DEFENCE

§ Mr. Speaker

Before I call the right hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Walker) may I tell the House that I have the names of about 30 right hon. and hon. Members who want to speak in this debate. With reasonable co-operation from Front and back bench speakers I shall be able to call most of them.

§ Mr. Peter Walker (Worcester)

Any person who has occupied the position of Secretary of State for the Environment or Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and has, therefore, seen the need for considerable expenditure in those spheres obviously joins hon. Members on all sides in deploring the necessity to spend a substantial amount upon the defence of the country. There is no Minister who has ever occupied a position in a major spending Department outside defence who cannot see many more possibilities of increasing expenditure for the good of the country and therefore, regrets the amount spent on defence.

I hope that the House will agree that, although, alas, the money devoted to defence cannot be devoted to objectives which would be immediately more beneficial to the quality of life, it is vital that we maintain the secure defence of this country above all else.

One of the tragedies is that all Labour Governments in recent times have commenced their terms of office with a major review of defence and not a review to decide needs and, therefore, to decide what is required for a sensible defence policy. It has always been a review aimed at reducing defence expenditure irrespective of needs. The Secretary of State frequently refers to the need to reduce defence expenditure as a result of 232 a static economy. But anybody who has studied Labour Party policy development in this field will recognise that the requirement substantially to reduce defence expenditure would have been a requirement of the Labour Party irrespective of the condition of the economy, because the requirement of the Labour Party is positively to shift expenditure from defence to other, doubtless worthy, objectives irrespective of the economic position. If that is not so, we shall welcome a statement from the Secretary of State for Defence that, should the economic position of the country, in his view and that of the Government, improve, this would enoble them to increase defence expenditure in the future to the degree to which they have cut it, to their regret, at the present time.

But I do not believe that that is the position. If one studies for example, the previous Labour Party conference debate on this issue, in which there was a clear-cut demand for a reduction of £1,000 million in defence expenditure, one sees that the arguments in that debate and the reasoning of that conference was not the economic necessity to do so but a belief that there was a genuine wastage of expenditure on defence purposes and that defence expenditure should be substantially slashed.

After the Labour Party conference, 113 Labour Members of Parliament signed a motion urging a reduction of more than £1,000 million—indeed, giving a specific figure by which they wished our defence expenditure to be reduced, £1,083 million. The disturbing fact about that motion is that no fewer than 26 Cabinet Ministers in the present Government were signatories to it. Presumably, if the present Secretary of State feels that it is not his task to meet those wishes, there might be opportunities for back benchers to fill some of the vacant posts.

Next we had the Foreign Secretary in the election campaign reducing that figure to £500 million. More recently, we have had the Secretary of Defence referring to "several hundred million". It was understandable, when one or two of his colleagues pressed him today on what IT meant by "several hundred million pounds", that he in no way defined the term but, I thought rather frighteningly, started to accept the percentage-of-GNP 233 argument which, if he meant to reduce expenditure to the average level of all the European powers, would reduce it by more than the £1,000 million required by the motion put down by members of his party.

The Secretary for Defence could obtain quite a substantial drop in his budget by dealing with payments for education, the health services and other social services in the Armed Forces in a way very different from the way in which they have been dealt with in the past. There are arguments both for and against doing so, and perhaps as much as "several hundred million pounds"—the amount he mentioned—could be obtained by that type of transfer to the Departments of Education and Science and Health and Social Security. Obviously, if such a measure were to be taken the House would wish to consider all its implications. But it is sad that when people talk of the total defence budget they include in the figure the considerable expenditure on education and hospital services which would not normally be included in similar figures for other operations in Government activities.

If the transfer or reduction of several hundred million pounds is achieved in that way no harm will be done to the defence of the country. We are, of course, concerned that the cuts which the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned will not be made in such a way as to diminish and damage the security of our country. He seemed at Question Time this afternoon to argue that months of delay in completing the review are not in themselves damaging. We on this side of the House consider that the delay is very damaging. It causes uncertainty and a great deal of concern and dismay. It is bad for the morale of the Armed Forces. It is bad for investment and planning in those industries from which we shall have to procure equipment in the future and bad for the potential of the exports of British defence equipment, because many countries abroad will be wondering whether equipment which they purchase will, as a result of the cuts, go out of production.

The four-months delay which is to take place—the Secretary for Defence is implying that the White Paper review will not be completed until the autumn—is therefore a matter of very real concern. I 234 suggested this afternoon that the right hon. Gentleman would decide his views in principle by the end of July or the beginning of August and then would be consulting our allies upon them. Certainly one would like to know at the earliest opportunity what his views are, fully understanding that, having expressed his views perhaps at the end of July or the beginning of August, those views would be subject to any international consultations he then wished to pursue. Otherwise. I think we shall have a situation in which he will have reached certain conclusions subject to those consultations, those conclusions certainly will leak at various discussions, including talks abroad, and through August and September there will be considerable, unnecessary uncertainty as to the Government's views on this subject.

When the right hon. Gentleman refers to the autumn, I wonder whether autumn will be a little late this year and whether, if there are to be substantial cuts, in fact the announcement that there are to be such cuts will be made after any General Election. There will be many aircraft firms and naval dockyards very interested in the conclusions of the review.

What disturbed us was, first of all, the remarks this afternoon implying that the right hon. Gentleman had accepted the case for substantial cuts in our commitment to NATO, to some extent implying that a figure of around £1,000 million was not out of the question. A cut of such an amount would mean a cut of between 25 and 30 per cent. of our defence expenditure—and 90 per cent. of our defence expenditure is already connected with our activities in NATO. Such a reduction would mean a very substantial cut in our contribution to NATO.

If the objective of the right hon. Gentleman's review is to measure the needs of defence at the present time and to see that this country meets its responsibilities in this field, I do not see that he can be very complacent about cutting our contribution to NATO at this time. Indeed, I recall his first speech to the House in the last debate on defence. Hon. Members, certainly on this side of the House, were very impressed by the second half of that speech, in which he outlined with some emphasis what he considered to be the very real potential danger, and his recognition of the considerable build-up 235 by the Soviet Union of their armed forces over recent years. That speech, certainly the last half of it, made us feel rather more satisfied that he would not be a party to making substantial cuts in our contribution to NATO.

I hope that those who advocate very substantial cuts in our defence expenditure will recognise the degree to which the forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries have been built up over recent years. It is a frightening story. I wonder how far some hon. Members opposite who advocate massive cuts in our defence expenditure are satisfied in their own minds about the objectives and purposes of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries in building up their forces to such a magnitude.

Over the last few years 200,000 more men have been recruited to the already very substantial armed services of the Soviet Union. Year after year there are increases in weapons such as cruise missile submarines. In the last four years they have added 16 more army divisions and 500 more aircraft. When one looks at the relative forces deployed in northern and central Europe between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, there cannot be any complacency about the need to keep NATO strong.

For every division of NATO there are now nearly three divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries. The Warsaw Pact countries have 50 per cent. more men under arms. They have nearly three times as many tanks and nearly double the number of aircraft. When I look at the way in which the Soviet Union has been pouring money into research and development, at an increasing rate of 10 per cent. a year, and then see close at home minor incidents such as a Soviet trawler coming close to our rigs in the North Sea, and taking photographs, against all safety-at-sea regulations, I do not understand how in all these circumstances any hon. Member can be complacent about the need for Britain and the NATO Powers to remain strongly armed. The Labour Party has been well aware of these facts during its period in opposition. It has now been over four months in government and I should have thought that in reality, although he may be unwilling to tell us today—I hope that he will not be—the 236 Secretary of State must have come to some major and important conclusions after that time.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

This is not the first time that the Opposition Front Bench has put forward the threat of Soviet forces, the existence of which I like no more than does the right hon. Gentleman. But he must be aware that the American forces have not been exactly unchanged either but have been increasing their technique and strength. Indeed, the American Navy is twice the size of the navies of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman asks what is the purpose of the Russian build-up. I should have thought that it was for the same purpose as the American build-up. Both sides argue, "Our forces are purely to defend ourselves against the other side". They are both making the same mistake and the Secretary of State is prepared to take the same dangerous road, which may land the world in disaster.

§ Mr. Walker

I do not believe that there is any comparison between a group of democratically-elected Governments deciding to remain secure and a decision by a Government which is anything but democratically elected. Examples such as Czechoslovakia are, I hope, a constant reminder to us all. I am shocked that any hon. Member who has witnessed the growing disparity between the Warsaw Pact countries' power and that of NATO should be other than concerned.

I hope also that the hon. Member will notice with some concern the manner in which, during the talks now taking place in Vienna, the Soviet Union objective has been in no way to obtain parity between the two sides. Its intention has been to maintain the disparities which are to its advantage—hardly typical of a nation which desperately wishes to obtain some parity and quick reductions.

The first major decision that the Government have to make concerns the retention of the nuclear deterrent. We approved of the decision of the Government to proceed with the recent test in Nevada, although we found slightly strange the reason given by the Prime Minister—that it was a decision not to retain the deterrent but to keep the option open. One would have presumed that, 237 with the defence review going on, the option could have been kept open without having the test at that moment and that, in a couple of months, if it were decided to proceed with the deterrent, the test could have taken place then.

Whatever the reason, we think that the decision was right. It was, of course, the decision of the previous Government to have a test, but there has been plenty of time for this Government to review it. We are pleased that, having reviewed it, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and presumably the Cabinet approved of the decision. We admired to some extent the way in which the Secretary of State for Employment and the Secretary of State for Social Services, who in the past have held different views on this topic, have remained members of a Cabinet which decided to hold this test and that on this occasion they have put country before party. In fairness to the Government, they have a mandate to do this. In their manifesto they said nothing about reducing the British nuclear deterrent force.

Does the Secretary of State now have information whether the test was successful? If it were not, and further testing is required, will he assure the House that further tests will take place should they be necessary?

§ Mr. John Lee (Birmingham, Handsworth)

What is the right hon. Gentleman's criterion for a "successful" test?

§ Mr. Walker

I presume that when the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State approved this test, they had particular objectives in mind and agreed that it was necessary, so that the deterrent could be retained in an up-to-date and useful form, that the test should take place. Otherwise, they would not have approved it. The Prime Minister himself told the House that the results of the test were not then known. I am asking whether they are yet known, whether, in view of the purposes of the test, which the Prime Minister approved, it was successful and whether any further tests will take place.

There was an implication in the Prime Minister's statement that one of the reasons that they were able to take this sensible and rational decision was that the Labour Party Conference had not passed with a two-thirds majority a 238 demand that we should scrap our nuclear weapons. Since then, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Boardman), I think, has written to the Prime Minister asking for an assurance that this would not mean that a future Labour Party Conference resolution which had a two-thirds majority would influence our defence policy in this way.

I am afraid that the Prime Minister has responded by refusing to reply, saying that the question was hypothetical and not giving that assurance. But the country would like to know that a basic decision on retaining the most effective deterrent weapon we possess will not be taken upon the basis of a two-thirds majority at a Labour Party Conference, with the block votes having the effect they have.

On this side of the House, we should appreciate some information, because the tests have taken place and it is obvious that the Government will have taken their decision whether to continue with a nuclear deterrent. In terms of our relationships with our allies in NATO and throughout the world, it is important that they make this clear as soon as possible.

I was encouraged this afternoon by the various pronouncements on the MRCA. This aircraft is vital to the RAF and to NATO. I am sure that the Secretary of State will agree that a major point is that if, on a basis of improving international collaboration, one made a decision that caused ill-feeling, that could be detrimental to the considerable savings which could be achieved by greater rationalisation of the procurement programmes throughout NATO and Europe generally.

It would be disastrous if the Government decided to scrap this aircraft. When the Secretary of State referred to the Germans supporting this approach with the same enthusiasm as he had, we were encouraged that at least on that issue the right hon. Gentleman has seemingly come to the decision—the right decision—to keep that aircraft.

Another sphere in which there is considerable uncertainty in the country, certainly in particular parts of the country—this will be of particular interest to the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, the hon. Member for 239 Portsmouth, North (Mr. Judd)—is the future of the dockyards. He will understand that when his post in the last Labour Government was held by a Plymouth Member, there was some contentment in Plymouth that things might be all right for Plymouth even if they were bad for the Portsmouth dockyard. Now that a Portsmouth Member holds this post, he will understand that there is considerable concern in Plymouth that if any dockyard goes it will not be Portsmouth but is likely to be Plymouth.

Throughout, there has been considerable concern in Chatham, which has not had a Labour Navy Minister either in previous Governments or this one, that its dockyard might be selected if there are to be substantial cuts. Fortunately, my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) is active in his representation of Chatham's needs.

I hope that the Secretary of State recognises—I know that the Under-Secretary will have recognised from his constituents—the real anxiety and concern in all these dockyards during the months in which the Government have talked about cutting hundreds of millions of pounds from our defence expenditure. The sooner these fears are removed the better. In view of the massive increase in Soviet sea might and particularly the threats at sea which are taking place, some assurance should be given.

On our general strategy at sea, could the Secretary of State say something about the present position of the Simonstown base? There is genuine uncertainty here. A Government spokesman in another place implied that, due to this Government's attitude to certain happenings in South Africa, we were renegotiating the agreement. The South African Government have implied that, due to their concern about some activities of this Government, they are, reviewing the agreement. The House would like to know who is reviewing the agreement, if anyone. What is the object of the review, if one is taking place? The Opposition consider the protection of the route round the Cape to be of increasing, and not diminishing, importance, and we believe that Simonstown is essential to the proper defence of that route.

240 In the terms of our sea strategy, we should be interested to hear how the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun)—if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker—explains the massive increase in the activities of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union now has naval forces in the Indian Ocean three times greater than those of the United States. Recently considerable additional submarine forces have been attached to the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean and a new 45,000-ton aircraft carrier has been sent there. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the Black Sea will be much closer in navigational terms to the Indian Ocean. The protection of trade routes is a real problem for the western world. We must recognise that in any future confrontation—which we all pray will never happen—if there is no adequate defence of the vital strategic routes used for bringing our basic raw materials and energy supplies our whole security will be swiftly undermined.

That brings me to the question of overseas bases. Once again, there is uncertainty whilst the review is being undertaken. Has the Secretary of State reached a conclusion about the vital base in Cyprus? Cyprus is vital to our air communications and to surveillance of the Mediterranean. It is important in terms of our relationship with Iran, and it makes a vital contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping force there. These alone would be good and sufficient reasons for keeping our Cyprus base. Although this is not of itself a reason for keeping a force in Cyprus, I think the Secretary of State will agree that in terms of recruitment to the Armed Services the existence of the Cyprus base has proved to be of considerable importance.

Judging by the pronouncements made by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on the importance of maintaining the independence of Hong Kong, a decision on Hong Kong has already been made. Anyone who knows the problems in Hong Kong would consider it inconceivable that a garrison should not remain there, especially in view of the importance of maintaining internal security in Hong Kong. May we have an assurance that the Government have no intention of dismantling the Gurkha Brigade?

241 I presume that talks have taken place with the Prime Minister of Singapore, and we should like to know the result of them. Did the Prime Minister of Singapore request any withdrawal of forces? If not, I hope that the Secretary of State, in considering the base, will take into account its importance for communications and its considerable commercial value to Singapore in the years ahead. Singapore has become an immense centre of commercial activity which offers great opportunities for this country. In that context, I hope that the Secretary of State will bear in mind the relatively small amount we spend on maintaining our forces there.

It is the duty of any Secretary of State for Defence to review defence expenditure for the purpose of making useful savings. One sphere in which my hon. Friends and I consider savings can be made is in making far swifter progress towards European rationalisation of weapon production. NATO Powers produce a wide range of products. For example, there are 13 competing projects for anti-tank missiles, 36 fire control radar systems, 40 producers of heavy naval guns and 23 different types of aircraft. This type of diversity of project, involving as it does diversity of research resources is a waste both for us and for our allies. Any progress that the Secretary of State can make there will be welcomed on both sides of the House.

I come now to the men in the Armed Services. We are, naturally, pleased that the forces recently received a pay award which was back-dated to 1st April, but they will be anxious to know the Government's attitude on their future. I well remember, at the time of the miners' dispute, that the right hon. Gentleman—perfectly understandably, as he represents a mining constituency—was eloquent upon the question of differentials and relativities between miners and those in other occupations, and he particularly stressed the danger of mining as an occupation. Now that the right hon. Gentleman is responsible for the Armed Forces, what will be his approach to pay in the Armed Services during a period in which we are suffering from severe inflation?

We all pay tribute to the manner in which the Armed Services carried out their incredibly difficult and dangerous task in Northern Ireland. In considering 242 the pay and conditions of men in the Armed Services who are serving in Northern Ireland compared with those in other occupations which are far less hazardous and arduous, one can understand that there may be a feeling of anxiety in the Armed Services. Many workers are protected from inflation by threshold agreements. If inflation continues as it has done over the last three months, what will be the Government's attitude to future pay awards, and will the general principle of threshold agreements be extended to the Services?

Will the Secretary of State consider carefully, if he has not already done so, whether a new initiative can be taken to provide housing for Service men at the time they are demobilised? We all know from constituency experience that many men who have served their country well for many years discover when they are on the point of being demobilised that it is quite impossible to obtain accommodation. Having been parted from his Army accommodation, a demobilised Service man has to wait sometimes 12 or 18 months before accommodation can be provided because of the system of allocation applied by local authorities.

Here is an opportunity for a unique initiative. We have just created 300 new district authorities with responsibility for housing. If the Secretary of State could arrange with the local authorities for Service men's names to be added to the waiting list some time before they are demobilised, they could be housed immediately on demobilisation, and this would remove a great deal of the personal anxiety and unnecessary hardship which results from the system operated by local authorities.

In the first four months in which the right hon. Gentleman has occupied his present position he has made several speeches which have made us feel that he understands the potential dangers to the country. He has made a decision on the nuclear test which we welcome, because it shows that he recognises the importance of this deterrent weapon. He has, however—I am sure without wishing to do so—caused an immense amount of anxiety that his review is being undertaken not on the basis of the future security of the country but on the basis of the necessity to satisfy a section of his 243 party which wants £1,000 million to be cut from our defence expenditure irrespective of the country's defence needs.

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will tell us that his review is an objective one which will take into account the security of our nation and not the motions carried or views expressed by any political party or any group in a political party. At a time when, potentially, we could in future be confronted with real international dangers throughout the world it is vital that this country should be able to make its fullest contribution to the security of the Western world.

§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Roy Mason)

First, may I congratulate the right hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Walker) on becoming Shadow Secretary of State for Defence. He presented to the House a very good and responsible picture of the defence problems which face me, as Secretary of State, and, indeed, the nation.

The right hon. Gentleman began by saying that he felt that one of the priorities should be to maintain the secure defence of this country. I do not disagree that that will be our goal. But the right hon. Gentleman knows that, because of economic pressures, had the Conservatives won the General Election a Conservative Government would have been bound to take the same path as that which we are traversing at the moment. The Conservative Government indicated as much by cutting back £250 million defence expenditure in 1973 alone—and the economic circumstances, especially the impact of the escalation of oil costs, had net then hit the nation. Therefore, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not shirk some responsibility for our having to examine the whole of the nation's defence expenditure.

The right hon. Gentleman then entered into some interesting aspects of the defence budget. I agree that it would be a good thing if the Department of Education and Science and the Department of Health and Social Security were to accept as part of their budgets the fact that the defence budget has to bear a large share of the cost of educating schoolchildren and nursing patients. The defence budget undoubtedly bears that 244 burden and it is borne by no other Department. It would have been a good move if the right hon. Gentleman, when in government, had pioneered some of these ideas. As the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the right hon. Gentleman was in a fine position to do so.

There are occasions when we would like to have a certain piece of equipment for our Services—for example, an aircraft, submarine or special project which might be too expensive. But what better could happen than that other navies, armies or air forces could say to us, "We will buy your piece of equipment if you are prepared to buy it yourselves". On that understanding—in other words that exports were in prospect and jobs and trade were available—then the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry had the finest opportunity when in office to take just that line. My Department would regard that course most sympathetically in considering how best, on the basis of exports, jobs and trade, it might be prepared to lessen the defence burden.

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)

The Secretary of State warms my heart. Is he telling the House that he will do a better job than my mob did over the Navy Harrier, for example?

§ Mr. Mason

Would it not have been a good thing if the Conservative Party, supported by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, had made a decision on the maritime Harrier? But they did not. All the Navy says about that piece of equipment is that it would be an added operational capability, but the Conservative Government refused to take a decision.

§ Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)

But is not the difference between the Labour administration and the Conservative administrations the fact that the Labour Government now have orders or potential orders—I refer to Iran, Spain, the United States and India—for the Sea Harrier, if only the Government recognise the ability of the aircraft and order it for the Royal Navy?

§ Mr. Mason

There is the possibility—I put it no higher than that—of orders. The Navy says that it would have been welcome, but it is in any case just an added operational capability.

I return to the point I was making to the right hon. Member for Worcester, 245 namely, that if there is a prospect of large orders abroad for this aircraft, is it not worth developing so that our Navy could have that added operational capability—but who will pay for it? It would be a good thing occasionally if Departments and Governments did not take the very strong posture of resisting giving anything to defence which might be to the benefit of jobs, trade, industry and exports—in other words, if they were prepared to unfreeze. However, I throw that suggestion into the debate as something about which we can all think. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to have that matter in his mind today, although not four months ago when his colleagues were in office.

The question of housing for Service men is certainly under study. I shall ask my hon. Friend who is to reply to the debate, to deal with that matter and also the point which was made about Cyprus and other overseas places.

I am flattered that the Opposition have chosen to debate defence only seven weeks after the last occasion, although I am not so naïve as to be misled as to why this has come about. My Department and I are always prepared to listen to constructive proposals. Nobody has a monopoly of such proposals and in that way we welcome this debate.

I should like to tell the House what has happened since our last defence debate. I have had meetings with the United States' Secretary of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger, and the West German Defence Minister, Mr. Leber. I have also attended my first round of NATO ministerial meetings, the Nuclear Planning Group in Bergen, and immediately afterwards in Brussels the Eurogroup of Defence Ministers and NATO's Defence Planning Committee. I have seen the Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malta on their recent visits to the United Kingdom and the ambassadors of a number of our allies and friends have called on me in London. These have all been opportunities for me to judge at first hand the importance attached by our allies to our present contributions to collective defence and to deepen my understanding of the collective security problems which we face.

My meetings with NATO colleagues have also enabled me to stress the importance given by the Government to our 246 NATO commitments and of our awareness of the difficult times that lie ahead for the Alliance as a whole in the pursuit now intensified in a range of negotiations, of means of relaxing tension between East and West while at the same time keeping up our defences. I have also encountered wide recognition of the economic problems facing Britain and the bearing which these must have on the size of our defence effort.

My meetings with fellow defence Ministers in NATO have brought home to me how many problems we have in common. I should like to be permitted to philosophise a little at this stage because it is interesting to see how the defence Ministers of Western Europe, in our open societies in Western democracy, have to consider defence matters much more seriously than do the countries of Eastern Europe.

In Western European countries we see a generation rising to positions of power—a generation to whom the last war is only a distant memory, if they remember it at all. As conflict and war in which we were involved recede into the mists of time, young people are not so moved to be fully appreciative of collective security and defence. Many of them even regard the apparatus of military alliances as a legacy of the cold war which no longer has any justification. Secondly, defence Ministers all face escalating costs of manpower and equipment, now rising faster than rates of economic growth and of inflation, because of the constantly increasing complexity of modern weapons.

Thirdly, those countries which have opted for professional as opposed to conscript forces have to bear on their defence budgets an even heavier burden of individual manpower costs. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries depend to the extent of 70 per cent. upon conscription. In NATO—excluding ourselves, Luxembourg, Canada and the United States, who are moving over to an all-volunteer force—62 per cent. of ground forces are conscripts. Consequently it is much cheaper individually to support them. We have to pay, and are prepared to pay, for professionalism.

Defence Ministers of the Western democracies are confronted with pressure groups among the opposition in their 247 own parties—I am not immune to that—and in the public at large. Contrast that with the peaceful life of a defence minister in a totalitarian state.

§ Mr. Carol Mather (Esher)

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a dividend for countries which have to raise their armed forces by conscription because it involves the ordinary citizen? It is difficult to put across the needs of defence in this country because we have a professional army which is separate from the people. We face this problem probably more than other countries with different systems.

§ Mr. Mason

I did not follow the point that the hon. Gentleman was endeavouring to make. Certainly countries which conscript their forces have an interplay between their communities and forces. However, it cannot be said that that does not take place in this country. Because this is a small, densely populated island there is interplay all the time. I am proud of our professional force. The British Army of the Rhine playing its part in NATO is the most professionally trained and highly efficient unit in the whole of the NATO Alliance. We pay for professionalism and in that respect it pays off.

In varying degrees my colleagues are all subject to economic pressures—balance of payments problems, particularly the escalation of oil costs, demands for the diversion of resources away from defence to other outlets, including economic growth and investments, and to other areas of public expenditure and cutbacks in public spending as a whole.

Even if in this uncongenial climate they manage to get their defence budgets together, they must look foward to the close scrutiny of their proposals by their Parliaments. Since 1971 my Ministry has presented to the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of this House no fewer than 140 memoranda and very many supplementary letters. There have been about 360 appearances by Ministry of Defence witnesses—Ministers and officials—before the Committee, at West-minister and in Commands and Defence Establishments at home and abroad. That is quite an effort by any "open society" standards.

248 I would not like the House to gain the impression that I spent my time in NATO in mutual commiseration with my colleagues. The greater part of our time was spent in constructive discussions about how to overcome the problems of maintaining adequate defences in conditions of general financial stringency. But we cannot ignore the present tendencies in the Western European democracies to rape their defence Ministers and their budgets whilst the Soviet and the Warsaw Pact Ministers enjoy exclusive virginity.

From my talks in Europe, I brought back with me two main impressions. The first of these was that there was a need for a major new effort in collaborative procurement. I was pleased that the right hon. Gentleman went out of his way to highlight this matter in his speech. We have seen in the past far too many cases of the needless development of rival projects by the members of the Alliance. I hope that through the Eurogroup of European Defence Ministers and in other ways we shall make substantial progress towards improving this situation.

One way of using resources more efficiently is to collaborate on procurement. This would be facilitated by greater harmonisaton of tactical concepts, and it should lead to greater standardisation with its direct military advantages and the scope it should offer for economy in supporting logistics. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries—based on Soviet training and equipment and consequential standardisation and interoperability—are well ahead of NATO in this respect.

My second impression was that it will take continuing Ministerial effort, because the political will is needed, to overcome the obstacles in the way of increased cooperation. It calls for the will in all the NATO countries to overcome military reserve and caution which tends to opt for its own particular brand of arms. I feel that the Eurogroup is a successful going concern and we are determined to keep up its momentum. This is particularly true of armaments collaboration where we have identified the problems involved.

Through the Eurogroup I think that we have found one of the keys to greater defence collaboration in Europe, though it will take determined political will and 249 a readiness by all member countries to give and take in order to open the door.

While it might be argued that at least in the development phase collaborative projects cost more in total, we avoid duplication, share the cost among the participating nations and, in the longer term, build up the European research and development base, lessen dependence on outside sources and, in the end, promote standardisation of equipment and greater military efficiency. It is of the first importance, therefore, that we increase substantially the extent and depth of European collaboration.

At the last meeting of the Eurogroup, I opened a substantive discussion on these issues and posed the following questions. First, I asked whether we could reach an agreed Eurogroup view on broad areas of equipment—those areas include the future main battle tank, helicopters, field guns, rifles and ammunition—in which we should encourage European capabilities for development and production and, if so, how we can also involve the French.

Secondly, I asked whether we could agree tactical concepts sufficiently far in advance to ensure that collaboration was undertaken before national viewpoints were frozen and entrenched positions taken up.

Lastly, I asked whether all the European members of the Alliance, in the interests of their own defence industrial development, could agree on the need to devise practical means of rationalisation, on co-ordinating their policy on the extent of European procurement, and on the extent to which they should buy American. The past point is particularly important.

I accept that the strength of the Alliance depends in large measure on American equipment and technology, and it clearly makes neither military nor economic sense for the Europeans to cut themselves off from these. We in Europe have neither the financial nor the technological resources to be completely self-sufficient. There will always be cases in which it will be sensible to adopt United States designs either by direct purchase or by manufacture under licence. But on the other hand, we must convince the United States that healthy European defence industries are essential if the 250 European members of the Alliance are to play their proper part within it. I expressed the hope that it could be recognised that there must be types of equipment where all the Allies, including the Americans, need to buy European. I hope, therefore, that we shall see the United States buying more European equipment.

These are questions that we shall be pursuing in the Eurogroup and in further Alliance-wide discussions. So much then for my report on Europe and NATO.

You will remember that when I last spoke to the House I gave a pledge that the morale and well-being of the Services would be my prime concern. I announced then the immediate introduction of a range of measures designed to improve the lot of those serving in Northern Ireland. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister subsequently announced the Government's decisions on the Report of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body.

In reaching these decisions we had to take into account the constraints of the Pay Code, but we felt able to go a little further in some respects. A particular feature, and one that I know was widely accepted by the whole House, was the introduction of an extra special payment of £3.50 per week for those serving in Northern Ireland. This was in addition to the increase in the "X"-factor, which is designed to take account of the balance of advantages and disadvantages in Service compared with civilian life, from 5 per cent. to 10 per cent. for men and from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent. for women, who, incidentally, will receive equal pay with men next year.

This, taken together with the earlier package of improvements, demonstrates very clearly the Government's concern for those who are performing such a crucial task—the vast majority separated from their wives and families and living and working, uncomplainingly, in arduous and uncomfortable conditions. We shall continue to do all we can.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about thresholds. Yes, all ranks will be eligible for the threshold payments as well. I hope that the new rates of pay will help to boost recruitment into the three Services. We have made no secret of the fact that recruiting has recently not been as good as we should have 251 liked, but the House will be glad to learn that there are signs that Service recruiting is beginning to pick up again. This is encouraging and I am hopeful that the trend will be sustained.

Since our last debate the Services have continued to acquit themselves with the greatest credit in the difficult circumstances of Northern Ireland. All of us are in some danger of forgetting just how difficult these circumstances are and what conditions our troops in Northern Ireland have to face. The bombings and the shootings, by their very repetition, tend to have a diminishing impact on the people of this country. Events that used to attract banner headlines and to be given lead coverage on the television screen are now treated as run-of-the-mill, as part of the normal way of life. It is quite unacceptable that this level of violence should persist in a part of the United Kingdom, and I once again emphasise that our Armed Forces will continue to play their part in striving to maintain law and order in the Province so long as their presence is required.

So far our Armed Forces have coped magnificently, and I know tha[...] they will continue to do so. Since the beginning of the year 681 persons have been arrested and charged with terrorist offences; over 800 weapons, almost 98,000 rounds of ammunition and over 14 tons of explosive have been seized. Those arrested have included many dangerous wanted men, particularly in Belfast.

We have never pretended that this will be an easy, let alone a swift, task; but the Government are determined to bring home to all those of evil intent that their methods will not succeed, and that our aim remains to bring about a situation where ordinary people in Northern Ireland can live their lives without fear, and where the maintenance of law and order is once again the responsibility of the police, backed by the community as a whole.

§ Mr. Lee

I do not wish in any way to diminish what my right hon. Friend has said regarding the Army's achievements, which he itemised in some detail, but will he tell the House when he considers that the military operation will have been successfully completed in Northern Ireland?

§ Mr. Mason

That will be only when we have been able to establish a larger force in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and been able to build up the Ulster Defence Regiment so that between them they can help to maintain law and order and relative peace. When those conditions are achieved the forces will, hopefully, be able to say that they have done a good job and withdrawal might be considered—

§ Mr. Lee

But when?

§ Mr. Mason

No date can be put on that.

I make no apology for not yet being in a position to inform the House about the outcome of our defence review. As I said on 13th May, we are engaged in the most comprehensive examination of our future defence rôle and commitments ever mounted in peace time. It is really a deep and thorough study of the best way of meeting our essential defence needs.

Already the preliminary views of some of our partners have been sought. My hon. Friend the Minister of State at the end of May visited the capitals of the other countries involved in the five-Power defence arrangements. He went to listen to their views, not to put cut-and-dried proposals to them. His report, together with the results of consultations which we shall be having with our other allies at the appropriate time, will be taken fully into account before final decisions are taken.

§ Mr. Antony Buck (Colchester)

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that it is very important for the Services to end the present uncertainty which the Services feel, but this is to be somewhat prolonged because of the period which will be taken to consult the Allies. Would the right hon. Gentleman take up the suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Walker) and publish something now, perhaps a Green Paper rather than a White Paper, so that we know of the position, and can be consulted?

§ Mr. Mason

I have taken that point on board. I do not agree that this matter affects the morale in the forces. I think that the forces have accepted that it is 253 worth while having a comprehensive review instead of suffering periodic short-term cuts. However, I shall consider what has been said in this regard and if the review starts to slip I will consider whether it is necessary to say anything further before the House rises for the recess.

I have previously explained to the House the background to the review—on the one hand, the economic situation which the Government inherited on resuming office and, on the other, the continuing and growing threat posed to Western security by the massive military might of the Soviet Union and its allies. However, I must do that again today, to bring the position up to date. It may give joy and succour to the more narrow-minded Opposition Members, while causing concern and upset in the minds of some of my hon. Friends, but it is essential for the House, for Parliament and for the nation for the Secretary of State for Defence to let the House know how he sees the threat, especially when we are considering how best we can reduce defence expenditure. Therefore, we must all the time have in the forefront of our minds the stark realities of our economic inheritance, which have become even clearer to the nation since we last debated defence. They have further reinforced the need, in the interests of Britain's economic well-being, to reduce the planned level of our defence expenditure. The Labour Party in its manifesto pledged to do this by several hundred million pounds a year over a period. I must stress to the House that that pledge will be honoured.

Our aim will be to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, the level of forces needed to assure Britain's essential security and to maintain the credibility of our contribution to collective defence, and, on the other, the maximum release of resources from defence to industries which directly boost our exports and economic growth.

§ Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow)

rose—

§ Mr. Mason

I shall come in a moment to what I believe my hon. Friend has in mind.

In drawing attention to the threat I am not making a political assessment about the actions which the Warsaw Pact might take in the years ahead, nor 254 do I wish to denigrate in any way the importance of the negotiations on security matters now taking place. There is, as the House well knows, a sensitive backcloth against which our own defence review is being considered. There is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe at Geneva, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and the multi-lateral talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna. Everyone who takes an active interest in defence knows that the British Government are playing a full and active part in both the CSCE and MBFR negotiations, and the United States keeps in close consultation with its allies on SALT. We are also trying, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, to make further progress on a variety of disarmament questions. That was the committee that pioneered the non-proliferation treaty.

The Government also give their full support to the tireless efforts of President Nixon and his Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, to promote the cause of peace and greater understanding between nations.

Therefore, a lot is going on, and many negotiators and nations are genuinely trying to exercise détente. However, I must warn the House that we must be on our guard against becoming too starry-eyed about all those negotiations. In all of them the going is tough, concessions and agreement from the other side have to be hard won and quick results are seldom obtainable. The Western negotiators must be constantly aware at the conference table of the realities of the situation.

I repeat one or two sentences which I have previously uttered in order to lead to what is probably the nuclear parity between us and the West. In Central Europe the Warsaw Pact has 20 per cent. more soldiers than NATO; 30 to 40 per cent. more soldiers in fighting units; two and-a-half times the number of tanks; and twice as many guns and aircraft.

The build-up of the Soviet fleet at sea is now well known. The Soviet Union is fast emerging as a maritime super-Power with a large modern ocean-going fleet of cruisers, destroyers and aircraft, some 350 operational submarines—at least 100 nuclear-powered—and a force of 255 over 1,000 naval aircraft. The threat posed to NATO by this massive Soviet capability at sea is obvious. In the Eastern Atlantic, for example—an area of special concern to Britain—NATO's ready maritime forces are already heavily outnumbered. In 1962—to give merely one example—there were only 10 major Soviet warships deployed away from the Soviet Union at any one time, worldwide. In 1973 that figure had reached 100–10 times as many in 10 years—and this notwithstanding the Soviet Union's small dependence on the sea as a trading route.

Overall, the Warsaw Pact countries are modernising and replacing their weapons and equipment at a much faster rate than NATO. The Soviet Union, with a gross national product approximately half that of the United States, produces a military effort which is just about the same. The obvious corollary is the much smaller spending in other sectors of the economy. The Soviet Government adopt a policy of self-denial and a lower standard of material prosperity which would be unacceptable in the West. The Soviet defence industries are, by and large, technically more advanced and better managed than those contributing to the remainder of the economy, and are correspondingly more cost-effective.

By Western standards this is a sacrifice of some magnitude, made over many years. If nothing else, it points to the reliance which the Russians place on military strength. This point is worth bearing in mind when one is considering the potential threat to British and Western interests in terms of force levels, quality of equipment, production rates, and research and development.

Naval construction, as well, continues at a high rate. Nuclear ballistic missile and attack submarines, missile cruisers, destroyers and, now, an aircraft carrier are among the ships under construction in the Soviet Union. There is now a capacity for as many as 12 ballistic missile submarines to be under construction at any one time.

The Soviet aircraft industry is second in importance to that of the United States at present, but it is continuing to expand, with the emphasis on the production of military aircraft. The Soviet industry is now building at least 700 fighters a year, 256 including some very advanced types such as the Foxbat interceptor and the variable geometry fighter, the Flogger, which compares with our MRCA. Flogger entered service in 1971 and several hundred have been produced. In addition, the Russians now have a new advanced supersonic strategic swing-wing bomber, called Backfire, for which there is at present no equivalent in production in the West.

It is also interesting to note that one-third of defence spending in the Soviet Union goes into research and development. Because of this, I warn the House that there is on its way a new generation of sophisticated advanced weaponry coming from the Soviet Union. As a particular example, the tactical air forces of the Soviet Union are now undergoing a significant modernisation programme, and this is presumably to overcome the longstanding qualitative advantage held by some NATO tactical air forces in the ground attack rôle. The Soviet Union already has major quantitative and some qualitative advantages in the air-superiority role. The Mig 25 Foxbat all-weather interceptor, capable of Mach 3 and carrying a new air-to-air missile, has recently been introduced to enhance this capability.

In the strategic arms field we watch as Russia proceeds with development of four new types of inter-continental ballistic missiles, multiple re-entry vehicles, super-hardened silos within her borders and the Delta class submarines carrying the new 4,200 nautical-mile missile which, with this range, can strike the United States and all parts of Western Europe without the submarines leaving home waters.

The increased strength of both the nuclear and conventional forces of Russia and her Warsaw Pact allies, backed by the massive Soviet industrial endeavour that I have just described, make it all the more necessary for NATO as a whole to sustain a credible deterrent policy. And deterrence must be valid against the whole range of possible threats, on land, at sea and in the air. It must include an ability to deter the use of military force as a political instrument. NATO, therefore, has no alternative but to maintain a range of options which must include nuclear weapons as well as strong conventional forces. Neither constitutes a credible deterrent 257 on its own. Each supplements and buttresses the other.

§ Mr. Newens

Will my right hon. Friend say whether the British Government are prepared to support the development of a new, second generation of nuclear missiles? This is one of the things that the Labour Party spoke about in its manifesto.

§ Mr. Mason

I shall be coming to that matter in a little more detail. I can tell my hon. Friend, however, that the whole of our nuclear capability is now being subjected to the defence review. When the review is complete, all of the nuclear capabilities—not just conventional capabilities—will be subjected to debates in the House.

The United States provides the main strategic deterrents for the West and the great bulk of the tactical nuclear weapons available to NATO. But we have thought it right, in the interests of the Alliance, that this nuclear responsibility should not be carried by the United States alone, Britain, accordingly, makes a contribution of nuclear weapons to NATO, in support of the current strategy of the Alliance and in the interests of common defence. The whole of our nuclear capability—unlike that of the French—is committed to NATO. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister reminded the House on 24th June, if NATO should collapse—if there should be no NATO—we should have to take our own decisions, and we should be able to do so. But so long as NATO exists, these weapons will be committed to the Alliance; and, whilst so committed, all our weapons remain subject to political control through Alliance consultation procedures and could in no circumstances he used without the consent of British Ministers.

As the Prime Minister explained, the arrangements for a test necessary to maintain the option of preserving the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent were initiated by the previous Government, and we allowed the test to go ahead. The experiment was conducted underground and fully in accordance with our treaty obligations. It was also fully in accordance with the policy of the previous Labour Government and with the policy in the Labour Party manifesto, based on multilateral disarmament, and 258 did not involve any breach of our party programme as laid down in successive party conferences over the last three years.

As the Prime Minister reaffirmed, expenditure on Britain's nuclear forces is under scrutiny as part of our all-embracing defence review. But, as shown in the last Defence White Paper, the annual cost of maintaining the Polaris force amounted to £39 million. That is a little over 1 per cent. of defence expenditure.

§ Mr. Robin F. Cook (Edinburgh, Central)

Now that we have arrived at the point of discussing the nuclear test, will the right hon. Gentleman answer the point that has been made to him? If our nuclear weapons are to be subject to a defence review and if we are looking at them seriously in the process of that review, why was the test not postponed until the review had been completed? Why was it necessary to go ahead prior to the review?

§ Mr. Mason

It was because the arrangements made under the previous administration were advanced. The agreement had been reached for the test. The slot into the Nevada chamber had been agreed. If we had decided positively not to go ahead, we would have closed one of the options open to the Government. Therefore, we thought it right to go ahead as planned. When the review is complete the House can determine to what extent it is necessary to do more about nuclear weapons.

However, I do not think that there is a case for singling out the nuclear side for rushed or arbitrary decisions. Our test was designed to keep all our nuclear options open while the review is in progress. In considering this aspect of our capabilities, we also have to bear in mind the considerations in NATO strategy which I have already outlined.

Let me give some further facts about nuclear testing which I hope will help to put our test into proper perspective. Since August 1963, when the Partial Test Ban Treaty came into force, until the end of 1973, the Russians have carried out underground tests which run into three figures. The rate of testing in 1974 is much the same. Over the same period, the United States Government have 259 announced that they conducted 265 underground tests. In the same period the French announced nine underground tests and have conducted 34 tests in the atmosphere. The Chinese have conducted 15 tests in the atmosphere and one underground. The United Kingdom, in the period from August 1963 to date—nearly 11 years—has conducted only four nuclear device tests, all of them, underground. Two were in 1964—the second of these was a failure—one in 1965, and the recent one a few weeks ago. Our latest nuclear test breached no nuclear treaty and broke no manifesto pledge.

The Prime Minister has already stated that the practice is that until the evaluation of the results of tests are complete no statement is made in the House. It is not the general practice of other countries to advertise tests in advance. The results of our recent test have not yet been fully evaluated, but the indications are that it was successful, and it was well below any likely threshold agreement for underground nuclear tests. I can now emphasise—and re-assure all those who feel concerned—that no further British tests are due to take place in the near future, and certainly not before the defence review is completed, and a report made to the House. All will be considered in the review—and there will be ample opportunity for debate before decisions are taken.

I would have thought that the whole House would recognise that succeeding British Governments have tried, by backing the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to stop nuclear arms proliferation. This is our desire and our earnest aim, but as everyone knows it is proving difficult. Meanwhile, it is the duty of all of us who have over the years become nuclear powers, and are constantly being reminded of the horror of this generation of weaponry, to endeavour to work much harder toward the goal of total abolition of these weapons by multilateral and international agreement. In that connection I sincerely hope that President Nixon and Mr. Breshnev will produce an agreement this week that will take us another step towards that worthwhile and internationally-required objective.

§ Miss Janet Fookes (Plymouth, Drake)

It was with some trepidation that I prepared to take part in my first defence debate. My trepidation was increased by the fact that I do not pretend to any expertise in the subject. That trepidation began to vanish, however, when I felt increasing sympathy for the position of the Secretary of State for Defence. It seems that he is being ground between an upper and a nether millstone. On the one hand, there is the party commitment to a reduction of expenditure of several hundred million pounds, with certain elements of the right hon. Gentleman's party demanding far more, and on the other hand is his realistic assessment of the growing power of the Warsaw Pact and the horrifying catalogue of increased strength of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The logical conclusion to be drawn from the right hon. Gentleman's speech is not that we need to cut expenditure but that, on the contrary, our defences need strengthening. I believe that defence is of the first importance and it cannot be regarded, as I fear some Labour Members regard it, as some kind of optional extra which can be discarded at will in favour of some other more desirable objective or means of spending money. I have been strengthened in my resolve on that point by the Secretary of State's speech. Servicemen have told me in Plymouth that our defence is an insurance policy and that we should not begrudge paying the premium; that we shall only get the kind of defence we are prepared to pay for.

The main threat to our security comes from the Soviet Union. That has been made quite clear by the Secretary of State, but I noticed earlier today that some of his hon. Friends had doubts about that. The great difference between Russia and other repressive régimes—I noticed mutterings about Chile and Greece—is that it is infinitely larger and more powerful. That is one practical difference. Secondly, the Soviet Union is activated by a Communist philosophy which seeks, as best it can, world domination. That is one major difference between the Soviet Union and the other regimes. We see the truth of that in its activities. I have seen no signs of 261 Russia's drawing back from East European countries. On the contrary, whenever one of those countries has moved towards independence it has been ruthlessly snuffed out. Russia's treatment of its own nations is no source of comfort. One has only to see the revelations of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the treatment of the Panovs, the Jews, the Christians and any dissidents within the regime to see what style and type of Government it is.

Furthermore, Russia seems anxious to infiltrate. It will infiltrate into the African countries. We have heard from the Secretary of State about its infiltration into the various seas. We know, for example, that it is building up in the Indian Ocean, and I have seen figures which suggest that it is likely that it spent about 8,000 ship-days there, in contrast with the Royal Navy's 1,000 ship-days in the year up to last April. We know that the Russian Navy is bristling in the Mediterranean and, worse still from our point of view, the Russian presence is increasingly obvious off our shores. The Secretary of State did not deal at length with the most recent example, where a ship—a trawler, so called—sailed very close to our oil rigs. As we develop our offshore installations our vulnerability will ever and ever increase. We must therefore make absolutely certain that we have a sufficiently strong Royal Navy to defend ourselves against what is very much a national rather than an international interest. I do not see how we can expect our NATO allies to put that at the forefront of their work. It is something that we must do for ourselves.

I am not happy, either, about the presence of Russian fishing trawlers bristling with equipment. They seem to move around our shores far too easily for my taste. The Secretary of State will recall that I asked whether he would forbid them to use the Millbay Docks, and at the time he made bland remarks saying that he felt they were no danger to our security. I would have thought this latest incident near the oil rigs would cause him to pause for thought. We know that the Russian crews are interchangeable between Russia's trawlers and its navy. There is no distinction between Russia's merchant service and its naval service. This also gives me cause for concern. It is clear that we need to 262 strengthen our Navy in this respect rather than weaken it.

The Russians will also make mischief in small ways. For example, I recently went over the survey ship "Hecate" when she was in Plymouth. I was told of the important work done by those on the ship. As I indicated at Question Time today, it necessitates the ship's going along straight paths—not deviating—in order to carry out the survey work. That means that other ships in the vicinity have to get out of the way. I gather that although most ships are very good about that the Russians will often, apparently deliberately, not get out of the way. It is a small point, but it is indicative of their state of mind.

I am naturally concerned about the impact on my constituency of any defence cuts, but if I felt that there was a good case for cutting defence expenditure I would not simply argue against it on employment grounds. However, we have real cause to keep our Navy strong, added to which is the possible impact of a cut in the Navy on a dockyard such as that in Plymouth. The effect would be alarming. There are 12,000 people directly employed in the dockyard, which means that, with their families, a vast number of people are directly dependent on it.

There are also the members of the defence police. Presumably, if there were a shrinking of the dockyard, there would also be a shrinking of the defence police.

The amount of money paid out in wages and salaries is very high. One must consider the effect of any reduction. I asked for the information in recent Written Questions and was given the following figures: wages and salaries of civilian employees in the dockyard amount to just under £30,500,000 a year. In addition, wages of £620,000 a year are paid to the defence police. The impact of any cut in those sums would be terrifying. It would completely disorient the economy of Plymouth and the area around it.

We have been given assurances that it the cuts were made there would be redeployment. That is very important, but I should like to quote the Secretary of 263 State's own words on this question. He said on 24th April: Cuts in defence expenditure sound simple enough. The after-effects are much more daunting. You can have a good night out on the prospects of the morrow, but if tomorrow's realisation reveals you are unemployed you won't then be so keen. This is the reality of massive defence cuts—job losses. As these get under way the Ministers for Industry will have a new dimension added to their portfolio and that is finding alternative work for the unemployed of the defence industries—as well as for cancelled defence export orders. I fully subscribe to those words.

It is all very well to suggest that redeployment will be possible, but one looks to those areas where for other reasons the major industries have been in decline, and one notices that despite all the help that has been given to them their unemployment figures are still higher than in other parts of the country. That does not give much cause for optimism, especially at a time of economic difficulties. Indeed, the Secretary of State kept emphasising our economic difficulties as a reason for making defence cuts. How, then, does he propose that we should get all this new industry going at a time of what looks like increasing depression? I am extremely alarmed about this aspect. I only hope that the Secretary of State will resist the blandishments of his Left Wing, who want him to make massive cuts.

I noticed with interest the argument in the right hon. Gentleman's speech that because the Conservative Government had made a cut of £250 million they were bound to go further down the same road. I see no logic in that argument. I believe the contrary to be true—that, those cuts having been made, there is now less room for manoeuvre than there was before. Therefore, I trust that when we finally have the defence review it will not be the alarming thing that we fear.

I also very much question the Secretary of State's assumption that the situation is not causing concern and loss of morale in the Armed Forces. I do not know to whom the right hon. Gentleman speaks. They are obviously not the same people as I speak to. I am sure that my hon. Friends will agree that there is continuing concern about the effect. Let us hope that the Secretary of State will remember the old adage that the shoe should fit the horse, and not the horse the shoe.

§ Mr. James Boyden (Bishop Auckland)

I had not intended to be particularly controversial, but I must refute the implication of what the hon. Member for Plymouth, Drake (Miss Fookes) said about Russian trawlers, and what the right hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Walker), who opened for the Opposition, said about Russians ships. Would the hon. Lady sink the Russian trawlers?

§ Miss Fookes

May I suggest that we do not go from one extreme to the other?

§ Mr. Boyden

That is precisely what the Opposition are doing. They are taking the view that we are in a state of war—that Russian ships are a menace wherever they are, and that the logic of that is to sink them.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has built up a picture of Soviet might. Certainly their aircraft and their military forces on land look very daunting to us. But what do our fleets look like to them? As a rapporteur for WEU, I had an interview about two years ago with the Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Fleet, who assured me—this was borne out by a leading member of the former Labour Government, now Chancellor of the Exchequer—that the Sixth Fleet could dispose of all the Russian missile ships and helicopter carriers in a matter of minutes rather than hours. Whether or not that is absolutely true, that is how the situation looks to the Russians from the naval point of view.

I would correct the right hon. Gentleman on aircraft carriers. The Russians have none. They have helicopter carriers with very limited range, and one aircraft carrier being built. We, the NATO forces, have very considerable aircraft carriers. I do not state this as a particularly important item in the balance of power, except to say, God help us if we do not get détente! It does not serve the purposes of détente to exaggerate the particular aspect of development that is going on in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun

Because both sides are doing it.

§ Mr. Boyden

We must get détente. We must bargain one thing for the other. We must bargain the military side—the land side—with the naval side. Why on earth 265 should not the Russians sail the Indian Ocean?

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles

It does not assist détente to exaggerate the Soviet presence; equally it does not assist to minimise it by kicking it under the carpet and pretending that it does not exist.

§ Mr. Boyden

There may have been some exaggeration on the part of my right hon. Friend, but there has been little attempt to put the matter in balance so that we can get round the table and achieve agreement.

I now turn to less controversial matters. I consider it my duty as Chairman of the Expenditure Committee to refer to the contributions that the Expenditure Committee and, particularly, the Defence Committee have made, and I hope will make, to better-informed discussion in the House and better ministerial action. I hope that the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) will catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because the Defence Committee has made a very successful visit to Gibraltar in the past few days which we hope will lead to the Minister of State taking some action.

The hon. and gallant Member for Eye will explain the situation. I shall merely say that the Expenditure Committee visited Gibraltar 18 months ago and drew attention to the extremely unsatisfactory state of the building of married quarters. Despite the 360 papers and the many witnesses from the Ministry of Defence, nothing very much has happened. However, the Defence Committee was in Gibraltar last week, and yesterday the hon. and gallant Member for Eye and myself saw the Minister of State, and it is to be hoped that some action will now result. I leave it to the hon. and gallant Gentleman to explain the matter in detail. The visit to Gibraltar of the Defence Committee is a small but important example of how the Expenditure Committee can have influence, and how it can encourage the Ministry of Defence to take action. Of course, the Committee always seeks to assure witnesses that it is not just looking for cuts but for the best sort of expenditure. Sometimes increased expenditure or punctual expenditure is more effective than, or as effective as, cuts.

I shall concentrate on a subject that the Defence Committee has spent some time 266 considering—with not very satisfactory results—and on which I have been making speeches for some time again without satisfactory results. I refer to economies in training which could be achieved painlessly either by one Service training for another or by integrated training where there could be a joint pool of effort. On the whole, the Services prefer to have one Service doing something for the other Services, but both methods of dealing with training need to be energetically considered by Ministers.

Training is an extremely large part of the defence budget. Indeed, it has been going up. In 1972–73 the amount spent on training was £308 million. It represented over 10 per cent. of the defence budget. There was an increase of 2 per cent. since the first days when I was at the Ministry of Defence. There are considerable economies to be made. I suggest that some economies might be made from following up what the Defence Committee has been probing into.

I come to the nub of my case. A few days ago the committee went over this subject with the directors of training for the Services. I was surprised to find that in this context there are four Services—the fourth Service being the Royal Marines. Each Service has its own separate training and each is very resistant to ideas of mutuality, a common front, integration or one-Service training, call it what one will.

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I did not ask him to do so, but as he has given way I shall proceed. Surely the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that the Royal Marines and at least one of the other Services have not been integrated throughout their long lives?

§ Mr. Boyden

I can only say that when the witnesses appeared in front of the Defence Committee to give evidence the Royal Marines appeared as a separate entity and gave a good account of its separate training.

The major point is that there must be waste and overlapping and considerable scope for economy. I do not say this in a destructive way. I shall offer some constructive suggestions on how steps could be taken which would enable economies to be made and a better form of training to be developed.

267 First, there is not adequate drive in the Ministry of Defence. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister of State to apply his mind to that. I am sure that if he does so he will get quite quick results. Secondly, within the Ministry of Defence the machinery for the co-ordination which I have suggested does not exist. The Defene Committee saw a major-general from the central staff which co-ordinates training. When asked how much time he devoted to the effort of getting common training he had to confess that it was very limited.

I have no criticism of the heads of training in the different Services. They are devoted to their jobs but their attitude—and quite rightly—is to maintain the morale of those being trained, to produce the most efficient training system and not to look to their colleagues to see whether they can collaborate, merge and lose portions of their training sections.

There must be some central focus in the Ministry of Defence. There must be some important person—for example, a major-general or an air vice-marshal—with a supporting staff, perhaps appointed temporarily for a year or 18 months, to consider the problem from the point of view that I have been putting to the House and to ascertain where amalgamations and economies can be made. The directors of training took the view that if they undertook the task themselves they would undermine recruiting, but training recruits is only a small part of training. A large amount of training relates, for example, to conversion to different trades, promotion and refreshers There are hundreds of courses.

The second provision that is required to support a central co-ordinator is a survey of those parts of training courses that could be satisfactorily approached from a common point of view. The Engineering Training Board has a successful record of working out modules of training for a whole range of apprenticeships and industrial training. There is probably that sort of expertise within the Ministry of Defence. I suspect that education directorates have staff that could cope with such matters. Be that as it may, people must be found who 268 can analyse a training course, take out certain bits and pieces and put the whole thing together so that the matters to which I have referred can be transposed and studied.

There are a great variety of training matters which are common—for example, cooks, drivers, clerks, some forms of gunnery, accounting and nursing. The Jarrett Committee considered the medical service of the Armed Forces and made some recommendations about various aspects of training. Those recommendations are being dealt with very slowly by the Ministry of Defence. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister of State to take the dust off the Jarrett Report.

There needs to be a technical analysis of the length of courses, the cost per student, the contents of the syllabuses and a thorough review of all the elements that make up the courses. In addition, there needs to be central direction in conjunction with the Service directors of training. I am not trying to suggest an imposed solution; the Services work much better when they are consulted and when they come to an agreement. Very often they are reluctant to take the sort of steps that I am suggesting, but when they start they come to a mutually agreed conclusion. If there is a force in the centre and if that force is conducting discussions in the way that I suggest, I am sure that there will be ample scope for considerable savings.

In the process, there could be two by-products, which strengthen my argument. One is that some of the procedures themselves will need looking at. In clerical processes throughout the three Services, for example, there must be room for greater simplification and more coming together. In rationalising the clerical processes, economies could be made in needs for training.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has been pushing very hard in the Eurogroup of NATO for collaborative efforts on the production of arms and, incidentally, for getting even simple matters like linkages of petrol flows into aircraft, common rearming facilities on NATO airfields, and so on, the need for which would not arise if we started from scratch. If my right hon. Friend applied the same energy to training, he would 269 make some startling economies. However, he will make substantial ones which will be useful and will strengthen the operational efficiency of the services if he remembers that the bigger the tail—and there is no doubt that training is a large tail—the less scope there is on the operational side. It will also simplify a part of the Ministry of Defence, which in itself would be useful. So not only from the point of view of the money but also from that of operational effectiveness and the by-products coming from it, I commend to my right hon. Friend this practically uncontroversial subject.

§ Mr. Russell Johnston (Inverness)

Debates like this always seem to show that the bulk of hon. Members are committed to two contradictory positions. First, they are anxious to see this country have the most effective defence system that it can. Second, they wish to pay as little for it as possible.

It is equally true that it is very difficult for Parliament to exercise any really effective control over defence expenditure and defence policy. I do not say that as a criticism of the excellent work of the Defence Committee. However, this is an area where it is difficult to exercise political influence over the Executive.

In the brief time at my disposal I want first to bring to the attention of the Secretary of State, engaged as he is in the defence review, the basic Liberal position on defence. Thereafter, I shall dwell upon two elements within that position.

The basis of our defence policy must be détente. I think that that is agreed in all parts of the House. The Secretary of State dealt with it very effectively. Although it is true that the Soviet threat seems extremely remote, and although it has probably diminished to the point where the likelihood of any Soviet military attack upon the West is most unlikely, nevertheless the importance of NATO as a means of safeguarding our freedom and, paradoxically, as a means of creating a realistic basis for disengagement, disarmament and détente cannot be exaggerated.

In a sense, although we get defence on the cheap from NATO—certainly more cheaply than if we attempted to do it all by ourselves—that does not detract from 270 further arguments about procurement, and I shall return to that subject later.

Secondly, we must complete the phased withdrawal of British forces from the Middle East and South-East Asia, although there are not many forces left there, and replace them with technical and training assistance.

Thirdly, we do not think that the realistic future for Britain is to maintain bases throughout the world, although we believe that we should maintain a mobile strategic reserve to enable us both to offer assistance to our friends as necessary and to play our part in what I hope will be an increasing function of the United Nations, namely, its peace-keeping rôle. There is no doubt that we must do that.

Fourthly, we believe, that Polaris should be phased out and that we should not embark upon a further generation of strategic nuclear weapons. I shall return to that in a moment.

Fifthly, we believe that, within NATO, we should work towards the creation of a non-nuclear European defence community as part of the general process of the development of some kind of West European entity, whatever form it may take. We recognise that the development of such a posture is possible only in the context of the American nuclear guarantee. But, as the Secretary of State said, the opportunities in Europe for improved co-ordination of conventional capacities in terms of control and procurement are considerable.

Sixthly, it is clear that all this very necessary effort must be undertaken against the background of sustained political pressure to pursue disarmament, which means pressing hard in the SALT negotiations, in Geneva and so on. It also mean developing an attitude, a [...]ew, a considered opinion on selling weapons, especially to countries where there are unstable political conditions. It may be that this is part of the defence review. As we know, Britain is the leading salesman of weapons in Europe. I wonder whether we should be proud of that. If we are interested in sustaining stable, conditions throughout the world, we must look at that carefully.

I now wish to comment a little more fully on two of the matters which I have 271 itemised. The first is the nuclear deterrent and the second is weapon procurement in Europe.

The Liberal policy on nuclear weapons is clear. We see no future for British strategic nuclear weapons. As a country, we misguidedly spent a great deal of money on Polaris. I am not proposing that we tow it out into the Atlantic and sink it. The Secretary of State pointed out that the cost of operating Polaris is very small. But we say that when Polaris becomes obsolescent, it should be phased out, and no attempt should be made to spend more money seeking to improve it and prolong its life. Certainly we should not contemplate turning to the next generation of missiles which will be necessary if we are to sustain any kind of race with the Soviet Union and the United States.

The purpose of the recent test puzzles me greatly. In his charming fashion, the Secretary of State made it clear that it was in line with practically all the Ten Commandants and that really no one could criticise it in any way. It seemed to me that there were some political contradictions, and that it was especially contridictory to protest to the French and the Indians about what they did only to go ahead and do it ourselves. I do not deny what the Secretary of State said about the number of tests undertaken by the Soviet Union and China—they are to be condemned—but that argument in itself is no defence of the action approved by the Secretary of State.

I come, then, to the practical question. If the Secretary of State argues that the test was undertaken to keep the options open, to my mind it implies that the Government regard the maintenance of our independent nuclear deterrent as a practical alternative option which could be pursued. It is that which I question. I do not think that it is. I do not believe that our nuclear contribution to NATO is relevant. What is relevant in NATO is our conventional capacity.

Both Front Bench spokesmen referred to the need to rationalise weapon procurement in Europe—a matter for which the Liberal Party has been pressing for a number of years. This represents a realistic area for reducing rising expenditure. We kid ourselves if we talk about 272 reducing total expenditure in an inflationary situation. It also makes, for me at least, absolute political sense if the Community is to evolve into any kind of effective political union.

Progress so far in the area of weapon procurement has been very slow. It was in some ways surprising that the Opposition Front Bench spokesman on defence dwelt some time on this. We have just had four years or so of Conservative government when not much advance was made in this field. The Minister is very much seized with this question. What does the Minister think the Eurogroup has achieved so far? Does he agree that it will not have much success unless it receives general directives from some kind of joint governmental authority in Europe, for example the Defence Ministers? What is the view held by the French? That is again crucial. The French have been opposed to the concept for long enough. Has M. Giscard-d'Estaing made up his mind whether he will commit himself to WEU, as has been the view before, and reject any Eurogroup solution? If that will be the French view, what are the Government proposing to do in such a situation?

There are many things one could speak about in this debate, but many Members wish to speak. I therefore conclude by wishing the Minister well in his defence review, which I hope will be proceeded with expeditiously and decisively.

§ Mr. John Cronin (Loughborough)

It is interesting to follow the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston). He made some points which surprised me. He suggested that the recent test in Nevada of the British nuclear weapon was comparable with those of India and France. The important distinction is that that test was held underground and completely in conformity with the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The other tests, held in the atmosphere, were obviously harmful to some extent and contrary to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The important thing about this test, which has caused so much real heat, is that it is purely a test to maintain the efficiency of our nuclear deterrent.

I understand the viewpoint of hon. Gentlemen who consider it important to 273 dispense with nuclear weapons. That is a point of view I do not share. I sympathise with it.

I do not share the point of view of the hon. Gentleman who thinks that there is some purpose in having inefficient nuclear weapons, because then one has the worst of all worlds. One still has the nuclear weapons but they are inefficient. One is surely wasting money. The Government are behaving with admirable good sense in holding the nuclear test.

One of the points made by the hon. Member for Inverness was that all the proposals of the Liberal Party for getting rid of nuclear weapons are made within the context of the United States nuclear umbrella, which presumably is intended to cover Europe. Is there a credible United States nuclear umbrella covering Europe? Can one visualise the United States using its nuclear weapons and inviting a massive attack against its own cities on account of some aggression on the part of the Soviet Union towards Europe? It is highly improbable. Can one visualise the Unit