VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

§ The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Profumo)

This is the third time, Sir Robert, that I have had the privilege of presenting the Army Estimates. On the first occasion when I saw the size of the bill for 1961–62, I recognised, to put it mildly, what a formidable charge on the nation's resources the modern Army represents, but in each succeeding year the amount has increased, partly because of rising prices and costs, partly because of higher rates of pay throughout the Army—which reflect the rising standards of living in the country as a whole—but also because of a continuous rise in the curve of expenditure on arms and equipment. In 1961–62, we spent £89 million on this; in the coming year, I expect it to be £112 million—an increase of £23 million.

The Committee and the taxpayer will rightly expect me to be able to give good reason for expenditure of the magnitude of £487 million. In plain words: What's it all for?" It represents the present-day cost of carrying out that part of our defence policy that is required of the Army. As a nation, we do not have unlimited resources either of manpower or of money, and one of my jobs is to be sure that the Army draws on those resources only to the extent that is really necessary. Men are an expensive commodity today, and soldiers are no exception, so we have to assess extremely carefully the number of men we really require for the tasks assigned to the Service. It is a question of strik- 1558 ing a proper and realistic balance between manpower, on the one hand, and equipment, accommodation and so on, on the other.

We have always recognised that the transition from conscript to volunteer forces was bound to be an anxious time for the Army, but I am considerably encouraged by the fact that we are now actually in sight of a fully-manned Regular Army. I recognise, of course, that we have had to keep a number of National Service men for six months extra, and I know what a heavy obligation that has been. The Committee may like to join with me in a tribute to all those young men who have seen National Service with the Army since the war, and, in particular, those who have had this further obligation placed upon them. I might just remind the Committee that we have kept, as I undertook during the passage of the Army Reserve Bill, to the absolute minimum the numbers required for operational purposes. It looked at first at though this would mean holding back about 15,000 young men; in the event, we have managed to do it on 9,200.

At the time, I remember that hon. Members were, quite rightly, very concerned about how we could deal with the genuine hardship cases. We certainly could not have done this without the Hardship Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of General Sir Reginald Denning, and I am indeed grateful to the members of the Advisory Committee for the time they have devoted in considering, with immense care, all the cases that were put to them.

Looking at the future, there seemed to me to be four basic questions the Committee would wish me to deal with today. First and foremost, are we planning for a large enough Army? Secondly, can we recruit enough volunteers to meet our requirements? Thirdly, is the Army to get the equipment it needs? Fourthly, is it being properly trained?

First, let us look at the size of the Army. As the Committee knows, the way the planners set about working out the manpower requirement is first to make an assessment of the commitments and then to break that down in terms of units needed to meet them. To man fully the number of units we need requires about 180,000 men. This leads me to the question of the Gurkhas, who do, of course, form a most valuable part of the manpower available to the Army. I know 1559 how deeply hon. Members on all sides of the Committee feel on this matter, and I am indeed most grateful to them for their restraint while I have been seeking a solution to this problem. As I have just explained, we require an Army of 180,000 people.

§ Colonel Sir Harwood Harrison (Eye)

Is that all ranks, officers and other ranks?

§ Mr. Profumo

That is all ranks.

§ Sir H. Harrison

Sometimes, it is not clear.

§ Mr. Profumo

I am glad of the opportunity to make it clear.

§ Mr. Anthony Royle (Richmond, Surrey)

Whose figure is this 180,000? Who has produced it?

§ Mr. Profumo

As I have tried to explain, the figure arises in this way. We take the commitments set for the Army, we work out how many units are needed to fulfil those commitments, work out how many men there are in each unit, and then do the multiplication sum, which gives a figure of 180,000 all ranks.

§ Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

Can the right hon. Gentleman break the figures down?

§ Mr. Profumo

Perhaps, with his usual courtesy, the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to proceed with my speech. No doubt, he will have an opportunity later on.

As I have just explained, we require 180,000. What we have had to decide was whether, in these circumstances, all the manpower should come from the United Kingdom, whether it should be a mixture of British and Gurkha and, if so, in what proportion; or, indeed, whether we should retain some or all of the Gurkhas additional to the 180,000 British Army.

If we were to go for a combination of United Kingdom and Gurkha personnel, together amounting to 180,000, it would mean disbanding existing United Kingdom units—I do not think that that would be acceptable to the Committee—plus the fact that there might well be circumstances in which the use of Gurkhas could be restricted, or, indeed, their recruitment terminated. In such a case, with a manpower ceiling carefully 1560 tailored to our requirements, we should be in great difficulties.

Now that we can see our way to recruiting 180,000 men in the United Kingdom, I really think it only prudent to go for the lot. Nevertheless, we have recognised that this is not just a straight military problem. We have felt that, in the mutual interest of the United Kingdom and Nepal, the Gurkha Brigade should be kept in being—apart from anything else, as an insurance, if one likes, against unforeseen circumstances in terms of first-class infantry fighting soldiers. We have, therefore, decided that the right course to follow is that the Brigade should revert to an establishment of 10,000 men, which was the figure agreed with the Nepalese Government in 1948. The adjustment from the figure of about 14,600, to which the strength has since risen, will be carried out over a period of three years.

In making these changes, we shall follow four main principles: first, that the identity of all eight traditional infantry battalions should be retained; second, that the Gurkhas should continue to have their own ancillary units so that the fighting formations shall be as viable and self-supporting as they are now; third, that no additional British manpower should be required to look after them; and fourth, that we should bring all this about as far as possible through normal wastage, with suitable compensation for any Gurkha soldiers whose services have to be prematurely terminated.

We have always said that we would not take any decisions without the closest consultations with His Majesty the King of Nepal. We have been fortunate in being able to make use of the good offices of Field Marshal Lord Slim, himself, of course, a distinguished Gurkha. He is on his way home from a visit to Nepal, where he discussed all this with His Majesty in person. I am happy to inform the Committee that the plan has the approval of the King. The colonels of the Brigade of Gurkhas have also been informed of this decision, which they understand and accept.

All this means that we are now planning on an Army with a total strength of 190,000, and I am convinced that this will be adequate to meet all our present commitments. In the Defence 1561 White Paper we have indicated that we hope to reach 180,000 by the spring of 1964. But there are a number of considerations which I wish to mention to the Committee in this connection. 1962 was a remarkable year for recruiting. The other rank strength of the Army rose by some 13,500. This was a fine achievement in which the whole Army played a part and of which it has every right to be proud. As a result of this, the Army has now reached 94 per cent. of its full strength.

Now we are going into a new phase, and the approach has to be a bit different. The Committee will be aware that much of the Army is already either up to strength, or will soon be very nearly so. Eight Corps, including the Royal Armoured Corps, the R.A.O.C. and R.E.M.E., are already fully up to strength. The Royal Engineers and the R.A.S.C. will have few shortages by the middle of the summer, and the Royal Artillery should be up to strength by the end of the year. The state of play in the infantry varies from brigade to brigade and there are a few battalions which still have a long way to go. However, eight brigades are at or near their full peacetime strength, and I expect most of the others to be there by early 1964. Recruiting for the Royal Signals is now going well, and it should be pretty well up to strength by the autumn of this year. Many of its tradesmen, of course, need long periods of training, so it will take a little time before the units themselves are able to build up their strength to their full establishment.

Now we have got to concentrate on the Corps where considerable shortages still exist—the R.A.M.C., the R.A.D.C., and the A.C.O To get a proper balance, we must now control the build-up, so as to get the men into the vacancies where they are needed This will make it harder to be precise in forecasting the exact date on which the strength of 180,000 will be reached. What matters here is that the 180,000 shall be in the correct proportions.

As the Committee knows, I have revised our recruiting procedures. There has been some criticism of this. To those who say that this more selective approach will slow up our recruiting, I simply reply that all the criticism so fax has been that our standards were too 1562 low. I do not accept this. One cannot have it all ways, and it is much more important to get a balanced, flexible Army of high quality than to race through the last stage in the build-up merely in order to get there by any particular month.

So far, I have been talking mainly about other ranks. Officers of the quality we need are not easy to get, and this year we are putting publicity for officer recruiting very much to the fore. But our most acute problem, about which I spoke at some length last year, is, I am happy to say, well on the way to being solved. We were then facing a most dangerous shortage of medical and dental officers, as National Service ended and the number of short service officers rapidly ran out. Thanks to the new deal which I announced last April, and to the generous help which we have received from the whole medical and dental world, we are now recruiting well, and, if we can continue thus, we need, I think, have no fear of being unable to maintain our medical standards.

A great part in all this is being played by the Q.A.R.A.N.C. The other rank strength rose steadily during 1962. Many are of potential officer standard. We are, therefore, providing training opportunities for Q.A.R.A.N.C. other ranks, which will assist greater numbers to attain professional qualifications, and so to help the officer structure. This will not only benefit the Q.A.R.A.N.C. but also do something to improve the nation-wide shortage of nurses.

Last year the strength of the Women's Royal Army Corps rose to 5,000. I hope that this trend will continue. Women will be employed in increasing numbers with the Royal Artillery, Signals, Ordnance and other technical and administrative trades. More W.R.A.C. will be sent abroad, principally to B.A.O.R., and also to Malta and Aden. We want more officers. Apart from administrative posts, there are opportunities for specialist appointments for girls with the right qualifications with the R.E.M.E. and the Royal Army Education Corps. I am glad to say that we are getting a good lot of applications.

Finally, a few words about recruitment of graduates, to which I attach the greatest importance. Although, so far, the numbers have been rather disappointing, I hope we shall improve on this 1563 with the aid of the university O.T.C.s, which give pre-service training to potential officers. Providing they qualify at their O.T.C. examination, they are excused further pre-officer training. This is not the only contribution which the O.T.C.s make. They are also providing a significant contribution to the recruitment of officers for the Reserve forces, particularly the Territorial Army.

But all these things cost money, and the contribution to Regular officer recruiting from the W.R.A.C. sub-units in the O.T.C.s has been very limited. Therefore, although I am most grateful to all those who have worked so hard for them, I have had to decide to discontinue the W.R.A.C. sub-units and to concentrate even further on improving the rest of the O.T.C.s, the importance of which I think is even greater now that National Service is ended.

So much, then, for recruiting. On the whole, the picture is a most encouraging one. We shall continue our efforts, and I hope and believe that the coming year will see us very near the end of these particular problems.

What about equipment? During the defence debate—

§ Mr. Shinwell

Not too fast. Will not the right hon. Gentleman tell us something about the "Ever-readies"?

§ Mr. Profumo

I will be doing that later. I am sorry to keep on asking hon. Members to be patient. I will reach that point in time, but I have to do it in my own simple, soldier-like manner.

During the defence debate, right hon. Gentlemen opposite tried to give the impression that there are serious deficiencies in B.A.O.R.'s equipment. This simply is not true. At any given time any Army has some out-of-date equipment, and this is the case with B.A.O.R. —which is why we are replacing it. But, as the Committee knows, re-equipment is a continuous and lengthy process.

What are the facts? Next year we shall introduce into B.A.O.R. an entirely new armoured personnel carrier. We already have a very good tank in the up-gunned Centurion, but, if the outcome of the trials is satisfactory, the Chieftain should start to take its place in 1965, and when it comes into service 1564 it will certainly be the finest battle tank of its kind. Within the next two years, the self-propelled Abbot will begin to replace the 25-pounder. To strengthen our firepower in the heavy-cum-medium range, we are going to buy the American 175mm. gun, which has a good performance. The point is that it is in production, so that we can expect to start getting this next year, which will be a good thing.

In the anti-tank field, the Carl Gustaf and Vigilant will start to come into service during this next year. In the Infantry, the 3 in. mortar will be replaced by a greatly improved 81 mm. mortar, and we shall start production in this country of the new general purpose machine gun to replace the Bren.

As far as low level air defence is concerned, the Bofors with automatic fire control is certainly not obsolete, but the Americans are developing a guided missile on a mobile launcher called Mauler, and we have decided to send a small team to work with them on the project.

Finally, Signals equipment. B.A.O.R. already has about three-quarters of the new range radio equipment covering communications from divisional headquarters to forward units. This provides better communications on a higher scale than ever before, and all this will be completed by 1964.

Therefore, I say again that what we are carrying out is essentially a replacement programme, and at no time during this programme would it be true to say that B.A.O.R. is insufficiently well equipped to carry out its rôle. It is the greatest re-equipment programme the British Army has even seen in peacetime.

So much for the men and their arms. I now want to talk about the other key factor in the fighting efficiency of the Army, training. Many hon. Members have themselves seen training going on in B.A.O.R. I hope that the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), whom we welcome to his new job, will take the opportunity to go to see how B.A.O.R. is operating and how its training is going. He will find it very interesting. Its programme is intensely active and its standard is as good as any in the N.A.T.O. command. The Strategic Reserve was also very busy in 1962.

1565 Unit and formation training has been going on in many parts of the world—in Greece, in the Far East, in Canada, and in the United States. In 1963 we hope to train units again' in Canada and America and, in addition, for the first time to send a battalion to Australia at the end of the year.

Exercise "Fallex" gave the Reserve Army art opportunity to practise mobilisation, and a number of Reserve Army units also went to Germany and France for their annual training. Next month, a plane-bad of "Ever-Readies" will be flown to Singapore and Hong Kong, where they will be incorporated into Regular units and do a fortnight's realistic training in their emergency rôle. I shall have more to say about "Ever-readies" later.

§ Mr. Shinwell

What size plane will it be?

§ Mr. Profumo

The biggest plane that my right hon. Friend can give us for this purpose.

The young Regular volunteer joining today will have every opportunity of becoming a highly professional modern soldier. He is getting through his initial training and is ready for service with his unit a little younger than his National Service contemporary used to be. Under existing regulations, a young man cannot be posted overseas until he is 17 years 10 months in the case of Germany, and 18 years 3 months elsewhere. These rules were made in the context of an Army with a large National Service element. The new young regulars are naturally eager to join their units as soon as they can. If their units are overseas they cannot do it. Either they have to stay with their training unit or else be posted temporarily to another unit in the United Kingdom. This hanging about is bad for the keen young soldier.

I am, therefore, proposing to lower the age limit for overseas service to 17 years 6 months all over the world. My noble Friend the First Lord has asked me to say that this new age limit will apply to the Royal Marines as well.

In a speech of this sort it is easy to omit the Reserves, but that would be quite wrong. They play a most important pail and without them the nation would have to keep a very much larger and more expensive Regular Army. 1566 Thank heavens for the voluntary spirit of those who serve in the Territorial Army and the A.E.R., whose specialist contribution is invaluable.

The T.A. has settled down well within its new order of battle, and its recruiting has been most encouraging. We are going to spend over £1½ million on new buildings for it next year, as part of a programme of £6 million over five years. I have told the T.A. that I recognise its requirement for more equipment, but at the same time the Regular Army must come first. However, several items of new equipment are now beginning to reach T.A. units.

I should now like to say a few words about the Territorial Army Emergency Reserve, not only for the benefit of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), but because I am interested in it. The Reserve is becoming established slowly but steadily. It is now about 4½ thousand strong. Because of the rapid build-up of the Regular Army, we shall not now need anything like the numbers I first envisaged. This means we can afford to be very choosy, and, quite apart from volunteers who fail to get past the unit recruiting officers, record offices are rejecting about one in every five volunteers.

As I told the House earlier, we are having a look at the long-term structure of our Reserve Forces as a whole. Reserves are, of course, complementary to the Regular Army, both as regards size and commitments. Thus, now that we know what size Army we can expect to get, we can press on with this examination to finality, and I hope to be able to report further on this in the not too distant future. At all events, the Reserves as they stand at present are ready to meet any demands that may be placed on them in the foreseeable future.

§ Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

Last year, the right hon. Gentleman was aiming at getting 15,000 "Ever-readies". What is the figure at which he is aiming now?

§ Mr. Profomo

The hon. and learned Gentleman is not quite correct. I was not aiming at getting 15,000. I got the House to approve of a ceiling of 15,000 if this was necessary, but I explained at the time that the T.A.E.R. was to be a reserve which would be capable of backing up the Regular forces where they 1567 were particularly short in times of tension. Now, as I say, because of the build-up of the Regular Army, there will not be such a great need in numbers, but I am not prepared to say at what stage we shall wish to stop recruiting "Ever-readies" because this will probably change year by year, and I do not propose to tempt providence.

All that I am saying is that, because there is not the same urgency as there was when I asked the House for.its approval, I am sure that the right thing to do is to go on building up, and the "Ever-readies" are building up, of which I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman will approve. They have not tailed off. The graph continues steadily upwards. All these are good men, well trained and frightfully carefully chosen. I will not need to go anywhere near a ceiling of 15,000.

§ Mr. Paget

May we take it that, as with the rest of the Army, the ideal number will be the number that the Secretary of State happens to get?

§ Mr. Profumo

That is not always the case. As, however, we are very clever in our planning, the numbers do coincide from time to time. The hon. and learned Gentleman is kind to pay this compliment to us.

§ Mr. Shinwell

Is it not a costly business? Was it not announced when the right hon. Gentleman propounded his scheme that there were to be very high bounty and other payments? In view of the numbers which the right hon. Gentleman has obtained, is the scheme in fact working?

§ Mr. Profumo

The bounty will, of course, still be the same, £150 per volunteer. This is an immensely rewarding result for the country as a whole to be able to build up a reserve force, even if we pay £150 per person, because these men can be called out on the signature of the Secretary of State at any time of tension. All I say is that the order of battle of the T.A.E.R. will vary from time to time according to the strength and requirements of the Regular Army. I believe that this is the right thing for any reserve.

I come now to a matter in which a number of hon. Members have shown a deep interest—bringing deceased Service 1568 men home for burial. I have been considering this problem with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence and my Service colleagues. We have looked at two possible measures: bringing home the dead where relatives so wish or, alternatively, flying out two relatives to the funeral.

We would face acute practical difficulties if we attempted to apply these measures on a world-wide basis, for example, climatic conditions, local laws prohibiting delay of burial for more than 24 to 48 hours and, even today, availability of transport. Sometimes, certainly we would be able to bring the body home or fly out the relatives to the funeral anywhere in the world, but we could not guarantee to do this outside north-west Europe because of the difficulties which I have mentioned. The wishes of next-of-kin might be received too late to prevent burial or relatives would not get there in time. Such failures—and they would be frequent—would cause intense disappointment and sorrow and, I believe, even bitterness.

The Government have, therefore, decided not to make any alterations outside north-west Europe. In northwest Europe, however, when Service men die, we intend to give the next-of-kin the choice of having the body brought home at public expense to a stated destination in the United Kingdom or Irish Republic for private burial, or having two relatives flown out to attend the Service funeral. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] We shall introduce similar arrangements, though with some qualifications, to cover the dependants of those serving and also United Kingdom-based civilian employees and their dependants.

These new arrangements can, of course, be carried out only so long as conditions permit. In the event of active service operations or deaths at sea, it would be impossible either to bring the dead home or to arrange for the attendance of relatives at funerals. I hope that the Committee will recognise that we have attempted to meet these human problems in an equally human manner.

Last summer, B.A.O.R. came in for some rather unpleasant and, I thought, unwarranted publicity. It gave rise to public concern as to the morale and well being of our troops in Germany. I repeat what I said at the time, that they are 1569 in good shape and that morale is high. None the less, we all recognise, as we must, the difficulties of serving for lengthy periods in Western Germany and it is up to us to see that everything possible is done for the welfare and standard of living of the troops who are out there.

There are a number of things that we are trying to do. Most important, of course, is to provide accommodation for as many wives and families as we possibly can. In spite of difficulties over land, planning permission and an overloaded German building industry, we provided 2,000 new married quarters last year; and although there is still a long waiting list, I hope that nearly 7,000 new flats will be finished and occupied by the end of March next year. Meanwhile, we are supplying a number of first-rate caravans, converting various barrack blocks and finding more individual hirings, as well as examining the possibility of prefabricated buildings.

As I told the House some time ago, I have been looking into the possibilities of television. It is an immensely expensive business and there are a number of very real difficulties, including technical ones such as frequencies, but with the full cooperation of the German authorities we have now got as far as examining a number of different proposals. I am sure that if this turns out to be a practical and not financially prohibitive proposition, it would prove a great facility for our troops. So would some good, live entertainment, but these days it has got to be really good to appeal to the troops. I have had some most helpful discussions, with the chairman of the Combined Services Entertainment Committee, Mr. Prince Littler, and his colleagues, and I hope that we may be able to get something going there, too.

But the basic problem is, perhaps, the language barrier, and I am sure that we have to try to do something here. We have now started a scheme in B.O.A.R. to give instruction in elementary and colloquial German in all units. But we are going further than this, and in future all units due for posting to Germany—they usually get six months' notice in advance will have German lessons organised so that a cross-section at least of their number start acquiring a little knowledge of the German language even before they arrive in B.A.O.R., when, of course, they 1570 will continue with the other scheme which I have announced. Finally, each unit will have special courses designed to introduce them to conditions of life in Germany and to make them fully aware of their duties and responsibilities as good allies within NATO.

Like other hon. Members, I was very concerned the other day over the incident involving the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, because I realised that there might be implications wider than those of military discipline. That is why I called at once for a report of what had happened and why. I have now had a full account from the General Officer Commanding, London District.

The battalion is at a very low strength; it is 363 strong. This is because they have not succeeded in recruiting enough. Regulars to man two battalions at full strength, one of which is in Kenya and must, of course, have a prior claim on the available manpower. There is no inconsistency between the encouraging words which I used earlier about our progress towards a fully-manned Regular Army and the particular state of this battalion. I said that we have already reached roughly 94 per cent. of our total strength, but I have also explained that the shortages fall very unevenly.

The Scots Guards are, I am sorry to say, finding recruitment more difficult than other Guards regiments. The question seems to me to be whether they have been asked to do too much. I have been into this most carefully. Like any battalion of the Household Brigade stationed in this country, they have to reconcile their responsibility for public duties with the importance of ensuring that the soldiers are fully-trained, efficient fighting men. Even with a strength of 363, it is possible for a reasonable cycle of guard duties, once in every four days—and this is not abnormal—to be combined with an adequate training programme, still giving every man his full annual leave and proper break periods after guard duties.

It is significant that of all the complaints made by the men—and I have examined each complaint myself—very few indeed alleged that they were being worked too hard. In any event, the Brigade of Guards functions like any other military formation and if at any time one of its units is finding it a strain to carry out its duties, it is perfectly possible, 1571 and, indeed, not unusual, for London District to attach a sub-unit from another battalion to help things out. This sort of assistance has neither been sought nor suggested in this case.

It is perfectly true that any battalion at low strength has special difficulties to face and, of course, the strain and responsibility on the officers and N.C.O.s is greater. None the less, I am satisfied that this battalion, even at its low strength, was quite capable of carrying out its tasks at Windsor in addition to an adequate programme of training.

With regard to the men's complaints, quite frankly, most of them are of the sort likely to be made in almost every walk of life—pinpricks, minor incidents, complaints about individual meals and so on. We shall never have an Army in which this type of complaint is not made, and they are not confined to men in the Services, either. We must neither overestimate nor under-estimate their importance. What is disturbing is the volume of complaints and the fact that a group of men were prepared to go to such deplorable lengths over them. Whatever the causes, there can be no excuse for soldiers taking action such as these guardsmen did.

From my consultations with the General Officer Commanding, which followed an investigation by the colonel commanding both battalions, the superior colonel, it is clear that something is wrong with the administration. The G.O.C. is making a close examination into where the faults lie and what action he should take to remedy them.

In the defence debate, I said that the Army as a whole welcomes my right hon. Friend's new proposals for the higher defence organisation. They will certainly modernise the defence superstructure, and it is important that the central organisation of the Army itself should be as modern and streamlined as possible before it becomes part of this new structure. I expect to have a report from General Nye's Committee, which is studying this matter, by the summer, and I hope that it may result in some radical proposals which will themselves help to contribute to the new look in defence.

The most important difference between our concept of modern defence structure 1572 and that of the party opposite is that we mean to retain the identity of the three Services, whereas right hon. Gentlemen opposite admit, as they did in the defence debate, that they would merge at least two of the Services. In my view, this could only lead to joining up the lot later on.

This sort of threat to the future of the Armed Forces can only have a detrimental and unsettling effect. The effectiveness of the Army in the final event rests to a considerable degree on the honour and traditions of its individual units and formations. These will bloom and flourish anew all the more with the return to an all-Regular status. What we have to do is to create the right conditions for the Army to take full advantage of its renewed voluntary status, to support it, revere it and show it the confidence it deserves from a nation which is justly proud of so fine a Service.

§ Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

We have, as has been usual during the last few years, had a speech of great clarity and good humour from the Secretary of State for War. We can also congratulate him on the good fortune of the Army, as it always appears to be, that the number of men who happen to be available is always just the right number required for our commitments. I still find this interesting.

We had the Hull Committee, which recommended a figure of 200,000 as a minimum and 220,000 as desirable. I do not know what reductions in commitments have occurred since then to make this assessment out of date. It was then decided, for reasons which had nothing to do with defence, but which appeared to the Prime Minister to be of value for economy, that the figure should be 165,000. That figure still happened to coincide with what the Government were advised could be obtained by the voluntary system.

Then it went up to 180,000, when recruiting was better. Again, by an odd coincidence that was exactly the right figure for the commitments. Now it has gone up to 190,000, which is, again, the ideal figure.

§ Sir Fitzroy Maclean (Bute and North Ayrshire)

Surely the figure is 180,000 again, because the figure of 190,000 includes the Brigade of Gurkhas. Thus, 180,000 is the figure for the British Army. 1573 The Gurkhas have always been kept separate from the figure for the British Army.

§ Mr. Paget

I understood the Secretary of State to say that the figure was 190,000 and that this would continue to be so.

§ Mr. Profumo

My hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) is right. I said that the figure was 180,000 British, plus 10,000 Gurkhas.

§ Mr. Paget

So the fortunate figure is now 180,000. It was still 180,000 when we authorised the recruitment of "Ever-readies". We were told that 15,000 "Ever-readies" were necessary always to be available to make up specialist requirements by the Army. Now, instead of 15,000, just over 4,000 have come forward. But, again, we find that by a happy chance this is the ideal figure. In fact, if anything, it is perhaps on the large side because we are now being highly selective as to which of the "Ever-readies" we are prepared to accept.

However, apart from these odd coincidences, we must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the success of his recruiting campaign. I think that the criticisms of the television advertising which appeared in yesterday's leader in The Times were of a rather "sour-grapes" description and were not justified. I have seen the advertisements, which seemed not unduly to exaggerate the goods offered. I think that it has been done very well.

I am not so happy about the curtailment of recruiting, because I still do not think that this figure is adequate. One thing I particularly regret. There seems to be an absolute rule now against the recruitment of men on probation. I believe that we should leave a discretion to the recruiting authorities. It all depends what these men are on probation for. After all, both the right hon. Gentleman and myself are ex-juvenile delinquents. If we had not been soundly beaten at our establishments we might very well have been on probation. We certainly did enough to be put on probation.

I think that it is the case that since one does get a lot of lads on probation for things which are really no more than pranks—boys of spirit who could be of real value to the Services—one should 1574 leave the discretion to the recruiting authorities, allowing them to decide in individual cases. By that I do not mean that we should accept as recruits people who are real thieves, bad lots and criminal types.

In considering the balance of the forces, one is much less happy. We now see the great cruiser "Blake" incapacitated by what appears to be the absence of 12 electricians. I do not know the extent to which units of the Army are incapacitated, from the Service point of view, by the absence of a few technicians, but I suspect that it may happen. The case of doctors provides an instance. Last year, the right hon. Gentleman announced that it was proposed to start an intensive recruiting campaign for Army doctors. I gather that this has not been very successful.

§ Mr. Profumo

The hon. and learned Gentleman could not have understood that portion of my speech which was entirely devoted to saying that it had been extremely successful. My hon. Friend can give some details later. If we can go on as at present, we shall be able to maintain our medical standards. The recruiting campaign has been very good indeed.

§ Mr. Paget

In that case, can the right hon. Gentleman tell us how many doctors he has and how many he still wants? This is one aspect of the recruiting campaign about which I am very doubtful. I am not happy seeing the Army bidding against the National Health Service, which itself is short of doctors, for doctors who are in short supply in the community as a whole. Doctors do more doctoring in private practice or in the Health Service than in the Army, where they are looking after what is generally the fittest section of the population. I would prefer the Army to use the Health Service far more.

Army hospitals should come under the Health Service, both at home and at permanent installations abroad. It would be better for a doctor's career if he were in the Health Service and simply in an Army hospital as in any other hospital. One would have more efficient hospitals and the hospitals would be better utilised.

§ Sir Harry Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely)

There is a Service hospital in my constituency which renders superb services 1575 to the civil population. Civilian and Service doctors work hand in hand and give immense benefit to the whole community, both Service and civilian.

§ Mr. Paget

In which case, why should the hospital not come under the Health Service in the same way as a civilian hospital? That seems to me an admirable argument for the very case I was making. I do not see why, in general, the soldier should not receive medical treatment as any other member of the population. Sick parades could be arranged in conjunction with doctors whose work was not exclusively confined to the Army. At foreign stations, where there were large family populations, it would probably be desirable for the doctors to be on a civilian basis, leaving only a small requirement for doctors for active service.

The requirement of the Royal Army Medical Corps would be very small. In wartime, as always, there would be a great expansion of the Corps by the use of civilian doctors. It was my impression during the war that civilian doctors were rather better than the Regulars.

I am also concerned about the 60 battalions of the infantry. Apparently, at least half of them are under strength. I do not know whether they are as much under strength as the Scots Guards, and I do not know whether the Scots Guards battalion is the smallest. I should like an assurance that the 60 battalions are to be made up to strength; if not, it would be far better to reduce the number of battalions.

§ Mr. Profumo

They are.

§ Mr. Paget

I was somewhat struck by what the right hon. Gentleman had to say about the Scots Guards. He seemed to take the view that there was no excuse for what happened and that 360 men could perform the duties required. Yet we had a concerted and planned refusal of duty which—do not let us mince words —amounted to mutiny and which was punished by eight days' loss of privilege, a punishment appropriate to an inadequate haircut.

Why? My feeling is that in this case justice was mitigated by policy. I cannot conceive that this could be the usual level of punishment for this sort of 1576 offence. Although the eight days' loss of privilege was the lightest punishment, all the punishments were trivial. Some of the men who wanted to have a court-martial seemed to receive some persuasion to accept this exceptional leniency. If there was nothing wrong and there was no excuse, why was that? I am not satisfied.

This is the moment to have another look at pensions. Two or three days ago, the Chancellor of the Exchequer suspended National Savings certificates. Apparently, this is the moment when the Government are to push up spending power. Is not this a direction in which a little spending power could be used? I have always maintained that Government contracts ought to be paid in honest money. The Government are not an ordinary employer. When they bargain to make a payment, they control the currency in which the payment is made and when that currency goes down, it is dishonest of the Government to pay their obligations to those who have served them in a currency which the Government themselves have made bad.

If that is too extravagant a system to work on, that is to say, paying pensions at the spending power which they had when the bargain was made, at least the Government should accept the cheaper principle of the same pension for the same service. They should not pay a lower pension because the man did his service long ago when the value of money was higher. That is a dishonest thing to do.

It is no answer to say that this compares with what happens in the Civil Service. The civil servant retires at 60 and his pension is based on what he was earning close to the date of his retirement. The soldier's pension is based on what he was earning twenty years before, at the age of 40, so that twenty years' more depreciation of the currency has taken place. The soldier—and particularly his widow—is much worse off than the equivalent civil servant of the same age.

This is an opportunity to right the position, and again I emphasise the case of the widows, many of whom are living in tragic circumstances, and many of whom are living on National Assistance. This is an opportunity to bring them up 1577 to the standard of what we call the post-1958 widows. Surely that can be done now?

I think it important to say a word about the old Polish professional soldiers. They came here and served us. It was unavoidable that they had no home to which they could return. They spent their lives in the Army. The Americans and the Canadians took them into their military pension systems. We have not done so. It would cost very little to do so. There would be very little difference between the pension we paid and the National Assistance they are receiving, but such a system would do something important for their sense of dignity. They would appreciate that they were getting something which was theirs. Surely this is the opportunity to do it?

I now turn to a wider subject, the unification of defence. Are these the last Army Estimates that we are to see? I know that the right hon. Gentleman does not know the answer. The Minister of Defence has not told him, and the Prime Minister has not told the Minister of Defence, because when this decision was taken apparently nobody had decided whether there was to be one accounting officer, and this, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who is only temporarily absent, pointed out, was the all-important question.

Is the Army Council to continue, or are we to have a Defence Council with members responsible for the Services and members responsible for general supply? Again, what is the position of the Chiefs of Staff? When this policy was announced, the Minister of Defence did not know. Apparently something was decided between then and yesterday's debate in another place, because it now appears that the Chiefs of Staff of the Services are to have direct access not only to the Minister of Defence but to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, whereas the Ministers responsible for the Services are to have access only to the Defence Ministry.

This seems to put them in an appalling situation. To put the political chief of a Ministry in a position of obvious and plain inferiority to his Service chief is outrageous. I do not often agree with Lord Montgomery of Alamein, but I do 1578 on this. This is something which requires more thought than it has received.

How will Supply work? Are there to be three Service Supply Departments, or one Defence Supply Department? We just do not know. What is more, the Government do not know whether what they are going to do will require legislation. During the defence debate it was said that it was too early to decide whether this would require legislation. A major vital change of this kind is proposed, but no White Paper is issued on it, and when questions are asked, no answers are given, simply because the Government do not know.

This, of course, is in line with the whole policy of this Government and the way they conduct their business. They first drift into trouble. Then, to assuage their back benchers, they announce a new policy, and as a final stage they begin to think out what their new policy means. This feckless swinging from one gimmick to another and making announcements without considering the consequences—

§ Mr. Profumo

The hon. and learned Gentleman says that this is a feckless gimmick, but when my right hon. Friend mentioned this question of unified defence he was told that the Opposition had thought of it first.

§ Mr. Paget

We had thought about it, and of its consequences, and asked questions about it, but the Government did not answer them. We had thought about it and proposed it ever since my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) raised it during the Navy Estimates debate in 1952.

The first and all-important question concerns the accounting officer. Are we to have three sets of competitive Estimates, plus one for the Minister of Defence, or one Estimate? It is not merely a question of one accounting officer, or four accounting officers. It may well be a question of no accounting officer.

I am very doubtful indeed whether, as things stand, Treasury responsibility performs any useful function with regard to the Services. The real question is whether detailed Treasury control of Service expenditure is any more appropriate than detailed Treasury control of the expenditure of a nationalised industry. We 1579 would not dream of applying it there, because we know that it would make that industry inefficient.

In the old days one began by considering one's commitments. The next thing to do was to decide what forces were appropriate, and, finally, to consider the necessary expense. That is no longer the process. Today, it is the practice to start with a sum which the nation can afford for defence. It has been generally agreed at about 7 per cent. of the national income, and in special circumstances this can be raised. The next stage is one of hard bargaining, and this is where the draft Estimates come in. This is done in July. An allocation is made between the Services, nominally by the Minister of Defence, but actually as a result of hard bargaining between the Service Chiefs of Staff. Only when that has been done do we get the actual Votes which are the anticipation of the Service Ministries as to how they will spend the money which has been allocated to them. All that Treasury control does is to see that the Government, or, rather, the Ministries, stick to the anticipated heads of expenditure within the sum already agreed.

Is there very much value in that? Does it really control anything? Does it really hold down expenditure? It certainly has the gravest objections. First, it is a cause of obsolescence. Today, it takes a year for anything to get into the draft Estimates. As I said, this happens in July. It takes another year for it to get into the final Estimates. We therefore start with a two-year march on the road to obsolescence before we begin, simply because of the accounting system.

To raise a particular point here, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman can give me some information about the new aeroplane, the Beagle, which is to replace the Dove and the old Anson. It is being brought forward rather quickly and cheaply by a smallish firm. It is a transport plane suitable for Army purposes. Will the Army get it? It is the kind of delay to which I have referred which prevents a good and fairly cheap thing from coming forward quickly.

The next thing the system does is that by keeping everything to a year we can make no distinction between capital and current expenditure. We cannot arrange 1580 our expenditure to be amortised over the life of what we are producing. The only loan finance which is allowed is in respect of married quarters. Any ordinary business would look at its capital and its income and current expenditure and keep them in proper order. Again, this method promotes the system of backlog. The accounting officers are watching all the time to see that money is not spent unless it has been authorised. That means that work is held back. Then, towards the end of the year, in order to catch up with what is authorised—and this point has been mentioned in one of the Public Accounts Committee's Reports —everybody goes on to overtime.

The Navy has said that it is in great trouble because, owing to the shipbuilding slump, naval construction has gone faster than expected, and it is therefore over its estimate. All this sort of nonsense seems to arise from an obsolete system. It would be far better to make a grant in aid to the Minister of Defence, whose business it is to run the Armed Forces as though they were a nationalised industry, and to bring in the most efficient methods of accounting and supervision from industry. If we are to combine the Services this is the sort of question that we should have been thinking out. We should not just blunder into it with an announcement of a new policy, made for political purposes.

Again, shall we have one Defence Council with members of the supply personnel, as well as one Ministry, or three Defence Councils within the Ministry? None of this seems to be known. Nothing has been thought out. We welcome the unification of the Services, but we do not think that the Services should lose their identities at regimental or unit level. The point at which they should probably lose their identity is at general rank. General officers should go on to a common list, but in the lower ranks, at unit level, we should maintain the uniform and identity of the regiment in order to retain the regimental spirit, the ship spirit, or the squadron spirit—the spirit that makes things go in the Services.

§ Mr. Profumo

Has the hon. and learned Member read the speech of his right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown)? If so, he will know that his right hon. Friend said that in the end there is an unanswerable case for two Services rather than three.

§ Mr. Paget

if we argue the case for one Service or two Services we do not mean that they should Jose their identities at unit level. I am saying that there is a case for one Service.

§ Mr. Profumo

The right hon. Member for Belper said that there was a case for two.

§ Mr. Paget

Two is a step on the way from three to one. At none of these stages—either half way, with two Services, or the whole way with one Service —do we want unit identity to be lost.

I now turn to the rôle of the Army. This is a rôle within a nuclear context. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I say a little about the fate of the deterrent, since it is within this context that the rôle of the Army must be placed. The deterrent is a threat, and a threat is potent to the extent that it is believed. The essence of the deterrent is credibility. In the old days credibility simply depended upon having the bomb. We then passed to the next phase —in which the Government still believe themselves to be—in which the credibility of the deterrent depended upon the means of delivery. I do not believe that the credibility of the deterrent any longer depends on that; I believe that its credibility now depends upon the capacity to survive the consequences of delivery.

This the Americans at one time tried to meet by a counter-force capacity—the capacity to destroy an enemy's power to retaliate. That idea is no longer regarded as practical. It may be that an anti-rocket rocket, or something of the sort, will provide that defence, but it is doubtful. The real means of attaining this capacity to survive the consequences today is retained deterrent capacity.

Let me explain what I mean by that. Some time ago I had a conversation with a certain right hon. Gentleman. I said to him, "Let us suppose that the Russians were to strike against us and were to knock out the airfields of our V-bombers. Let us suppose that we had our V-bombers airborne. Where would we send them? To Russia, to kill thousands, or millions, of Russians, for no ascertainable purpose, while we brought certain annihilation upon this country? If you did that you ought to be shot, because we would face the ultimate horror of 1582 having a lunatic in charge in a nuclear age."

In those circumstances, the last thing that we would do would be to send the airborne V-bombers to Russia. Russia, by leaving our cities in existence, would have retained a deterrent capacity sufficient to deter our second strike. In fact, so long as Russia leaves us something which is worth our existence to retain she has an overwhelming capacity to deter not only our first but our second strike. In other words, she is in a position to threaten us at each stage with an overwhelming retained deterrent capacity.

That is the real reason why this country has not got and never can have an independent deterrent. It has nothing to do with Skybolt, Polaris, or anything else. It is a question of geography. However invulnerable our deterrent may be, we could never use it until we were dead—in other words, until we were destroyed to the point that we had nothing left that was worth retaining. A mere post-mortem spasm is not a deterrent.

§ Sir H. Legge-Bourke

On a point of order. In previous Service debates so far this year, when we have started discussing these matters, we have been told by the Chair that this is getting into a defence debate and is not related to any of the particular Service Estimates. I wonder where we are getting to now. I humbly suggest that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has gone so far in developing this argument that it will be impossible for us to make any sense when we are speaking in relation to what he is now proposing to say about the Army rôle without referring to the argument he has used. We should like some protection for back benchers.

§ The Temporary Chairman (Mr. Charles Royle)

In recent years it has become the custom in Service debates to allow the debate to go a little wide, but I must say that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has not associated nuclear matters with the Army and I should be glad if he would do that.

§ Mr. Paget

With great respect, Mr. Royle, I am going to do that in a moment. What I am doing is showing the real context, a changed context because of the changing nuclear theory in 1583 which our Army has to perform its duties in Germany. This has changed because United States policy is now based entirely upon the question of retained capacity. The Americans recognise, and have recognised, that the Russians are quite capable of deterring them from using their maximum, or anything like their maximum capacity.

They therefore think in terms, first, of a conventional response, then a nuclear demonstration to intimidate by dropping a bomb somewhere not too vital, then a limited counterforce action, but at each stage keeping in hand a massive deterrent to deter a counteraction which the Russians might take. That is the whole theory of the Kennedy Administration, but what has not been recognised fully here is the amount of scope that leaves the Russians to change the status quo on the ground by conventional means before they reach the point, or before we reach the point, at which they would have to fear a nuclear intervention from the enemy.

§ The Temporary Chairman

Order. I hope the hon. and learned Member will come to the Vote that we are discussing. His remarks are getting rather wide.

§ Mr. Paget

I am extremely glad of that, because that is exactly where I have got. I have indicated the circumstances in which B.A.O.R. has to operate. It is no longer sufficient merely to act as a sort of trigger. Today, B.A.O.R. has to meet a real danger of having to deal with attacks on the ground which cannot be effectively deterred by nuclear threats.

The question is: is it in a position to do so? Frankly, I do not believe that it is for one moment. I will leave to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley to deal with the various deficiences of the Army—worn-out 25-pounders, the non-existent medium and heavy artillery, the indefensible nuclear weapons, the absent anti-aircraft capacity, the obsolete support planes and the parade of new weapons which appear year after year in the Estimates until, in this age of fast-moving technology, their obsolescence out-paces their delivery. We have had them in year after year. I shall merely deal with postings.

N.A.T.O., and indeed B.A.O.R. also, are posted in barracks because the bar- 1584 racks happen to be there. The American barracks are in Bavaria and our barracks are a little higher on the map. We are allocated the job of defending the Weser line. Even in the circumstances of peacetime manoeuvre, it would take us 48 hours to reach our battle positions. The line is right across the communications. Goodness knows what would happen if we had refugees coming the other way. Those positions on the Weser could be reached by the Russians in 12 hours.

Just consider the situation we might be facing. Suppose we got pressure on the communications with Berlin. Suppose if to test them we moved some divisions there and the Russians riposted by coming in one night? By morning they would be across the Weser and approaching the Rhine. We could not use nuclears against them. They would all be mixed up with us. At that stage it would be we, not they, who would be presenting nuclear targets. The divisions brought up against the corridor to test the corridor would be perfect nuclear targets. So would be the Americans and their cantonments and postings in Bavaria—perfect nuclear targets.

At that stage, once the enemy has broken in, nuclears give all the advantage to the attacker, not to the defender. The advantage of nuclears to the defender arises only before the break-in, but in this case there is nothing to break in. Our divisions are simply in barracks within an unimpeded night's march by the enemy. That is what Stalin did in 1941, and he lost 100 divisions in a fortnight and was then faced by German forces with 3,600 tanks. The Russian forces in Germany alone, ready and available right on the frontier, capable of attacking within 48 hours' warning right away, have 6,000 tanks and nine divisions of airborne troops to follow them up.

How long are we to go on like this? Just visualise what could happen. On the first day we should be anxiously extracting our troops. On the second and third days we would be far too anxious, and so would be the Americans. They would not be able to use nuclears. Until we extricated the troops the Russians would have a free run, and by the time we got to the first phase, the sort of demonstration drop, there would doubtless be a pause. The Russians would stop and say, "Here we negotiate," but they would negotiate 1585 with the Russians in a new position on the Rhine. In this context if we are trying to design nuclear policy to provide a pause we must try to take steps to see that that pause is on their frontier, not on ours.

§ Mr. Shinwell

What conclusion does my hon. and learned Friend for Northampton (Mr. Paget) reach as a result of this analysis? Is he seeking to represent to the Committee, as I ventured to in the defence debate, that because of the paucity of arms at our disposal and the paucity of forces in a conventional sense it would be better to take them out altogether?

§ Mr. Paget

I think that that is one of the answers. Unless we are prepared to make this "phoney" defence into a real one, what my right hon. Friend says may have to be done. This is becoming progressively more apparent to the Americans. They are not prepared to go on accepting the helplessness of this situation. Therefore, I say that this is a case in which we cannot expect to go on getting away with what we are doing now. There have to be new postings. We have to place our troops at least nearer to what they have to defend than the enemy's troops are.

We have to get our troops to dig in and put in the field defences which any division requires to defend a position in real life. We have almost certainly to provide more troops in this theatre—at least up to our Brussels requirement of four divisions. This, more and more, we are finding the Americans are demanding. If Europe is to be defended, something of this sort must be done. How do we do it? Obviously, we cannot do it if we maintain all our other commitments.

What are these other commitments? Let us take Hong Kong as an example. We have the best part of a division in Hong Kong, and certainly it is not there to defend Hong Kong against the Chinese. The Chinese have only to turn off the water to make that impossible. Nobody pretends that it is defendable from outside. We recognise that if we cannot defend our position by diplomatic means, it is certainly not worth trying to defend it by force.

This division in Hong Kong is there simply to support the civil power; it is there to help the police if they get 1586 into trouble, and it is costing us about £4,000 per year per man. Is this a reasonable way to support an emergency reserve police? I venture to say that the internal security of Hong Kong is something which they should provide themselves. After all, as I understand it, their income tax is 2s. 6d. in the £, and I do not know why we have to provide a purely internal security force for them.

Turning to Singapore, I do not know the point of maintaining a base in which we depend upon an organised Communist labour force in the docks. Possibly there is a case for maintaining some troops in Australia, but, as in Hong Kong, I believe that we shall come to realise that this is a part of the world in which, if we cannot maintain our position by diplomatic means, it is not worth trying to maintain it by force.

The position in the Gulf may be a different matter. We are still very sensitive about it. I see the point of a N.A.T.O. base in Cyprus, but for the life of me I see no point of a British base in Cyprus. In Libya, we are supporting King Idris. We talk about our influence in the Middle East. Have not Iraq, Syria and the Yemen demonstrated how little is the influence which we have there?

§ Sir Richard Glyn (Dorset, North)

rose—

§ Mr. Paget

I am sorry. I would rather not give way to the hon. Member, for I have been too long as it is. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am trying to conclude, but it is an important speech. All I am trying to indicate here is that these are interests which are relatively less important than the defence of the vital point, which is the German frontier.

Are we not progressively supporting interests which, in so far as they still exist, are not the sort of interests which can be maintained by force? They rest upon such things as the memories of honest administration in India, the good will of trade associations in Malaysia, a reputation for honest dealing in Hong Kong, and "know-how" in the oilfields. It is these intangibles which are our interests in this area, and they are not supportable by force. Indeed, is not the force with which we pretend to support them becoming a sham which would dissolve in 1587 a moment if it met any solid and determined opposition? We cannot be strong everywhere.

I have not found these defence debates very happy debates. I believe that they have been a tale of decadence. Decadence does not lie in loss of status. The Swedes lost an empire and certainly have not become decadent, nor have the Dutch. Decadence is a mood in which shadow is accepted for substance, in which shams are preferred to reality, in which we no longer lie to deceive our enemies but lie to deceive ourselves. We have been presented with an independent British deterrent. It is neither independent nor British—nor is it a deterrent. These are not lies which we tell to deceive our enemies, but lies which we tell to deceive ourselves. B.A.O.R. is neither posted nor equipped to fight the Russians. We are preferring a sham to a reality. We have preferred to posture throughout the world in the shadow of a power whose substance has departed.

We have a Government whose policies have collapsed. We have a Parliament which can serve the people only by going back to the people and renewing itself. We have slid, and we are sliding, down the slope into decadence. It is a difficult slope to climb up. Lies, shams, shadows—these are habit-forming. The next Government—it cannot be this Government, for this Government have dealt too long in false coins for even their trust to be believed—have the task of bringing this nation back to respect of reality, to respect of substance and, above all, to respect for itself.

§ Brigadier Sir John Smyth (Norwood)

As I spoke for 17 minutes last week in the defence debate, and as this debate started very late and many hon. Members wish to speak, I shall cut my remarks very short and confine them to manpower and recruiting, bound up with the question of the future of the Gurkha Brigade, which are part of the same problem.

But in courtesy to the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), I should like to refer to one or two points which he made. First, may I say how much I agree with him on the question 1588 of Service pensions, and I put in a plea from this side of the Committee that the debate which we had recently on this subject has not properly been considered by the Government. We want an answer to some of the points which we put, particularly about widows and about the pensions of elderly officers who fought in one or perhaps both wars. That is not creating a precedent, and I am sure that we ought to do it.

The hon. and learned Member engaged in a friendly encounter with my right hon. Friend about who thought first of the reorganisation of the Central Command. We heard about it from the Minister of Defence the other day. Yesterday, in the House of Lords, Lord Montgomery of Alamein staked his claim to have beaten both my right hon. Friend and the hon. and learned Gentleman and to have thought of it first. I should like to stake my own claim. I not only thought of it, but I discussed it with Sir Ian Jacob, who was one of my pupils at the Staff College just over thirty years ago. We talked about it, but nothing happened. As I said in the defence debate, we must give full credit to the Government and the Minister of Defence; they have not only thought about it but have put it down on paper, and we are going to discuss it.

The hon. and learned Gentleman never makes a dull speech. I think that his latest announcement of Labour Party policy or the grand strategy of the future will have to be published in some form of White Paper for us to be able to understand even a bit of it. The hon. and learned Gentleman's speech last year contained two things which I missed from his speech this year. Last year, he had the rather amusing idea of putting sailors into tanks in some of the places where be thought the garrison could be reduced. We always used to think in the Army that a sailor on a horse was like a monkey on a bag of nails. I do not know what a sailor in a tank would be like. I hardly think that it would fill the bill.

Another thing I missed from the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech was the important statement he made last year about Labour Party policy on the actual number of troops that his party would keep in N.A.T.O. if it came to power. 1589 The hon. and learned Gentleman said this last year: …I would put the N.A.T.O. priority without question first, and I would put it certainly not at 51,000–52,000 nor at 55,000, men, but at something nearer 80,000. The hon. and learned Gentleman inspired the Leader of the Liberal Party to try to compete with that, because he raised his bid to 75,000 for the Liberal Party.

The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) commented on the hon. and learned Gentleman's statement and said this: If we are to have honesty, I presume to say that after the most careful thought he"— that is, the hon. and learned Gentleman— on behalf of the Labour Party this afternoon made a declaration that the strength of the British Army of the Rhine ought to be 80,000 and that if the Labour Pary returns to power it will be 80,000 and this will be done inside a ceiling of 165,000. I am sure that he will forgive me for putting it in one word— 'Nonsense'. It just cannot be done. There is nobody who has a reputation to lose, and no one who knows anything about it, even with the qualifications of an unpaid orderly-room lance-corporal who would make such a statement. I hope that I have made myself clear on that Point".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1962; Vol. 655, c. 622 and 649–650.] The hon. Gentleman certainly made himself clear and I, for one, would agree on this point with him. What one wants to ask is how the Labour Party would be able to raise the present number of troops in N.A.T.O. by 25,000 without fatally weakening the Strategic Reserve and reintroducing conscription. It could not be done. And what is the point of pouring all these men into Europe?

I must leave to other speakers the answers to the other points made by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I think that my right hon. Friend ought to be a very happy man that he has been able to say in this year's Memorandum that by the end of this year we shall have an all-Regular voluntary Army and one which will, by the beginning of next year, number 180,000 men. My right hon. Friend has now held office for nearly three years and he might gain fame by being the last Secretary of State for War that this country will ever have, if some of the proposals in connection with the central reorganisation go through. I have never known a more popular Secretary of State for War amongst the troops than my 1590 right hon. Friend has been, with the possible exception of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). I say that from the Army point of view. We have never had a Secretary of State for War who has been more courteous and helpful to Members of Parliament than my right hon. Friend.

Several hon. Members have poured cold water on the scheme put forward some years ago for going back to a Regular long-service defence force by the end of this year. No one has been more critical of this than the hon. Member for Dudley. I was going to quote a number of things that he has said over the past five years, but, most unusally—I have never known this happen before—the hon. Gentleman has not been here at all for this debate.

§ Sir H. Harrison

The hon. Gentleman is in a Select Committee.

§ Sir J. Smyth

Then I will not say any more.

I will quote this one sentence from what the hon. Gentleman said as recently as 1960: The target is 180,000 men—a target which we certainly cannot reach"—.[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1960; Vol. 619, c. 484.] Well, my right hon. Friend has done that.

I come now to the statement on Gurkha recruiting that my right hon. Friend made this afternoon. It must be looked at against the background of the very much improved position of British recruiting. In 1948, as my right hon. Friend said, we made an agreement with Nepal that we would maintain eight battalions of Gurkhas, a total force of, I think it was, 10,400 or 10,000, as my right hon. Friend said. In 1957, we made a verbal agreement with Nepal that we would increase that number to 15,000.

I see that the hon. Member for Dudley has just entered the Chamber. I must tell him that a little while ago I said that I had never known a debate on the Army Estimates without him being present.

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

May I deny the rumour, which I am sure has been spread about by the Secretary of State for War? I have not been to Cheltenham. I have been to a Select Committee.

§ Sir J. Smyth

That verbal agreement to increase the Gurkhas in the British Army to 15,000 had a number of advantages. First, it gave us 15,000 tough, highly trained infantrymen of great loyalty to the British Crown. Secondly, it was of great financial assistance to the Nepalese Government, because their revenue from the Gurkha Brigade is about one quarter of Nepal's total revenue. Nepal, though ostensibly an independent country, is very closely allied to Britain, and always has been.

I have referred many times to the distinctly threatening situation which today exists the whole way along the Himalayan Barrier. Had British recruiting gone badly, we would never have had this cut in the Gurkha Brigade. As the Committee and many other people know, a year or two ago it looked almost certain either that the whole of the Gurkha Brigade would be disbanded, or that there would be a very severe cut indeed, which would have had almost the same effect. It was at that time, nearly a year ago, that the Gurkha Brigade asked me to take up their case here in the House of Commons. As the Committee knows, I have done so in a number of speeches and in a number of Questions put to Ministers, and I have elicited statements from them. I have also spoken on the radio.

I have had great support from hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. For that, I am extremely grateful. I am also grateful to certain Ministers—my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for War—for considering the points that were made. They did not just maintain a wooden attitude and say, "We have decided to disband the Gurkhas and we are going to stick to our decision". They considered all these points very carefully and the result has been given to us in my right hon. Friend's speech this afternoon which, although it will be disappointing to many, is very much better than we had dreamed of a year ago.

I want to say this quite definitely. Any cut in the Gurkhas at present is a fundamental mistake, not so much from the Army's point of view, perhaps, because it may be said that we can make do with 10,000 just as well as with 15,000. But 1592 this is a particularly bad time to disband 5,000 Gurkha soldiers and send them back to Nepal, because, as I know very well, the Chinese will immediately make a dead set at them and will make every effort to enlist them in their own army. Therefore, it is a very poor economy on the part of the British Government by any standards, military and particularly political.

However, the decision has been made by the Government and has been conveyed to the King of Nepal by Field Marshal Lord Slim. If I wanted to put anything to the King of Nepal or anyone else I would certainly choose Lord Slim to do it. I am sure that he performed this task well. I appreciate, that, the decision having been taken, it is no good belly-aching about what has happened. We must now look at the situation as it exists and use it to the best advantage. The Gurkha Brigade agrees with me that the future is the thing that matters.

We must ensure that the cuts announced are made in a way which will reduce the fighting efficiency and morale of the Gurkha Brigade as little as possible. We must also see that everything reasonable is done to cushion the retirement of the 5,000 men who have become redundant. I am sure that on both of these points my right hon. Friend will consult the colonels of the Gurkha Brigade and that they will arrive at the best conclusion possible. We must keep up the recruiting machinery, or recruiting will run down and we will not be able to maintain even the 10,000 Gurkhas we are allowed.

My right hon. Friend said that we will keep all the eight Gurkha battalions, and we are grateful to him for that. That will mean that the present establishments will have to be considerably reduced. It must be remembered that the establishment of a Gurkha battalion is considerably higher than a British one because it must keep a certain reserve of men to compensate for those who return home to Nepal on leave. I hope that whatever arrangements are made the war establishment of the present Gurkha battalion will not be allowed to fall below that of a British battalion.

I realise that one of the Gurkha battalions will have to be used as some sort of training battalion, but I hope that it will not be labelled as a non-fighting unit 1593 because nothing could do more to lower their morale. Perhaps there could be some form of rotation, but, whatever happens, great difficulties would be caused if one battalion became labelled as noncombatant. I hope that my right hon. Friend will remember that we must deal generously with those who will become redundant, especially those who lose their pensions.

§ Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

The right hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) speaks with considerable authority on military affairs. During his oration he ventured to make a little fun at the expense of some of my hon. Friends. Let me assure him that it was quite unnecessary, for that is an exercise that we can undertake ourselves with remarkable efficiency.

I agree wholeheartedly with everything that the right hon. and gallant Member said about the Gurkha battalions. I regret that the Secretary of State has decided to effect a curtailment of the strength of these excellent members of Her Majesty's forces. I was not quite clear as to the propriety of the action he contemplates. I was even less clear about the reason for his decision.

I gather, from what the Secretary of State said, that we have 14,000 men in the Gurkha battalions—the right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am stating the position wrongly—and that the intention is to reduce that number to 10,000 over a period of three years. What the reason is I cannot understand, unless it be that the right hon. Gentleman is such an incurable optimist about the building-up of the Regular forces that he fancies his chances of being able to carry on without the aid of the Gurkhas.

I warn the right hon. Gentleman that he should not be too optimistic about building up the Regular forces in the next few years. I agree that we have done remarkably well in recent months, but I wonder how far that is attributable to rising unemployment. I would not be surprised to learn that unemployment has had some effect.

I know from letters I have received from my constituents, and the statements that have been made about men joining the Durham Light Infantry and regiments associated with the North, that they have been doing so because jobs have not been 1594 available for them. Whether or not that is so, it would be a mistake to assume that because there is some rise in the recruiting figures there will not be any setbacks in the next few months or in 1964.

The right hon. and gallant Member for Norwood is an expert on the Gurkhas. I know little about them except that I had a remote association with them when I was at the War Office and the Ministry of Defence. I beg him and those associated with him to continue their pressure on the Secretary of State for the retention of the Gurkhas. As to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks about Lord Slim meeting the King of Nepal, I understand that Lord Slim is about to return in full agreement with the Secretary of State, but I would like to see his terms of reference. In any case, let us not blame Lord Slim for the decision that has been taken to curtail the Gurkhas. It is the Secretary of State's decision, and although Lord Slim has not yet returned to this country, presumably he has already made a report to the Secretary of State. It is certain that the right hon. Gentleman imposed his decision, and that was that—but I hope it does not mean finality.

I am absolutely bewildered on the subject of manpower. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) was not in his place when the Secretary of State spoke about the total of 180,000 men. It is really 190,000, because of the 10,000 in the Gurkha battalions, although it seems somewhat curious, because I understood that there were 14,000 in the Gurkha battalions; so that the overall total should have been 194,000. I cannot follow the figures and that is probably because I have no mathematical grounding. Or is it because the right hon. Gentleman is trying his hardest to bewilder and confuse us and create the impression that the recruiting figures are going up all the time; that we are beginning to reach the point of balancing our forces? I appreciate that that is a serious problem for the Army, but we are now told that all will be well by 1964 or 1965.

I do not know the answer to these questions, but I will leave this matter of manpower and the mathematics involved to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, who is an authority on this subject, and say that the Secretary of 1595 State's speech was remarkable not for what he said, but for what he to say. He said hardly anything about the "Ever-readies", except that he has about 4,000 of them.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), in what, without any condescension or attempted patronage, I would regard as a tour de force, covered the whole sphere of military operations and strategy, and pointed out that the Secretary of State, when he originated the"Ever-readies"spoke about having 15,000 as a target, although he now has only 4,000. He has got them at much expense, for we must remember that they get a considerable bounty. The question is whether, in spite of what he said, they would be of any real value in an emergency.

Neither did the right hon. Gentleman say very much about the B.A.O.R. There was some rumour recently that he was going to withdraw a brigade from B.A.O.R. Nothing has happened. Is that in the offing, or in cold storage? Is it to come out of the bag after the series of debates on defence and the Service Estimates? As to the forces in B.A.O.R., my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton surprised me by what he said. He covered the strategic issues and also the question of an independent British deterrent, which I thought a little irrelevant. I am sure that if I indulged in a dissertation on that subject I should be ruled out of order. [Heim. MEMBERS: "No."] Let me do so then, so that I can say what I wanted to say.

My hon. and learned Friend came to the conclusion that it would be quite impossible to withstand the assault of the mighty Russian forces in East Germany, with their 6,000 tanks and nine airborne divisions, to say nothing of their ground forces. My hon. and learned Friend came to the conclusion that we have no hope at all. I ventured to interrupt him and ask whether this meant that we should withdraw our forces—a point which I put in the defence debate —and he was not clear whether that was the conclusion that he had arrived at.

§ Mr. Paget

rose—