ARMY

§ Mr. Speaker

On the point of order raised by the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mr. Biggs-Davison) just now, I hope that we shall not have a detailed debate but passing references are sometimes permissible. I shall see how we get on.

§ The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army (Mr. Robert C. Brown)

Six weeks ago, in the debate on the Defence Estimates, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence described to the House the Government's plans for implementing the proposals made as a result of the defence review. A major feature of these is the restructuring of the Army. I welcome the opportunity to explain in more detail precisely what this will mean to the Army's organisation, its capability and its men.

The Army, to a greater extent than the other Services, can only be the sum total of its men. It is often said that the Navy and the Royal Air Force man their equipments, but the Army equips its men. The truth of this was forcefully brought home in the defence review, when we looked at the Army's rôle and commitments. We sought ways to make significant savings, but, at the same time, to preserve our capability to safeguard the security of Britain, and to maintain our commitment to NATO.

Some savings could be found in the equipment programme. But to cut this too severely would have deprived the Army of the modern weapons which are essential to it if it is to remain a first-rate force. We, therefore, looked for savings in manpower, which represents the largest part of the Army's budget. Our solution was, therefore, to look at ways of streamlining the Army and of cutting overheads by cutting the need for them.

1209 The requirement for a reorganisation of the Army had, indeed, been recognised for some time, and we seized the opportunity to realise this in a comprehensive and logical manner. By our planned reorganisation, from divisional to unit level, the requirements of both economy and security will be met.

The principles on which the reorganisation is based are set out in the Statement on the Defence Estimates. The removal of a level of command and the increase in the span of command are complex proposals. In view of their importance, I should like to describe what they mean in some detail.

One British Corps currently commands three divisions, two artillery brigades and the corps troops. Each division has two brigades, each of four major units, armoured and infantry. The brigade level of command will be removed, but in order to avoid too many subordinates under one commander, changes will also be made at the divisional level. We shall in future have four armoured divisions, each rather smaller than the present three divisions, and a fifth field force consisting largely of infantry. By cutting out the brigade level of command, the number of major headquarters will be reduced from 12 to seven. Each of the new divisions will contain armoured and reconnaissance regiments, mechanised infantry battalions, and artillery and engineer support.

There will be five battle groups of armour and infantry, compared with four in the existing brigades. At unit level, there will be four squadrons in each armoured regiment, and four companies in each infantry battalion, instead of three. This will result in a substantial increase in the number of combat teams, and in fire-power. By cutting down the headquarters and increasing the teeth arms, we shall be making a significant improvement in operational capability.

Similar principles have also been applied to the United Kingdom Land Forces. The headquarters of 3 Division and 16 Parachute Brigade and a large part of their subordinate headquarters and support will be disbanded.

All district headquarters throughout the United Kingdom will take under command all the units in their boundaries, both regular and TAVR. But in three 1210 of the districts, East, South-East and South-West, we plan to organise these units so that they can form field forces. In South-East District, for example, there will be an airportable formation, equivalent to a reinforced brigade group. It will include the parachute capability which we undertook to maintain in the defence review. This formation, of about 10,000 men, will replace the United Kingdom Mobile Force. There will, as previously stated, be no reduction in our contribution to the ACE Mobile Force.

Another feature of the restructuring is the pooling of specialised tasks presently undertaken by different arms and corps. In future, responsibility for these will be taken on by one specific arm or one specific corps, thus reducing overheads. For example, long range anti-tank guided weapons will now become the responsibility of the Royal Artillery, instead of being held by both the RAC and the infantry as at present. Army helicopter support will be centralised in Army Air Corps units, and ground-based reconnaissance will be concentrated in the Royal Armoured Corps.

The reductions in manpower in headquarters and support areas will not involve corresponding reductions in weapons; the man-to-weapon ratio will thus be improved. The same number—and in some cases more—of front-line weapons and equipments, either in service now or planned to come into service, will be manned.

The Government are keenly aware of the importance of the regimental system to morale and of the general interest it inspires throughout the country. The Army reorganisation was, therefore, planned to have as little effect on regimental identities as possible. I am sure hon. Members on both sides of the House will share my pleasure in the knowledge that all cap-badged regiments in the Royal Armoured Corps and infantry, including the Parachute Regiment, will be retained in the future. In the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Corps of Signals, the Army Air Corps and the supporting services there will be some reduction in the overall number of units, but impact on the regimental structure will be kept to the absolute minimum. The changes which will be made are only those which are essential if the 1211 reorganisation of the Army is to be thorough and effective.

§ Mr. Churchill (Stretford)

The Minister has said that one of his guiding lights has been the need for maintaining a balance between security and economy. Will he say what possible advantage to either will be derived by the disbandment of the Gurkha Battalion in Brunei, which was at no expense whatsoever to the British taxpayer?

§ Mr. Brown

That disbandment, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is the subject of discussions which are taking place at present.

We have not yet been able to quantify in cash terms the precise savings which will accrue from these measures. But they will enable the overall strength of the Army to be reduced by about 15,000 men. That is approaching 10 per cent. of the total force. The resultant savings will be a significant measure towards fulfilling the manifesto on which we were elected as the Government.

§ Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath)

Will the Minister make it perfectly clear whether it is not the Government's intention to have a Quartermaster Corps? If the Royal Corps of Transport, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the REME are to be untouched, why are we not to have a Quartermaster Corps?

§ Mr. Brown

If the hon. Gentleman had been listening, I think he would have realised from what I said a short while ago that the existing Royal Corps of Signals and so on would stay largely as they were. There is no question in the Defence Review of a Quartermaster Corps.

§ Mr. Carol Mather (Esher)

The Minister has said that the Government have made no assessment of cash savings as a result of these economies but that they meant a saving of 15,000 men. What is the object of the exercise if there is no idea of what economies this will mean? The whole idea of these cuts was presumably to make economic savings.

§ Mr. Brown

I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would have been able to answer his own question. I am sure he knows that the biggest cost of any army, and certainly a regular professional 1212 army such as ours, is the cost of manpower. If there is a saving of 15,000 in manpower, there must be economic savings.

As I was saying, this pledge largely fulfils the commitment in our manifesto, particularly as we shall also be able to make proportional reductions in the number of civilians employed by the Army.

As the Defence White Paper explains, there will also be some reduction in our forces stationed outside Europe. But by means of the reorganisation we shall be able to continue to maintain our contribution to NATO of 55,000 troops on the mainland of Europe, in accordance with our treaty commitments. We shall make no reduction in this level in advance of mutual and balanced force reductions.

The aim of the restructuring has been to create a more cost-effective and streamlined field Army, with fewer overheads and a greater combat capability. When it is complete, we shall have a modern Army, geared to the requirements of the 1980s. As part of this, because BAOR would depend, of course, on its reinforcements to bring it to its war footing, we have sought to simplify and to improve the reinforcement process. Mobilisation will be more efficient and more rapid, and there will be a significant increase in the number of reinforcements available.

Within all this, the part played by the TAVR in maintaining the security of Britain will gain even more importance. As a result of the Defence Review, the TAVR will become more closely integrated with the Regular Army, to the advantage of both. It will continue its present rôle of reinforcing the Regular Army in defence of the United Kingdom and of the Continent, and TAVR units train to this end with the Regular Army. I believe that the integration of the TAVR within the new district command structure will lead not only to greater efficiency but also to improved morale. The men and women of this reserve will have a stronger sense of professionalism and of identity with their Regular counterparts.

It would, of course, be foolish to pretend that all is perfect in what is unfortunately an imperfect world. The final shape of the reorganisation will depend on the outcome of trials and exercises. But we do not believe that there 1213 will be any need for a major recasting of the model I have described. One cause for concern is the level of recruiting to the TAVR, which is still less than we would wish to see. However, I am confident that the TAVR, with its high standards of efficiency and dedication, is capable of meeting the tasks allotted to it.

Within the Regular Army I know that there is concern about redundancy. While the reductions in manpower will as far as possible be achieved by natural wastage, a measure of redundancy will be unavoidable. The scale of the restructuring makes it impossible to say at this point in time precisely who will be involved. Hon. Members will appreciate that there is a mass of fine detail being sifted as our overall proposals are realised.

§ Mr. John Lee (Birmingham, Handsworth)

If my hon. Friend cannot say much more about this, can he say over what period of time this contraction of 15,000 is expected to be achieved?

§ Mr. Brown

We would anticipate that in the case of the Army the redundancies would start towards the end of next year, and we would hope that the reductions would be over a period of about four years. I cannot say with any accuracy at this stage, but that is the time scale that we have in mind. However, I can say with conviction that the terms of redundancy set out in the White Paper are fair and that every effort will be made to assist those concerned in their return to civilian life.

The quality of life and the conditions of service of the soldier are matters of paramount importance, in which I take an extremely strong personal interest. Service men and their families, particularly when stationed overseas, are cut off not only from their relations and friends but often also from familiar entertainments and pastimes. In Germany especially, boredom presents a problem; however, as I was able to announce to the House earlier this year, plans to provide an English language television service for the British families in Germany are progressing extremely well.

By the end of the year a recorded service will be available for about eight hours a day to about 17,000 Service men and their families. By 1978, as far as is feasible, 1214 programmes will be transmitted to Germany simultaneously with their transmission in this country. Technical considerations, and also the time difference between this country and Germany for part of the year, may sometimes make simultaneous transmission impossible: but live items such as the news are likely always to be broadcast at the same time, and this will be a most welcome innovation and, in the Government's view, fully justifies its relatively small cost.

If we think in terms of defence costs overall, the capital cost of giving this service to Service men and their families in Germany of £8 million a year and running costs of £1 million a year are absolutely good value for money. I do not think anyone would dispute that.

§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)

The hon. Gentleman has talked about £8 million, but I gather that the cost of maintaining our force in the Eastern Mediterranean and east of Suez, is only three or four times that amount. Does he really think this dissemination of news is worth the sacrifice of that commitment?

§ Mr. Brown

This is an attitude one finds hard to understand. We on this side are criticised for cutting costs east of Suez, and on the other hand the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) seems to be taking a nigardly attitude on expenditure of £8 million to give some joy and satisfaction to Service men and their families on the Continent. It will be noted in other places.

We are aware that the substantial rise in house prices in recent years has caused a good deal of worry to Service men who have deferred house purchase until they leave the Services. We have, therefore, been pursuing a number of schemes designed to give Service men some assistance in this respect. We recently published improvements to the Resettlement Scheme whereby an interest-free advance of pay up to a maximum of six months' pay or £3,500, whichever is less, is made during the last two years of service. This loan is recoverable from the lump sum payable on retirement or discharge.

We have also introduced a new scheme from 1st April 1975 for Service men of 50 years of age or more. This scheme provides for an interest-free advance of a similar sum recoverable at an annual rate 1215 of 10 per cent, of the advance with any balance remaining on retirement from terminal benefits. As hon. Members are aware, special arrangements were recently introduced to enable members of the Services to vote in the referendum, irrespective of whether or not they were actually registered as electors here at home. This involved for the Service authorities a considerable task of planning and organisation; I am sure the House will wish me to recall that once again the Services have displayed their usual versatility in carrying through a quite unprecedented operation. Some 230,000 votes were cast by Service personnel and their wives entitled to vote under the special forces voting scheme. This represents about 60 per cent. of the total eligible and is roughly in line with the average of the United Kingdom. Possibly there is a message here in that there were soldiers, sailors and airmen who agree very much with their civilian counterparts, certainly when it comes to voting in a referendum.

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)

On this point, of course we would all agree with the tribute the hon. Gentleman has paid to the Services, but does he not think they should always vote on every occasion in General Elections, at least as much as their civilian counterparts?

§ Mr. Brown

I very much agree, and I am coming to that point. These arrangements reflected the Government's concern that only a small proportion of Service men and their wives who are qualified to have their names placed on the electoral roll as Service voters are actually so registered. The reasons for this unsatisfactory state of affairs have been fully explained recently by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force. I am conscious that the hon. and gallant Gentleman and his hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) in particular, who is not in his place, share the Government's concern in the matter, and, therefore, I take this opportunity to repeat that it is the intention of the Government to introduce, as early as the opportunity presents itself, legislation designed to improve the arrangements under which members of the Services and 1216 their wives may register as electors. Frankly, I am appalled at the small percentage of Service people who are eligible to vote, and I would like to see Service men and their wives, as in the referendum, completely on a par with their civilian counterparts in all elections.

§ Mr. Cranley Onslow (Woking)

I am sure that that concern is shared by the whole House. The Speaker's Conference and both sides of the House have welcomed very much the initiative which has been taken in this field by the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence, and we would certainly like to see it pressed forward. But cannot the Minister go further and give a positive undertaking that legislation will be introduced in the next Session, if it is not possible in this? Why should we need any longer?

§ Mr. Brown

I certainly cannot give a firm undertaking but I would hope that as soon as the Speaker's Conference gets under way the sooner we shall be able to get this legislation on the statute book. For too long it has been apparent that Service people have not been taking the opportunity open to them to register because of the obvious difficulties of which we know. I sincerely hone that we may see legislation in the next Session.

§ Mr. Onslow

I do not wish to press the hon. Gentleman but surely we do not need another Speaker's Conference on this. The work has already been done. All we need is the parliamentary draftsman to draw up a Bill.

§ Mr. Brown

The hon. Gentleman knows well enough that the parliamentary timetable is not a matter for me, but I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House will take note of this, and I will see that he is informed of the views that have been expressed during this debate.

§ Mr. Townsend

The Minister mentioned Service men's families. Will he take account of the case of dependants who are over the age of 18 but do not appear on registers? This should be carefully looked at.

§ Mr. Brown

I can give the hon. Gentleman the undertaking that I will have this question examined.

To turn now to a very different but equally important subject, I should like 1217 to say a few words about our forces in Northern Ireland.

There has been a general reduction in the Army's operations in the Province, particularly in the size and frequency of patrols, and in the scale of searching and questioning. However, intensified patrolling is continuing along the sectarian interface as part of our efforts to reduce sectarian violence. Hon. Members will, I know, agree with me that force levels in Northern Ireland should be kept as low as possible consistent with the job the Army has to do. Last year the situation in the Province made it possible to reduce the force level from 16 major units in the infantry rôle to 13. In April this year a further reduction was made. However, any further cuts in force levels in the Province must depend upon a lowering of the present level of violence.

Hon. Members will share my horror at the high level at which violence continues, much of it totally indiscriminate. While we do not believe that the Provisional IRA has been responsible for much of the bombing and shooting that has taken place during the past four months, others have taken their place. There have been more than 70 civilians killed since the cease-fire started.

The Army and the Ulster Defence Regiment continue to work in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the prevention of violence and in helping to bring to justice those responsible for the brutal crimes taking place. The task of combating violence in the conditions that exist in the Province is not an easy one. Although the number of incidents involving the Army has been greatly reduced since the cease-fire, maintaining a low level of operations can, as we all know, be an even greater strain on morale. During this period soldiers in the Province are continuing to carry out their duties with the same bravery, skill, and determination as have characterised their contribution throughout the emergency.

My own experience of visits to units in recent months has been that morale in the Army is high, nowhere more than in Northern Ireland. The recent pay award to the Armed Forces has demonstrated that the Government are concerned to be a fair employer. Recruiting 1218 has suffered none of the detrimental effects as a result of the defence review predicted by some Opposition critics. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that the changes in the Army consequent on the review have amply demonstrated that it is a vital organism capable of evolution, of adapting itself to new conditions. I firmly believe that Britain will continue in the 1980s to have a firm guarantee of its security, with field forces which for their capability and efficiency are the envy of many of our allies.

§ Mr. Philip Goodhart (Beckenham)

In the main debate on the Defence White Paper about six weeks ago there were many powerful criticisms of that document from the Opposition side of the House. At the end of the debate, many of my right hon. and hon. Friends nevertheless went into the Division Lobby to defend Ministers against the wrecking amendment being pressed by the Secretary of State's nominal Friends below the Gangway, one of whom is here again today. On that occasion the number of Conservative Members voting against the wrecking amendment was noticeably larger than the number of Labour Members who could be persuaded to support their Government.

Today we approach this debate on the Army with the same spirit of critical objectivity, in spite of the provocative remarks by the Minister of State, who has earned his promotion to the Privy Council on other occasions, about the termination of the Simonstown Agreement, a decision which can only add to our defence costs but which is more properly debated in depth on the Navy Estimates.

The policy for the redeployment and restructuring of the Army, which has been outlined in the White Paper and very clearly described by the Under-Secretary, whom we welcome to the Dispatch Box this afternoon, will clearly leave us with smaller and weaker forces than we had before. In at least one respect the Army is more fortunate or less grievously hurt than the other Services.

Well before Ministers embarked upon the elaborate charade known as the defence review, a thorough study of the Army's command structure and the fire 1219 support had begun. In most of the conflicts in which the British Army has been involved since the end of the Second World War—Palestine, even Korea, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Borneo, the number of trained men deployed has been more important than the amount of fire-power they could bring to bear. On the central front of NATO, however, it is plain that firepower is more important than manpower. We therefore plainly welcome any study, particularly one which started under a Conservative Government, which seeks to improve the proportion of weapons to men and the balance between headquarters and fighting units.

As a result of the planning which has been done, the Army has avoided—at least so far—the necessity of disbanding any cap-badged regiments, as the Under-Secretary reminded us, but the Secretary of State has frankly admitted that brigade headquarters would not have been cut in the way they have been had it not been for Treasury orders. Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver may have written some of the lyrics for this reorganisation, but it is the Treasury which has provided the tune.

Looking back to days that even I can remember in the Army, there were airborne divisions, armoured divisions and infantry divisions. They have all gone or are going, and the new formations which are taking their place should more properly be known as financial divisions. Certainly the shape and deployment of these financial divisions has been dictated by the size of our purse rather than the scale and scone of the threat which this country and its allies are facing.

In the debate on the White Paper, some of my hon. and gallant Friends have already pointed out certain of the risks in cutting out the brigade headquarters level of command. In these new divisional headquarters the planning time available to the commander has inevitably to be reduced as the headquarters becomes the focus for a flood of unfiltered and unchecked information. At a time when there is urgent talk about the need for co-operation with our allies, I note that this reorganisation of our command structure gets us increasingly out of step with the rest of our NATO partners. If these new divisions are to work, they must be 1220 equipped with a full range of highly sophisticated, high-speed, secure communications equipment. The chances of this essential equipment being provided by this Government are, however, almost nil. Indeed, procurement of this part of the Army's equipment has always lagged behind. I remember mentioning it in my maiden speech on the Army Estimates some 18 years ago.

At NATO headquarters recently I learned with some degree of horror that compatibility between the communications systems of the various armies operating on the central front of NATO will not be achieved for at least another 12 years. Meanwhile, we have grave fears for the safety of the present equipment programme of the Army.

The Secretary of State for Defence has again been disarmingly frank and made it plain that the only criticisms of the defence plans that really have any effect on this Government lie on the employment side. Ministers have clearly been impressed by the sight of angry shop stewards from aircraft factories rushing to Conservative Members to complain about the niggardly arms procurement and arms sales policy of this Socialist Government. The Government know that they will provoke a storm of criticism if they cut back still further on orders for combat aircraft, for every one of these contracts has considerable political, employment and economic sex appeal.

We know that the employment position in our shipyards is likely to deteriorate still further with the world surplus of shipping. Therefore, any attempt to cancel or to roll back our remaining shipbuilding programme for the Royal Navy is likely to provoke yet another storm of opposition from the shop stewards and the trades unions.

The procurement programme for the Army is spread over a wide range of equipment which lacks much glamour. We have seen demonstrators trying to save the Buccaneer and the Harrier. It is much more difficult to imagine demonstrators marching up and down Whitehall shouting slogans such as "Save the Ptarmigan Trunk Communications System". We therefore suspect that the Army will be asked to bear an undue proportion of the extra £110 million defence cut that so recently made nonsense of the defence review. We suspect 1221 that the Army will always be in the front line and most at risk when it comes to coping with any future economies.

§ Mr. Emlyn Hooson (Montgomery)

I have not followed the hon. Gentleman's reasoning. Does he believe that the Government should give way to the demonstrations, when surely the great need in this country and in the rest of Europe is for a standardisation of weapons? Surely any demonstration by a particular lobby in this country must be put in the context of the great and crying need in NATO for standardisation.

§ Mr. Goodhart

I find it difficult to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman's comments, because whether a single contract goes forward has nothing to do with standardisation. A decision about standardisation comes at a much earlier stage, the design or ordering stage of the weapon concerned.

§ Mr. Neville Sandelson (Hayes and Harlington)

An important point was raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman but the reply he has received is not yet adequate. Surely the hon. Gentleman appreciates that with standardisation of equipment as between the NATO partners some countries will lose out on some contracts. Clearly, this will affect the production of a particular piece of equipment in British plant. Will the hon. Gentleman elaborate on Conservative views about reciprocity as between the various allies and partners in NATO?

§ Mr. Goodhart

I begin to see the point of the question, which I must admit I failed to appreciate from the question by the hon. and learned Gentleman, because the matter was entirely off the point that I was making. The question is not whether one will order equipment which is standardised. Planned wireless sets and the Ptarmigan Trunk Communications System have a high degree of compatibility. The question at issue with these cuts is whether those systems will be ordered at all and not whether they are standardised. If we do not have a wireless set it does not matter whether it is standardised. We are talking about absolute cuts.

Some of us are critical of the whole concept of directing all our efforts to the central front where there is already a heavy concentration of men and weapons. 1222 It seems to some of us that the threat is greatest on the flanks of NATO, and that the Soviet Union and her friends are likely to probe most vigorously where we are weakest.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), in the defence debate referred in a telling phrase to the Soviet Union as being "soft underbelly men". By cutting our United Kingdom mobile reserves and by cutting the airportable brigades from three to one, Ministers have helped to make the soft underbelly just a little bit softer. Our ability to reinforce the flanks is much reduced.

The Under-Secretary has said that we are to keep the Parachute Regiment. Can he confirm that we are to keep the three battalions of the regiment?

As I understand it—and the Under-Secretary touched on this point—the units of the airportable brigades are to be redeployed under the command of home districts. The argument is that this will make the home districts more mobile-minded. The Americans have an expression which they use when faced with an argument which is inherently improbable; namely, "Go tell it to the Marines". Perhaps our equivalent expression, when faced with the improbable argument that redeploying some of the airportable units back under the districts will make the districts more mobile-minded, should be "Tell it to the air-portable brigade".

My hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin) hopes later to talk in greater detail about the sorry state of our Reserves position. I hope that the Government will be particularly slow in disrupting the United Kingdom Mobile Force so that after the next General Election other ministerial eyes may still have time to review the situation.

During the past five years the Army overseas has had to reinforce the home front in Northern Ireland. Although a sort of cease-fire has reduced the casualty rate among our forces, clearly the scope and nature of the rôle of the Army in Northern Ireland must continue to play a major part in any debate on the Army. Since the Army first took up an operational rôle in Northern Ireland, no fewer that 279 of our Service men have been 1223 killed. Ninety-eight of them have died since we last had a full debate on the Army, in April 1973. During the past five years service in Northern Ireland has often been dangerous and uncomfortable I know that Ministers are anxious to do what they can for the comfort of the troops. I hope for an assurance that they will not relax their efforts on behalf of the troops. When the immediate danger seems to recede, one becomes more rather than less conscious of the discomfort. There are those of us who fear that the IRA is using the cease-fire to rest, regroup and rearm. The level of violence could escalate with great rapidity.

Of course, we want to be able to reduce the size of our forces in Northern Ireland. We are glad that the Under-Secretary has been able to spell that out in some detail. So long as our forces are subjected to the over strain of too frequent emergency tours in Northern Ireland, the terrorists can feel that they are having some success. It is wrong militarily, and bad from every point of view, to continue to use soldiers in a purely police role. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the Northern Ireland political leaders to reach agreement on their future policing arrangements. One such agreement has been reached, the police should be given wholehearted support and so enabled to carry out their duties throughout the community in sufficient strength.

Then there is the rôle of the Ulster Defence Regiment. The calamitous raid on the Ulster Defence Regiment armoury the other night should not blind us to the fact that night after night thousands of Ulster citizens are prepared to undertake arduous and sometimes dangerous work for the whole community. With a prolonged period of semi-cease-fire, the nature of the strain on the Ulster Defence Regiment is changed. What study is being made of the long-term rôle of the regiment, particularly in a "no-peace, no-war" situation?

Whatever interpretation we may put on the recent armoury raid, the raid underlines the fact that a United Kingdom military presence in Northern Ireland will be needed for a long time. I deplore the rumours of premature withdrawal of the Army from Northern Ireland. I am prepared to accuse this Government of 1224 stupidity, and even of Socialism, but I do not believe that they would deliberately refuse to carry out the first responsibility of any State, which is to protect its citizens in their own homes. Ministers have only themselves to blame if doubts persist. Yesterday my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) asked, as is his wont, a wholly helpful question: is it not the case that the Government are resolved, whatever may be said to the contrary, that our forces shall continue in support of the civil power until normal policing by the RUC throughout the Province is possible? The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland replied: Yes, Sir."—[Official Report, 16th June, 1975; Vol. 893, c. 958.] If only he had left it at that, all would have been well, but he rambled on, leaving loopholes for those who want to find them. I respect the right hon. Gentleman's good faith in this matter, but I wish that one of the Ministers on the Government Front Bench could persuade him at least sometimes to give rather shorter answers.

I hope that the Under-Secretary will have noted the irritation aroused among members of the general public and the Armed Forces, in particular, when it seems that the next-of-kin of suspected terrorists who have been killed receive larger compensation payments than the dependants of Service men who have been killed in Northern Ireland. I am glad that in response to our prodding the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, has set up a review of the operation of the Criminal Injuries to Persons (Compensation) Act (Northern Ireland) 1968. I hope that the Under-Secretary can tell us how far the review has gone, and when we may expect a final report.

I concede that Ministers are in a difficult position. If they are too generous, others who have been injured or bereaved in earlier conflicts will ask, with increasing force, "What about us?" But, as all the available cash appears to be earmarked for unwanted schemes of nationalisation, Service pensioners must, alas, wait. Like other pensioners, the Service pensioners are particularly vulnerable to inflation. We do not expect this Government to be able to match the record of 1225 real improvement set by the last Conservative administration. I freely admit that we left an overly complicated scheme behind us. Not many months ago the Officers' Pension Society found that the Ministry of Defence was calculating the pension of a substantial group of pensioners on the wrong basis. If the Ministry cannot understand its own system, what hope have the rest of us? Are plans being made to simplify the system at the earliest opportunity?

As the Under-Secretary has reminded us, the proposed cuts will make 15,000 soldiers redundant. Most of them will become premature pensioners, and the career structure for everyone else will be adversely affected. Many of those made redundant will be senior NCOs and middle-rank officers. The somewhat meagre compensation terms are set out in Annex H of the defence review.

Many of those affected will also have housing problems. Housing help for ex-Service men is dealt with by Circular 54/75 of the Department of the Environment, published on 9th June, one of the smuggest and most inadequate circulars that I have ever seen. Is it really the last word on housing assistance to those soldiers whose careers are being cut short? There is a fractional improvement in the assisted house purchase scheme. Will the Under-Secretary of State look at the scheme again both on a short-term and a long-term basis? For example, what consideration is being given to the establishment of a Services' building society?

Inevitably, as we go over the Estimates a gloomy story is unfolded, a story of retreat and of cutting back. The alliance has clearly gone through great strains in the past few months. As the Secretary of State for Defence—whom we hope to see some time in our defence debates—is in the United States at an important conference, it might perhaps be appropriate for me to close with a quotation from a speech made by the President of the United States on his return from a NATO meeting in Europe, when he said: An adequate level of defence is going to cost us something. But the price of sacrifice is far less than the price of failure. Freedom is never free; but without freedom, nothing else has value … We will honour our commitments … We will do our duty. 1226 Those are the words of President Ford. I just wish that we had a Government who would honour their commitments and do their duty.

§ Mr. James Tinn (Redcar)

The Opposition demand cuts in Government expenditure, yet when we specifically tackle that problem in a responsible way they criticise the Government for jeopardising the security of the country and the future of Service men. It must be more than a little trying for my ministerial colleagues, accustomed though they are to this exercise and to being criticised by some of my hon. Friends from the opposite standpoint. Some of my hon. Friends feel sincerely that the Government have not gone far enough in reducing the burden of defence expenditure. I have more sympathy with my hon. Friends who take that view than I have with the Opposition, because it is consistent with their general line of argument on other matters and is a view that they have sincerely held for a long time.

One of my principal reasons for intervening in the debate is to stress that I do not share that point of view. The very fact that the Government are criticised for cutting defence expenditure too quickly and too much and at the same time are criticised for not moving fast enough in that direction is probably a fair indication that the Government are getting the balance about right. It is a difficult balance to strike, but I am impressed that the Government have taken steps in foreign affairs as well as in defence after careful study so to adjust our commitments as to make possible reductions in expenditure. They have reduced in step our commitments and our defence burdens to take account of the country's financial and economic problems.

We cannot go on indefinitely carrying a heavier defence burden than anyone else. Neither can we—and in this I agree with the Opposition—so rapidly cut back our defences as to throw them out of gear and risk weakening our contribution to NATO.

Détente, which we hope will continue, does not make defence any the less necessary. Détente has come about precisely because the Western Alliance has maintained a credible, realistic posture. There 1227 are no signs that the Warsaw Pact countries feel that the improved political climate between East and West, which we all welcome and trust will continue to improve, justifies a reduction in their military commitments. Until they do, we cannot afford to take undue risks. I assure the Minister and his colleagues of my support, and I am sure that the support of my parliamentary colleagues will be expressed in the Lobby on this and other occasions. At the same time, we have respect for the minority who take a different view.

I turn to the more specialised problem of the harmonisation of equipment and communications. The Western Alliance suffers a tremendous disadvantage in having 14 separate national Ministries of Defence. That system inevitably produces a much less co-ordinated and a much less unified result than is achieved by the Warsaw Pact countries. We have a multiplicity of tanks produced by various member States, as against the Russian provision for the Warsaw Pact countries. Failure to standardise leads to many considerable disadvantages and complicates the problems of logistics.

I understand that a measure of progress was made towards standardisation with the Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft gun, but subsequent to its introduction the gun has been so modified and "improved" by the various member countries that now the ammunition is no longer interchangeable between the models used by one country and another. So we have the absurdity that our troops using this gun in Germany require British ammunition for the gun which cannot be readily supplied from German sources. That obviously leads to duplication and inefficiency.

The lack of standardisation means also that the general servicing back-up is more complicated, and there are problems of transport and communications. We still lack sufficient standardisation in our communications both in technology and, I suspect, in our procedures. I understand that the general lack of standardisation has continued seriously to impair the efficiency of the NATO forces. It has been said that the forces on the ground in Europe which would be required to meet any first military action would be 1228 rendered largely ineffective, even on the basis of exercises which have been planned months in advance, because of the problems of standardisation with which we have not grappled successfully.

A considerable element in the general problem of standardisation is the preponderance of the United States defence industry and the refusal of the United States to allow its armed forces to be supplied by the allied nations. That has led to the present situation in which Europe buys from the United States 10 times as much as it sells.

The United States at least has the advantage of a trend towards standardisation, but it is clear that we cannot continue to buy from the United States at that ratio. I hope that the proposed relaxation by America, to which my right hon. Friend referred recently, will be realised. That will enable us to achieve a better balance of arms sales between the nations of the Western Alliance and the United States. If such a balance can be achieved, we shall see in practical terms the greater standardisation which we need so much

§ Mr. Neville Trotter (Tynemouth)

This debate takes place against the background of what I think many of my hon. Friends must feel to have been one of the saddest statements ever made in the House—namely, when the Secretary of State for Defence pointed out that the Germans are nearly twice as well off as we are and that our defence spending must take that into account. I feel that that statement did not receive the thought that it deserved at the time that it was made in view of its reflection on our general economic condition.

The hon. Member for Redcar (Mr. Tinn) referred to the need to cut our commitments. I suggest that it is impossible to cut the commitment of defence. No Government can cut the commitment of defending our country and our way of life. I accept that it has been possible to reduce our presence in Singapore, and our presence in the Far East is now minute, but it seems that we are now engaged on cutting the main core of the defence of this country.

§ Mr. Tinn

The hon. Gentleman will recall that all the cuts which have been made all over the world by earlier 1229 Labour Governments, many of which were far from considerable, have been opposed by his right hon. and hon. Friends. When are they to give us the support that we need? None of us is saying that we can jeopardise the security of this country, but we cannot continue to carry the burdens of other people apart from our Western Allies.

§ Mr. Trotter

We are talking about cuts in the main defences of Britain in Europe. We have been told that the heavier burdens cannot be borne by Britain, but there is no suggestion that we cut back our education system or our social service system because of the heavier burdens. I would say that defence is at least as high a priority as education or social services to all right-minded persons.

We have seen continued evasion as regards Brunei. It seems that we still do not know whether or not we shall stay in Brunei. Of course, there is no cost to the taxpayer if we stay there. The suggestion to come out of Brunei has been raised only as a matter of dogma. Unfortunately, that dogma has clouded the whole of the Government's approach to this major defence review.

Some time ago—after the war and at the time of Korea—we saw no less than 25 per cent. of Government spending going on defence. Today that spending is down to 10 per cent., and it is to be reduced still further. I cannot accept that the world is less dangerous now than it has been since the war. If we look around us we can see that we now live in a more dangerous world. I do not believe that this country can allow its defences to be reduced.

The country can count upon the calibre and moral of the men in the forces but we cannot expect them to do the impossible. We must remember that quantity counts as well as quality in terms of the Army and of the other Armed Forces. We have been told that there is to be a cut, as the Under-Secretary of State put it, of approximately one man in 10 in the Army. We are told that this cut is not to be in Germany but that the Army there is to be completely reorganised. Why are we committed to this reorganisation before any practical trials have been carried out to see whether the scheme will work? It may be that at the end of the day we shall have a better organi- 1230 sation in Germany. I hope that s the case, but how do we know that it will work?

Those who took part in the parliamentary visit to Germany this year were told that by scraping together units from every corner of Germany there was to be an attempt to try out the new divisional concept of reorganisation in the autumn of this year. Surely it would have been more sensible to have had that trial first before committing ourselves.

It seems that the decision has been made that the manpower cuts are to take place in the United Kingdom. Comment has already been made about the lack of operational headquarters. The Under-Secretary of State took credit for removing one level of command. What is the good of infantry units or any other units if there are no effective operational command headquarters? We cannot take the headquarters of the South-Eastern District and remove it to somewhere in Europe. The concept of command headquarters having two roles is no good for the future of the Army.

One detailed point that I hope the Minister can explain is why in the one remaining brigade group or field force, whatever it is to be called, two out of the five battalions are to be Territorials. Why should they not all be Regulars? Surely there are plenty of other roles for the Territorials without having to put them in the one remaining brigade group. It should be a sobering day for this country when the Under-Secretary of State tells us that the whole of the organised operational Reserve of the British Army consists of one brigade group. That is an incredible state of affairs to announce.

I believe, in fact, that the Government do not know in any detail how the review of the Army's strength is to proceed. They have been told that the Army must save x millions of pounds, and on that basis they have thought of some figures. Originally we were told that the savings were to amount to 12,000 men, but now they are to be nearly 15,000 men. Not so long ago the Secretary of State was using a figure of 18,000. There is considerable uncertainty as to how many people will be made redundant and what reductions are to take place. How can we have any confidence that the result 1231 will make sense if it is arrived at by this extraordinary method?

I believe that it is foolish to cut the Army, but if that decision has been made, there is a choice between whether we should continue at the same level of presence on the central front or should maintain a rôle on the southern front. The central front is generally regarded as being the most stable front in NATO. Both sides know that if a catastrophe were to start there, within a short time they would be engaged in a nuclear war. That would happen within a matter of a few days, or possibly even within a few hours.

On the other hand, on the southern flank the whole area is in a state of instability. The NATO Ministers have only recently expressed disquiet at this instability and have called for special vigilance by the allies. But the "special vigilance" that we are showing is to withdraw from that flank altogether. The commander-in-chief of NATO's southern flank recently said in London, not a quarter of a mile from this building, that our presence in the Mediterrarean area is essential not only for military reasons but for political reasons, to bring stability to an area where at present there is growing doubt about the future.

Let us look for a moment at the state of the British Army in Germany. I am sure that we would all wish to pay tribute to the high standard of the men. They are professionals. Because of the courtesy of the Under-Secretary, I was able to visit my local infantry regiment in Northern Ireland. I spent a weekend with that unit, and I can underline the fact that those men are professionals. There is nothing wrong in any way with the calibre of the men, but the Army in Germany is in very poor shape. I do not know whether the House or the people of this country fully appreciate that this is so.

For historical reasons the Army in Germany finds itself in the places where it ended up at the end of the war, often because that was where the old German barracks were situated. Its location bears no resemblance to the plan of operations should it ever have to go into action. It is restricted in its use of equipment. For example, the number of miles run by its tanks is limited by economic considera- 1232 tions and by shortage of spares. A large number of units ostensibly in Germany are not there at all. They are in Northern Ireland or in Cyprus, or they are preparing to go to Northern Ireland or have just been there and are on leave or retraining for their European rôle. A visit to Northern Ireland may be good for the training of the individual infantry man, but it is bad for his unit's training in the rôle of an armoured engagement in central Europe.

We find in Germany second-generation battalion commanders who have never taken part in an exercise with troops at a level higher than that or their own battalion. That is an incredible situation in an Army faced with the army of the Soviet Union.

My opinion—it may not be the opinion of all my Conservative colleagues—is that if a choice had to be made it would have been wiser to have gone for a smaller but a really effective contingent in Germany—say, one full-strength NATO division of three brigades. We could give it all it needed, place it in the right positions, provide it with full equipment and let it use that equipment and exercise itself without limit and be fully trained and ready for its role. Would that not be better than the larger but ineffective contribution which the Army is in danger of making at the moment? The remaining units so saved could have been used in a contained reinforcement rôle on the southern front.

I appreciate that the Government have decided to cut the transport force of the Royal Air Force, but I suggest that greater use could be made of civil aircraft, as has been done by the United States army and air force. I suggest that for this rôle on the southern flank less would need to be spent on Army equipment. The forces concerned could be equipped to a lighter and lower level with less need for tanks and other heavy equipment. With the limited funds which the Government have decided to spend on the Army, this plan would, I suggest, give better value. Furthermore, these units would be better suited for a secondary rôle in Northern Ireland and their periodic absence in Northern Ireland would have less effect on their efficiency.

Let us look at the equipment of the Army. It is revealing that, following 1233 what has been called the most stringent defence review of all time, no new equipment at all appears to be in the pipeline. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that to be the true state of affairs—that there is nothing in the Estimates that was not already in train. Furthermore, there are harmful cuts being made in many directions—for example, the RS80 is to be cancelled while the Soviet Union is known to have doubled the number of its own similar long-range rocket weapon. The Vixen is cancelled. Instead there will be Ferrets continuing in use until they are up to 30 years of age. One must wonder whether the maintenance involved in running 30-year-old vehicles is not greater than the cost of replacing them with more modern and effective vehicles.

The most worrying feature of the equipment situation concerns the supply of ammunition. I hope that the Minister will find time to say a few words on this topic. In the Defence White Paper ammunition is included in the category of items to be reduced in number, postponed or cancelled. Does the House fully appreciate that owing to the additional practice required by infantry regiments going to Northern Ireland we ran out of certain types of ammunition? I understand that we had to import ammunition from Belgium. This may be possible in peace time, but what happens in time of war, when the Belgiums will require all their own ammunition? I hope the Minister can say that something is being done to increase our preparedness in this direction, because without ammunition the Army is helpless.

I shall end by repeating that the country cannot expect too much of the men in the Army. They will, of course, do their best but they are too thin on the ground. The cuts have gone beyond the degree that is acceptable. We have now reached the stage when we are cutting into the main defences of Great Britain. We are reducing the reserves of this great country to one brigade group, and that has gone beyond all reasonable bounds.

§ Mr. Iain MacCormick (Argyll)

Until a few moment ago nothing had been said to give me much of an excuse to take part in this debate. However, I admired 1234 the speech of the hon. Member for Tyne-mouth (Mr. Trotter), who made some good points. I was also impressed by several speeches made on 7th May, when the House debated defence details. On that occasion my hon. Friend the Member for Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire (Mr. Reid) said that the Scottish National Party was fully behind the concept of NATO as an alliance which would defend the free and civilised Western world. That goes without saying.

I wish to refer to a speech in that debate which was of great significance—namely, the speech made by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell). Speaking of the British Army's rôle as it is at present understood by military and political experts, the right hon. Gentleman said: It is to delay the moment when we are faced with the choice of surrender or the use of nuclear weapons. The choice of surrender or suicide! I do not like that sort of choice. I do not want to have a choice between surrender and putting the pistol to my head. I think that there is a general acceptance of various expert views of the present state of defence in this country which tend to be tied to what Governments feel about spending in a given military situation. Much of the speeches in that debate six weeks ago related to the impossibility of saying what was the ideal amount of money to spend on defence. It is difficult to give an ideal amount.

Remarks such as those can lead us to other conclusions. Later in his speech on that day the right hon. Member for Down, South went on to speak about the sort of Army he saw as being the best means of defence of these islands. He said: The army which this country needs is not the conscript army of the nations of the Continent but the cadre army where, in every rank, men are ready to occupy two or three ranks above; an army—and this applies to a lesser extent to the other forces—which is an élite, in the sense that a cadre is an êlite. He went on: If our Army is not a regular force which will march away, with a few details added, and either be obliterated or win, if it is the cadre for a future army, there is every reason why as much as possible of that cadre, and as large a cadre as possible, should be civilian."— [Official Report, 7th May 1975; Vol. 891. cc. 1490, 1492.] There is much more to what the right hon. Gentleman said on that occasion 1235 than is now envisaged by either side in the plans and policies which they are developing for the defence of this country.

I was interested in the remarks made by the Under-Secretary in opening the debate. I took no exception to some of his remarks. I was pleased when he spoke of the importance of the regimental system. How could any hon. Member representing Argyll be anything other than pleased to hear in this context mention of retaining the regimental system?

The Under-Secretary also spoke of the part being played by the TAVR. He spoke of its becoming more important. I wonder whether, in the context of the quotation I have just made, people fully appreciate the contribution which the TAVR should be making at present. I am not happy about the present situation. Nor am I happy with the concept of the TAVR being regarded as a force to be used to reinforce Regular units if war breaks out. Anyone taking that view is thinking on far too small a scale. If we are ever to fight a war which will involve infantry units and armoured corps units, we must think in terms of far greater numbers of people than comprise the Regular Army and the TAVR.

I cannot claim to have served in the Regular Army. However, I had the great pleasure and privilege of serving for 10 years in a yeomanry regiment. It was very sad that a few weeks ago we went to Edinburgh to lay up the guidon of the Queen's Own Lowland Yeomanry. That marked the end of a body of people which had existed for 200 years. Those people were able to give a talented dimension to the defence of this country.

The TAVR regiments include, not only amongst their officers but also amongst their men, a wide and diverse range of experience.

I have always appreciated that it was vitally important that we should not create within our area a military corps of the type which exists abroad. We have always managed to relate the Army and the other Services closely with the people of the country. One of the dangers of the present situation is that we might create a Regular Army which is so specialised and so divorced from every day contact with ordinary people that 1236 it will be totally apart and develop in its own way. Apart from those dangers, it is surely undesirable for us to remove so many possibilities of appointments and promotions which are always inherent in a situation where the Regular forces work closely with what used to be the Territorial Army and what is now the TAVR.

I shall direct my remarks chiefly to the existence of the citizen force which I believe should exist. It has a direct rôle to play in the defence of the country and an important social role. I live in Oban, which is a small town in the Western Highlands, where there has always been an infantry company or a Royal Artillery battery. Now there is nothing there. An important way in which the young people in that town could identify themselves with the common good has been removed, with unfortunate consequences.

I wish to make the following recommendation to the Secretary of State for Defence. In the present situation there is a great deal to be said for looking carefully into the rôle of the volunteer forces in this country, with a view to restoring to them the most important rôle which they used to play.

§ Mr. Richard Crawshaw (Liverpool, Toxteth)

It was not my intention to speak in this debate. However, as there are not many Government supporters present, I welcome this opportunity to make a contribution.

It is unfortunate that the Government are being criticised by hon. Members on both sides. I feel that the Government have made a good job in difficult circumstances. However, I am concerned that those Labour Members of Parliament who always feel that any money spent on defence is a waste are not here. I am beginning to think that the Minister made more expenditure cuts than I had thought. However, some of my hon. Friends do not speak in terms of defence. They speak in terms of getting rid of all defence. We are not talking on the same wavelength.

I wish to speak about the basic strategy of our defence forces and how they are to be regulated and formed. I am worried about one matter. If the Conservative Party were in power and had received 1237 a Treasury brief to cut £X millions from the Defence Estimates, it would have made those cuts and brought forward a programme which it would say would work adequately since it had received the backing of the Army Council, and so on. Therefore it does not behove the Opposition to criticise the Government for bringing forward similar proposals. Before the last two General Elections the Conservative Government made considerable cuts in defence expenditure. When that happens it cuts the ground away from people who, like myself, try to speak up for the armed forces as against those who wish to make cuts in expenditure on the armed forces. We must make the best of a difficult situation.

I was impressed with what the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) said. I am not certain whether we are spending money to the best advantage. We are told that the strategy is based on the fact that our Regular forces in Europe are to hold a Warsaw Pact assault course, whilst negotiations take place, pending the use of tactical and atomic weapons—which we hope will not occur. If that is the strategy, what is the purpose of our highly mobile forces in Germany? Where will they go? What is their purpose?

The hon. Member for Tynemouth put his finger on the point. The troops are not where they should be. They will have to be moved. Is it realistic to expect any Government at a moment of tension to move those forces 100 or 200 miles forward towards the Warsaw Pact countries? Would anyone be able to make that political decision at a moment of tension? If that is that case, I cannot see the purpose of stationing highly mobile forces in Germany. If the forces are not to be moved forward I should have thought that we could have positioned our defences where the forces are now situated.

We do not need highly mobile forces to hold on while negotiations take place. The Battle of the Bulge was won by forces who held their ground. Have we not reached a stage—shown in the last Middle East war—when highly sophisticated weapons are capable of defeating assaults by tanks and aircraft? If our strategy of a holding war is correct, I believe that we could carry it out with even fewer men than we are putting into 1238 Germany now. But this is not likely to happen. When the Defence Department is told that it has to cut so many millions of pounds from the Defence Estimates, who does the cutting? Is it the Secretary of State who looks through the strategic plan of NATO and says "We do not need so many of these or of those," or is it the higher officers of the Services who say "We will make the plan and give it to you."?

I have taken part in reorganisations of the Reserve forces. I know that on such occasions vested interests count for a great deal. It is only natural that when cuts have to be made people seek to ensure that they are made in some unit other than the one with which they are concerned. The result is that there is a lot of horse-trading and the final product does not resemble a defence structure. I saw it happen in the 1950s with the Territorial Army, when it was a case of either the Territorials or the Regular Army being cut.

In the event, the Reserve Army was cut down so that Regular units could be preserved. Did this give us a proper defence force? I disagree with the basic strategy of a holding force while negotiations take place—the policy of surrendering or putting a pistol to one's head. I believe that it would be possible it would mean a citizens' army—to think on different lines without any great manpower expenditure. There would be financial expenditure because, while reserve forces do not cost much in terms of maintenance, they cost a great deal in terms of the equipment which must be provided. We must be careful that we do not end up with forces which are incapable of doing the job for which they are required.

It is generally agreed that the last thing the Warsaw Pact countries want is a direct confrontation with NATO. What is most likely to happen is that there will be some country in Europe which will seek to free itself from the Warsaw Pact. I understand that there is a nodding agreement that we will not interfere in such a situation. What happens in the case of a country like Yugoslavia? When Marshal Tito dies, there is not the slightest doubt that certain people will seek to overthrow whatever Government is subsequently established there. 1239 It is not unlikely that countries bordering Hungary will send in troops to help the guerrillas there. Over a period of six to 18 months there is the possibility of a conflict building up.

What can we do about that'? Nothing. This is because all our reserve forces are committed to building up and patching up our Regular Army. This is a fatal flaw in our defences. It leaves us with the possibility of accepting defeat or mutual suicide. Neither of those courses recommends itself to me. People say that those in authority must know this and that they would not allow such a thing to happen. We have only to read General Percival's book on Singapore to know that, while people in this House were talking of sending reinforcements to Singapore, the generals knew, and had known for years beforehand, that they would never be able to hold Singapore if the attack came from a certain direction. That was because the money and the equipment were not available.

All too often, our armed forces have had to bear the brunt of the decisions of those who have taken the easy option at the Dispatch Box. I do not criticise my hon. and right hon. Friends. They are carrying out their job well. I congratulate them in that they have managed, despite the opposition of many of my hon. Friends, to maintain a defence force that makes some sense, although it may not be complete sense.

I was a little disappointed to hear the reasons given for pulling out of Simonstown. I have always hoped that the defences of this country would be adequate. I have been in this place for 11 years, and I began my stay here by saying that we had commitments worldwide which were weakening us while our main defence effort lay in Europe. I stressed the importance of bringing our troops back into Europe. I cannot, therefore, be accused of being an empire builder.

I do not pass judgment on this, but it was unfortunate that it should be said, as an excuse for pulling out, that Simonstown was of no further use and then to add that it was a political liability. We might have appeared in a better light morally if we had accepted one or the other situation earlier rather than accepting the political liability when it served 1240 our purpose and then throwing it overboard when it was of no further use to us. It is unfortunate that that phrase was used.

All too often over generations one side of the House has condemned the other for what it has done in defence affairs. The people who promulgated policy from the Dispatch Box often knew that it did not make sense but they had to put such policies forward because of financial restrictions. Is it beyond the wit of man to devise some scheme whereby we can determine what is the best use to be made of our forces and how best they can be maintained without bringing the issue into the area of party politics?

I am certain that all of us here today are concerned solely with the maintenance of our country's defence. I look forward to the day when we can discuss these matters in private, all-party committees, when estimates and strategic and tactical considerations can be examined. We talk about a war for which we are preparing lasting 14 or 15 days. Yet we still spend millions of pounds on maintaining submarines. Why? I am not talking about nuclear submarines. How does that policy fit in with the 14 or 15 days' war? I do not say that we should get rid of these submarines, but let us look at the situation and make sense of it.

Either we are preparing for that kind of war, which I do not believe is the sort of war for which we ought to be preparing, or we are preparing for something which will provide us with sufficient safeguards in the event of a miscalculation by the Warsaw Pact countries. That can be done only by building up reserve forces here, not by having all our reserve forces committed to plugging the gaps in the Regular Army. That reserve force must be able to fulfil the task which it has fulfilled in previous generations—to form the nucleus of a larger Army, should that unfortunate day ever arise.

§ Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay)

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw) has raised a number of extremely valuable and important points, and I hope that the Minister, when he replies, will provide answers at least to some of them. I wish that I had more time in which to comment on more than one or two of them. 1241 The hon. Member has enabled me to shorten my speech by stressing the need for an independent Territorial Army on a very considerable scale at home. There is an increasing appreciation of the fact that this is a basic lack in our whole defence thinking today.

In regard to planning for a particular sort of war, the hon. Member and I both lived through a war which, according to authoritative prognostications, could not possibly last six months. The awful thing is that very rarely do such events match up to expectations, therefore I do not think we can wholly support the concept of a 14-day war, a six months' war or a year's war. I am as incapable as everyone else of looking into a crystal glass and predicting how any war will develop.

On the question of a large Territorial Army, able to operate effectively, not just filling gaps in a regular force, I am in 100 per cent. agreement with the hon. Gentleman and with the preceding speaker.

The hon. Member for Redcar (Mr. Tinny, who opened the debate, and who always makes his jibes in a very gentlemanly manner, teased Conservative Members once again by saying that we are always urging cuts in Government expenditure but always refuse to consider them—at least from the back benches—when the defence forces are involved. This comment had been made in a less pleasant way when I tried to reply to it from below the Gangway in an earlier defence debate but failed to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker. I make a very real distinction, as do a number of my hon. Friends, between expenditure on defence forces, involving our security, and every other call on our resources. I am not ashamed to say so, and have always said so both here and elsewhere.

I refuse to believe that it is right or proper to say that we have a national cake, with so much available for roads, schools and hospitals, and so much for national security. This is a completely fallacious argument. The same applies to the gross national product in terms of this or that percentage. Again, it is an equally fallacious argument to say that because other countries are not doing their part in regard to security, 1242 we should not do ours, either. To be logical, we should say that, precisely because other countries are not doing their part we, if we are to look after our security, ought to do even more. That is the way in which we should look at it.

A country considering itself to be under any form of threat, present or future, does not divide the cake as between roads, hospitals and security. It asks, first, what is needed to safeguard it, and then what can be spent on everything else. It would be nonsense to suggest that the Israeli Cabinet first works out how much is needed for this or that and then finds that there is a bit left for defence. The same applies to Turkey, to Pakistan, and to any country believing itself to be under a threat. Any such country first of all allocates whatever resources are needed to keep itself free and alive as a nation, and then decides how to allocate the remainder of its resources.

Let it not be said further, as a criticism for us to refute, that we in the Conservative Party draw a distinction between defence and other considerations. We do make this distinction, and I am proud to do so and will go on doing so.

§ Mr. Tinn

At the same time, I think the hon. Member wrongs us if he assumes that we give any lower priority to defence. We recognise the primacy of defence as an obligation of Government. On our side we would welcome more instances from his party concerning those areas of Government expenditure in regard to which they are prepared to support any cuts.

§ Sir F. Bennett

I am fully prepared to do so. It would, however, be out of order to attempt to do so today. In addition, I should have to speak for far too long. I shall do so whenever the opportunity offers itself. But the hon. Member condemned himself even further, in my eyes, by saying that the Labour Party does not give defence a lower priority. This is exactly what I am trying to point out. I do not want to have an equal priority given to defence and other matters; I want a much higher priority to be given to defence. I am not in any way encouraged by the hon. Gentleman's statement that he does not 1243 give a lower priority. I hope that he gives a much higher priority to defence.

Today we have concentrated mainly on the Army in Europe. Some very odd arguments have been made concerning the various cuts. A little while ago I was told, in an answer, that the abolition of our facilities in Simonstown would make the maintenance of our sanctions against Rhodesia more expensive and more difficult. From my record, I am not exactly a supporter of sanctions against Rhodesia, but it is an odd argument today, in talking of the amount of expenditure and the cuts, to say that without Simonstown, at a time when we have not much money available, it will be more expensive to carry out sanctions against Rhodesia.

Then there is the argument involving the Sultan of Brunei, who says that there will be no expense in leaving the Ghurkas where they are. We are told that their removal is under consideration. As far as I know, this is not a political, moral, or strictliy defence matter. Perhaps we may later be told what are the considerations impelling us to deal another blow at the Ghurkas in this context.

If we are talking about the rôle of the Army today, mainly in Europe, but especially in Gemany, we should first of all face up to the dangers of the task before us. Her Majesty's Government, in the recent White Paper on defence, freely admitted, while arguing for cuts, that there was no sign of other than a constantly increasing aggressive power from the countries of the Warsaw Pact—the Soviet Union in particular. It was not said in the White Paper that this is a static or declining threat. It was said that it is increasing, both in strength and capacity. We are facing today a constantly increasing and aggressive power on the borders of the Berlin Wall, and along the Iron Curtain throughout Europe. There are no signs at any level, in any of the exercises carried out by the Warsaw Pact powers, that their thinking is in defensive terms. They are thinking in terms of an expansionist military activity.

There are some who say that there is no possibility of a war in Europe. If that is the thinking of the Kremlin, why is it that the Soviet Union—a much poorer nation—devotes an ever-increasing 1244 amount of its available resources to its army stationed in the West? I can understand that it might be doing so on the border with China, but the Soviet Union knows perfectly well that no single country in Western Europe would launch an attack upon it. Why, then, does it constantly increase its forces?

There are some who say that the Soviet Union does not really need to attack us any longer because, unfortunately, it is doing only too well by means of subversion and political penetration of our institutions in the West. I think that at the moment too many people are making the job of the Soviet Union extremely easy, so that it can extend its influence without exerting military power. At the same time, I am not prepared to let my security rest on the fact that we allow ourselves to be subverted indefinitely in this way, as opposed to being overtaken by force.

There is another factor keeping the Soviet Union at bay—the thought of nuclear reprisals. The Soviet Union fears nuclear reprisals—tactical in the first place and then strategic.

There was a reference to the comment made in an earlier debate by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) that the choice was between surrender and suicide. That is an oversimplification of the sort in which he often indulges, because that second consideration is also in the mind of the Soviet Union. The suicide would not be one-sided. Therefore, it may very well be that the continuing facility for us to possess and, if necessary, be able to use, nuclear weapons, provides another option, apart from unilateral suicide. It is an over-simplification, to put it in terms of simple arithmetic.

The only other asset that we have at the moment to deter the Soviet Union is that the Soviet Union is not yet altogether happy about the political reliability of its satellite armies. I have seen one picture of the faces of the Russian masters at the last May Day parade in East Berlin when East German troops were goose-stepping past with the most modern equipment, and the Russians were not looking very cheerful at the sight of the German army marching past the dais.

I have the feeling that there are still a few people in the Kremlin who are not 1245 altogether sure what the armies of their Polish, Hungarian or Czech satellites might do once the chips were down. We can be grateful for that, but it may be a declining asset in that over the years a new generation is growing up who have never been anything but citizens of satellite countries, and they may become more useful soldiers as time goes on.

I was especially anxious to speak in this debate since recently I have been to Germany twice, once with the Defence Expenditure. Sub-Committee and, after that, because of my interest, I wanted to try to learn a little more as a private individual. I came to a few pertinent conclusions about the state of our Army today. I wish that I had more time to say whether I thought our troops were in the right place. However, that has been dealt with already.

Having myself served in the Army first in the yeomanry during the last war and afterwards, I am sure from experience that the morale of our Army is today absolutely first-class. It is higher today than that of any other army on the western side of the Iron Curtain. When I was there, there was a good deal of unhappiness about pay. But I believe that that has been largely, if not wholly, dealt with by the quite generous proposals which the Government have made in the context of Service men's pay.

There is one continuing grumble. There is a feeling of unhappiness among our troops about the level of, and the cuts being made in, their realistic training facilities. I do not know whether right hon. and hon. Members really understand the extent to which economies of this kind can become utterly miserly. Soldiers do not want to spend all their time on what we used to call TEWTS. They want to go into the field to fire their weapons and use their tanks. They do not want to be told that their armoured cars or tanks have done x miles and that they cannot do any more for another six months. I have even discovered that there is insufficient ammunition available to provide infantry troops with small arms training and that, therefore, they have fitted tubes for .22 ammunition. But now they have been told that Britain even has to cut down severely on the supply of .22 ammunition, which is freely bought by people in this 1246 country to shoot rooks or rabbits. If we cannot make unlimited supplies of .22 ammunition available, we have indeed fallen into a very low state. There can be no justification for it. It is childish, especially when anyone in this country can buy as much as he likes with a police permit.

As regards their equipment, I have found not one officer or man who does not say that the Chieftain tank is the finest tank he has ever known. They are extremely proud of it. The one thing that they urge is that the replacement of its small engine with a larger one should be accelerated. It is ridiculous to have the best tank under-engined and underpowered, which the present Chieftain tank is.

The only mobile anti-tank weapon that our troops have is the outdated Wombat. It is a good name for something as antidiluvian as that. It cannot do other than put their lives at risk if they ever require to use it. If there is one name on every soldier's lips, it is that of a replacement piece of equipment which is ready. I refer, of course, to the Milan. I hope that the Minister will say something about it. There can be no arguments about long-term development. The equipment is ready for use, and everyone in the Army wants it now.

The final point made to me about equipment related to a helicopter missile. We have first-class helicopters, and Service men at all levels paid tribute to their excellence. But in a typically British muddling way we provide the Army with first-class helicopters but not with the missiles to use with them. Our Service personnel feel that it is high time that they were provided with effective missiles since we never know when the dangers will increase. Of the two which they would prefer, one is the Hot and the other is Tow. They do not want to wait some indefinite time for the British Hawkswing. I could not find a single word of praise for it during the time that I spent in Germany.

I put it to right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House that when we talk about forces cuts we do grave harm to the long-term morale of our men, especially when the size of our forces is altered not because of security requirements or changes in commitments but simply to fulfil a political pledge at a 1247 conference to the effect that we will knock off £500 million or add £200 million or even add only £40 million. This is not the way to play with the lives of our forces.

Reverting for a moment to the RAF, I met a number of senior NCOs due to lose their jobs who never thought that they would have anything other than a long life in the RAF. The provision of golden or silver handshakes does not remove any of their bitterness. If their careers are to come to an end, they want it to be for a better reason than a Leftwing-stimulated resolution at an annual party conference.

§ Mr. William Hamilton (Fife, Central)

The House will know that this is a Supply day, on which the subject-matter for debate is chosen by the Opposition. The Opposition have been criticising the Government constantly for not tackling the main problem of the day, namely, inflation. However, when they have the opportunity of a full day's debate on a subject of their choosing, they choose to debate not inflation, for which the Government are criticised constantly, but the Army.

§ Mr. Goodhart

So what?

§ Mr. Hamilton

Far from saying as they have been saying in this House and in the country on other occasions, that the way to tackle inflation is by making massive cuts in our public expenditure, today virtually every speech from every Tory Member——

§ Mr. Onslow

The hon. Gentleman has not been here.

§ Mr. Hamilton

Indeed, I have. Every Tory speech today has advocated increased public expenditure on the Armed Forces, especially on the Army. The hon. Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) has just made the same point.

§ Mr. Goodhart

On a pure point of procedure, the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) should know that we have not debated the Army for two years and that this is the form of the Army Estimates debate. Does not he wish to have the Services debated one by one, as we have over the years?

§ Mr. Hamilton

The right hon. Lady who is the Leader of the Opposition for the time being has said constantly, day after day, whenever she has dared to get to her feet, that we should devote every opportunity to discussing the major problem facing the country, which is inflation.

§ Mr. Onslow

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

§ Mr. Hamilton

In a moment.

§