DEFENCE

§ Mr. Gordon Walker (Smethwick)

Anyone who is concerned with the power and influence of Britain in the world must have been very depressed and disturbed by the two speeches we heard yesterday from the Government Front Bench and by the White Paper presented to us by the Government. The Secretary of State for War gave us a swashbuckling speech in his favourite rôle of a pocket Palmerston; I will have more to say about the contents of that speech later. The Minister of Defence made some very perfunctory remarks—and I regret that he is not in his place at the moment—about defence; that part of his speech was really as blank as his own White Paper.

The Minister of Defence then devoted almost the whole of his speech to the question of the integration of the Services. The timing of this announcement by the Minister of Defence is very odd. He gave us rather half-baked, ill-thought out and incomplete proposals, and the reason why he did it at this particular moment is, I think, quite clear. This is the old trick of holding back something which sounds important until the last possible moment and then produce it to divert attention from things which the right hon. Gentleman does not want 222 discussed, namely, the convulsion of the Government's policy as a result of the Skybolt fiasco.

The Minister of Defence said that the Government had taken a decision in principle. What matters is not a decision in principle but hard decisions of practice, organisation and command which have to be taken. The decision in principle, after all, was taken as long ago as 1957 and was embodied in the 1958 White Paper. We were told then that the Services were being subordinated to the Ministry of Defence.

The right hon. Gentleman left almost all of the critical questions open. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) said, the Government have not even decided whether there should be one accounting officer. This is a crucial question. A single accounting officer is absolutely indispensable to a single Ministry of Defence. If there are four accounting officers the cake will still be cut up in the way described by the right hon. Gentleman and which we want to avoid. Apparently the right hon. Gentleman is not even sure whether there will still be a Board of Admiralty and similar bodies. I understand that the Chiefs of Staff will still individually give the advice of their own Services and will have individual access to the Prime Minister.

Nonetheless, I welcome this as a step in the right direction. It is something which the Labour Party has long asked for. But we must tackle this question in a much more radical way. The central and fundamental problem which we face is finding a defence policy which can be effectively supported by small regular forces in conditions which are really no longer suited to the historical evolution of three Services each concerned with its own natural element.

The Minister was woolly on this point. He said yesterday: Fighting efficiency depends in the last resort upon the pride a man takes in his ship, in his regiment or his squadron. We do not want to blur that."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 38.] But this is not the issue. The issue is not the unit, squadron or ship in which a 223 man takes pride. The real issue is the independence of the Service. After all, each regiment and each unit is now integrated into a Service. It does not thereby lose its identity and men do not lose their pride in it, although it is subordinated to an overall direction of policy. The same thing applies to joint operations. When there are joint operations, units remain the same and are still a source of pride.

We have to achieve for the three Services in combination what each Service has achieved within itself. The importance of men having pride in their units is not the issue. The Service is the issue.

We must come back to this point at a later stage. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley said, we must have a White Paper with proposals properly set out in it and we must have a full debate.

We do not propose to be diverted from the main issue of this debate, namely, what is the fundamental reason for the continual failure of important Government defence policies? We have had so many of them that the Government's defence policy is in ruins. The fundamental reason for this is the Government's stubborn refusal to get their priorities and principles right.

I do not say that it is easy to get the defence problems of Britain in proper focus and to solve them. We must tackle very grave and onerous questions in working out the proper defence policy for Britain. Our guiding aim must be to secure for Britain as great an influence in the world as we possibly can. I resented the rather cheap jibes of the Secretary of State for War last night about our wanting to strip the country of its defences and leave it naked. That is all right for a platform speech, but it is not worthy of a Minister of the Crown speaking in what is meant to be a serious defence debate.

Therefore, the first step is to get the principles and priorities right. As I see it, our defence policy must rest on two principal foundations. First, we must at last reach a clear-cut decision to end the hopelessly extravagant and wasteful attempt to maintain a British independent nuclear deterrent. The Skybolt fiasco means that our V-bombers 224 will rather more rapidly lose their strategic rôle. I take it that that is why they have been handed over to N.A.T.O. in a tactical rôle. That decision was right. This is the start of the tapering off of our powerful but, as it is becoming, obsolescent V-bomber force. What is wrong is the Government's determination to cling to the idea of maintaining an independent deterrent in other forms.

I do not wish to go over the technical and detailed matters which we discussed in the debate on the Nassau Agreement. I want to go straight to the major remaining argument of the Government in support of this policy. It is—and the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for War stated it yesterday—that without a nuclear weapon of our own we shall be exposed to nuclear blackmail. This is the fundamental argument of the Government in justifying their policy.

The Secretary of State for War at last gave us an example of what he meant by this yesterday when he said: …it may well suit Russia to say on some future occasion, 'Let one British soldier, or perhaps a marine, set foot on the soil of such and such a land, even if by invitation of those who dwell there, and we will deliver a devastating nuclear attack on your island home.'"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 155.] This is the first clear statement that we have had of this argument and which makes some attempt at giving an example. However, if one analyses this, it appears a grotesque proposition. It is, first, based on a distrust of the United States, a belief that they would not stand by us when we were threatened by a nuclear attack from Russia which might start a nuclear war. This is the real basic idea.

Everything is possible, but in defence and foreign policy one must make some assumptions, and it seems to me that the safest and most realistic assumption is that the United States would not abandon us or Europe in their own interests. They would never, and could never, allow the Soviet Union to move its missile bases further West—nearer the United States. That is one reason. Another reason is that if they abandoned Europe they would leave themselves in a crisis with only one choice, which would be that of nuclear war. They would deprive themselves of the conventional option, which America could never dream of doing.

225 Apart from that, the right hon. Gentleman gives the wrong answer to the fundamental question of what deters Russia from making a nuclear attack on Britain alone and in isolation. This is the point which the right hon. Gentleman made. The thing which deters Russia from doing that is simply their fear that they would be exposed to the terrifying annihilating first-strike weapon from America. This could happen if they started attacking us in this way—[An HON. MEMBER: "Threatening us."] All right, threatening us. If we stand up to the threat, the threat will not be delivered because the Russians would fear that, if they attacked us in isolation, the Americans would deliver a devastating first-strike attack upon them. However slight the risk might be, it is a risk that Russia cannot conceivably run. It is that which protects us from nuclear blackmail and not the two or three Polaris submarines—which might be all that would be operational at any one moment.

The second foundation of our defence—

§ Sir Cyril Osborne (Louth)

Does not the right hon. Gentleman consider it absurd to think that Russia would launch an attack on us because one of our soldiers went to one country?

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

That was what the Minister said.

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

To that I say "Hear, hear". The Minister stated exactly that. I agree with the hon. Member that it was nonsense.

§ Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale)

It is the best speech that the hon. Member has made in the House.

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

I say to the Secretary of State for War that there are times when we all say, "Save us from our friends".

The second foundation on which we must base our defence policy is that we must have first-class conventional forces. This is not so much a question, as some hon. Members opposite argued yesterday, of enlarging our conventional forces as of giving them first-rate equipment so that they are the best we can have, maybe the best in the world.

This is something that we owe to our soldiers. Our forces are frighteningly 226 under-equipped, particularly in Germany. The Memorandum accompanying the Army Estimates, which is bound up with the White Paper, is a piece of camouflage. It paints a picture of a wonderfully equipped modern army. But when one reads the fine type, however, one finds a catalogue of weapons which do not yet exist, which may not exist for six or seven years or which are coming under design study. The picture when one reads it carefully with all its qualifying phrases, is very different from the general impression that is attempted to be given.

The present state of B.A.O.R. is alarming. I am talking not about morale and discipline, which are, without question, first-class, but about equipment, which is the Government's responsibility. We are dangerously undergunned and outgunned. At last, we are to get the close-support Abbot, a good gun. At last, we will be able to replace the 25-pounder, which is the only close-support gun we have. As to the long-range gun, the Minister of Defence was ambiguous. I hope that if he winds up the debate tonight, he will be able to give us a little more clarity.

The Minister of Defence said that subject to satisfactory contract arrangements, if an order is placed now, the American 175 mm. gun—which is an excellent one—should come into delivery in 1964. There are a lot of qualifications there. Is a contract or order to be placed? Will the gun come forward? We want a clearer statement, because the provision of a long-range gun is essential if we are to equip our soldiers properly and equally in Germany. Incidentally, we need a medium-range gun. I do not think that one is in sight. We have never been told about one. We have no weapon for countering low-flying aircraft, which the Russians on their side are developing and which may be one of the chief dangers to which our men might well be exposed.

Apart from the need to equip our soldiers properly, first-class conventional forces would be in the general national interest. They would be far better suited to the defence and protection of our overseas interests. A shortage of conventional forces exposes those interests to great dangers. Secondly, the provision of first-class conventional forces would enlarge and not diminish our influence in the Alliance and in the world. This is a basic difference between the two sides and I want to state it as clearly as I can. We 227 are not stripping the country naked; we are not doing that sort of thing. We are trying to find a way to enlarge and increase the influence of this country in the Alliance and in the world.

A nuclear deterrent of our own makes a marginal contribution to the Western deterrent. It does not buy us influence, as was shown over Cuba. If we spent that money on the equipment, the improvement, the modernisation and the mobility of our conventional forces, this would make an indispensable contribution to the Alliance and not a dispensable or marginal contribution. That would give us, not all the influence in the world, but correspondingly increased influence.

We should use this increased influence to take the initiative to reorganise N.A.T.O. I am very disturbed about the state of N.A.T.O. I am even more disturbed about the prospects that seem ahead in N.A.T.O. It seems to me that we are in grave danger of moving from our original concept of a single alliance to a new concept of two linked alliances, one on each side of the Atlantic. The notion of an alliance within an alliance must weaken and ultimately ruin N.A.T.O. Our guiding aim must be to resist this sort of development of two linked alliances displacing a single N.A.T.O. alliance.

In that connection, one must face the problem of the challenge and the difficulty of General de Gaulle. We are all in danger of getting too much flustered by the General. We let him get us too worried and we think too much about all the difficulties that he can cause. We must criticise his attitudes, particularly towards N.A.T.O., but we should not exaggerate, as some people do, his capacity to upset the apple cart.

The internal economic position of France is not as strong as many people think. The very large devaluation which General de Gaulle made, and from which his country derived great economic benefits, is beginning to wear out. Nor can he escape the facts of the world. France is not a super-Power. France cannot be equal to Russia or the United States. It can never displace the United States as the indispensable nuclear protector of Europe and, indeed, of France itself. In the attempt to do so, General de Gaulle is already slashing his conventional 228 forces, and will have to continue to do so, thereby reducing his value to his allies and neighbours in N.A.T.O. and Europe. Certainly, we should not follow General de Gaulle's example. We should realise that he is following our example and making the same sort of mistake that we made in the 1957 White Paper.

General de Gaulle may sulk in his tent, and this can weaken and embarrass the Alliance—there is no point in disguising that—but certainly he has no capacity to destroy N.A.T.O. if we go about things in the right way and keep our heads.

I want to say clearly that I think that the United States is not helping by producing the present flood of proposals for multilateral, multinational and all the other kinds of deterrents. I agree with the aim of the United States to achieve a greater sharing between allies of nuclear strategy and policy, but it seems to me that the United States, by producing all these proposals for multilateral and other similar kinds of deterrent, is not achieving that aim and is endangering other aims which she rightly regards as of great importance.

The proposals for multilateral deterrents are bound, first, to divert and dissipate the energy of the Alliance. They require a great deal of talk, discussion, and so on, which we should devote to other matters. Secondly, they are bound to divide the Alliance. We know that Canada and the Scandinavian allies are doubtful about this proposition. There will be great argument and division unnecessarily over this matter.

All these proposals are designed, as I see them, to create the illusion that European nations have a nuclear independence which, in fact, they will not possess, because when one looks at all these proposals one sees that they all go back to an ultimate United States command. This would be an illusion of independence. If any real proposals were made that would put nuclear forces under complete independent European control without going back to American command, this would be much worse. It would split N.A.T.O. into two alliances and it would spread nuclear weapons and make disarmament more difficult.

I also notice that all these proposals are devices to get European nations to 229 bear part of the cost of the American nuclear missile programme. It seems to me that it must endanger any alliance if the principle were to be established that the lesser allies paid the major ally an actual sort of levy. This would be a source of great weakness to the Alliance. I am in favour of paying our contribution in full to the Western Alliance, to the club, but I want to pay it in first-class conventional forces; I want to pay it in real coin, not in prestige paper money.

§ Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish (Lewes)

This will not make real sense to the House or the country. Everyone naturally wants to know what sort of size of conventionally armed forces the Opposition has in mind, by how much their size would he increased and how they would be raised. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not leave that subject without saying anything about it.

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

I want, of course as large conventional forces as we can get by recruitment. I am not thinking so much—I made this clear in my speech—of enlarging the conventional forces as of enormously improving their equipment, mobility and armament. This is the issue in my mind, but, of course, if we can recruit more all the better.

§ Viscount Lambton (Berwick-upon-Tweed)

Will the right hon. Gentleman make it clear whether he is in favour of limiting what is reached by voluntary recruitment, or whether he would be definitely against having conscription?

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

I certainly think that we can achieve our aims without conscription and that Regular forces have a very great advantage over conscripted forces.

§ Viscount Lambton

What number?

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

I am not in Government. I cannot say exactly what number. As a matter of fact, the Government are varying the numbers almost every month. We cannot in Opposition answer detailed precise questions of that kind.

§ Viscount Lambton

They are important questions.

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

They are important questions and they are questions which we shall answer very quickly when we are in office, which will be very soon.

Our aim should be to use the enhanced, increased influence that we should get by very good conventional forces, far better equipped than we have today, to secure the reorganisation of N.A.T.O. which would give the allies of America a very real share of control in N.A.T.O. over nuclear strategy and policy. Our principal aim should be the simple one that it is better to have an effective share in the total Western deterrent than a partial share in a partial deterrent. This should be the principle on which we go. But we must be clear what is obtainable and what is not obtainable. I do not think that there is any substitute for one man having the power to press the button in the event of having to answer a Russian first strike. There is no substitute for that, but there is the possibility of a real and effective share in the very terrible responsibility of shaping nuclear strategy.

The allies could share with the United States in decisions about forward production and plans, about deployment and targeting. These are all hard and difficult decisions in which we could share. Also in shaping the general concept about the possible use of these weapons. We should also share—I attach immense importance to this—in shaping N.A.T.O. doctrine about tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

I want to make it clear, because this was apparently misunderstood in some speeches yesterday, that these tactical nuclear weapons must exist in Europe so long as Russia has them. We cannot expose our men with unequal weapons in points of danger and, indeed, the mere presence of these weapons would inhibit the conventional massing of forces by Russia. But we must get away from the very dangerous over-dependence upon these weapons which exists today. All N.A.T.O. exercises, I think, have shown that our forces act on the assumption of an automatic, almost immediate resort to tactical nuclear weapons in almost every conceivable kind of emergency that might arise in Europe.

In our own military interest, we should redeploy these tactical nuclear weapons. 231 We should withdraw them, so far as possible, from our front line forces and defences. So far as possible, we should withdraw them physically—there are limits here depending upon range—but we should absolutely withdraw them in terms of command structure. They should be put under a separate command which ultimately goes up to S.A.C.E.U.R., of course, but which is distinct from that of our conventional fighting forces. All the forces in Europe, and ours, too, ought to rely mentally and tactically on the use of conventional arms, and not mentally and tactically on the assumption that nuclear weapons would come very early indeed to their aid. It makes a fundamental difference to the approach, organisation and tactics of the forces whether we have a dependence on tactical nuclear weapons and automatic assumption of their use, or whether we work on the opposite principle.

This redeployment in our own interests would be a step towards something to which the Labour Party attaches very great importance, namely, the achievement of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, based upon the maintenance of a balance of military forces. In this connection, it is very significant that it is not only on this side of the Iron Curtain that this discussion is going on about conventional and nuclear forces; a very vigorous controversy is going on also in the Russian Armed Forces.

If we are to get our principles and priorities right, we must never forget that the ultimate aim of defence and foreign policy must, of course, be disarmament. The purpose of defence is, after all, to reduce the dangers to which the country is exposed, and we cannot do this more surely or better than by agreed all-round disarmament. That is a more effective way, if one can achieve it, of reducing the dangers to which the country is exposed than even the best armaments.

We feel that the pursuit and study of disarmament should not be a sort of adjunct to Government policy, experts in conferences and so forth, but should become an integral part of defence policy. That is why we want to set up a disarmament Department or office in the heart of the structure of Government. The duty of such a Department or office would be to make continuous hard- 232 headed study of the techniques, methods and scientific problems of disarmament, and it should be organised in such a way that its ideas are continuously and constantly in the minds of Ministers and the Cabinet. This must figure as much in the minds of the Government as the problems of defence in the ordinary sense and of foreign policy.

We realise fully, of course, the difficulties and great stumbling blocks in the way of an advance towards disarmament, but we are not altogether unhopeful about the prospects. After all, the United States and Russia have a certain limited mutual interest in securing disarmament or, at any rate, a check on the enormously increasing cost of armaments. This mutual interest has, I think, been shown by the very great narrowing of the gap on the question of a test ban and also—perhaps more significant—the relatively similar approach which both sides have made to the broader problems of disarmament.

But, clearly, it is not just a matter of wishing and hoping for disarmament. We can achieve disarmament in the modern horribly complex world only by tackling hard and complex technical problems. I do not think that the British Government have made a sufficiently powerful, effective and impressive contribution to this working out of the technical, scientific and similar details and problems of disarmament. My own dearest wish would be to see Britain play a decisive rôle in helping to lift from humanity the burden of dread which has rested upon it since Hiroshima.

§ The Minister of Aviation (Mr. Julian Amery)

The problems we are facing and discussing in our debate are singularly baffling, and I pay tribute to the objectivity with which the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) attempted to face them in his speech. He accepted the difficulty of the problems on which the Government have to pronounce, and on which it is the duty of the Opposition to offer criticism. He stuck to the facts. He expressed clear recognition of the very great power of the V-force of Bomber Command today. If I may say it without offence, I think that in this his speech was in singular contrast to those of his two hon. Friends 233 who spoke yesterday and who tried to tackle these problems in a sweeping way as if they were really quite easy and could be dealt with in a Daily Mirror leading article style.

The right hon. Gentleman said that the problem had two foundations. The first foundation, he said, speaking for his own side, was the desire to end the deterrent. He based himself on the claim that nuclear blackmail of this country was unlikely. He could not, he said, envisage circumstances in which the United States could possibly abandon us. The right hon. Gentleman will remember Mr. Christian Herter's Press conference at the end of President Eisenhower's régime. Coming to more recent times, it is interesting to note what President Kennedy himself has said about the relevant phrase in the Nassau communiqué referring to our supreme national interests.

When asked in what circumstances he thought that this clause in the agreement might apply, President Kennedy said: …if they were threatened with a bombardment of their island, they might feel that they wanted to have the capacity to respond. He went on: I think probably the interest of any nation, if they are going to put that much of an effort into it"— meaning the deterrent— every nation is conscious that there may be a moment when it is isolated and when its national interests are involved. The British have had several of those experiences. They had them certainly at the beginning of the Second War. So I think the concept of their having to be alone is rather a strong one in the British. He went on to say: Yet to operate in the case of Cuba, we had the support of the Alliance. We might have had a situation where we did not. I think we"— the Americans, he means— would probably want to feel that after due notice, we had some control over these weapons". The President was recognising that every country may feel, if it makes the effort necessary to build a deterrent, that it must ultimately have control over it.

I can quite see that it is open to any private politician, journalist, critic or observer to gamble on this and say, "I think that the odds are that we can be safe under the American nuclear umbrella". But a Government cannot 234 gamble with the safety of the nation and the people. One is thinking in terms of the situation not today but 10 years ahead. It takes 10 years to develop a weapon system. Therefore, in my view, it is irresponsible to believe that, 10 years ahead, one can rely on forces not in one's control. We have seen some pretty big changes in the last 10 years. I go a step further. It seems very strange that the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues should wish us to strip ourselves of our nuclear power in a period in which it is almost certain that both France and China as well as Russia and America will become nuclear Powers.

§ Mr. Gordon Walker

The Minister says that we must look 10 years ahead and not rely on anybody else. Is not he relying on America to provide Polaris just about 10 years from now?

§ Mr. Amery

There is a great difference between the supply of weapons by allies and facing a situation which many hon. Members opposite have often described as national suicide.

The right hon. Gentleman went on to speak about first-class conventional forces well equipped. I find it a little difficult to follow his thinking here—it was the second foundation which he put—because, as far as I could judge, his contribution to equipping them more effectively was to withdraw the tactical forces from the front line.

In my view, there is a third foundation of defence policy, and to this I now turn. My right hon. Friend will deal with the great questions of the deterrent when he winds up tonight, but there is a side to all this which has not, I feel, been sufficiently discussed in the debate. I refer to the scientific, technological and industrial base without which one cannot equip fighting forces or give them the support which they need. Partly, of course, this is a matter of money, but more important than money and even harder to get are the qualified scientists without whose help one cannot develop the weapon systems one will need in the future.

The Department over which I have the honour to preside employs nearly 3,000 qualified scientists and engineers, and this makes us one of the biggest single employers of scientists in the world. We 235 sponsor most of the research in the aviation industry and very nearly half the research in the electronics industry. This is a formidable total—about 20 per cent. of the total research of the country, and 80 per cent. of it is done on defence account.

Hon. Members will, of course, have seen the report of the Royal Society on the drain of scientists from this country to the United States. I am glad to say that there have not been many from the Ministry of Aviation. We have lost four during the past five years. On the industrial side—I refer to the aviation and military electronics industry—the loss has been less than 1 per cent. The truth is that both in our establishments and in industry our research scientists have had a challenging job to do, and this has, I think, made up to a considerable extent for any difference in the salaries or facilities we have been able to offer.

These scientific resources are very precious, and it is important to make the best use of them. Here I pay tribute to the work which my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations did in regrouping the aircraft industry, and which has substantially eliminated duplication of scientific effort. When there were several airframe companies, there was, inevitably, a good deal of duplication. With the reorganisation of the industry, the same total of scientific effort has been applied to the solution of a much wider range of problems.

Now, a few words about how we use, in the military interest, our scientific and technological resources. Rather more than half our effort goes into monitoring and supervising the development and production of equipment for the forces. The remainder goes into research. Broadly, there are two kinds of research. There is research aimed at particular projects—the TSR2, the P1154, or whatever it may be—and there is general research which absorbs about one-third of the effort.

By general research I mean research which has no direct or immediate relation to a particular military or even civil requirement, but which is of intrinsic scientific value. Unless we do work of this kind, we shall not be able to meet the increased requirements of the future. I will give one or two examples.

236 Our fastest firm operational requirement at present calls for speeds of Mach 3. We are at present experimenting and studying at Farnborough a need which we think will arise for sub-orbital manned flight at speeds of Mach 14.

A great deal of research is going on into materials. It is easy enough to grasp the possibilities of hypersonic flight, or satellites in space, but we shall not be able to do much about them unless we can develop the necessary materials, the coolants, sealants and transparencies, as the scientists call what we would call anti-freeze, glue and windows. My scientists have laid great stress on the importance of work on these materials. We have accordingly set up at Farnborough a new Chemistry, Physics and Metallurgy Department and a new materials group at the Explosives Research and Development Establishment. At the Royal Radar Establishment we are making a special study of the electrical properties of pure materials at low temperature.

This is a field of research which may well bring advances as dramatic as the transistor and the laser. This may one day allow a complete break-through in the generation and transmission of electrical power. We are also doing a great deal of work on micro-miniaturisation. Hon. Members will know what an ordinary computer looks like. It is a box about eighteen inches high. We have now at the Royal Radar Establishment reduced that to the size of the tiny object I hold in my hand for the House to see. There are 350 units in a box of this kind, which represents an effective computer.

Most of this research work is carried out on the Defence Vote, but of course much of it has quite important civil application. For instance, the evolution of the slender delta wing which is paid for on the Defence Vote is fundamental to the development of the Concord project. Data handling research for radar defence has led directly to computers and machine-tool control.

§ Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

The right hon. Gentleman might elucidate what he is driving at. Do we understand that all this research, with all the 3,000 scientists at the right hon. Gentleman's command and all the paraphernalia associated with research and 237 development, is directed to the production of aircraft? But what about the nuclear deterrent; or do the Government regard the nuclear deterrent as being confined, apart from contributions from the United States which may come along in due course, to the production of aircraft?

§ Mr. Amery

The right hon. Gentleman no doubt will have the patience to hear me out and I will be dealing with some of the nuclear aspects presently. What I have been trying to explain—and not enough attention has been paid to it in debate—is the importance not only of having an effective force of scientists, technologists and industry but of providing the industry for them, and this goes across the board of the conventional side as well as the nuclear side, in which hon. Members opposite have expressed interest.

In asking the House, therefore, to endorse our expenditure on general research, it is fair to claim that there is a very valuable pay-off in terms of the civil exploitation of military discoveries. Our whole technology is strengthened in the process for peaceful as well as warlike purposes.

I should like to turn for a moment to research on particular projects, or rather to research and development, because we cannot separate the two. The process of development gives rise continuously to problems which can be resolved only by research. Research and development is something of a controversial issue. We have been under a great deal of fire because of the cost in time and money. The sums involved are very great and I admit that estimates in terms of time and cost have proved wildly inaccurate. All this has given rise to a good deal of criticism and, as a former Secretary of State for Air, I have been among the critics. I know better than most how slippages in time and cost can jeopardise military planning and make nonsense of defence budgeting. It is right, therefore, to devote a few moments to this issue, if the right hon. Member for Easington will allow me.

I should like to examine why our estimates have so often been wide of the mark. The problem facing the Ministry is quite different in scale, and to some extent even in kind, from the old supply problems as we knew them even as re- 238 cently as the Korean War. There is hardly any problem today which our scientists and engineers cannot solve—given the time and the resources. The difficulty is to estimate accurately how much time and how much of the resources.

When, for instance, it is decided to develop a new aircraft or guided weapon one is designing a weapons system which is aimed at overcoming the defences which one thinks a potential enemy will have developed in 10 years' time. It is a sort of chess-board manoeuvre. One tries to meet, well ahead, the move which one thinks the other side will make. This is well expressed in the phrase "anti-missile missile".

It is easy enough to work out solutions to these problems on paper, but when it comes to cutting metal and fitting black boxes for something which has never been done before it is very difficult to say how long it will take and how much it will cost. What is more, in the course of the cycle of development and production, there will be changes in defence policy, or new intelligence will come in about the intentions of a potential enemy. All this may well lead to changes in the requirements and therefore to modifications.

Let the House take, for instance, a project like the TSR2. This aircraft has to fly at supersonic speed pretty well on the deck. It must be able to follow the contours of the ground. It must also fly at supersonic speed high up. It needs a short take-off capability. It must be rugged enough to land and to take off from unprepared strips. It must provide a stable platform not only for the reliable delivery of nuclear weapons but also to carry a range of conventional weapons. Originally conceived in the tactical rôle, it is now to be equipped to fulfil a strategic rôle. On top of all these things, it has to give its crew a safe and reasonably comfortable ride. None of these things have been done before in a single aircraft. They involve new inventions and any error in one component may well lead to modifications in another.

As one develops an aircraft like this one is bound to run into problems which one did not expect. To solve them takes time, and in these things time is money. Every extra month spent on solving a 239 problem means an extra month in which one has to pay the salaries of the design staff and the overheads of the firm.

This is not just a British problem. The Harvard Business School recently investigated a dozen major American weapon programmes. Its report shows that the ultimate cost of development has been anything from twice to seven times the original estimate. There was one remarkable instance where a project was completed on time and for less than the original estimate, but I am told that it was scrapped as obsolete as soon as the development was finished.

I have called for a similar study, but I do not say that this will be an answer to the problem. It is clear that this is not just a British problem. The Americans have it and the French have it, and I dare say it is known behind the Iron Curtain too. I am sure that the House will agree that in these circumstances it is not altogether surprising if our estimating has been sometimes at fault. But to explain failure in estimating does not excuse us from the duty of trying to do a great deal better than we have done so far, because until we can prepare more accurate estimates it will be very difficult to achieve effective forward planning for defence.

The House is already familiar with the different stages in the development of a weapons system—the operational requirements, the feasibility study, the project study and the development contract. I will not cover this ground again today, but I should like to mention one or two new steps we have taken to improve our estimating. For every major project, we have now set up a management board. These boards meet at regular intervals to consider progress and take major new decisions when these are called for. They are attended by administrators and scientists from the Ministry, top representatives of the different contractors on the airframe, engine and electronic sides and by representatives of the customers—for example, the Royal.Air Force or the Royal Navy.

These boards are served by a project director in the Ministry who may be a scientist, engineer or a Service officer and whose job is to co-ordinate the Government side of the work. He has to 240 make sure that all the information on the project is brought at once to the attention of our best experts on the airframe, engine and electronic sides, so that any problem can be solved as quickly and as cheaply as possible.

We are also devoting rather more of our scientific resources to monitoring industry's work. This is an effective method of control, but I should be reluctant to push it too far because monitoring—that is to say, putting Government scientists in to supervise the work of industrial engineers—means the duplication of effort and also means taking them off original work.

§ Sir Harry Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely)

My right hon. Friend refers to customer's representatives—in other words, from the Service Departments—on the projects. Has any note been taken of the recommendation in the Zuckerman Report that serving officers concerned with matters of this kind ought to be able to spend rather more years on this work than has been the practice hitherto? Cross-posting has happened so often and just as a man has become expert he has had to move.

§ Mr. Amery

That is a matter which is more for my right hon. Friends the heads of the Services than for me.

The prime responsibility, of course, for the efficient management of a project rests with the contractor. But we are insisting in certain cases that management introduce programme evaluation reporting techniques and other methods of technical and costs control. All this will help to produce an improvement in our estimating.

Research and development expenditure by my Department on defence projects is about four times as great as on civil projects but this expenditure on defence nevertheless has an important pay-off on the civil side. For instance, the Olympus engine for the TSR2 is basically the engine which will power the Concord.

In the same way, the Blue Streak missile, first developed for military purposes, is to be the first stage of a civil space launcher. The blind landing system which proved so effective during last December's smog at London Airport has been developed on the defence account for the V-bombers and the Belfast. It has now also been installed in the VC10 241 and is to go into the Trident. It may well revolutionise civil flying as well as pay a decent dividend to London Airport.

Only last week we placed an order on military account with Westlands for a new hovercraft, the SRN3. We cannot yet be sure whether the hovercraft has a valid military application. Early studies suggest that it may be useful to the Royal Navy in an anti-submarine rôle and possibly to the Army for amphibious operations. The only way to make sure is to experiment, and the new hovercraft when built will be handed over to the Navy for trials. The results of these trials are bound to have important implications for civil exploitation.

We are also investigating the possibility of giving an aircraft vertical lift by means of helicopter blades. After take-off, the blades would be retracted, rather like a wine whisk, to allow the aircraft to fly at normal high speeds.

The defence budget, of course, benefits from research and development on the civil side. The VC10, the DH125, and the Avro 748, for instance, were all developed for civil purposes very largely, if not entirely, at the expense of the firms concerned. All three of these aircraft have now been ordered for the Royal Air Force, so here are examples of the industry helping to finance the military research and development budget.

I have concentrated so far on the scientific and technological base of our defence efforts. I now turn to the industrial base. Last July, a few hours after I became Minister of Aviation, we had a debate on the aircraft industry. Hon. Members on both sides of the House discussed the prospects of British aviation and expressed deep anxiety. The chiefs of the industry were also very worried men at the time. Exports were falling off and the prospect of large redundancies loomed ahead both for design staffs and production workers.

I was urged from every quarter of the House to do what I could to speed up decisions and get orders placed. I think that I can now report some progress. Since our debate last July the following decisions have been taken. First, six further VC10s have been ordered for Transport Command, Contract negotiations are in progress and a substantial share of work is to be sub-contracted to Shorts.

§ Mr. Wigg

Will the right hon. Gentleman also state exactly how many times these projects have been announced before. This first one was announced on 10th August as a camouflage of the cancellation of Blue Water. Will he say, when he is stating an item, how many times it has been announced already and whether it has been included in a special announcement?

§ Mr. Amery

If the hon. Gentleman had listened to what I said he would have heard me say that I was summarising the decisions taken since last July. Of course they have been announced before. In July the House charged me to get decisions taken and I am now reporting to the House the work I have done.

Secondly, a full project study contract has been placed for the P1154 and is nearly complete. Design work has begun and the firm will soon start cutting metal. The P1154 leads the world as a vertical take-off fighter aircraft.

Yesterday the hon. Member for Sheffield Park (Mr. Mulley)—and I am sorry that he is not here at the moment —complained that we have not done anything to live up to our professions last year of trying to build aircraft that would serve more than one purpose. But it is expected that the P1154 will serve as a replacement for both the Hunter and the Sea Vixen.

Third, a contract is under negotiation to supply the DH125 to R.A.F. Training Command. The DH125 is basically an executive aircraft which flies at high subsonic speeds, comparable to those of the Comet or the Boeing. It sells in the civil market at about half the price of its American competitors. The R.A.F. will use it to replace the Varsity. Work on this aircraft has begun.

Fourth, preliminary development and production work has begun on the military version of the Avro 748. This is to be a short range version for the R.A.F.

Fifth, we are advancing £10 million to Shorts to complete orders for the Belfast long-range freighter and for the Seacat.

Sixth, deliveries of the Scout helicopter for the Army have begun and are now well under way.

Seventh, as I told the House earlier today, we have decided to place an order with Hawker Siddeley for the Hastings/Beverley replacement. In range, pay 243 load, speed and take-off performance this aircraft promises to be the most advanced tactical freighter in the world.

Lastly, on the civil side, the decision has been taken to join with the French Government to develop the Concord. All these decisions have been taken since July. In addition, development continues on the P1127 vertical take-off fighter and the TSR2 which, I am convinced, will prove to be the outstanding combat aircraft of this decade. The cancellation of Skybolt has only underlined its importance and the soundness of the Government's decision to develop it.

Production work also continues on the V-bombers, the Buccaneer, the Lightnings, the Sea Vixen and the Argosy. In addition, there is a substantial civil programme centering on the VC10, the Trident and the BAC111.

Taken together, all this adds up to a programme of work which should provide a high and steady level of employment for both design and production sides of the aircraft industry and should also ensure an effective base in our defence policy.

But one cannot fly aircraft without engines and this programme, of course, involves a corresponding load of work for the engine groups. Here I would mention specially the Olympus engine, a variant of which is to be used in the TSR2, the Spey, which will power the Trident and the Buccaneer, and the Pegasus, which provides both lift and forward thrust for the P1127.

The electronic equipment carried by a modern aircraft represents a very high proportion of its cost. The development and production orders which I have mentioned carry with them consequential orders for the electronics industry. Reconnaissance aircraft, for instance, can now be fitted with electric scanning devices, using the line-scan principle, which take pictures by day or night and present the information on a radar display so that it is immediately available for operational use. Electronic countermeasures are also vital to all three Services, and more particularly to Bomber Command. In addition to the electronic equipment for the aircraft, our defence programme calls for ever more orders for the electronics industry. Under plan 244 Hobart, the Army's signal system is to be entirely re-equipped, and work on this has begun.

I should like now to say a word about the guided weapons side of the industry. It is the cancellations which, like the unhappy marriages, usually hit the headlines. Let me say a word about cancellations. Of course it is heart-breaking for a design team when production has to be cancelled, but we cannot always pick a winner.

§ Mr. Wigg

Hear, hear.

§ Mr. Amery

If we never betted except on a certainty we would never place a bet, and the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who knows the racecourse better than most, should appreciate that.

It is the old choice between the sins of omission and the sins of commission, and, whatever the moralists may say, I have always preferred the latter. A cancellation clause is an escape route which justifies us in taking a risk, and it is quite wrong to think that a cancellation is money down the drain. The work we have done on Blue Streak and Blue Water, for example, is the foundation of our present capability both to produce ballistic missiles and to have a space programme. Here I can correct the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who said yesterday that the Government had spent £300 million on Blue Streak. In fact, the cost of Blue Streak up to cancellation was £84 million. The hon. Member was something of a poet in his younger days, but he must keep his imagination in check. I commend to him General Donovan's old motto— "In God we trust, the rest we check".

We hear a good deal about Blue Streak and Blue Water, but nothing like as much about the success stories, about Bloodhound, Thunderbird, Seacat and Firestreak. Yet all these systems are in service and have given a very good account of themselves. I wonder how many hon. Members realise that the Seacat missile has been sold to Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and Germany, or that both Sweden and Switzerland have bought Bloodhound. The last two countries are particularly good judges of a good missile. They are under no financial or political pressure to buy from any particular source. They are free to take what they think best.

245 A new generation of guided weapons is now coming in. Bloodhound will be deployed next year and the development of Red Top is well advanced. The Vigilant anti-tank weapon is now in quantity production and will go into service this year. Development has begun on Swing-fire, a new anti-tank weapon for the Army, and on CF299, a new anti-aircraft guided weapon for smaller ships.

On deterrents, Blue Steel, at which right hon. Gentlemen opposite used to mock so often, is now in service, and trials at Woomera have confirmed its accuracy and its reliability. In addition —and here I come to the right hon. Gentleman's point—we are taking other measures to reinforce our national airborne deterrent in the period before Polaris comes into service. The House will not expect me to go into details about the further strategic nuclear weapon which we are developing for carriage by the TSR2, but this will mean more work for the industry.

§ Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East)

I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman does not want to go into detail about this new weapon, but can he give us some idea of the order of the increase in range which it will add to the projected range of the TSR2—scores of miles, or hundreds of miles?

§ Mr. Amery

It would not be in the public interest to go any further into that matter. Clearly, it means more work for the industry as well as greater power for the R.A.F. Meanwhile, my Department will have a good deal of work to do in conjunction with the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment in connection with the development and production of warheads both for the Polaris and for our airborne systems.

The guided weapon and electronics side of the industry is very much concerned with space. It looks as though the pioneering work in space will, for once, be done on the civil rather than on the military side. Completion of the E.L.D.O. launcher and the development of the communications satellite are perhaps the most likely first steps, but I have long been convinced that space will also have important implications for the defence programme. Work done on rockets means that we could easily produce—

§ Mr. Brian Harrison (Maldon)

My right hon. Friend has mentioned a very important matter in referring to E.L.D.O. Can he say whether, if E.L.D.O. should fall and not be successful in Europe, we would be capable of producing our own satellite launching scheme for putting a telecommunications satellite into orbit?

§ Mr. Amery

My hon. Friend interrupted me in mid-stream. I was saying that the work we have done on rockets would enable us—E.L.D.O. is a civil organisation—to produce an all-British launcher for military purposes if we needed one, not at very high cost, but at fairly small cost. Our establishments over the last two or three years have also done a good deal of work on satellite research and we have recently been studying the feasibility of certain draft operational requirements for the military use of space, which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air has put to us. One of these has a direct bearing on our research work on a manned spacecraft, about which I spoke to the House some months ago.

All in all, the Government will be spending some £375 million in the current year on research, development and production contracts with the aviation and electronics industries. In addition, we shall be spending £50 million on intramural research at our own establishments. Of this total, £340 million in industry and £30 million at our establishments is a direct result of the defence programme. All this represents a very full load of work for the industry, both now and for many years ahead.

The civil pay-off for the production side of the aviation industry comes very largely in the form of exports, exports of aircraft, engines, guided weapons, and defence electronics. These are a very important item in our trading account. Last year, military exports earned us £55 million as against £80 million on the civil side. The graph of exports fluctuates up and down a bit and we should not be too depressed by the fall in last year's figures. One big order for a new military or civil aircraft could easily redress the balance.

I hope that I have said enough to convince the House that the British aviation industry provides a fully effective scientific, technological and industrial base for 247 the defence policy which my right hon. Friend has outlined. But there are some problems ahead.

Technologically speaking, Britain can undertake any project which it wants. What is becoming more doubtful is how far we can undertake all the projects which we need. Have we the means to meet all our requirements for aircraft and missiles for the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy and the Army, and to equip our civil air corporations and to make a contribution in space? This is a question which has to be answered against the knowledge that research and development costs are continually increasing as projects become more sophisticated.

To solve the problem is partly a question of money and partly of human resources. Extra money can always be found if we are prepared to forgo other expenditure. More scientists can be trained, but it takes time. Meanwhile, one way of solving the problem, as my right hon. Friend suggested yesterday, is by interdependence.

Interdependence can take several forms. We can buy a complete weapons system off the shelf abroad. We are doing this with the French AS30 air-to-ground missile. It is also what we are doing with Polaris. British industry would be perfectly capable of developing a submarine-launched missile, but this would take longer than buying from the United States and there would be a stiff bill for the development. Buying off the shelf is only likely to pay in the long run if there is a two-way traffic—if other countries buy from us.

That is not easy where our largest ally, the United States, is concerned. The United States has a very powerful and influential defence industry, and it is not easy to sell our weapons over there. There may be rather more scope with our European allies whose economies are more comparable with our own.

Another form of interdependence is for several countries to invest in the development of a particular national project. Thus the United States and Germany have joined us in the development of Hawker P1127. France and Germany have joined us in the development of the RB162 lightweight vertical take-off engine. But to my mind the most in- 248 teresting form of interdependence is the joint project. In the civil field we have joined France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands to produce the E.L.D.O. space launcher. In the same way we have joined France to produce the Concord supersonic airliner.

It may well be that the Concord type of agreement is one which could usefully be extended to military projects. On two recent visits to France I discussed with M. Messmer and other French Ministers a number of projects on which we might co-operate. We are in close touch and will explore and pursue the possibilities of such co-operation between our two countries. This kind of joint project has special attractions from the point of view of exports. If two countries put their money into developing an aircraft, this virtually doubles the market for the aircraft. But it means more than that, because they both stand a good chance of selling it to their traditional customers

Competition with the Americans in the export of both military and civil aircraft is pretty fierce. The Americans have the great advantage of selling over the top of a big home market, and at the end of a very long production run. They also have the intangible, but real, advantage of being the leading Power, military and financial, in the Western Alliance. But a joint project on Concord lines is one of the ways in which we can extend our home market and put ourselves in a better posture to compete.

Of course, interdependence is not a panacea nor an end in itself. There will be projects for which we will welcome support from abroad. There will be others where we shall want to expand our own inventions on a national basis. In any case, I think that as a general rule it will be found that one only gets serious foreign support for a project when one is prepared if necessary to go ahead on one's own.

There is a Motion on the Notice Paper, in the names of a number of hon. Gentlemen opposite, which calls on the Government to end the dilatoriness and lack of forward planning which has brought the aircraft industry into its present difficulties. Frankly, I do not think that this charge will stick. Most of the major military programmes for aircraft and guided weapons have now been settled. They were not easy decisions to take, 249 but I cannot think of any instance where redundancy would have been affected one way or the other if we had taken our decisions a few weeks, or even a few months, earlier than we did.

There is also an Amendment to the Motion I have mentioned. It is in the name of the hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) and some of his hon. Friends, and recommends measures to take into public ownership as much of the industry as may be necessary to make it as efficient as, or competitive with, foreign aircraft manufacturers, including those that have been nationalised in France and elsewhere. … I do not think that there is much point in comparing the structure of our industry with that of other countries. The French aircraft industry was smashed in the war. It was reduced by the Germans to subcontracting. It had to be rebuilt almost from its foundations, and this at a time when France was ruined.

§ Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

On a point of order. I have been wondering for some time how this very long essay was in any way relevant to the Motion which we are discussing. The secret seems to have emerged that the right hon. Gentleman is addressing himself to quite another Motion which is not before the House.

§ Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir William Anstruther-Gray)

I have not taken that view. I understand defence to be the theme of the right hon. Gentleman's speech.

§ Mr. George Brown (Belper)

Further to that point of order. The Minister has said that he is dealing with a Motion on the Notice Paper in the name of some hon. Gentlemen, and an Amendment to that Motion in the name of other hon. Members. Neither the Motion nor the Amendment to which he is referring is before the House.

§ Mr. Deputy-Speaker

The right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that, but in general the Minister is speaking on the general subject of defence, and I believe that to he in order in this debate.

§ Mr. Amery

I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I can understand that the right hon. Gentleman would wish to bury this Motion and the Amendment as quickly as he can, but there is a 250 lot of comment on the same lines as this Motion, and it is natural that I should refer to it.

It is unrealistic to compare the structure of the French industry with our own, but I think—

§ Mr. Paget

Is it significant?

§ Mr. Amery

Yes. We are talking about the industrial base of our defence policy, and there is comment, not only in this Motion but elsewhere, on how the industry ought to be organised, and it is my duty, as the Minister sponsoring the industry, to express to the House the views I hold on the way it should be organised.

To those who seek comparisons with France, I draw atttention to the fact that the Mirage IIIV aircraft, to which the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) referred at Question Time yesterday, is an interesting example of an aircraft which has come out of the private side of the French industry. I am grateful that hon. Gentlemen opposite should have expressed an interest in the nationalisation of the aircraft industry. It is a handsome political present, and we shall make the best use of it, but I beg the House to dismiss any idea of this kind.

The British aircraft industry has a rather special history. It has grown up—

§ Mr. John Cronin (Loughborough)

It is intolerable that the right hon. Gentleman should erect these Aunt Sallies. There is nothing whatsoever about nationalising the industry in the Opposition Amendment.

§ Mr. Amery

I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman should dissociate himself from it, but the tag will stick.

The industry has a rather special history. It has grown up over the years as a result of close partnership between Government and the firms, under whatever political party has been in power, and this is a partnership which has proved itself in the two greatest wars in our history.

On the Government side there have been outstanding administrators, and some of the best scientists in the country. On the industry's side we have had brilliant designers, daring test pilots, and 251 some of the best management in British industry. No one who has worked closely, as I have, with Sir Roy Dobson or Sir George Edwards, can doubt the industry's ability to develop, to produce, and to sell aircraft and guided weapons as good as any in the world. An industry which can develop the TSR2 and the P1154 stands in no need of nationalisation. It is in good heart and good shape, a vital element in our defence, and one which, like the Fighting Services, deserves the salute of the House.

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

I count myself singularly fortunate in following the right hon. Gentleman, and perhaps a little later I shall address a few words to him, but I must not be deflected from my main quarry.

My first thoughts turn to the conditions under which the Government's statement on defence is published this year. I can understand the argument—it was used from the Benches opposite yesterday—that there is a case for not publishing a general statement of policy year after year, but if the Government had intended to discontinue the practice of an annual defence statement, I would have thought that a year ago, when they produced their statement laying down the principles for the next five years, they would also have said, "Well, this is our statement for the next five years, and from now on we shall leave it to the three Service Ministers".

In a year in which the Government have clearly been giving the closest attention to the organisation of defence, in a year in which they have been faced —whether they are to blame or somebody else is to blame does not matter—with a major collapse in terms of their weapon policy, in a year in which they have not been able to get away from conscription—whatever they might say they are still landed with it—in a year in which their Reserve policy has been exposed as having the greatest weakness, in a year in which they have failed to carry out the promised examination of the reserve system about which they talked in last year's White Paper, one would think that they would come forward with some sort of explanation, if not to convince the Opposition, at least to instruct those Members on the 252 Benches opposite who have the patriotism, the courage, and the wisdom to pay more attention to the defences of this country than to the political fortunes of their own party. I therefore did a little exercise, as I always do, and tried to anticipate what the White Paper would contain. I reached the conclusion that there was not going to be one.

Having reached that conclusion, I addressed myself to the question why there would not be one. I was absolutely sure that there would be some echoes from what is called the Mountbatten Plan. If ever we want to know what Government thinking is we read Mr. Chapman Pincher. He knows nothing about defence, but he knows the Minister of Aviation very well. If anybody wants direct evidence of that, I can tell him that the worst speech that I have ever heard from any Front Bench speaker of any kind during the seventeen years that I have been in the House was a speech by the Minister of Aviation—and the next morning the Daily Express said that it was the greatest speech ever! That is direct confirmation of what I am saying.

These are the sources of my information. I do not know the position of Lord Beaverbrook in this respect, but I rely on Mr. Chapman Pincher. He is a jolly good journalist, although he knows nothing about defence, and he has excellent sources of information. When I see someone tipping winners, I follow him. I followed this one. I guessed that this statement would be made.

The Minister of Defence, for whom I have considerable admiration—if the party opposite wants to revive its fortunes, it should follow him; he is the most skilled Tory tactician in the House —yesterday managed to reduce the temperature of the House degree by degree by degree in a masterly diversionary exercise. What he did was right. When he took up the job of Minister of Defence, being a man of great courage he considered the whole problem and told the Prime Minister, "We will have to reorganise the Ministry of Defence". My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) could teach the right hon. Gentleman nothing in the art of getting away with it. I pay tribute where tribute is due.

253 I have seen this sort of work at close quarters. There is no better opportunity for seeing it than when one is one of the seconds, watching what goes on. Why did the Government do this? Here I will venture a guess. In my opinion, the Government are engaged in the major activity of switching the whole of their defence policy. The Minister of Defence no longer believes that a policy based upon the deterrent can be made to work. But let us consider what the poor Prime Minister had to face—the speech from the hon. Baronet the Member for Dorset, North (Sir Richard Glyn).

I do not mind the same sort of speech from the hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth); he is a highly competent soldier, and I know that he does not believe a word that he is saying. I always take note of the order of battle, and whenever I see somebody who is called early in the debate putting up the conventional line I know that it means that the Whips have been round. Yesterday, the hon. and gallant Gentleman put up a brilliant exercise in defence of the Tory Party. But when the hon. Member for Dorset, North makes the same speech my bowels turn to water. But after a bit he receives murmurs of "Hear, hear" from his colleagues.

He, poor man, believes every word of it. He honestly believes that this country commands 20 per cent. of the deterrent. He honestly believes that President Kennedy sits down every morning and says to Mr. McNamara, "Let me have the battle order. How many V-bombers have they got? How many V-bombers are ready to go? Let Strategic Air Command know." The hon. Member speaks as though the whole defence and foreign policy of the Western world depends on our defence policy. I do not believe a word of this, and I do not believe that the Minister of Defence believes it. Further, my regard for the Prime Minister is such that I am sure he does not believe it, either.

Let us do another little exercise. Let us start by being grown up and deal with the facts. First, I want to utter a word of criticism of one of my hon. Friends. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) yesterday referred to Brunei as a "blow-pipe operation". I beg him not to do that. Let us strive after 254 reality. When we went into Brunei we went in in the dark. It may be amusing to talk about a blow-pipe operation, but our troops were carrying out the most difficult of operations and there were 19 casualties in the first three hours. There is one officer of our flesh and blood who will never come back.

Whenever I have talked about defence in the last seventeen years I have said over and over again that I am interested because I know what it is like to be at the receiving end. I have seen the review of the book on Lloyd George and the failure in Chanak. I was serving in Chanak and in Istanbul during that operation, when the Tory Party once again put its fortunes before the good of this country. I calculated in my mind whether I could swim far enough to reach the nearest battle cruiser if things went wrong.

I have seen these things happening over and over again. When, by some piece of misfortune—or good fortune—I came to this House and interested myself in defence, that was the sort of thing that urged me on. I always try to play fair and be true to the things to which I was brought up. That is why it has always been easy for me to avoid quarrelling with people like Viscount Head. He and I share the same tradition, and we have tried to fight the same battle.

§ Brigadier Sir John Smyth (Norwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for what he has said about the Brunei operation. It naturally caused great resentment when the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) yesterday claimed that the operation in Brunei was a blow-pipe and bow-and-arrow operation, when we remember that battalions like the 1/2nd Gurkhas suffered heavy casualties and lost a British officer—actually a son of a former colonel of the regiment. I am grateful to the hon. Member for putting that point right. The troops greatly resent statements like the one we heard yesterday from the hon. Member for Leeds, East.

§ Mr. Wigg

I am obliged to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for his words of approval—especially as I had just said some rather hard things about him. But whether it was the Gurkha Regiment or part of the Royal Tank Regiment, it does 255 not make any difference, we are dealing with men of our own flesh and blood and we are placing on them obligations that we should never ask them to undertake when we deny them the means of carrying them out.

I now turn to the question of manpower. So far the debate has been carried on as though we had got rid of conscription. In the debate we had on 30th and 31st January the Prime Minister was up to the old trick—and last night the Sorcerer's Apprentice, the Secretary of State for War, was at it again—of trying to smear my party, first, by saying that it is against the deterrent and, secondly, that it wants conscription. Nobody wants conscription. I do not want it, and hon. Members opposite do not. For the 900th or perhaps the 1,000th time, let me make it clear that the first person in this House to make any attempt to get rid of conscription was my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington, as long ago as the Whitsun debate of 1952. But we sought to lay down conditions that must be brought about in the meantime. We said that it was necessary to introduce a long-service engagement and a differential rate of pay. What the Government did in 1957 was to get rid of conscription and only afterwards to bring in the long-service engagement.

Some of us forecast in advance what would happen, and we have been justified up to the hilt. The present Viscount Head, who was then Minister of Defence, said that we had chosen as our planning figure the figure that we expected to recruit, and that later on we would see how it worked out on the ground. The first figure announced was 375,000 for all three Services. In 1958, for the first time, the figures of 165,000 for the Army, 135,000 for the Royal Air Force and 88,000 for the Royal Navy were announced, making a total of 388,000. Then the plot thickened.

In March, 1959, the then Secretary of State for War said that 165,000 was not good enough and that we wanted another 15,000. He told us what the 15,000 were needed for. In the OFFICIAL REPORT of 3rd March hon. Members will find, at columns 229–30, that the Secretary of State for War complained that the size of an infantry battalion at 635 was too small, and he gave 256 examples. In Korea it had not worked and in Cyprus it had not worked, and we needed at least 700 to a battalion. I will give the Secretary of State for War a little information which he can look up and check from his own files. The decision was taken by the Secretary of State that 8,440 men should be added to the infantry establishment and that in consequence infantry units should have their peace-time establishments raised to 774. As the right hon. Gentleman and I both know very well, the war establishment is much higher, but I will not mention that figure. The figure of 774 was to be the strength of an infantry battalion, and that figure was laid down in 1959. If we add 15,000 to 388,000, we get 403,000; and then in 1960 the Minister of Defence said that the figure was 400,000.

The figure which is of interest and the first figure which one should look at in this interesting White Paper is to be found in Annexe 1. There we find what the Government recruited on 1st April—what is here needed is a break-down figure as at 1st January—and the figure is less than 388,000. The figures for the Royal Air Force and the Navy are both well below the stated figure. Let us consider an example of how it works out and see whether the Government's supporters will cheer.

H.M.S. "Blake" cost £15 million, and its full complement was gathered on board. Suddenly this vessel had to be put into reserve and its complement of 800 men dispersed because they were short of a dozen electricians. Recently we were going into Brunei. There were two brigades in the Strategic Reserve, the 51st and the 19th and units of the 51st Brigade were selected to stand by. Of this Brigade, the Devon and Dorsets were so short of men that they could not go—

§ The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Profumo)

May I be allowed to explain to the hon. Gentleman that the Devon and Dorsets are not in the Strategic Reserve.

§ Mr. Wigg

They are in the 51st Brigade, that is all I know—

§ Mr. Profumo

But not in the Strategic Reserve.

§ Mr. Wigg

That is good. I have done my homework very well, for I know all 257 the units of the 51st Brigade—even those which are there but ought not to be there for some special reason, and that is good enough. I am quite happy to take on the Secretary of State for War regarding this one. If the Devon and Dorsets are in the 51st Brigade and ought not to be, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers—they were unbrigaded—were brought in to do their job and they had a strength of 450. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were sent out with a strength of 550.

The Secretary of State himself has given the overall answer. I asked a Question of the right hon. Gentleman, and hon. Members can find the answer in the Written Answers in the OFFICIAL REPORT. There are 30 battalions of the line which at the present time are under establishment. Let us make clear what this means. We have now a total of 68 battalions—that includes eight battalions of the Gurkhas—of which at least 30 are under strength. The Secretary of State for War knows that were he honest and if he took the advice of his military advisers he would undertake the reorganisation of the infantry. He does not do that because of the alarm and despondency which it would create among hon. Members on the benches opposite.

Turning to the question of the reserves, we were told upon the introduction of the Army Reserve Bill that a new force was being created, the "Ever-readies." There were to be bounties of £150 and 15,000 men would be recruited. They were to be the elite of the Territorial Army and would be available at a moment's notice to "top up the batteries" of the Rhine Army. How many of these men have been recruited? Is it 15,000? Hon. Members should notice that there is not a word about them in the White Paper. If the Government had succeeded in recruiting 15,000 this would not have been announced once or twice, but half a dozen times. I think that the Minister has got about 4,000. A year ago—it is in the 1962 White Paper in paragraph 38—the Minister promised an examination of the whole reserve system. But there is not a single word about it. Has anything been done?

My hon. Friend should note a fact about all this—that there is a settling day. The Government have managed to stave off that settling day. They have done everything to get round it by talk- 258 ing about the Army Reserve and introducing the "Ever-readies" and having units well under establishment. Were they faced with an emergency, heaven knows what they would do. They have been gambling with the reserves, and that is why they have not had a long-term examination and dare not tell the House. But in May, 1965, the fun and games will start, because the last National Service man will have passed through the provisions of the reserve legislation and the Government will be brought down to whatever number they can recruit. This is the gamble which they have taken with the fortunes of this country in respect of men. Now let us turn to the question of equipment.

The Minister of Aviation has left the Chamber. I was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman made the kind of speech which he did this afternoon. But I suppose he thought that he would get away with it. What are the overall figures in terms of expenditure? These Defence Estimates bring up the bill, since the present Government have been in office, to £18,400 million, of which £7,500 million has gone in equipment. No wonder my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) talks about nationalisation. Since 1947, £4,800 million has gone into the aircraft industry from all sources. Of this £4,800 million, £3,400 million went from public sources. What have we had in exchange? Since the present Administration has been in office, or since the end of the war, there have been 300 aircraft projects of various kinds, and of that number not more than a dozen can be in any way regarded as successes. Of that dozen not more than three or four have sold overseas. I should say that the winners were the Meteor, the Vampire—and they are marginal—the Viscount, and to some extent the Hunter, particularly because of off-shore purchases.

Of missiles, only one anywhere near a winner is the Bloodhound. The tragedy is that we take too long to make up our minds whatever may be the reason—perhaps when they get into the Government my right hon. Friends will discover what is the reason. But for some unaccountable reason we take far too long to make up our minds and so we get left behind.

I will make a prophecy. We have said that the TSR2 is the best strike and 259 possibly the best aircraft of its kind in the world. It has not yet flown. But it weighs 90,000 1b. If we had been wiser and not so imbued with paranoia, we should have gone in for something half the size. The American F4H and the A3J can do now what it is claimed that this aircraft will do, not tomorrow but several years ahead. I think that the Government must always have three white elephants in the stable. As fast as one moves out another one moves in.

§ Mr. John Hall (Wycombe)

I am interested in the performance of the TSR2 and other American planes which have been developed on the same lines. Does the hon. Gentleman know what the performance of the TSR2 is supposed to be?

§ Mr. Wigg

No. But what I do know is that the TSR2 has had a somewhat chequered political life. In 1957 the Government announced that they would not produce a successor to the manned bomber, and then, under pressure exerted by the Air Staff, in Conference Prospect they had to come forward with this project which was a successor to the manned bomber. At present, no one knows what it is. Its performance is secret. But, judging on past performances, I do not think that the Government know either. What I do know is that the Phantom and the Vigilante are two wonderful aircraft in terms of speed and performance. It is extremely doubtful what, in fact, an aircraft like the TSR2 and its weight can do.

§ Mr. John Hall

I am extremely perplexed by this, because if the hon. Gentleman does not know the performance of the TSR2 how on earth can he claim to be able to compare it?

§ Mr. Wigg

Again, we know that it is a strike tactical reconnaissance aircraft. We have been told that it is going to have a supersonic speed at both high and low altitudes. We also know that no weapon has been planned for it. We are told in the Defence White Paper prepared by the Secretary of State for Air last year that the AS30 will go on the TSR2. We also know that the Bullpup is going on the Buccaneer. So we know, roughly at least, the kind of weapon the Government have in mind; that it is to go in at supersonic speed, and we know its weight and scope.

260 Again, what is so highly suggestive—and here I help the hon. Gentleman if he wishes to be helped—is to watch the Government's public relations exercises. I have brought down to the House on previous occasions the Evening News which said in 1959: Blue Streak Wins. Macmillan talks from strength We have had another one from the same paper. Missile X, the Atom Wonder. The most versatile strike weapon in history". This is 20th February last. I will lend it out to hon. Members afterwards.

It is just a question of a little detective work. We know the range of the AS30