SOUTHERN AFRICA

§ The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher)

The Government welcome this opportunity to make clear their approach to the problems of Southern Africa and the discussions that will be taking place on these and other matters at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka, and the opportunity to hear the views of hon. Members.

There is naturally deep concern in the House and in the country generally about the situation in Rhodesia. Rhodesia is the last sizeable territory of the British Empire which we have not yet been able to bring to legal independence. It is the Government's objective, as it has been our predecessors', that the principles of a non-discriminatory multi-racial society should be enshrined in all our former territories at the time we grant them independence.

In relation to Rhodesia, successive British Governments laid down clearly before the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 the way in which those principles should apply to negotiations for a political settlement. Those five principles were: first, the principle and intention of majority rule already enshrined in the 1961 constitution would have to be maintained and guaranteed; second, there would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution; third, there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; fourth, there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; fifth, the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. After the illegal declaration of independence, a sixth principle was added by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson), namely, that it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

That is the basis on which successive British Governments have sought to 621 achieve a solution to the Rhodesian problem. Our election manifesto reaffirmed our commitment to those six principles. It made clear our intention to achieve a settlement based on the democratic wishes of the people of Rhodesia and to ensure that the country, when it proceeds to independence, gains international recognition.

The House is familiar with the attempts made by one Government after another over the past 16 years, for they began well before UDI, to find a basis for Rhodesia's independence which stood up to the test of those principles. Those attempts ended in failure. It has not been for want of trying that successive British Governments have been unable to bring about a solution, but there was no significant change in the internal situation in Rhodesia. White minority rule continued. The terrorist war intensified, claiming more and more lives and a growing list of atrocities.

There was, however, for those who could see it at the time, real hope for the future when, in response to the Kissinger proposals, Mr. Smith, in September 1976, accepted a commitment to majority rule within two years. It nevertheless proved impossible to reach agreement at the ill-fated Geneva conference, and further attempts at a settlement under international auspices were also unsuccessful. Eventually, agreement between black and white was reached within Rhodesia on 3 March 1978. This internal settlement, despite its imperfections, represented a major advance, and it is right that we should acknowledge this fully. My right hon. and hon. Friends and I were united in urging the then Government to recognise that this was so and to take positive steps to encourage it to develop in the direction that both we and they wanted. The late Reginald Maudling, whose understanding in these matters we remember so well, spoke strongly in that sense in our debate on 8 November last year.

The response of the British Government at that time was never more than grudging, yet remarkable progress was made in Rhodesia. All racially discriminatory laws have been repealed. In a referendum of the white electorate a new constitution was approved. After that came the elections in April, the first 622 ever held in Rhodesia on the basis of universal suffrage.

Many critics have sought to deny the significance of that election, in which 65 per cent. of the electorate voted, attributing the high turnout to pressures of various kinds. If the turnout had been small it would no doubt have been argued that that demonstrated a lack of support for the internal leaders and the arrangements they had negotiated. That election cannot possibly be written off as an event of no significance. It is, indeed, an advance without parallel in the history of Rhodesia.

There are those who, against all the evidence, have sought to deny that major changes of a kind and on a scale that would have been unthinkable a short time ago have taken place. There are others who have sought to minimise the importance of what has been achieved. That is not the view of the Government, nor is it the view of the team of observers under the distinguished leadership of my noble Friend Lord Boyd. It seems to me self-evident that our policy must be based on a full appreciation of what has been accomplished and that we should pay tribute to it. I believe that it has brought us much closer to a solution than ever before.

We are conscious of Britain's responsibilities towards Rhodesia. We intend to carry them out with full regard to the situation as it exists now in that country and to the wishes of its people. Terrible war still rages in Rhodesia. Hundreds of ordinary anonymous Africans who never had any part in UDI are being killed every week by fellow Africans.

It is imperative that we seek a solution that contributes to a better and more secure future for the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries. To that end we initiated a full process of consultation. Our first concern was to establish proper contact and communication with the newly elected Government in Salisbury. A senior official, Mr. Day, was sent to Salisbury for that purpose. He keeps us in constant touch with what is happening there. One of the main purposes of these contacts has been to break down the atmosphere of suspicion, bitterness and mistrust which has bedevilled all attempts to achieve a solution to the Rhodesian problem over the past 15 years. Rhodesians, both black and white, 623 are now coming to realise that we are determined to do the best we can to help them and their country and that we do so as their friends.

The Government appointed Lord Harlech as a special emissary to visit the Commonwealth and other African States most closely concerned with the Rhodesia problem. I am most grateful to him for the way in which he has carried out that task. He has had discussions with the Presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi and Angola, with the Mozambique Government, and with the federal military Government in Nigeria. He also met Mr. Mugabe and representatives of Mr. Nkomo. Although, not surprisingly, the views of the people he met varied considerably, he found general agreement on three points: first, acceptance that the situation in Rhodesia has changed and that account must be taken of this; second, criticism of certain aspects of the Rhodesian constitution; third, a firm view on the part of all the leaders to whom he spoke that a solution to the Rhodesia problem must stem from the British Government as the legally responsible authority.

Later, Lord Harlech visited Salisbury to discuss with Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues the results of his consultations with the African Presidents. Later again, Bishop Muzorewa saw President Carter and Mr. Vance in the United States, and my noble Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and I had talks with Bishop Muzorewa in London. We welcomed this opportunity to discuss with him the way towards a settlement. We impressed upon him that the present British Government recognised and accepted the extent of the progress that has been made inside Rhodesia. We explained that the British Government were engaged in a process of consultation with a view to bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with the widest possible international acceptance.

The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka will be an important stage in these consultations. Subsequently, the British Government will put forward firm proposals on the constitutional arrangements to achieve a proper basis for legal independence for Rhodesia. In that task, I stress that we shall be guided by the six principles that have been supported by successive British 624 Governments in relation to Rhodesia. We shall aim to make the proposals comparable to the basis on which we granted independence to other former British territories in Africa. They will be addressed to all the parties to the conflict.

The Government's purpose will be to help those who wish to resolve their political problems by democratic and peaceful means. We cannot subscribe to a solution which seeks to substitute the bullet for the ballot box.

§ Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow)

Will the right hon. Lady say whether the Government will in any circumstances be prepared to recognise the independence of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in the present circumstances, which enshrine, for the white minority, certain rights which cannot in any way be taken away from them? Those rights, as many hon. Members are aware, would be totally at variance with the terms upon which independence was granted to any other Commonwealth country.

§ The Prime Minister

As the hon. Gentleman has heard, I have said that the proposal which we shall make will depend upon two things. The first is the matter of the six principles. Secondly, it will be similar to the basis upon which independence has been granted to other African States. In his own way the hon. Gentleman is asking me whether we would decide whether the fifth principle, the test of acceptability, has been fulfilled by the elections which took place. I shall be frank with him. Although sometimes diplomatic process and frankness go ill together, we have not yet determined whether that is so. We are extremely anxious to try to take along as many as possible with us in bringing Rhodesia to legal independence. We believe that the path that we have chosen to that end is the better one.

I am aware that other people have already made that determination. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has read carefully every word of the report of Lord Boyd, who is held in great affection in many British Commonwealth countries in Africa. In a chapter on the nature of the vote, the report states that It was the intentions of the voter when he voted that we wished to probe and we are satisfied that the election did in fact constitute a kind of referendum on the constitution". 625 That was his view.

We have not yet decided on the matter, because we have wanted to go another way—a way that we believe will be better for Rhodesia in the longer run. It is a way that we believe will bring more countries along with us, and if we go along that consultation route it will be to the benefit of Rhodesia. It is a way in which we can gain that country's acceptance to legal independence.

§ Mr. James Johnson (Kingston-upon-Hull, West)

I should like to ask a perfectly fair question at this stage of the right hon. Lady's speech. She talks of conferring legal independence and says that she does not expect to carry all with her. Will she answer a question that she has dodged on two Wednesday afternoons in succession, while sitting on that Front Bench beside her Lord Privy Seal? Will she tell the House whether she has met any other Commonwealth leader who, like herself, believes at this stage that it is possible to confer legal independence upon this State of Rhodesia?

§ The Prime Minister

With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, I have tried to answer that question in as much detail as possible. I shall shortly say something about the constitution. The hon. Gentleman will understand that I have to go to Lusaka for further consultations. Therefore, I am not in a position to put detailed proposals to the House ahead of those consultations.

The progress that Rhodesia has made towards democracy in the past two years canont be brushed aside. At the same time, because it is in Rhodesia's own interest to be accepted fully into the international community, we must have regard to the views of other Governments. That is the point I was trying to make to the hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, West (Mr. Johnson).

Many black Rhodesians realise the extent to which the country's economic future depends on the continued involvement of the white community and, consequently, on retaining their confidence. Some elements of the present constitution are based on provisions which have been accepted and implemented in virtually all other independence constitutions. For example, there are precedents for a measure of special representation for min- 626 ority communities, both white and Asian. However, there has been criticism of the blocking power of the white minority and of the character and powers of the public service commissions.

Our concern is to find a solution which, while acceptable to other Governments, will enable the white community to play a full part in the future of the country, a solution in which their skills and contribution are recognised, their confidence maintained and which will encourage them to stay.

At this point, we should like to make clear that we are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia. We believe that it is possible in Rhodesia, as in other countries to which Britain has granted independence, to reconcile reasonable reassurance for the white community and the protection of their rights with black majority rule.

We feel deeply the need to do everything in Britain's power to bring an end to the war. Unfortunately, that does not depend on us alone. It depends on an equal disposition to do so among those who are engaged in the fighting.

There are those who seem to believe that war is better than any negotiations That remark was made by Mr. Nkomo on his arrival at the OAU summit earlier this month. Mr. Nkomo said to Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: the war has reached such a stage that there can only be a settlement by military means. If there are to be talks, they will have to be carried out by generals meeting on the battlefield. The British Government totally reject that view. Those who rely on force to achieve their ends must not have a veto over those who seek to advance their cause by democratic and constitutional means.

The need for peace is equally great among Rhodesia's neighbours. The Government intend to do all that they can to contribute to a solution which would be of benefit to the people of Zambia and Botswana as well as bringing to the people of Rhodesia, both black and white, a stable and peaceful future.

§ Mr. Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds)

I was delighted to hear my 627 right hon. Friend say that the proposals by the British Government will be put to all parties to the conflict. Will she undertake that in putting those proposals to all parties to the conflict she will expect all parties to call off the conflict while they are considering the proposals?

§ The Prime Minister

There is no longer any vestige of excuse for the conflict to continue. Most of us recognise that fact completely. I hope that at Lusaka we shall have the co-operation of other Commonwealth nations in calling off a war in which hundreds of Africans who had nothing to do with UDI are being killed and maimed weekly, their crops burned and their stock taken. There are some similarities between the situation in Rhodesia and that in Namibia. In both cases there is a choice between a solution by violence and a solution by peaceful agreement. There are also major differences. Britain has no direct responsibility for Namibia. We are one of five Western countries which have worked out in a process of long and arduous negotiations a settlement proposal which is designed to enable free and fair elections to take place in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, leading to full independence with international recognition and support.

Perhaps the major difference compared with Rhodesia is that the proposal of the five Western countries has been accepted formally by all those concerned—South Africa, SWAPO, by virtually all the other Namibian parties, by the Security Council, by the remainder of the West and by the Third World.

§ Mr. Ioan Evans (Aberdare)

Before the right hon. Lady leaves the question of Rhodesia, will she clarify the Government's position on sanctions? She made a statement in Australia that has caused some confusion. Will she, before she goes to Lusaka, say what her intentions will be on sanctions in November?

§ The Prime Minister

I have already made it clear that the top priority is to try to move Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance. If we bring Rhodesia to legal independence sanctions will fall because, I am advised, the United Nations sanctions motion depends upon there being a state of illegality in Rhodesia. I am the first to say that there is not much time left. 628 If we do not make progress towards legal independence within a reasonable time this year, I do not think there will be any better chance next year or the year after. I therefore regard the consultations at Lusaka and the proposals that we shall make in the light of some of those consultations as crucial. If we are successful, the problem of sanctions will not arise. I do not think that I can add to that.

Before I was interrupted I was referring to Namibia. I said that agreement had been reached but that there were difficulties in respect of precise interpretation and implementation of the agreement. The current obstacles are about how the SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire are to be dealt with and how SWAPO's adherence to the ceasefire and to the other provisions of the settlement proposal are to be monitored in the countries that border on Namibia.

The five countries concerned have devoted intensive efforts to trying to resolve these matters in a way which all concerned could accept. We agree that there should be a further round of more detailed talks, and in the past fortnight the five have put to the South African Government suggestions about how these might be best handled. It was announced this morning that Sir James Murray, the United Kingdom's permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva, has been appointed as the envoy of the five to conduct these talks with the South Africans. A great deal is at stake there. A success in Namibia—a success for peace and negotiation—could have tremendous effects on the prospects for peaceful solutions to other problems in Southern Africa. It could affect the whole relationship between South Africa and the rest of the world. By the same token a failure would have the most dangerous and negative effects for all our efforts in that part of the world. It is for these reasons that the five will spare no effort to try to bring about the agreement which we all seek.

If there are to be peaceful settlements to the problems of Southern Africa, the role of South Africa is critical.

§ Mr. Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley)

Have the South African Government accepted the size and composition of the United Nations body which will supervise and control the transition?

§ The Prime Minister

The details in the interpretation of that agreement are what have caused the problem. Quite a number of soundings have been taken. Any further negotiations are being handled by Sir James Murray on behalf of the five. It is not possible at the moment to go any further.

I was referring to the critical role of South Africa in the settlement of the problems. The policy of apartheid, with its emphasis on separating peoples rather than bringing them together, and all the harshness required to impose it on the South African population is wholly unacceptable. Within South Africa, as in the outside world, there is a growing recognition that change must come. It is in everyone's interest that change should come without violence. We must work by fostering contact, not by ostracism. We must be ready to acknowledge and welcome progress when it is made, even when it may appear slow and inadequate. We must not drive the South Africans into turning their backs on the world. We need to recognise the immensity and complexity of the problems they face. We must encourage progress in working out solutions to those problems.

The heart of the problem in Southern Africa in the immediate future will be Rhodesia. That is so for two reasons. The first is that if it can be given peace Rhodesia stands at the threshold of resumed economic growth and prosperity. That can be of great benefit to its neighbours, some of whom have been less favoured by nature and by circumstances. Rhodesia can feed others as well as itself. Greater prosperity in the region can bring greater stability and can reduce the tensions on which terrorism feeds and from which it profits.

The second reason is that it is vital to the future of Southern Africa that the democratic process should be seen to succeed and that terrorism should be seen to fail. Whatever further progress remains to be achieved, the plain fact is that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia has moved far along the road, by means of elections, towards building up a democratic society founded on racial partnership. This achievement must not be thrown away or discarded in favour of the rule of force. I look forward to the consultations in Lusaka, believing that they can help us in our task of creat- 630 ing an independent Rhodesia—a Rhodesia that will win that widespread acceptance from peoples of good will that is so important for its future.

§ Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South-East)

I am grateful to those who arranged the business of the House for giving us the opportunity of discussing this important matter, and to the Prime Minister for coming here at what must be an extremely arduous time for her to give us some indication of the policy that she intends to follow when she meets her fellow Heads of the Commonwealth. That applies especially to the question of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

It is not my desire this afternoon to make her task more difficult. This is a problem of deep concern to all of us, and if we need any reminder of the gravity of the developing situation it would have come, surely, in the two dreadful events of the last seven days. In one the whole staff of about 50 persons in a Roman Catholic mission near the Mozambique border were abducted. The second was the killing by Government troops of 183 of their own black auxiliaries who were being moved for the purpose of retraining, and most of whom were supporters of Sithole. In those circumstances, all of us must speak frankly but with the desire to help the situation and to try to make the task of the Prime Minister at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting as easy as possible.

I must apologise to the House for the fact that because, unavoidably, of arrangements made for today I shall be unable to be present throughout the debate, and I hope that hon. Members will excuse me.

First, I should like to say a word about the Commonwealth conference itself. These meetings are extremely valuable because the Commonwealth embraces people from most, if not all, parts of the globe—from rich nations and poor, from North and from South, from large countries and small—all of whom have to some extent a shared history, and all of whom—and this is perhaps the most important point that emerges when the 30 to 40 Prime Ministers meet—speak a common language. There are no interpreters' booths. All this in itself has been of singular significance.

631 The Queen, as Head of the Commonwealth, as we all know—we have had recent illustration of it—attaches great weight to her responsibilities to the member countries of the Commonwealth, and in her person she forges a personal link between all the members of the Commonwealth in a way that cannot be achieved by any other method.

I am sure that I carry the House with me thus far, but I must say this to hon. Members on the Government Benches. I think that there has been a tendency in some parts of the Conservative Party over recent years to dismiss the Commonwealth as being a body of little value. It is an attitude which has sprung partly from the fact of the end of Empire and partly, if I may say so, from their love affair with the European Community in the 1960s and early '70s.

That attitude is a mistake. Our experience shows that for a medium-sized country such as Britain, as we are now, working in a number of international forums, whether in the United Nations itself, in UNCTAD or in conferences such as that on the law of the sea, the links between Commonwealth countries and the personal contacts which have been built up among them have been of immense help in the process of understanding and agreement.

In our negotiations in the European Community on agricultural and other matters, our membership of the Commonwealth and the fact that the Commonwealth countries believe that we understand and speak for them on a number of such issues is very highly valued by them. I speak, for example, of countries such as Botswana, Barbados and Mauritius. The knowledge that there have been long historical ties between Britain and those countries has meant that they feel that they have a friend at court in the Community.

We should never forget that and I am sure that the Government will not, but I emphasise that we must stand firmly for a strong Commonwealth and Britain must supply a great deal of the impetus behind it. Therefore, from these Benches we hope that the Commonwealth conference which is about to begin will be very successful in strengthening Commonwealth ties and that Britain, through the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, will be active and will exert every 632 influence to make the conference a success.

However, as the right hon. Lady has already deduced, the issue which will be most inflammatory is the one on which she spent most of her time, namely, the disagreement about the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and it is to this and this alone that I shall speak this afternoon.

The first point to note is, I think, the one that Lord Harlech was told and which the Prime Minister reported to us a few minutes ago. She will find that she is constantly told that the legal and moral responsibility for solving this problem belongs to her Government. But, because many of the Commonwealth countries say that we have by our own default been unable to solve the problem, a new element has come into it, and this is part of the problem, as she will find. They will say that she must take the initiative, but they will say also "Because you have failed to solve this problem, other events have taken place which have resulted in some responsibility falling upon us."

That will be said especially by some of the front-line States, in particular, Zambia, because Zambia feels deeply and strongly about the severe effect that what she regards as our failure to bring an end to the rebellion, as it is called, in Rhodesia has had upon her trade, upon the living standards of her people and in the hardship and loss which has been caused. So there is this dilemma. The Commonwealth countries expect Britain to give a lead but at the same time they say "This is partly our responsibility and we expect fully to be brought into the picture."

This afternoon, I think, the right hon. Lady has made some impression upon that situation. I must tell her that I have thought that she would be well advised—I think that she has begun to do it this afternoon—to play down the impression that is around that the United Kingdom intends to take its own decision unilaterally on these matters irrespective of the views of the Commonwealth.

The right hon. Lady said today that she intends to try to carry as many members of the Commonwealth or the international community with her as possible. I am glad to hear it. But there has been an impression around—perhaps it has not sprung from her and it may have sprung 633 from members of her party—that somehow the Commonwealth conference is a bit of an embarrassing interlude for the Government because it prevents them from taking an early decision on sanctions and in due course on recognition of the Muzorewa Government.

It would be folly if that impression were allowed to prevail, and I think that the right hon. Lady has gone some way today to correct it. But here I must revert to the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdare (Mr. Evans) regarding the Prime Minister's interview in Australia. She there said that an order to renew sanctions would not pass in this House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear.") Indeed, the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) has put his own gloss on that and has gone further in his interpretation in an article in The Daily Telegraph yesterday. He said that the Prime Minister's statement in Canberra amounted to a repudiation of sanctions. That was his word, a repudiation. Is that so?

When my hon. Friend asked the Prime Minister the question, I thought that she ascended into the clouds. I got no clear answer from her as to what she meant and as to her attitude. I do not press the right hon. Lady unduly this afternoon because she has to go and discuss these matters with Commonwealth Prime Ministers, but I repeat her words: British sanctions", she said, would lapse in November and we doubt very much whether a renewal of sanctions would go through the British Parliament. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I dispute that conclusion. I believe that if the Government were to recommend a continuation of sanctions, such an order would pass. It would have full support from the Labour Benches, as I have already told the right hon. Lady, and it would, I assume, receive considerable support from her own followers.

A sanctions order which was backed by the Government would pass easily in the House, and I hope that the right hon. Lady will not shelter behind an excuse of that sort. She may have meant that there would be a division of opinion in her own party on the matter. We have noted from some of the cheers this afternoon that that is so. There has always been a divi- 634 sion of opinion in the Conservative Party on the issue. But that is not the same as conveying the impression in Australia and to the whole Commonwealth that the order would automatically be defeated.

§ Mr. Michael Hamilton (Salisbury)

I think that the words used in Australia were "the British Parliament" and not "the House of Commons", to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I think that he will agree that there is a certain difference there.

§ Mr. Callaghan

I quoted the exact words that were used, and I now repeat them: We doubt very much whether a renewal of sanctions would go through the Briitsh Parliament. That is what I said. But certainly it starts here in the House of Commons. This is where the sanctions order will be taken. If, of course, another place were to decide differently, that would be a different matter. I do not wish to get into that constitutional issue this afternoon—we have too many others to trouble ourselves with—but I do not proceed on the assumption that if the Government of the day decided that internationally it was of the greatest importance and in the interests of this country that sanctions should continue, the House of Lords would take a view different from that of the House of Commons. At least, I trust not.

§ Mr. Russell Kerr (Feltham and Heston)

It would be the last thing that it did.

§ Mr. Callaghan

I wish to press this matter a little further, and I press it because I believe it to be vital to everyone in the House and outside. Are we to understand that the right hon. Lady would like the sanctions order to be renewed but she fears that it would be defeated? If that is it, I believe that she is wrong. Or does she really mean that the Government's policy is not to renew sanctions? If the latter, she is dissembling, and she is using the attitude of some hon. Members in her own party as a cover to shield herself from what would be, in my view, a majority in the House to renew.

We may not be able to get an answer today, but we shall need to know when the House returns because there will be very little time afterwards. It is as well 635 to put the right hon. Lady on notice and to make it clear where she stands. Although I do not press her this afternoon, I promise her that she will be pressed hard in Lusaka. The Commonwealth Heads of Government will not be easily brushed aside on this issue. All the reports that reach me from overseas confirm that her interview in Australia has made her task at the Commonwealth conference much more difficult. The right hon. Lady knows as well as I do the suspicion that can be created, and has been created, among other Commonwealth members. She has been informed of it. I believe that the interview in Australia was a self-inflicted wound, and it is one which I regret.

The Foreign Secretary has taken a rather wider view. He said in another place recently that the election in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, whatever its defects, has created a new situation and that we should take advantage of that. I do not disagree with him. I have emphasised the same point in my contacts with African and other Commonwealth leaders, including my conversations with Bishop Muzorewa. I was glad to hear the right hon. Lady pick up that theme this afternoon.

The Foreign Secretary's view, which he put clearly, is that the greatest objectives are a peaceful settlement, an end to the war, a return to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia of legal independence and the widest possible international acceptance. I agree with those aims. No one would disagree with them. However, that is not the end of the story. That is the easiest part. The hard part comes when the Government and the Prime Minister have to consider how the conditions are to be created that will lead to a peaceful settlement and an end to the war.

The Prime Minister spoke about the bullet and the ballot. Who could disagree with those remarks as a general principle? However, do the Government share the Opposition's view that Mr. Nkomo, Mr. Mugabe and the Patriotic Front must have an important role in the discussions about the settlement if it is to bring peace and is to endure? Surely that is a fundamental question.

I have referred to the impression, which I do not say the right hon. Lady herself has given, that Britain intends to proceed unilaterally to recognise the new State 636 when the Government are satisfied that the six principles have been observed. This afternoon the right hon. Lady said that there must be a second condition. She said that we must carry with us as many countries as possible. I understand the first principle. It is an arguable position for Her Majesty's Government to take. However, other elements have entered into the dispute, as she partially recognised this afternoon, since the six principles were laid down, namely, the existence of large bands or armies of armed men in Zambia and Mozambique who have no present intention of laying down their arms or subscribing to a settlement that is reached with Bishop Muzorewa's Government on their own. That is the problem.

I make these remarks now so that before the Prime Minister goes to Africa we shall have considered the consequences of the actions that she takes there. Let us suppose that a Government were to return from Rhodesia and to say "We have used our best endeavours. We believe that the six principles have been observed. Alas, we cannot carry the Commonwealth with us, or large numbers of the Commonwealth. A, B and C agree with us, but the great majority do not." Suppose that the right hon. Lady was to proceed along those lines and lift sanctions and in clue course, presumably, as she said in Australia, recognise Bishop Muzorewa's Government. That course would ensure a long-standing hostility to Britain among many members of the Commonwealth and among the United Nations.

I do not want to put it too high, but another factor is the impact on our trading relations with some parts of the world. We should not be put off a course that we believe to be right because of that, but we must take it into account as a factor. I do not know what the truth is of the stories that are coming back from Africa of British firms being denied the right to tender.

Leaving that aside, what would follow from the gesture of lifting sanctions without getting the consent of other countries which now, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, feel more involved and have a greater sense of responsibility because we have failed—we have all failed—over the past 15 years to solve the problem? What would be the consequences?

§ Mr. Callaghan

I ask my hon. Friend to allow me to follow through my train of thought. When I have done so, I shall give way to him with pleasure.

If the Government took the course that I have described, would they not be morally committed to assist Bishop Muzorewa's Government to survive? What form would that assistance take? No doubt it would take the form of money, technical assistance and credits. Would it go further? Would that gesture of solidarity taken in opposition to so many lead to the supply of arms? Would British troops be sent to stiffen Bishop Muzorewa's armed forces? Would British troops be involved in an armed struggle with the Patriotic Front?

These are not fanciful questions. These are the issues that the Government will have to face when they take their vital decision whether to lift sanctions if they cannot persuade others to support that course. I give the Government early notice that the House will expect to know where the Government will stand on the sequence of events that will derive from the attitude that is taken about the lifting of sanctions and the recognition of Bishop Muzorewa.

What would be the end of the road? None of us in this House will forget that the involvement of the United States in Vietnam began with the sending of a handful of American advisers there by President Kennedy. We all know where that ended. The United States was drawn in inexorably. The only basis on which the Government could proceed with any hope of success in these circumstances would be to persuade Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe that further armed struggle would be fruitless and that the front-line States would accept the British Government's conclusion.

§ Mr. Hugh Fraser (Stafford and Stone)

How?

§ Mr. Callaghan

I think that I should give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Mr. Hooley).

§ Mr. Hooley

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, in the strict sense, we cannot lift sanctions? The only body that can determine the sanctions issue is the Security Council of the United Nations. If we were to act unilaterally we should 638 be in breach of our obligations under the Charter and would be defying an action of the United Nations which was instigated and initiated by the United Kingdom.

§ Mr. Callaghan

I did not wish to go down that by-way, although my hon. Friend has raised an important issue, namely, where our international obligations begin and end. The sanctions orders preceded the resolution of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the way in which we have carried out our obligations to the United Nations so far has been through the annual renewal of sanctions. It could well be argued, although I prefer not to go down the road any further, that we would be in breach of our international obligations if we unilaterally decided not to renew the order. I hope that I shall be forgiven for not pursuing that issue any further.

§ Mr. Ian Lloyd (Havant and Waterloo)

The right hon. Gentleman has sketched a most important scenario. However, as all the forms of aid that he thinks might possibly be supplied by a British Government subsequent to a settlement of which he may disapprove are now being supplied by the Eastern Powers—for example, Cuba and Russia—what is the Opposition's view on that type of aid and its continued escalation?

§ Mr. Callaghan

With respect, I am not interested in trying to score debating points. I am trying to find the least unsatisfactory course and path forward. I shall take up the hon. Gentleman's intervention later. In fact, I was about to come to it. Before I gave way to my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley, I was about to say that if the Government cannot persuade Nkomo, Mugabe and the front-line States that the continuation of the armed struggle is fruitless and we recognise and we lift sanctions, we shall get the worst of all worlds. We shall be involved. We are bound to be involved. It would be morally wrong for the Government not to become involved on Bishop Muzorewa's side, having encouraged him against the Patriotic Front.

§ Mr. David Atkinson (Bournemouth, East)

rose—

§ Mr. Callaghan

I prefer not to give way. I want to have a connected theme.

639 In the scenario that I have painted, where would Nkomo and Mugabe look? They would look, of course, to where they are looking now. They would look increasingly to the Soviet Union and to Cuba. At present both countries are helping them. Both countries, especially the Soviet Union, are adopting a low profile in Africa. There is more than one reason for that. I shall give what I consider to be the main reason. It is that they, especially the Soviet Union, do not wish to jeopardise the ratification by the United States of the strategic arms limitation agreement. Our interests in this matter coincide with those of the Soviet Union. The Opposition and the Government, I know, believe strongly that that agreement should be ratified. I hope that it will be.

I am projecting my mind forward. What would be the attitude of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the following circumstances: in a few months' time the SALT agreement has been ratified and is out of the way; Britain has made a gesture—this is a reasonable assumption—by refusing to lay the sanctions order again, and therefore she is not committed to sanctions against Rhodesia; and the Patriotic Front, knowing that in those circumstances it had nothing to gain from the West or from this country, appealed for armed assistance on a massive scale from the Soviet Union? How do the Government evaluate the response that the Soviet Union would make in those circumstances, having got SALT under its belt? What does the House think its response would be?

If the United States and the United Kingdom stood together, we might face the Soviet style. It has been done before. But if we were together, there would be a catastrophe in which the United Kingdom would be immersed up to the neck and embarked on a long-drawn-out war which we should not win. The right hon. Lady's attitude, therefore, at the Commonwealth conference, and the policy that follows in the ensuing months, will determine which of those paths Britain intends to tread. As the right hon. Member for Pavilion said in his article, which I have read with care, the right hon. Lady really has very few cards left to play. One of the cards that she had to play—the one called sanc- 640 tions and recognition—has, I am afraid, been partially thrown away because of the impression that was given in Australia.

The Lusaka conference need not, and must not, be just a period of recriminations, sterile debate and who-did-what. There will be some experienced Prime Ministers present, together with our own Prime Minister. Some of them have considerable experience of working together on the problems of race. The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Sir Shridath Ramphal, has also had much experience in those areas.

When the Prime Ministers are assembled in Lusaka they will be geographically and physically as close to the problem and to the central point of the controversy as ever they are likely to be. I urge the right hon. Lady to consider whether some quiet private initiative cannot be taken under the umbrella of the Commonwealth by some of the Prime Ministers present. The right hon. Lady said that Lord Harlech met Mr. Mugabe and representatives of Mr. Nkomo. I hope that she will take the opportunity of meeting and talking, if meetings can be arranged, with Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe.

In this situation the political and the military aspects of the struggle are intertwined. Lord Carver gave his opinion in another place the other day after his experience as Resident Commissioner-designate. He said that it was impossible to make any progress in the political field unless one took account of the military aspect. With respect, it is not sufficient just to use the phrase "ballots and not bullets". We must take account of the fact that these men are in the field; they are armed. Somehow they must be brought to a peaceful conclusion.

Let me sum up. I bear in mind that our primary concern must be the welfare of all the people, black and white, living in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and we recognise that progress has been made by Bishop Muzorewa's Government. We think that the Prime Minister's policy emphasis is wrong in its present objective of lifting sanctions, followed by recognition of the Muzorewa Government. The first objective should be to work to bring the armed struggle to an end through a political 641 settlement that will involve all the leaders both inside and outside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia—that is, the Muzorewa Government and the Patriotic Front.

For that purpose the Prime Minister should seek the co-operation in any appropriate way of the other Prime Ministers who will be present at the Commonwealth conference. In our view an essential step—I agree with the right hon. Lady—is to make further changes in the constitution, the composition of the Government and the powers of the black Ministers. The Government must work on the assumption that the Patriotic Front has the capacity to keep the war going for a long time. The Patriotic Front believes that it will win. At least I should say that it cannot lose.

The constitution has not been voted upon. That is a necessary condition for a settlement before recognition, but there should be changes in it before it is submitted to the people. At that stage a vote in favour in some form would constitute a better basis for international recognition. In all that the Government must work closely with the United States.

The House will recognise that I do not—I hope that my tone has shown this—underestimate either the difficulties of the Prime Minister or the risks of the course that I recommend. Nor am I over-painting the prospects of success, whatever course is taken. My conclusion is that a policy of not renewing sanctions, unless events have changed between now and November, and doing it in isolation, would almost certainly be in contravention of our international commitments; would be dangerous for this country and disruptive of the Commonwealth; would give false hope to the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; would not end the war; and might lead to a collapse of the structure of that part of the African continent.

§ Mr. Speaker

Order. There are eight Privy Councillors who wish to catch my eye and five hon. Members who hope to make maiden speeches. There is a much longer list of Government supporters on this occasion than there was of Opposition speakers in the debate on regional policy. The Privy Councillors will place a long-established tradition in 642 jeopardy if they are not brief and do not allow others to speak.

§ Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles)

In the interests of brevity, I propose to deal in my short speech solely with the situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and not with the other issues that were raised by the Prime Minister.

It is right for me to begin by saying that the House has—perhaps not unusually but rarely—been treated to two extremely thoughtful and logical opening speeches, for which we are grateful. Both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition put the issues before us with great clarity. That will, I hope, enable the rest of us to be even briefer than we should otherwise have wished to be.

There are two important differences between the situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia now and that of any other emerging country under the British Commonwealth. The constitution was not put to the people as a whole, as the Prime Minister said. The acceptability of the present constitution was never tested in that way. It was put only to the white minority. Nor was the constitution negotiated at a constitutional conference by the British Government with all the parties involved. In fact the present constitution—we must never forget this—flows from the proposals of an illegal regime in rebellion against the Crown. That is what makes the present constitution intrinsically difficult to accept, even if we accept the view of Lord Boyd—I personally do not—that the election process itself was some kind of referendum. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister is surely right to go on reminding us that the new regime in Salisbury exists. She was right to say that that was a major advance.

My conversations with Bishop Muzorewa over the years have left me with the impression that he is, indeed, a sincere man drawn into politics almost against his will, who plays a distinguished role in his country and who now finds himself leading the Government. My impression is that he accepts parts of the constitution which he probably finds objectionable. That is part of a political process with which we are familiar and of which we have all had experience. It 643 is, of course, the art of compromise. I do not dispute that.

In a debate in the other place some months ago I heard two previous Foreign Secretaries, Lord George-Brown and Lord Home, each say that he would have accepted the present constitution in his time. Indeed, well they might, and well might this House. We have to remember that the present constitution, with its 10-year entrenched clauses, and so on, might have been perfectly appropriate in the late 1960s or early 1970s, but events have moved on since then. That constitution was not on offer at that time, and many of the African population, and many of the African leaders, took Mr. Smith at his face value when he said that there would not be African majority rule in his lifetime, or when he said on other occasions that there would not be African majority rule in a thousand years.

That is why we had the development of the armed struggle. We have only reached the present compromise constitution, and Mr. Smith has only changed his mind to the great extent that admittedly he has, because of the success of the armed struggle in 1977, 1978 and 1979. When we find, therefore, that those who in their movements brought about that degree of change—those who have been banned and sent out of the country—were excluded from the recent election process, we can understand why so many people inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia today view the Government of Bishop Muzorewa in precisely the same way as the French Resistance viewed the Vichy Government in France. It may not be a point of view that we share, but unless we understand that point of view, and how it has been arrived at, we cannot grasp why it is that there are those outside who are continuing the war against the Government.

One of my fears, after my last visit to Rhodesia in January of this year, is that the bitterness against the new Government of Bishop Muzorewa could be precisely because it is an African-headed Government, so that the bitterness may be even stronger than that which existed against the white minority Government. That is the danger that we have to recognise.

§ Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath)

Is not the right hon. Gentleman making 644 light of the fact that Bishop Muzorewa and his party were elected partly because they supported the constitution? Secondly, is it not vital that there should be strong safeguards for the white community in order to stop the exodus, currently running at about 1,000 a month, from increasing? Will the right hon. Gentleman look at those points?

§ Mr. Steel

I have never disputed at any time that there should he guarantees to the white minority. As for saying that Bishop Muzorewa's party was elected because it supported the constitution, I remind the hon. Member that all the parties in the election supported the constitution. The parties which did not were not allowed to take part in the election.

§ Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler (Norfolk, North-West)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

§ Mr. Steel

I am sorry. I listened to the appeal from the Chair and I promised to be brief. I want to finish as quickly as I can.

It will not do to adopt the attitude—which is to be found in some parts of the Conservative Party—that because there is a black face at the head of the Government things will be easy from now on. The fact is that the liberation struggle has been supported by the frontline States. They have, as the Leader of the Opposition rightly said—and he also came into the firing line of criticism, as all British Prime Ministers have—been critical because they have suffered, their economies have suffered terribly and their people have suffered terribly as a result of what they regard as the failure of successive British Governments to bring an end to the rebellion.

§ Mr. Steel

I ask the hon. Gentleman, please, not to interrupt me. I promised the Chair that I would be brief and I am determined to set an example in this respect.

We have also to bear in mind at the same time the report of the Bingham commission and to understand the impact that that has had in Tanzania and Zambia, as I found when I was there earlier this year. We are still forced, at the end of the day, to recognise that the Prime Minister was right when she said that those 645 who rely on force cannot exercise a veto, but where did the primary violence come from? It came from the injustice imposed by the Smith regime when it sought to exercise a veto on the orderly transfer to majority rule, towards which every other colony under the British Crown had moved. That is where the primary violence arose. The injustice was the primary violence, and the secondary violence followed.

This Government are in no different position from the previous one. They still have to seek reconciliation, a ceasefire and the end of the war. It will not be helped by the threat to lift sanctions. I do not want to make much of the Canberra interview, although the Leader of the Opposition did so. That is the only criticism that I have of his speech. It was not a prepared statement, it was an off-the-cuff interview, and all of us have been caught out at different times with off-the-cuff interviews. Let us forget that. I much prefer the statement of the Prime Minister this afternoon to what she said in Canberra.

It is right that the Government should take whatever initiative they can to bring about reconciliation. I, like the Prime Minister, regret some of the utterances of Mr. Nkomo. As I told Mr. Mugabe when I met him in Mozambique, I regret that he has not travelled more widely, to London and to America, to put his point of view, because I think that today he carries far more support—although this is a matter of opinion—inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia than does Mr. Nkomo.

The Government must be sensitive to the feelings of the Commonwealth as a whole. They must accept that at the end of the day a successful, independent Zimbabwe-Rhodesia must have international acceptance. It will not succeed if it has simply British acceptance and that of a few other member countries.

I end by wishing the Prime Minister well in her journey to Lusaka. There are no easy solutions to offer, except the path of seeking reconciliation between those fighting outside and those currently in control inside. That is the only path that she can follow.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

I think that there is general understand- 646 ing in the House about the importance of Southern Africa to the economies of the OECD countries, and not least to our own, in terms of mineral resources, in terms of investments made out there, and in terms of its geographical position. There is also a very widespread understanding—the Leader of the Opposition shares it as much as does my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—of the threat of the Soviet imperialist thrust into Southern Africa, already achieved by the colonisation of Angola, the establishment of a protectorate over Mozambique, and the back-up of the civil war in Namibia and Rhodesia.

The issue between the two sides of the House, if I may put it that way, is how we are to resist this imperialist thrust. It was, I think, the view of the Leader of the Opposition when he was Prime Minister and of President Carter that they must at all costs avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Southern Africa. They therefore tried to achieve what I might call a Yalta-type solution, that is to say, a settlement in Namibia and Rhodesia that would give an important role to SWAPO in Namibia and to the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia—and, if need be, a leading role, as happened with the Communist parties in the countries of Eastern Europe, as happened as a result of the Yalta agreement.

We had just now from the Leader of the Opposition, if I may say so, a speech which was the quintessence of appeasement and almost of what in wartime we called "collaboration". The ghost of Neville Chamberlain—and perhaps even of Pierre Laval—would have nodded approvingly. The right hon. Gentleman was saying to us "Never mind about principles. Yes, they have fulfilled the six principles. Yes, they have had an election, and we may not be able to argue too much about it, but think of the risk that we should be running by recognising what is, in reality, a legitimate Government. We should be running the risk of a possible Vietnam in Southern Africa."

To begin with, I think that the idea of a Vietnam in Southern Africa is rubbish, and I should like very briefly to say why. We have seen the impotence of the frontline Presidents to defend themselves against the raids of the embattled Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. We have seen the 647 total failure of the Patriotic Front to disrupt its elections. This does not look to me like a Vietnam. If the Soviets wanted to take on—with their new East German Afrika Korps—the combination of Rhodesia and South Africa, they would have to send a sizeable expeditionary force to the area. They would not get very far with local forces alone.

§ Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler

While my right hon. Friend is discussing the attitude of the Patriotic Front, will he not agree that the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel) was entirely wrong a few minutes ago when he asserted that the Patriotic Front was prevented from taking part in the election? That was not the case. Does he not agree that Mr. Sithole, Bishop Muzorewa and others made quite clear before the election that the Patriotic Front was free to play a full part in the election at any time? I have a quotation here from the Boyd report to prove it.

§ Mr. Amery

My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, North-West (Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler) is absolutely right. The Patriotic Front was repeatedly invited to take part in the election and, even since the election, Bishop Muzorewa has said in public that he is perfectly ready to allow its leaders to come back, if they came back unarmed, to take part in the political life of that country.

It is clear enough that the Anglo-American proposals put forward by the previous Government are dead. I fear that the Waldheim proposals for Namibia will also be dead shortly. Here I would like to say a word about Namibia. I was in South Africa when the British ambassador presented the five-Power proposals to the South African Government. These were described—I remember the words because I saw the document—as "final and definitive." The South African Government accepted those proposals on the understanding that no further proposals would be put forward and no further concessions would be asked for.

It is stretching the imagination beyond the bounds of credibility to suggest that what Mr. Waldheim has since proposed falls within the ambit of the five proposals. It simply does not. Sir James Murray is at present in South Africa dis- 648 cussing these matters and I do not want to make his task more difficult. It agreement can be reached, we shall all be delighted. However, what I would say is that it would be dishonourable for the British Government to go back on their "final and definitive" proposals and lend their support to asking for further concessions. It is equally unthinkable that we should support sanctions against South Africa if it failed to accept the new demands of the United Nations.

In the debate on the Address I ventured to suggest to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that the Government would be well advised to recognise the Muzorewa Government as soon as it was appointed—that is to say, the first week of June. If the Government had done so there would have been a storm of protest, but there is a big difference between the protests that people make against an accomplished fact and the protests that they make when they think that their protests may well prevent what they want to prevent.

Because we did not grasp the nettle—I suspect that my right hon. Friend wanted to do so—entrenched positions have been adopted by the different African leaders. We had the first dose at the Organisation of African Unity and we shall get the next one in Lusaka. There will be more at the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations and again at the meeting of the non-aligned conference in Havana. Each time it is more difficult for the people who have adopted entrenched positions to retreat. I suspect that we may have to pay a higher price, in the shape of reprisals in Nigeria and elsewhere, than we would have had to pay had we taken a decision at once.

The Government have made it plain that they will not make their own proposals until after the conference in Lusaka. We all know that the Government will have a rough ride, and we wish them well in facing the storm that is ahead. The Government will be in the dock. There may well be massive demonstrations in the streets. The portly shadow of Mr. Nkomo will be in the background, if not in the foreground. There will be the constant anxiety not to embarrass Her Majesty the Queen. But the test of the skill and determination of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be 649 whether she can emerge from this situation without having tied her hands. The Prime Minister can be sure that the African leaders at the Commonwealth conference will do everything they can to tie her hands in advance. She must resist that at all costs.

We must speak of the British proposals in a speculative sense, because they have not yet been put forward and we shall not be in the House when they are put forward. But we are all agreed—even the African leaders—that there is a new reality about what has happened in Rhodesia. What sticks in the throat of the front-line Presidents is this: they know that there has been a free and fair election; they know that there is a black Cabinet and a black Parliament—

§ Mr. Alexander W. Lyon (York)

Nonsense.

§ Mr. Amery

—but what the front-line Presidents do not like is the fact that it is difficult, under the existing constitution, for revolutionary change or a military coup d'etat to take place. They support the Patriotic Front because they are on its side—yes—but also because they are afraid for themselves. They are afraid that a successful, multi-racial pro-Western, liberal-oriented State in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would have a destabilising effect on their own ramshackle Governments. Therefore, they have fastened on not the voting, not the Cabinet or the Parliament, but three particular issues.

The first is the ability of the white representatives in the Parliament to block an amendment to the constitution for eight to 10 years. In many African countries constitutions have been legally amended to make way for a one-party regime. Under the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia this could not be done. Should we complain? Does independence really mean a licence to introduce revolution by one vote in Parliament? I do not think many of us would believe that.

The front-line Presidents also object to the public service commissions which determine that, for 10 years or so, promotion will be by merit only and not by ministerial favour. Their object is 650 not only to maintain standards but to prevent a putsch or coup d'etat.

There is then the issue of personality, the issue of Mr. Ian Smith. This is an emotional issue in the House and, I suspect, in the Foreign Office. It is much less an emotional issue in Africa. The Africans know that Ian Smith is the chief of the white tribe in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. [Interruption.] They know that as long as he is in the Government Bishop Muzorewa can count on the support of the white population. If Ian Smith were to go prematurely—when there is a settlement I have no doubt that he will go—the white population would divide or split. This is exactly what the Patriotic Front would like to see, because it could be very dangerous to the stability of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

§ Mr. Amery

I will not give way.

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill)

Order. The right hon. Gentleman is not giving way. I am sure that he wishes to continue with his speech.

§ Mr. Amery

I must keep my promise to the Chair and not be a minute longer than is necessary.

If we are to talk about too many white officers in Rhodesia, let us talk about the East German white generals on the other side of the Iron Curtain. We might also remember that it was not a bad thing, when the first two Labour Governments were in power in this country, that the bulk of members of the Civil Service, the Army and the police were, generally speaking, Conservative or Liberal.

§ Mr. Hughes

They still are.

§ Mr. Amery

Bishop Muzorewa's experience of other countries in Africa has taught him the danger of constitutions being torn up before the ink was dry on the paper, and of a putsch being carried out by officers. He cannot understand our hesitations. We have fulfilled the six principles. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister could not have said so more explicitly. Lord Home, 651 who drafted five of those principles, confirmed that they meet the bill so far as he is concerned. The right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. Wilson), who drafted the sixth, said the same thing in a television programme that he and I did together. I am also a little surprised that my right hon. Friend did not entirely endorse Lord Boyd's view that the test of acceptability implied virtually a referendum on the constitution. Perhaps, because she is going to Lusaka, she wanted to hesitate.

I see no sense in the idea that we should now call a constitutional conference to confer independence through the normal colonial procedure. Rhodesia was never a colony in the ordinary sense. Its status was much more akin to that of the self-governing dominions whose independence we recognised under the statute of Westminster without attempting to tamper with their constitutions in any way.

We cannot weigh the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa Government in the same scale. One is the result of a self-determination exercise resulting from a general election. The other is not only an illegal opposition; it has proved incapable of upsetting the general election. It would be ludicrous to suggest another test of acceptability.

The only argument is whether there would be advantage in trying to modify the constitution so as to secure wider recognition. If the modifications were cosmetic they would convince nobody; if they were substantial they could be immensely damaging to what has already been achieved in Salisbury.

It may be that my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary will be ingenious enough to find something that is neither cosmetic nor substantial but will paper the cracks. It will be very difficult. Therefore, I hope that the Government will heed the wise words of Lord Home and Lord Boyd—the most experienced elder statesmen in our party on African matters—both of whom have said "Be very careful in tampering with the constitution. It is a very delicate plant that was achieved with very great difficulty."

I am sure that my right hon. Friend and her colleagues are genuine in their desire to build on the achievement. But 652 the delay in recognising risks undermining the very foundations of that achievement. We must rid ourselves of certain illusions. We may not be able to achieve a political settlement with the Patriotic Front. That may not be possible, because if Moscow does not want peace there will not be peace. It is time for a new approach.

Here I congratulate my right hon. Friend sincerely on what she said in Australia about sanctions. The significance of what she said, was, I believe, that in the new situation it would be quite wrong to have an adversary relationship with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. After what has been done out there, whether or not it fully satisfies our requirements, we ought not to look upon the new leaders as adversaries. We ought to want to work with them. The time is past for negative pressure to be exercised on the Salisbury Government.

As I understand her, my right hon. Friend said that recognition might take a little longer to achieve. If she means a Bill to go through this House, that is perfectly true. But recognition is not an act. It is a process. We and the Americans have regular diplomatic contact with the Salisbury Government. So do the South Africans. Zambia has opened up the border and Zaire has been trading openly for some time. When the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is received at Camp David by the President and at the State Department by Mr. Vance; when he is received by my right hon. Friend in London, as well as by the Foreign Secretary, we are nine-tenths of the way towards recognition. That is absolutely as it should be.

What we want is a positive approach to the final recognition, not a grudging one. There will be those who will try to say "Keep the new State at arm's length. Do not let us get involved". That is the view of the Leader of the Opposition. The attitude is "For goodness' sake, do not let us get committed to the Muzorewa regime". I take the opposite view. We must have a genuine and generous act of reconciliation. We must he ready to give aid, so far as we can afford it, to give political and diplomatic support, and even the supply of weapons if the other side does not make peace.

There is far more at stake here than just the fate of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. If 653 a successful Zimbabwe-Rhodesia comes into being—pro-Western and liberal in its politics and economics—the impact on South Africa could be enormous—not on South Africa alone but on the ramshackle dictatorships in Mozambique, Zambia and Angola. We have a chance to make Zimbabwe-Rhodesia the rock on which the tide of Soviet imperialism can be broken and turned. We have the chance to open a new chapter in the history of this area which is vital to us and to the West. I say to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister "The responsibility now rests on you, with the House in recess, to a greater extent than ever. You have the chance. You may never have it again."

§ Mr. Arthur Bottomley (Middlesbrough)

The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) belongs to a family that has had a long association with the Commonwealth. Indeed, it was his own father who contributed to the position whereby every member of the British Empire was a free-born denizen. As a result, the new Commonwealth of today has been built up. I have yearned for the time when the right hon. Gentleman would make a contribution that would strengthen the Commonwealth. But, regrettably, each speech that I have heard him deliver has failed. I am sorry about that.

The situation in Rhodesia today is different from what it was when I first met Mr. Ian Smith in Rhodesia in 1964. We now have a black Prime Minister with an African majority in Parliament. From a British point of view, this is what we have been struggling to achieve for many years. But will it work? In my judgment, I am afraid that it will not do so because it will not satisfy the Commonwealth or world opinion. For that reason, we must consider the position as it is seen by others.

The Government who have been elected in Rhodesia have what we in Britain have been hoping to see for many years past—an African Prime Minister with African majority rule. The white Rhodesians took part in a referendum. The constitution that was adopted came about because of that. The black Rhodesians took no part, because they were not allowed to. Obviously, the 654 Rhodesian Government did not want that to happen, because they knew what occurred when the highly respected judge, Lord Pearce, and his Commission went out to see what the reaction of the Africans would be to the provisional agreement that had been reached between Lord Home and Mr. Smith in 1970. The Pearce Commission enabled the Africans to let out an unmistakable yell of protest against the conditions that they had so long endured in silence.

The very people who have ill treated Africans—keeping their leaders in detention, murdering some and perpetuating a system that permits the confiscation of property and food, the destruction of cattle and crops and the forcible removal of people to protected villages—still rule. Detention without trial and summary executions continue even now.

Bishop Muzorewa came to power because both black and white Rhodesians saw him as a man not seeking power for himself, his tribe or his party but as a man of peace and good will who would unite the African nationalists. The Bishop has failed to get the co-operation not only of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe but Mr. Sithole. As we know, leading members of his own Government have resigned. He has failed to take them along with him.

The black Rhodesians voted for the Bishop, believing that they would have an opportunity of working on their own farms, of buying clothes in the Salisbury shops or drinking in the white man's bars and cafes. The more sophisticated wanted to see a major transference of land and resources from the whites to the blacks. They now look upon the Bishop as a puppet—as a prisoner of the entrenched white bureaucracy and officer corps of white landlords and business men. Of course, this belief is encouraged by the patriotic forces, but so long as the Bishop shares responsibility with Ian Smith and van der Byl, the conviction that he is a stooge will grow, particularly among the young people. The unanimity rule in executive council means that the apparatus of power remains firmly in the hands of Mr. Smith and Mr. van der Byl.

Over the years, I have made many propositions to help solve the Rhodesian problem. I suggested to Ian Smith that he should seek active co-operation with Joshua Nkomo, who then had the mass 655 support of the Africans. He spurned the idea.

When my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was Foreign Secretary and the first meeting of the interested parties was held on the Victoria Falls bridge under the joint presidency of Mr. Vorster and President Kaunda, I urged him to leave the negotiations entirely to them. They were in the front line and would suffer if there were violence. Later, I opposed Ivor Richard being sent on a mission because I believed that it would bring Britain actively into the struggle for power, and it has done that. I then suggested that a peaceful solution might be found if Mr. Smith were prepared to hand over power to Mr. Garfield Todd, who was a European, trusted by the Africans. If he had asked Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and the Bishop to join him in forming a Government, a successful outcome might have been achieved.

I believe that we are now in a war situation. Reference has been made to Vietnam. No one wants to see a development of that kind, but I believe that it could arise. Indeed, I go as far as to say that if the Government support the present majority and the Prime Minister in Rhodesia that is almost inevitable.

I suggest to the Prime Minister that a further attempt is made to get all the parties together—the front-line States, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and the Bishop. After all, it is their future that is at stake. This time the Prime Minister should also take with her the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The recent conference of the Organisation of African Unity appeared to support that idea. The Government might also consider making a statement before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference. The atmosphere that that would create would enable the Prime Minister to take a more easy part in the proceedings than will follow from her statement in Australia, which at present is paramount in the minds of most of the African leaders.

§ Mr. Peter Temple-Morris (Leominster)

The right hon. Gentleman keeps lumping Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo together, but is it not a fact that both of them are making active preparation for possible civil war? In those circumstances, can the right hon. Gentleman possibly say that whilst they may be called nominally 656 the Patriotic Front they stand for anything like the same thing?

§ Mr. Bottomley