DEFENCE

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath)

There have long been many, both inside and outside Parliament, who have believed that as broad an agreement as possible ought to be obtained between different parts of the political spectrum on matters of defence. For most of the post-war years this has been possible. We have never gone back to the old joint arrangements of the Imperial Committee of Defence. On the other hand, facilities have been provided by the Government of the day to the Opposition for discussions and information about various aspects of defence. I was able to take advantage of those in my time as Leader of the Opposition, and this afternoon I offer those facilities to the present Leader of the Opposition and to his defence spokesman whenever they wish to take advantage of them.

By and large, where there has been agreement between the different sides of the House, it has been welcomed by the Services, welcomed by our allies, and welcomed by people in Britain. But there is no doubt that since 1968 there has been a growing division between the two sides of the House on some defence matters. In part, this has been the result of the decisions of the previous Government on the withdrawal of forces from 1411 Singapore, Malaysia and the Gulf, about which I shall speak later. There has also been a wider divergence in what I might term the philosophical approach of the parties to Britain's responsibilities overseas. In their last years, the previous Administration pursued policies which confined the military effort of this country almost entirely to Europe. They recognised that Britain had vast economic and political interests outside Europe. But they argued that, in the maintenance of the stability on which those interests depend, the British Armed Forces either could play no useful part or should play no useful part.

On the other hand, we believe and have argued that circumstances today and circumstances of recent history contradict the approach put forward by the previous Government. We consider it to be contrary to the real facts of the modern world. We believe that an intelligent and realistic analysis of British interests in the world today leads inevitably to the conclusion that there are times and places, specifically, where these interests can best be served by defence arrangements outside Europe. This seems to be the difference in approach of the parties over the past few years.

We reject a narrow regionalism in defence, just as we reject regionalism as such in other fields, because we are convinced that it runs counter to the interests and to the character of Britain.

Sometimes this argument for the almost complete concentration of defence in Europe is based on the so-called need to demonstrate our Europeanism in our application to join the European Economic Community. At others, it is said that the Community, whether it is enlarged or not, and the countries around it, are concerned only with Europe and ought to be concerned only with Europe. There is no contradiction between the views which I have expressed about the wider interests of Britain and the fact that there may be times and places where we should safeguard these through forces. There is no contradiction between that and our desire to find acceptable terms for entry into the European Economic Community.

In the 10 or more years in which I have been closely and deeply involved in 1412 European matters, I have never heard the arguments of Europeanism or of regionalism used amongst those whom we wish to join. They recognise that our interests run beyond Europe—indeed, many of them welcome that. France is a country in a similar position to our own, and we have seen the tenacity and skill with which she has maintained her great interests outside Europe. She has found no conflict between that and membership of the Community. This, therefore, is not an argument of substance.

We can safeguard key British interests, often jointly with friends and allies, in other parts of the world at the same time as we fulfil our obligations and maintain our security in Europe. In Europe the foundation of our security is the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and in it our role is a major one. Among the European members we alone make a contribution to the strategic nuclear forces, and without that contribution the strategic nuclear forces of N.A.T.O. would be a United States monopoly. This is significant not only for us and for Europe but for the Alliance as a whole. It has helped in working out the arrangements for effectively associating all members of N.A.T.O. with nuclear planning. It has also been of importance in the context of the work which has been done and is being done to try to control and limit the spread and development of nuclear weapons, on which the right hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. George Thomson), who spoke yesterday in the debate, placed great emphasis.

In our contribution to N.A.T.O. this country has consistently set an example to our allies. This is something which we ought to recognise and something to which the right hon. Gentleman in his speech yesterday did not entirely give full consideration.

The proportion of our defence effort which goes to the direct support of N.A.T.O. has steadily increased. In the coming financial year we shall be spending about 5½, per cent. of our gross national product on defence and of that about nine-tenths will be devoted to the support of N.A.T.O. in Europe.

The point which I make to the House, to the country and to our allies is bluntly this: our contribution to N.A.T.O., as a proportion of gross national product, is greater than that of 1413 any of the other major N.A.T.O. Powers. This, therefore, is something of which we can be proud, but which must at the same time be recognised by our allies; and when there are proposals for developments in N.A.T.O. it is not good enough for them to say to Britain every time, "Of course you must contribute more and more in every possible scheme which comes forward." We must have the right to decide in which way we can best make our contribution. That is what the Government have been doing over the past months.

Moreover, we spend a considerable sum—not far short of £150 million a year—across the exchanges to support British forces abroad committed to N.A.T.O. It is therefore the whole picture which needs to be seen by the House, by the country and by our allies in N.A.T.O.

It has been our view that in making a greater contribution to N.A.T.O. it should be done through more forces and more armaments. We hope that European countries will contribute teeth to the Alliance, which is what we ourselves have decided to do. Our first steps as a Government were to make available the squadrons of Jaguars and a reserve armoured car regiment, as well as maintaining the "Ark Royal" in service. We shall now be contributing to the infrastructure part of the Defence Improvement Programme.

Yesterday the right hon. Gentleman said that it seemed to him that we had been slow to take part in this programme. The reason is, as I have explained, that we were already making a major contribution. We added to it teeth for the Alliance. The infrastructure programme could have been carried on by others who were not in a position to do the same as we had done, but our position in the infrastructure part of the Improvement Programme which has now been announced has been facilitated by the understanding which the Germans have shown in the offset negotiations.

Therefore, we have been able to reach a conclusion that is satisfactory both from the point of view of providing additional teeth to the Alliance and helping to provide infrastructure.

We have welcomed the assurances which the American President has given 1414 that under his Administration American troops in Europe will be maintained at their present level, and we accept that continuing United States support is dependent on reciprocal efforts by their European allies. We have shown that we are making our contribution.

So I think this can be summed up by my saying that, despite the fears which have been expressed and the disillusionment which is sometimes said to exist, there is now on both sides of the Atlantic heartening evidence of an increased determination to sustain, convincingly and effectively, the policy of deterrence which the Alliance has pursued during the past 20 years.

If the current negotiations for the enlargement of the European Community succeed, new prospects for European unity will be opened up. We shall then—the members of the Community—increasingly feel the need to develop new methods of working together, not only in foreign policy, where a beginning has already been made by the existing members, but also in defence.

The need for all of us to continue our vigilance and build up our strength will continue. An enlarged European Community and the members of it will have an additional responsibility there. For this reason, as my noble Friend the Minister of State said yesterday, the military expenditure of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Powers increases steadily by about 6 per cent. a year. My noble Friend gave a detailed account of the comparison between the force strengths and weapon strengths of the Warsaw Pact and the N.A.T.O. Alliance. I thought that the right hon. Member for Dundee, East rather rebuked my noble Friend for giving the House these details, and he condemned the White Paper for what I think he described as a negative approach in setting out the real position and telling the country what the situation is.

The right hon. Gentleman still seemed to think, as some have done before him, that if only we ignore these facts and wish them away somehow a happy state of amity will speedily exist between the two sides of the Iron Curtain. I should have thought that Czechoslovakia would have disabused the right hon. Gentleman of that view. Surely that lesson cannot 1415 have been forgotten already? It is right that the full details should be given.

My experience of relations with the Soviet Union has been this. The Russians continue to build up their military might by every means open to them and to make every advance in technological development—in weapons—with which their scientists can help them. That we must accept. It is right to state the position continually to the best of our knowledge.

Where the Soviets consider that their interests are served in a particular field by an agreement they will negotiate hard and long to get it, as they did on the partial test ban treaty which we helped to negotiate and on the non-proliferation agreement during the time of the last Administration. The Soviets, having driven their bargain, have in recent years stuck to it.

Elsewhere in other fields they are constantly probing their opponents' weaknesses, attempting to get through their guard, always on the look-out for means of bringing pressure to bear upon them.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

The Prime Minister is saying that Soviet Russia has negotiated certain agreements which are in its interest. Would it not be in the interests of both Russia and ourselves to go ahead with East-West security arrangements which would reduce troops on both sides? Surely that would be in Russia's material interests and in ours. Therefore, why denigrate attempts to move in that direction?

§ The Prime Minister

I will deal with this problem in a moment or two, because it is a very important one. I am not denigrating any attempts to negotiate an agreement. What I am pointing out is that at the same time as the Soviet Union is prepared by hard bargaining to secure an agreement in certain spheres where it suits it, in other spheres it will continue to press and probe. Examples of this are there for us all to see. The Soviets do it in the air corridors. They do it in the land corridors. They are playing cat and mouse with the Americans in the Caribbean at this moment. They can at any time use the same tactics to menace or threaten traffic in the Indian Ocean. These are the facts. They cannot be wished away. The experience is 1416 there not only in the past, but in recent months. Since I have been Prime Minister and since this Government have been in office we have had to handle the probing by the Soviet Union in these different spheres.

My conclusion, therefore, is that I do not believe that we are witnessing the preparation of a straightforward military coup on a continental scale. We may see further attempts, and I hope successful ones, to get agreement, and then further probing; but—I think that this bears relationship to many speeches which were made yesterday, some by my hon. Friends—I do not foresee a straightforward military attempt to conquer Europe. because I think that the risk of escalation to the ultimate horror of strategic nuclear bombardment is sufficiently high to deter any rational person from deliberately planning a campaign of that kind.

As I argued from the benches opposite in the last defence debate, what always exists is the doubt in the mind of anybody in power as to how the other will react. It is that doubt, even in the situation of approaching parity on nuclear weapons, which is, I believe, the safeguard against escalation to that stage.

No, Soviet policy is more subtle and more realistic. The Russians are conscious of the difficulties which Western democracies face in maintaining substantial military establishments in time of peace and in face of popular demand—natural demand—for improved standards of living, which can express itself freely, be it through the parliamentary system or through all the media of communication.

The Soviets are aware of the political stresses and strains and of the internal dissensions to which the North Atlantic Alliance is sometimes subject. They hear the talk of the possible withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. They may calculate that a stage could eventually be reached at which the sheer disparity of military strength would leave Western Europe with no convincing strategy and no confidence in its ability to sustain a confrontation if one occurred.

They might calculate that in those circumstances anything could happen. Political pressure which could be shrewdly applied and backed by the threat of greatly superior physical force might compel one of the more exposed 1417 members of the Alliance to lapse into neutrality. Now the Soviets no doubt hope and plan that if this happens, if one of the members of the Alliance were to go neutral, then a process of disintegration could begin which would lead to the ultimate prize, an extension of the Soviet sphere of influence gradually into countries at present members of the Alliance and, if possible, to the Atlantic. So I would submit to the House that it is this kind of pressure in particular against which we have to safeguard and it is for this reason that we must ensure that the North Atlantic Alliance is a first charge on the growing prosperity of Western Europe.

§ Dr. M. S. Miller (Glasgow, Kelvingrove)

I am listening very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman's analysis, which is a very interesting one, but would he not agree that it would be far better strategy from our point of view to inculcate into the Russians the same ideas as he believes have been inculcated into the West? Does he not realise that in Russia also there are people who want a better standard of living and that this is the way we should be tackling it, not in a military way?

§ The Prime Minister

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman that there are many in the Soviet Union who want to see an improved standard of living, and I would have thought there were lessons, certainly over the last ten years, that attitudes had begun to change. I would also have thought he could agree that we in this country have gone as far as anybody to encourage that, whatever Government has been in power, by every form of consular agreement, by trade arrangements, by trying to increase trade and by cultural exchanges on a very wide scale. I do not believe anybody could argue that the limitations have come from this country. Where there have been limitations it has been, as every Foreign Secretary knows, on the other side; but we will certainly try to encourage that.

I was asked about progress on East-West relations. In my view it is possible to make progress on East-West relations only if all the time we maintain and provide for our security. The Soviet Union does not negotiate with the weak. It looks instead for other means to attain its ends with those who have no strength 1418 of their own. It is from a strong and healthy Western Alliance that we can seek to reduce East-West tensions in Europe. In this field progress undoubtedly has been made. We have welcomed the negotiations which the Federal German Republic has been patiently conducting with the Soviet Union, with Poland and with East Germany. In particular, we have noted the Federal German Chancellor's assurance that the treaties negotiated will not be ratified until the problems of Berlin have been satisfactorily resolved. This, to us, is of the greatest importance as it is to the other Powers concerned with Berlin.

The Federal German Chancellor himself has repeatedly stressed how the Federal Government's Ostpolitik is founded upon the Western Alliance and the unity of the West. We have taken an active part, with the three Western Allies who have been holding discussions with the Russians about the future of Berlin.

Once there is agreement on Berlin—and this is really the test case—and evidence of a genuine readiness by the Warsaw Pact countries to enter into talks which do not involve all give on one side and all take on the other, then we shall be ready to explore with our allies, and with the countries of Eastern Europe, the possibility of convening a conference or conferences on European security. In these circumstances, a conference could lead to more permanent improvement in East-West relations and new areas of possible agreement might emerge from such a conference or conferences.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important of these could be agreement on the reduction of the military forces which are now facing one another across the centre of Europe. Of course, nobody will underestimate the problems involved in doing this. They are very great. There is the imbalance which we discussed yesterday. There are the difficulties of satisfactory inspection; but I do not believe that anybody in this House would question that an agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions would be a very great advance indeed, if this could be achieved while at the same time we were able to maintain the security of the West. So we will work for this because we believe that it is a very great prize, 1419 but, as 1 have indicated, I do not believe our military effort can or should be confined to Europe. Our interests go much wider. The trade and investment on which we depend and by which Britain lives can only flourish in stable conditions. That was why when in Opposition we made it plain that where Britain has traditionally borne a responsibility for defence we would be ready to help if the countries of the area wished us to do so. We shall continue support for C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., and we shall deploy forces in the Indian Ocean area and in Malaysia and Singapore.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, East, expressing the view which is stated in the Opposition Amendment, opposed our policy as far as Singapore and Malaysia are concerned because, he said, it is wrong to risk getting committed to operations of this kind which might involve us in additional forces or which we could not carry through single-handed. He went on to say that our forces in the area would be a deterrent—he granted us that—but he also said that they might become involved before a political decision could be reached. This seemed to me a strange argument in many respects, particularly in view of what his own Administration was planning to do and which it started to carry out.

First of all, this is an age of very rapid communications. British Governments have had long experience in handling forces right across the world before communications became as rapid as they are today. But under the policy of the late Administration it did not provide a deterrent on the spot. What that Administration was going to do was to send our reinforcements from within the general capability if circumstances demanded it. Presumably they intended doing this if trouble arose; so they were not going to have a deterrent to stop trouble arising. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nor will you."] We will indeed, because as the right hon. Gentleman himself granted yesterday, the five-Power arangements between the five Commonwealth countries will provide the deterrent in the area and there can be general agreement about this. It is certainly the view of the other four countries, and, of course, it is possible to reinforce in the way the right hon. Gentle- 1420 man described. But I have never understood the logic of having no deterrent there and saying when trouble arises massive forces will be sent out to deal with it. If the right hon. Gentleman's statement about the difficulty of political decision means anything at all, it means, presumably, that if the Government were prepared to have a long wrangle about whether or not they should send a force out, by that time the damage might very well have been done. This seemed to me an untenable argument by the right hon. Gentleman and the party opposite.

I would like to pay tribute to the professional competence with which the operation last year was carried out to show how quickly and successfully troops could be flow out from the United Kingdom and an area could be reinforced. But this only emphasises the importance of the policy we are pursuing to have the deterrent there first and then, if the deterrent fails, to be ready to deal further with the area. I feel it was a pity that the hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite did not take the final, logical step of leaving a modest permanent force behind and so help to prevent the very contingencies they themselves feared would arise, which the right hon. Gentleman emphasised yesterday.

§ Mr. George Thomson (Dundee, East)

The difficulty in South-East Asia is that the real danger is the danger of racial troubles and if we have forces on the spot there is a real risk of being sucked into a second Northern Ireland or a second Vietnam. That is the objection. But if the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister is arguing that we must have forces on the spot to act as a deterrent, why did he announce yesterday that he did not intend to leave any deterrent force in the Persian Gulf?

§ The Prime Minister

I would not have said Vietnam is a racial conflict, but we are well aware of the difficulties in South-East Asia and in all the time that the British Forces have been there in the past they have not become involved in racial disturbances. There must be a very clear position about racial problems, as has already been announced. As compared with the dangers which threaten that area from the outside, I must disagree with the right hon. Gentleman when he says that the main danger is racial disturbances. I do not accept that as being 1421 the main danger to the stability of the area.

§ Mr. George Thomson

Then will the Prime Minister say what is the main danger? Who is the enemy that British forces are supposed to deter in Singapore and Malaysia?

§ The Prime Minister

I should have thought that the right hon. Gentleman, with his Ministerial experience, would be aware of the threats to Malaysia from the forces outside in Southern Thailand and north of the Malaysian border. These are well known to anyone who has studied the problems. If the right hon. Gentleman had been through the area he could have discussed the problems with the people on the spot.

Our Commonwealth partners in South-East Asia have been hard-headed about these matters, and they are developing their own defence capability. Malaysia and Singapore are both showing their determination to develop increasing self-reliance on their own forces, and they have received support from Australia and New Zealand.

It is now quite clear to the Opposition, I hope, that we shall not have anything like the enormous complex of facilities which Britain had there in the past. We are, as I constantly reiterated in Opposition, one part of a five-Power force and arrangement. Our requirements will be the minimum compatible with efficiency, and we shall share support and logistic arrangements with Australia and New Zealand. This is the kind of Commonwealth co-operation in defence which I believe to be valuable, and to be in tune with what is required in that area, but which apparently hon. Members opposite had not considered or were not prepared to support.

The right hon. Gentleman said yesterday that in carrying out this rôle the Services felt that they were being overstretched and unsupported. Nothing could be further from the truth. As I found when I visited the forces in Singapore during the recent Commonwealth Conference, they do not have that feeling in the least. The Services welcome the fact that they will continue there as a presence for a deliberate purpose. What is more, the fact that there are Her Majesty's Forces outside Europe gives an added interest to recruiting to young 1422 people in this country. I was very interested in what the right hon. Gentleman said about the ways of increasing interest in the forces, but there is no doubt that the thought of a life confined to commuting between Aldershot and Western Europe is not one which has the interest of service in other parts right across the world.

Each time I have visited Singapore and Malaysia I have been impressed by the enormous opportunities which are open there to British enterprise, whether commercial, financial or cultural. As development goes ahead in those countries, and in Indonesia in particular, so the opportunities for Britain will become greater. But there has been no doubt—and this is connected with our defence policy in South-East Asia—that we have suffered a handicap there in the past few years. I do not believe that the last Government ever realised the extent to which they created that handicap by their sudden announcement of complete withdrawal. There is no doubt that it gave the impression that we were no longer concerned, not only with military matters but with trade, investment and commerce in the area.

Another consequence of the policy we have followed is that now they recognise that we have a continuing interest there, though our presence is modest, and that we shall continue an interest in trade and investment. Anyone visiting Malaysia and Singapore today will see how that process is already under way.

§ Mr. Richard Crawshaw (Liverpool, Toxteth)

The Prime Minister mentions trade. Is not Japan making the greatest inroad in economic affairs in Malaysia? How many troops has Japan got there to safeguard those economic interests?

§ The Prime Minister

That is an argument I have constantly heard before. The hon. Gentleman is experienced in military matters and has very often stood with distinction for his own beliefs in the House. How is it that the Japanese can trade in Malaysia and Singapore? It is only because there is stability there as a result of a British presence. How much trade would the Japanese have in that area if there were instability, insurrection and conflict? None at all. If it is a fact that with stability in the area the Japanese are making inroads into British trade, the 1423 answer lies with British industrialists and traders to hold their own markets. The stability is there, and it is up to us to seize the opportunity in the same way as the Japanese or Germans do.

I want now to speak about the other matter which was raised by the hon. Gentleman a moment ago, namely, the position in the Gulf. My right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary announced yesterday our proposals which have been put to the countries in the Gulf for dealing with the matter. I have been in the area a number of times in the past 10 years. I believe that the last Government's decision for total withdrawal, regardless of the circumstances, was a most damaging mistake, and I said so at the time. It upset the balance of power in the area. It created confusion and uncertainty, and the after-effects are still evident.

The disputes in the area, only one of which has been resolved—that of Bahrein—were not problems under either Government until the last Administration's announcement that they would withdraw completely. But those matters, having come into the public domain, now exist as disputes. We are glad that the dispute between Iran and Bahrein has been resolved. The other disputes still exist, and look like being problems for some time.

We criticised the then Government's decision when we were in Opposition and pledged to consult our friends in the area to see what form a continuing British interest in their stability should take. When I toured the Gulf countries and other countries concerned with policy in that area at Easter, 1969, I told them that when we came to power we would arrange to discuss with them the form in which we could best help them maintain their stability. That is precisely what we have done. The nature of the continuing interest we propose after discussions with them was announced by my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary yesterday.

The right hon. Member for Dundee, East criticised us yesterday for taking eight months to consult the countries in the Gulf and work out our proposals with them. Fifteen countries were involved in the consultations. To criticise the Government for taking eight 1424 months to consult them shows either how little experience the right hon. Gentleman has of such matters or the paucity of the argument he can raise against what the Government have been doing.

There is one other important aspect of the matter. As we constantly made clear in Opposition, when we supported the Government's approach, we strongly support the project for a union between certain of the Gulf States. The then Government supported it, but when 1 went around the Gulf I found that they were supporting it in theory but doing absolutely nothing to help bring it about in practice. This was not through misadventure, that was a deliberate policy to leave the Gulf States to form their union if they could in their own way. I constantly felt that the problems of forming any sort of union or federation are quite difficult enough for any group of countries, let alone those which have had no experience of this kind. Therefore, help should have been given by the Government of the day. The Labour Government spent all their time preparing for the military withdrawal and providing the Rulers with an explanation of why this was taking place, but they gave them no help in forming the union or making the sort of proposals to them which we have now been able to make.

In those circumstances, it is not surprising that the union has not made greater headway than it has, and that in some ways the project has languished. We are determined to do all we can to held the project forward. Of course, we recognise that it cannot be imposed on the Rulers. They must reach their decisions freely, taking into account what seems to them to be in their best own interests. But there is a rôle here for British diplomacy. We consider that we still have a responsibility in this matter. and it is one that we shall not shirk.

§ Mr. George Thomson

I apologise for interrupting again, but the right hon. Gentleman is not being fair and accurate in saying that we refused to give help for the formation of this union. Over a number of years, we gave maximum support and encouragement for the formation of the union. I myself, as a Minister of the Crown, went out to the Gulf with an offer of £2 million to the Emirates to help 1425 them co-operate together in various forms of development work that would help them to establish a viable federation.

§ The Prime Minister

No assistance was given to them in the actual procedure of forming the union and no proposals were made to them of the kind which we announced yesterday to help them with their own defence. We have committed ourselves to this offer.

§ Mr. Christopher Mayhew (Woolwich, East)

rose—

§ The Prime Minister

I cannot give way again. I have already given way many times. We intend to give the Emirates every support that we can in forming a union. We have shown them that we will help with continuing training and a presence as far as that is acceptable to them. We believe that the best hope for stability in the area is a union of the kind now being discussed, helped and encouraged by continuing British efforts on the lines described yesterday.

§ Mr. Michael Stewart (Fulham)

The right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) yesterday asked a question which was not clearly answered at the time and which I think should be answered now. In essence it was this: if the union of Emirates is not formed and the other things hoped for in yesterday's statement do not occur, will the British withdrawal none the less occur at the end of 1971, or is the British withdrawal contingent on progress with the union? It was a straight question and really was not answered. I think that we should know the answer.

§ The Prime Minister

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary answered that question clearly. Perhaps 1 might explain to the former Foreign Secretary by saying that this is a proposal to the Rulers and to those countries interested in a union as to what we can do to help them form a union. This is a matter for discussion with them. If necessary, my right hon. Friend himself or another of my right hon. Friends can visit the area in order to carry it further. But until we know what the decision is we are not, as my right hon. Friend said quite clearly, going to answer hypothetical questions as to what will happen. I would have thought that a former Foreign 1426 Secretary would have accepted that this is the right way to carry on diplomacy in as complicated and difficult a situation as this.

I want now to turn to the broader issue, which is the question of United Nations peace-keeping forces. We have endeavoured to support the United Nations in this, but for too long a United Nations force has been needed in Cyprus. We wish to see a settlement there and an end to the need for a peace-keeping operation. A more determined effort is now required to resolve the differences which took the force there seven years ago, for one reason, namely, that there are other possibilities of peace-keeping forces being required in other parts of the world. I do not believe that we shall be able to persuade other countries constantly to support the United Nations in peace-keeping endeavours if they find that a peace-keeping force is not a means to resolve a situation and to give time for diplomacy to work, but is merely a permanent commitment which seems to be unending. This is our view about the force in Cyprus, but in the meantime we are maintaining our contingent there.

In the four-Power talks in New York, we have been discussing ways in which the international community could help to guarantee and sustain a political settlement between the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute. This is one of the possibilities I have just mentioned. If there is progress towards such a settlement, we shall be prepared to ctonsider participating in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in that area, provided, of course, that there is agreement by all the parties concerned.

We were asked yesterday about disarmament. At Geneva, we will continue to work for agreement on measures of arms control and disarmament. It is true that progress has been slow, but we were encouraged by the non-proliferation treaty entering into force last year, and only a few weeks ago there was the signature of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. Action has been taken already to keep outer space free of nuclear weapons, and this most recent measure will ban weapons of mass destruction from the seabed. All this is only the beginning, and in this I agree with the right hon. Member for Dundee, East. 1427 There is still no agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and we have yet to agree on measures to deal more effectively with the weapons of biological and chemical warfare. The S.A.L.T. talks are going on, of which we are kept fully informed and to which we make our contributions of thought and ideas. But the rule by which we have to judge all these things is the extent to which they provide additional security for the area concerned. For this reason, I think that the negotiation of new agreements will always be painstaking and slow. But we shall persist in our efforts.

Finally, I wish to say something about the Armed Services. They have been through a period of intense change which has been discussed in detail on the Service Estimates. To some extent, it has been right and inevitable because, in a period of rapidly changing technologies, it would have been a sign of danger if our Armed Services had attempted to remain static. Changes of structure have been necessary as well as changes of equipment. They have been accepted as necessary by those concerned with ensuring that we have a modern and effective system of defence.

But I know that there has also been a widespread feeling in the Services that some changes have not been necessary and could have been avoided by greater foresight, and that sometimes the Services have not been fairly treated. Sometimes they have felt that their efficiency and well-being have been placed at the mercy of domestic considerations—sometimes political—from which they should have been protected.

Certainly it is the Government's firm intention that the Services should now benefit from a period during which they can have a reasonable assurance about the policies which they will be asked to pursue and the resources which will be available to them. The White Paper shows the real character and purpose of the work which our Services do today, and tribute has many times been paid to the fairness and persistence with which the Army has carried out an almost impossible task in Northern Ireland. We ought to remind ourselves perhaps of what the purpose of that task has been. The simplest way of doing this is to ask 1428 ourselves how much bloodshed and how much destruction would have taken place by now in Northern Ireland had it not been for the presence of British troops.

Many people in Northern Ireland will, I think, gladly say, whether they be Catholic or Protestant, that they owe the fact that they and their families are alive today and going about their business to the presence of the British Forces in Northern Ireland and the way in which they have carried out their task.

The White Paper also emphasises what has often been mentioned, the three major relief operations which the Services have conducted in the last few months—in Jordan in September; in East Pakistan in November, and in Malaysia in January. On each occasion, the Services reacted with immense speed and efficiency, and during my visits to Pakistan and to Malaysia on the way to the Commonwealth Conference, as well as at the Conference itself, I heard from the Heads of Government of the countries concerned, and from many others, warm thanks and much praise for the work of the British forces in these operations. I also talked to British Servicemen who had taken part in them.

These achievements have been vividly reported, but all too often they fade from memory very quickly. But allowing for the immense services which the Armed Forces provide in this respect, it is not of course their primary task. Their primary task is to maintain the security of this country and the stability of the area in which they are serving.

There is an important part for Parliament and the Government to play in assuring the Services that we recognise what they are doing and are proud of what they are achieving. To the young men of this country the Services undoubtedly offer a career which is responsible, rewarding and among the most honourable and worth while anyone can undertake. What I want to emphasise is that we as a Government, and I believe the whole House, recognise our Armed Forces for what they are, the foundation of the security of this nation.

The Opposition Amendment suggests that our Forces are over-stretched and that we are neglecting our rôle in Europe. On the contrary, full and proper use is 1429 now, once again, being made of the potential of our Armed Forces and the defence facilities we have at our disposal. I know that the Services welcome our policies and that they are an encouragement to them.

In Europe we are increasing our contribution and, from a stronger alliance which we hope to build, we want to see progress and we shall work for progress in East-West relations. Elsewhere we are reversing policy decisions which we believe were taken hastily, mistakenly and which I have often felt Her Majesty's Opposition would like to reverse after a period of time and upon reflection, after seeing what were the consequences of those policies.

Some of these policies have not been reversed because they had changed the situation which could not be restored to what it was. But we are reversing other policies. We have done so in the Far East according to what our friends there want. We are changing policies in the Gulf in the way in which our friends there believe can best help them to maintain stability.

What this country has once again got is a realistic and responsible defence policy.

§ Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Sutton)

The House has listened to a speech from the Prime Minister which would have us forget those past debates in which, from these benches, the then Opposition launched some of the most virulent attacks on the honour and patriotism of those of us who were either in Government or on the Government benches. The Prime Minister, because it is in his interests to do so, wishes to forget all that was said over that six-year period, but today he will not be allowed to forget that.

He has cynically broken pledge after pledge in the defence area and if there were any reason for us to doubt this, the assembled mass of his own backbenchers, who listened with ever-increasing gloom as he wriggled on the issue of the Gulf, is certainly confirmation of our beliefs. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] He did not mention that there was an Amendment in the names of many of his hon. Friends strongly criticising the whole basis of his Gulf policy.

1430 One of the most precious rights of this House of Commons is the right to exercise democratic political and financial control over the defence affairs of this country. Our House of Commons throughout its history has fought zealously to retain and preserve this right. It is therefore a lamentable situation when the Secretary of State for Defence sits in another place and cannot even come to listen to this debate for more than ten minutes at a time.

The Prime Minister dismisses that. The noble Lord is not answerable to this House of Commons. He holds his high office without any democratic mandate from a constituency, and the Prime Minister should explain this situation. It makes a mockery of the general concept of democratic, political control of the military. Previous Tory Administrations have had the Defence Secretary and also the Foreign Secretary in another place. We are beginning to wonder whether the Chancellor will not find refuge in another place, too, in order to avoid the embarrassment of accepting the scrutiny and real criticism that occurs in this House.

To give him credit, the Secretary of State took office with a lot of good will from both sides of the House but he will have to do a great deal better than he has so far done in the defence debate. The tone of that speech in another place was reminiscent of attitudes that many of us hoped had long since left us in the 1950s, let alone the 1960s. The vocabulary of sensible politicians should no longer include the sort of words used by the Secretary of State. He said that he did not wish to rattle sabres but anyone reading his speech must feel that his emphasis on the offensive military threat posed by the Russians could at least have been put in perspective if he had discussed the whole question of détente, the possibility of negotiation and of mutual force reductions in Europe.

The Prime Minister made much of the statement that we should not resent the facts about Russian forces and Warsaw Pact forces being presented to the House. I agree with that. What we do resent is that the Secretary of State and the Minister of State have been less than fair to the House in the comparison of those forces. They were not facts. The full details were 1431 not given, and they should be given. The Minister of State talked of N.A.T.O. force levels in the central region and said that there were more than 60 Warsaw Pact divisions confronting 23 divisions or their equivalent on the N.A.T.O. side.

It is this sort of talk that leads leader writers in newspapers to talk of a 3-1 ratio. Everyone knows that N.A.T.O. divisions are much larger than Warsaw Pact divisions. It has been said in a number of places, for instance by the former Under-Secretary in the United States Defence Department, that the typical British division is almost twice the size of a Warsaw Pact division and that a U.S. division is nearly three times the size of a Warsaw Pact division. On 2nd February, 1968, the then Secretary of State for Defence, McNamara said in his major statement: In all regions except Norway, the N.A.T.O. Pact forces are about equal in manpower. N.A.T.O. has about 900,000 troops deployed in all regions in continental Europe compared to 960,000 troops for the Warsaw Pact. He went on to say that manpower comparisons alone are not conclusive measures of military strength, with which I agree. There is the problem of "teeth to tail ratio" being more in favour of Warsaw Pact countries. It does, however, give a reasonable, relative measure by which to compare force capabilities. In the case of the air forces, mentioned by the Secretary of State, McNamara said at that time: … our relative capability is far greater than a simple comparison of numbers would indicate. By almost every measure—range, payload, ordnance effectiveness, loiter time, crew training—N.A.T.O. (especially U.S.) air forces are better than the Pact's for non-nuclear war…

§ Mr. John Wilkinson (Bradford, West)

The hon. Gentleman might perhaps turn to the military balance figures published by the Institute of Strategic Studies. He will see there that the combat and direct support troops available to N.A.T.O amount to 580,000 and to the Warsaw Pact countries 900,000 in the northern and central fronts. The report then adds that the Soviet forces could be doubled in four weeks, something which does not apply to N.A.T.O.

§ Dr. Owen

The question of reserves is one upon which McNamara has laid 1432 stress. The hon. Gentleman has quoted figures with which I am familiar. I have looked at the military balance quoted by him of N.A.T.O. versus the Warsaw Pact. In such a comparison it is necessary to include the southern flank as well as the northern and central flanks. On that comparison, in 1970–71 N.A.T.O. forces were shown to be 1,105,000, as against Warsaw Pact forces of 1,270,000. If we include France, which is reasonable, there is an additional 40,000 troops. Of course the number is difficult to compare and we on this side have always laid great stress on strengthening our force levels in Europe.

I would like to mention maritime forces to which the Prime Minister particularly seemed to attach great force. To hear the Secretary of State and his Ministerial colleagues one would think that the Russians had a superiority in this area. In the most recent study an attempt was made to improve on the ordinary comparisons of tonnage and to use a measure of standardised cost which consequently took account of such factors as the greater degree of sophistication in smaller vessels, the higher cost per ton of nuclear-powered submarines, the high proportion of old vessels in the U.S. Fleet and so on.

The principle behind the measurement system was expressed in this way: As a general rule it seems reasonable to assume that increased expenditure does buy an increase in performance or capability which, in a rough and ready way, has some relationship to the increase in the money spent. It was on this system of measurement that the N.A.T.O. fleet came out as over twice as large as the Warsaw Pact fleet. If it had been possible to include the value of the bases in the comparison, which would have been logical, the superiority would have been greater, and greater still if planes on aircraft carriers had been included. The facts have not been fairly presented to the House.

The Government claim, and the Prime Minister made great play of the figures, to have strengthened N.A.T.O. by their recent changes. This, as I well know, only invokes laughter in the Pentagon and in Washington. We all welcome the European Defence Improvement Programme and the Government's financial contributions, but, as I intend to show, their forces contribution to N.A.T.O. has been rather less than it was when we left office.

§ The Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Antony Lambton)

Before the hon. Member leaves the subject of comparisons, will he please compare the armoured strength of the Warsaw Pact and the West?

§ Dr. Owen

There again one has to take into account not just tank numbers but tank effectiveness, which it is difficult to do. Many people think that, for instance, the Chieftain tank is far more proficient than many of the tanks it faces. I am not saying that across the whole range one cannot pick out areas where there is superiority. I am not trying to hide the facts.

I should like to discuss this so-called increased N.A.T.O. contribution, and the teeth which the Prime Minister spent a great deal of his time talking about. Let us examine the teeth. The Government have made much of the fact that they are putting six surface ships and a submarine out into the Far East, and this may I understand be on a continuous deployment basis. These are very different proposals from those we put, which were for a continuing presence on an alternating basis. This in no way is offset by the running on of H.M.S. "Ark Royal", which at best I assume will be available on average for less than two-thirds of the year and whose Phantom aircraft were already assigned to N.A.T.O. under the previous Government's proposals.

Let us look at the Army. The Government are putting one battalion group into the Far East, plus an air platoon and one artillery battery. This is certainly not offset by expanding T.A.V.R. to increase the reserve contribution to N.A.T.O.

Let us look at the Royal Air Force. The Nimrod and Whirlwind helicopters going to the Far East will be sorely missed by N.A.T.O.—particularly the Nimrods—and although the change in ratio of the Jaguar aircraft going into close support in N.A.T.O. will help, there is no increase in numbers, and the Phantom aircraft numbers will be less. Some being afloat on H.M.S. "Ark Royal" and not available should they be required in the event of an emergency in the central area. As one would expect with no extra money and with increased commitments, the N.A.T.O. contribution will be actually smaller, and it is humbug for the Government to try to pretend otherwise.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Lambton) for 1434 interrupting me, because it gives me an opportunity to quote some of his words of 1961 from a pamphlet entitled "Inadequacy: The State of our Conventional Forces"—I hope that I am not doing him an injustice in ascribing the authorship to him. At that time—and we believe that the situation could build up again—which is one of our fundamental criticisms of the Government—the then Tory Government had been slowly decreasing the force levels committed to Europe. From 1957, force levels of 77,000 were cut by 1961 to 45,000, and many of the units were below establishment, as he himself wrote. The hon. Member questioned Britain's over-commitment throughout the world and said: Indeed …the more one looks at the question, the more one comes up against the fact that the Government… —his Government— …has to face a very unpopular decision or risk continuing a policy which has very great dangers, both to the country and to the maintenance of those overseas bases which we yet retain. In other words, that we must have some form of conscription or risk the inescapable logic of the Labour Party's contention that we must cut our commitments. It is a tribute to the Labour Government that they increased the contribution to the Rhine Army and army units assigned to N.A.T.O. by 3,400 from 1964, and increased the strength of B.A.O.R. infantry battalions by up to 6 per cent. and, when we were able to come out from east of Suez completely we would have been able to make a more significant contribution.

Hon. Gentlemen opposite, who must privately be as annoyed as we are that the Secretary of State is not here to answer our questions, might care to think about this vocal gem which the Secretary of State produced recently in another place. He was forced to try to rebut criticisms of some of his policies, and in one particular field which has been so prevalent in recent months, the noble Lord said: My Lords, some people have dismissed our policy as a policy of general exhortations and pious hopes. But it is not; it is a policy of close attention to detail."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 24th February, 1971; Vol. 315, c. 1073.] So, after those halcyon years of Opposition when irresponsible pledge after irresponsible pledge was issued by the spokesmen appointed by the present Prime Minister, many of whom hold high 1435 office in his Government, all we are offered is a policy of close attention to detail.

§ The Minister of State for Defence (Lord Balniel)

The hon. Gentleman knows that he is taking those words completely out of context. The words "exhortations and pious hopes" were referring to an article which related to recruiting. Recruiting in 1968–69 amounted to 28,000. This year there will be 39,000. Is that really "pious hope and exhortation?"

§ Dr. Owen

I said "In one particular field"—

§ Lord Balniel

It is a total distortion.

§ Hon. Members

Withdraw.

§ Dr. Owen

I said, in one particular field that has been so prevalent in recent months". Does the Minister deny that one of the major sources of criticism from the Press and informed military correspondents has been about recruiting? I did not say I was speaking about his whole policies—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ridiculous."] It is perfectly fair. So the Secretary of State reserves his general exhortations for his right hon. and hon. Friends who are becoming increasingly restless as broken pledge after broken pledge is tossed into the wastepaper basket.

I will let the Prime Minister know about these broken pledges. He seems to have thought that he could make an anodyne speech to the House and we should forget everything that had been said prior to his gracing us with his presence. Perhaps it was too embarrassing for the Government to have as a defence spokesman someone who had been making these speeches. So we have the Secretary of State, no politician, making statements in another place where we cannot even listen to them.

For instance, we hear no more about prolonging the carrier life of H.M.S. "Eagle" and H.M.S. "Hermes". Nowhere do the Conservative Government say they will prolong the life of existing carriers. We hear no more about the folly of accepting fixed defence budgets for the years ahead—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ark Royal."] It is ridiculous to hold 1436 on to one aircraft carrier which would be available for such a short period of time.

§ Lord Balniel

The hon. Gentleman, in his one brief moment of glory, was responsible for the Navy. During that period of time £30 million was spent on H.M.S. "Ark Royal". It was then decided to scrap it. Why?

§ Dr. Owen

The right hon. Gentleman should try to get his facts right. First, the decision to retain H.M.S. "Ark Royal" was made before I joined the Government. Secondly, he should try to envisage that the unanimous advice which we were tendered at the time by the Service chiefs—

§ Lord Balniel

Who was responsible for the policy? The Service chiefs?

§ Dr. Owen

Nobody is blaming the Service chiefs. I am saying that those hon. Members on the Opposition benches spent all their time saying that the Government should protect Service lives. So they should. So they should take notice of any threat to Service lives. There was the question of covering the withdrawal from east of Suez. It was felt, rightly, or wrongly, that there might have been circumstances in which that withdrawal could have been dangerous. It was believed at that time, and upheld by the Secretary of State, that to protect Service lives it was right to provide aircraft cover, not just the cover from H.M.S. "Eagle" and H.M.S. "Hermes" but sophisticated aircraft cover from phantom aircraft. Should we have ignored that advice? Hon. Gentlemen opposite would have a reasonable case if there were a role for "Ark Royal" for only two or three years, but to commit themselves to a whole new refit for the "Ark Royal" in 1974–75 when they have insufficient service manpower and when they know that in that period there will have to be a substantial refit—

§ The Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Peter Kirk)

The hon. Gentleman must get his facts right. There will be two short refit periods of the "Ark Royal", but for nowhere near as long as he has suggested.

§ Dr. Owen

We shall be interested to know the time scale and the cost. But it was always thought to be an interim 1437 refit every two years for an aircraft carrier, with a large refit every four or five years. If hon. Gentlemen opposite are happy to run an aircraft carrier as complex as that until the end of the 1970s, they will have to spend more money on refits than they at present envisage.

Let us deal with defence expenditure, which is a matter very close to the hearts of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. The present Home Secretary said in the defence debate of 1967: …our principle would be that any money needed to maintain the security of this country must be a prior charge on the Budget".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th July, 1967, Vol.751, c. 1098.] In the same debate the then Opposition defence spokesman pointed to …the stupidity of picking on a figure for defence expenditure four years ahead as the Government did in 1964. The present Home Secretary said again on 25th July, 1968: We believe that the fundamental error of the Government has been to base their defence planning on a fixed financial ceiling …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th July, 1968; Vol.769, c. 1024.] The present Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said We do not pretend to think that we can have adequate defence on the cheap. We are prepared to pay the price to secure our interests and fulfil our commitments."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1969; Vol.779, c. 249.] Both were then in Opposition. What is the reality? The Secretary of State in giving a lecture in October last year talked of 'Increasing complexity'—of equipment—'growing cost within a rigidly controlled defence budget, more and more sophistication and an escalation of prices. And all this at a time when the Government are trying to reduce public expediture and take less money from the pockets of the people of this country '. The final culmination came in Cmnd. 4578, on page 16 The figures for the defence budget were explained in the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1970 (Cmnd. 4521). This settled firmly the expenditure on the defence programme over the next four financial years. One more cynical pledge which has been completely broken. We hear no more about the pledge to restore the Hunter-Killer submarine build rate which was given in 1970. We are not ferreting back into 1964 or even 1965.

§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)

The hon. Member is going back to 1961.

§ Dr. Owen

We went back to 1961 for the deliberate reason that we are looking at commitments. This is one of our most serious objections to the policy of this Government. Those who held responsibility for defence forces in this country deeply resented the attack on our patriotism which was launched upon us by the then Opposition defence spokesman. We are entitled to ask what has happened to all their pledges to repair breaches which allegedly had been torn in the defences of this country. The pledge to rebuild the honour of our country which has been cast down. It is a sick joke. There was no breach and there was no casting down of honour.

The present Government inherited from us the best paid, best trained, and best equipped defence forces in Europe and in many areas forces which were superior to the United States forces in quality. The present Government have done nothing about these pledges. They do not need to be fulfilled and they know it. They had committed themselves to restore the force levels that we reduced in the Far East and planned to reduce. All they have done is to come up with this miserable package which is dangerous in form and marginal in content.

§ Sir Frederic Bennett (Torquay)

I am sure the hon. Gentleman would like to be fair. He has called this a miserable farce. May I recall to the hon. Gentleman the words of the Leader of the Opposition in a speech in the United States. He said: It is a hundred times easier for Britain to remain there"— east of Suez— even with a token force than for us to seek to enter when trouble occurs". Does the hon. Gentleman rebut that or does he accept it?

§ Dr. Owen

The hon. Gentleman is aware of the fact that devaluation meant a change of policy. Nobody has tried to deny what the Labour Government had to do—

§ Mr. Churchill (Stretford)

They welshed.

§ Dr. Owen

The hon. Gentleman, when he has been in the House a little longer, 1439 will hear a lot more about pledges which have been broken by his right hon. Friends. As a Welshman, may I say that I resent the use of that word. The facts are that they have had the opportunity.

In the Gulf they are accepting our run down timetable almost in its entirety. There is not a person in the Ministry of Defence who does not openly admit that the present Government have taken over all the policies of retrenchment, withdrawal and reduction which they so attacked when they were in Opposition.

Realism came to British defence and foreign policy over the decisions following devaluation. For the last two and a half years of the Labour Government these policies were pursued courageously against virulent and, as we now see it, totally synthetic opposition.

What do we now have in this White Paper? A rather nauseatingly-written political introduction headed "Policy". This is intended as a general exhortation to try to pretend to their own back benchers that they are to spend more money, expand force manpower and accept new commitments. They are not doing anything of the sort.

This type of posturing—the policy which has been built up by the Tory Party in this country as some kind of principle—should be recognised for what it is: a mixture of deceit and humbug. However, the serious objection to the policy is that it is a prescription for overstretch. It does not honestly face the real facts that the Cabinet have already decided that there will not be any substantial increase in financial resources for defence over the next five years. It does not honestly face the fact that the voluntary manpower pool is not sufficient to give credible support in terms of increasing force levels to support open-ended commitments in the Far East. Behind this policy statement there are attitudes which could, if unchecked now, eventually lead to this country once again returning to the situation in 1963.

§ Mr. Churchill

It was surely the hon. Gentleman's own Administration which had an open-ended commitment in the Far East under the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement and was providing no deterrent capability on the spot and was 1440 relying merely on reinforcement from this country.

§ Dr. Owen

The hon. Gentleman, of all people, should be aware of the fact that one of his own relatives came to this House and negotiated the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. This was inherited by us. The hon. Gentleman must do his homework.

§ Mr. Churchill

rose—

§ Dr. Owen

I am not giving way again to the hon. Gentleman. I am saying that these policies, if unchecked, could eventually lead to the state in which this country found itself in 1963 when we inherited from the Tory Government in 1964 a serious state of affairs. We inherited a strategy which was still largely based on massive nuclear retaliation. We inherited forces extending all round the world, overstretched, ill-equipped. Even spending just under 7 per cent. of the gross national product on defence as the Tory Government then did, we could not meet all the financial requirements dictated by these commitments.

So we are left with the Secretary of State boasting in another place that this year's White Paper is 30 pages shorter and 7½p less than the 1970 White Paper—altogether, he claims, a good example of Conservative cost-effectiveness. What drivel. This House wants more information, not less about defence policy and wants it in this House—not in a totally undemocratic assembly, composed of a cross between hereditary peers and Prime Ministerial appointees.

The White Paper says very little about the all-important strategic arms limitation talks which are now taking place. I understand the problems involved. In my view, it has been a major omission from recent defence debates how little serious discussion Parliament gives to this whole area of nuclear disarmament. It is no good us leaving it entirely to the two super powers to argue about the major issues. It is particularly important for Britain, which is one of the few countries that possesses enough nuclear know-how to argue with its ally, the United States, that our voice should be heard, and that that voice should not always be confined behind closed doors. I realise the problems of defence Ministers. The fact is that in the past in regard to the S.A.L.T. 1441 real mistakes have been made. The real tragedy is the way in which first the Johnson Administration, then the Nixon Administration prevaricated over proposing a M.I.R.V. testing moratorium. This was the one really effective immediate initiative open to the United States Administration in a serious attempt to halt the arms race.

By the time that the S.A.L.T. actually began, the United States had almost completed its M.I.R.V. testing programme, and so the one opportunity for taking a major step to halt the quantum leap that M.I.R.V. deployment involves was lost. It is now unlikely that the Russians will agree to an immediate ban on M.I.R.V. testing, knowing, as they do, that the Americans could easily circumvent such a ban by fitting M.I.R.V.s without further testing and with a fair measure of confidence in their existing technology. History will show the reluctance to push a M.I.R.V. moratorium to have been a massive error of judgment.

Admittedly, all weapon moratoriums have their dangers, but, even with the Russians' persistent refusal, to consider on-site testing, there were reasonable grounds for believing that modern detection devices would have been able to pick up the testing of M.I.R.V., and even, if necessary, banning the testing of M.I.R.V.s and decoy testing. It is because of the imbalance of M.I.R.V. technology, with the United States having a clear lead, that initially S.A.L.T. is likely to prove disappointing. However, the long-term prospects for talks continuing over the next four or five years could involve major changes in current nuclear policy. At this stage, the Russians will probably be unwilling to accept a freeze on the existing level of missiles and aircraft unless this is accompanied by a total M.I.R.V. ban or by including M.I.R.V.s in the total number of missiles counted. They know that they have fewer missiles than the United States and that the United States is possibly developing a new generation of bombers. They also know that they are behind in applying M.I.R.V. technology, and so a freeze would be likely to ensure a widening of the missile gap for some years to come.

The other issue for the S.A.L.T.—and it is important in terms of the massive drain on financial resources in the two 1442 countries—is whether there can be any agreement on reducing or banning A.B.M. deployment. The Soviet Union already has deployed round Moscow the Golosh system, and the United States has become committed to putting the safeguard system round their Minuteman sites and probably round Washington. This problem of A.B.M. deployment must be taken seriously, and when the Prime Minister says that he is being kept informed about the S.A.L.T. and is taking an active interest in them, I hope that he is putting in a specific British input to the United States.

The United States recently has become very concerned about the Russian SS9 missiles which have three warheads and which, though not at present independently controlled, are able to land in a pattern which could effectively knock out a Minuteman site, even when hardened by the addition of extensive reinforced concrete round the launching base. The facts are well known in the United States, but they are rarely discussed here. The main American concern is that this could provide the Russians with a first-strike weapon system and it was this concern which formed the major argument for deploying an A.B.M. system.

It seems extraordinary that Congress could decide actually to slow down the conversion rate of Polaris submarines to be fitted with Poseidon, which is a system with a proven second-strike capability, and at the same time accept, after tremendous opposition in the United States, the case for an A.B.M. system which would at best, if proved technically successful, confer a limited second-strike capability on the vulnerable Minuteman sites. It would, however, be achieved at a tremendous financial cost. Let us hope that a total ban on A.B.M. deployment is being actively discussed and pushed by Her Majesty's Government.

It is clear, therefore, that the 1970s will present a completely new dimension of increase in nuclear weapons if the S.A.L.T. fail, and it is against this background that we in this country must discuss the comparatively insignificant strategic forces of Britain and France. It is particularly gratifying to hear that the present Government have not made any attempt to link entry into the 1443 Common Market with discussions with the French on nuclear matters. The complete absence of any move by this Government or the French is to be welcomed. Many of us on this side of the House, though strongly committed Europeans—and 1 make no secret of my views on the subject—and hoping that the Common Market talks are successful, would strongly condemn any linking of nuclear weapons with the Common Market negotiations. At one time, it seemed as though the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister in his Godkin lecture, was proposing such a link. It is good to know that the E.E.C. negotiations are not straying into the possibility of committing this error. It is a quite separate problem and should be discussed in the environment of the N.A.T.O. Alliance.

Europe has a real interest in the outcome of the S.A.L.T., especially as they relate to the large number of existing Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles which are targeted on Europe. We in this country have made it clear to the United States that we would be deeply concerned if the Americans were to propose any unilateral reduction in the 7,000 nuclear weapons at present in Europe. These weapons are considered to be now an indispensable element in N.A.T.O.'s deterrent against attack, and any future reduction, which hon. Members on this side of the House will welcome, would have to be accompanied by equivalent reductions of the Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

A.B.M. deployment is also of concern to the British and the French because the effectiveness of their existing strategic forces could be weakened by widespread A.B.M. deployment. My message to the Government is that this is an area of vital interest to Europe and to this country. I hope that they will not feel that they must necessarily endorse American initiatives because of some feeling of nuclear inferiority. There is no need for pessimism. The S.A.L.T. could still represent a major break-through in halting the arms race.

The greatest contribution that we could make to intelligent discussion of these crucial issues is to challenge technically, 1444 as an understanding but nevertheless independent critic, the assumption on which American policies are based within the Alliance.

I do not wish to embark on too long a discussion of maritime strategy, for much of the ground will have to be covered tomorrow when we come to debate the Government's deplorable decision to sell arms to South Africa. However, one cannot look at the White Paper without criticising the whole concept of the supposed military threat of Russian naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

No one who has served in the Ministry of Defence will deny that this Ministry is not usually short of military threats. In fact, they abound in every corner. One can barely hold a meeting without being confronted by some new threat. The job of Ministers is usually to inject a degree of realism into the assessment of potential military threats. I find it all the more inexplicable and extraordinary, therefore, that this Government should have found it necessary to find a military threat all on their own. It is a very remarkable achievement. For the last four years, the Ministry of Defence has quite rightly watched the growth of the Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean very carefully. Never at any time was the threat judged to be anything other than primarily political; yet, suddenly, having taken office on the afternoon of 19th June, by Monday. 22nd June, the Foreign Secretary decided to change the assessment of the political threat in the Indian Ocean to a major military threat. The topic turned into a discussion of protecting our sea lanes and returning to concepts of future naval war that were slowly being abandoned in the 1950s, let alone the 1960s.

Not unnaturally, the Ministry of Defence is already beginning to revise its previous judgments. It would hardly be in the nature of the Ministry to turn down a threat offered to it on a plate by no less a person than its own Prime Minister. The difficulty of obtaining a sensible dialogue on the possibility of limiting war at sea is that each side of the argument tends to overstate dramatically its case. For example, it is inconceivable that the super Powers will ever again face the same type of prolonged maritime warfare, going on over many years, as they did in the last two world wars. However, 1445 it is a realistic planning assumption that an initial maritime incident could be contained using conventional weapons over many more days than are likely to be possible with an initial land-based incident. At sea, with no rigid boundaries, the probability is of a slower escalation with more time for second thoughts, and, in consequence, a higher nuclear threshold.

To that extent, limited war at sea is credible. The proponents of extended war at sea, however, talk of the need for the worldwide protection of sea lanes and constantly reiterate import figures and merchant ship numbers to show the vulnerability of various nations to interference with their seaborne overseas trade. These arguments are very hard to sustain, and my experience is that the more sophisticated naval officers are themselves unconvinced that this is a sensible strategy on which to base their future policy. It becomes particularly irrelevant when one considers how strongly the then Opposition used those same arguments as a reason for not withdrawing from the Persian Gulf. Yet now the Government have accepted the logic of the argument that this was not a major factor and it was more important to ensure peaceful relations with the States surrounding the Gulf.

The only case for accepting that a military threat exists in the Indian Ocean was the view that there might be interference with Western tankers sailing from the Gulf. The Government are obsessed with the Cape. If there really is a military threat, why are the Government leaving the Gulf? They must know that of all the assessments for withdrawal the one case strongly contested by the Americans was withdrawal from the Gulf far more than from the Far East. It is the Gulf area which is the most likely place for any interference with Western shipping—the Gulf and its surrounding areas to the Indian Ocean.

Can anyone seriously believe that the Western Alliance, if confronted with a persistent threat over a period of a few days of the Russians interfering with our merchant fleet, would take—[Interruption.] The Minister of State must not make such offensive remarks. Why should we choose the Cape, far away from our shores? Why not choose an area of 1446 the sea, if we wish to risk escalation against the Russians, nearer home?

§ Dr. Miller

Does my hon. Friend agree that since British ships going into the Indian Ocean form only about 8 per cent. of the total amount of shipping, it seems ridiculous that Britain should take unilateral action to protect the sea lanes, and is she not acting against her own interests by the decision to sell arms to South Africa?

§ Dr. Owen

If we accept, as my hon. Friend does, that the major threat is political, the most assinine way to go about defending it is to alienate practically all the countries surrounding the Indian Ocean. If we think that there is a threat of military action we should not withdraw from the Gulf.

The Prime Minister would like us to believe that he has not changed his mind about the Gulf. The right hon. Gentleman finds it impossible to admit to the House that he has changed his mind. But if we look through the quotations which have been given before, the Prime Minister was firmly committed. In 1968 the right hon. Gentleman said: and so, when the time comes—and on the Prime Minister's time schedule the opportunity will be open to us—we shall ignore the time phasing laid down by the Prime Minister and his Government for the Far East and the Middle East. We shall support our country's friends and allies and we shall restore the good name of Britain."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th January 1968; Vol.756, c. 1971.] Again, in March, 1968, the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] You have not done this—

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Miss Harvie Anderson)

Order. The Chair has been tolerant. I have been sad