DEFENCE

§ The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Watkinson)

I beg to move, That this House approves the Report on Defence, 1961, contained in Command Paper No. 1288. The form of the White Paper this year confines itself primarily to policy, and the Services memoranda, to which I do not wish to refer in any detail today, have appeared rather better illustrated and set out in rather more detail. I hope that that balance will be for the convenience of the House. It is defence policy which is pre-eminent and the details, the single Service requirements, are better set out in the Service memoranda. The White Paper this year, therefore, tries to set out, clearly and factually, the broad frame of defence policy.

The White Paper is the first to be written against the background of the probability that both sides now have enough nuclear explosive to destroy one another. We have also rightly taken account of the growth of the industrial and military power of China.

There is one point I want to mention before coming to the White Paper policy in detail, and it is a matter about which the whole House will agree, however much we may differ on our method of getting there. In producing this White Paper, and its clearly and carefully thought-out policy statement, the Government have sought to face, I hope honestly, what I consider to be the dominant issue of our age.

In man's recorded history, peace has been a matter of only relatively short intervals between wars of steadily increasing destructiveness. Can we—and I hope that the House will bear this question in mind in this kind of defence marathon, as it goes on for two days—exploit the situation, that a major war would now destroy much of our civilisation, to deflect the course of history and break the sequence of alternating war and peace?

That is the basic fact that must underlie defence policy. Can we do it, or do we fail? If we fail, then time is running out for us all if we cannot break the sequence of peace as an interval between wars. Our primary task must be to stop our world destroying itself and the 1199 mission of defence is rightly enunciated as a mission of peace, but peace through vigilance and purpose.

That is why the White Paper begins by setting disarmament as the Government's first priority, but all of us will agree that there may be a long road to travel before we can achieve disarmament. We must, therefore, give equal priority—and this is the second main point of the White Paper—to the task of preventing any kind of war from starting. That is the reason for maintaining a powerful deterrent policy in concert with our allies.

Thirdly, the White Paper sets out the Government's considered belief that our contribution to the deterrent strength of the West must continue to cover both the nuclear and conventional aspects of defence, not only because we and the West as a whole must clearly show our ability effectively to react against threats of any kind, but to ensure that the views of this country carry their proper weight in negotiations for nuclear test agreements, in disarmament negotiations and in N.A.T.O. and our other alliances.

The fourth main point of the White Paper is that we must carefully assess the shape and size of our contribution so that it is reasonably well balanced, both in relation to our national resources as a whole, and in its various components, nuclear and conventional and, within those broad divisions between men and weapons.

To sum up the four main points of this year's White Paper before dealing with them in detail: first, there is the need for new progress on disarmament; secondly, the necessity for deterrence over the whole spectrum of defence, including nuclear as well as conventional; thirdly, the maintenance of a carefully balanced contribution to meet our worldwide commitments and our obligations to our allies—I merge three and four for the convenience of the House.

We have made good progress with the five-year plan for defence, constructed with such skill and energy by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. [Laughter.] Yes, I know that it is often alleged, for purely political reasons, that the policies set out in earlier White Papers of this period have changed. The fact is that 1200 the main frame of British defence policy has not changed. The maintenance of peace through the maximum contribution to the deterrent forces of the West has not changed. Technology and weapons have changed, but these must be subordinate to policy, for it is policy and not any particular weapon system that is decisive, particularly in this age of probable nuclear sufficiency.

The Government believe that the best, and perhaps the only, way to have peace is to stick to our present carefully balanced policies and the responsibilities that flow from them. Those who preach the unilateral renunciation of our defence obligations should ponder the hard facts of the dangerous world in which we live. Perhaps they might even consider how they would get on squatting in Red Square instead of outside my Ministry. All I would say is that such actions, if noted at all by a potential aggressor, would only encourage it in the belief that its aggression was likely to succeed. Unilateral renunciation of our defence obligations thus increases, not decreases, the danger of war. So, in my view, does any action or misrepresentation which might cast doubt on our will to carry out our obligations.

Fortunately the Government, like, I believe, the majority of our countrymen. wish to stand aside from this twisting of defence facts to suit political ends. It may be that the official Opposition would wish to do the same. Certainly, their recent policy statement is vague enough to give plenty of room to advance or retreat. I do not wish to deal with it in great detail now, and whether it is an official statement that we should consider, or what the Daily Herald calls the Cousins' case, or the Crossman case, but I would like to ask the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who, I think, is following me, to tell the House in rather more detail how this policy would work. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about your policy?"] If it is considered that the Opposition have no need to adumbrate their policy to the country, it obviously implies that they see no possibility of ever carrying it out. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will go into this in more detail, and tell us, for example, how he proposes to carry out Article 8 of the official statement.

Anyway, be that as it may, the Government's task is clear. It is to stick to 1201 their defence objectives and to state the facts concerning them. We believe that peace rests on a firm defence policy.

§ Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

But what is it?

§ Mr. Watkinson

This policy has so far been justified—and this is the answer to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman)—by the one result we seek from it, the maintenance of peace. That is all we seek from our defence policy, and we have no intention of deviating from our chosen course, which has so far won us that objective.

I now turn to examine in more detail the four main elements of our defence policy. First, disarmament. Disarmament and defence policy are obviously closely inter-related, and Her Majesty's Government hope that 1961 will see the conclusion of a nuclear test agreement. The other day I came upon something said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), and it shows how well he has always looked far into the future. In 1953, he said: We and all nations stand, at this hour in human history, before the portals of supreme catastrophes or of measureless reward, but I have sometimes the odd thought that, with the advance of destructive weapons which enable everyone to kill everyone else, no one will kill anyone. The conclusion of a nuclear test agreement would certainly be a very large step forward towards the ambition of having a world in which no one will kill anyone.

I want just to make this point so that there is no misunderstanding about the difficulties of this task, or of its cost; for the setting up, for example, of 180 control posts would be a very heavy burden on finance, manpower and on our technical capacity. None the less, this would be an immense step forward. It would be a great move towards broader measures of disarmament, and although it has all the difficulties of there being no known method of detecting hidden nuclear tests, plus the problem of clandestine manufacture and all the rest, 1961 should be the year in which we gain this first and vital disarmament objective.

For the rest, there remains for a Minister of Defence the problem of keeping the balance of force on which peace rests throughout the development of any 1202 disarmament plan. To pretend that such problems do not exist is no help to disarmament. I believe that it is equally unrealistic to pretend that Great Britain could at this moment cast away her position as a nuclear Power which is fundamental to ensure that our views carry weight in all these dicussions. With Russia and the United States of America, such an action would merely weaken our influence, perhaps at a vital moment, as I have tried to show, in world affairs. It would certainly not stop other Powers from creating their own nuclear weapons.

The White Paper sets out as the Government's second objective our determination to maintain the deterrent strength of our alliances and our worldwide commitments until disarmament is achieved. Before turning to N.A.T.O., may I say that I hope hon. Members have glanced at the map on page 4 of the White Paper. It shows the worldwide spread of our commitments, and I think that most of us today would agree that the risk of an incident which might lead to limited or unlimited war is perhaps more likely outside the N.A.T.O. area than within it.

That is why it is important, in the Government's view, to create the unified commands in the Near East and Middle East which are recorded in the White Paper, and to carry on the further re-organisation of our forces which will give us greater mobility, greater hitting power, and a chance of trying to deal with a small incident before it turns into a dangerous nuclear explosion.

Now I will turn to N.A.T.O. It is sometimes said that Her Majesty's Government do not contribute enough to N.A.T.O., or that we are perhaps somewhat half-hearted about our support of this great alliance. Perhaps the House will consider the facts. Of the Royal Navy, 85 per cent. of the active and operational Reserve Fleet is committed to N.A.T.O. When, in due course, Fighter Command becomes part of Saceur's unified air defence, over 50 per cent. of the Royal Air Force front line aircraft will be committed to N.A.T.O. Forty per cent. of all Army formations available are assigned to N.A.T.O. Here, while the Army is being reorganised, we shall not always avoid having units which are under strength.

1203 I must make it plain that we and the United States are disturbed at the world imbalance of payments, which is at present reflected in a substantial German surplus and United States and United Kingdom deficits, and at the military expenditure which, almost as a side effect, plays a part in bringing about this state of affairs. Nevertheless, it is the Government's wish to continue to maintain B.A.O.R. as close to full strength as we can in the circumstances, and we shall keep N.A.T.O. fully informed of our position here.

I now turn to the broader issue of N.A.T.O. policy and purposes. I hope that I have made it plain that the Government intend to give full support to the alliance, but I hope that it is equally plain to those who take the trouble to go to S.H.A.P.E. and Fontainebleau—as I know many hon. Members on both sides of the House have—and study the problems, that its strategy, especially nuclear strategy, needs a fresh appraisal to see if it is still right in completely changed circumstances.

I think that hon. Members know what is happening. Apart from the normal reviews—and N.A.T.O. is fairly review-ridden, anyway—a special review is now going on covering the whole of N.A.T.O. nuclear strategy. I wish to comment on only one or two points which I think important. Our representative there has already put forward British ideas for further progress. First, the terms "tactical" and "strategic", as applied to nuclear weapons, can be very misleading. It is the target that determines whether a nuclear weapon has been used tactically or strategically. The weapons themselves are often neither tactical nor strategic; it is only the rôle in which they are used which makes them one or the other, and we must try to keep that point in mind.

Secondly, N.A.T.O.'s main aim is to prevent war by maintaining an effective deterrent against aggression. To this end, N.A.T.O. strategy is based on the strategic nuclear forces of the West—S.A.C. and Bomber Command—and the shield forces in Europe and the naval forces in the Atlantic. If these forces fail in their deterrent rôle they will have to be used to fight the resulting war, but in our view their main task is to stop a war starting in Europe. That is the 1204 fundamental principle that we must never forget. There are many elements in this problem of taking a new look. One is a need to identify those weapons which are necessary for the rôle of the forces under S.A.C.E.U.R.'s command; another is the need to solve the very difficult problem of control—political as well as military—and a third is the need for weapons clearly to be subordinate to overall strategy.

Perhaps I could sum it up by repeating that we do not challenge N.A.T.O. purposes or principles. The fundamental problem could be summed up essentially as one of control and of the right balance between the nuclear and the conventional in N.A.T.O. forces. Therefore, our idea of N.A.T.O. is an alliance with strong conventional forces, backed by atomic fire power in the tactical rôle We do not see any advantage in setting up N.A.T.O. as a strategic nuclear Power; nor, I understand, does General Norstad.

I now turn to the second part of the N.A.T.O. problem, which can be summed up under the word "interdependence"—a much overused word. None the less. it is fundamental to the success not only of N.A.T.O. but of the world alliance of free people to make this concept of interdependence work. We feel it right that this should be considered in much wider terms than merely bilateral or multilateral arms deals. They are very important. but they are not the whole picture. There is the interdependence—although perhaps better words would be "standardisation" and "rationalisation"—of the whole allied defence effort. There is the problem of how to use our scientific, industrial and economic resources better together. There is the problem of trying to identify projects. At least, Great Britain took the lead there and presented N.A.T.O. with a list of a limited number of specific projects.

The Government regard that list as being a test of whether N.A.T.O. can make interdependence work. So far, I am glad to say that, as I am advised, the work on these projects is going well, but we must see some ascertainable success if we are to claim that interdependence is providing an end product. In the meantime, we have built up much better co-ordination between our military experts, scientists and technicians, and the chance of work being wasted is much less than it was.

1205 Interdependence also means that each N.A.T.O. ally must try to meet to the greatest extent the requirements of other N.A.T.O. nations British forces make use of many facilities on the Continent of Europe, and it therefore seems only common sense that we should be willing to help the Germans or any other of our allies if we can do so As the House knows, there has recently been a meeting of exports in Paris, under the auspices of N.A.T.O., to deal with the specific question of any help we can give to the German forces. No final decisions have yet been taken, but I thought that I should bring the House up to date with the progress of discussions at the beginning of the debate.

First, we have told the German authorities that we shall be ready to assist them in placing contracts for the maintenance of ships and aircraft in this country. That does not seem to be bad business, and our shipyards could do it well. Secondly, we have said that we could provide storage facilities for ammunition, petrol, oil, lubricants and general stores in some of the surplus storage capacity in our Service depots. Those depots will continue to be run by the Army or the Navy, and by British staff. Thirdly, we have agreed to examine the 'possibility of arranging German naval training in the manoeuvring areas normally used by the Home Fleet. That is a perfectly proper N.A.T.O. purpose.

We have also asked the German authorities to send a small party over to see whether the existing tank-firing facilities which we can provide for a limited number of German troops at Castlemartin would meet their demands. That party has yet to arrive, and no decision will be taken until an inspection has been made and we have had further talks. I hope that that brings the House up to date on that aspect of interdependence.

I now turn to the question of Anglo-American co-operation, which also comes under the heading and the broad scope of interdependence. Here, we share between us the responsibility for the Western deterrent. The United States Strategic Air Command and Bomber Command are closely linked, and I hope that they will remain so. We have given the United States facilities in Holy Loch for the maintenance of a Polaris submarine, and I am glad to welcome, on 1206 behalf of Her Majesty's Government, the United States mothership "Proteus" which will arrive there on 3rd March.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire)

There will be a welcome there, too.

§ Mr. Watkinson

Possibly a different sort from the one the hon. Member is thinking of. It seems to me to be only common sense that when, because of our geographical position, we can help to increase the effectiveness of this great addition to the Western deterrent to war, we should do so. In my view, it is a sincere attempt to give a further insurance for peace in the world.

§ Mr. John Rankin (Glasgow, Govan)

Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that Norway might have fulfilled, he rôle which is now being fulfilled by Holy Loch? Can he tell us why Norway rejected Polaris?

§ Mr. Watkinson

I would not know. No doubt Norway, Germany and other N.A.T.O. allies could have taken over this responsibility, but I prefer that the British Government should share in this task.

At many other points we are in the closest operational relationship with the United States. The United States development of Skybolt saves us research and development resources which we can divert to other purposes. I want to say again here what I tried to say about N.A.T.O. as a whole: if interdependence means anything to the Western world it must be a two-way trade, and it must work properly. That is why I very much hope to have an opportunity of meeting my new American opposite number, Mr. Macnamara, in Washington very soon and—

§ Mr. Rankin

Macnamara's Band?

§ Mr. Watkinson

—to discuss with him ways and means of furthering our common aims and complementing our joint efforts. It is based on the belief, as I have said, that this must be a two-way trade and that it must be seen to work reasonably efficiently. So much for interdependence.

§ Mr. Jeremy Thorpe (Devon, North)

Accepting that interdependence is the cornerstone of defence policy, if it is such a good thing why should it not be equally applicable to nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear 1207 bombs? Why is it all right for conventional weapons and not nuclear weapons?

§ Mr. Watkinson

I am coming to the question of nuclear weapons in a moment, when I shall answer the point raised by the hon. Member.

I turn now to the Government's third objective, namely, the need to contribute to the whole range of defence. In this, to answer the hon. Member's question, we approach the area of fevered and highly inaccurate controversy which surrounds the nuclear weapon. I will expound the facts which are clearly set out in the White Paper for those willing to read them. This firmly restates the Government's determination that Great Britain can, and should, continue to make her contribution to the nuclear deterrent strength of the West.

I believe that this is the clearest definition one can have of our continuing purpose. It seems to me of little point to split hairs about the terminology of our nuclear deterrent. An aggressor knows that we have this weapon and that in certain circumstances —which I pray will never arise—we should use it. The Government have made it plain that we have, and will continue to have, this capacity over the next ten years at least.

There is another argument—which I shall deal with in detail, because the House should have the facts in front of it as far as I can properly give them—apart from the one of outright rejection. It might be called the bayonets versus bombs argument. Are we spending too much on the strategic nuclear weapons? Is the balance between nuclear and conventional weapons right? The Government think that they have done this, and I will explain why. The cost of our nuclear strategic deterrent is about 10 per cent. of the defence budget. The cost of our air defences, world-wide, is about 10 per cent. of the total defence budget. Of this second 10 per cent., about one-third is attributable to the requirements of the deterrent.

If we decided to abandon the air defence of the bomber bases altogether, at best the saving would be a very small one. The type of force that would be required in this country would still need to carry 1208 out the rôle of reconnaissance and preventing radar jamming, and so on. We should still need the control and reporting system which, I hope, will gradually incorporate civil aircraft, and we should still need fighter aircraft and defensive guided missiles for many tasks around the world.

The point I wish to emphasise is that it is very easy to overestimate the resources that would be saved if the United Kingdom were either to opt out, or reduce, the contribution to the nuclear deterrent.

§ Mr. Warbey

rose—

§ Mr. Watkinson

No, I cannot give way. We have a two-day debate.

It is even easier to assume that if this change of policy were accepted we should be able to increase substantially the size, or the quality, of our conventional forces. If we gave up the whole of the bomber force completely there might be some real saving. Merely giving up the weapon will not result in any real saving. One would have to give up the whole of the delivery system, otherwise there is no real saving by cutting back in this field.

On the whole, I think that the balance in our defence programme is about right As for those who try to disguise an occasional doctrinal difficulty by claiming that our contribution is insignificant, I would say that they must face the fact that as it stands ready at this moment Bomber Command is capable, by itself, of crippling the industrial power of any aggressor nation. That is the truth of the present situation.

§ Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)

That is absolute rubbish.

§ Mr. Watkinson

I will arrange for the hon. Member to visit Bomber Command and to see for himself, if he wishes to do so. The force is extremely flexible and geography is on its side. Its deterrent power can operate in circumstances far away from Europe.

§ Mr. Davies

I sincerely believe in the cause of truth. Is the right hon. Gentleman telling the people of Britain that subsonic planes, in this technicological age, would be able to get through and deliver as he implies? If he is saying that, he knows it to be wrong, and so do the hon. Members of this House

§ Mr. Watkinson

The simple answer to the hon. Gentleman is "Yes", and I know it to be right. Even in an era of nuclear sufficiency there are powerful arguments for the retention of a British deterrent. I know that there are divided views on this, but if we are approaching, as I believe we are, some kind of nuclear balance, then keeping the means of delivery diverse, dispersed and up to date is even more necessary.

We have a few ideas for doing this. The free falling nuclear bomb, with which the V-bombers are armed, can at this moment be delivered to its target if the need arises. As air defences increase it will be replaced by the stand-off Blue Steel. To enable the V-bombers to attack their targets with even greater stand-off capacity, we are arranging to introduce Skybolt in the later 1960s. It is under development in the United States and is making very good progress. It is by no means the only possibility for the later 1960s. There are other means of delivery which we could adopt for deterrent purposes.

I am trying to tell the House the whole story as clearly as I can. There is the Buccaneer, which is shortly to come into service with the Royal Navy, which will be able to penetrate enemy territory by flying at very low levels. There is the TSR2, which will come into service with the Royal Air Force in the mid-1960s, an even more advanced weapon with the ability to fly at very low levels and to follow the contours of the ground automatically.

There are also other possibilities under study which we may adopt. I quite accept that the position is inconvenient for the Opposition at this stage, but I think that they might have served their own interests, and perhaps the national interests, better if they had stuck to the line which we remember they took in the defence debate twelve months ago. I will leave it at that.

The Government do not judge these issues by internal political considerations. We apply the yardstick of their effect on possible aggressors. By this test I believe that we have just about the right balance between the nuclear and the conventional.

I turn now to the fourth main aim of defence policy: how to get the best value for defence expenditure and the best 1210 balance within it. What dividend do we seek? All we seek is a peaceful world in which the basic protection of our way of life can he preserved. So far, we have secured our end. No doubt I shall sit through this marathon debate and hear again the usual charge of money wasted on defence. Peace is not to be bought on the cheap. We have had peace and if one wants it one has to pay for it. It is as simple as that.

Some of the following figures may, perhaps, help to dispel this illusion. In the ten years from January, 1951, to December, 1960, 410,000 tons of naval shipping were laid down. In the same ten years, the lift potential of the global transport force of the Royal Air Force has been increased from 50 million passenger miles a month to 150 million passenger miles a month, and is still building up.

In 1951, as everybody knows, we had a mixed force of Lincolns, Washingtons and Mosquito bombers carrying conventional bombs; but now one Vulcan bomber carries a far greater load of destructiveness than the whole bomber force did ten years ago.

The equipment of the Army is changing out of all recognition. It is being re-equipped with the F.N. rifle, the Stirling sub-machine gun, the Mobat antitank gun, the 105 mm. pack howitzer, the 8-inch howitzer, and Thunderbird. The new Chieftain tank is undergoing trials. There are many other clear gains to our defensive strength which are the dividend of the money spent. I ask the House not to have any doubts about this. In my view, the right dividend is the peaceful state of the world we have so, far managed to achieve and for that the price we pay is a very small insurance policy.

I turn to the difficult problem of defence planning. I do not try to disguise the difficulty of getting the best balance in a rapidly changing world. It is an immense subject and I shall take only four examples. First, there is mobility. I accept that the case for relatively small Regular forces rests on greater mobility and greater hitting power. I say again, because I sincerely believe it, that in an age of nuclear balance it is perhaps the small "brush fire" which may hold the greatest risks for us all. One does not cope with that situation with small garrisons, but with large mobile forces.

1211 Commando carrier and seaborne support especially will greatly increase our ability to bring this kind of composite force to bear quickly. It also enables us to poise it perhaps below the horizon, where it does not produce any particular political side effects.

I think that we are working towards the right balance in new Regular forces to meet this need for knocking the small incident quickly on the head before it can spread to something more dangerous. What is the present position of this front line "fire brigade" force?

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

Will the—

§ Mr. Watkinson

No I wish to go on.

At present, we have four commandos in the United Kingdom, Malta, Aden, and aboard H.M.S. "Bulwark", and we are planning to raise a fifth. Army deployment plans provide for a strategic reserve in this country and theatre reserves in East Africa and the Far East. Perhaps I should make plain that any large emergency would certainly allow us to draw on the seven brigade groups in Germany, as we have a right to do.

There is much talk about the necessity for quick reaction time in nuclear defence, but the rapidity of reaction time for conventional forces is as important. A considerable proportion of the strategic reserve in this country and in Kenya remains always at 48 hours' notice to move by air or land. In addition to commando carriers and commandos, this means that we could bring a substantial force quickly to any trouble spot. This is what we hope to maintain and improve as time goes on.

I turn to Regular recruiting. It is not my job to go into the details. I am sure the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) will go into that in due course. What I want to say to him and to the House as a whole—I may be proved wrong, but I do not think so—is that I believe we shall succeed in recruiting our Regular forces provided the nation gives this task reasonable support. I hope, therefore, that right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Members opposite will not be backward in giving their support to this cause. I do not think that they wish to do anything else, but let us have it clearly on the record. Any mis-statement about defence, any cleverly twisted argument is a disincen 1212 -tive to a young man who wants to go into the forces. Let right hon. Gentlemen opposite take it to heart, despite all their saddle-soreness from galloping their hobby-horses all over the country.

I come back to recruitment. It is fair to say that not very long ago, in 1957—we must try to get this into proportion—it was forecast that the shortage of Regular recruits in the Army—and, of course, it is the Army which is the problem—might be about 50,000, or perhaps. at best, 25,000. Already, we can see that we shall do better than that. Although I try to be perfectly frank with the House and say that there has always been a risk in giving up conscription, I believe that it is absolutely the right thing to do. I believe that as the country sees the Regular Army formations with progressive training, better units, better accommodation, better weapons, and better equipment, we shall get the recruits we need, and not only the men we need but the right men of high quality.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

They will not stay in the Army.

§ Mr. Watkinson

Although it would be very unwise to make judgments on one set of figures or another, I am certain that the January recruiting figures will bear out that argument. We shall go on with our estimates, and this year, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War will tell the House, we have a very elaborate stepped-up campaign to draw the attention of virile, energetic young men to the good, well-paid life which the Army provides.

§ Mr. G. W. Reynolds (Islington, North)

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the recent article by the Bow Group is part of that campaign?

§ Mr. Watkinson

Recent articles by the Bow Group show what a broad-minded party the Conservative Party is. Right hon. Members opposite are always saying that we are a great monolithic party which never thinks out its policy.

To come back to recruiting, which perhaps is more important than what we have been talking about, I think that we could get the total of just over 400,000 men. At a cost of 52 per cent. of the defence budget, I want to make it plain that this is as large a force as we can 1213 properly afford if we are to have a reasonable defence budget. The figure of just over 400,000 would be divided into 180,000 for the Army—

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

The right hon. Gentleman is getting his figures wrong. If he is getting only 400,000 he has 135,000 for the Air Force and 88,000 for the Navy. That is a long way short.

§ Mr. Watkinson

My addition is: 180,000 for the Army, 135,000 for the Royal Air Force and 88,000 for the Royal Navy.

§ Mr. Paul Williams (Sunderland, South)

. My right hon. Friend mentioned 180,000 for the Army, but can he tell us where we are? Is it 165,000, or 180,000? It is very important.

§ Mr. Watkinson

Of course it is important, but, as I have been saying, I have reasonable confidence that we shall reach the 165,000 target early in 1963, which is the due date. I then have confidence, because by then we shall have the strong upward tendency in recruiting, that we shall be able reasonably quickly to get a little over 180,000, which will be the ceiling which probably will have to be imposed for financial reasons.

§ Mr. Wigg

In the 1957 White Paper the Government gave a categorical assurance, which was repeated by the Home Secretary, that unless they got the 165,000 by 31st December, 1962, in honour the Government were pledged to reintroduce some form of conscription. The Minister has now admitted for the first time—or, actually, for the second time, because the previous Secretary of State for War said the same—that they are not going to get 165.000 by 31st December. 1962.

§ Mr. Watkinson

I know that the hon. Member wants recruiting to succeed, but I think that he is saying exactly the sort of thing that makes recruiting a great deal more difficult.

I come now to the question of defence, research and development. I am very surprised that more notice has not been taken of the arguments put forward in the White Paper concerning this immensely difficult problem. I hope that we have made some important strides forward in our objective of trying to match—we can only do that in our own 1214 chosen spheres—the vastly greater potential of the United States and Russia. This is really our problem. We are trying to compete with two industrial nations who can afford to spend money and do research on a scale that we cannot hope to imitate. Yet, by trying to select our particular spheres, I hope that we can—we must certainly try—keep level with them, or even make an occasional break-through, in friendly rivalry with the United States and, in a deterrent sense, in respect of Russia.

To give the House an example, we might hope to do that in the Navy in relation to anti-submarine warfare, and in the operation and control of aircraft carriers. In these matters we have already contributed much. We are pressing forward to the maximum of our ability in the tasks relating to the science of submarine detection and location, the importance of which I need not stress to hon. Members who have studied the numbers of Russian and Chinese submarines.

In the Army, we are producing and continuing to develop the best family of tank guns and tanks in the world. I hope that the Germans will now take the British 105 mm. tank gun as the Americans and other allies have done. In the R.A.F., we are clearly right to make our contribution by means of aircraft. In that way we have already contributed much. By "aircraft" I mean, also, aero-engines.

In the TSR2, for example, we have a project which at present is ahead of anything else in the world. We believe that our bombers can become airborne more quickly than any others—and so on through the whole range of our effort. I am trying to say that if we can manage to select the right sphere in which to make a contribution of our own, we may still hope to stay level with those two industrial giants. The development of the vertical take-off and short take-off aircraft is another sphere where I think we have very much to contribute.

Having selected our fields of endeavour, we have to work out whether we are now successfully operating a better method of selecting our projects and monitoring them as they go forward into production. We must make greater use of the initial study contract to study the feasibility of any particular kind of 1215 weapon system or project and then to study its development and what it will cost over the time-scale and so on. We are making a great many careful developmcnts to enable us to pick the successful projects at the earliest possible stage in their production, and in the very difficult stage when they change from an operational requirement to something which has to go into industry or into a defence factory. A great deal of work is going on in connection with this.

My fourth point in this balance within the programme is that of cost. No one would be better pleased than I were it possible to turn this expenditure to more peaceful purposes, but this cannot be until we can get some proper moves forward in disarmament and control. In the meantime, I expect that this year defence expenditure will continue the trend shown in the graphs which appear on page 9 of the White Paper; that is to say, a further small decline—I think very small—in the proportion of the gross national product devoted to defence.

One point I wish to make in answer to those who say that we spend too much on defence, and that the money might be better spent on other purposes, is that despite the constant crises over the last seven years there has actually been a decline of nearly 20 per cent. in defence spending I think that a very good record, bearing in mind the immense task we have to perform around the world. I do not mean that by comparison with our allies we are not still carrying our full share. Only the United States and France contribute a larger proportion of their gross national product to defence than we do.

Another interesting point about finance is that, strictly and technically. the Ministry of Defence is responsible for policy and the Service Ministries are confined to our annual budgetary exercise, a year-by-year process. It has always seemed to me that this is a quite illogical way in which to plan a large expenditure of money on projects for which the time-scale is normally between five years and seven years. It presents industry, the defence factories and the research stations with an impossible task. 1216 I am, therefore, glad to say, as is mentioned in paragraph 31 of the White Paper, that we are trying—it is still to some extent an experiment—to solve the problem by having a five-year forward look at defence spending; so that industry and all those concerned can obtain a much clearer idea, over a proper time-scale of what kind of defence spending they may have to contemplate, and what their share of it may be.

I have tried to be factual and to tell the House where we stand as clearly and plainly as I can. I am happy to leave the "fun and games" until later in our proceedings. Naturally, we examine and re-examine the broad pattern of our defence spending and our defence policy. No one could stand at this Box and, with the help of the Government's advisers, bear this burden, if he did not make every possible attempt to see that we were getting the best value in our defence programme and policy. Having carried through this continuing process of examination and re-examination, we believe that our defence programme represents about the best balance within our contribution and that our contribution is as much as we can fairly be expected to make to our various alliances and in the performance of the job we have to do in the world. The difference between us is, perhaps, expressed in some words from Henry V: There is some soul of goodness in things evil, Would men observedly distil it out. My right hon. and hon. Friends and I believe that we can only get peace by holding a continuous responsibility; by not rejecting the nuclear weapon so long as it serves its purpose—as it is certainly doing today—and by firmly going forward with a clear and definite defence policy which plays its maximum part in keeping the peace and in our alliances, and represents within our own defence policy the best and the most clearly adjusted balance which we can provide. That is the position as it stands. It represents no broad change in our defence policy and it is the best insurance policy for peace that the country could ever have.

§ Mr. Denis Henley (Leeds, East)

I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to 1217 the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: has no confidence that the policy as set out in the White Paper, Command Paper No. 1288, will provide effectively for the defence of Britain The White Paper which the Minister of Defence has just presented to the House is in many ways an extraordinary document. In presentation and tone it resembles, particularly in its strip cartoons, a "Robin" comic rather than a serious document of study. One can welcome some of the irreproachable platitudes which appear on the first two or three pages of the document, but. unfortunately, when the document descends into matters of detail it becomes clear that Her Majesty's Government have not the slightest idea what these platitudes mean.

Indeed, in so far as there might have seemed to be anything attractive in the White Paper, the Minister of Defence robbed it of all meaning when he confessed that this year's Defence White Paper represents no substantial change from the White Paper presented to the House in. 1957 by his predecessor, who is now the Secretary of State for Common wealth Relations.

I am sure that the House will find itself in general agreement with some of the statements with which the White Paper begins. We can agree, above all, with the opening sentences: There is only one answer to the threat to mankind posed by armaments. This is to reach a satisfactory agreement on general disarmament under effective international control. I believe, as I hope that everyone on both sides of the House profoundly believes, this statement to be true.

There is a further statement on page 3 which, I think, will command at any rate overwhelming majority assent on both sides of the House. It is this: Until general disarmament has been achieved, peace rests on the maintenance of adequate power by the West to discourage aggression by the Soviet bloc or by China. There is a further platitude about which we will all agree. It is when the White Paper states that there are certain limitations on the contribution which Britain can make to the Western defence forces—first, the other demands which may be made on our national resources as a whole, and, secondly, the other 1218 demands which may be made on our military resources in particular.

There is one glaring omission from the list of limiting conditions with which the White Paper begins, and that is the one to which I shall have to devote the bulk of my speech. We on this side of the House believe that, since disarmament is the only answer to the threat posed to mankind at present, it is absolutely essential that any steps we take in armaments in the short run should contribute to the long run end of disarmament and should not conflict with it.

We believe profoundly that defence policy must be subordinated to foreign policy, that generals must be subordinated to Foreign Secretaries. We believe that it is a tragedy that, not only in our own country but also in other countries, for many years the position has been the other way round. For years defence commitments which may have been made five, six or seven years ago have been tying the hands of diplomats and steps have been taken in the sincere hope of maintaining strength for negotiation which in fact have made negotiation impossible or futile.

It is from this point of view that I wish, first, to criticise the Government's defence programme. I believe that in 1961 there is a better chance than there has been at any time since the end of the Second World War to make real progress on disarmament and on agreement with the Soviet Union and her allies on arms control. I believe that there is a real danger that some of the policies now followed by Her Majesty's Government and by the West as a whole may make such agreements more difficult.

The biggest single threat posed to any agreement between the West and the Soviet Union at present in the field of disarmament is the very real and immediate possibility that atomic weapons will spread into the possession of a large number of countries which do not now possess them. When we on this side of the House raised this problem many years ago, a good deal of scepticism was expressed by Ministers and hon. Members opposite. However, we have now seen the French Government carry out test explosions. There has been recent evidence that perhaps the Israeli Government are seeking to produce atomic explosives. We know that at least ten or twenty other 1219 countries have, at any rate, the physical capacity to begin producing their own atomic weapons if they should judge it politically and economically advisable to do so.

I hope that the Minister will take this opportunity to deny that he meant what he said in the course of his speech that he sometimes had the odd thought that peace would be safer if everybody had the opportunity of blowing up everybody else.

§ Mr. Watkinson

That is not what I said. That is what my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) said. I will supply the hon. Member with the quotation if he wants it.

§ Mr. Healey

The Minister of Defence said that he sometimes had this odd this. [HON. MEMBERS: "No"] May I take it that on this issue the Minister of Defence disagrees absolutely with the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W Churchill)?

§ Mr. Watkinson

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman again, but I want to keep the record straight. The record will be quite clear that I gave a quotation from a speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford in 1953.

§ Mr. Healey

The right hon. Gentleman has still not said whether he agrees with the statement. Why did he quote it if he did not agree with it?

§ Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (Leicester North-East)

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree or disagree with it?

§ Mr. Healey

The plain fact is that all of us on this side and a large number of right hon. and hon. Members opposite take absolutely the contrary view, namely, that if the possession of atomic weapons spreads to more countries than have them at present—if the existing balance of terror, as the right hon. Member for Woodford once called it, turns into a general thermo-nuclear anarchy—any possibility of reaching agreement on arms control in the world as a whole or with the Soviet Union will be lost beyond all possible recovery.

I hope that the Minister of Defence, in spite of his embarrassment when I asked him that question, shares that view. If he does, I hope that he will also agree with my further point that, 1220 if the possession of atomic weapons spreads inside the Western Alliance, it is certain to spread outside it—not only inside the Soviet Alliance, but also to a large number of countries in Africa and Asia, which may have suspicion or fears of the possible action of some countries which are now inside the Western Alliance.

I believe that action to stop the spread of nuclear weapons is not only vital, but extremely urgent. Unless action can be taken on this issue in the immediate future, there is the real possibility of atomic weapons spreading into the possession of so many countries that all the calculations on which both sides of the House now base their defence policies will become irrelevant.

We shall face a situation in which we no longer have to calculate our policies in the light of one particular thermo-nuclear threat. We shall have to calculate our policies in the light of possible atomic threats coming from a dozen or a score of separate Powers. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that in the immediate future our own defence policy is calculated to contribute towards stopping and not encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons.

§ Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset. South)

Has the hon. Gentleman given any thought at all to the technology and testing requirements of any nation that possesses or uses the hydrogen bomb? How is it possible for possession just to spread in the way he is envisaging?

§ Mr. Healey

I have given a great deal of thought to this question. So have the American Government. So, I think, have Her Majesty's Government. That is one reason why they are trying to develop foreign policies calculated to stop the spread.

The point which I want to establish in this House this afternoon is that if one wants to stop the spread of atomic weapons one must also judge one's defence policies in the light of the impact that they are likely to make on the intention of other Governments. It is my belief that the Government's determination to continue developing new delivery systems for Britain's atomic weapons for at least ten years ahead is likely to be a major obstacle to any 1221 agreement on freezing the present situation.

I do not deny, as some hon. Members on both sides have done, that Britain possesses a formidable thermo-nuclear striking force. It is, indeed, a formidable one. I believe, however, and we on this side believe, that to keep our thermo-nuclear force effective over the next ten years will require a colossal effort by this country—and will be impossible without physical assistance from the United States of America, which would set a dangerous precedent for the action of other of America's allies.

The first question we must ask is why the Government are so set on this course. At the outset, we come across a serious contradiction between the views of the Secretary of State for Air and his supposed senior, the Minister of Defence, who has just spoken to us. Ever since he took office, the Minister of Defence has insisted that the aim of this operation from the British point of view is to make an independent contribution to the Western deterrent. In his Press conference on the Air Estimates last week, the Secretary of State for Air said that the first aim of our efforts in this direction was to establish an effective British deterrent. He referred quite separately to the question of making a contribution to the joint Western deterrent.

The difference is a very important one and I should like to spend a moment or two describing it. If the Secretary of State for Air and the Government want an effective independent and purely British deterrent, will they please tell us at some stage in the debate precisely what they want it for? Can any of them conceive of any situation in which we would need a completely independent deterrent because a military threat to which our deterrent was appropriate was being presented exclusively to these islands?

For myself, I find it almost impossible to conceive of such a situation. If, however, the Government can conceive of such a situation, I would ask them a second question. Assuming that such a threat is presented, do they really believe that over the next ten years—I speak not necessarily of the present, but looking ten years ahead—a situation could arise in which we could effectively use an 1222 independent thermo-nuclear force? Presumably, we would not use it against a country that did not have atomic weapons, because to do so would involve us in moral obloquy throughout the world from which we should never recover. Do we plan to use it against the Soviet Union or the United States? Against whom precisely do the Government plan to use this purely independent deterrent?

I suggest that if the Government are planning purely independent action against a major thermo-nuclear Power, it has no chance of success, because either of the other nuclear Powers which wishes to exert the whole weight of its nuclear striking force exclusively against these islands could be almost certain of knocking out our forces before they could be used, particularly because, with our existing V-bomber force, which is to remain an essential component of our delivery system for at least a decade, we are dependent on a warning system which we do not independently control and which is very largely manned and controlled by our allies.

Indeed, it seems to me that if one takes the evidence presented in the Memorandum accompanying the Navy Estimates and accepts that the Soviet Union is producing submarines with a nuclear missile capacity, it would be dangerous to rely on having any warning whatever, because submarines could fire missiles at this country from the surrounding waters without giving our aircraft even 30 seconds in which to get off the fields on which they are dispersed. The plain fact is that the contention of the Secretary of State for Air at his Press conference was one of his last spasmodic reactions at the end of the old Suez neurosis. The Government as a whole have completely given up the idea of a purely independent deterrent. It is simply a few remnants of the Suez group scattered around the benches opposite who still cherish the illusion.

If, as I think the Minister of Defence has done, we reject the conception of a purely independent British deterrent and we try to justify the Government's policy on the basis that it is a necessary contribution to the Western deterrent—I fully concede that this is the argument which the Minister of Defence used last 1223 year and has used this year; it is the only argument which he has ever presented to the House or to the country to justify this policy—I ask the right hon. Gentleman to give the House evidence that any of our allies wants us to make this contribution. I suggest that there is no such evidence, although there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. There is also plenty of evidence that our alliance, if we are talking as part of an alliance, does not need it.

Let us look, first, at the American thermo-nuclear striking force as it exists and, secondly, as it will exist two or three years from now. Even at present, the United States of America, with which we are in alliance and on which we and the whole of the West depend for the deterrence of thermonuclear attack, has 2,000 long-range strategic bombers, two wings of tactical bombers with nuclear capacity, 14 aircraft carriers whose aircraft carry atomic weapons, 14 wings of tactical fighters, Atlas missiles, Snark missiles, Regulus missiles and Matador and Mace missiles.

That was the situation last year. By 1963, America will also have 13 squadrons of inter-continental Atlas missiles. It has already produced two Polaris submarines. It is planning to produce three more Polaris submarines every year for the next ten years and each of those submarines will carry 16 megaton missiles. By 1963, the United States is planning to produce three wings of B58 bombers. The Minuteman missile is likely to come into operational use a year or two before it was originally planned and the American Air Force will be equipped with the Hound Dog air-to-surface missile.

The question which I should like to put to Her Majesty's Government, which they have never answered, is that if we assume that we are an alliance and that if ever we are presented with a military threat by the Soviet Union we shall have the support of our allies, what is the sense—

§ Viscount Hinchingbrooke

Ah.

§ Mr. Healey

The noble Lord may well say "Ah", but the Minister of Defence is precluded from saying so by the whole nature of the Government's foreign policy. The question which I put to the 1224 Government, and on which I should like an answer during this debate, is as follows. Given the colossal striking power of the United States in thermonuclear deterrents, what is the sense in spending £200 million a year in this country to keep 100 or more V-bombers in useful life for a few more years than otherwise they would be likely to be effective?

The precise cost of our thermo-nuclear programme is difficult to discover. I maintain, however, that insistence on giving priority to this effort has distorted the whole of our defence programme. We can be sure in advance that a very large proportion of our expenditure will be wasted, because, as the Minister of Defence has often admitted, it is not possible for a small country like Britain to try out six or seven alternative projects simultaneously. It must try to guess the right one, as the right hon. Gentleman once said, in the stable. We have had only one case so far. It was Blue Streak, a total failure which cost the country £100 million. That is well over three times as much as the groundnuts mistake cost the Labour Government ten years before.

The total loss on the Blue Streak project has reduced the Minister of Aviation, whom I am glad to see here, to the ignominious rôle of a latter day George Dawson carrying a load of surplus ex-service scrap round Europe in an effort to save money from the ruins. I suggest that on this issue, as on so many of the Government's defence programmes and policies, the Government are always making the fatal mistake of judging weapons which we may have in five or six years time against Soviet defences Which we know they have now.

The reason the Blue Streak effort was a complete failure is that we failed to take account of the fact that at the same time as we were producing missiles the Soviet Government were improving their missiles and their defences. The chance of this being so in the ease of a small Power trying to compete with great Powers like the Soviet Union is so great as to make any expenditure in this field unjustifiable.

I am glad to say that I am able to welcome this criticism also from a group of Conservative thinkers—in the old days that used to be an oxymoron—in a recent pamphlet which the Bow Group has published. I was very glad to see 1225 that, perhaps for this reason, the conference of Young Conservatives this weekend refused to endorse the Government's defence policy when the resolution was put to it.

§ Mr. Watkinson

I hoped the hon. Gentleman would say that, because it enables me to put on record the fact that they passed a strong resolution requiring the Government to retain their nuclear weapons with only three dissentients.

§ Mr. Healey

I am glad that the Minister of Defence feels fortified by the Young Conservatives' support on this single issue, even if they rejected the rest of his policy.

I am very glad to see—it is a good thing not only for the Conservative Party but for the country—that members of the Conservative Party should have wakened up from this age-long sleep in which they previously existed, in which the Government could completely revolutionise their defence policy from year to year without any of the hon. Members opposite even noticing, in which they got the same monolithic support, although one year the policy was completely different from the policy a year later.

I believe that as things now are, this country cannot stay in the atomic arms race with the great Powers unless it gets help from the United States and, as we know, the Minister of Defence has sought that help on more than one occasion. I feel more satisfied than ever, after a visit last week to Washington, that it will be quite impossible for the American Administration during the next ten years to give Britain help in this field of atomic military matters without offering help on the same terms to the rest of its allies, or at least to its more important European allies.

If we compel the Americans to set this precedent, we shall be creating a tremendous incentive for the Continental European countries to produce their own atomic warheads so that they can get help from the United States in producing their own delivery systems. In my opinion, the American Administration is coming to recognise this, and this explains the mystery of the vanishing Skybolt and why the Skybolt, which was the great deus ex machine of the Government last year, is reduced to a paragraph in the memorandum of the Secre- 1226 tary of State for Air this year. That is because the Minister of Defence knows that if the Americans ever produce Sky-bolt, they will not give it to us except under such stringent control terms as to make the idea of an independent British contribution to the Western deterrent complete nonsense.

I think the Minister of Defence admitted in other parts of his speech that we cannot in this country, nor can any other country, including the United States, hope to be independent in defence. What we must aim at through our alliances, as the Prime Minister has said, is interdependence. The only security offered to any country in this declaration is collective security, and interdependence can only be achieved in an alliance on the basis of specialisation. The Minister of Defence gave the House some impressive examples of how Britain could contribute to the military effectiveness of the Western Alliance by specialising on research and development in certain fields. The one field in which, by our very size, we are prohibited from making a further contribution is that of atomic weapons delivery systems.

I should like the Minister of Defence, or others who may speak later from the Government side, to make a rather more definite comment than the Minister made in his opening speech on the extremely important messages which President Kennedy sent last week, first to the N.A.T.O. Council on the general problems of N.A.T.O. co-operation, and secondly to the West German Government concerning the question of economic burden sharing within the Western Alliance. Do the British Government fully endorse those policies and proposals?

I should like also to hear from some future Government speaker whether Her Majesty's Government agree with the German Defence Minister who is reported as saying in The Times of today that Britain and France are the main obstacle to interdependence in N.A.T.O.'s logistical planning. I have often heard this said by persons who know a great deal more about Government policies than a member of the Opposition in any country is able to learn, and I think, in view of the extreme importance of this statement by the leading member of an allied Administration, that we should at 1227 least have some comment from the British Government on what they think about this problem. But I would insist that if, as I believe, we in Britain must share the burdens of interdependence within N.A.T.O., we must also share in the right to decide what N.A.T.O. strategy should be.

The second major criticism which we should like to make of the Government's defence policy is the Government's failure to press inside N.A.T.O. for the right Western strategy—indeed, in some cases the Government's obstruction of necessary changes in N.A.T.O. strategy which other of the N.A.T.O. allies would have wished. We believe—and we have, stated this point of view in many defence debates over the last few years—that the existing N.A.T.O. strategy in some respects is extremely dangerous. Moreover, we believe that some proposals, which have been made officially, for changes in N.A.T.O. strategy in the immediate future would merely increase the existing dangers of N.A.T.O. strategy.

In our view, the main danger in. N.A.T.O. strategy is that the nature and deployment of N.A.T.O.'s shield forces make it almost inevitable that any local conflict in central Europe must turn into an atomic war. Most of us have tremendous doubts as to whether, once atomic weapons are used, even on the battlefield, there is much chance of halting the progress of events before it leads to all-out total global thermonuclear war.

The main criticism that one would make of the proposed changes in N.A.T.O. strategy, and particularly the proposals put to the N.A.T.O. Council in December by General Norstad, is that his proposal for scattering medium-range ballistic missiles all over the Continent of Europe would make it certain that any limited war in Europe would spread immediately to total war It is no good the Minister of Defence suggesting, as he did, that the proposals made by General Norstad were purely in the field of tactical weapons. General Norstad was asking to have put under his control weapons with a range of 1,500 miles because he wanted them for the purpose of making atomic attacks on targets inside the Soviet Union.

1228 Does the Minister of Defence really believe that it would be possible for N.A.T.O. to drop atomic bombs on targets inside the Soviet Union without almost a certainty of a total Soviet Union response against the whole of the striking forces of the West? He can juggle verbally in Parliament as to the difference between tactical and strategic targets, but if an H-bomb drops on Vukovv Airport, just outside Moscow, and the fall-out blankets the whole of the capital of the Soviet Union, does he think that the Russians will be impressed by the fact that the weapon was aimed at and in fact hit a purely tactical target? Of course he does not think that.

The plain fact is that if this proposal were carried out and if there were any effective political control of the use of these M.R.B.M.s, there is an overwhelming probability that the West would decide not to use them. In fact, the West would have become dependent on weapons which, in an emergency, it was not willing to evoke. The West would be faced with the terrible choice which has always threatened powers since the atomic bomb was first invented, that in an emergency there would he a stark choice between suicide and surrender.

I am very disappointed, as I think we all are, that Her Majesty's Government have not come out openly in the N.A.T.O. Council and in public with these very powerful arguments against the Norstad proposals. I hope that at last in this debate we shall have some intelligent and precise comment upon them from the Government benches.

I am glad to say that I can announce to the House and to the country at large that on one issue on which there was perhaps thought to be serious disagreement on our side, there is no longer any serious disagreement at all; that is, that the West must have atomic weapons as long as the Russians have them. There is no doubt that if one reads the speech made last week by Marshal Sokolovsky, who was recently Chief of the Soviet General Staff, the Russians have these weapons in very large numbers, that they are very effective, and that they are planning to produce more. In a situation in which the other side is at least as fully supplied with these atomic weapons, both battlefield and strategic, as is the West, then it seems 1229 to me that these weapons are a certain deterrent only against their use by the other side. They are a possible deterrent against all sorts of other situations, but they are a certain deterrent only against their use by the other side. For that reason, I believe that we must try in the West to produce a situation in which we do not ever need to use these weapons first.

There is growing agreement—President Kennedy stressed this in an interesting interview which he gave in Washington a few days ago—that the West does not plan to use these strategic thermo-nuclear weapons first. America, as he said, is planning to have a second strike not a first strike strategic force; but it is still unfortunately the situation—and we cannot get away from this—that at the present time the West may face certain challenges from Eastern Europe which it cannot meet by the conventional forces which it now has in Western Europe alone.

Therefore, we believe that the West must now devote great attention to this problem: what steps can we take in order to get out of the situation which we are undoubtedly in at the present time, in which we can be faced with conventional challenges in Europe which we cannot meet unless we use atomic weapons against them? This is a very difficult problem in theory, but I do not believe that it is as difficult in practice as it is in theory. It seems to me that many people who study these problems particularly perhaps in universities and other institutions, make them much more difficult than they really are by refusing even to consider the question of the political context and what the Soviet Union is likely to do.

If we look at the problem as it is in practice and not as it is in theory, then I think that we are all agreed, even Field Marshal Montgomery, which only proves that nobody can be wrong all the time, that there is no substantial danger at the present time in Europe of a deliberate large-scale Soviet attack. The deterrent posture of the West is by itself sufficient to prevent that in practice, even though it may not be sufficient in theory.

The only real danger of war in Europe is a small, local conflict arising in a situation in which the whole spectrum of deterrence would be irrelevant, arising 1230 perhaps just across the Iron Curtain or in East Berlin. No military posture by the West could deter such an incident breaking out in the first place, because such incidents arise because ordinary men and women suddenly feel an irresistible desire to get rid of a local town councillor or to knock off a policeman on the corner. No one can be sure that such a situation will not arise so long as ordinary men and women are living under Governments which they dislike.

I remember last year asking Willy Brandt, the Lord Mayor of Berlin, if he thought that there was any chance today of another rising in East Berlin, such as the one which took place in 1953. He replied very acutely, "No, and I did not think so in 1953 either". This is the real danger. It is a danger to which the whole concept of deterrence is irrelevant. It is, in fact, the only real danger, in my view, which the West now faces in Europe. It is absolutely vital that if such an incident should arise N.A.T.O. should be in a position to halt the conflict locally without using nuclear weapons, without stepping on to the nuclear escalator which leads up to the final catastrophe of all-out thermo nuclear war.

I hope that we shall have some facts and figures given on this because a very large number of us. I think on both sides of the House, have had the unpleasant feeling in the last few years that the organisation of Britain's forces in Germany is a major obstacle to such a policy. Whatever Ministers may say in London, the officers in charge of troops in Germany now rely implicitly on fighting with atomic support, if they have to fight at all. If one talks individually to the officers serving in Germany, one finds that this is their expectation. My hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) will have a good deal to say about this when he speaks later in the debate.

We all know that the way in which the Rhine Army has been equipped with nuclear weapons is essentially the price paid by the West for the policy of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in 1957. We were only just able to justify defaulting on the promises made by Mr. Eden in the Brussels Treaty by giving nuclear fire power to half the number of forces that we had originally 1231 undertaken to maintain in Germany. I believe that we must reverse this trend. Our major and most urgent task in N.A.T.O. should be to produce a highly mobile, conventional force which is capable of halting a small scale, local conflict without any recourse whatever to atomic weapons. In order to ensure that this force does not respond with atomic weapons, atomic weapons should be physically withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of the Iron Curtain, because no matter what control mechanism may have been worked out by Governments in peacetime, if once there is danger of an atomic missile being overrun by enemy troops the chance that those on the spot with the physical power to fire it will do so is a real one.

I do not myself believe that in order to achieve this objective it is likely to be necessary for N.A.T.O. greatly to increase the manpower now available to it in Germany because the sort of conflict we are considering now is not a major conventional attack by the Soviet Union but a local outbreak on a very small scale which must be dealt with quickly and which, if it is dealt with quickly, cannot develop into a large-scale attack. What is necessary is that the equipment of the N.A.T.O. troops in Germany should be vastly better than it is now and that our troops in particular should be much more mobile and very much better supplied with conventional artillery and signals equipment. My hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich. East will have more to say about that when he speaks.

§ Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

If I may say so in no condescending fashion, this is one of the most intelligent speeches on the subject that I have heard for a long time. I am trying hard to understand one of the points which my hon. Friend makes. He says that a local conflict may occur. He says also, or he implies, that a local conflict may occur in spite of the nuclear deterrent and, if a local conflict does occur, the nuclear deterrent has not prevented the local conflict breaking out. Does he suggest also that a local conflict could develop into a nuclear conflict? If so, I have great difficulty in understanding why he relies on the nuclear deterrent.

§ Mr. Healey

I can, perhaps, clarify that very briefly by saying that my con- 1232 ception is this. Fighting breaks out because somebody kills a policeman in East Berlin. Soviet troops take part in the fighting. Perhaps it drifts across the frontier and Western troops are involved. It is perfectly true, of course, that the nuclear deterrent has not prevented fighting breaking out, and it could not. But the existence of nuclear capacity on both sides is an effective deterrent for both sides against allowing the conflict to become a bigger one providing that both sides, or at any rate that our side, are capable of dealing with the local conflict rapidly and preventing it from spreading. Then, I think, there is no temptation to the Soviet Union to try to enlarge the conflict, because one already has powerful deterrents against any deliberate decision by the Soviet Union to enlarge the fighting. The danger I foresee is that, if the local Western forces have atomic weapons in their possession, or if there are atomic weapons in the area into which the fighting may drift, then the West may initiate the use of atomic weapons, and at that point it will be extremely difficult to prevent the conflict from spreading.

I come now to the problem of manpower which, I know, worries us all on both sides of the House. I believe that there are two lines along which it is possible to tackle the problem of manpower which the Government have so far shown little or no sign of investigating. In Europe, the obvious line along which the problem of the British contribution to the N.A.T.O. shield forces can best be approached is to try now to see whether we can reach agreement with the Soviet Union to limit arms and forces in both halves of Europe. The basic pre-conditions for such an agreement have existed for a long time. As we all admit, both sides recognise that aggression would be far too dangerous to risk. Each side appears fairly satisfied that the other side will not attack. Therefore, what is required is agreement in a situation which is inherently stable to rule out the possibility of surprise attack and to stabilise the present situation at the lowest possible level of armaments and forces.

I do not want to make a particular party point on this. In fact, the first proposal for such an agreement was made by Mr. Eden, with Mr. Dulles' support, 1233 as far back as 1955. We had valuable and impressive proposals from the Communist side by Mr. Rapacki in 1958, I think it was. When Mr. Macmillan went to Russia eighteen months ago, he reached agreement with Mr. Khrushchev to study the concept. Last year, at the United Nations Assembly, the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Gomulka, raised the matter again.

I appeal most earnestly to the Government to do their utmost in the next few months to tackle the N.A.T.O. strategic problem along these lines. Nobody can be certain that, if we start, we shall succeed. I myself believe that the chances of success are, if anything, greater than the chances which we all agree to exist of achieving agreement on a nuclear test ban, and I believe that if we could reach agreement on this issue not only would it be by far the best answer to the strategic problems faced in Europe not only by N.A.T.O. but by the Soviet Union but it would create also a precedent for political agreements in Europe and for further steps towards disarmament in the world as a whole, the importance of which it is almost impossible to exaggerate.

§ Mr. John Beggs-Davison (Chigwell)

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for his courtesy in giving way. I do not quite understand what he proposes. Is he now proposing that there should be a limitation of armaments throughout Europe, not just in one special zone of Europe?

§ Mr. Healey

What I am proposing is that we talk to the Russians about the general principle of limiting arms and forces in as large an area of Europe as possible, establishing ground control posts to ensure that these limitations are observed and also, perhaps, following the suggestion of Air Marshal Slessor, having overlapping radar screens, Western screens going up to the Polish-Soviet frontier and Soviet screens coming up to the North Sea or, perhaps, into Britain. How far we could reach agreement is entirely a matter for negotiation. The point I make is that the larger the area is the better will be the result. But, of course, the matter does require negotiation among a very large number of Governments. Although I could easily produce a sheaf of blueprints of possible solutions, I think it would be a waste of time to do so.

1234 The other line of attack on which the Government have shown far too little sign of pursuing touches our commitments overseas. My hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East will be dealing in detail with this matter. The more one travels about the world, the more convinced one becomes that a large number of so-called commitments which the United Kingdom now carries outside the Continent of Europe are out of date and do not make sense in 1961 in either military or political terms. If we look at the military problem, I think we must agree that it is doubtful whether by 1970 this country will have any land bases abroad except in the white countries of the Commonwealth. It is probable that there will be a barrier to the flight of military aircraft stretching from the Soviet Union through the Middle East, through Africa, to the Atlantic.

If we look at the political situation, especially in the light of our experiences in 1956 and 1958, we must conclude, I think, that there will be very few potential situations in which British military intervention would be likely to produce political advantages greater than the certain disadvantages attending it. I know that the Government themselves have already made up their minds that at least one type of intervention is to be ruled out. There are to be no more "Suezes".

I am rather worried in this respect by the prominence given in the White Paper to the Chinese threat. I cannot help wondering whether the generals and admirals are now fighting, a rearguard action and trying to justify the maintenance of inflated establishments by trying to create new commitments against China in the Far East because they know that the Government recognise that commitments in other parts of Africa and Asia may have to be cut.

The only thing in the White Paper which the House can genuinely welcome is a few odd signs here and there that the Government, for the first time since Suez, are beginning to look at the defence problem rationally. When the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations produced his White Paper in 1957, many of us had the very strong feeling that he was clutching at the megaton missile as a sort of virility symbol to compensate for the exposure of Britain's military impotence 1235 at Suez. Since that time one has felt to a large extent that Britain's defence policy required study by a psychiatrist rather than by a military technician.

Although there are signs that the Government are escaping from this phychosis, there are also signs that they are escaping from psychosis simply into a sort of sleeping sickness lit by a few flashes of schizophrenia. There is still no sign of any serious attempt to relate Britain's defence policy to Britain's political aims. The structure of our defence policy as it exists and as it is proposed in the White Paper is likely to be a major obstacle to the success of the West in disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. In spite of spending nearly £17,000 million since the Government took office, the country is still incapable of meeting any of the military threats which it is likely to meet. For this reason, I ask the House to reject the 1961 Defence White Paper.

§ Mr. Stephen Hastings (Mid-Bedfordshire)

I hope that the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) will forgive me if I do not comment upon his speech. With the hon. Gentleman's concurrence, I prefer to leave that to someone with greater experience than I have.

I know that it is traditional for maiden speaker to avoid controversy. This I am most anxious to do. At the same time, I wish to try to make a contribution of some sort, especially in a debate as important as this, and for that reason, I propose to put forward a proposition. I shall do my best not to be contentious and I hope very much that I shall not tax the forbearance of hon. Members too greatly.

I wish to discuss two separate and distinct aspects of the defence problem. The first concerns the type of emergency with which we had to deal and from which we suffered in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. I believe that there is an analogy between the activities in those three emergencies. I have seen enough of this kind of activity in my life to hope most fervently that we shall not be called upon again to cope with anything of the sort, but I suppose that, in the present state of the world, it would be a bold man who could predict that with 1236 certainty. In any case, such an eventuality may, I think, fairly be discussed within the confines of this debate.

It is clear from the White Paper and from what my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence has said that we can fly our conventional forces to any area of emergency with considerable speed. and, indeed, with increasing speed as time passes, and this is much to be welcomed. But I am not so much concerned with that aspect this afternoon as with what these conventional formations can or cannot do when they arrive.

Conventional formations and units are vital in a situation of this kind, for three reasons. First, they give confidence to the unfortunate people whose only crime is that they happen to live in the troubled area. Secondly, they serve to contain the emergency—that is, they prevent it generating into mass activity of one kind or another. Thirdly, they are necessary for a multiplicity of guard duties. But, in my submission, conventional units are not best equipped to penetrate to the core of this kind of trouble or to put a stop to it; which means that the capture of the leaders and their supplies of arms is necessary. I think that for this task an unconventional approach is necessary This is expensive neither in money nor in men. But there are two essential prerequisites—first, accurate information and, secondly, experience of this sort of thing. I do not propose to say anything about the first other than to comment that without accurate prior information no amount of experience of this activity will be of any avail.

Concerning experience, we should by this time know a great deal about the sort of techniques to which I am alluding—techniques of resistance, terrorism, subversion, or whatever one likes to call them. We learned much about them during the war and since then we have, unhappily, seen variations on the same theme in the jungles of the Far East, in the African forests and in the mountains and towns of the Levant. This activity can be as much political—even social or, if one likes, anti-social—as military. It comprises the intimidation, even the murder, of innocent people in order to spread fear. We know the disruptive possibilities of sabotage and of the apparatus of secret communications 1237 with the outside world, and so on. We know that all this can be governed and ruled by the particular and strange psychology of resistance, which is a very real thing.

But the experience to which I have referred is the property of individuals, although it also rests in the files. Now, as I understand it, towards the end of each of the three emergencies to which I have referred we trained a number of officers and N.C.O.s in these techniques. But when the emergency was over these men dispersed. They were posted to other units and subsequently lost as a body, with the result that, when the next emergency arose, they were not readily available; and it is not unfair to say that we were compelled to relearn the lessons which perhaps we should have known at the beginning which we had certainly learned in the past.

This knowledge should not be considered as a severely specialist subject. Rather should it form part and parcel of the training of all officers and men of the reserve liable for service in an emergency of this kind. I would go further and suggest, with respect to my right hon. Friend, that there might be a case for the raising or formation of special units composed, naturally, of men of a high calibre who are carefully trained and able to live and work in groups of two or three rather than in conventional platoons and companies, in discomfort, if necessary, well away from the N.A.A.F.I. or even the cookhouse, and able to stay doggedly and patiently on the trail of a quarry as elusive and dangerous as can be.

There is in an emergency of this nature a whole range of para-military tasks which do not necessarily fit within the normal duties of either the policeman or the conventional soldier. It is this gap that should be filled, not after such an emergency has begun but as a permanent feature of our defensive arrangements. In addition t