RHODESIA

§ The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Dr. David Owen)

I do not think that any of us in this House would wish to go down for the Summer Recess without turning the attention of the whole House to the problem of Southern Africa in general and Rhodesia in particular. Certainly this was the Government's feeling in providing time for this debate. Few problems which face us at the moment can be potentially more dangerous for British citizens inside that country as well as for the whole of that continent, particularly the southern half of it.

The problem in Southern Africa is extremely complex and has been debated frequently in the House. There is a tendency to think, from the news coming out of Southern Africa, that it is all going wrong, that nothing is going right. I think that that is too defeatist an attitude. This week and over the past few weeks a very important decision was taken in the United Nations and in South Africa in relation to Namibia.

South-West Africa, or Namibia as it is now most commonly called, is a problem which has bedevilled the United Nations for over 30 years. Over the past 18 months there has been an attempt, unparalled in diplomatic history, involving the five Western Security Council Powers, to try to negotiate a settlement which would allow Namibia to become independent peacefully, under the auspices of United Nations resolutions. Those discussions have been extremely difficult. They have had to take place between two major elements which are currently fighting each other—the Government of South Africa, who see themselves as the administering authority for Namibia, and the main liberation movement, SWAPO. Those two bodies hold very different views, and many hours of discussion have taken place between myself, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, Germany and Canada and diplomats from all our countries. Extensive consultations have taken place with most of the member 772 States of the United Nations and with the Secretary-General. Perhaps above all there have been consultations between the major African States, particularly between Nigeria and the five front-line Presidents. It says a lot for the willingness of all the differing parties, despite firmly held views, and their willingness to compromise that we are close to success. I do not say that we have finally achieved it.

It is certainly greatly helped by the decision taken on Monday by the South African Cabinet to invite the United Nations Secretary-General to send his representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, to Namibia on 5th August to work with the administrator-general in that territory, Judge Steyn, in trying to produce a plan which, it is hoped, will go back to the Secretary-General at the end of the month and be voted on in the Security Council early in September. That plan will have to be based on the detailed proposals that were put forward by the five Western Powers and endorsed in the Security Council.

There are many problems still to be negotiated. The composition of the United Nations transitional group will need to be negotiated and discussed. This is the responsibility of the Secretary-General. But there is a chance that the United Nations will have a presence on the ground to keep the peace during the transition, to supervise the elections and to ensure that Namibia moves to independence during the next few months. If that were to be done, it would be a formidable achievement.

Many discussions have taken place in the House over the past few months about Zaire, about our feelings of frustration and anxiety over the events in Kolwezi and Shaba province, about the obvious ill feeling that existed between Zaire and Angola and about the general concern which all Members of the House share about the Cuban presence in Angola. It has been easy to despair that an African solution was possible.

Over the months many people—perhaps unwisely—peddled what were superficially attractive solutions of Western intervention, involving NATO involvement and suggestions of pan-African forces. Luckily, wiser counsel prevailed, and it was argued that, patiently and carefully, we could use our influence to help Africa 773 solve that problem. The Belgian and French Governments, helped by the United States Government and by ourselves, launched a humanitarian exercise to try to save life in Kolwezi. There were many suspicions in Africa that that force would stay, that it was intended as an international force and that it would become involved in the dispute between Angola and Zaire. That has not been the case. That force has been withdrawn and replaced with an African force.

It was further felt that Western pressure on Zaire to try to make political and administrative changes might lead to an alienation of the Zairean Government from the West. It says much for the statesmanship of President Mobutu that he has been prepared to listen to considerable criticism. Although these are early days, there are some hopeful signs that the Zairean Government are making some of the administrative and political changes that are necessary to bring stability to that country.

As a result of a series of meetings over the past few days, arranged with the encouragement of the Presidents of Zambia and the Congo, President Mobutu of Zaire and President Neto of Angola have taken significant steps towards reconciliation. Diplomatic relations are to be established between their countries and provision made for the return of refugees whose exile has provided the focus for the dispute in Shaba province. The proposal to open the Benguela railway should greatly help the economic situation in the whole region and will also make a valuable contribution to Zambia's economic recovery, which is of importance to us all when we consider the problems over Rhodesia.

It is welcome to see both States turning to the Organisation of African Unity to establish a commission of four African States—Sudan, Ruanda, Nigeria and Cameroun—which will oversee the normalisation of relations and the surveillance of the common border. Therefore, in those two areas, both crucially important for the future of Rhodesia, both with a very considerable inter-relationship, there is a sign of very welcome progress.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

Has the right hon. Gentleman managed to convince the South African Government that our support for the Walvis 774 Bay resolution was not a betrayal of the undertakings made in April to the South African Government? Does he regard the abandonment of the anti-Soviet liberation movement in Angola as a positive development?

§ Dr. Owen

I think that the fact that members of the South African Cabinet made their decision in the way they did reflects their belief that the five Western Powers' explanation of vote in the Security Council, and the discussions that we held with their Foreign Minister, Mr. Botha, had assured them that we did not wish to be coercive in the support for that resolution, and that we were making a distinction between the political arrangements for Namibia following independence and the legal situation.

It says much for the South African Government, of whom I have often been very critical, that they have been prepared to accept—although they do not accept that resolution—that they will enter into negotiations with a Namibian government following independence as a voluntary act on the future of Walvis Bay.

I therefore believe that, whilst there are no winners, as it were, the issue of Walvis Bay has been resolved in a way that is reasonably satisfactory to all parties. I do not believe that it will run away. I believe that it is impossible to see the long-term future of Namibia with Walvis Bay outside it. But it has always been the belief of the Five that one could not involve that in the complicated transitional period. That is why we left it outside. As I explained to the South Africans, the choice before us was whether to have a resolution which we should have to veto, which would have completely ended the whole initiative—a resolution on which we should have abstained and would therefore have had no control over the content—or a resolution which we negotiated, where we would have some influence on the content, provided that we were prepared to support it. I believe that the choice we made was the right one.

It is up to South Africa as to how it sees the stability of Angola, but I believe that it also sees signs, as I see signs, of a change inside Angola, of an emerging African nationalism. I believe that it is not unrealistic to envisage the day, as has already happened in the Horn of 775 Africa, when there will be a reduction in Cuban forces in Angola and when eventually all Cuban forces will return to Cuba. There has been some reduction and some of those forces have gone back to Cuba—though nowhere near enough.

This all raises a fundamental question which has been under dispute in this House for over a year and a half, certainly as long as I have been Foreign Secretary, but going back a great deal longer than that—that is, how British influence should be exercised in Africa. It is a very complex question. It is easy to look back to days when British influence was not just influence but power. While we held colonies, we were able to decide the future of African countries. It is easy to look back even with nostalgia to those days. I do not have nostalgia for those days.

I believe that the record of decolonisation of successive British Governments since the war has broadly been a proud one in which we can hold our head up high. But we have to face the fact that one of the greatest problems facing us, and the one that has always threatened certainly to damage, and some would say at times to destroy, our record for de-colonisation has been the issue of Rhodesia. It has baffled successive Governments and successive Foreign Secretaries. Anyone who believes that there are easy, simple solutions to this problem is extremely foolish.

When I first took over this office, I was attacked for saying that I believed that I had to involve myself as extensively as I did in Rhodesia. People took the view at that time that we had no influence on these matters and that this was not an issue in which we had any form of influence or control. The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said this, but others did, too. I always believed that the potential dangers of the situation in Rhodesia were so grave that it had to be a major responsibility of any British Foreign Secretary.

The question then arose as to how we were to exercise that influence. Hereby hangs the difference. I do not believe that it is a difference between the two Front Benches—I certainly hope not—but certainly there is a difference between some Members of the House as to whether or not one should exercise that 776 influence working with the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and one's main Western friends and allies. I do not believe that there is another choice for any British Foreign Secretary than to use all those three areas of influence. By turning aside from that, the House would be making an extremely grave decision.

I put that to the Opposition for consideration in deciding whether they wish to make this a party political issue. I have endlessly striven to avoid that. I do not believe that it is in any of our interests, and it is certainly not in the interests of bringing about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia.

Let there be no illusions. If we lifted sanctions we should immediately put ourselves into a major confrontation with the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity and, perhaps most important of all, our closest Western friends and allies.

There have been changes in foreign policy towards Africa by all the major Western Governments. For a short time after the war, many people thought that in Africa we had made a historic decision. I pay tribute to the memory of Iain Macleod, who, as Colonial Secretary, undoubtedly made that shift and that change of emphasis in British policy. Since then many people have wondered at times whether we have shown quite the same determination and resolution about the settlement of African problems.

During that time, when successive British Governments have tried to live up to their responsibilities in Rhodesia, they have not always had the strongest support from their Western friends and allies. The imposition of sanctions has not been fairly and reasonably applied by all our Western friends and allies. There was the notable example of the decision of the United States Congress on chrome. Many other decisions have made it difficult for successive Governments to live up to the full implications of sanctions.

I believe that that has been a great tragedy for the United Nations as a whole. I still believe that, rather than fighting and loss of life, there is still a place for the peaceful means of persuasion, one of which is sanctions. The 777 fact that sanctions have been able to be flouted during a long period has undermined many people's belief that such action can ever again be used effectively to introduce peaceful change. I believe that, if sanctions had been fully, firmly and fairly applied, we should not now be debating the grave situation that we face in Rhodesia.

§ Sir Derek Walker-Smith (Hertfordshire, East)

The right hon. Gentleman will forgive me for being a little surprised that he should say that the purpose of sanctions was to introduce change. Surely he and the House are aware that the purpose of sanctions is defined by and restricted to the provisions of article 39 of the United Nations Charter—a threat to peace. From whence does the threat now come?

§ Dr. Owen

It is right that it is a threat to peace. It may have escaped the right hon. and learned Gentleman's attention that there is a war going on in Rhodesia. Since 1972 there has been the loss of 7,000 lives. If sanctions had been applied more firmly and fairly beforehand, I do not believe that that would have occurred. There has been the loss of more than 1,000 lives over the past four months since the internal agreement was reached and signed in Salisbury.

The fact that there is a threat to peace cannot be in dispute. The question is, how do we resolve the dispute and work towards a peaceful negotiated settlement? It is my strong contention that if we abandoned sanctions at this stage we would place ourselves in the position of losing completely and absolutely all forms of influence over Rhodesia. When hon. Gentlemen decide how to vote tonight, let it be clear that there is a danger that their vote will be misconstrued, although there does not appear to be any difference between the two Front Benches on the issue of sanctions. I recognise that the right hon. Member for Knutsford (Mr. Davies) has his problems, and I do not want to make them any harder for him. However, I believe that his vote tonight will be misconstrued by those who wish to do that—and there are quite a number—as indicating a major shift in the Opposition's policy towards Rhodesia. I hope that that is not their intention.

§ Mr. Robert Hughes (Aberdeen, North)

Is my right hon. Friend aware 778 that within the past two days in Aberdeen an article has been published in The Press and Journal saying that what the Rhodesians want—and are hoping for—is a change of Government to the Tories, who would be more amenable to the Smith regime? I believe that the Opposition's reaction shows that their votes tonight will not be misconstrued. They will be voting to support an illegal regime and all that goes with it.

§ Dr. Owen

I hope not. I should prefer the Opposition to explain their vote as being a criticism of me rather than a major change of policy on their part. If it eases their conscience and ability to pass through the Lobbies, let them make it a criticism of me. My shoulders are broad enough to take it.

Let us make no mistake about the choice which lies before the House in the method by which we may bring about a negotiated settlement. I believe that it has been shown in Namibia and Zaire that it is best to make progress by working with, rather than against, the United Nations, the OAU and the African countries. I believe that that course has been advocated not only by the British Government, the United States Administration, which appears at present to be the subject of some criticism from the Opposition, and the French Government but by the German Government and all the other members of the European Community. There is no major country in the world that, when given the opportunity to endorse the internal agreement in the United Nations, chose to do so.

The course which I advocated, which was neither to endorse nor to condemn the agreement, was difficult to persuade some of our friends and allies to support. That should be better understood than it is. Even at that time, they foresaw some of the problems that have arisen as a result of the internal agreement, not least the perpetuation of the severe divisions between the nationalist movements.

§ Mr. Ronald Bell (Beaconsfield)

Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that, if the British Government had recognised the provisional Government as the legal Government of Rhodesia, the European nations would not have followed in that recognition?

§ Dr. Owen

That is not only exactly what I suggest but what would have 779 happened. The hon. and learned Gentleman should read the statement of explanation of the vote of the French, United States and German representatives in the Security Council when the issue came up. The House should recognise the change in French policy towards Africa that has taken place over the past few years. There was a time when the French continued to supply arms to South Africa, despite the resolutions of the United Nations. That has now changed. President Giscard has made it perfectly clear that he understands that that is an issue of major importance to the African countries which are close to France. France is now following a policy similar to ours, which is determined to ensure that white minority regimes will have to make steady progress towards majority rule.

I come to what our role should be in respect of Rhodesia. I believe that there is common ground between the two Front Benches that sanctions should not be lifted and that the effect of doing that would be severely damaging. It is important that we should work towards round-table talks, but that will not be easy to do.

I said at the time when I was discussing this aspect that I thought we should work privately, using quiet diplomacy—that none of the sides wanted to go back into a Geneva conference where all the wounds would be opened and publicly displayed. I believed that we should search to find a common area of agreement by discussions prior to holding round-table talks.

To that end, we have had the United States Ambassador, Mr. Low, and a Foreign Office diplomat, Mr. Graham, moving around Africa, largely without publicity, trying to bring about a better measure of agreement among all the parties. It is not easy, and I do not wish to mislead the House that I believe that we are within immediate sight of success. I want to be quite clear about that, though we have made considerable progress.

We have made progress in a number of areas. The United States was under great pressure to lift sanctions, and the House will have followed the debates that took place and the eventual passing 780 of the Javits-Chase amendment. The American decision is, in fact, similar to the position that I adopted in reply to a Question from the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe), when he asked me what our attitude was to the fifth principle. Our attitude has always been, from the time that the internal agreement was signed, that it was not ultimately for us to make the decision about its acceptability, that we could have our doubts about it, but that it would be for the people of Rhodesia as a whole to determine it. We have stood by the fifth principle throughout these negotiations—as I believe we are bound to do and as successive Governments have done. The interesting aspect, however, of the Javits-Chase amendment was that the United States Congress believed that before elections took place all the parties should come to round-table talks.

It is often said in Africa that the African States do not want all-party talks and that all they wish to do is to support the Patriotic Front. A very important statement came out of the OAU summit meeting at Khartoum only a few weeks ago. I quote: The OAU maintained that while it supports the Patriotic Front as the sole liberation movement in Zimbabwe, it still maintains that the other political groups should be involved in an all-party conference. The Council reiterate the decision of the Assembly of the Heads of State in Libreville that while supporting the Patriotic Front within the context of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe, which the OAU supports, the choice of the leaders in Zimbabwe is up to the people of Zimbabwe.

§ Mr. Roger Moate (Faversham)

Through the ballot box.

§ Dr. Owen

Yes, through the ballot box. That is a clearer statement of the intentions of the OAU than we have had for more than a year, and it is an extremely important statement which was, I believe, a tribute to diplomatic pressure and persuasion and to the fact that we are working together to achieve a negotiated settlement.

§ Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn (Kinross and West Perthshire)

Assuming that such a conference could take place, and assuming that there were elections which the Patriotic Front won, what form of government does the Foreign Secretary imagine there would be in Rhodesia? Assuming that the Patriotic Front lost, what does he imagine the Patriotic Front would do then?

§ Dr. Owen

If round-table talks took place and it was possible to have a transitional government which involved all the parties—which would be one of the major aims of such a conference—they would, I hope, so conduct the run-up period to the election that the people of Zimbabwe would choose in a fair and free test of opinion. I have made no secret of my belief that, even if someone were to campaign on a Marxist ticket, as it is sometimes called, that would not be acceptable to the great bulk of the black African Rhodesians who would be voting for the first time in Rhodesia. I do not believe that any political party that takes that as its main slogan in fair and free elections will win support in an election.

I also believe that we ought all to expect that, during a transition period, there may be many political groupings different from those that now exist. In looking at Africa, we ought all to recognise that there is hardly a single nationalist leader or major figure who has not at one time worked with others to whom he is at present opposed. I hope even now that the divisions of opinion between them are not permanent and fixed. Given the opportunity to shift their ground, I believe that they could well do so. The question is how to achieve that and how to have a stable transitional period.

I come now to the issue which has been the dominant problem ever since fighting started in 1972—namely, how to bring an end to the fighting, which, since 1975, has escalated sharply. There must be something like 80,000 to 90,000 people currently under arms in Rhodesia.

§ Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler (Norfolk, North West)

Can the right hon. Gentleman envisage circumstances in Rhodesia today in which elections could take place with the certainty that intimidation would not so distort the results of the election as to make it meaningless?

§ Dr. Owen

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I cannot give that assurance, and I think that is why proceeding to elections with the present level of violence would be extremely difficult. I do not say that it has to be ruled out, but it is why I attach great importance to roundtable talks and why I believe that we have to deal with this issue of law and order.

782 I come to the issue of law and order. It has to be faced—

§ Mr. Geoffrey Rippon (Hexham)

Before the right hon. Gentleman gets on to law and order, may I ask him a question? He keeps talking about the negotiated settlement. What change does he think an all-party conference might make in the already negotiated internal settlement? What principle of that internal setlement does he think inadequate?

§ Dr. Owen

I would hope that the most successful change would be that at the end of it all parties would agree to work together. I have always been clear about the basis on which that conference would take place. We cannot expect any party to come to that conference abandoning its previously held views. Therefore, I have always made it clear that it would be held without precondition and proceed gradually by patiently working out the areas where there are already significant areas of agreement. There is, for example, a broad measure of agreement that there has to be some governing council, or executive council—call it what one will—which has administrative, executive and legislative functions, and that it should be possible to share power during this transitional period.

At the moment, the sharing is between only one of three elements of the nationalist movement and the whites, with the Patriotic Front outside.

§ Mr. Rippon

It has been boycotted.

§ Dr. Owen

The right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) is expert in many areas of the world. I do not know how much he has studied the issue of Rhodesia, but he will know that it cannot be said that it has simply been boycotted. The successful ingredient would be, even if one could not reach complete agreement, at least to widen the areas of agreement to cover more nationalist leaders than it currently does. This is a very widely held view in Rhodesia. Let the House be under no illusion about that. I believe that the majority of Rhodesians at the moment—the clear majority—would argue that no settlement will really work unless Joshua Nkomo enters into it. The wiser ones would also say that full opportunity must be given for Mr. Mugabe to come into it. Indeed, the 783 right hon. Lady the Leader of the Opposition, in answer to a question, at one time did not exclude the presence of Mr. Mugabe or Mr. Nkomo at such talks. There is much agreement and common ground about a council.

I turn to the question of law and order. This presents a major problem because everybody, naturally enough, is wanting to be the president of the new independent Zimbabwe. That is a perfectly reasonable political ambition which all of us in the House ought to understand. But in this country to be Prime Minister does not mean that we wish to have in our own hands the total and complete control of the armed forces. We have a strong tradition of civilian control of the armed forces. We spread that control. In Africa, he who is seen to control the armed forces is seen to be the person who holds power. Over the past two or three years in particular, the crucial issue has revolved around who controls the armed forces. Therefore, on 1st September, when we put proposals to the House about the armed forces, they were widely welcomed in all aspects save for one area of criticism on the question of law and order.

I think it is true to say that outside the House a more realistic view was taken and it was broadly understood why we had to integrate the armed forces. The question how to do this has been one of the most difficult to solve. The statement mentioned that a Zimbabwe national army would be created, based on the liberation forces, with acceptable elements of the existing Rhodesian defence forces and with recruitment open to all. That was the area that was to be negotiated.

Let us look beyond the words at the substance of what has been discussed inside Rhodesia with the resident commissioner-designate and many others since then. The issue of integration of the armed forces, which was anathema to the Rhodesians in September last year, has gradually had to be accepted more and more.

§ Mr. John Davies (Knutsford)

It was anathema in July 1978.

§ Dr. Owen

Yes. The right hon. Member for Knutsford may be right in saying that it is still anathema, but, unless a 784 way is found to resolve this problem of the armed forces, the conflict will continue. Therefore, the way to try to achieve a solution leads to the question whether there is a role for the United Nations in holding the peace in the transitional period, as has just been agreed in Namibia. Can the United Nations hold the neutrality of the transitional administration while trying to create an army which will be loyal to whomsoever is elected president of Zimbabwe? Nobody believes that that will be easy, but no one has yet suggested any other way to deal with this question of the armed forces.

It may be possible to negotiate the issue directly between Mr. Smith, the Executive Council and the Patriotic Front forces. It will certainly be one of the major elements in any round-table talks. I have no preconceived ideas about it. but one of the most significant and important isues to come out of the meeting at Dar-es-Salaam was the acceptance by the Patriotic Front, under tremendous pressure from the front-line Presidents, that during the transitional period the armed forces must come under a resident commissioner who could be an agreed neutral figure.

That is an extremely important principle. I believe that it is the key to success, because it will not be possible to hold elections while one side is thought to control the armed forces. The recent raids into Mozambique have illustrated this point very well. One of the black nationalist leaders on the Executive Council is dissociating himself from the raids while the other is finding it difficult to explain the position. I believe that, though one can delegate some issues to the military during the transitional period, major issues of principle, such as deciding to raid a foreign country, would have to come under some form of political control. Control of the police and the armed forces lay at the root of the resignation of Byron Hove. That issue will have to be resolved if we are to try to de-escalate the violence.

It may not be possible to reach an accommodation and agreement with everybody. I believe that some elements are irreconcilable. Some people, who wish to fight this war to the bitter end, have no intention of negotiating any settlement. I have discussed these issues, and I think I know who those people are. 785 I believe that if we were to attempt to go for a clean decision and not allow that element, which I believe is the dominant element in the Patriotic Front that is prepared to negotiate, a chance to come to a negotiated settlement, there would continue to be fighting in Rhodesia, even if the country were to go to an election and even if it were to be granted independence. We have an obvious demonstration of the dangers of this type of continued fighting between nationalist leaders in Angola which still goes on with three major elements in Angola.

The complexities of some of the issues that I have explained ought to indicate that we should agree to strive, even at this late hour, to assert our responsibilities. I recognise the relevance of the right hon. Gentleman's motion, and I have always believed that the assertion of our legal responsibilities—involving an independent, neutral figure during the transitional period—is necessary. But I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman in thinking that any British Government could do this by taking over tile internal agreement. We should seek to strive to widen the areas of agreement and to try to bring in all the parties. The insertion into the situation of the resident commissioner, which was a crucial element in our proposals last September, was a hitherto unprecedented acceptance of British legal responsibilities, and it still holds the key to avoiding chaos.

I should like to say a little about the dangers of chaos for Rhodesia. Though I personally believe that over the last few months there has been too great a temptation in the newspapers and in some of the comments here to over-write the success of the internal agreement and to portray it as being more stable and more successful than it has been, there has been a slight danger in the last few weeks to be too cataclysmic about the immediate future. No one can tell what will happen. The key question is morale. There could be a dangerous crack in morale and a very dangerous situation may develop. In such a situation, any Government must make contingency plans. We must be prepared to see whether we can avoid tragic loss of life among black and white Rhodesians. Of course we must avoid loss of life, and we are doing so, but we should not assume that these difficulties will not go on for 786 quite a few more weeks and months. All the time I am convinced that we must work to try to bring the parties together. We must try to widen the areas of agreement.

I do not set aside the possibility that some irreconcilable element will have to be excluded, but if we are to adopt the internal agreement with the current level of fighting there is clear evidence to suggest that there are significant sections of opinion—I say no more than that—which will not work for its success. In view of the great difficulty of mounting any form of elections and a fair test of opinion, it would be an act of total irresponsibility for us to choose sides and to give up all influence on bringing the parties in dispute together.

I intend to go on talking to Mr. Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa, Mr. Sithole, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Smith. I shall go anywhere to see any of them. [HON. MEMBERS: "And Chief Chirau?"] And Chief Chirau. I shall speak to anyone, as I have always been prepared to do, and I shall continue to strive for a negotiated settlement. I believe that this is in the interests of this country. I believe that it is in the interests of Rhodesia. I believe that it is our responsibility, moral and legal, to bring about an independent Zimbabwe under majority rule where white and black can live together, where white skills and techniques and knowledge can make that country a rich country to benefit the rest of Africa, but a country in which there is a clear transfer of power to the black majority which is acceptable to those people and which this House judges to have fulfilled the Fifth Principle.

§ Mr. John Davies (Knutsford)

We meet for this final major debate in this Session of Parliament on the subject of Rhodesia in a situation which seems to me one of extraordinary paradox. We may now be nearer in Rhodesia to a democratic transfer of power to majority rule than we have ever been. We may also be nearer to a situation of despoliation and disaster than we have ever been. No credit for the former possibility of democratic transfer attaches to the Government. A major part of the guilt for the danger of despoliation and disaster does attach to them.

787 Nearly two years have gone by since Mr. Kissinger took his initiative in Africa and, for the first time, procured the major breakthrough in the form of an acceptance of a transfer to majority rule. Throughout the ensuing period, the Opposition Front Bench and myself have tried by every means we know not to escalate the issue into one of party dispute. We have sought at all times to try by persuasion and by endeavouring to convince the Government of the rightness of what we thought to bring them nearer to our point of view. The total sum of that effort is an entire disappointment.

I think back over this period and how, from the time the Foreign Secretary assumed his office, I have persuaded and persuaded and called and called for the setting up of a mission in Salisbury and have asked him to nominate a person of prestige and obvious impartiality to take hold of the problem on the spot, to provide a channel of communication and to advance the whole question of the turnover foreseen in the Kissinger proposals. The Foreign Secretary has continually responded by saying that it is in his mind, but he has never done anything.

The Anglo-American initiative emerged in August and was later presented to the House. From the start, I sought to press on the Foreign Secretary the thought that to incorporate the security provisions implicit in that statement would be automatically to condemn it to failure. No sensible inhabitants of Rhodesia could accept a situation where those who had for so long been terrorising and massacring them would be those whom they would have to greet as their guarantee of security. How irrational that proposal was, how hard I tried to persuade the Foreign Secretary of that and how entirely obdurate he proved to be throughout.

I come now to the astonishing November declaration by Mr. Smith of his preparedness to accept the principle of universal sufferage—astonishing for a man who had said "not in a thousand years". Despite all my attempts to persuade the Foreign Secretary, was any real effort made to use that major declaration to push forward, in the way that the 788 nationalist leaders in Rhodesia sought to do, towards an understandable settlement? No, none at all.

When the Foreign Secretary went to Malta earlier this year, I again pressed and pressed him, personally and on the Floor of the House, to use that occasion to persuade Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe, at a time when the internal settlement was not yet concluded, when negotiations were on and when the possibilities were there, to involve themselves in the operation and to convince them to do so. The right hon. Gentleman utterly failed to do that.

The same is true of my experience in seeking to be persuasive over the internal settlement. From the beginning—3rd March—I sought hard to ensure that this most enormous change in the circumstances in Rhodesia should be regarded as such and that it should be given every kind of help so that what was, at that time, a very delicate plant should be given a chance of life and the opportunity to survive, to come forward to something that was valid and to have the effect that was wished, namely a democratic transfer to majority rule. I sought so hard, and all I got from the Foreign Secretary was that he would neither endorse nor condemn the settlement. What a weak-kneed, incompetent way of handling this matter.

§ Mr. Alexander W. Lyon (York)

The right hon. Gentleman has just returned from Rhodesia. What did he find was the attitude of the black population to the interim settlement? The reason that it was impossible either to agree or disagree with the internal settlement is that none of us knows what the blacks feel about it, though we are increasingly led to believe that they reject it.

§ Mr. Davies

I shall come to the great deal that I learned on my recent visit. I have not been without information throughout, because countless of my hon. Friends have been there.

§ Mr. William Molloy (Ealing, North)

That has given the game away.

§ Mr. Davies

How many Labour Members have been to Rhodesia? How few, how few.

789 I move on to the question of the development of this internal settlement through the difficult and agonising months since 3rd March. Immediately after my most recent visit to Southern Africa, I saw the Foreign Secretary and again sought hard to persuade him that many of the things that I have long sought that he should do are still required, but I got no response.

It is no longer possible for me and my right hon. and hon. Friends to seek to pursue that persuasive, low-level approach. The Government have been entirely unresponsive to it. Unfortunately, that lack of response has rebounded significantly to the damage of the situation in Rhodesia.

I have not been impressed by the Foreign Secretary's remarks in the House and I was even less impressed by what he said at the end of a business breakfast with Mr. Vance some time ago. Indeed, Lord Goronwy-Roberts in another place has tried hard to seek the cover of identification with the Opposition in their view of matters in order to escape the justified condemnation of the country.

Let us see where all this has landed us. I return to the question of my visit to Rhodesia and to Lusaka. The clearest of clear impressions that came to me was that I was faced on the one side with the Patriotic Front, in the person of Mr. Nkomo who was confident that he had only to intensify the fighting and to wait and the whole of Rhodesia would drop, like a ripe plum, into his hands. That is the position that I found and it is the result of all that the Foreign Secretary has told us today.

On the other hand, what did I find in Rhodesia itself? The internal settlement is obviously faltering in many ways—I make no secret of that. It is faltering primarily because the dozens, indeed hundreds, of people I saw on that brief visit all mentioned as their first problem the fact that clearly the whole of the outside world was against them and against the internal settlement. That is where the leadership of this Government has taken those people who sought a democratic agreement in their country.

§ Mr. James Johnson (Kingston upon Hull, West)

Labour Members are not 790 allowed to attend meetings of the 1922 Committee, but it is common knowledge in the House—in the Lobby, in newspapers and elsewhere—that when the right hon. Gentleman returned from his visit to Rhodesia, he said—and I am choosing my words carefully—that accepting the settlement of Smith and the three black men would not make it stick. Does he deny that?

§ Mr. Davies

I freely admit to the hon. Gentleman, who has always preserved a fair-minded attitude to this matter, that I said then and say today that it is not possible to recognise the internal settlement because it lacks the essential imprimatur of acceptance of the fifth principle, that is, the will of the people, which has not yet been declared. I freely admit that to the hon. Gentleman. I said it then and I say it now.

I fear that the net result of the Foreign Secretary's efforts has been to bolster the Patriotic Front in the belief that it cannot lose and to undermine the internal settlement. I found the people of Rhodesia in a state of great uncertainty. Whole areas that they had hoped and expected to be able to develop have not been developed. The elimination of racial discrimination which they promised has still not been done and needs to be done. The de-escalation of the war has not taken place. That needs to be done. It may be that "war" is not the right word. In Rhodesia we find a terrible permeation of the whole country by those who are bandits. They are simply set on massacre. They have chosen soft targets because they believe that others find the results more impressive. It is a horrifying and disgusting experience. That is part of the whole problem that has arisen because of the failure to grasp the problem of the war.

I do not doubt that the preparation for elections is inadequate. The completion of the constitution has yet to be achieved. The protection of minorities is, of course, the sixth of the principles that were set out by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson). That principle is still not entirely complete. All these matters remain to be completed. The internal settlement was a basis of consensus, but because the Government have adopted and followed the "Not 791 endorse, not condemn" attitude, for so long—

§ Mr. Alexander W. Lyon

And the Opposition.

§ Mr. Davies

We have certainly not adopted that approach. We have said throughout that we could not recognise but that we would support. I have said that continually and I continue to say so today.

What has happened? The nationalist leaders have found themselves compelled, because of the indifference and the total unhelpfulness of the British Government, to move around the world seeking such support as they can get. They have not been able to apply themselves as I had hoped in pursuing the problems.

Can the situation possibly be retrieved? I believe that it can, but only if there is a massive change of policy on the part of the Government. Unfortunately, none of my experience hitherto suggests that that will happen.

What has to be done? A mission has to be installed in Salisbury with proper leadership. It should have a competence in helping towards bringing about elections, which are the key to resolving the problem. It should not sit on the outskirts and watch disparagingly. It should go there to help. It should deal with the provision of an observer corps for the elections. It should try to mount that operation with all people and countries of good faith to secure progress.

I welcome what I believe to be the wise decision of the American Senate, which drew attention to the need for proper observation of the elections. Obviously, it has directed the attention of its Administration to the need to be involved and to provide for the constitutional requirements on the basis of minorities.

If that were done, the effect would be as great psychologically as it would be materially. It would have an immense uplifting effect on the morale to which the Secretary of State was referring. It would have a powerful effect. I wish to God that the right hon. Gentleman would accept the need so to act, as I have been recommending for so long. That would create the very circumstances that would enable the contesting parties to meet on 792 an equal footing. They cannot do so at present because the Patriotic Front considers that it has the situation made. However, if the Government were seen to adopt the approach that I have outlined, they would tilt back the balance to something nearer normality. That is the balance between the parties. It is the balance of the parties—

§ Mr. Tom Litterick (Birmingham, Selly Oak)

What is that?

§ Mr. Davies

I have said nearly 14 times that that is the balance between the parties. Can the hon. Gentleman hear or can he not?

Equally, there must be a time limit to the preparedness of the parties to come to any discussion. We cannot ask them to go on indefinitely. I remind the Prime Minister, who is occupying the Government Front Bench alongside the Secretary of State, that on many occasions I have been assured that there was no question of the Patriotic Front holding a veto against the settlement. I call the Prime Minister's attention to the reply that he gave me only the other day. I said to the Prime Minister: May I recall to the Prime Minister his answer to the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill)? Is he seeking to say to the House that the fact that a war is being waged from outside a country's frontiers by guerilla forces means that automatically there is a case for non-recognition of the Administration within those frontiers? The Prime Minister replied: No, that was not what I said, and I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman would draw that deduction if he is making it as a general rule. If he is applying it only to Rhodesia at the moment, my answer would be 'Yes, I am saying that.'"—[Official Report, 27th July 1978; Vol. 954, c. 1793.] So the Prime Minister is saying that so long as the guerrilla war wages, however conducted, against the people who would wish to settle their differences within the country, so long the Government can never recognise the result. That is a clear denial of the right hon. Gentleman's former undertakings on the veto. That was a dangerous denial.

The Secretary of State has once again returned to the issue of an all-party conference. He does so without making adequate reference to the fact that every statement that he has ever made about an all-party conference has been to call 793 it on the basis of the Anglo-American plan. That plan is as much anathema now in terms of its security provisions as it was originally. That is still an unacceptable proposition for the right hon. Gentleman to put forward. It may be that the parties will be able to come forward if they are totally uncommitted on both sides, and when there is no commitment even on the part of the Government or their American partners.

In the light of all the experience that I have had in trying so hard to change the Government's mind by persuasion, my one hope now is that there should be an early General Election for this purpose as for so many others. I take that view because I believe that until the election takes place the right steps will not be taken to overcome the immense difficulties that the wonderful country of Rhodesia is labouring under so that it may be brought back to a position of rationality and proper majority rule.

If that does not happen, we may find ourselves driven into desperation, into a situation in which we are faced with, as it were, a break down. I welcome so much the valid suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling), which in such circumstances may well need careful consideration and might have to be applied.

I realise the importance of sanctions. I have seen with my own eyes the effect of the limitations on the ability of Rhodesia to have access to the outside world. I know how difficult and important are the problems that sanctions raise. We must consider not only their practical effect. They have a symbolic effect as well for all sides.

I do not recommend my party at this stage to call for the immediate suspension of sanctions. I take that view because I very much hope that the time will come when the Conservative Party will be in office and will be able to deal with sanctions. When it does so, it must be from the point of view of legitimacy and from an unassailable position. That is my keenest wish and desire. I cannot see the present Government responding to that call. In any event, we must retain the total unassailability that Britain has alone in relation to Rhodesia. Britain alone can render 794 an illegitimate regime a legitimate one by its own act. That must be done by the British Parliament.

I welcome greatly the Senate's resolution, which points the way to the American Administration. At the same time, I must repeat that if it appears clear by the time that we come to discuss the sanctions order in mid-November that the expectation of the internal settlement, which has now been declared, of holding an election between 4th and 6th December seems realistic and that Rhodesia seems about to hold the elections in free and fair conditions, I cannot see the Conservative Party voting to renew sanctions.

It is with regret that I have had to speak in these terms. I have had a completely and utterly unsatisfactory experience in dealing with the Government. I have endeavoured to the utmost to try to bring them to a state of reason in determining what they should be doing. They have consistently refused to take that approach. I call upon my right hon. and hon. Friends to accompany me into the Lobby this evening to mark their failure.

§ Mr. Michael Stewart (Fulham)

The speech to which we have just listened from the right hon. Member for Knutsford (Mr. Davies) has not made it any easier for us to understand what he actually believes about this problem. In debates not so long ago, he was thumping the Table and talking about ending sanctions. In the last few minutes he has told us, first, that he is not recommending his hon. Friends to vote against sanctions—a remark which was received with a gloomy silence—and a little later he was depicting again circumstances in which he would ask them to do so, and he got enthusiasm from the more zealous supporters of Mr. Ian Smith.

We are really, therefore, not very clear what the Conservative Party does believe about sanctions. We are even less clear what the Conservatives now believe about the internal settlement.

As far as I could make out, the reasons offered for voting against the Government were, first, that my right hon. Friend ought to have enthusiastically embraced the internal settlement earlier, and secondly, that the Government ought to 795 have sent a mission to Salisbury. I shall deal with both of those points in a moment. But it seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman was painfully seeking some ground on which he could dissociate himself from the Government. What he ought to have been doing was seeking some ground on which he could clearly dissociate the main body of his party from those who have consistently supported the rebellion, because we are in this situation now. Let us look for a moment at what the situation is.

I believe that if the fighting goes on, it will end, sooner or later—and I accept the caution of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary about making prophesies about time—but it will end inevitably in the defeat of the Ian Smith regime in the most terrible circumstances. It is against that background that we have to consider what the situation is. I do not believe that anyone would really deny that will be the result if the fighting goes on.

Rhodesia, that unhappy country, has been brought into that situation by, first, the illegal declaration of rebellion. There have been many rebels in the history of our vast empire, many of whom, as we all know, ended up as the friendly and trusted leaders of independent nations. But they have all been able to claim that they represented their peoples or a large majority of their peoples.

Where Ian Smith is unique is that he has started a rebellion for the purpose of ensuring the domination by 5 per cent. of his people over the remaining 95 per cent. That is why one cannot regard him in the same way as insurgent leaders elsewhere. That surely is something that ought to have been condemned and discouraged from the start. [An HON. MEMBER: "It is past."] But this is what has led us where we are today, and it affects the judgment that we must pass on what would be right policy today.

We have been brought into the present situation by, first, an act of rebellion and, secondly, by the repeated refusal of many opportunities to conclude a reasonable settlement. The "Tiger", "Fearless" and several other proposals were obstinately turned down, because Mr. Smith believed that if he went on being obstinate he would retain his racial regime in power. A very heavy responsibility 796 rests on all those, including some hon. Members of this House, who have encouraged him in that obstinacy. It is those people from whom the right hon. Member for Knutsford should try to dissociate himself.

In that situation the suggestion is put forward that the internal settlement finds a way out. When I first began to read the text of it, I earnestly hoped that that would be so. I had had such personal experience of the difficulties and the horrors attendant on this problem that I was anxious to see anything that was a practical way out. But there were two gigantic obstacles to it.

The first obstacle was that all the instruments of power remained firmly and unshakeably in the hands of the Rhodesian Front, and I doubted whether anyone would have confidence in a settlement that contained that principle dug into it. Secondly, the internal settlement contained the phrase that one of the duties of what is called the transitional Government would be to begin the removal of discrimination. But it was also provided that any measures for that, or indeed, for any other purpose, required the unanimous consent of the four—that is to say, that Mr. Smith had a veto on them. That seemed to me to be a gigantic difficulty.

But there was one ray of hope. The internal settlement might have been redeemed if the clause about the progressive removal of discrimination really began to take life. If we could have seen, in the months since the internal settlement was started, that there was a genuine effort to remove discrimination in schools, in land ownership, in what one will, one might have wanted to hope for the best about that. I therefore studied with great interest the two articles that appeared in The Daily Telegraph by Mr. Ian Smith to see what he said about this. There was not a paragraph, not a line, not a word. Mr. Smith does not apparently consider that this is a subject worth talking about—and I am afraid of the same here from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman.

§ Mr. John Davies

The right hon. Gentleman should read the speech.

§ Mr. Stewart

Perhaps I do the right hon. Gentleman an injustice. Let us see the nature of the injustice. He said one 797 thing about it. He said that the people in charge under the internal settlement were not making any progress on this subject. Mr. Smith does not regard it as worth talking about. The right hon. Gentleman, back from his visits, tells us that in this vital field the one thing that might have made the internal settlement a possible option was making no progress at all.

This is not something on which the Smith regime can say that they are inhibited, because my right hon. Friend does not speak more kindly. They could do something about schools. Whatever the situation, they have not begun.

I am bound to say, therefore, that for Britain to associate herself with a settlement which has those weaknesses would have put us in a totally impossible position, discredited and dishonoured with our friends in Europe, with Africa and throughout the world.

I look now at another suggestion. It is embodied in one of the early-day motions and particularly sponsored by the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling), which makes mention of return to legality and then working the internal settlement. I am sure that this is a genuine attempt at a solution. But the truth is that return to legality and the internal settlement are incompatible. A regime in which Mr. Ian Smith has a veto on anything that the Government may do is not a return to legality. A return to legality means that the full authority of the British Government is restored in Rhodesia. There is really no way forward here.

But there is one way. The phrase "return to legality" does have some hope in it. Notice what it means. It means the complete abandonment by Mr. Smith and those associated with him of his pretensions to be the lawful Government or any kind of Government in Rhodesia. It means the abandonment of this illegal declaration that should never have been made. If that were done, one could indeed have what the right hon. Gentleman wanted—a mission, a British Government presence, in Salisbury.

We really cannot send someone claiming to represent the British Government in Salisbury, where he is in a situation in which all the power is under the control of the Rhodesian Front and in which any changes in the conditions require the 798 consent of Ian Smith. That would be to send him in chains. If someone from the British Government goes at all, he must go as the representative of the lawful authority. That is what "return to legality" would mean.

I think that there is a chance that we shall get a return to legality if those who have been encouraging Mr. Smith, those in this House, on his course so far were now to say plainly to him "Look here, we are people who have been your friends. We are people you can trust. We must now tell you that your illegal attempts are doomed to failure and the sooner you abandon them the better for everyone concerned and for everyone, black and white, in Rhodesia." That is the message that hon. Members and anyone who has influence with Mr. Smith ought to be giving to him now.

§ Mr. Rippon

Why does the right hon. Gentleman keep on talking about support for Mr. Smith? We are talking about support for the internal settlement. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]. What objection has the right hon. Gentleman to giving support to Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Sithole, who think that they have brought about the miracle of a negotiated internal settlement based on one man, one vote?

§ Mr. Stewart

The right hon. and learned Member can please himself whether he listens to what I am saying. It is a free country. But since he has so obviously not listened to everything that I have said so far, he ought not to intervene. What the internal settlement means is all military power under the control of Mr. Smith and a veto on any action of the transitional Government by Mr. Smith.

§ Mr. David Price (Eastleigh)

Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that Mr. Smith has moved a very long way towards the "Tiger" proposals since his original rebellion? Surely it is worth us in this House being a little more generous towards him in the hope that he will go the whole way? I am with the right hon. Gentleman. If Mr. Smith would return to legality it would solve most of the problems. But having gone so far towards majority rule we surely ought to be a little more helpful.

§ Mr. Stewart

I would have been glad to believe that that could have been so. 799 But when one notices the dismissal of Mr. Hove merely for saying that there ought to be changes in the power structure, which everyone knows is tree, when one notes the complete failure to do anything to remove discrimination in any form and the continuance of the Smith veto unchanged, I do not see how we can have the confidence in Mr. Smith which the hon. Gentleman asks us to have.

§ Mrs. Jill Knight (Birmingham, Edgbaston)

What about Bishop Muzorewa?

§ Mr. Stewart

If the hon. Lady studies one of the latest pieces of news, I think she will find that Bishop Muzorewa must be rather more concerned about the degree of confidence which those in Africa who previously followed him now have in him than what the reactions of this House may be. I am afraid that every sign is that the internal settlement is breaking up of its own defects.

§ Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South-West)

Sabotage.

§ Mr. Stewart

The hon. Gentleman can believe that if he likes. I, therefore, conclude—

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

No, I am sorry. I have given way enough. What is required is a return to legality and then the kind of conference which my right hon. Friend has in mind. Anyone who wants to end this dreadful story of blood in Rhodesia ought to be encouraging and supporting my right hon. Friend in the efforts which he has made to get a conference—I give way to the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles

I am very grateful. The right hon. Gentleman seems to be concluding his speech. He referred just now to Mr. Smith leaving out essentials. Is it not fantastic to sit here in the House of Commons and hear a Foreign Secretary and an ex-Foreign Secretary make no mention whatever in their speeches about Soviet involvement in this whole ghastly problem?

§ Mr. Stewart

Oddly enough, I was going to refer to that, because I was going to say something about the position of the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front must be brought into these discussions. I know 800 that there are some Opposition Members, who, immediately one says that, cry out "Talking with murderers". Unhappily, there are so many people of so many different factions in Rhodesia against whom the word "murderer" or the word "traitor", could be flung. We do not get very far by those exchanges. If we get a settlement at all—

§ Mrs. Knight

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

No. If we get a settlement at all the blood must be forgiven and forgotten on both sides. But the prelude to that is a conference which brings in the Patriotic Front.

§ Mrs. Knight

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

I am sorry, I am not giving way any further. I have given way enough. Other hon. Members want to speak. By what means can the Patriotic Front—

§ Read-Admiral Morgan-Giles

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) distinctly heard the right hon. Gentleman refer to her. Is it not customary to give way in those circumstances?

§ Mr. Stewart

I indicated to her that I was not giving way to her.

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton)

There is no point of order. The Chair heard nothing irregular.

§ Mr. David Stoddart (Swindon)

The hon. Lady just does not understand the word "No".

§ Mr. Stewart

What arguments or motives are there at this stage to get the Patriotic Front also to make the step forward which is necessary for peaceful settlement? That is exactly the point which the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) raised. I trust the Patriotic Front wants a country which will be ruled by the people of Zimbabwe for their benefit and not under any kind of foreign domination.

§ Mrs. Knight

And no elections.

§ Mr. Stewart

The danger is that the longer the struggle continues the greater the chance that baneful influences from outside will increase. It is entirely proper to emphasise that point. I trust that 801 the leaders of the Patriotic Front will realise it. I think also that they should realise this. I suppose that it is in their power, in the last resort, to say "No, we want to fight to a finish. Rather the whole of our own way accomplished by blood than a good part of it accomplished by agreement." If that is the course on which they are determined, I hope they will think first of this. If they come into their inheritance that way, what a mangled and impoverished inheritance it will be. It is very difficult to visualise the wretchedness of the country that they will inherit. That ought to weigh with them.

There is a further consideration. There is more than one leader in the Patriotic Front. As always in politics, there are rivalries and mistrust. If they think that the road forward is by blood all the way, they will find, as Andrew Marvell wrote: The same arts that did gain A power, must it maintain. Whoever first comes out on top, if things go that way, will be living in a country where he will know "I got here by force. Others might follow my example." It would be a regime of fear, dread, suspicion and tyranny.

All of this can be avoided if there is from Smith a recognition that the whole illegal declaration of independence was a piece of wicked folly and ought to be abandoned. If there is a return to legality, then the Foreign Secretary's hands are greatly strengthened in any discussion he has with the Patriotic Front which has, as I have suggested already, powerful and practical reasons why it should listen to the voice of peace rather than the thought of victory by blood.

It is impossible to answer the question "How pessimistic or optimistic is one about the outcome?" The situation is very dark, but there is the possibility of peaceful settlement. I have tried to suggest to the House what the ingredients of it are.

§ Mr. Reginald Maudling (Chipping Barnet)

Many right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak, so I shall be as brief as I can be and also as positive as possible. To combine the two is not easy.

Let no one underestimate the gravity of the impending tragedy in Rhodesia. The possibility is a collapse, political and 802 economic, and bloody warfare between black and white and between black and black. Nor should we underestimate the effect on this country if that should happen, because the wound left upon the conscience of Britain would be deep and long-lasting. But it is not inevitable. It can be avoided, but it will happen unless some action is taken to avert it.

The current position cannot last. It is possible for the Government of Rhodesia to contain the guerrillas, but they cannot destroy them. How can life go on without some prospect of victory and peace at the end? What future is there now for any young white man in Rhodesia? What future is there for Rhodesia without the white population? What future is there now for the peaceful black population if the men with the guns seize power? They come, Cuban trained, with Russian arms and with murder in their hearts, across the boundaries into Rhodesia. It may be said that they come in support of what they believe to be a just cause, but so do the members of the Provisional IRA.

It seems to me that there are several choices at present. The first is to let things continue on the path of chaos and carnage. The second is to accept the view that the settlement is working, that an election will soon he held, in December, and that all will then be well. I do not believe that. I wish that I could believe it, but it is not the world in which we live. It will not happen. Men of good will would like it to happen, but it will not.

Next, we could accept the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's suggestion of a conference among all parties to reach agreement. Again, I wish that I could believe in that, that I could believe that it would happen, but I do not. Too much blood has been shed already. There is too much fear and too much lust for power to make that possible.

Then, we could wash Britain's hands of it all. That is a choice too shameful to contemplate.

None of those choices seems to me to be acceptable. I am driven to the conclusion that the only way in which we can make progress and avert disaster is to support the internal settlement, on the right terms and in the right circum stances.

803 My first reason is that the internal settlement was agreed within Rhodesia, between the representatives of the Europeans and the representatives and leaders of the black Nationalist Party in Rhodesia. My second is that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has accepted that the internal settlement meets all the principles for which both sides of the House have stood for many years.[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes. Hon. Members should look at the answer of 18th April. The internal settlement meets all the principles for which we have stood, save the one outstanding question of the test of public opinion at a free and fair election. Our job is to see that there is a free election.

How can one support the internal settlement in practical ways? I do not believe that to remove sanctions now in favour of an illegal regime would help. It would be ineffective and divisive. It would be no real help to Rhodesia if the United Kingdom alone were to take that step. We should accept and recognise the internal settlement and the provisional Government as a basis for a return to legality of Rhodesia under the Crown.

If we study the history and the experience that some of us have had in the independence of colonial territories, we see that there are plenty of precedents. After all, Rhodesia is still de jure a colony, and only this Parliament can give it legal independence.

In the independence of every colony there has been a period of self-government under a British governor on the basis of a constitution agreed by the parties in the colony and accepted by Her Majesty's Government. In every case this has been followed by independence and free elections.

The British responsibility under this suggestion would be to see that the agreed constitution, the internal settlement, was carried out and respected. It would be our responsibility then to see that the elections which followed were fair.

In those circumstances, if we do that, if we again accept this responsibility, as we should, what reason could the Patriotic Front possibly have not to put itself to the test of a popular vote? I can think of no better circumstances in 804 which it should be asked to do that—under a British governor, under a return to legality, to put itself to the test of a popular vote.

If the Patriotic Front wins, so be it—it wins. If it does not, it must accept that. Why should it not accept this proposal? If it does not, the only alternative—and God forbid that it should be the alternative—is that it is determined to put political power to the arbitrament of the gun and the gun alone.

What case is there in justice or equity against that solution? It needs trust, but we all need trust now. Without that, all is lost. It calls for effort and possibly for sacrifice by Britain, but that we cannot evade. Let us have no doubt about that.

A return to legality on that basis would mean two things. First, the sterile argument about sanctions would end. Rhodesia would be British territory once again, de facto as well as de jure. Could we impose sanctions on ourselves? The thing would collapse. The argument would end.

Secondly, the relief of the pressure on the Rhodesian security forces would be considerable. If Rhodesia returned to legality, there would be no case for the Governments of surrounding countries continuing to support forces invading what is once again British soil in fact as well as in law. I believe that they would not do so. But if they did, first, our protests should be vehement and effective. Secondly, if that action should continue, we should defend British soil and look to our friends and allies, including the United Nations, to help us in doing so.

No doubt there are many objections to what I propose, but let the objectors produce a better solution. The alternative is disaster.

§ Mr. Jeremy Thorpe (Devon, North)

I think that it has always been common ground in the House that the only possibility of averting bloodshed was a negotiated settlement. It is a truism that there can be no negotiated settlement without talks. Therefore, it seems to me that anyone in the House or outside who in any way inhibits the possibility, however slight, of talks taking place does a grave disservice to the possibility of a peaceful solution.

805 When I listened to the right hon. Member for Knutsford (Mr. Davies) speaking from the Opposition Front Bench—I have a great respect for the right hon. Gentleman—I thought that the message to go out from the vote which the Opposition intend to force today would be, whether they intend it or not, "Hold on against the possibility of a Conservative Government in November. You will probably get sanctions lifted, and you have a good sporting chance of getting the internal settlement recognised." I could think of nothing that would make those who are at present reluctant to go to talks even more reluctant to do so.

I say straight away that those talks may fail. They may not produce the result that we want, but nothing should be said that in any way inhibits the possibility of their taking place, in conditions which I shall mention in a moment.

I listened to the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) with great interest. He has had a very long experience of African affairs. I just wonder how acceptable the right hon. Gentleman's proposals would be and whether he has any evidence that they would be acceptable to Mr. Smith, who in 1965 committed UDI in order to reject the last vestige of colonial administration by Britain, which in effect had not really been of any account since 1923.

I wonder, first, whether the right hon. Gentleman stopped to consider what was the likelihood of acceptability, and, secondly, whether he had any idea of the number of troops and officials and the entire apparatus of government which would be required to give credibility to Britain's returning to that colonial and administrative role. I should have liked to hear a little more about that. Although it is an interesting idea, it is not a very practicable one.

I was at the very beginning among the first to press the Foreign Secretary to recognise those aspects of the internal settlement which I believed represented an advance. Certainly the recognition of the principle of one man, one vote, the principle of independence on 31st December, represented a formidable increase, a formidable advance, on behalf not only of Mr. Smith but of many of his European compatriots.

806 Those proposals of the internal settlement are regarded as inadequate by the Patriotic Front. I asked the Foreign Secretary whether he agreed that no particular group had a veto. The proposals are, he said, not acceptable to the Patriotic Front. They are not accept