FOREIGN AFFAIRS

§ Mr. Speaker

Before the debate opens, may I remind the House that between 30 and 40 hon. Members are seeking to take part in it? All have an equal right to be called if I can get them in; brief speeches will help.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

On a point of order. May I have your guidance before the debate takes place, Mr. Speaker? You will have seen on today's Order Paper a Motion, signed by 143 hon. Members, asking for certain action—

§ Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman must put his point of order briefly and not traverse the whole of the foreign affairs debate which we are to have.

§ Mr. Allaun

I have to indicate my point, Sir—which some of us feel is of slightly less importance than the lives of millions of people.

591 A number of us wish to indicate our views by abstaining in the Division, provided that a satisfactory decision has not been taken by the Government. How do we indicate that we are abstaining, or acting, on the Nigerian issue and not on such trivial matters? The whole relevance of Parliament on issues of importance is involved.

§ Mr. Speaker

The hon. Gentleman has clearly indicated, if he takes the step of abstaining from the Division or of voting for the Motion what his opinion is, and why he will be doing so. Obviously in a foreign affairs debate all kinds of matters will be discussed. The hon. Gentleman is keen on one and other hon. Members are keen on other aspects of the foreign situation. He must decide, as every hon. Member must decide, whether he votes for or against the Adjournment of the House, or abstains. It is as simple as that.

§ Sir Alec Douglas-Home (Kinross and West Perthshire)

The House is glad that the Foreign Secretary has returned for this debate, because it will give him the opportunity to give authoritative answers on behalf of the Government to a number of questions which have been causing concern to hon. Members on both sides of the House. One of them is Nigeria, to which I shall return.

The first matter which I wish to raise is the treatment of Mr. Anthony Grey by the Chinese. His continued detention is unjustifiable and offends against every standard of international behaviour. That is true and will not be disputed. But when it comes to action there must be only one test: would that action hasten Mr. Grey's release? The House, while rightly expressing its grave concern, will, I feel, be generally inclined to trust the Foreign Secretary's judgment as to whether this is the time when, however hard it may be, he has to ask for even more patience from Mr. Grey's relatives and friends, or whether the point has been reached when there is no alternative but retaliation.

I make it clear that if the Foreign Secretary prefers to say nothing today, I will not press him, and I believe that the House will understand. Nevertheless, it is right that, on behalf of hon. 592 Members on both sides, it should be stressed what a very serious view hon. Members take of the Chinese Government's delay in releasing a man who is innocent of any crime. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

The second matter about which many hon. Members on both sides of the House are anxious is the handling of the Falkland Islands negotiation. The Foreign Secretary had a taste of the mood of the House at Question Time yesterday. It is true that the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers have repeated—the Foreign Secretary said it again yesterday—that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands would not be changed unless the islanders wished it. It is pertinent to ask why, in spite of these repeated assurances, there is such widespread disbelief and disquiet and why it persists. I hope that I can help the right hon. Gentleman to understand the foundation for the anxieties.

On 31st January, 1966, the right hon. Gentleman told the House that he had not discussed the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with the Argentine Government since the British Government did not regard this as negotiable. That was accepted by the House, because sovereignty was not on the agenda of the talks. But suspicion has arisen in recent weeks on two counts. Ministers in another place and in this House—and the Minister of State dealt as valiantly as he could with this matter—when questioned on the point and scope of the negotiations, have replied by saying a number of things: that they were about links, that they were about communications, that they were about links and communications.

They did not say that they were not about sovereignty. But the conclusion became almost inescapable that, although the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in another place, did not feel free to say so, the negotiations were essentially about sovereignty, and certainly that was the impression of the Argentine Government. The Foreign Secretary confirmed this yesterday. Therefore, the situation is different from the situation which the right hon. Gentleman described in January, 1966, and our assumptions and suspicions were correct.

In addition, we have had the persistent rumours of what Lord Chalfont is said 593 to have said. He must be the most prolific off-the-record talker which any Government have ever had. Some examples are these. He is said to have said to the islanders that their economic future was bleak without Argentina; that the dependence on wool exports could not possible provide them with a living for much longer; that Britain could not continue the expense and responsibility of their defence.

I do not know whether the Foreign Secretary can confirm these rumours about what the noble Lord said, but he can hardly blame the Opposition, or, indeed, a number of hon. Members opposite, if, as a result of all this, we have concluded that the purpose of this exercise is to come to an agreement with Argentina and to present it to the islanders as an agreement made jointly by the British and Argentine Governments with which they had better concur or else.

If the purpose is to give confidence to the Falkland Islanders, the Foreign Secretary could so easily have said that, as it is clear that the islanders do not wish to change the status quo, sovereignty will be taken off the agenda of the future discussions. He was unwilling to say that. Therefore, I think that two conclusions are justifiable. Either he is using sovereignty with no intention of conceding it, in which case the Argentinians are being encouraged in false hopes and are being led up the garden path, or he has in mind a form of agreement where he would argue with the islanders that in return for this or that, in exchange for this or that, they would do well to surrender their sovereignty to Argentina. The line between persuasion and pressure is very, very thin. If the Government so intended, the sustained interest of the House has, I think, prevented them from taking this course.

Nevertheless, the Opposition will divide the House tonight because we want to make it crystal clear that should the Conservatives inherit a state of continuing negotiation we will exclude the subject of sovereignty from the talks. We cannot see any point in the talks continuing if sovereignty is included. Is there any reason why the islanders should not be a party to these discussions and in the talks? Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will tell us what he thinks about that.

594 The third matter to which I should like to draw attention which is of enormous interest to the House and of great complexity and difficulty concerns the civil war in Nigeria. Africa presents a most pitiful picture of tribal rivalry and warfare. From all accounts, there is a massacre in Southern Sudan, where the dead can be numbered on a comparable scale with the dying and starving in Nigeria. It it a terrible fact that tribal warfare is rife. The anxieties over Nigeria are twofold. The first is the supply of arms from outside the country, and the second the feeding of the under-nourished and starving.

On the supply of arms, the British Government are assailed for continuing to send arms to a Federal Government in the circumstances of a rebellion, or so-called rebellion, whereby Biafra seeks to escape from central control.

The first reflection that I have on this aspect of the matter is that there can be no rule applied in Britain's dealing with a Commonwealth country. For example, the House will recall the cases of two other Commonwealth countries, Tanzania and Kenya, which were threatened with internal rebellion. Britain not only sent arms to these countries; she actually intervened militarily and, what is more, to universal applause.

The Nigerian case concerning the secession of Biafra is not, I admit, an exact parallel, but, nevertheless, it is worth recalling the previous actions taken by a British Government in those countries. In this case, the Government were asked, and are being asked, to cut off traditional supplies to a Commonwealth Government which is represented in all Commonwealth conferences. I have never felt justified in asking the Government to do that. For Britain now, unilaterally, to renounce the supply of arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria would not, I believe, serve the cause of peace, and for an additional reason to those that I have given. The situation has changed for the worse. France and Russia have now entered the lists of suppliers, the first with cynical opportunism, the second of set purpose.

It may not be generally known to hon. Members that the Russians have taken what they call "technical control" of all the Algerian airfields and far to the south in Algeria. There is nothing 595 they would like better than to penetrate the north and the west of Africa and be the sole supplier of arms and aircraft to Federal Nigeria, thus achieving what they have achieved in Algeria, virtual control over the airfields of that country. The Nigerians are well aware of this pitfall, and I hope that we, too, shall take it into consideration.

Now that the civil war is complicated by the intervention of other countries from outside and, therefore, the situation has been altered from what it was only a few months ago, ought there not to be a cut-off of all external arms supplies? That could only be organised, I would suggest, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but I think that the effort should be made. With the Soviet Union involved, the policing of such an agreement would have to be done, and, as all hon. Members know, that is difficult to achieve when the Soviet Union is involved. Nevertheless, I believe that such a scheme ought to be tried and that the British Government should take the initiative with U Thant, even though the chances of success are small. I think that the House would like the right hon. Gentleman's reaction to such a proposal.

My next subject is food. The malnutrition and the death roll both in Federal and Ibo territory are harrowing now. If, as is rumoured in certain areas, the inhabitants are eating the seed corn, then the suffering and death could multiply into a tragedy of completely horrifying proportions. Let us not underestimate the work which is being done by the voluntary societies, the Red Cross and others. I dare say that hon. Members have received the pamphlet which I have received from Oxfam. The information contained in this paper adds up to a substantial assistance in food, medicine and generally in relief. It is a most creditable story on which all concerned should be congratulated. The most useful thing that the House can do now is to ask the Foreign Secretary if we can establish the true facts.

It is, I think, agreed that the scale of the mercy operation requires a land corridor to Iboland. Do the Federal Government agree to the use of a land corridor, and will they make it available? If so, what is the obstacle to relief going that way? It is extremely important 596 that the Foreign Secretary, if he feels able to, should answer that question.

It is also agreed that an air flight into one important Biafran-held airfield should be organised. While it could not do the job that a land corridor could do, it could do a very important supplementary job and deal urgently with particular areas in which famine is rife. Have the Federal Government agreed to facilitate such flights by day into this airfield, and, if so, what is the obstacle to relief going that way? I think that the House may take it that, short of forcing a way into a Biafran-held airfield, the Red Cross and the British Government are eager to exploit any opening that is given, as neither funds nor lack of organisation will stand in the way of a full-scale operation.

It seems that the Government are renewing the efforts to promote new discussions on a cease-fire and a possible peace to follow it, and that two Ministers are abroad now with that in view. As those talks are likely to take a considerable time, would it be possible to achieve quick relief by proposing to Colonel Ojukwu that the international observer team, which has been well received in Federal territory, should be allowed on to this vital airfield to control and regulate the daylight flights bringing in food to Iboland, to ensure that the supplies are received and, more important, that the supplies go to the right place, since there is a great deal of doubt where the food that goes to Iboland ends up, very often not with the children and the starving. It would be helpful if the Foreign Secretary would give us the latest information that he has and the answers to the questions I have asked, which, I hope, are quite plain.

Only a few weeks ago we had a foreign affairs debate on the Queen's Speech, when we were able to review the strategy of the free world and Britain's part in it. I do not intend today to retrace or retread that ground. The Soviet Note to Her Majesty's Government was a Note of vulgar abuse from a country which has a bad conscience, and it courted the reply which it received. The right hon. Gentleman was right, too, to ration the number of the rather common run-of-the-mill secret service agents to which we are automatically expected to give hospitality in the Soviet Embassy.

597 To the general foreign and defence policy of the Government we shall return on a future day. I do not know whether the Foreign Secretary will want to say anything about developments in Europe. I notice with satisfaction that there have been discussions in Brussels on organising technological co-operation.

In conclusion, I turn to the wider scene and the reaction against the actions of the Soviet Union. If there is a criticism of the Government's action, it would rot apply to their policy in support of N.A.T.O., but rather to this, that they do not seem fully to recognise that the danger from the Soviet Union is not one of direct war; it is one of what I might call creeping expansion round the flanks of the free world. Against: hat, the Government not only do not ensure but are actively abandoning positions which are vital to the strategic defence of the free countries.

I hope that the Foreign Secretary will be able to satisfy the House in answering some of the questions that I have raised, because I believe that they are of general concern.

§ The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart)

The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has referred to the specific points in which the House has the greatest interest at present, and we must accept that those of us who are opening this debate do not seek to develop any general theme of international affairs but deal with certain issues which have forced themselves on the attention of the House and the general public.

However, I notice that some of them are concerned with areas such as Nigeria, where there is actual fighting, some are concerned with Central Europe, where there is tension, and we have also had references to matters where mankind has avoided either fighting or tension and is trying to seek negotiated settlements of disputes.

It seems to me that the whole task before mankind, in which this country must play its part, is to help to get ourselves back from the edge of the precipice towards a situation in which human beings can live normal lives and engage 598 in activities which are more constructive than violence, tension and conflict.

As the House knows, recently I have spent a fortnight in Pakistan and India. I would like to have told the House about the possibilities of trade and economic advance beneficial to them and to us, because, as I say, what we must seek to do, everywhere in the world that we can, is to stop fighting, to reduce tension, to encourage negotiated settlements of all points in dispute, and so create the kind of world in which mankind can apply himself to the solution of all those economic problems which beset him so intensely.

The first step, then, is to stop fighting, and immediately we must think of Nigeria. I accept the right hon. Gentleman's setting of this in the whole African framework. We have to recognise that Nigeria is a large and fully independent country and a partner in the Commonwealth. We cannot claim to order its affairs. But while its affairs take this present tragic form, there is no Parliament or country in the world which cannot fail to be concerned about them, which cannot fail to express that concern, and try to seek a solution.

We have to remember, too, that, weighed against each other in this conflict, there is, on the one hand, the dread of some of the Ibo people about what their situation might be in a united Nigeria, though I believe that the evidence is now overwhelming that, fortunately, their fears would not be justified. Unhappily, they are still there. Against that, we have to weigh the fact which is very much in mind in the States and the Organisation of African Unity that tribal secession could be the road to disaster, not only for Nigeria but for Africa as a whole. This great issue is involved, and no attempt can be made to judge the problem if one neglects that issue, which is of so much concern to Africans.

This means that, in any steps that we take, we must endeavour to work both with Nigeria and with the Organisation of African Unity. Above all, we must avoid any posture which would enable it to be said that we are the former Imperial Power interfering. We have to be a nation concerned as a matter of common humanity with what is happening, and to demonstrate that we must seek to work 599 with Nigeria and with the Organisation of African Unity.

Among all the differences of opinion that are expressed, I believe that the universal concern now is with relief for the starving and with such progress as can be made towards a cease-fire as will enable relief for the starving to occur. It is that, therefore, on which I want to concentrate.

First and foremost with regard to relief, as the House knows, Britain has already contributed £250,000. Last month, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued an appeal. M. Ruegger, of the International Red Cross, was in this country recently, and he discussed the matter with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. The Government have decided, therefore, subject to the approval of Parliament, to make a further gift of £700,000. That will bring our total contribution to nearly £1 million. The necessary Supplementary Estimate will be put before Parliament in due course. Meanwhile, if necessary, payment will be made out of the Civil Contingencies Fund.

Of course, it is not enough to provide the funds. We have to find an answer to the problem of how to get in the food. This has been discussed with an eye both to an airlift or air drop and to a land corridor. The right hon. Gentleman asked me if the Federal Government have agreed to daylight flights of relief into rebel-held territory. The answer to that is yes, and recently they have confirmed their consent to these. Unhappily, I have to tell the House that Colonel Ojukwu still maintains his objection to daylight flights. While we should be prepared to use the Royal Air Force to assist in an airlift or air drop, I think that the House will accept that we could not do that unless we had the assurance that both sides were prepared to allow these flights to go on in safety; but I will develop this point a little further later.

We are seeking to get in touch with all the persons concerned in the matter to see if this necessary degree of consent can be obtained. If it is, we shall not be backward in providing the means for an airlift. However, were all that done, it would still remain true that it could 600 not provide supplies on anything like the scale needed for the tragedy.

I have heard it argued that some of the figures of deaths from starvation which have been quoted so far have been exaggerated. I hope and believe that that is true. But, even when allowance has been made for that, already there is a great tragedy occurring and an even greater one looming up in the months ahead unless food can be got in by a land corridor.

Here again, I have to tell the House that the Federal Government agreed some time ago to what were called mercy corridors to get food in by land. I believe that the concern of Colonel Ojukwu is that, if there were such corridors, they might be used for a sudden military incursion into the territory which he now holds. Whether or not we think that it is reasonable to maintain that objection in the face of starving people—and I am not sure that it is—we must see if we can try to overcome it. My right hon. and noble Friend the Lord Shepherd is now in Lagos, and one of the matters which he will be discussing is the possibility of arranging some kind of international safeguard to make sure that there is a mercy corridor for food, that Colonel Ojukwu is sufficiently confident that it will not be used for military purposes and that he will be able, at long last, to consent to this absolutely essential step if famine is to be stopped and greater famine averted.

The House will understand that much still depends on the attitude of Colonel Ojukwu. We have asked, and shall continue to ask, all those who are in contact with him to get him to modify his attitude on these matters and not—I am afraid that I must put it this way—to hold his people to ransom.

I have referred to my noble Friend's visit to Lagos. That is concerned not only with matters affecting relief, but with the possibility of a cease-fire. I am not in a position—and I do not think that the House would press me—to say very much about the conversations so far. It is not the first time that this country has been active in trying to get a solution to the problem. There were the discussions at Kampala and at Aburi before that. We have made efforts jointly with the Organisation of African Unity. We have already 601 made it clear that if, as a necessary condition to a. cease-fire and ending the war, there must be a peace-keeping force to give assurance to the Ibo people against the fears that they entertain, we are ready to take part in the provision and organising of such a force.

While the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, is in Lagos and since, as I stressed earlier, it is vital to act in concert with the Organisation of African Unity and to recognise how much this matter means to all Africa, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary visited Addis Ababa. Again, I cannot go into detail, but he has had encouraging talks with the Emperor of Ethiopia and with representatives of the Organisation of African Unity.

On the two issues of relief and the promotion of a cease-fire, I believe that this country is fulfilling its responsibilities and duty to humanity. But I want to raise one other point about which many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House are concerned. The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire raised the question of single-handed action by the Government to stop the supply of arms. I recognise that this matter is bound to evoke strong feeling. I believe that if we are to get it right we have to begin by accepting all round that, whatever our differing views on the matter, we all want to take the kind of action that will avert famine and bring a stop to misery. There are genuine differences of opinion about the effect of particular kinds of action. That is why I believe that it would be wrong to advocate the single-handed stopping of the supply of arms by this country.

But there is a further proposition: an attempt to get universal stopping of the supply of arms. I have explained to the House before that, while this is by no means an impossible concept, it is an extremely difficult one. No multilateral control of arms would be satisfactory or would achieve the object which so many right hon. and hon. Members have been pursuing unless it was effective in controlling private shipments as well as those approved by governments. That must be accepted if we want to get an all round stoppage of arms going in. It would mean that governments would be required to take not merely the negative action of stopping the supply of arms themselves, but the positive action of preventing, so 602 far as it was in their power or that of their territories, private persons sending arms. If a cease-fire and a meeting of both sides seems to be within reach, I believe that in that context there would be the possibility of getting multilateral control of arms and so achieve the objects which so many right hon. and hon. Members have in mind.

§ Mr. Frank Allaun

Why cannot the Foreign Secretary attempt now a joint ban by the four remaining Powers? Each of those Governments are quite capable of stopping any black market supplies. These are not drugs; they are armoured cars and heavy weapons.

§ Mr. Stewart

I am sure that my hon. Friend realises that it is important that we be sure they are not only capable, but prepared to do so. I doubt whether any embargo would be completely effective unless we could get it policed at the point of entry into Nigeria and into the rebel held territory. That seems to be one of the great difficulties.

I must also make a point with which my hon. Friend may find it difficult to sympathise, but which he must understand is a real difficulty. It would be quite easy for me, as a diplomatic gesture, to say that Great Britain calls for this action without any consideration of the kind of response I should be likely to get. I should risk very greatly that not only Nigeria, but all Africa, would regard this as a hostile move, and a move helpful to the idea of tribal secession. It would not matter whether that was a justified suspicion. The fact that the suspicion was there might do great damage. Despite the agreeable prospect of appearing to have tried to make peace, I could not take the responsibility of doing something which would be more likely to make the situation worse.

Having said that, I ask right hon. and hon. Members to realise that we are now in the middle of one of several moves to try to get again the idea of a cease-fire and a meeting of the two sides. If we can make progress in that respect, the objective about which I have just been speaking may be more easily in reach. I have tried to state both the difficulties and the possibilities as fairly as I can.

§ Mr. Peter Emery (Honiton)

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I also thank him for his comprehensive 603 statement. However, there is one section concerning relief with which he has not dealt, namely, the much more difficult possibility of night flying relief in. The right hon. Gentleman has not mentioned this. Will he do so?

§ Mr. Stewart

There is some night flying going on now, but, frankly, this is desperately inadequate to meet the need. To relieve the famine we must at the very least have daylight flights. Indeed, only a land corridor will really meet the need.

§ Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley)

The Foreign Secretary has been very patient and comprehensive in his coverage. Could he clarify two further points about daylight flights for relief? First, are the Federal Government prepared to accept that flights should take place from any airport? Secondly, can he say whether Colonel Ojukwu objects to flights during daylight coming from any airport, or will he consider certain places from which they could come, provided that they did not come from Federal territory?

§ Mr. Stewart

I hesitate to give an answer that is anything less than precise, so I will ask my right hon. Friend to deal with that point when he winds up the debate.

One of the difficulties is that Colonel Ojukwu feels that if food came in by day it could then be presumed that all-night flights were bringing in arms, and the Federal Government could legitimately try to shoot down night flights. That would not be welcome to Colonel Ojukwu, and for that reason he is not prepared at present to give his consent to daylight flights. My recollection—I shall not say more than this—is that the consent of the Federal Government would apply to any airport. If I am wrong about that, my right hon. Friend will put the record straight before the end of the day.

As I was speaking on the theme of stopping the fighting, I was going to refer to another area, where we have not so great a tragedy now, but a potential tragedy, and sporadic fighting, the Middle East. All I wish to say to the House at this stage is that the slow progress of Dr. Jarring, and the continual outbursts of fighting across the River Jordan, 604 create a situation in which all the parties concerned would be very ill-advised simply to let matters slide, thinking that the present situation suits them best.

I believe that what is needed is from Israel a clear unmistakeable statement that they will carry out the United Nations Security Council Resolution, a statement made in the knowledge that that resoluion includes the withdrawal of forces, and from Israel's Arab neighbours an equally clear statement that they will carry out the resolution, in the knowledge that it speaks of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is the fear on each side that one side will not withdraw, and that the other will not make a lasting peace, which blocks the way to progress.

We have urged, and will continue to urge, on the parties concerned the importance of making clear declarations to Dr. Jarring on those lines. That, I believe, might remove the suspicion and make it possible for Dr. Jarring to get on with the substance of the dispute.

I have spoken of areas where there is fighting, intense and sporadic. I now turn to the area of greatest tension, without fighting, in the world, which now, unhappily, since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, is Europe. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Russians had made their vulgar abuse, and had got their answer. It has been suggested in certain quarters that I should have tried to vie with them in the kind of language used. I do not think that any useful purpose is served by that kind of thing, and I am sure that the Soviet Union did not enhance its standing in the world either by the substance or by the language of its statement to us.

What I wanted to make clear, and I believe did make clear, in our answer was that the responsibility for the setback in our relations lay entirely with them and not with us, and the idea that we were already planning on worsening relations, and that we used the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a pretext was such that it was difficult to see how an intelligent man could compel his hand to the pen to write that.

Secondly, I wanted to make clear that the invasion is the concern of us all, and that it cannot be regarded as some kind of bilateral relationship between the 605 Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. It is the concern of all nations, and particularly of N.A.T.O. Thirdly, I thought it right to make it quite clear that the feeling in this country about Czechoslovakia has not been organised by the Government, that it is a spontaneous expression of both people and Government.

Further, I wanted to make clear—and this I trust in time will prove to be the most important part of my reply—that the future choice still lies with the Soviet Government, that we are deliberately not pressing this to the point where one cuts off all hope of a return to better relations. But whether we are able to do so must now depend on what degree of respect the Soviet Union is prepared to show for the rights of nations and the opinions of mankind.

The right hon. Gentleman was concerned with whether we had properly taken the measure of the Soviet threat to the world. The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the steps taken at the recent N.A.T.O. conference in Brussels, where our increased commitments to N.A.T.O. were very well received by our allies, and where nearly every member of N.A.T.O. announced his intention to make some further commitment to the strength of the alliance.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke of creeping Soviet expansion around the flanks. This is a matter to which the member States of N.A.T.O. have paid particular attention. At the Brussels conference there was particular concern with the naval position in the Mediterranean. It was with that in mind that we had earlier increased our naval presence there, and are now doing it still further. There has recently been a full-scale N.A.T.O. exercise in the Mediterranean, and an air reconaissance force has been set up.

If the Opposition are in the mood to say that we are not doing enough against this threat to the N.A.T.O. flank, I must ask them how they reconcile that with their insistence that we are to try to take back on the shoulders of this country responsibilities right across the world which no nation of our size and resources attempts to maintain at present? There is a real cleavage here, which some of the shrewder, if not necessarily kinder, personalities on the benches opposite have perceived—[Interruption.] There is 606 a real state of what some call ambivalence, and others dithering, between their passion for an east of Suez policy, and their emphasis on the problem in Europe created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We believe that the general decisions we have taken are those which will provide the best concentration of our effort, and our best contribution to the alliance.

§ Mr. Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds)

The right hon. Gentleman will recall that in the N.A.T.O. communiqué to which he referred there occurred the phrase," the quality of reserve forces will also be improved." Two weeks later we had the bad news about our own reserve forces. How does that follow the communiqué?

§ Mr. Stewart

I thought that if it were not the right hon. Gentleman, it would be somebody else who would raise that point. We are having a debate on this subject next Monday. I do not think that hon. Members who attend that debate will feel that there is any need for anxiety there. All I am saying in response to the right hon. Gentleman is that, having regard not only to the central threat to N.A.T.O., but to its flanks, I believe that we are making the right disposition of our forces; but I think that further discussions on military matters can properly be taken up by the House next Monday.

Having mentioned the problems arising from one great Communist Power, it is inevitable to think of the other, and of the case of Mr. Grey, to which the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly drew attention. I was grateful, and I think that everyone concerned will be, for the great care with which the right hon. Gentleman handled the matter. On several occasions I have had to consider whether the policy we have been pursuing, of trying gradually to improve relations with China, or the policy which some have urged on me, of some kind of retaliatory measure, was more likely to help not only Mr. Grey, but nearly a dozen other British subjects for whom we are concerned.

My view at present is that we should continue the line which we have been adopting. May I remind the House, as I said in an earlier debate, that in recent months we have secured the release of three British subjects? In August, 607 1967 we imposed certain restrictions on Chinese with official and diplomatic passports in this country. That produced no result of benefit to our subjects in China, but, not long after, we relaxed those restrictions, and that did give some improvement, both in the treatment of our own Mission and in the release of British subjects.

However, I recognise that policy on this matter has to be subject to constant review and I do not think that any outside who are interested in it will be in any doubt of the profound sympathy of everyone in the House for Mr. Grey and those dearest to him. We have all read the report which our chargé d'affairs made after he was able, at long last, to see Mr. Grey, referring to the deplorable conditions in which Mr. Grey was being kept. It is now recognised, I think, throughout the world, and China herself must surely realise, what reputation it brings her when she treats innocent people in this fashion.

§ Mr. Brian Parkyn (Bedford)

While recognising that it was right for the Government not to retaliate over the treatment of Chinese journalists in this country, would my right hon. Friend not agree that there are 16 remaining Chinese in prison in Hong Kong without trial and without charges being brought against them, and that this itself exacerbates the situation? If they were to be released or tried, would this not itself do a great deal to achieve the release of Grey?

§ Mr. Stewart

I am not sure that that would be so. Although my hon. Friend is referring to people detained under emergency legislation and, in that way, not tried, there are very important differences between their treatment and that of Grey. Their case is subject to review, the detention is only for a limited period and the conditions in which they are kept are totally different from those of Mr. Grey. They receive regular visits from relatives. One must remember the difficult task which the Hong Kong authorities now have; I should have to think very carefully before increasing the difficulty of that task.

I turn now to this problem: if we do want to stop fighting and reduce tension, mankind must find other ways of settling 608 disputes. It is not in the nature of the world that disputes between nations will not arise, and part of the curse of our present situation is that the violent means of settling them—armament—are plentiful enough and ready to hand and can be brought into use at any moment. The peaceful techniques of solving disputes—mediation, arbitration, conciliation and the others mentioned in the U.N. Charter—are laborious legal instruments sometimes rusty with disuse.

We have been pressing for some time in the United Nations for a proper study of all the methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, with the object of making them, as it were, a handier and more up-to-date armoury for nations which want to settle their disputes peacefully. If one is to do that, one must show that, whereever it is possible, one is ready to try to deal with a dispute by negotiation. That brings me to the question on which all hon. Members have shown an interest—our attempt to deal with the dispute which exists between us and the Argentine over the Falkland Islands.

I fear that I must begin by saying, once again, what I have said so often, something which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite first say they believe, although they then endeavour to wriggle around into the opposite position. It is this: we are not prepared to make any settlement which would oblige us to hand over the islands against the wishes of the inhabitants. Every other conceivable remark that can be made about the whole matter must be interpreted in the light of that, which is a fixed point.

The question which was raised is. in that case: why negotiate about sovereignty at all? The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire said that, if he had his way, he would strike sovereignty out of the list of things to be negotiated about. He must understand this: if he does that, there will be no discussions at all. If he accepts that, he must accept that the islanders are to remain indefinitely in a position which is seriously and increasingly vexatious to them, that they are cut off from their nearest continental mainland, that this can be a great hardship in their present affairs, and—I would not exaggerate this, but it is true—that it makes their economic development more difficult, and, of course, cuts them off from that group 609 of human beings who are nearest to them and with whom they would have most affinity, that is to say, the very considerable British community living in Argentina. As things now stand, they can have no communication with those 20,000 equally British people living in Argentina.

This does not seem to me to be a happy situation. I believe that it was right to enter into negotiation in the hope—I stress again that it cannot at present be more than a hope—of reaching a settlement. To do that one must be prepared to talk about sovereignty, but, quite clearly, one could only talk about cession of sovereignty subject to certain conditions, one of which is the one which I have repeated so often that I will not attempt to repeat it again—

§ Sir John Rodgers (Sevenoaks)

While accepting the point which the right hon. Gentleman has made repeatedly, that he would not make any cession of sovereignty without the agreement of the Falkland Islanders, would he go one stage further and say that he would not take any steps to make them change their minds on that issue? That is the point at issue.

§ Mr. Sandys (Streatham)

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

We might as well have them all at once.

§ Mr. Sandys

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would try to clarify a little more the point which, I think, is puzzling many of us on this side. First of all, would he say whether it is not true that the Argentine Government have made it clear that they are not prepared to sign any agreement which does not provide for a transfer of sovereignty? If that is so, can he explain what can be the possible basis for a settlement and could he give us some indication of what kind of settlement he is hoping to achieve?

§ Mr. Stewart

I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Sevenoaks (Sir J. Rodgers) was here yesterday, because I dealt then, in answering questions, explicitly with that point—that we have not pressurised, and shall not pressurise, the islanders to change their minds.

With regard to the point of the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), I said that a settlement involving the 610 cession of sovereignty, which is what the Argentine Government have said they want, could be made only subject to certain conditions and we have made that condition perfectly clear. Although there is a great divergence between the two positions of the two countries, I do not believe that the divergence is such that we should throw up the search for a solution.

As to the form of settlement, frankly, I do not intend to answer questions on that. Anyone who has been engaged in negotiations of that kind knows perfectly well that while they are going on, all kinds of proposals and counter-proposals are made. They are all ad referendum to the Governments concerned at the time and I would not tie myself to saying that it had or had not got to be in a particular form. What I will tie myself to is this, that, whatever the form, one of the provisions must be that we should not be in a position where we could be required to hand over the islands against the wishes of the islanders. I really think that that ought to do.

§ Sir Cyril Osborne (Louth)

Supposing that the economic position of the islanders deteriorates so badly, because wool becomes less valuable, and, therefore, their economy is no longer viable, and, as I have been told is possible, many of them want to emigrate to New Zealand, and supposing that the islands become depopulated and that there is then no objection to transfer, would the sovereignty then be transferred?

§ Mr. Stewart

That intervention contained a lot of hypotheses. If the hon. Gentleman's gloomy predictions occurred and if, for sheer economic reasons—and certainly not as a result of any pressure from Her Majesty's Government—the condition of the islanders was so gravely altered that neither nobody lived there or those who did wished to be transferred, then that situation would arise. But I do not think that I should be asked to pursue that sort of matter any further.

§ Several Hon. Members

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

I must get on.

Since the question of the price of wool has been raised, it links up with the point made by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, who suggested that there was only a thin line 611 between persuasion and pressure. It seems, from what the right hon. Gentleman said, that he accepts my assurance—I do not think that anyone doubts it—that we shall not transfer sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders, but must find some point of disagreement to gratify certain hon. Members. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Let us consider what sort of point of disagreement that is. There is no conceivable evidence to show that at any time we have either pressurised or persuaded the islanders to agree.

When my right hon. and noble Friend was there he, in speaking to the Executive Council, described what Her Majesty's Government had in mind. It was then, as a result of ensuing questions and discussion, that points affecting the economic situation of the islands were raised. Any answers that my noble Friend gave there were genuine, objective answers, and that was what the Falk-landers wanted.

§ Sir C. Osborne

Why not say what they were?

§ Mr. Stewart

Because this was a discussion in confidence with the Executive Council and because one cannot conduct negotiations of this kind in public view—not if one hopes to have any chance of success.

Nor do I think it necessary for me again to defend my noble Friend against the ludicrous charges that have been made. I have seen one charge in one newspaper that he gave them totally false information about the price of wool. In fact, he quoted no wool prices at all. Back in London, at a Press briefing, he repeated a perfectly correct statement about the price of wool that had been made by the Chairman of the Falkland Islands Company. That was distorted in one newspaper into an assertion that he gave them totally inaccurate information about the movements of the price of wool during the last two or three years. That is the sort of thing that people who are interested in this matter must take into account when they read this quite reckless misinterpretation of what my noble Friend said.

§ Mr. Jeremy Thorpe (Devon, North)

Accepting what the right hon. Gentleman said about sovereignty, would he accept 612 that there is a lesser stage than giving up sovereignty, namely, the granting of preferential political rights such as Spain at one time enjoyed in Gibraltar? May we have an assurance that no such preferential political rights will be granted to the Argentine, unless they, too, are submitted to the Falkland Islanders?

§ Mr. Stewart

I am glad that I do not have to negotiate with the right hon. Gentleman as well as with the other parties concerned, because he is now bringing a new and unexpected dimension into the matter.

§ Mr. Thorpe

Answer my question.

§ Mr. Stewart

Unless one knows exactly what preferential rights the right hon. Gentleman has in mind, it is difficult to answer him, except to say that I would say nothing inconsistent with the human rights of the islanders.

§ Mr. John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell)

The right hon. Gentleman and Her Majesty's Government are talking to Argentina in an endeavour to improve relations. I cannot understand how, in this way, relations can be improved. Her Majesty's Government say that sovereignty will not be transferred against the wishes of the islanders and that they are convinced that the islanders do not wish their sovereignty to be transferred. Are the Government not doing what my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) said, which is leading Argentina up the garden path? Is this not likely to sour instead of improve relations with the Argentine?

§ Mr. Stewart

To give the hon. Gentleman a perfectly candid reply, I must tell him that one took a risk in opening discussions on this subject at all. It could be argued that we should not have bothered about the inconveniences which the islanders are suffering, but I do not think that that would have been the right position to have taken up. In view of the civilised manner in which the negotiations have proceeded, I hope—whatever their outcome, whether or not they are successful—that there will certainly not be a worsening of relations.

§ Mr. Heath

This is an important point. The right hon. Gentleman has accused my hon. Friends of trying to find a point 613 of difference with him. [Interruption.] Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that we have accepted assurances from him and his predecessors in the past, particularly about the Middle East and the Far East, all of which have then promptly been withdrawn and the promises broken?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what we really fear is that he will reach an agreement with the Argentine for the transference of sovereignty on terms which he will then put to the islanders, with the backing of Her Majesty's Government, and which they will then feel in no position to resist? That is the underlying fear which grips my hon. Friends and many hon. Gentlemen opposite below the Gangway. Only those who are naive about this will not accept the real situation.

§ Mr. Stewart

What the right hon. Gentleman is really saying is that he does not trust me or believe my assurances. [Interruption.] Well, I do not mind very much whether or not he does. The Executive Council of the Falkland Islands say that they believe Her Majesty's Government to be acting in good faith and that any settlement that is reached will be consistent with the pledge that we have given. That is my reply to the right hon. Gentleman. I assure him that we shall not conclude an agreement with another country behind the back of Parliament and then try to conceal what we have done, as the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman was a member did. [Interruption.]

§ Mr. Sandys

rose—

§ Mr. Stewart

I fear that I—or at least hon. Gentlemen opposite and I between us—have taken up a lot of time. We must allow for those many hon. Members who wish to take part in the debate.

I remind the House of the theme I put forward at the beginning of my remarks. I have spoken of areas where there is fighting and tension. I have spoken of the possibilities and difficulties of trying to settle disputes in a civilised manner, all of them having the object of enabling mankind to carry out more humane and constructive activities than waging wars or preparing for them.

This was deeply in my mind during my recent visit to the East as I saw those 614 two countries, India and Pakistan, unhappily divided by a dispute the solution of which must rest with them but which is diverting them from so much that needs to be done in their countries. I was, at the same time, encouraged to find that both of them, though facing economic and social problems of a totally different dimension from those to which we are accustomed—or, indeed, to which the countries of West Europe are accustomed—are, nevertheless, making undoubted and encouraging progress in agriculture and are so laying the foundations on which there can be industrial expansion in which, I hope, the skills and investment of our country can help to play their part.

I hope that in this whole process of stopping fighting, reducing tension, promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes and encouraging the humane and constructive efforts of mankind, Britain will play a part consistent with its power and duty.

§ Mr. Hugh Fraser (Stafford and Stone)

The whole House will be pleased to hear, in the old Colonial Office phrase, that the interests of the Falkland Islanders will be regarded as paramount. What seems to lie between us is a matter of negotiation.

I turn to something which lies more fundamentally between the back benches and Front Benches on either side of the House. This is the question of arms supply to Nigeria. The Foreign Secretary has worked hard on this problem, but it is only fair to say that neither my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) nor the right hon. Gentleman could give much comfort to this House on these issues, except to say, in the words used by the Chancellor on television the other night, that nothing further can be done except this continuing round of negotiations, of visits by Ministers to Addis Ababa and to Lagos.

It is the belief of many back-bench Members on both sides of the House that the reason that nothing can be done is simply that nothing can be done within the concept of present policy. This is where we join issue with both Front Benches. What at least 140 hon. Members are asking for is a change of policy. Surely at this 615 stage the main object of British policy should be to achieve a settlement. Of course that is the object of the right hon. Gentleman, but so long as we go on supplying arms to one side in what every independent international jurist, from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, to others in Europe, must regard as a civil war between two de facto Governments, so long as Her Majesty's Government take one side in the same way as American diplomats and military until recently treated the Vietcong, what hope have we of being regarded either as a mediator or a trustworthy purveyor of relief to those starving in Biafra? We have no chance whatever.

Whatever permutations and gyrations and movement of Ministers may take place, until there is a changed policy I believe there can be no progress. That change of policy has been written fairly clearly by hon. Members who have signed my Motion. What fills me with sorrow is that pursuit of the present policy can be achieved only by the implementation of the objective—however horrible it be, however much it may be dismissed by Ministers—by support for one of the contestants and can be made successful only by the process of what has been called the quick kill. Ministers may deny that, but the present policy can work only if there is a quick kill in Nigeria.

Even that policy has failed. The August offensive has not been successful. It has not gone through. The Russian night-fighting Migs, with Russian pilots, of course, may achieve this. They may change the position in a few weeks, but as we meet here this afternoon there is military deadlock in Nigeria. Surely this is the time when the Government and the Conservative Front Bench should decide not just on a new series of initiatives which have little or no chance of success, but on a change of policy. That change of policy is written in the Motion signed by 140 hon. Members. Its essence is cessation of arms supply and negotiation for a cease-fire. Until there is a cessation of arms supply we can have no standing in the organisation of such a cease-fire.

Of course it might not work, but the present policy has no hope of working at all unless it be by the application of 616 tactics of mass starvation or a military hecatomb. At least such a policy as we have recommended would put us in a position to lead in an act of world mediation, including the dispatch of envoys to Biafra, and bring us into line with most of our European allies. I do not know why right hon. Gentlemen are so fearful. Has the Dutch refusal to supply arms meant the destruction of Western property? Has it led to the cancellation of development rights for the Royal Dutch Shell Company? Of course it has not.

Right hon. Gentlemen should be aware of the danger of the failure of the policy of the quick kill which was announced by General Gowon in August last year. Surely they must be aware of the real danger of continuation of this terrible deadlock and bloodshed. Surely they must be aware, if they read the Nigerian Press on the Federal side, of mounting tension inside Nigeria. Surely they must be aware of the massive charges of corruption. Surely they must be aware of the Russian assistance which is coming in. Surely they must be aware that in this matter it is not the people who pursue a butcher's policy who are realists in power politics, but people such as hon. Members who signed my Motion. We are more realists than some members on the Front Benches.

Those who signed the Motion are left in something of a quandary tonight. This is the second time in four months that the wish of the House of Commons to vote on the question of arms supply has been frustrated. It is a vote which I believe not only members of the House of Commons wish to exercise. It is a declaration which the leaders of the churches and millions of our constituents wish to see done, but we are being frustrated. There is only one way tonight for those hon. Members who feel as I do. For tonight the two parties, I gather, have issued a three-line Whip. The only way for us to manifest our political and moral conviction on these issues, from whatever political party we come, is to abstain from voting. Unless there is either a condemnation of arms supplied to Nigeria or a statement by the Government that they will stop, I can have no part in the foreign policy of either party.

I am told that it is a serious matter to defy one's Whips on a three-line Whip.

617 I regard it as a very trivial matter. There are other acts of defiance being carried out in the world—defiance by men, women and children against Ilyushin bombers and Saladin armoured cars from this country I propose in my wretched way to manifest my defiance tonight.

§ Mr. Hugh Delargy (Thurrock)

The short speech which I shall make will be almost a personal statement. I ask the House to bear with me.

Until recently I was as strongly opposed as is the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) to the policy of the Government in Nigeria and to the Government's manner of presenting the facts. Indeed, I was the first Member to raise the question of the conflict in Nigeria. On 22nd February I asked this business question: When may we expect a debate on Nigeria, where a cruel civil war has been raging for nine months "— it was not nine months, but I was speaking off the cuff— chiefly with arms sold to one side by the Labour Government? "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd February, 1968; Vol. 759, c. 651.] It was a pretty loaded question. Since then I have signed Motions protesting against the policy and protesting against the supply of arms, one of them a very recent Motion.

Had there been a Division after the emergency debate last August, I certainly would have voted against the Government. As it was, I shouted, "Shame, shame!" as loud as anybody, because at that time the situation appeared to me to be like this. There was a country in Africa, I thought, called Biafra whose people were highly civilised, predominantly Christian and Catholic, a country surrounded by hostile States, principally Muslim and pagan, which were determined on genocide. Indeed, there was a frightful massacre of Ibo people in 1966. So, as a last resort the Biafrans rose in arms against their oppressors in defence of their liberties, their lives and their religion. That is how I saw the situation for a long time.

I do not see it quite like that now. First, Colonel Ojukwu's uprising is not a last stand for liberty. It was a carefully prepared campaign to secure power all over the country. His army over-ran two 618 States and began the advance on Lagos. It was stopped. The confusion and ruin caused by his retreat from the capital are very largely responsible for the frightful refugee problem which is now causing such anguish.

The second important point is that Colonel Ojukwu's uprising has nothing whatever to do with religion; or at least it had not until he made it an issue. The fact that one half of the Ibo people are Christians has been used to enlist the sympathy and help of Christian people everywhere. This week three bishops, including the Archbishop of Lagos, are flying to Rome to see His Holiness the Pope. They may be there already. They are to give His Holiness another viewpoint. They are to express their deep concern at the foreign Catholic support which is being given to Biafra. I know that other religious leaders have other opinions.

I know that missionaries in Biafra have identified themselves with the people. This is quite understandable and admirable. To be persona] again, I have a special affection for these missionaries, because they belong to a religious order which was responsible for my education.

But this does not make of this uprising a holy war. When I spoke to one of their own bishops, he did not claim that it was. Anyhow, look at the line-up. On the Federal side there is the support of Britain, America, some Afro-Asian states, and the Soviet Union. On the other side, supporting the Biafrans, there are France, Portugal, some African States, and China. There are not the makings of a holy crusade in that lot.

My friends may ask me why I have suddenly changed my mind. They have a right to. I have received more information and have had more conversations, but not, may I hasten to add, with anybody in the House. I have not discussed this matter with one Member of Parliament.

I was particularly impressed by a report which I read last week in a weekly called the Tablet, which is a very old-established paper, very Catholic, and exceedingly conservative. The editor of the Tablet went to Nigeria to see for himself and to write it up. This paper was the last paper in the world, I thought, which would have condemned Biafra. But it has.

619 It may seem naive that I am impressed by a magazine article. I usually am not, because I am in the trade myself. But I know the man who wrote this article. He is a trained observer, an experienced and widely travelled journalist, and a man of undoubted integrity.

My friends may ask me whether I approve of the sending of arms from here to Nigeria. I do not approve of the sending of arms from here to anywhere. If the Government were to decide never to send arms to anywhere again, I would leap with joy. But I am also convinced that the withdrawal of arms from here to Nigeria now would not affect the fighting at all. It must be said for the Government that they did not step up the supply of arms and they refused arms, particularly aircraft. This is where the Russians stepped in. The Russians said that the aim was to crush Biafra.

Biafra must not be crushed. Biafra must be saved. The longer the war goes on, the more remote becomes its salvation. I agree with what the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) said about the total embargo, which might still be proposed, I think, by our representative at U.N.O. I could not quite follow the argument of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State that somehow or other, if Britain first suggested it, this would encourage other rebellious tribesmen in other parts of the continent. I hope that my right hon. Friend will look at that point again.

This war will come to an end some time. Everything comes to an end some time. The longer the war goes on, the more bitter will be the peace that follows it. That is why I shall vote for the Government tonight, without doubt and with a clear conscience.

§ Sir Cyril Osborne (Louth)

The moving personal statement which we have just heard from the hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Delargy) shows how difficult is the Government's problem in handling the Nigerian situation. The hon. Gentleman would not have made in February the speech which he has made today, and who knows what further evidence might be produced to move him 620 just as greatly again to change his ground?

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that, if all arms supplies could be banned everywhere, that would help to stop war and we should all go into the Lobby in support of it. The one thing we are all agreed upon in every part of the world is the paramount need to stop fighting. The reports which we have received through the post of the horrors in Nigeria convince us, whichever side we take, that somehow this fighting must be stopped. But, moved as I was by the hon. Gentleman's statement, I am not sure that I accept his position today any more than I should have done six months ago.

Before the debate began, the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) raised a point of order in which he said that the matter of the Falkland Islands, which we have been discussing, was trivial compared with the troubles in Nigeria. There is a lot of truth in that, but I wish to put to the Minister a bigger issue. The greatest horror facing us will develop if we allow Anglo-Soviet relations to become more and more sour so that the security of all Europe is involved, for this would affect us much more closely than either the affairs of the Falkland Islands or the Nigerian situation.

No one in the House will justify what the Soviet Union has done in Czechoslovakia. We cannot understand why it has done it. All I hope is that the Government, through the normal diplomatic channels, will do everything in their power to heal the breach that is now growing and see that it does not develop so that the old cold war which we had in the past under Stalin is revived and the security of all Europe is endangered. This is the over-riding issue facing us in foreign affairs.

I want to see the better understanding which was being developed under Khrushchev restored and the concept of peaceful co-existence re-established. I beg the Foreign Office on that one issue to do its utmost and not allow the situation to drift into sourness and statemate.

I come now to something in the nature of a personal statement myself. A year and a half ago, the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Kenyon) and I were chosen by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to represent this House in 621 the Falkland Islands. I have two points to make about that visit. The Falkland Islands are the last place to which I should want to go to live, and I do not believe that any hon. Member could persuade his wife to go and live there for 12 months. It is the most desolate place I have ever seen in my life.

There are 2,000 people living there, and they have 600,000 sheep between them. Their economy depends entirely upon wool, and that economy is made viable by the Falkland Islands Company, which has played a very good role in the history of the Islands. It takes a ship there once a year, bringing out the wool clip and taking in all the stores which the islanders require for the year. The company treats the islanders extremely well. But there is no denying that the basic wool market—it is a very coarse wool which the islanders produce—is throughout the world endangered—I put it no higher—by the artificial fibres which scientists are producing in greater perfection every year. If the artificial fibres which we use in various textile trades could take the place of wool, the Falkland Islanders could survive only if this country were prepared to support them financially. This is the problem as I see it.

I stayed on one farm where a young man and his wife were just getting ready to go to New Zealand. New Zealand has welcomed Falkland Islanders because they are good farmers and hard workers. I believe that the majority of the young people of the islands would leave at once if they had enough money to go to New Zealand. Many of the older ones said that, if they could get a reasonable price for their bits of property there, they would like to come back and live in England.

I put this problem to the Minister of State. I do not doubt his honesty. I do not doubt that he is dealing honourably. I do not challenge him. I believe all he says, and, in my view, in many ways he is trying to do the right thing. I am convinced that, if the Argentine were to say to those 2,000 islanders," We will provide £10 million", the islands would be depopulated within 12 months. If that happened and there were then no islanders to object to the transfer of sovereignty, would the Government transfer the then empty and useless islands 622 to the Argentine? I think that they would, and for my part I see no reason why not. That may be an unpopular view, but I see no reason why they should not. Strategically, the islands are no longer of importance to us.

What worries me in the present situation is that we do not know all that has been said or done. Lord Chalfont went out and spoke to the Executive Council. So did the hon. Member for Chorley and I when we were there. I do not see why the House of Commons cannot be told what was put before the islanders. How can we judge whether it is good, bad or indifferent if we do not know what was put before them? For the life of me, I see no reason why we should not be told.

On our return journey, the hon. Gentleman and I were encouraged or, rather, ordered by the Government to go to Buenos Aires and stay with the ambassador there. There we met the English colony. They put these points to us, which are crucial in the whole argument about the Falkland Islands. The representatives of the British colony said," There are 20,000 of us in Buenos Aires and the surrounding area. There are 2,000 in the Falkland Islands ". The trade of the British colony in Buenos Aires was, we were told, worth about £200 million a year. The islanders' trade is worth about £2 million a year. They said to the hon. Gentleman and me," Surely, our case is much stronger. We are more important than the islanders ". I believe that this is something which lies at the back of the Government's mind and has a lot to do with the present situation.

I want the Government to take the House more into its confidence. Let us know exactly what has been said to the Executive Council so that we may judge whether it is good to go on with the negotiations.

§ Sir Dingle Foot (Ipswich)

For a reason which I do not propose to elaborate, I shall not say much about Nigeria tonight. That does not indicate any lack of interest on my part. I have made many visits to all parts of Nigeria during the past 15 or 20 years, and I have friends on both sides of the conflict. I hope as devoutly as any hon. Member that the Government's attempt at mediation will succeed. There is, however, one 623 comment I wish to make arising out of what we were told by the Foreign Secretary about the land corridor and daylight flights.

In two world wars we in this country have employed, and very effectively employed, the weapon of blockade. We did not only prevent munitions of war from reaching enemy countries; we also prevented food from going into those countries. That was an extremely effective weapon in the First World War, though it struck mainly at the civilian population. I well remember that every Tuesday in the Second World War I used to justify at the Despatch Box the Government's policy of refusing to allow food to go into enemy-occupied countries. In view of what we did—as I believe, necessarily and legitimately—I find it rather remarkable that in an African State where a very savage civil war is being conducted one side should be prepared to allow food to go through by air or land to the civilian population of the other.

§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Frederick Mulley)

The point my right hon. and learned Friend has made is very sound, but the problem in Nigeria is that it is the recipients who are asking for the blockade to remain.

§ Sir D. Foot

I appreciate that, but comment should be made on the Federal Government's attitude on food supplies.

I now turn very briefly to three other aspects of the debate—first, defence; second, the situation in the Middle East; and third, the Falkland Islands.

In the past 10 years or so, our defence policy has been based on certain political assumptions. It was assumed that the world was becoming a more peaceful place, and that we could look forward to a continuing detente between East and West. That was explicitly said in the Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1967, in which the Government said: The Government believes that N.A.T.O. cannot produce a strategy appropriate to the real threat facing Western Europe, unless it takes into account the political intentions as well as the military capability of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact powers. The starting-point of any inquiry must, therefore, be to consider how the threat has 624 changed since N.A.T.O. was set up, and why. The allied governments recognise, by their actions no less than by their public statements, that tension in Europe has relaxed and that there is little danger of aggression at present.

§ An Hon. Member

That was true then.

§ Sir D. Foot

It may have been true then, but that assumption lost any validity it may ever have had in the summer of this year, when the Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia, since when we have had the threat to Yugoslavia. In Moscow, if there be hawks and doves, it is clear that the hawks have won. I recommend hon. Members to read the article by Mr. Frank Hardy on the Moscow scene in last Sunday's Sunday Times. It made it quite clear that times have changed since Mr. Khrushchev's day, and that it is the heirs of Stalin who are in control.

I listened to the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary at the Labour Party conference at Blackpool. When he was being challenged, he asked: Is it possible to mention the invasion, even to think of it, without thinking in the same moment of what defence remains for ourselves and for the peoples of Western Europe? I do not pretend to speak with special authority on these matters, but during the past 10 years, when occasion has arisen, I have constantly tried to draw attention to Russian naval expansion. I have said that we in this country should be concerned not so much with the Red Army as with the Red Fleet. Her Majesty's Government are obviously concerned with the growth and activities of the Red Fleet in the Mediterranean. We should be no less concerned with its growth and activities in the Indian Ocean, because no one can doubt the extent of Russian interest in the Middle East.

These developments make it imperative that the Government reconsider the decisions they made when cutting our defences last January, particularly the decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf. The Gulf States are the main source of oil supply not only for this country but for the whole of Western Europe. My right hon. Friend should not dismiss so lightly this country's role east of Suez, because only a year ago he and all his colleagues on the Front 625 Bench believed in that role. It was not until we had the struggle between the Treasury and the other Departments at the beginning of this year that the other Departments gave way and—disastrously, as I believe—the Treasury won.

The fact remains that 62 per cent. of our crude oil comes from the Middle East. If those supplies were cut off it would not matter very much what happened on the ground in Europe or at sea in the Mediterranean. Western Europe would be nearly paralysed. It does not make sense to build up our N.A.T.O. defences in Europe and the Mediterranean and at the same time create a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf.

§ Sir C. Osborne

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it is equally important to use the diplomatic channels and try to get back to the situation in 1967, when the position between ourselves and the Soviet Union was better than it is today?

§ Sir D. Foot

Maybe, but I do not think that: one does it just through diplomatic channels. I do not think that Russian policy ever changes very much, whether it is Czarist or Communist. The Russians are always trying to expand, always feeling their way until they meet resistance. We had that lesson last over the Berlin airlift. There is no doubt that we should keep our diplomatic channels open and use them when the occasion arises, but I do not think that the language of diplomacy alone is adequate for the present situation.

I was about to turn to the situation in the Middle East. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is having or is about to have interviews with Mr. Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister. My right hon. Friend referred in particular to the Resolution moved by the representative of this country and passed in the United Nations last year. I remind the House that it called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict and for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. I emphasise that second part, because it is essential. Restitution must be made not only to the refugees of the recent war but to the earlier Palestine refugees. That is a price of settlement in the 626 Middle East, and unless it is paid I do not believe that there will ever be a settlement with the Arab countries. Almost every year since 1951, the United Nations has passed a resolution calling on Israel to allow the 1949 refugees to return to their home or to pay compensation. Those resolutions have been consistently ignored by the Israeli Government.

There could be a settlement; the chances still exist. The Israelis could get everything they can legitimately want—freedom of navigation, and probably international recognition of their frontiers but only on condition that they are prepared to pay the entirely reasonable price which I have indicated.

There is another aspect of the situation in the Middle East. An Arab regional conference on human rights ended yesterday in Beirut. It received a number of reports on the situation inside Israel and the occupied territories, and in particular a report from the Institute for Palestine Studies. It is a terrible document—almost as bad as some of the reports we hear from Biafra. I quote two paragraphs from the newspaper report dealing with the matter. This said: The first section "— of the report— is called 'mass executions and individual killings', and the report finds that these take five forms: during the demolition of villages, city quarters and houses; during attempted crossings of the Jordon River by west bank residents trying to return home; during sudden and arbitrary roundups of civilians going about their ordinary business; during searches and curfews, and the killing of stragglers and homeless wanderers. In its section on torture, the report said that it would be impossible to compile an exhaustive list of methods of torture used in Israeli prisons, but from the evidence so far available it listed 16 practices of physical, as opposed to psychological, torture. In a separate report (to be enlarged into a book) one, Asad Abdul Rahman, described at length his ten months in four Israeli prisons as well as his impressions of the experiences—often worse—by other prisoners. Those are the allegations, and, if true, they are very serious.

On 27th September, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for the dispatch by the Secretary-General of a special representative in order to investigate just this kind of allegation. That has not yet been acted upon. I ask my right hon. Friend to 627 impress on Mr. Eban the great importance of urgency in this matter. There should be an early inquiry conducted either on behalf of the United Nations or by the International Red Cross.

I come finally to the question of the Falkland Islands. The issue is really the same as in the case of Gibraltar and British Honduras. I was glad that yesterday my right hon. Friend referred to our paramount obligations under the United Nations Charter. In view of the terms of the Charter, there is no point in arguing about historical claims made by Argentina or Guatemala or discussing the precise interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht because Article 103 of the Charter says: In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall prevail. Those obligations are contained in Article 73, which was quoted by my right hon. Friend yesterday. This provides that … the interests of the inhabitants of these"— dependent— territories are paramount…. It goes further. A later paragraph provides that it is the duty of the governing power … to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement. We could not possibly carry out that obligation if we were to hand over anyone against their will. I think that that proposition would be accepted throughout the House. But I observe to right hon. and hon. Members opposite that, if they accept the principle in the case of the Falkland Islands, they must also accept it in the case of Southern Rhodesia and this is why, quite apart from all the other reasons, we cannot possibly surrender sovereignty to the racialist minority in Salisbury.

I appreciate that the analogy cuts both ways. Perhaps I can introduce a personal note. During the last 20 years, I have been privileged to meet many of the leaders of emergent African countries. I generally met them for the first time in 628 prison and the acquaintanceship has ripened later in happier circumstances. I am glad to count as friends a number of heads of state and ministers in those countries.

One never knows, speaking in this House, how far one's words will carry but I would like to say this to my friends in these countries: I and many of my hon. and right hon. Friends, and some hon. Members opposite, have the greatest sympathy and agreement with them in the views they have expressed at the United Nations and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference about Southern Rhodesia. We think that at any rate some of the criticisms directed against Her Majesty's Government are justified. We shall hear those criticisms again, no doubt, next January when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meet in London. But I would also say to them that their expressions of opinion would be even more logical and effective, and would carry even wider conviction, if they were to support the United Kingdom at the United Nations in its stand on Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and British Honduras. They should make it clear that if the people of Southern Rhodesia have a right to choose their own destiny, so no less do the people of the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and British Honduras.

§ Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker (Cheltenham)

The speech of the hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Delargy), to those lucky enough to hear him, will remain as one of the bright lights which occasionally occur in this House. All of us who recognise his integrity, independence and humour will have been pleased by what he said and respect his admission that eight months ago he was wrong.

I found the remarks by the Foreign Secretary about Nigeria very clear. As far as I am concerned, I am sure, as I have been before, that the attitude of the Government towards this very difficult problem is correct. He raised one question which I should like the Minister of State to draw to his attention in due course. I cannot find the reference, but some time in 1964 the Prime Minister raised the whole question of arms control, not just in crises like that of Biafra,