DEFENCE

§ Mr. Speaker

I have selected the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) and some of his hon. Friends, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add 'condemns Her Majesty's Government's failure to restrain arms spending; and urges it to reduce Great Britain's share of the gross national product devoted to military expenditure from the current 5.7 per cent. towards the 4 2 per cent. average for European North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Government'.

§ The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Ian Gilmour)

The right hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. George Thomson) yesterday said that there had been a great conversion on this side of the House to the Labour Government's defence policy. I thought at the time that in view of the behaviour of the right hon. Gentleman's party during the last few months, indeed over the last few days, it was a little insensitive of him to talk about conversions either forcibly or voluntarily made, but since he spent most of his speech trying to convert members of his party who sit below the Gangway who had signed the Amendment, I very quickly forgave him. I shall come to that Amendment later, and to some of the hon. Members who have signed it.

A glance at Annex B of the Statement on the Defence Estimates will show how important are the responsibilities of the Procurement Executive. About one-third of the total defence expenditure in the financial year 1972–73 will be spent in the equipment area. It is clearly vital, therefore, to have the best possible organisation for administering this. And I think that we now have this in the form of the procurement executive which, under Mr. Rayner, came into being last August.

1514 My right hon. Friend and I are confident that the major reorganisation which has taken place will create lasting and major improvements in the whole machinery for procuring defence equipment. The aim is to ensure not only that each product provides the best all round solution to the military requirement, but also that it comes into service when it is needed.

The benefits of the new organisation will not become fully apparent at once; defence procurement, however efficiently organised, operates over a period of years rather than months. But the new organisation has got off to an excellent start. Every aspect from personnel management to methods and procedures, from relations with industry at home to international collaboration—to which I shall return—from basic research to the rôle of the project managers—these and many other problems are being vigorously tackled by the chief executive and his controllers. Already it is clear that the organisation we have chosen was the right one.

I should, perhaps, remind the House that the procurement executive is an integral part of the Ministry of Defence, and under my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State my responsibilities stretch rather wider than the procurement executive. They include responsibilities for scientific research and operational requirements. It is my job, therefore, to try to keep these three facets in phase with each other.

Of course, a totally tidy and all-complete equipment programme is not possible. There never comes a moment when we can plan from scratch and, having taken every relevant factor into account, make ideal and unchangeable decisions on our precise arrangements for the next 10 years. At all times we are to some extent prisoners of the past, the present and the future. The slate is never rubbed clean.

If we delay a decision on one equipment to see how it may be affected by a future decision on another equipment, we may in reality be deciding that the first equipment is never produced, since the delay may well mean that it would come into service too late for the Services.

Moreover, the industrial situation is never static, and, once again, it may be impossible to delay a decision as long 1515 as other considerations might ideally require, as to do so would mean a company laying off its design team or making many other people unemployed.

Further, nobody can ever be sure of the exact operational requirements over the next few years. Nobody can be sure of the exact pace or direction of scientific and technological advance in the future. Nobody can be sure, either, of industrial developments here in the next 10 years or what the export prospects may be.

I do not, therefore, want to exaggerate the scientific and rational element in our planning and in our decisions. We could be entirely scientific and tidy only if we lived in a world of our own, paying only the minimum attention to both industrial and military imperatives, and virtually ignoring what the Russians and other countries were doing. But that having been said, we do, within the inevitable constraints that are upon us, try to make as rational an assessment as we can of the best way of meeting our operational requirements out of our industrial and financial resources, acting either on our own or in collaboration with our allies.

Only when there are compelling reasons of timing or of costs or when there is no British equipment available or in prospect do we decide to buy abroad. Otherwise, we buy British or engage in collaborative projects.

This country has a good record of collaboration. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Maj.-Gen. Jack d'AvigdorGoldsmid) has made some kind references to existing projects. He will be pleased to know that we are not resting on past efforts. As we formulate our equipment plans, we examine carefully the scope for further collaboration, either through sharing projects with our Allies or in identifying areas where we can avoid duplicating each other's efforts.

Progress is not easy. Operational requirements must be reconciled, the times at which countries plan to introduce new equipment often vary widely, and each country is understandably anxious to preserve its own industrial base. Collaboration cannot be a wholly one-way process and there must be some sensible give and take. But in spite of the diffi 1516 culties there is a growing awareness that further progress must be made.

There are two developments which I am sure will give added impetus. The hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan) asked about the work of Eurogroup in this context. The European members of N.A.T.O. are becoming more conscious of the need to secure the maximum effectiveness from their defence effort. Moreover, the enlargement of the E.E.C. will facilitate a more rational organisation and a more effective use of Europe's industrial resources; for example, by removing some of the present barriers to trans-national industrial partnerships.

Over a whole range of future requirements we are presently engaged in bilateral or multilateral discussions with our Allies over the possibilities of multilateral solutions. These cover, for example, battlefield communications, surveillance systems and future air defence systems. I fear that progress will not be spectacular but I am confident that we shall be able to extend collaboration sensibly to fields where at present there is wasteful duplication.

§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian)

What are the precise functions of the Ministerial Aerospace Board, which is mentioned in paragraph 21 of the White Paper? Will the Department make the key decision about whether we should participate in the American shuttle, a decision which must be made by the summer of this year?

§ Mr. Gilmour

The aerospace board has been set up, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry are prominent members of it. It has met. It has responsibility for looking at the future of the civil aviation programme.

§ Mr. Dalyell

In the hon. Gentleman's Department?

§ Mr. Gilmour

No. Civil aviation policy is decided not in my Department, although the procurement executive can, except in relation to Concorde, monitor and, if necessary, control a project. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace is the Minister primarily responsible for civil aviation policy.

§ Mr. Robert Maclennan (Caithness and Sutherland)

The hon. Gentleman has described, and the White Paper draws attention to: the need to maintain an adequate industrial base for the future programme, and to strengthen relationships with Defence suppliers. If this close domestic relationship is being developed for procurement purposes, may I ask the Minister to say what parallel developments are taking place in Europe? It seems on the face of it that the new development, which he says is so important, is likely to prejudice the rationalisation of co-operative effort in Europe.

§ Mr. Gilmour

I do not think so. if we rationalise and make closer the relationship with our manufacturers, this will help future European rationalisation rather than hinder it. There has not been established much new European machinery of the sort the hon. Gentleman has in mind, though I do not rule it out in future. At the moment we are acting rather pragmatically.

The House will recall that on 11th November last I announced that orders were being placed for 14 new ships for the Royal Navy, including four type-21 frigates and two type-42 destroyers: in addition, a number of small auxiliary ships were to be ordered. I can tell the House that this ordering programme, valued at over £70 million, has now been completed. The ships involved are being ordered earlier, but not at the expense of the rest of the programme because the defence budget targets have been increased accordingly.

Besides greatly helping to improve the capability of the Royal Navy. these orders, which were exceptionally limited to development and intermediate areas to maximise their effect on the employment situation, will over the next year create or preserve over 4,000 shipworkers' jobs alone; about two-thirds of them in Scotland. Additionally, there will be an increase in indirect employment in the shipyards and about another 4,000 jobs will be provided in sub-contracting firms throughout the country.

The Army Department will spend an extra £1 million in the coming year in purchasing tractors and dump trucks to meet a N.A.T.O. requirement for rapid repair of aircraft runways. These orders 1518 will create additional work for about 100 men.

New orders of aircraft for the Royal Air Force which have been announced over the last four months will also make a substantial contribution to employment in the aircraft industry.

§ Mr. John Wilkinson (Bradford, West)

Will my hon. Friend consider putting out to contract and tender with the aerospace industry on a much larger scale than is at present the case the third-line servicing of the Royal Air Force? The latest studies show not only the great economy to be achieved from this but better opportunities from the employment point of view.

§ Mr. Gilmour

My right hon. Friend has dealt with this matter by way of answers and questions in the House and has given my hon. Friend details about the position.

§ Mr. Dalyell

I am rather confused. The Minister said that employment would be given for 100 men on this £1 million order. I represent the Leyland truck factories in my constituency. It may be my stupidity, but I do not understand what the hon. Gentleman is getting at.

§ Mr. Gilmour

I think it must be. Our estimate is that 100 people will be employed, who would not otherwise have been employed, on making these vehicles. I honestly think it is a fairly simple conception.

The order for additional Buccaneers which is being brought forward will mean continuing employment for about 800 men in Hawker Siddeley Aviation at Brough and Rolls-Royce Scottish factories. The order for Nimrod, which I announced on 19th January, will give employment to some 2,000 men in Hawker Siddeley Aviation factories in the North-West and in other factories elsewhere. Moreover, as my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the House on 23rd November, 1971, we are ordering from Scottish Aviation at Prestwick more than 100 Bulldog aircraft to replace the Royal Air Force's Chipmunk aircraft. This will mean continuing employment for about 200 men in Scotland.

Finally, I am glad to be able to announce today another new aircraft order. During the past few months hon. Members on both sides have shown a 1519 great deal of interest in the choice of aircraft to replace the Varsity in the multi-engine pilot trainer rôle. A very thorough assessment of the available aircraft has now been completed, and the Jetstream has been judged to be the aircraft best suited to the R.A.F.'s requirement. We intend, therefore, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory contract arrangements, to place an order for about 25 Jetstream aircraft with Scottish Aviation Ltd. I believe that such an order will give considerable encouragement to the export prospects of this excellent aircraft and be appreciated not only in Prestwick but in Scotland generally. [Several HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Some 400 new jobs will be created, and altogether, at its peak, the contract will provide employment for about 600 people.

§ Mr. Dalyell

Over what period?

§ Mr. Gilmour

I intend to tell the House about other contracts later in my speech.

§ Mr. Dalyell

rose—

§ Mr. Gilmour

When manufacturers build things they employ people, and they make some estimates of how many people they are going to employ. It really is not difficult.

§ Mr. Dalyell

Over what period of time? If the hon. Gentleman does not know he can say so.

§ Mr. Speaker

There are about 30 hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who wish to speak in this debate.

§ Mr. Gilmour

Manufacturers estimate that they will employ another 400 people most of the time and 600 in total at peak. That really is a perfectly straightforward matter. If the hon. Gentleman had had some experience of business he would understand it very easily.

The need to have and sustain an adequate and healthy industrial base capable, within available resources, of meeting our expected future procurement programme is fundamental to defence planning. We attach great importance, therefore, to strengthening relationships with defence suppliers. The National Defence Industries Council already provides for consultation at a high level between Government and industry on defence procurement matters of mutual concern. Membership of the council has been 1520 reorganised to include top management in the procurement executive. This consultative machinery is being expanded at various levels to embrace presentations to industry by the Services on future equipment plans, joint symposia on specialised technological areas, and the setting up of ad hoc groups to examine particular aspects of procurement policy.

Discussions are also taking place with industry about the quality standards we expect of contractors and on how we shall assess that they are fully met. It used to be the practice of the Services to devote very considerable effort to direct inspection at the place of manufacture. The emphasis now, however, is on placing the maximum responsibility with the manufacturer for the quality of what he produces. The trend is now firmly towards entrusting defence orders only to firms whose arrangements for quality and product reliability give the Department the confidence to reduce its own direct inspection to a minimum level or even dispense with it entirely.

Keeping in close touch with those industries associated with our defence needs, important though it is, is not by itself enough. We have not only to discuss but to act when a problem has been brought to light. Often action in this field means the Ministry having to be flexible and understanding. Often it will mean persuading firms to become more efficient. But at the present time action means very often that the Government having to sustain a vital defence industry by giving it the work it needs, when it most needs it. Preserving a healthy defence industrial base means just that; we cannot allow essential bits of it to wither away through lack of forward planning on both sides, or because of badly-phased ordering.

One of the vital areas for defence is the guided weapons industry. I am glad, therefore, today to be able to tell the House of new decisions in that field. As the House is aware, we have been studying ways of satisfying the R.A.F.'s requirements for both medium and short-range air-to-air missiles to supplement those at present in service.

We are asking Hawker Siddeley Dynamics to look into the possibility of modifying the American medium range Sparrow weapon to incorporate advanced new British components which are to be 1521 developed by Marconi Space and Defence Systems Limited and E.M.I. Limited. Meanwhile, since no suitable British weapon is available a small number of medium range Sparrow missiles is being acquired from the United States to top up our holdings for the Phantom aircraft. We have had to buy American because the previous Administration as a matter of policy abandoned the U.K. capability in the air-to-air weapons field and instead purchased American missiles for the Phantom.

As to the short-range requirement, I can now tell the House that the Government have decided, subject to a satisfactory outcome of negotiations, to place a contract with Hawker Siddeley Dynamics for project definition of a new missile known as S.R.A.A.M. 75. It is the Government's intention also to equip the Royal Navy with a new anti-ship guided weapon system for use with naval Lynx helicopters. Subject to satisfactory negotiations a contract for project definition will shortly be placed with the guided weapons division of British Aircraft Corporation. This missile is known as CL 834.

After the project definition phase, these two projects will be reviewed in the light of all the circumstances of the time, including the progress and latest estimated cost of the project, and the overall loading of the industry. A decision will then be taken whether or not to proceed to full development. Work in these initial stages of CL 834 and S.R.A.A.M. 75 will occupy important advanced technology resources in the British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics as well as in other British firms.

§ Mr. John Morris (Aberavon)

Could the Minister assist the House? He has given the employment figures for some other projects, and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mrs. Shirley Williams) is concerned about S.R.A.A.M. 75. What are the employment results of his present decision as regards project definition study and also the purchase of Sparrow?

§ Mr. Gilmour

I cannot give the right hon. Gentleman the answer to that because we have only just made and announced the decision and, therefore, we have not had the necessary full discussion.

1522 Finally, I would like to deal with the Amendment which has been tabled. I am rather disappointed to see that only one hon. Gentleman who signed it is here, the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun). He will, therefore, forgive me if I address my remarks almost exclusively at him. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, East yesterday produced a cogent argument against the Amendment in general, and I would like to adopt but not repeat that argument. My right hon. Friend yesterday reiterated the purely defence aspect of the situation and emphasised the threat to which we are subject. I would like therefore, to concentrate on perhaps the less obvious implications of the policy advocated in the Amendment.

I have already mentioned that a third of defence expenditure is taken up with equipment. There is little room for manoeuvre in manpower costs. So any cutback in the budget would therefore inevitably have to be borne substantially in the equipment area. Not only would we not have been able to add to the defence orders in order to help unemployment; we should have to cancel and forgo many other projects as well. That means that those areas and people who have benefited from our orders for naval ships on the Clyde, on the Tyne and at Leith and those who have benefited from the Nimrod, Buccaneer, Bulldog and Jetstream orders would not have benefited. It is remarkable that many of those who have signed the Amendment have a lot of constituents who are benefiting and who will benefit from these recent defence orders. Other hon. Members have constituents whose jobs are heavily dependent upon the maintenance of the defence budget even at its normal level.

No one doubts the sincerity of the hon. Member for Salford, East or of his hon. Friends who have signed the Amendment. But, equally, no one can doubt that their convictions can only be acted upon at the cost of making many of their constituents unemployed. So to support the Amendment is to opt for increased unemployment. Hon. Members opposite must know this perfectly well. Many of them whose constituencies, like that of the hon. Member for Salford, East, are in the North-West have written to me or been to see me to ask for 1523 increased orders for the North-West, for Hawker Siddeley. Many of my hon. Friends have done the same. They wanted us to place more aircraft orders because they were worried by the prospect of many more people being unemployed at Hawker Siddeley. We are now buying more Nimrods, yet many hon. Members from the North-West have signed the Amendment, which, if carried out, would mean there would be no Nimrod order and no Jetstream order either. The inference is perfectly clear. Hon. Members opposite consider their ideological prejudices more important than the employment of their constituents.

I recognise the pro-European direction of the Amendment, and I welcome the desire of hon. Gentlemen opposite for greater harmonisation of our defence policy with Europe. But, while I appreciate the zeal of the hon. Member for Salford, East for European integration, I think he is pushing far too fast and in the wrong direction. In any case the Amendment is sheer economic as well as defence madness.

So much for the inconsistencies of Labour Members. We are only pleased that their views are very far from being shared by the Opposition Front Bench.

§ Mr. John Cronin (Loughborough)

Can the Minister of State indicate why the Government do not employ a middle course in this respect and negotiate with the other countries in Western Europe to increase their supply of armaments and therefore take some of the burden off this country?

§ Mr. Gilmour

Whether or not the other countries in Europe increase their defence budgets, if we reduce ours, as I have explained at some length, that will still mean increased unemployment in this country. The employment situation as a result of our defence budget is the same irrespective of what people in Europe do, although on defence grounds we would welcome any increased effort made by our friends in Europe.

§ Dame Joan Vickers (Plymouth, Devonport)

My hon. Friend the Minister of State is giving employment to a great number of people, which we welcome. But why is he cutting down employment among his own employees in the dockyards?

§ Mr. Gilmour

The point of our increased shipbuilding orders was to keep a viable defence shipbuilding industry, and, therefore, it would not have been appropriate to place them in my hon. Friend's constituency.

We hope that in due course the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, East, who made such a sensible speech yesterday, will be able to convert his hon. Friends to a more enlightened attitude on defence.

§ Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Sutton)

The House has conducted a debate on defence estimates and defence expenditure in a situation which, I think, is almost unique in that yesterday the House was presented with a report from its own Select Committee on Expenditure undertaken by the defence section of that committee. It is a great shame that it has not been possible for the House to have had a greater opportunity to read this report before the debate. Indeed, we have had very little time to look at the White Paper before the defence debates.

There is no area of governmental activity where parliamentary control is in reality less effective than in the area of defence. For far too long successive Governments and successive Ministers have been allowed to hide behind a shroud of secrecy and not subject their policies and their expenditure priorities to the same degree of scrutiny as that which we traditionally exercise in other areas of expenditure.

It is a significant advance in parliamentary scrutiny, criticism and control of the executive that an expenditure committee is now seriously looking at defence. I pay tribute to the Government for having made available a great deal of information which has hitherto never been disclosed to hon. Members, and that has made a valuable contribution to opening up the whole subject. We on this side of the House feel there is room for a greater relaxation in security classifications and I said this when I was in government, and we endorse the recommendation from the all-party committee that there should be far greater freedom to disclose classified expenditure figures. We understand that there are security implications, but I believe that all my hon. Friends, whatever their feelings about defence expenditure, would 1525 welcome more information and a clearer idea of the options. I hope that the Government will think, too, about providing time for a discussion of the report. Perhaps as a member of the Committee I should not comment on its merits, but I believe the report contains enough information to justify the House taking a further look at expenditure.

I believe that world military expenditure is far too high and, like many of my hon. Friends, I would thoroughly support any activity which is consistently aimed at reducing world military expenditure. It stands at the moment at about £500 billion and it absorbs some 6 per cent. to 7 per cent. of all world output. There is a grave danger that we shall learn to accept a continuing arms race. It has already become a part of twentieth-century life. But, as parliamentarians, we have a duty constantly to examine this expenditure.

With inflation and rising wealth in many Western countries, defence expenditure has increased to keep pace, but there have been two significant leaps. It doubled in the three years following the declaration of the Korean war in 1949 and it then increased by 50 per cent. between 1965 and 1970, largely as a result of the Vietnam war and as a result of Soviet military expansion and increased expenditure. However, this trend has not been followed in Europe. In 1952 Britain was spending approximately 11.8 per cent. of her G.N.P. on defence. That may not be comparable with the way in which we express defence expenditure now, but it is a fair approximation. In the same year, 1952, our European allies were spending 7.5 per cent. So even at that time there was a marked discrepancy between Britain and Europe. By 1959 our European allies were spending 5.9 per cent. while in Britain—

§ Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Walthamstow, East)

The hon. Member is referring to our European allies collectively and that, therefore, gives him an average figure. But that could be misleading because it could include Luxembourg, and I do not think her defence expenditure can be all that great.

§ Dr. Owen

Luxembourg is included but it is a weighted average. In Britain in 1964 we were spending 7 per cent. 1526 of our G.N.P. on defence. My hon. Friends should bear in mind that one of the substantial achievements of the Labour Government from 1964 to 1970 was substantially to reduce that figure to its current level. I would say to many of my hon. Friends who signed the Amendment before the House that I, like them, fought in 1966 and 1967 for defence cuts—and I have done that while representing a naval constituency. I am proud to say that I did so and openly advocated such cuts. I believed at the time that we should withdraw from East of Suez, that we should adopt a different world rôle, with a primary emphasis on Europe.

We were right to press for that, but we should not delude ourselves. To bring about that degree of reduction in percentage of G.N.P. was a painful experience. We had difficulties with our allies and the Services, and we had persistent and most obsessional criticism from Conservative Members—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It is all very well for them to say "Hear, hear". They are now accepting exactly the same defence policy as the Labour Government. There is not a jot of difference in it, and they know it. It is all credit to the Secretary of State who sits in another place that, for all the difficulties, he saw the sensible nature of the defence changes that had taken place and has carried them on substantially unchanged. I am glad to see the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary here, because he, too, has accepted many of the foreign policy judgments embodied in many of the defence cuts, particularly in relation to the Persian Gulf, that were so vigorously opposed by Conservative Members.

I welcome to that extent the degree of agreement between the two Front Benches, but when we left office in June, 1970 we had every intention of pursuing defence cuts. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), the then Secretary of State, was convinced that there was a possibility of multilateral discussions aimed at reducing defence expenditure. It is here that I part company with my hon. Friends, because I am certain that defence expenditure cuts by this country in the next decade can come about only by multilateral agreement, by negotiations with our allies, and that the most foolhardy 1527 step would be to make those decisions unilaterally.

We should see what some of our friends in Europe think about this issue. We on this side often pay tribute to the immense achievements of our Social-Democrat colleagues in West Germany for their Ostpolitik policies, but let us face facts. Neither the Chancellor, Herr Brandt, nor the Defence Secretary, Herr Schmidt, would dream of advocating unilateral defence cuts at this critical moment in the pursuit of détente. They know full well that their ability to conduct negotiation on détente, to pursue the policies we have all advocated for many years, depends on their having behind them a shield of security. They are as committed to N.A.T.O., to the European Improvement Plan, to the overall strength and stability of N.A.T.O., as we are.

Equally, it is no use our being anxious about defence cuts by our principal N.A.T.O. ally, the United States. If we were to pursue unilateral cuts, would it pursue unilateral cuts? I believe it is inevitable, and, as viewed from the United States position, probably right, that it should to some extent reduce its force levels in Europe. But those reductions should be planned and discussed with its N.A.T.O. allies and come about as a result of mutual agreement.

Where my hon. Friends' criticism of the Government is wholly justified is on the difference of attitude between the two Front Benches on the possibilities for détente and the objectives behind it. I was utterly astonished to hear the Minister of State say yesterday, in discussing the negotiations for force reductions in Europe: We want to strike a fair bargain which does not diminish security on either side. Nobody would disagree with that. If it can be achieved it may well be enormously worth while in relaxing tension, but we must be under no illusion that what we are concerned with is force withdrawals for a specified area. It will not result in any direct financial savings."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 23rd February, 1972; Vol. 831, c. 1316.] If that is the right hon. Gentleman's concept of mutual and balance force reductions, it is a very different concept from that which was inspired by the then Labour Government in 1967 in the Harmel Report, which was agreed by all 1528 our N.A.T.O. allies then and in subsequent N.A.T.O. discussions in Reykjavik, Brussels and in Lisbon, when his own Government were involved. It has always been a part of mutual and balanced force reductions that they lead to an absolute reduction in forces, that one disbands forces. Obviously, the savings will not come in the first financial year or even in the second or third, but the end result is substantial savings if reductions can be achieved on a mutual basis. I see no point in continuing the arms race just for the sake of doing so. There are far more priorities for expenditure in this country to which I would gladly divert resources, and to which we did divert resources when we were in government. What I am not prepared to contenance—nor, I believe, would many of my hon. Friends who signed the Amendment—is anything that in the short term put in peril the security of this country.

The objective of defence cuts is one that I commend. I would go even further. As this country enters the Common Market, as we compete with European countries across the open tariff system, it will become clear that we shall not be able industrially to support a disproportionate defence effort. That must be apparent to our friends and allies both in N.A.T.O. and in the European Economic Community. It is reasonable and right—and I am sure the pressure is being put on by the present Government as it was by the Labour Government—to ask our European allies to ensure that their contributions compare reasonably with those of the countries paying the highest contribution. It is obvious that in any form of industrial common market no country can make a disproportionate effort. One of our major arguments against the East of Suez policies was that we felt that we were being saddled with overseas costs wholly disproportionate to this country's size and its place in the real world, particularly in Europe.

I do not dispute for one moment that Conservative Members wish to see mutual and balanced force reductions as much as we do. But since they took office they have always been the most pessimistic about them. One of the bases for their pessimism is their assessment of the threat in Europe. The White Paper is the second to start by re-emphasising the 1529 imbalance in Europe. It must be clear to any hon. Member who studies the facts that there is a marked difference between this country's assessment of the military balance and that made by our principal N.A.T.O. ally, the United States. To say that it is more optimistic and that we are more pessimistic is but one explanation. The pressures on both sides are different. We wish the American Administration to resist force reductions. They wish to show that in the fullness of time, if they do make force reductions, they will not be leaving Europe with an unbalanced military force level.

§ Mr. Wilkinson

Will the hon. Gentleman explain—

§ Dr. Owen

No. The hon. Gentleman made his speech in an intervention yesterday. I am going on to explain the point. I know the hon. Gentleman will not like it.

I am asking the House to look at the question of the military balance far more seriously than is normally the case in the opening few paragraphs in the last two Defence White Papers about the "threat" or the kinds of advertisement we see, usually for the Army, which talk about the crude two to one outnumbering of N.A.T.O. forces in Central Europe, the three to one outnumbering in armour and artillery, and four to one outnumbering in some essential types of aircraft. Anyone can play the numbers game. The facts are that the United States' objective assessment of the military balance is that we are roughly in balance. That was McNamara's belief in 1968 in his annual posture statement.

§ Mr. Wilkinson

indicated dissent.

§ Dr. Owen

The present American Administration has not come out with quite such a categoric statement, but the hon. Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Wilkinson), who is always quoting the Institute for Strategic Studies should examine a publication of that Institute, January's edition of Survival. He will find Frederick Wyle's assessment of the balance. He was the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and N.A.T.O. Affairs and left office in 1969. I believe that his assessment is exactly similar to that of most people in the Pentagon today. He says: 1530 First, there is in fact a reasonable balance of conventional forces between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact, and between the countries on each side in the Centre Region of Europe, with and without the backing of the principal power in each alliance: a global superiority in manpower, equipment, and budget by N.A.T.O., and a rough parity on the ground in Europe, with substantial equipment advantages in most categories. That may be too optimistic for hon. Gentlemen in this House, and I think it possibly is in some sense. I think the United States has tended to underestimate certain key factors, but it is certainly a long way from the pessimistic forebodings that come continuously from this Government, and of course from none more than the Secretary of State, who said, as reported in col. 400 of the OFFICIAL REPORT: The fact is that in Europe the Warsaw Pact has a marked superiority over the West…".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 22nd February, 1972; Vol. 328, c. 400]

§ Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

Does my hon. Friend realise the danger of articles such as that of Wyle? This is the same kind of argument as that which says that the Americans can leave Vietnam and leave a viable situation behind them. This is the preliminary excuse for their going, and it is terrifying.

§ Dr. Owen

If my hon. and learned Friends reads the article and knows Wyle's commitment to the subject of European defence and N.A.T.O. he will realise that what he says is unjustified. Wyle has always been a very strong advocate of continued American contributions at a substantial level in Europe, as I am. He has always believed that the strength of the European defence effort is wholly dependent on the United States' contribution to it. If my hon. and learned Friend wishes, I can add another statement. I would draw attention to the statement of the Government, a very valid statement, on the question of mutual and balanced forced reductions at a conference in Munich only a few weeks ago which I had the honour of attending. The Under-Secretary of State for the Navy said, talking about Europe: …there are complications arising from the different size of Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O divisions. Although there is something approaching equality of manpower there is also a crucial disparity in numbers of major equipments, of which, in terms of offensive 1531 capability, tanks and tactical aircraft are the most significant. Here we have some 14,500 Warsaw Pact tanks facing 6,000 of N.A.T.O.'s and figures of 3,500 and 1,300 respectively for tactical aircraft. These facts serve to illustrate the central problem of M.B.F.R., namely the enormous difficulty of applying mutual and balanced reductions to an unbalanced situation without producing a result which is even less balanced. I accept those figures, which are taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies publication "The Military Balance 1971–72". But when we talk about numbers of tanks we must look at the capability of those tanks and the difference in their rôles. Tanks deployed by N.A.T.O. are primarily for defensive purposes. N.A.T.O. has always had a far higher percentage of anti-tank guns, for instance; and quite rightly so, because their primary rôle is defensive. So when we look at tanks we must look at their capability, and the Chieftains and other British tanks are in every way superior to most of the tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries.

§ Mr. Ian Gilmour

Has the hon. Gentleman seen what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said in another place—that the Warsaw Pact has a superiority of two to one?

§ Dr. Owen

I read what the noble Lord said in another place and I would say that the emphasis on his speech was on criticism of the Government for not pursuing policies of détente and disengagement. I agree with that. But on the question of balance in Europe I do not agree with the noble Lord, nor do I agree with him on the question of nuclear weapons. Those were not the views of the Government of which I was proud to be a member when they were in power, nor are they their views in Opposition. There has to be reliance on some form of nuclear guarantee; that is inherent in the strategy of flexible response. Many hon. Members, including hon. Gentlemen opposite, have argued that Europe must have a massive conventional capability, and I believe that that is the view of my noble Friend. I believe that this is politically impossible and that this is the view of the present Government.

§ The Minister of State for Defence (Lord Balniel)

How can the hon. Gentleman tell us that we are not trying to achieve relaxation of tension and détente? We support the Ostpolitik, we 1532 are playing our part and are involved in the strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the Berlin Agreement was signed last September. What further step does he think should have been taken which we have not taken?

§ Dr. Owen

I think it is a question of enthusiasm and emphasis. Hon. Gentlemen opposite may not like to hear this, but they should listen. The basis on which they have to look at this is that if they support the desire for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces from a wrong assessment of the facts, they are not likely to achieve rapid progress. I am not unrealistic about the position; I realise that progress will be slow. President Johnson first suggested the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1964; it is only now, in 1972, that the first break-through is likely to come on A.B.M.s when in May President Nixon visits Moscow. Of course these things take time, but hon. Gentleman have every right to urge the Government, as we do, to put as strong an emphasis as possible on this.

A more realistic assessment must be made of the military balance, especially since the assessment of this country is not in agreement with that of our principal N.A.T.O. ally. I am not necessarily saying that we should accept all the American views on the balance, but I believe that we are unrealistic in many of our basic assessments of the military balance on the central front and in Europe as a whole. I think this point needs to be brought home to the House.

I would say that there are in this report of the Committee, which did not feel able because of the limited evidence taken to form an assessment, two articles of interest. There is the article on military balance by the Institute of Strategic Studies—so often referred to by hon. Gentlemen opposite—which is very good, and another article from the S.I.P.R.I. Year Book, 1968–69. The figures in the latter may be slightly out of date, but it gives a rather more optimistic viewpoint. These should be studied by hon. Gentlement. It is no use bandying figures about without looking more carefully at the facts. Unless and until that is done, we shall not achieve the basis for negotiation of large mutual and balance reductions of forces.

1533 Having said this, I think my hon. Friends are right to urge this Government to reduce defence expenditure and pursue policies of détente. I must say to them that if in fact they are trying to do this on a unilateral basis they are threatening the success of what they and I wish to see. That was the view of this party in Government and it should not change because we are in Opposition.

There is one other major item of defence expenditure and that is the research and defence budget. It is well known to this House that the research and defence budget, which the hon. Gentleman who started the debate mentioned because he is responsible for it, involves substantial amounts of money. It employs, I believe, some 30,000 people, has some 30 establishments and spends over £100 million.

We on this side welcome, broadly speaking the setting up of the procurement executive. We believe it is doing a substantial job. We are greatly concerned—I know my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) is—that we are taking up too much of the scarce resources of manufacturing skills and equipment, and we must urge the Government to make strategic decisions in this whole area. I believe that the room for small, piecemeal changes and small economies is not great. What is needed is, first, a merging of establishments, and second, the eradication of some whole areas of research and development—a policy of much greater selectivity and considerable ruthlessness. This is one area where I do not believe this will lead to unemployment because industry is crying out for these skills.

Industry is crying out for these skills, and if we are to get industrial expansion it is unhelpful, to say the least, to have so much skill bound up in defence research. This area merits considerable study. It has been looked at several times by Select Committees of the House, and the conclusion on an all-party basis has always been that there is room for substantial cuts. I hope that the Government and the new procurement executive will pursue this with vigour.

On other aspects of the defence estimates I reiterate what are becoming old chestnuts, and they will continue to be reiterated by me for as long as I 1534 continue to speak from this Bench. The Government should look at the shape of the Navy. It is wrong. I have said before and I will say again that we need to build more nuclear-powered submarines and fewer surface ships. I draw to the attention of the House the important and difficult expenditure choice that will face the country at the end of this decade. The M.R.C.A. expenditure is coinciding very much with the cruiser expenditure, and there is little room in the defence budget for future years. We who expect to be on the opposite side of the House dealing with these problems three or four years hence are showing more concern about what will be happening then than in the immediate future. We therefore feel we should draw attention to this and to the need for it to be looked at again.

There are areas of defence where I should like to see more money spent, with economies in other areas. The argument that the balance of the Fleet has always been the same is no argument, when the Russians have so significantly changed the balance of their fleet in favour of under-water warfare and submarines, for saying that we in this country should continue to stay outside such a strategic change.

On he question of the M.R.C.A., most hon. Members thoroughly approve of the prospect of greater European collaboration in building together expensive military projects. This not only makes sense in terms of unit costs because of the larger numbers but also makes sense in terms of logistics, support and back-up in Europe. It also means that we can make economies. But the European collaboration has to take place at a much earlier stage, right back at the staff requirement and operational requirements stage, and we need to push this with a great deal more vigour.

For instance, in Europe the lorries run by various European armies, are practically without exception, national in origin, with different spares and different logistic back-up. This is a nonsense which cannot be tolerated for much longer. There are economies to be made there. Similarly, with aircraft types and with ships, where the different types of frigates and destroyers bear little resemblance to each other.

It is no use to talk on the one hand about European unity and on the other 1535 hand to put forward European force levels which constantly exclude France and even exclude the French divisions in Germany. Of course the French are not members of the military structure of the organisation, but they are and have always remained subscribers to the North Atlantic Treaty. The amount of money the French continue to spend on nuclear weapons is also of serious concern. It means that they cannot spend much on conventional weapons. By 1975 it is estimated that 20 per cent. of the French defence budget will be spent on nuclear weapons, although that technology is already available within the Alliance.

There is no doubt in my mind that collaboration in Europe on procurement and military strategic matters within N.A.T.O. can result in substantial economies. There is a need for this policy to be pursued with much more vigour. Everyone wants it, but the attainment of this objective has been severely limited.

In conclusion, I hope that when my hon. Friends come to make a decision on how they will vote tonight they will ask themselves whether the Motion will achieve its objective. If it were to encourage the Government to pursue policies of détente with the same vigour with which they are pursued by our Socialist colleagues in West Germany, the Motion would possibly have a good effect. If it were, however, to lend credence to the belief that unilateral defence cuts by this country are the answer to stability in the future and to world peace, then it would be gravely disadvantageous. We are a member of an Alliance, and our strength lies in the unity of that Alliance and in multilateral agreement. We in this country must realise that one nation alone is not capable of responding to the threat to our shores or to industrial competition. We need to combine; we need to adopt a multi-national identity. It is in multilateralism that the prospect of meaningful and safe defence expenditure reductions lies.

§ Mr. Julian Critchley (Aldershot)

Earlier this week the whole House showed and shared a sense of horror and sorrow at the outrage that occurred in 1536 my constituency of Aldershot when six civilians and a priest were killed. It is ironic that some advantage may come from this disaster, for the universal horror which has been expressed has led Mr. Lynch to move with unaccustomed firmness against the I.R.A. in the Republic. I think we are all, on both sides of the House, agreed that there can be no settlement in Northern Ireland until the South recognises, as does the North, that the ugly romanticism of the I.R.A. is the enemy of all reasonable people.

My intervention is for one purpose, to tell the House that the Mayor of Aldershot has announced this afternoon the setting up of a disaster fund for the dependants and relations of those who have died and for those who have been injured. I feel certain that many people, civilian and military alike, will wish to show their sympathy in this way for the victims of the outrage.

The relationship between Aldershot and the Army has always been close, but it has been strengthened by what has happened this week. We have strong feelings of admiration for the skill and restraint that the British Army has shown throughout the emergency in Northern Ireland.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and add instead thereof: condemns Her Majesty's Government's failure to restrain arms spending; and urges it to reduce Great Britain's share of the gross national product devoted to military expenditure from the current 5.7 per cent. towards the 4.2 per cent. average for European North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Governments". The Amendment stands on the Order Paper in the name of 117 hon. and right hon. Members. Before anyone asks where they are, I will point out that there are only 15 hon. Members opposite present this afternoon. On a matter which involves nearly £3,000 million, hon. Members, particularly hon. Gentlemen opposite, seem blind to their responsibility for trying to secure the enormous savings which could be achieved.

§ Lieut.-Colonel Colin Mitchell (Aberdeenshire, West)

There are 15 on this side of the House, and that is more than there are on the Opposition benches.

§ Mr. Allaun

Fifteen does not represent a record-shaking attendance. We are talking about the biggest increase, in cash terms, in the Army's expenditure in peacetime history, not excluding the period of the Korean war.

I am not an expert statistician, so I have asked the statisticians in the Library to work out how much the defence budget costs each family in the country. The cost to an average family of four of the £2,854 million works out at £3.97 per week. Of course some families will not pay so much in taxation, and others will pay more. The taxation comes from money spent on beer, tobacco, income tax, and so on, and this defence budget accounts for £4 per week per family.

It is remarkable that, with the exception of my 117 hon. Friends, most people do not seem to be very concerned about this matter. I am advancing a moderate argument. Indeed I am beginning to wonder at myself. I am becoming so moderate that one day I shall join the five hon. Gentlemen who sit behind me on the Liberal Benches—but if I do I shall certainly wear a steel waistcoat.

What we are proposing is that the British share of G.N.P. devoted to arms, which I was told in November by the noble Lord was 5.7 per cent., should be reduced to the average amount of G.N.P. spent on defence by European N.A.T.O. countries, namely to 4.2 per cent. The noble Lord said that if the figure were reduced, it would save the little sum of £600 million. If we were to reduce it to the Italian share of G.N.P., to 3 per cent., or to the West German share of G.N.P., to 3.7 per cent., we would save far more than £600 million a year.

With a sum of £600 million a year in our hands we could do all the things we dearly want to do. I want to see the building of 500,000 houses a year to relieve the terrible housing misery in this country. I believe that 500,000 houses could easily be built annually with this money. The T.U.C. and the Labour Party are pressing for the old-age pension to be raised from £6 to £8 a week. That again could be done out of this saving of money on defence. We have all heard with horror about what happened recently in one mental hospital, and I have no doubt that such cases could be repeated in future. All these matters require money to remedy them, and defence 1538 is the only sphere in which the present Government, or any other Government, can act without hurting ordinary working people.

I repeat the question which I put to the noble Lord yesterday: why should Britain spend a higher share of G.N.P. on arms than any other country in Western Europe, with the exception of Portugal which is engaged in a colonial war? The Minister said: … the simple fact is that the Soviet military capability is growing steadily … Its present expenditure is about 8 per cent. of the gross national product. I deplore the fact that the Minister was deliberately selective in his arguments. He omitted to mention that the Soviet Union is the great military power in the Warsaw Pact and that America is the great military power in the N.A.T.O. Pact and that, if the Russian share of G.N.P. is 8 per cent., that of America is, I understand, 9 per cent.

The Minister then proceeded to attempt to scare us—and this was not the first occasion—with reports about the Soviet Navy. He spoke about … its deployment in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 23rd Feb., 1972; Vol. 831, c. 1313.] I dislike its presence there, it serves no useful purpose at all. And exactly the same applies to the United States Navy. What are they doing in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. They are much further from United States' shores than are the Soviet Union ships. The White Papers which were issued by the Labour Government—and I did not always agree with them—all maintained that there was no likelihood of Soviet military advance into Europe. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) as former Secretary of State for Defence put forward this view in his White Paper, I do not remember it being challenged by the Opposition at that time. Is it not clear to all but the most hidebound militarists that neither the Americans nor the Russians have the slightest intention of invading East Europe or West Europe.

§ Mr. Wilkinson

Then why is it that the Yugoslavs are so apprehensive about their security and are having to revise their ideas of partisan warfare and citizen force defence to meet a Soviet challenge, and why is it that the Romanians also 1539 are apprehensive about the Russians to their north?

§ Mr. Allaun

I accept the question. What Soviet Russia did in Czechoslovakia was absolutely wrong and indefensible, but this is partly due to the existence of the two military camps—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Hon. Gentlemen may not accept it, but that is my belief. There are also other reasons, but I regard that as the dominant one. If that is the case, then I argue that neither side wants to invade the other. I noticed that the hon. Gentleman did not suggest that the Soviet Union wanted to invade Western Europe, any more than America wants to invade Eastern Europe. If this is the case, why should we go on wasting our resources in this way?

§ Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)

The hon. Gentleman has put forward the case involving stalemate in general in Europe, and I go a long way with him. Would he accept that the Soviet Union has the second largest and most modern fleet in the world? Why should the world's second largest land power wish to be the second largest sea power when it does not need sea communications to survive, as do these islands?

§ Mr. Allaun

The hon. Gentleman asks why the Soviet Union has the second greatest navy in the world. He might as well have asked why America should have the first greatest navy in the world. They are both equally foolish, and I am asking for sanity so that there should be mutual force reductions. Why should we act even more foolishly than the rest of the European N.A.T.O. Governments?

I was disappointed with the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. George Thomson). He should have taken the line of my hon. Friends and myself. The pursuit of drastic arms reduction is the official policy of the Labour Party, to which we on this side of the House belong. I hope I summarise his argument correctly by saying that he believes the time is not right to reduce arms, that the situation is one of détente and that we are on the eve of discussion of mutual arms reduction. I think that is a fair summary of his argument. He was really saying that this is not the time to take action. But it never is the time. Supposing at this moment we had a situation of acute 1540 tension in Europe. Would the argument then be that it is not the time to take action because the situation is so serious? One cannot win. It seems that it never is the time.

§ Mr. George Thomson (Dundee, East)

There is a time, and I was a member of a Government which recognised that there was a time when we reduced defence expenditure from 7 per cent. to 5½ per cent. of G.N.P.

§ Mr. Allaun

I am grateful for that intervention. What I am asking goes further and reduces the percentage to 4.2.

My right hon. Friend's second argument was that he wants to see mutual arms reductions. I believe everybody is of this view. There may be some people who still believe in gunboats, but most sensible people on both sides want to see mutual arms reductions. I stress that our Amendment in no way conflicts with mutual balanced force reductions. The latter, mutual force reduction, should bring down the proportion for all countries and give additional help to our social services and other needs. In my view, Britain would be in a stronger position to argue for mutual arms reduction if her own contribution were not higher than the remaining countries in N.A.T.O., with the exception of America and Portugal.

Where could we make the cuts? The first sphere would be in research and development. We are spending £330 million a year on military research and development. I agree very much with my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Dr. David Owen) that it is a fantastic expenditure. It is almost exactly ten times what the State spends in two different directions on medical research. We spend £33.8 million a year on medical research and 10 times that amount on military research. This is a crazy situation. This is where the country could and should make cuts if commonsense applied.

The second item is the British Army of the Rhine, which involves direct expenditure of £263 million. If overheads were added, it would be a tidy sum more than that.

Thirdly, we could make cuts in our nuclear strategic forces programme.

Fourthly, we could make cuts in the development and production of the 1541 M.R.C.A. The latest figure which I could get appeared in Flight of 24th June, 1971. It is now estimated that it will cost us £630 million. However, I should like to take a bet that that by no means is the figure which it will eventually cost. Everybody knows that this has happened to all our previous weapons, without exception.

The last sphere in which we could make cuts is in the size of our Armed Forces. They should be reduced from their present size of 364,000 in uniform, plus 344,000 non-uniformed employees of the Ministry of Defence. Before anybody asks me whether I believe we should cut their pay and conditions, I do not think that I need to answer that question. It is quite clear that certainly we on this side of the House stand for good pay and conditions for both Servicemen and people in the ordnance factories. However, this makes it all the more important, if we are to increase their pay—in view of inflation and price increases it has to be increased—to make economies in their numbers and in other spheres of arms spending.

That brings me to my last point which was mentioned this afternoon by the Minister of State for Defence Procurement: would reduction in arms spending cause unemployment? My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth), who represents a town which is based on Vickers Armstrong, has had the sense and the courage to point out to the workers at Vickers that their employment would be far more secure if, instead of concentrating on the 7,500-ton Polaris, they were tendering for and building 100,000-ton oil tankers, and so on.

There have been two high-powered inquiries into the question whether arms reduction would cause unemployment. One was by the United Nations and the other by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Both have shown that, with planning, it is practical to transfer men from war production to peace production. I will illustrate my point to the Minister, because it may be that he has not had the experience. Imagine an engineer turning a small piece of metal on a centre lathe. It does not matter to him whether that piece of metal is to go into a tank or a tractor. However, from my experience of 1542 engineers with whom I have worked, I know that they would greatly prefer that piece of metal to go into a tractor rather than into a tank.

The proof of the pudding is that in 1945 we did not just transfer from a large arms programme to a small arms programme, which is what I am advocating today; we switched from a war economy to a peace economy. There were 9 million men and women in the Armed Forces or in the war factories. Within nine months they were switched from a war economy to a peace economy, with planning under a Labour Government, without unemployment. What I am suggesting is very moderate, and no doubt it could be done, but perhaps phased over about three years.

§ Mr. Ian Gilmour

No one disputes that at certain stages of the economic situation what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting can be done. However, the point with which he has to deal is: can it be done in a period of high unemployment? If it is as easy to redeploy people as he suggests, it is difficult to understand why unemployment doubled when the Labour Government were in power.

§ Mr. Allaun

I do not defend that. However, unemployment has now gone up to over 1 million, which is more than we ever imagined or would have allowed.

A high military budget is normally accompanied by a fall in economic growth rate. The example given to me by my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness, who knows more about shipbuilding than I do, is Japan where tonnage has grown from 2 million per year to 14 million per year in a relatively short time, whereas our share of world shipbuilding has slumped dramatically. We devote between 90 and 98 per cent. of research in shipbuilding to military rather than to peaceful shipbuilding. My point is that an equal amount of research and development applied in the civilian sphere would ensure far more employment and production than in the military sphere.

§ Colonel Sir Harwood Harrison (Eye)

I endorse wholeheartedly the opening remarks of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Dr. David Owen) who spoke about the Report of the sub-Committee of the Select Committee on 1543 Expenditure. The hon. Gentleman was a most valuable member of the sub-Committee, as were the other six members, of which I had the honour to be Chairman. The eight members of the sub-Committee got to know more about what is happening, by the kindness of the Ministry of Defence, than any hon. Members have done before. We produced a unanimous report because we kept the right objective before us. As part of the Expenditure Committee looking at the expenditure of the Ministry of Defence, we did not conceive it our duty to say which weapons or how many men should be employed, but we pointed out that, if it followed a certain course, that would be the expenditure. This is the report which we produced. I do not want to put hon. Members off by its size. Our report is in the first part. The rest contains the evidence which we took.

One remarkable point about our report, which is not in the White Paper, is that many words are missing and we have had to put in asterisks. We are grateful for what we heard, but we hope that in future the Ministry will be able to let us publish rather more, because it is only with knowledge of what is happening that we can have a true debate on whether we are spending our resources properly.

I shall take certain points in the White Paper and comment on them with partially my own views and some of the views of the Committee. I refer first, from my own point of view, to paragraphs 4 to 9. From the evidence we took and from what I have seen, there is no doubt that the Soviet threat is still as strong as ever and increasing in the West. That was underlined by my noble Friend the Secretary of State in another place yesterday. Though the Soviet Union may have built up its forces in the East, this has meant no slackening in the West. I welcome particularly the remarks in paragraph 8 about our contributions—increased contributions—in N.A.T.O. for the European defence improvement programme.

Taking one example of what comes under this programme, we visited Germany and saw the building of solid shelters for our aircraft, which should be bombproof. At present we do not have them. We and the Royal Air 1544 Force there considered that on our four airfields these are very necessary.

From our observations and from a visit to S.H.A.P.E. headquarters and talks with General Goodpaster and our own General FitzPatrick, the Deputy Commander, we also concluded that the slowness of integration between the different allies was most disappointing, particularly now that 52 per cent. of our expenditure is on personnel, thus limiting the equipment. Standardisation would help in this matter. That comes out clearly at paragraph 31 of our report.

When the Secretary of State gave evidence before the Committee, he said that one of the most disappointing aspects of N.A.T.O. since 1949 has been the lack of any real advance in the standardisation of weapons. He said that some standardisation had been achieved, and we know this. But the obstacles are still formidable. They must be overcome.

One of the difficulties is that countries want to re-equip at different times. Many countries, because of social or employment conditions in their industries, prefer to produce their own weapons. Many have their own research and development. Many are still reluctant to make themselves dependent on what they regard as possibly unreliable sources for weapons which they consider vital to their defence needs. Integration does not mean that every N.A.T.O. country must participate in every project. Experience shows that three countries combining is the best formula—such as over the multi-rôle combat aircraft. Such products can then be sold to the other N.A.T.O. allies. Much more can be done in the standardisation of equipment. Even if we have the same equipment, each country can produce its requirements.

At present there is a large variety of different types of aircraft in the German, Belgian, Dutch and British air forces. Their effectiveness is greatly reduced because the airfields of each country are equipped to deal only with the types of aircraft used by that country. The Commander-in-Chief told the sub-Committee that if, when one or more R.A.F. airfields had been put out of action, those R.A.F. aircraft which were airborne at the time could be diverted to airfields of other countries to be rearmed and reloaded the operability of 1545 the R.A.F. as a whole would be increased 200 to 300 per cent. These are very sobering thoughts for allies against one common enemy. For this reason, he said that he would give first priority to inter-operability, and then to standardisation of aircraft and weapons.

Second, I refer to paragraph 13. During the Christmas Recess I visited the new Five-Power Pact in Singapore. It is possible that I am the only Member of Parliament who has made such a visit. I hope that many other hon. Members will do so. I also went to Kuala Lumpur and met leading Ministers in Malaysia. As my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said, the ANZUK side under Admiral Wells is off to a good start. The Australian and British contingents are roughly on a par, while that of New Zealand, naturally, is smaller. But it is remarkable that New Zealand has placed her one regular battalion in Singapore, although rather under-strength. All the staffs are already integrated. The brigade commander is British. Fortunately, he has had experience in the trouble in Malaya in the early 1950s. He was staff trained in Australia.

As our battalion, we have the Royal Highland Fusiliers. They have had no jungle fighting experience, but they are becoming trained. They are alongside New Zealand and Australian forces, of which some men have had experience in Vietnam. The brigade was using signalling equipment from Australia, to achieve standardisation, and we paid for and hired our portion. There was a united financial control, with Australia and ourselves paying 40 per cent. and New Zealand paying 20 per cent., owing to the strengths. I was very glad to find that on our side there was only one joint command secretary covering all United Kingdom financial matters.

The staff of the Department of the Environment responsible for our defence buildings has been reduced from 2,000 to 400, but I am told that in future the task will probably be carried out by the Public Works Department of the Singapore Government. This should result in a saving.

It must be hoped that we can continue to take full advantage of the jungle training school in Johore, which is now to have a Malaysian commandant but will 1546 still have British instructors. Arrangements have been made for two British battalions to be put through a ten-week course each year from 1973 onwards. I hope that our commitments elsewhere, such as in Ulster, will not prevent this.

I saw something of our other two partners who are there on the ground. The Singapore Air Force, flying Lightnings, is training very well. The aircraft are serviced by Royal Air Force volunteers. The young Singaporian Army appears to be keen and efficient. It lacks good young officers and senior warrant officers and N.C.O.s, but in three or four years' time that will be rectified and it will be capable of giving as good as it gets.

I could not help thinking how much wiser is the policy of getting local troops in their own country to look to their defence. When I visited Changi Barracks, I recalled the utter folly of the Colonial Office in the years 1939 to 1942—be it from Whitehall, local men on the spot, or the Commander-in-Chief—which would not recruit a single Singaporian Chinese for labour battalions to clear fields of fire or to arm them to be soldiers. Naturally, those Chinese dislike the Japanese and they would have fought hard to defend their homes. That was one of the most crass, stupid policies, either of the civilians or of the military chiefs on the spot, and we paid dearly for it. It was one of the biggest blots in our history. However, I have said enough of those past times.

The Malay Army has been nearly doubled, and it has seen quite a bit of active service combating the Communist terrorists who are now showing much activity again. The Malay Navy is based in the Straits between Johore and Singapore, and, again, it is indebted to regular Royal Navy personnel who go out to instruct and to see that all the engineering side functions properly. There is no reference to it in the White Paper, but I want to pay special tribute to those airmen, soldiers and sailors who go abroad as specialists to train service men in different parts of the world and to look after machinery. Certainly their work is much appreciated out there.

I do not want to be controversial, but I found that there was much rejoicing in Malaysia and Singapore when the present Government reversed the complete 1547 evacuation policy of the Labour Government. I thought, knowing those parts of the world, that this was one of the more important issues at stake at the time of the General Election.

I want to say a word about B.A.O.R. In 1960, we saw the creation of a new fully professional volunteer British Army which today enjoys a reputation for high morale and efficiency. In Germany, this is very well deserved. We were assured that the pick of all our equipment is set aside for it. However, we must realise that it is a peace-time Army, with all the problems of the dependants. With the lowering of the age of majority to 18, this has meant that more recruits and very young soldiers are married. It increases the problems of accommodation, and we say in our report that some of the accommodation amounts pretty well to squalor. That is not to say that there are not excellent quarters in B.A.O.R., and it is fair to say that the Ministry of Defence had nearly got on top of the problem before the age of majority was reduced to 18. It is typical of us politicians to take a decision without considering all its ramifications.

Some of these younger married soldiers cannot get quarters when their battalions or regiments go out to Germany. They have to remain in hirings, especially round Munster, which is a University town where there is very little accommodation. What they get is poor and expensive. In our report, we recommend that this problem should be looked at as quickly as possible. For the same reason, there is an increase in the problems of schooling, health and hospitals. It is not realised by the British public at large that the Defence Vote bears a big sum which is purely for civilian matters.

In Chapter 2, paragraph 8, it is said that the peace-time strength would be more than doubled on mobilisation. This would take quite a considerable time. It is difficult to know whether this sentence can be substantiated and, if so, how soon, whether there would be a time of tension and, if there were a proclamation to call up reserves, whether our enemies might not take this as a warlike act and attack. It should be realised that, if this happened suddenly, not the whole of B.A.O.R.'s strength could at once go into action. Some personnel would be