. Ten missiles with hydrogen bomb warheads would destroy our crowded island, and the dying would envy the dead.

If the new generation of nuclear weapons that the Ministry of Defence is considering is the cruise missile with its electronic map of Europe, the Minister should admit, as American Government officials have, that fears of that missile have caused delays in the signing of the strategic arms limitation talks, stage II. I urge the Government to help stage III, which we hope will begin shortly, by offering to divest themselves of any intention to proceed with a new generation, whether of Polaris submarines or cruise missiles, and seek the removal of United States nuclear bases, as they promised in the 1974 election manifesto. Such an offer from us may greatly encourage the success of stage III of the SALT talks. Any suggestion of going back on the existing commitment would damage the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

The Defence Estimates show an increase from £7.1 billion last year to £8.6 billion this year. That is an increase in cash terms of 24 per cent. We all know roughly the figure of inflation. It is nothing like 24 per cent. Despite explanations that I have secured from statisticians, I am not satisfied that the real increase is only 3 per cent. But, even accepting that it is, I still say that seven of the 13 European NATO allies have welshed on their commitment to or at least failed to carry out the demands of NATO.

As evidence for this, I quote from the communication from the United States embassy in London, dated 13 March. This communication published a release from the office of Representative Les Aspin, who currently serves on the House Armed Services Committee, the Government Operations Committee, and is chairman of the Oversight Sub-Committee of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Those credentials are surely good enough for anyone. He says: It is now apparent that most of America's NATO allies have not kept their end of the 73 bargain. Of the 13 allies only six plan to increase their 1979 Defence Budgets by 3 per cent. beyond the inflation rate. Iceland is excluded because it spends nothing on NATO defence. Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey all plan Defence Budgets with a real growth substantially below 3 per cent., Canada and Portugal call for real reductions in their 1979 Defence Budgets. These countries already spend a lower proportion of their resources on arms than we do, and now we are increasing our expenditure by a higher percentage than they are. I am not saying that these countries should increase their spending to our level. On the contrary, I am saying that we should come down to theirs.

Of course, Conservative leaders want far greater spending on defence but they do not say how much. It might be interesting if Tory Front Bench spokesmen were to say how much they want to spend on arms. I suggest that if we were to quadruple our arms spending they would still cry "Not enough." Their arms spending is a bottomless pit.

I refer to a recent Conservative Party political programme on television which was a clever and dangerous piece of propaganda. It was devoted solely to a speech by that wily old bird, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, to whom I pay tribute. There has been a subsequent speech on the same theme by Admiral Sir Terence Lewin. Their main argument was that we should not "appease Russia" because that country was threatening the world. Just as we should have squared up to Hitler when a relatively small action by ourselves and others could have smashed him, so should we act together against the Soviet Union.

That parallel, like most parallels in politics, is dangerously misleading. In the 1930s there was one great Fascist military Power bent on seizing and conquering Europe. Today there are two super-Powers—America and Russia—neither of which wants war but each is so frightened of the other that each is preparing for it. Russian and American leaders both say that they can only negotiate from a position of superior military strength. Since it is impossible logically for both to be more powerful than the other, the arms race intensifies. It is the preparation for war which takes us nearer to the precipice.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

The hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun) will agree with me that one of the most brilliant Left-wing pamphlets of the last generation was that of the present Leader of the House, who wrote one entitled "Guilty Men". In it he condemned the Conservative Party for failing to recognise the danger of Nazi Germany rearming. He criticised the Tories bitterly for failing to grasp the hand that the Soviet Union then stretched out to us to join with it to contain the Nazi menace.

The hon. Member today seem to be pursuing a neo-Chamberlainite policy—burying his head in the sand, refusing to recognise the danger, refusing to rearm to meet it, and when a hand is stretched out to help from the other side he refuses to grasp it. One might call him a member of the Red Cliveden set or a Red Fascist.

One of the most interesting aspects of this was the reaction of the Left wing of the Labour Party to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia we heard scarcely a squeak from the Tribune group. When the Chinese invaded Vietnam there were massive protests from the Tribune group, which were endorsed by the executive of the Labour Party. Naturally, one would think that in a conflict between two Marxist States some of the Labour Left wing would have been on one side and some on the other. But no. They all fell in with the crack of Moscow's whip. One cannot be surprised if certain sections of the press call the Tribune group "Moscow's agents". I do not call them that because I think that they do it for free.

The hon. Member for Salford, East tells us that we should not sell arms to China in the present situation. But unless the Chinese are strengthened—and they are weak, compared with the Soviet Union—Vietnam will become a base for Soviet imperialism against the whole of South-East Asia. I beg the hon. Member to realise that it is only the resistance of the national liberation movements that China is fomenting in Cambodia and Laos which prevents Vietnam from being a base for Soviet imperialism now. If the hon. Member does not understand that, 75 he will not begin to understand what I am talking about.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun

The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) was not listening. In my last few words before I sat down, I explained the difference between the 1930s and today. Today there are two military Powers, neither wanting war but both so frightened of each other that they are preparing for it. The right hon. Gentleman, by his anti-Soviet tirade, is trying to prepare this country for a war against Russia, and I am not playing that game.

§ Mr. Amery

The hon. Member for Salford, East is wrong. There were two super-Powers in the 1930s—Nazi Germany and the Entente Cordiale of Britain and France. Neither wanted war, and the only reason why the Nazis went to war was that they thought that we were a pushover and that we would give in all along the line.

When the Prime Minister came back from Guadeloupe, he made a statement about the talks and took me to task because I said something to him on the lines of what I just said to the hon. Member for Salford, East about China. The Prime Minister asked whether I wanted to return to the climate of the cold war in the 1950s. How I wish we could return to the security which we then enjoyed.

I fear that the House, and certainly members of the public, may well have forgotten how, for 20 years after the war, the nuclear preponderance of the West ensured that no local conflict, such as the Berlin blockade or the Korean war, would ever escalate into a global war. Even as late as 1962 over Cuba, the Soviets had no choice but to back down in front of Western nuclear supremacy. In that period, although the Germans were not yet rearmed, a "tripwire" of forces was enough to guarantee our safety, not just in Europe but world-wide.

The milestones of the recession since then make sad reading. In the mid-1960s the Soviets acquired the capability of inflicting unacceptable damage on the United States. From that moment it became clear that no American President would risk the devastation of the American homeland by defending his allies, however close, with American 76 nuclear weapons. The supremacy of the West had gone. But we were not yet in danger. It was thought that our superior quality in conventional weapons was almost a match for the superior quantity of the Soviets. It was thought that our preponderance in theatre nuclear weapons presented an almost impenetrable second line. Behind this was the unquantifiable value of the strategic nuclear weapons, not only of the United States but, in due course, of Britain and of France. The Germans had rearmed and the Chinese had left the Soviet alliance.

There appeared to be a balance, an uneasy equilibrium. This was the basis of the doctrine of "flexible response"—that neither side could hope to overcome the other. It was an uneasy balance but, while it lasted, a healthy one. This was the strategic military basis for the political concept of détente. The Soviets had not given up their imperialist ambitions. The imperialist forces inside the Soviet Union, negative and positive, had not abdicated o but, as they could not break through the ring, Moscow decided that it was better to co-operate rather than to advance.

The White Paper is based on the assumption that the strategic doctrine of flexible response is still valid and the political concept of detente is also valid Neither is true. It may have been true for the period between 1968–69 and 1974–75, but it certainly is not true now. The Soviets used the time to modernise their forces, extend their ocean-going navy and develop a long-range airlift, to build up Cuban and East German mercenaries and to train national liberation forces. That happened while we—and this applies to the West, not just to the Secretary of State for Defence—slept. Not only did we sleep, but we pulled away all the elements of flexible response outside NATO and the West Pacific.

The withdrawal of the Americans from Vietnam, of the British, Australian and New Zealanders from Singapore and Malaysia and the rundown of the Seventh Fleet to a point where, according, to the latest Japanese defence White Paper, it can no longer protect the Pacific sea lanes, meant that there was no element of flexible response left in South-East Asia.

In the Middle East the British withdrawal from Aden and from the Gulf, 77 and the rundown of our forces in Cyprus, meant that there was no element of flexible response left in the Middle East. In Central and Southern Africa the breaking of our agreement with South Africa over Simonstown and the treating of South Africa and Rhodesia almost as enemies meant that no element of flexible response was left in that part of the world. We had withdrawn all the elements of flexible response from all the areas between the Western Pacific and Western Europe. No wonder the Soviets moved in. They moved into Vietnam and are now trying to turn it into a base for Soviet imperialism. They moved into Aden, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola and Mozambique and are stepping up support for SWAPO and for the Patriotic Front.

The survival of NATO—the White Paper is what one might call "Nato-centric", because it speaks only of NATO—depends, as does the survival of Japan, on the supply of oil, minerals and other raw materials from the Middle East, Southern Africa and South-East Asia. It is a Maginot Line mentality to believe that we can defend our interests only in Europe. But even if we could—here comes the rub—the doctrine of flexible response does not make sense any more even in Europe.

§ Mr. James Lamond (Oldham, East)

I am listening with great interest to the right hon. Gentleman's analysis, but he said that Britain had been asleep at some period in recent history. He went on to detail a number of events that occurred while we were enveloped in this big sleep. Was any part of that time during the Tory period of office from 1970 to 1974? Was there a sudden awakening during that period, or did we continue to slumber, as he saw it, during the period of office of his Conservative right hon. Friends?

§ Mr. Amery

It is a good debating point.

§ Mr. Russell Kerr (Feltham and Heston)

It is a good point.

§ Mr. Amery

No, it is not a good point, but it is a good debating point.

When the Labour Government decided to withdraw from South-East Asia and the Persian Gulf, the withdrawal from the 78 Persian Gulf had not yet finally taken place when we came to office. We were advised that it was too late to reverse it. I think that was a mistake. I thought so, and, indeed, said so at the time. I do not wish to discuss my own personal position. I was a member of the Government who took the decision, so I must bear my share of the responsibility. But it is only a debating point, because the decision and preliminary steps were taken by the then Secretary of State for Defence, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The point I was trying to make is that even in NATO the doctrine of flexible response is no longer true. In conventional forces we are no longer ahead of the Soviet Union in quality. That may be the case in electronics, but I am not sure even about that. We are certainly not ahead in quantity, because the White Paper makes clear that the Soviets outnumber us by three-to-one in tanks and artillery and two-to-one in tactical aircraft. I am told that if the Soviets were to choose the time and place of an attack. they would outnumber us by 20-to-one.

In theatre nuclear weapons the Soviets now have the edge on us. The SS20 and the standoff missiles of the Backfire bomber are pieces of equipment we do not possess. A good deal of research has been undertaken in the United States, and no doubt in this country, as to what the response might be; but this has not been developed and it will be some years before it can be deployed. Even in the strategic nuclear field, if Dr. Kissinger is right—and he would not have said so unless he had pretty good information—the Soviets are now in a position to knock out 80 per cent. of the land-based missiles of the United States without destroying major cities. This poses an evident political problem which Dr. Kissinger outlined in his interview with The Economist. Furthermore, the industrial base for our arms industry has been so run down that it will be quite a business to replace it.

We have experienced over a generation a recession from supremacy t