AVIATION

§ Mr. Frederick Lee (Newton)

Now that the corpses have been dragged away from what has been described as the abattoir, it is possible for us to see the new team which has taken over at the Ministry of Aviation. Following what happened yesterday, I must be careful what I say about heads falling.

Perhaps I might be allowed to congratulate the new Minister on the fact that as yet his hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mr. Maurice Macmillan) is still the back bench member of the family. I should also like to congratulate the new Parliamentary Secretary. I know from his business background that he has considerable knowledge of the kind of technical equipment which is such an important feature of this industry, and I am sure that we all wish him well in his new appointment. I cannot guarantee how long it will last, but there it is.

Today we are inviting the Committee to discuss the affairs of the aircraft and aviation industries. This is a wide subject and the Votes on the Order Paper will, I think, permit hon. Members to raise a wide variety of issues, perhaps of a constituency nature, which I cannot discuss. The charge which we make against the Government is that because of their determination to use aviation to provide an ever-widening field for profit-making they are jeopardising the efficiency and solvency of both the B.O.A.C. and B.E.A., and that, as a consequence, they are adversely affecting considerable sections of the aircraft industry.

I believe that, flowing from this, at a time when the industry is struggling to adapt itself to vast changes which are now inevitable in a dynamic period such as this, the production, and, indeed, the utilisation, of aircraft has been pitched into the centre of political controversy.

On 22nd March we discussed the conditions in the aircraft industry, and it was then quite obvious from the speeches made by hon. Members on both sides that we were all anxious about the position as it then existed, and about the future of the industry. I do not think that there has been any improvement since then; indeed, my impression 435 is that there has been a fairly marked deterioration. Certainly, from my contacts both with employers and employed, in a wide section of the aviation and aircraft industries, I have never known a time when there has been greater apprehension and, in some cases, real bitterness, than there is at present. The Minister has undertaken a huge task, and for the sake of the industry and the nation we wish him every success in it.

Perhaps one of the greatest success stories in world aviation, if not the greatest, is the story of Rolls-Royce. This is a British firm, whose engines are powering not only a great percentage of our own aircraft but large numbers of foreign aircraft. Yet we know that well over 3,000 of the Rolls-Royce workers— some of them very highly skilled—are being dismissed from their jobs. It is a sad reflection on the efficiency of Tory planning that some of these men have been driven to accept jobs with foreign airlines, such as Swissair, at the very time when the nation is suffering from an overall shortage of precisely this kind of labour.

It is time for some of the things we have heard about the ability of Toryism to plan to manifest themselves, in the Government's ability to channel industry into areas in which highly skilled people and consequently, unskilled ones, are loosing their jobs. We would be grateful if the right hon. Gentleman—who has not had a lot of time in has job— would tell us something about the position and the prospect of Rolls-Royce in the immediate future.

I now turn to another firm—this time on the aviation side of the industry— which is in great trouble, namely, Messrs. Short Bros, and Harland. A few days ago Mr. Wrangham, the chairman of Short Bros and Harland, shocked us by his statement that unless the firm obtained more orders for the Belfast military transport aircraft, or substantial outside aid, the firm would not be able to continue any of its other activities. Some of us have visited this firm and have seen what I consider to be a first-rate factory, with a well-balanced labour force, doing a first-class job of work. I should be very sad to think that this firm was in danger of folding up. Such a decision would result in a great loss to the industry and the nation.

436 We are always very anxious when we hear statements from responsible persons like Mr. Wrangham, who, more than anyone else, is aware of the problem. At present, the firm employs 7,000 people —the lowest level since the war. At one time it employed 20,000; in 1950, the figure had fallen to 9,000, and it is now down to 7,000. The firm is operating in an area which has about 8 per cent. unemployment, and in which it is, therefore, extremely difficult to find alternative work.

So far, the only order that it has for the huge Belfast freighter is from the Royal Air Force, which has ordered 10 machines. We understand that it is necessary for the firm to sell 30 of these aircraft before its costs are covered. It is fair to point out that whereas even now the level of employment throughout the aircraft industry is 2 per cent. higher than it was in 1958, Short Bros, is now employing about 15 per cent. less than at that time. It is not a run-down of any type which has caused the problem in this factory.

I know that we have to base our calculations for the future on the ability of certain aircraft, and not merely upon sentiment. These aircraft must live or die by their performances. Nevertheless, it is germane to the argument to realise how much depends upon the success or failure of Short Brothers. The problem is that the public and private educational systems in Northern Ireland have developed on the basis of its aircraft industry. Courses at the local technical colleges are specifically directed to the industry's needs, and a Chair of Aeronautics has been established at Queen's University.

The company has a spendid apprenticeship system. It has trained over 3,200 operatives, and technical apprentices since 1937, of whom about 50 have secured degrees. In addition, about 1,000 awards of different types have been gained. Many of these young men are now teaching at Queen's University and technical institutions throughout Northern Ireland. All this—the basis upon which Northern Ireland will expand or decay—as in great danger, and it is difficult to know how it is to survive if Short Brothers is not able to remain in existence.

437 We know that the Royal Air Force has opposed the placing of further orders for the Belfast freighter. I suppose that its argument is that the Belfast is slower than a jet would be. We realise that the Royal Air Force is naturally interested in prestige types of aircraft rather than in ordinary freighters. The glamour of a supersonic aircraft probably attracts it far more than does an ordinary freighter of the Belfast type. But I would remind the Government that we are by no means out of the wood in respect of the use of jet aircraft. The noise factor will probably play a much bigger part in the situation, especially when freight is landed at all hours of the night. There are restrictions already at London Airport and at Idlewild upon the use of jet aircraft at night.

When we consider the objections of the Royal Air Force to further orders being placed for the Belfast it is relevant to remember that it had the same objections to the Beverley when that successful aircraft was first introduced. We were told that it would not meet Royal Air Force requirements. I understand that there were even murmurs against the Viscount, and suggestions from the Royal Air Force that it would not be a winner. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, and it has been proved that the experts are not always right. Incidentally, I understand that the Army wants the Belfast, and has made representations to that effect.

The only aircraft of this type now in the possession of the Royal Air Force is the Beverley. It is now obsolete. There is no civil air freighter of the strategic range and size that modern military equipment and technical support forces demand. Therefore, whereas the Belfast can fly in 1963, there can be nothing else of this type within five or seven years, unless we buy American aircraft.

In the debate on 30th March this year the then Home Secretary—now the First Secretary of State—said: As the House knows, the freighter can lift a tank, and can lift not only that but many of our most modern weapons. It is not only useful for that, but for the transport of men to a very much larger extent than any other aeroplane known in the world. The freighter has, I am sure, proved its worth, and I would agree immediately that the whole question of the future of Shorts—whether it is to remain 438 independent, or whether it is to be amalgamated—is a matter that must be decided."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th March, 1962; Vol. 656, c. 1739.1 Words of encouragement of that kind should have led to something being done about further orders for the Belfast freighter.

I do not want to go on quoting, although I could quote Lord Montgomery and Lord Chandos on the same subject. But it is surely important that the Government make up their minds about the future of Shorts. I have heard a proposal that Shorts should be used in a different way; that it should be consolidated with one or both of the aircraft groups and should undertake a programme of overall, sub-contracts and that kind of thing for the next few years with the Government leasing the assets at a nominal rental based on the value of the business or the prospects rather than on the valuation of the assets.

That would be tantamount to saying that Shorts should be turned into an aircraft garage and the design staff, numbering about 900 people, paid off. This would mean that research into guided missiles, electronics and work of that kind would be ended. This would be a great tragedy and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will tell us that he will not countenance such a suggestion. He must decide on the future of the Belfast and not allow the firm to be used in terms of a garage for other people.

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

As my hon. Friend knows, I engaged in the controversy about the Belfast with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations when he was Minister of Defence. Am I to understand that my hon. Friend is now proposing that this aircraft is of such merit that it should be ordered on that basis by the Service Departments? That was not the original argument advanced by the Government and supported by the Opposition Front Bench until now. The original argument was that this was an aircraft which would have a civilian market. Do I understand that my hon. Friend is abandoning that argument?

§ Mr. Lee

I understand that there have been discussions between Short Bros, and B.O.A.C. for a new version which could 439 fly by 1965. This is conditional on further orders from the Royal Air Force into which new ideas would be injected.

§ Mr. Wigg

I am obliged to my hon. Friend for what he has said. It reveals what is in his mind. But in my submission, this does not depend on new ideas, but on a new engine. My hon. Friend may be able to conjure ideas out of the air, but not engines. As I understand it, the position is that if there is to be an extended Belfast, what is required is a stage 5 Tyne engine. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is what is involved?

§ Mr. Lee

My hon. Friend has the answer. A stage 5 Tyne engine which would assist in the problem at Rolls-Royces Which I have put to the Minister. It would mean a delay before the aircraft was flying. There is still the question of development costs and timing. But, as I have submitted, the Belfast is still the best proposition we now have, other than buying American.

Yesterday, I received a deputation from people representing a wide measure of interests in Northern Ireland, including the religious denominations, chambers of commerce, all sections of political thought at Stormont, and the trade unions. They were unanimous in expressing anxiety, and in their feeling that Northern Ireland faced a great controversy unless something was done about this problem. The Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, which represents 3 million people, sent representatives to see me and I was reminded that at the Confederation's annual conference a resolution was passed asking for assistance to Shorts. The resolution is on the lines I have described and I will not bother to read it.

I turn from the question of Short Bros, to what is, perhaps, the main bone of contention, the B.O.A.C.-Cunard merger. On 7th June, which was the last day prior to the Whitsun Recess on which business other than the Adjournment debates took place, as hon. Members who found it impossible to tear themselves from this place until they had studied the OFFICIAL REPORT will know, there appeared among the Answers to Written Questions 440 a statement from the Minister of Aviation informing Parliament—I say "informing Parliament" in a purely technical sense—of the merger between B.O.A.C. and Cunard.

Most hon. Members knew about this from the London evening papers on 6th June. But I object to Parliament being kept in ignorance on matters such as this until it is far too late to challenge them or, to receive detailed information about them in the House. I am glad to note that the hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) is in the Chamber. It would be interesting to know how the hon. Member knew about this and was able to put down a Question which received a Written Answer. How much notice did the hon. Gentleman give to the Minister of his intention to ask the Question?

§ Mr. John Diamond (Gloucester)

One guess!

§ Mr. Lee

I do not guess about these things. I put it down to intelligent anticipation at its very, very best.

On 26th June, when the House reassembled, the Minister was good enough to answer a Question from me on this matter and I invite the House to consider the relevant part of his Answer: Airlines on the Atlantic have suffered severe losses because of the setback in the growth of traffic and excess of capacity. The United Kingdom is facing fierce competition on these routes and by concentrating their capacity, maintenance facilities, sales effort, managerial experience, B.O.A.C. and Cunard should strengthen the British aviation effort in this vital area."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th June, 1962; Vol. 661, c. 960.] I invite the hon. Member for Belfast, North to keep that answer in mind.

Will the Minister answer a few more questions? The Government White Paper on the nationalised industries, issued last year, indicated that these industries have social functions to carry out which may be inimical to profit making. I suppose that financing research would be relevant in this connection and the question of operating unprofitable routes. Does the new company carry these responsibilities? Does the 70 per cent. of B.O.A.C. repudiate them, or does the 30 per cent. Cunard accept them? We must know this because of its association with the House.

441 Can the new company compete for trooping contracts? We have a position in which the nationalised industries can-not compete for such contracts and private campaniles can. Which "hat" does this company wear. I should be grateful if the right horn. Gentleman would answer those questions. At Question Time the Minister told me that the financial result of the company's work will be placed before Parliament. May we be assured that hon. Members will be able to debate and criticise the performance of the company, as with the nationalised industries, and that the Ministry can direct the overall question of policy? This is something we must know. I shall be very annoyed if we are fobbed off on the ground that within this new company there is a private enterprise element whose affairs do not concern the Minister.

I do not consider that B.O.A.C., or any other nationalised organisation, has a right to do this kind of thing without the consent of Parliament. The organisations were set up by Parliament to develop on certain lines. It may well be that as time goes on the set-up may need altering. But if and when that time comes, let the Minister come to the House to seek the permission of Parliament and to advance reasons to prove the need for any change which is proposed. At the moment, there is no reason why that should happen.

§ Sir Arthur Vere Harvey (Macclesfield)

About three years ago B.E.A. applied for a minority interest in Cambrian Airways. We did not hear any objection to that.

§ Mr. Lee

That is a different matter. I will explain the difference from my point of view during the course of my speech.

What would have been the position if B.O.A.C. had sold the majority holding? Suppose that instead of 70 per cent.—30 per cent. in favour of B.O.A.C. it had been in favour of Cunard? Suppose there had been a combination of Cunard and B.U.A.? What then would have been the position? If we have no right to be consulted before a merger of this kind takes place, I take it that, similarly, we should have no right to be consulted if a majority shareholding were taken from the national- 442 ised airlines, which would present the House with all sorts of difficulties.

I wish to make my position clear. In these days, when take-over bids have become a widespread method of industrial reorganisation, I do not say that nationalised industries should not have access to the same techniques as private monopolies. If that were the straight issue I should take a different attitude. What we have to ask ourselves is why B.O.A.C, which was so adamant in opposition to Cunard having a single licence on the London—New York run, suddenly agreed to that firm having 30 par cent. of B.O.A.C.'s business.

I think Chat the answer is to be found in the letter written by Sir Matthew Slattery, in the 6th June issue of B.O.A.C. News, in which he said: The Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of 1960 radically transformed B.O.A.C.'s position. It ended our right to be the sole British challenger to the host of foreign airlines flying the world's scheduled long-distance routes. The independent airlines successfully staked their claim to a share in the British effort. In particular, the emergence of Cunard as an Atlantic air carrier through their wholly-owned subsidiaries in Bermuda and the Bahamas produced a big new factor for us to reckon with. This was not just another competitor—we have always had plenty of foreign competition. This was British competition, splitting the British effort, dividing the British market and—because of the way international air agreements work—inevitably having to siphon off most of its traffic from the British share. These were the most immediate effects of the new situation. But the long-term effects we (and Cunard, too) had to face were even more difficult. We were threatened with continual uncertainty over the outcome of future route licensing applications. This was no basis for long-term planning or investment by either of us. That puts it in a nutshell. What I object to is the presence on the Statute Book of an Act which is nothing short of a continuous threat to the two public Corporations. As the expenditure of public money produces lucrative routes, licences will or may be granted to companies which will be given the right to exploit them while the Corporation, as in this case, is placed in a disgraceful position of having to share its best routes with a rival to whom the Minister himself refused a licence on the ground that B.O.A.C. was already suffering from surplus capacity.

Look at what the two organisations will get out of the merger. In the case 443 of Cunard, it is clear that it will get a minimum of 30 per cent. of B.O.A.C.'s existing business on the North-Atlantic route and I think that I can show that it will get more than that. The company is rescued from its plight of having bought two Boeings and spares for £6 million and, having spent £800,000 preparing to run on the route, finding itself without a licence to use them. Between 1952 and 1961 the Cunard Steam-ship Company's operating profits fell from £10,790,000 to £1,122,000 and it paid no dividend this year. So this deal is in the nature of a life-belt for the company.

What does B.O.A.C. get out of it? It may be, although I do not think so, that I am a biassed witness, but I will quote the Economist, which I do not think hon. Members will consider has a biased judgment. It said, on 23rd June: Whatever one's views on nationalised versus private industry, the plain fact is that the arrangement between the two airlines comes close to making a gift of public assets to private investors, i.e. the shareholders of Cunard. It is important to demonstrate why this drastic step should be in the public interest. B.O.A.C. is hiving off the most glamorous third of its business to a £30 million subsidiary—a holding company rather than an operating company—in which B.O.A.C. will hold two-thirds and Cunard one-third of the capital. On the face of it Cunard could never hope to acquire this kind of stake in the North Atlantic air traffic on its own. So far as I see B.O.A.C. gets nothing out of it. It already has more aircraft than it needs, so it gets some more surplus capacity to add to its overall running costs, a superfluity of surplus capacity.

We would all be grateful to the Minister if, as his first attempt to help the House in his new capacity, he would explain what the Government mean when they use the terms "free enterprise" and "competition". That explanation would have relevance to wide sections of industry and it would have special significance to this one. The argument advanced in March, 1960, was that with an expanding cake in air travel no one need suffer. The Corporations and the independents could fly happily along together in a growing market with the independents supplementing the Corporations' efforts.

There was just one small, almost irrelevant, detail which the Government for- 444 got to consider, namely, what would happen if the confounded cake shrank instead of expanding. In fact, that is precisely what happened. Total traffic on the U.K.-U.S.A. East Coast route dropped by 11.8 per cent. between April-June, 1960, and April-June, 1961. With it the fight for traffic among the international airlines grew to intense proportions. At the very moment when our flag carrier was engaged in this, the Government insisted on handicapping it with the dangers of diversion of its share of traffic.

It was interesting to read what the then Minister, who is now Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, said on Second Reading. He said that the Bill is not intended to undermine the position of B.O.A.C. or B.E.A. Those two corporations are our main flag carriers on the air routes of the world. Large sums of public money have been invested in them and they have to face fierce competition from foreign rivals. They therefore deserve, and will get, our full support and encouragement. The right hon. Gentleman told us that the Bill would "regularise" the existing position—allowing the independents some of the more profitable pickings— in two ways. He also said: First, the monopoly of the Corporations will be brought to an end by the repeal of Section 24 of the Air Corporations Act, 1949. Secondly, a Board will be set up to whom all operators, both Corporations and independents, will be able to apply for licences on equal terms. The right hon. Gentleman was arguing that the Act was justified on a theory of limited competition. We would like to know what this means. Perhaps the new Minister can answer it. The former Minister argued: The introduction of some element of competition between the Corporations and the independents and the continuing need for all operators to justify the retention of their existing services will, I am sure, provide an additional impetus for efficiency. I would, however, emphasise that neither the Corporations nor the independents, wish to see unrestricted cutthroat competition. The last thing any of them wants is a complete free-for-all."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 6th March, 1960; c. 1231–3.] Can we be told what all that mumbo-jumbo means? Is it competition or not?

I understand that under the terms of the agreement the new B.O.A.C.-Cunard company will be able to purchase flying 445 hours from B.O.A.C. for all types of aircraft. So the potential of the new company is far greater than the 10 aircraft mentioned in the agreement. Before very long B.O.A.C. will replace its existing fleet with VC10s. It is clear that not only will Cunard get the advantage of the modernised B.O.A.C. fleet, but it will be able to buy flying hours from B.O.A.C. to ensure far greater capacity than the 10 aircraft which have been mentioned.

From the point of view of B.O.A.C. all that this will do will be to enable it to buy capacity from itself to increase the Cunard profit. This does not make sense to me, but for Cunard it solves one of the greatest problems which faces any private company, namely, when and where to develop. It can develop in a secure position established in the industry.

The type of business—we discussed this in the debate on London's airports recently—which seems more than any other to be certain of expanding spectacularly during the next few years is the carriage of freight. B.O.A.C. was preparing for this and had for some time been in discussion with Shorts for orders to be placed for suitably adapted versions of the Belfast. I take it that the increased capacity for freight developed by B.O.A.C. will now be placed at the disposal of Cunard.

To me, this suggests that B.O.A.C. has nothing like an acceptable agreement out of the arrangement which we axe discussing. During the last fifteen years the amount of capital involved in building up the services has cost B.O.A.C. well over £110 million—of public money. Not only does Cunard now horn in on a very substantial portion of that, but it is assured of a large portion of the returns on future freight and passenger services, and the fleet can be enlarged by the purchase of flying hours from B.O.A.C.

I am told—and this makes the agreement even more remarkable—that none of the Cunard hangers at London Airport was big enough to house the 707s which they bought, that there were no other facilities available to them there, and that B.O.A.C. had an option on them which could have been taken up in 1963. If anybody can make sense out of this from the B.O.A.C. point of view, 446 I shall be pleased to hear it, because the net result of all this is that we have returned to the point at which we started, with an internal monopoly to control our share of the Atlantic routes. There is, of course, one slight difference in the monopoly. It is no longer a public monopoly. One of the flag carriers which, to quote the right hon. Gentleman, "must deserve and will get" our full support and encouragement has been forced to bow the knee to the threat of licensing contained in the 1960 Act.

The Government's position in all this is quite remarkable. First, they set out in the 1960 Act to show us how well competition works. They told us of the impetus which it could give to industry. They set out to prove the beneficial effects which flow from the stimulus of competition, but the independents, who, in the aviation world, are the exponents of competitive private enterprise, have gobbled each other up in order to eliminate the realities of competition, while on the political side the Tories, who passed the 1960 Act to ensure that the stimulus of home competition would ensure our competitiveness in world markets, now encourage the creation of monopoly at home to save us from the wasteful nature of competition. In other words, while those who exist to practise competitive principles strive to eliminate them from their industry, the verbal advocates of competition, while still mouthing platitudes about its virtues, connive at the creation of monopoly.

What is the Minister's argument about this? It is that monopoly is the price of efficiency. That is precisely what he said to me a few days ago. What a difference two years of freedom of the 1960 licensing Act has brought in the educational processes of Toryism.

What happens now to the rump of the Cunard on domestic and European routes? We know that competition is out and that a tie-up with B.U.A. seems inevitable—and quite sensible, as I see it. What then? We see B.E.A. in exactly the position of B.O.A.C. on the Atlantic route. One fine day, perhaps just prior to or during a Recess, we may learn that B.E.A. has been forced into a merger with B.U.A.-Cunard, and they, too, will have scuttled away from the dangers of competition and under the 447 umbrella of a nationalised industry, and in the process will have eroded the public ownership of B.E.A.

All the arguments of both B.U.A. and Cunard before the Licensing Board in efforts to grab B.E.A. routes base themselves on the virtues of competition. This is the only case which they can make, for on no single route is there a lack of capacity and, by coincidence, on each a profit is being made. This is a strange story of the erosion of great public assets.

I started by saying that Government policy is jeopardising both B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. and, consequently, is adversely affecting considerable sections of the aircraft industry. How can it be otherwise when the two Corporations which, along with the Service Departments, are the principal customers of the industry, are living under the threat which I have described? B.O.A.C. has ordered £151 million worth of VC10s. B.E.A has ordered £30 million of Tridents. B.E.A. has the option of more Tridents if it wishes to take it up.

He would be a brave man indeed, as chairman of either of these companies, to enlarge a huge capital investment of that type while such a threat was still hanging over their future. By 1965, if the Minister licenses these routes, it will cost B.E.A. £5.8 million per annum— and this is the very Government which tells us that the failure of nationalisation can be shown by the fact that it does not make profits. Hypocrisy cannot sink much lower than that.

Some day the House will have to debate the facts of life in relation to competitive private enterprise in our great industries. I have suggested before that it is little more than Tory and Liberal mythology, which in our great industries does not exist. We are now rapidly reaching the stage at which the British people have to choose between private and public monopoly, because there are no other alternatives in most of these great industries.

Even in the United States, the home of competitive private enterprise, Pan-American and World Air are coming to an agreement to amalgamate in order to eliminate wasteful competition on the North Atlantic run. At home, while 448 the Tories preach the irrelevance of public ownership, Cunard, for well over a century the emblem of competitive private enterprise, could not find sufficient enterprise to accept millions of public money to build a Q-ship because it had to find some of its own money. We now have the spectacle of Cunard scrambling away from the dangers of competition under the wing of a nationalised industry.

This is the story of the B.O.A.C. and the Cunard merger. I hope that the people of the country will take particular notice of it, for these two great airlines, which have been publicly financed, have done an incalculable amount of good research and development to make our industry one of which we can be proud. Because of the sheer chaos created by the Government, both are jeopardised. I hope that the country will learn from this and will understand that Toryism means a bloodless society, that the anaemia of Liberalism is no alternative, and that we must get down to a properly planned economy under a Labour Government, so that we can make Britain great once again.

§ The Minister of Aviation (Mr. Julian Amery)

I should like to pay tribute to my predecessor at the Ministry of Aviation for his work for over two years in connection with aircraft for the Royal Air Force. The Air Force is indebted to him for what he has done over that period to speed up deliveries. I am not qualified to comment on his work on the civil side except to say that the initiative which he took in launching a European space launcher organisation marks the first constructive step taken to get Britain into space, and this is a contribution which I, for one, fully support.

Last Friday morning I was in the lofty Air Council chamber that looks over the Embankment discussing with some of the air marshals the slippage in the deliveries of some aircraft. In a moment of impatience I allowed myself to say, "If I were Minister of Aviation what I would do is this…." Some of the air marshals present told me in spicy military terms what they would do if they were in that position themselves. Hardy were the words out of my mouth when the skies darkened and the ground 449 began to tremble, and we embarked upon the convulsions of the weekend which had some effect on the composition of the Treasury Bench. When the dust subsided I found that I was Minister of Aviation and that the usual channels, with their usual foresight, had so arranged matters that I had an opportunity to express my views on aviation policy within less than 24 hours of entering my new office.

It is not a very easy thing to do.I have to admit, even after 24 hours in my new office, that things look rather different from another chair. It is perhaps just as well that my remarks in the Air Council were not recorded. All the same, I begin by saying that with my experience at the Air Ministry I am very concerned—I know that a number of right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the Committee are also very concerned—about continuous slippage in delivery times and about the steady rise in costs of many of the projects with which the Ministry of Aviation has to be associated.

This is not a purely British experience. It happens in other countries, too. I would not for a moment pretend that the customer is always right. Quite often the Service Departments complicate the process by changing their minds half way through the development of a project and asking for new modifications. However, there is a serious problem here. It is one of the first questions to which I want to address myself. I admit freely that it is easier to identify than it is to solve.

While I was at the Air Ministry I had many contacts with the Ministry of Aviation and more particularly with the R.A.E. at Farnborough. I was immensely impressed by the work which the Establishment does and, more particularly, by its recent development of the blind landing system. I do not know how many hon. Members have had experience of this system. It is a very strange sensation when, after circling an airfield, one begins to come down from 1,000 ft. to the airfield and the pilot takes his hands and feet off the controls and one sees the ground steadily getting nearer. There is an almost irresistible impulse to tap the pilot on the shoulder and say, "Look out, it is coming". But there is no need for that. On three suc- 450 cessive occasions I landed more smoothly than I have ever been landed by the best of pilots.

§ Mr. John Rankin (Glasgow, Govan)

I do not intend to deal exactly with blind landing in the setting in which the Minister described it. Is he aware that many hon. Members have failed to take part in blind landing and that I, on requesting that we should visit the station, was told that it was not opportune. Could the Minister make it opportune for hon. Members to visit the station?

§ Mr. Amery

I will certainly consider the hon. Member's request. I do not know whether there was a security consideration. There may be, but, of course, I will consider his request. I am very glad that he has raised the point. I hope that any other hon. Member who wishes to approach me on any matter will always do so.

We have decided to introduce the blind landing system for V-bombers and we are developing it to civil standards for the Belfast. An intensive evaluation is going on to see how far the system can be applied for commercial purposes. There is already a good deal of foreign interest in the system. For instance, the Americans have had one of their airfields fitted with the ground equipment and have sent over one of their aircraft to be fitted with the airborne equipment. That aircraft has now returned to America for trials. In all this the Committee will appreciate that it will be very important to establish accepted international standards so that the same blind landing systems can be operated in the different countries between which aircraft operate.

The hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Lee) raised a number of important points. He was kind enough to give me notice of some of them. When answering some of his questions I shall be vary careful and guarded, for reasons which I am sure that he will appreciate. I am conscious that there is a serious situation in the aircraft industry. I am also conscious that my own experience of it is all too limited. I do not want to say anything which would make the task of the industry more difficult.

I want to deal, first, with the question of B.A.O.C. and the Cunard Company. 451 I do not pretend to be a master of this subject, but from the little I have seen since I came to the office last night, and from the discussions I have had within the Department, I have personally come to the conclusion that the hon. Gentleman's misgivings are very largely unjustified. As he knows, my predecessor refused a licence to Cunard Eagle to operate an independent service. After that, B.A.O.C. and Cunard got down to talks together on their own initiative. I understand that there was no initiative from the Ministry of Aviation. It was the decision of B.O.A.C. and Cunard. It was taken after consultation with their professional advisers.

The hon. Member for Newton asked what B.A.O.C. got out of it. I do not know, but we did not push the Corporation into it. It came to the conclusion that in the circumstances at that time it was the right thing to do. It is true that we were consulted. The Corporation was under no obligation statutorily to consult us, but it did consult us and my predecessor saw no reason to object. Given the circumstances at the time—I am not going back to the question of the 1960 Act; I am concerned merely with the circumstances of the time—I do not believe that the hon. Gentleman, if he had been in my predecessor's chair, would have taken a different view.

My predecessor thought—for what it is worth, I have come to the same conclusion—that it was in the best interests of British aviation that the two groups should co-operate to secure for Britain, which is what really matters to everybody, the maximum share in an already highly competitive North Atlantic traffic.

§ Mr. Lee

The right hon. Gentleman has spoken about what would have happened if I had been in his predecessor's chair. I must remind him that, if I had been in that chair, there would have been no Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act. I would have seen to that.

§ Mr. Amery

The hon. Gentleman would have had to face a completely different situation. There was an already established Cunard Company operating. We cannot go back every time to earlier Acts and say what should have been done then or later. My predecessor had to face this situation, and he thought in 452 the circumstances at the time that this was the best thing to do.

The hon. Member for Newton asked me certain specific questions. He asked about trooping. I understand that it is not relevant in this case. These are scheduled flights, not charter flights. They are directed to the Eastern seaboard of the United States, the Caribbean and South America. The hon. Gentleman asked about special obligations.

§ Mr. Lee

I must apologise to the Minister for interrupting again so soon. I am sure that he is trying to be helpful. I know that at the moment they are running on this route. I asked about the principle when there is an amalgamation between a nationalised corporation and a private firm. If such a development were to take place in Europe, would they be eligible to take part in trooping?

§ Mr. Amery

Surely we must not be too doctrinaire about these things. The hon. Gentleman asks what the position is in principle. I am stating what the position is in practice on this issue. All these things must be judged on their merits. It is a great mistake to try to run every aspect of our economy on doctrinaire lines.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned social and other obligations. My understanding is that all previous obligations of B.O.A.C. are accepted by the merged company in the fields in which it is to operate. As for responsibility to Parliament, there will be accountability to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries; that Committee will no doubt be able to summon and question B.O.A.C. directors in respect of their stewardship of the B.O.A.C. investment. The Minister will be open to question in the House, subject to the accepted rule that he is not responsible for matters of day-to-day management.

§ Mr. Roy Jenkins (Birmingham, Stechford)

Will the joint company pay B.O.A.C. salaries in all cases?

§ Mr. Amery

I should want notice of that question. I do not know the answer. I will write to the hon. Gentleman about it.

As I have said, we want to avoid being doctrinaire on a matter of this kind. The 453 hon. Member for Newton asked what we mean by free enterprise and by competition. He asked what is the exact principle of philosophy behind all this. At the last General Election the Leader of the Opposition advocated public investment in private enterprise. This is private investment in public enterprise. It is not so very different. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

There are other very successful examples of this kind of thing—British Petroleum and, in other countries, the K.L.M. and S.A.S. airlines. I know that this question of nationalisation is a very sensitive subject for the Labour Party, but what we are concerned with is not public enterprise or private enterprise, but British enterprise and getting as large a share as we can of the world air routes and the very valuable foreign exchange which they bring.

Let me now turn to the more serious problem which, I think, faces us in this debate, which is the prospect of some redundancy in certain sections of the industry. This is a very large industry. It is larger by comparison than the whole of the rest of the Western European aircraft industries put together. It represents 10 per cent. of our engineering exports. It is vital to our defence, and, as the hon. Gentleman said, it is a very considerable advertisement for Britain. I was recently travelling in South-East Asia, in a Comet IV, and was able to judge for myself the big impression which this aircraft is making on public opinion in other countries.

The total size of the industry has fluctuated a great deal but, broadly speaking, since 1957, it has been a little above or a little below the 300,000 level. It was 308,000 in 1957, which was the highest figure, and in 1959 it went down to 288,000, and now it is 298,000. There are two closely connected problems, but for the sake of the discussion one can separate them. There is, first, the problem of the design teams, and there is also the problem of the production teams.

The hon. Member for Newton spoke of the problems of Rolls-Royce. I was not notified that the hon. Gentleman was likely to raise that question until just before the debate. Rolls-Royce has had difficulties on the production team side, but it is rather anxious about the design 454 team side. I have a delegation coming to see me, led, I think, by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) early next week, and I shall brief myself in readiness for it, though I cannot give any details about it now.

The issue is really this. Everything depends on the existence of customers. Who are the customers? They are the civil airlines, both the Corporations, and the private operators, the military air forces and the other civil and military customers abroad. Let me take the civil side first. We are at the moment, as the Committee knows, supporting the Hawker Siddeley Trident project and the VC10. I saw the VC10 fly the other day, and it seems to me to be a very promising aircraft. I think that the firm is thinking of developing it. There is also the B.A.C. 111. We are supporting all these projects, which can give a certain amount of work to the design team, but I would be the first to admit that they have passed the peak of their design work.

More important, looking ahead on the civil side, is the question whether this country should undertake the development of a supersonic airliner. We are carrying out a design study with the French Government and French interests, and Government money has been committed on both sides of the Channel. If the decision is taken to go ahead with this project, it will mean a great deal of design work in the early stages and a great deal of production work later. This is one project which hon. Members should keep in mind.

On the military side, as the Committee is aware, in addition to the 10 Belfasts, five VC10s are on order for the R.A.F. as strategic troop transports. One of the possibilities we are now considering as part of the defence review would involve an increase in the long-range transport force, but I cannot at present say what form this will take or whether it will be undertaken.

When I was at the Air Ministry, I took a great interest in the development of the vertical take-off and landing aircraft to operate in the ground attack role, as I told the House on more than one occasion. I am glad to be able to say something about this in connection with the P1154. This is a design submitted by Hawkers, based on the work 455 done and the good results obtained from the P1127. It is a single engine supersonic aircraft, using vectored thrust to give it vertical take-off capability, and also the ability to make full use of any take-off run that might be available.

The vectored thrust engine, which is a British invention, has many advantages. It avoids problems of ground erosion, since the jets need only point downwards at the instant of take-off, and this, in the general concept of vertical take-off, may be useful. We are proceeding with the first stages of the development of this aircraft as a Hunter, and possibly a Sea Vixen, replacement. We are backing the aircraft in N.A.T.O. and hope that other countries will join with us in its full development.

§ Mr. Rankin

While the right hon. Gentleman is referring to the V.T.O.L. aircraft, can he say something about its civil capabilities?

§ Mr. Amery

I have long held the view that in defence the V.T.O.L. will come more and more into plans for aircraft building, but that is all I can say at the moment.

In one particular field we have made a rather important step forward, and it is now apparent that it is possible, on the basis of the vectored thrust engine, to build a supersonic ground attack fighter aircraft. The P1127, as the hon. Gentleman will remember, was not a supersonic aircraft. It was a subsonic aircraft and it did not quite meet the full military requirement: the new one goes some way further, and is a very interesting development.

§ Mr. Roy Mason (Barnsley)

Has any estimate been made yet of the export potential?

§ Mr. Amery

There is a N.A.T.O. competition for an aircraft of this kind, and it will have to compete with other contenders for this kind of aircraft. We are backing it in N.A.T.O., and hope that some other countries will join in its full development, but I cannot anticipate the results of the competition. There is also a problem of the tactical transport aircraft to replace the Hastings and the Beverley, but it is not yet decided what kind of aircraft it should be and when it shall be introduced.

456 Summing up what I have said in the field of requirements, we have a number of promising starters, though I must be cautious about them. None of them is a certainty and it is not in my hands to say whether they will be chosen or not. If some of them reach the post, there will clearly be a good deal of design and production work for the industry, and it is against this background that I want to say a word about the problem of Shorts. I myself and the Government as a whole are very well aware of the serious employment situation that prevails in Northern Ireland. Personally, I have long connections with Northern Ireland, and I am deeply conscious of what is happening there today.

A number of hon. Members have been to Northern Ireland to see the Shorts' set-up for themselves, and they talked with our chairman, because we are 70 per cent. holders in this company, Mr. Wrangham.

I had to postpone my visit at the request of the company because it was not convenient for the company at that particular time. I hope to go soon and see the situation for myself. I am advised that on the production side, the 7,000 employment level at present prevailing can be maintained until next summer. The firm is engaged at the moment on two major projects for the Government—the Belfast strategic freighter, of which 10 have been ordered for the R.A.F. and the Seacat Naval Surface/Air Guided Weapon, which is proving a good export, and orders have been secured from Sweden, Germany, Australia and New Zealand.

The immediate problem concerns the future of the design team. Our hopes for exports of the Belfast freighter have so far been disappointed. It is very hard to assess what the prospects of a modified Belfast would be, and in trying to judge the prospects of the design team I cannot add very much to what I said earlier when speaking generally about the design picture. I cannot say now what the Government's decisions are likely to be on the military orders to be placed, and I am sure that no one would suggest that we should order the wrong aeroplane for social or economic reasons. The Committee would not want us to do that.

457 I cannot give a date when the decision will be taken. What I can say is that when I left the Air Ministry we were expecting to take decisions shortly. I am very well aware that the Northern Ireland people will want to have a decision and know as soon as possible what it is to be.

Just before this debate I saw Lord Brookeborough, who is here on a visit with a number of his colleagues, and the predominant impression I brought away from that meeting was their need to know. I shall do all in my power to make sure that the decision is brought about as soon as possible—

§ Mr. Stratton Mills (Belfast, North)

I realise that my right hon. Friend has difficulty in giving an exact date on which we can have a decision, but is it likely to be before the Summer Recess, or in the early autumn, or when? I should like him to elaborate on that, rather than leave it as it is.

§ Mr. Amery

I fully understand my hon. Friend's anxiety. I wish that I could help him, but nothing is more difficult than to forecast dates when the decisions that have to be taken concern a number of other people. I am not in a position to forecast what it will be, but I would say that the important thing is to get a decision quickly, because what the Northern Ireland Government need to know is what the future will be, so I undertake that in so far as I am concerned with the matter I shall do all I can to get on with it, and arrive at a decision as soon as possible—

§ Mr. Stratton Mills

Yes, but will it be a matter of months or will it be a matter of years?

§ Mr. Amery

I am not thinking in terms of years at all, but it is difficult to say whether it will be now, or in the autumn, or at what precise time because, at the moment, I do not know, and I do not want to mislead the Committee—

§ Mr. Wigg

As I understand it, Rolls-Royce offered to produce a stage 5 Tyne on payment of a sum of money which I shall not mention. Are the Government reopening negotiations with Rolls-Royce to find out what figure Rolls-Royce will want to produce the stage 5 Tyne? In any case, there is bound 458 to be a trough in which the Northern Ireland workers will be caught. The Minister also said that the Committee would not expect the Government to take a decision on social and political grounds, but this constitutes a major change of policy, for the original decision taken by the Government was for just that reason.

§ Mr. Amery

As so often in other matters, the hon. Gentleman is very fully informed on an aspect on which, frankly, I am not informed at the moment, but I will look at that point, and try to unravel the complexities with the officials of my Department.

As to the latter part of his intervention, what I say is that I am sure that the Committee would not want us to get the wrong aircraft simply because of a very serious situation of a non-military character. I am sure that would be contrary to opinion in the Committee—and also contrary to Northern Ireland public opinion, a part of the United Kingdom that has produced more field marshals than any other. To produce an aircraft that the Services do not want would, surely be illogical. Perhaps the Services will want it, but I cannot anticipate that—

§ Mr. Mason

But the right hon. Gentleman, more than anybody else, should know about this. He has just left the Air Ministry, and should know whether the Royal Air Force, in its discussions with him over the last twelve months, has made it known to him that it is desirous of having more of these aircraft or not, and he should have indicated to Shorts long before now whether the Belfast is to be ordered in greater quantities than ten.

Secondly, there is the question of coming to a decision. How long must these people wait? It is no use the right hon. Gentleman fobbing off his hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) by saying that he cannot say until possibly the autumn or next year. This is not a new problem. The Ministry has had the matter before it for a long time. The right hon. Gentleman may be a new Minister, but the problem is not new, and we cannot afford to await a decision much longer.

§ Mr. Amery

It is all very well for the hon. Gentleman to say that he wants 459 a decision now, but he knows quite enough about how the Government machine works to know that there are many considerations that have to be weighed one against the other.

There is the problem of money, and of the different requirements of the Services over the whole field. The defence budget has to be drawn up with great care, and competing requirements carefully considered. Certain things go forward and others do not. The normal period for arriving at that particular decision is about this summer. I did not tell my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) that it would be in the autumn of next year. I said that I was not thinking in terms of years, but in terms of a relatively short period—

§ Mr. Wigg

Surely the right hon. Gentleman recognises the importance of this matter. On 11th February, 1959, the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations put before the House a picture of the Government, by gigantic intellectual effort, an achievement worthy of Christopher Columbus, having found a military use for the Britannic, as it was called. But in an Adjournment debate on 4th May, 1960. it was revealed that this was only political convenience in the Minister's mind.

Since that time the people of Northern Ireland have become the victims of the Government's shilly-shallying. It is absolutely clear that if there is to be an extended version of this aircraft the firm must be able to spread its development costs, and an ex-Secretary of State for Air should know that. If he does not, I can only congratulate the Royal Air Force on his new appointment.

§ Mr. Amery

I reject altogether the hon. Gentleman's insinuation that we did not want an aeroplane of this kind, and I am absolutely clear that the order for 10 Belfasts will be very valuable and useful to the Royal Air Force. It can carry things that no other aircraft available over the time scale can carry. The problem is to decide what is needed next. That is quite a different story, and the decision is one that we cannot anticipate now—

§ Mr. Stanley R. McMaster (Belfast, East)

My right hon. Friend has summarised very well the various factors that the Government must weigh in coming to a decision on the aeroplane, but have they considered the factor of redundancy in the design team, and Shorts' difficulty in getting it together again? Has he considered as a solution at least an interim order to carry on further design and research to keep the team together pending a decision? This is a vital point, particularly in respect of morale.

§ Mr. Amery

I am very conscious of that and, because of it, I have stressed that the most important thing is to get an early decision. I will certainly think over what my hon. Friend says about an interim design study, but as I understand that that takes some time to get launched I would think it more important to get a decision quickly, if we can.

The Committee has been rightly concerned in the past with problems of air safety. This is a matter on which this country has a very good record, and one to which I personally gave a good deal of thought in my last office. Much depends here on the system of air traffic control. My predecessor and the former Secretary of State for Air, whose judgment I have always found to be extremely reliable, came to the conclusion that if the future requirements for air traffic control in the limited air space over this country were to be met, there would need to be a unified system of control for both civil and military air traffic.

As a first step towards the establishment of such a system, he asked Sir Laurence Sinclair, who was Controller of Ground Services in the Ministry of Aviation, to consider how best to bring together in a single headquarters the existing staffs in separate Departments; the staffs, that is, concerned with policy, planning, and the formulation of operational requirements for air traffic control. Sir Laurence has now produced certain proposals which are being considered by the Departments concerned.

I should have liked to have answered more fully some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Newton, and to have had an opportunity to answer some of the points that I am sure will be 461 raised later. The Parliamentary Secretary will seek to do that when he winds up the debate. He has great experience of the industry, and a deep knowledge of the technology connected with it. The Government, and the Committee, will benefit very much from his co-operation.

My own approach to our problems is plain enough. I want to see a strong aircraft industry, strong enough to support efficient civil operators and powerful military air forces. We have to keep our production in the forefront, and I hope that, in due course, we shall be able to get into space.

The news that the X15 spacecraft was space-borne yesterday is an extremely interesting and stimulating thought. It presents an immense challenge to our scientists and industry. There are enormous financial difficulties, but they must be overcome and it may be that co-operation with France and Europe on the lines of E.L.D.O. and the supersonic airliner offers the best opportunity.

I will try on another occasion to get down to greater detail on how I think these things should be done. I do not wish to delay the Committee by reading undigested Departmental briefs, or by expressing views of my own without a fuller knowledge of the facts. "In God we trust, the rest we check" is a good motto for an incoming Minister. I welcome the debate, not as an opportunity to expound Government policy, but for my hon. Friend and myself to learn from the very beginning of our assumption of office something of the views and feelings of the House of Commons on a matter which we all recognise is of the first importance to our economic life and national security.

§ Mr. John Rankin (Glasgow, Govan)

I am sure that hon. Members were rather surprised at the somewhat abrupt termination of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I was disappointed that he should have dismissed the problem of air safety, the subject with which I particularly wish to deal, in a single sentence by dealing only with Air Traffic Control.

I would like, first, to offer my welcome to the right hon. Gentleman on assuming his new office. I would have thought that he might have come to 462 his new job substantially informed, because part of aviation came under his direct observation when he was Secretary of State for Air. He might, as a result, have spoken with a little more freedom on some aspects of the issues facing us. As he knows, changes are taking place in Scotland. His right hon. Friend, his predecessor, had agreed to come to Glasgow and Edinburgh on 24th July next, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept the obligations which go with his new office and keep this appointment.

The White Paper dealing with the future of Scotland's airports has become a burning topic. It has become tied up with the future of Abbotsinch, and there are rumours that Glasgow and Edinburgh, or a consortium of municipalities in the area, should take over the airport at Abbotsinch. It is being hinted quite freely that if they do not see their way to do so the Government will disinterest themselves in the future of Abbotsinch and more or less leave things at Renfrew as at present, although it is incapable of handling the increasing amount of traffic. The alternative would be for aircraft to go to Prestwick.

The following figures show why that should not be done. In 1961 B.E.A. handled 751,000 passengers at Renfrew, an increase of 110,000 over 1960. Up to June this year 389,000 passengers were handled there as compared with 330,000 up to June, 1961, an increase of 59,000. That increase is, of course, welcome, but the increase for this year portends to be even greater than the whole of 1962 and more than the 110,000 in 1961, simply because the three busiest months of the summer—July, August and September—still lie ahead; which in 1960 alone saw 261,000 passengers handled at Renfrew out of a total of 641,000.

These figures reveal that by the end of 1962 there will have been an even greater increase than that which occurred in 1961. It would be unfortunate if anything were done by the Minister to disturb the business which is now being done at Glasgow's airport. It would be completely wrong even to suggest that there should be a transfer of this business to Prestwick. I realise that Prestwick is also doing well and 463 we in Scotland welcome this. Total terminal passengers there last year numbered 198,795 while those in transit numbered about 167,000. This total of more than 366,000 passengers represents good and increasing business.

Although that business exists it would be wrong to do anything to disturb what is going on at Renfrew—other than the transfer to Abbotsinch, which is the proper location. Abbotsinch has an acreage of 773 and is the largest airport in Scotland—double the size of Presitwick. I hope that in coming to his decision the Minister will ensure that nothing is done to harm the future prospects of Abbotsinch and the business which could be done there.

Many people say that it is just as easy to get to Prestwick as to Renfrew. Last weekend I took the trouble to check the scheduled times. The scheduled time to Renfrew is twenty-five minutes from Glasgow. It is five minutes longer to Abbotsinch. The scheduled time to Prestwick is sixty minutes, and since most of the business done at Renfrew belongs to Glasgow and the immediately surrounding area it would be fatal to displace this traffic and transfer it far away from the city, which would be the result if it were sent to Prestwick.

Tribute should also be paid to the business which has been built up by the off-peak services. These show after a full year's operation an average passenger load of 87 per cent. This is better than is provided by the ordinary passenger services; because the fare is only three guineas. Later I shall urge the importance of cheap fares in the expansion of air traffic but I want to speak chiefly about air safety.

As I have said, the right hon. Gentleman merely brushed aside air safety by saying that we wanted to do more about air traffic control. I agree that we want controls but that is not the only problem. I was attracted back to this topic which I dealt with first on 14th February, 1947. Fifteen months later I returned to it in another debate in the House, and from time to time it has been frequently discussed by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee; because it is the important thing in air travel. We must 464 carry passengers safely. We must get more and more people into the air.

§ Sir A. V. Harvey

And get them down again.

§ Mr. Rankin

Yes, we must get them down safely, and the House of Commons has pledged itself that its policy in air travel is safety first, safety second and safety all the time.

The Economist, in an interesting article last weekend, said: The number of people at risk in any single accident is rising rapidly. Tightening airworthiness regulations will not remove one risk peculiar to charter flying—the risk that pilots may be strange to the routes on which they are flying. I raised this issue a week ago last Monday in a Question in which I asked the Minister if he would do some research on the relative safety of jet aircraft and piston-engined aircraft. [Interruption.] I do not want to disturb the consultations between the newly elected, but I should hope that the emotions which accompany promotions have now subsided and perhaps I can now have the attention of the two Ministers concerned.

The Minister, in his reply on that occasion—and I assume that the Parliamentary Secretary will have studied it —said that these large jet aircraft had been in service for only a short time whereas piston-engined aircraft, even the largest, had been in service for a very long time. That was a badly informed answer, for the simple reason that the piston-engined Vanguard came into service only in April, 1960.

§ Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton)

The Vanguard is not piston-engined.

§ Mr. Rankin

I am sorry if I was not making the point quite clearly, but I included the turbo-props. As I have said, the Vanguard has been in service only since April, 1960, which is not as long a period of service as that of the Boeing. The Minister went on to say that in the attempt to make flying safer he proposed to apply progressively some of the modern standards of air safety to the older aircraft where they are relevant to the type of construction. This was a rather guarded statement, but anything that increases the safety factor in the air must be welcomed.

465 In 1960 there were 103 accidents to powered aircraft not engaged on public transport, and 10 of these were fatal. This compares with 91 for the previous year, 11 of which were fatal. I agree that the increase is very small but the fact remains that it is there.

In public transport twelve accidents happened to aircraft on scheduled passenger services, six to aircraft on non-scheduled passenger services, and one to aircraft on a scheduled freight service. This compares with a total of 19 for 1959. So far we have no returns for 1961 but recent happenings must be fresh in everyone's mind. The figures I have quoted are taken from an official publication on air accidents which is available in the Library.

On 14th February, 1947, in reply to a debate on air safety, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation, as it then was, said: We shall not be satisfied until we reach that high standard of efficiency in which accidents will be things of the past …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th February, 1947; Vol. 433, c. 749.] The simple question I put to the Minister is: are they? Of course they are not. Since those words were spoken, aircraft constructed to fly the Atlantic on three engines have crashed on four. Air accidents from time to time over the years have seen the entire complement of an aircraft killed on the ground; drowned in the sea; or burned to death. For these reasons we simply cannot dismiss this problem as being in any way solved by better forms of air control however desirable those may be.

I agree that many of these accidents were no concern of the Minister's, but the type of machine flown was the type in use in this country and that fact must concern him. The Alitalia airliner which crashed in India a fortnight ago was the fifth big jet accident this year. The death roll to date is 872. We have many villages with populations of that sort, consisting of 800 or 900 persons, and if such a village were suddenly wiped out as these people have been it would have a tremendous impact on people's minds. We cannot merely say that it is a pity and pass by. In the first part of this year 872 persons have been killed in aircraft accidents, despite the fact that fifteen years ago we wore looking forward to the time when we would no longer be troubled by them.

466 It is obvious that we have got to think in different terms about accidents. We still use the formula that they are related to the number of millons of passenger miles flown. But nowadays we have got to regard accidents in terms of human life because of their obliterative effect and because of their finality. As aircraft get larger the risk increases. If a DH Rapide with five or seven persons crashed, it was a pity. But when a jet aircraft crashes with 150 persons on board it becomes a tragedy, and this is the fact that we must face.

It has been estimated in one of our periodicals that if the number of crashes that have occurred so far this year are to be taken as a guide for the future, we can look forward to one major crash per month. We recognise that an aeroplane is liable to accident like every other type of machine, but a fault in the engines of the "Queen Mary" will still leave her afloat. If something goes wrong with the power unit of a jet aircraft she streaks to oblivion like a rocket. She has no crash-worthiness, as the Economist called it last week, or, as I christened it fifteen years ago, "crash survivability". It is the business of our experts aided by our Ministers to find an aerodynamic formula which will supply what I call this missing link in air travel.

I know that many suggestions have been made. We must try to devise some sort of apparatus which will automatically come into effect when an accident takes place. Before the war, when we spoke of the ejector seat the idea was regarded as farcical and we were told that it was impossible. But when war came and it was discovered that while aircraft were expendable highly-trained pilots were not expendable, the ejector seat became a possibility and is now a fact. Perhaps it would be possible to utilise something on the lines of the ejector seat, based on a much larger idea involving a retarding force such as we have in the helicopter, so that at the pressing of a button a windmill device will immediately come into operation, thus using the air as a retarding force to diminish the speed of the aircraft as it heads for the earth. We have got to think in terms of finding something that 467 will slow down this rocket descent of the aeroplane when anything untoward happens in mid-flight.

I should like to know whether the characteristics of the V.T.O.L. aircraft, developed for civilian use, could be introduced into other types of aircraft so that their descent would be sufficiently slowed to enable passengers to land without injury. I trust that experiment will continue so that we can attain this objective of safety for passengers in flight.

In view of what has been happening we are driven back to a comparison of relative safety between scheduled and charter aircraft. That is a point which I raised just over a week ago. It would seem that the proportion of accidents occurring on non-scheduled flights is much greater than that on scheduled flights. The Economist, quoting from "Flight", observed that 40 per cent. of passengers killed in the previous twelve months were flying in charter aircraft, and this is out of all proportion to the scale of the operations which represent about 5 per cent. of world traffic.

This raises another point. Familiarity with the routes which are being flown is essential and, while the pilot of aircraft on scheduled flights gets an intensive route training, this is impossible for the charter pilot. He must, of course, make sure that he has taken all necessary steps to study his route, but who ensures that the airline does its job and sees that in fact he does so? We have no guarantee that, whatever may be the responsibility of the pilot, the airline ensures that the rules are duly observed. This is driving many observers back to a view, which I do not take and which I have rejected for a long time, that the pilot should necessarily be blamed for most of the accidents. Many people believed that the pilot was chiefly to blame until it was shown that the structural weakness in a machine could also be a factor, and this was proved in the case of the Comet and the Electra.

The human factor has been revived by the death last Saturday through thrombosis of the co-pilot of a machine when about to land at Prestwick. One wonders if the medical examination that is supposed to be carried out periodically was, in fact, carried out as 468 thoroughly as it should have been when a person who was about to ground his machine died from thrombosis.

What has been happening in the last few months raises a great many points from which we cannot pass lightly. It is difficult to find any common reason for them; there seems to be no common factor. One point which emerges, however, is that while there have been no accidents to Boeings which are being flown by B.O.A.C.—[Interruption.] I am talking about the last six months; that is my point. It leads us to wonder to what extent supervision and care of the machines plays its part in these accidents.

We need all the airport aids that we possess; and we want to increase them wherever possible. Instability at the landing point, when the pilot is probably most tired after a long flight, say, across the Atlantic, brings us back to the view that automatic aids must be developed to aid the pilot at that stage. As we have seen, fire is always a possibility. We should be told what is being done to render its outbreak less likely than has sometimes been the case.

There are three matters which demand the attention of the Minister and his Parliamentary Secretary. The first is that mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman himself concerning the need for a supersonic aircraft. That embodies research. The second is the need to get more people into the air, which necessitates more aircraft and must mean cheaper fares and more work, not only at Short's, in Northern Ireland, but, I hope, at Prestwick, in Scotland. We, too, are calling for aids to ease the problem of unemployment in our midst.

The third point which demands the attention of the Minister is the continuing search for more and more safety in the air. This means greater research on the lines I have indicated, because if we urge more people to travel, we must guarantee that having taken them into the air, we will land them safely at their destination.

§ Mr. Stanley R. McMaster (Belfast, East)

I trust that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Rankin) will forgive me if in my contribution to the debate I do not follow him except for his final remarks. I should like, first, to 469 say a sincere word of congratulation to my right hon. Friend the Minister on his appointment and a particular word of welcome and congratulation to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary. I am very glad to see a young man with such interest in, and experience of, industry in this key position in the Government. I particularly welcome him today.

Quite a lot has been said in the debate, particularly by the hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Lee) in opening, about the future of a firm in my constituency, namely, Short Brothers and Harland. It is in particular in respect of this firm that I should like to address the Committee this afternoon.

If I may be permitted to give a brief resume of its history, this is one of our oldest aircraft-producing firms. It started its life producing balloons at the end of the last century, and 50 years ago it started producing aircraft. In 1910, it produced the Tractor biplane, and as early as 1914 a seaplane, the Canton Unne, which was used, together with other seaplanes produced by Short Brothers, in one of the first bombing raids of the First World War in 1914.

The company went on to produce, in 1920, the Silver Streak, the first aircraft with a stressed skin, which at the time was thought impossible but is now the standard method of constructing aircraft. It produced the first little stressed skin seaplane, the Cockle, in 1923, and it went on to produce other aircraft, including the large four-engined Empire line of flying-boats which were used extensively throughout the Empire and by the R.A.F. all over the world and which, in 1937 and 1938, operating the first regular trans-Atlantic passenger service, carried the colours of this country and raised us to a first-class aviation nation.

Short Brothers and Harland also produced experimental aircraft such the Mayo Composite, with two aircraft one on top of the other, rather like the X15, to which my right hon. Friend has today referred. It was the first example of a mother aircraft launching another in flight. The company produced the Stirling bombers during the war and the Short Sunderland flying boat, which many hon. Members will remember. It also produced the first four-engine jet bomber, the Sperin, after the war in 470 1951, and as well as the Britannia and the SB5, about which a great deal has been written and said in technical journals in recent years. This is a variable geometry aircraft with swept-back wings. In addition Shorts developed the first vertical take-off multiple jet plane the S.C.I, which is still being evaluated and embodies a principle rather different from that to which my right hon. Friend referred when he spoke about the Hawker P1127, a principle which is, perhaps, better adapted to a civil vertical take-off plane requiring more than one engine with a deflected jet and which would carry heavier loads than this support attack aircraft referred to by my right hon. Friend. The work on all the problems of stabilisation and the difficult problems of control connected with this pioneering venture was carried out in Belfast by Short Brothers and Harland.

Hon. Members, on both sides, will appreciate, therefore, that this firm, one of our first aircraft manufacturers, which is so threatened today, has a tremendous history. I stress as my first point that it would be a tragedy to our aircraft manufacturers to allow this firm to go down the drain.

The factory in which the company is situated lies in an area of, unfortunately, high unemployment. In Northern Ireland, we have 7½ per cent. unemployment. It lies beside the great shipbuilding yards of Harland and Wolff and the raw materials can be brought in by boat and landed at the doors of the factory. There is an aerodrome beside the factory from which the aircraft can take off. This is an enormous advantage to Northern Ireland. It is the most suitable type of industry that we could possibly have to help us in our problems of unemployment, because one of our difficulties in attracting industry to Northern Ireland is transport costs.

Here is an ideal industry, producing aircraft, with a long history of production and a fine record. Its work accounts for many man-hours and requires comparatively little material. It is an industry which is essential for Northern Ireland. This has been recognised by the Government. Various Ministers have stressed the importance of Short Brothers to Northern Ireland and have accepted the idea that the aircraft industry is ideal for Northern Ireland.

471 My right hon. Friend for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones), when Minister of Supply, said in the House on 2nd December, 1957: It is the Government's wish that Short and Harland's shall continue as a fully balanced aircraft production unit and everything practicable is being done both by the firm and the Government to this end."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd December, 1957; Vol. 579, c. 3.] His hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary said later, on 22nd May, 1958: I assure the hon. Members concerned that all practical steps will be taken to maintain the firm as a fully balanced aircraft design and production unit."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd May, 1958; Vol. 588, c. 1619.] Much more recently, my right hon. Friend the then Minister of Aviation, now the Minister of Defence, visited the factory in Belfast, his visit being reported in the local Press as follows: Earlier, the Minister had told leaders of the Federation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions that it was the policy of the U.K. Government to retain Short Brothers and Harland as a balanced and self-contained development, research and productive unit in the aircraft industry …. He said that it was important to the Government and himself to retain a balanced labour force in the aircraft industry here. He felt that it would be a great pity if such a skilled labour force and technical research group as they had in Northern Ireland should be dissipated. Their technical research team in his opinion compared with the best in the world … Mr. Thorneycroft referred to the policy of the British Government in the giving of orders outside the two big mergers in Britain. Shorts is not within the merger. He said the position of Northern Ireland must not and would not be forgotten. His predecessor said there would be two aircraft groups, but that also, on the grounds of public policy, it would be right to step outside these groups in the placing of contracts. Everyone agreed Northern Ireland industry was a ground of public policy to justify stepping outside the mergers. I think it has been accepted, and Ministers have affirmed this continuously since 1948, that it is the Government's intention to retain Short Bros, and Harland. Therefore, it was not without concern that I listened to my right hon. Friend in his opening speech today stating that he could not decide, and that there would be delay in deciding, What kind of transport aircraft was to be ordered. The Government could not make up their mind now. They would have to consider and weigh the possibilities. This is a problem which has been placed before the Ministry many 472 times by the firm, by myself and by my fellow Unionist Members. This is not a new problem.

The position has become so serious that on 15th June, only a month ago, the chairman of the company said that unless further orders were forthcoming the firm would have to close down. My right hon. Friend said that there was enough work for another two years and that there would be no redundancy until next summer. I am informed by the company itself that redundancy in the design staff will start within a month unless further orders are placed. Therefore, I would stress the very great urgency of coming to a quick decision on this vital point. If a decision cannot be taken within a month some type of development work should be placed with the firm, as I suggested in my intervention, so as to justify the firm in retaining its development staff, work such as the ordering of the Tyne 5 would create, a matter which was referred to in my earlier intervention, thus enabling the company to carry on work Which would keep the design team together. Once the design team broke up it would be impossible to get the men back again. Not only would the men go to other firms in England and America but the executives would leave, and when they leave they cannot be replaced.

I wish to stress some other points which have a bearing on the matter. Not only has the work done at Shorts of particular value to the economy of Northern Ireland, but the company has also taken a leading part in apprentice training. If Northern Ireland is to attract new industry it is vital that such training should go on. The company has started a school at the Technical College and at Queen's University, and has initiated a chair of aeronautical engineering. Both the company and individual directors have been very active in advanced education. They have the most up-to-date ideas. Some of their team have gone to America in order to develop techniques and to bring them back to this country to be used in the research and development connected with the study and testing of new aircraft. By so doing the firm has built up the most advanced team in Britain.

This is one of the things that Northern Ireland will stand to lose if the firm is 473 not retained as a balanced unit. It has been suggested that perhaps it would be possible to diversify its activities. The firm has already gone in for diversification. It has produced a very successful missile, the Sea Cat, which sells not only in this country but in many N.A.T.O. countries. The company has produced analog computers, fork-lift trucks and even small carpet sweepers. However, there is a limit to this diversification.

Of eight thousand employees, 6,000 are employed on aircraft production. As the chairman said, the future of these enterprises depends on the success of the aircraft factory. If it were to close down, then the other factories would go and the loss to Belfast would be tremendous. In the past year I have seen 12,000 men laid off from Harland and Wolff in my constituency due to the recession in shipbuilding. A further 7,000 to 8,000 men are threatened at Short Brothers, making a total of some 20,000 men. This is something which could not be faced in Northern Ireland —20,000 men being declared redundant in the course of a year or two.

The history in connection with the Belfast is that the order was not placed until 1960. Negotiations went on through 1959 and finally a fixed price contract was offered to Shorts, the first of its kind to be placed in this country for an aircraft of this size. The Services were getting a very cheap aircraft, one based on the Brittania and on the engines which were in the Vanguard. By doing this the company cut to a minimum the development costs. The aircraft has cost about one-third what it would have cost to develop a completely new transporter, either turboprop or jet. In spite of this, the company has developed an aircraft which meets entirely Army requirements.

My right hon. Friend referred to the delays in production of aircraft and mounting costs. There have been some delays in connection with the Belfast because the Army continually changed its mind regarding what it wanted the plane to carry. The Army has now a plane with a fuselage measuring 12 ft. by 12 ft. There is no other plane big enough to take a Chieftan tank. It is 64 ft. long. Only ten of these aircraft have been ordered, but the Minister consented 474 to the development costs being spread over thirty aircraft. I should like to be told why there is this hesitation in placing further orders.

Of the ten aircraft ordered, how many will be available to meet the strategic needs of the Air Force? I suggest that by the time one or two of the aircraft have been evaluated and used for development and if perhaps another, unfortunately, meeting with an accident, as happens all too frequently these days, we shall be lucky if five or six of the ten are left. Do the Government really suggest that these ten are sufficient to meet the strategic requirements of the British Army towards the end of the 1960s?

The aircraft as it stands is capable of carrying an enormous load. It can carry 45 tons—and I stress 45 tons—for a distance of 1,000 miles, or, if required for a longer hop, it can carry 15 tons for 4,000 miles. The lower freight is the result, of course, of the need to take more fuel.

The plane can carry every piece of the Army's modern mobile equipment. A typical payload would be three Saladin armoured cars with their crews. As a troop carrier, with two decks and dense seating, it will carry 240 men and their equipment for its maximum range across the Atlantic.

The Army has seen the plane. Many staff officers have been to the factory in Northern Ireland where the first two planes are reaching the final stage of construction and they have been very impressed with its capacity and potential. They are, I believe, well satisfied and enthusiastic about the future of this future of this colossal plane.

§ Mr. John Cronin (Loughborough)

The hon. Gentleman will understand that the Army is particularly satisfied because there is at present no efficient long-range strategic freighter of any kind in the Royal Air Force. The Army would be very happy to accept anything, quite apart from the good qualities of the Belfast.