THIRD DAY

§ The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)

The paragraphs in the Queen's Speech dealing with foreign affairs set out a comprehensive doctrine in the international field. If I may try to put it in rather simple terms, it is that our national interest is to take the heat out of dangerous situations so that they do not end up in fighting. We have to create a feeling of stability without which there cannot be that confidence upon which permanent peace depends. We intend to be loyal to our alliances and while we are not prepared to be pushed about by those who disagree with us, nevertheless we are ready to discuss our differences with the sincere intention of trying to resolve them. That is our philosophy and I do not believe that any other makes sense in the modern world. We have to do all this against a background of world interdependence or common interest.

In matters of science and of health, that interdependence is widely recognised and to some extent practised. In the field of economics, I think it is realised that the world is interdependent, although we have a long way still to go to develop satisfactory techniques for carrying it out. When we come to the political relationships between nations, however, we have to admit that in many cases they are conducted with the maximum of suspicion and the minimum of confidence. That is the background to the present international situation against which our policies have to be judged.

321 The House rose for the Summer Recess under the shadow of the serious events in the Middle East. In the last debate before we rose, I outlined to the House our efforts to secure a meeting of the Security Council at Heads of Government level to discuss the situation in the Middle East. I think there is no doubt that that proposal received general approval in all quarters of the House. Unfortunately, Mr. Khrushchev, after first seeming to accept, later declined. I think it was a pity: I think an opportunity was missed.

Therefore, the proposal for a special General Assembly of the United Nations was put forward by the United States and supported by us. At that special meeting of the General Assembly in August, which I attended, efforts were made by one or two countries to stir up controversy and make it a cold war exercise. Our action in sending troops to Jordan was denounced by one delegate as aggression, but I do not think that that kind of comment had very much effect. The Soviet representative, with one or two others, tried to concentrate the whole debate upon the withdrawal of the United States and British troops, but that attempt also failed, for the reason, I think, that there was a widespread desire, which became obvious almost at once, for a constructive approach to the problems arising between the Arab States.

We did everything we could to encourage the attempts which were made by the Arab States to get together and we gave warm support to their resolution setting out the good neighbour policy between them. In accepting this resolution on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I pointed out that the need was to translate the admirable sentiments of the resolution about good neighbourliness into deeds effecting all the countries of the Middle East. In accordance with the resolution, the Secretary-General visited the area and made his report on 30th September. He detailed the arrangements which he was making and which he proposed to make to give effect to the resolution, and that report of his was accepted without debate.

We immediately, the following day, announced that our withdrawal would begin on 20th October, and that is what happened. Meanwhile, a United Nations representative has established his headquarters in Amman and the Secretary-General has retained the right to go himself or send his representative to any 322 capital in the area in regard to the implementation of the resolution.

This is an experimental procedure. It is a new process in the supervision of the carrying out of a resolution of the General Assembly. I think it should be watched with the greatest interest. I think it offers great hope. We know the difficulty which the United Nations has in being effective when there is a sharp disagreement between its members. The strength of the position in this case is that the present United Nations action is based upon a resolution carried unanimously.

The Leader of the Opposition in his speech on Tuesday doubted whether our intervention had achieved anything. He doubted whether the internal security of Jordan was any greater than in July. In the week beginning 14th July there was a sense of impending disaster, incitement to murder and insurrection was loud and sustained from agencies outside the frontiers of Jordan, there were armed incursions and arms-running into Jordan. I think without doubt there was a situation of dire emergency. The State of Jordan might easily have ceased to exist and there might have been bitter fighting between her neighbours.

Whilst no one can prophesy as to the future, particularly the future in the Middle East, I disagree with the Leader of the Opposition entirely as to the present position, because all the information in my possession shows that the atmosphere today is quite different from that on 17th July and very much calmer; and in all this, if I may say so, I think great credit is due to King Hussein for his courage and tenacity.

Our action won time, and, in my view, good use has been made of that time and it is not a contribution to peace and stability in the area for anyone to pretend otherwise.

About the long-term future of Jordan, that is a different matter. We did not go into Jordan to use it as a base for other operations. We did not go in in order to occupy it or to interfere in its internal affairs. Our only wish was to give Jordan herself the chance to work out her own future with her neighbours acting in the spirit of the Arab Resolution. But for our action I do not believe that Jordan would have the chance to try to do that.

During the debate in the House in July on the situation in the Lebanon. I spoke 323 of the dangers of indirect aggression and of the manifestations of this that there had been in the Arab States over the past few years. It was because what I said was true that the Arab States came together in New York, with, I am told, some very plain speaking, and there has been another example of similar plain speaking at a recent meeting of the Arab League. But the danger is there, the danger of indirect aggression. It was recognised in the resolutions of 1949 and 1950 which were supported by the Opposition when they were in Government. Of course, it is not confined to the Arab States, but I believe that the international community will have to work out ways and means of meeting that threat.

One of the suggestions which were put forward, in which, I think, there is great merit, is that there should be some kind of monitoring of the broadcasting which goes on from one country about affairs in another. I am not saying this aiming at a particular group of countries. I think it is a standard to which we should all endeavour to subscribe.

The resolution of 21st August looked a little further, however, than the immediate problem in the Middle East because it invited the Secretary-General to continue his studies and consult the Arab countries with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution. President Eisenhower had referred to this in his speech at the opening of the Special Assembly.

We have for a long time been giving thought to this matter and I myself have had several discussions with Mr. Hammarskjöld about it. I think two important factors are now emerging which may make the launching of such a plan at long last more feasible. The first is the indication of American willingness to contribute large sums to an international fund, rather than bilaterally, provided the Arab countries themselves take the initiative to set it up. Secondly, I think the attitude of other possible contributors is more favourable. I shall not be more specific than that. The Secretary-General has been having consultations with the Middle Eastern Governments about it and has had indicated to them in what way the United Nations might help.

324 It is now for the Arab countries themselves to decide. We are prepared to assist in Middle Eastern development to the best of our ability, but the decision as to a new institution must be made by the Arab countries themselves. It cannot be imposed upon them from the outside, but I believe that there may be an increasing realisation in the Arab world that the future lies in co-operation for constructive development and not in arguments about supremacy, and this is a trend which we should strongly welcome.

One small postscript to this chapter is that the arrangements for the flying out of the British Parachute Battalions from Jordan were made by the United Nations. It was not necessary, but, to my mind, it was highly desirable that the United Nations rôle should be emphasised in that way. The arrangements were made with great efficiency by General Bull, representing the United Nations, and members of his staff; and, so far as I am informed, there was complete co-operation in a rather complicated operation on the part of the authorities of the United Arab Republic and the arrangements were scrupulously observed on both sides. I say that that little piece of practical co-operation may be a good omen for the future.

In regard to the situation in Cyprus, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the House last Tuesday about the recent series of discussions in the North Atlantic Council. There was a further meeting in Paris yesterday. I regret, however, that I have no progress to report as a result of that meeting.

The Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. has been making great efforts to arrange for a conference. He had circulated to the Council a draft minute setting out the basis for a conference and two alternatives for its composition. He had also circulated the draft of a letter to the Permanent Representatives.

We had notified our acceptance of the documents and of whichever proposal for composition was most acceptable to the others. The Turks had similarly agreed, and we were under the impression that the Greek Government had certainly accepted the basis for the conference and were very near agreement on composition. These documents will be published. 325 I think for the convenience of the House they should be published as a White Paper as speedily as possible.

We have tried very hard to make this conference possible. It seems to me that for it really three things are necessary. First, there should be agreement about the agenda, that is to say, what the conference is to be about; secondly, there should be agreement as to the composition, in other words, as to who is to attend it; and thirdly, there should be agreement about the timing of the conference.

So far as the agenda was concerned, as I have said, there was agreement. It was agreed that the conference should discuss our interim seven-year plan. It was agreed that amendments to that plan could be put forward and discussed. It was agreed that certain proposals which M. Spaak had put forward himself should be discussed. It was agreed that the discussion of a final solution might also take place, and we made it quite clear that we thought it would be appropriate to assess the elements of a provisional settlement in relation to their effect upon any final solution.

So far as composition was concerned, agreement had virtually been reached as to the place and composition of the conference. We had made it quite clear, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said an Tuesday, that we would make no attempt to exclude Archbishop Makarios from participation should it be wished that he should come as a representative of the Greek Cypriots. We have sought in every possible way to accommodate ourselves to the views of the others concerned.

We understand the difficulties of the Greek Government. We have no wish to add to them. The third element is the timing of the conference. The Greek Government have said finally that they cannot agree to attend. They feel that so much is at stake that if the conference were to fail the situation would be worse than if no conference at all had been held. That is a point of view. We do not agree with it, but we understand it. We hope there will be further thought given to this matter, and we are quite prepared to take up the idea of a conference at any time. We prefer to regard this round of discussions as adjourned rather than concluded.

326 I see, however, that we have been accused of "incomprehensible and unacceptable intransigence." I would repeat again our position. We stated that the conference should discuss not only our plan but any amendments and M. Spaak's proposals. We agreed that the discussion of a final solution should also take place. We agreed that a provisional solution should be discussed to see if it would prejudice any particular final settlement. We agreed that M. Spaak should be invited to take the chair at the conference. We agreed in addition that, if desired, representatives of two other N.A.T.O. Governments should attend. We agreed that Archbishop Makarios could come. I do not think that that attitude can fairly be described as incomprehensible and unacceptable intransigence, and I do not propose to comment further at this stage upon the statements published in Athens today.

Another outstanding event during the Parliamentary Recess was the agreement at Geneva between the scientists about control and suspension of nuclear testing. Although there was some last minute alarm as to whether the conference would meet, it did meet, and a spirit of workmanlike co-operation was speedily established between the two sides. I pay tribute to the work of the leader of the Western Delegation, Dr. Fisk of the United States, and to Sir William Penney and Sir John Cockcroft.

There is now agreement that control is technically possible, and we have to seek further agreement on the political and administrative points which arise. Those points are the membership of the control organ, its method of work, its method of taking decisions, the provision of reliable communications for it, the provision of transit facilities, the staffing of the control posts and of what nationalities they are to be, the speedy analysis and processing of the data provided, and the ensuring that the national Governments will give the facilities which will be needed to make the control processes set out in the report really work.

As the House will remember, the report was published on 21st August, and the following day the American and British Governments announced that they would suspend tests for a year from 31st October provided the Soviet Union would come to the conference and did not have tests over 327 that period. Well, I believe that the Russians are coming to the conference, which opens tomorrow. Meanwhile, the Soviet representative at the United Nations said that his Government categorically declined to suspend tests for one year. That statement has, I think, been modified since, and although we would be disappointed if that were the attitude of the Soviet Union, we hope they will in fact refrain from nuclear tests after 31st October.

Our attitude remains unchanged. We intend to do our utmost to make the conference a success and we hope that the result will be that the termination of all test explosions of nuclear weapons will ultimately be achieved.

Another hopeful development is, I think, the conference of experts which is to meet in Geneva on 10th November to devise a system of measures against surprise attack by one country on another. We trust that the experts' technical talks on this subject will again lead to agreed conclusions and so make possible a political agreement on a second important facet of disarmament. I do, however, want to make absolutely clear that our objective is still a comprehensive disarmament agreement. The question is how we arrive at it. There is not agreement yet on a comprehensive plan. There is not agreement yet even on the group of partial measures which we put forward in the summer of 1957, but my belief is that the success of these two conferences coming off in Geneva will change the atmosphere and thus contribute to a much more fundamental agreement. If these political discussions can be conducted in the same spirit as the technical discussions of last August, I think we have good reason to be hopeful.

I should like to say a few words on the Far East. I gather that there was complaint made from time to time that I had not made sufficiently clear the attitude of Her Majesty's Government. In my speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25th September I stated our position precisely. Our objective is to secure general international approval of the contention that the status of these islands and of Formosa should not be settled by force. I know that there are some who say that because the conflict between the Chinese Communists 328 and the Chinese Nationalists is of the nature of a civil war, we are not entitled to try to prevent these matters being resolved by force. I think that is a very dangerous argument, particularly when we remember that one participant in the civil war is closely allied to the Soviet Union and the other participant has a defence treaty with the United States of America. Those are facts, and they make the idea of settling this matter by force extremely dangerous.

There are several countries in the world which are divided. There are other areas in the world whose status is not agreed, and I believe that it should be our endeavour to prevent solutions of that kind of problem by force of arms. Of course, one way of preventing the use of force is to give in to the other side. That kind of appeasement can be very dangerous. That could lead to the overthrow of our friends and the withering away of independence in the area. The House should reflect upon the consequences in the smaller countries of South-East Asia and the Far East of the United States giving in to the use of force over Formosa and the off-shore islands. This is not a view which I expect some hon. Members opposite to endorse, but one ultimate consequence might be the withdrawal of the United States from the great responsibilities she has undertaken in the Far East.

§ Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)

A good job, too.

§ Mr. Lloyd

I believe that only a tiny minority believe that it would be a good thing for the peace of the world.

§ Mr. Davies

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way to me. I had the privilege of listening to him in the United Nations in New York and I should like him to tell us and the British nation clearly and exactly where we stand over the off-shore islands of Matsu and Quemoy, because that has not been clearly stated. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman now today linking Quemoy and Matsu with Taiwan or not?

§ Mr. Lloyd

Our position with regard to the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu has been stated. It was stated in 1955 quite clearly, but what is not often quoted from Sir Anthony Eden's statement at that time is the complete repudiation of the use of force for altering that 329 status, that is the de facto status, the present physical position. As far as the linking of the off-shore islands with Formosa is concerned, that is precisely what the Chinese Communists insist on doing.

We, therefore, have to try to produce an atmosphere in which some agreed modus vivendi is possible, whether by direct or indirect negotiation or by practical action. Two things seem to me to be necessary—first, an international climate of opinion against the use of force and, secondly, some flexibility of approach by those concerned. So far, there is complete inflexibility on the part of the Peking Government. They continue the use of force and they say that the only answer is for the United States to withdraw completely from Formosa and the Formosa area; they link the whole time absolutely the off-shore islands and Formosa itself.

So far as the Government of the United States are concerned, I am absolutely satisfied that they want to deal with this matter peacefully. Furthermore, President Eisenhower, in his speech of 12th September in the United States, said that there were measures that could be taken to ensure that the off-shore islands, in his phrase, would not be a thorn in the side of peace. And Mr. Dulles, in his speech to the General Assembly a few days later, said that the United States were seeking to promote a cease-fire and equitable conditions which would eliminate provocations and leave for peaceful resolution the various claims and counter-claims that are involved.

I believe that that was a conciliatory and flexible approach, and there has been some indication of results from it because, as far as General Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, after Mr. Dulles' recent visit to Formosa, the General said that the Nationalists believed that the principal means of achieving their aims lay in the application of the "three peoples' principles" and not in the use of force. He was referring to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's three principles of nationalism, democracy and social well-being. That, in view of previous statements was an important contribution of which I do not think sufficient notice has been taken in this country. It is not a complete renunciation of the use of force, but it 330 is a statement that the principal means should not lie in the use of force.

We have done everything in our power to create an opinion against the use of force and to try to encourage the prospects of negotiation, and it is a situation in which negotiation may be direct or indirect, or indeed it may be a process of action by either side, action and reaction which will have the effect of reducing tension, and that is what I believe we have to work for.

Before I end with my most constant preoccupation, which is the question of our relations with the Soviet bloc and how they can be improved, I should like to say a word about Yugoslavia. Her Majesty's Government are honoured at the present time to be entertaining M. Koca Popovic, the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, and other representatives of that country. This is a return visit for one which I paid in September last year, during which I received a very warm and friendly welcome. We are delighted to have him here. We remember our comradeship in the last two wars and we view with satisfaction our present friendly relations. We have very different views on most internal and external problems but we discuss these views from time to time with complete frankness and in the most friendly way. We frequently differ publicly but we are able to differ without rancour or ill feeling and I really do believe that there is a feeling of warm friendship between the peoples of the two countries.

I believe that our relations are a model for two countries with very different conceptions of how to organise their societies and a very different approach to certain world problems. I only wish that the same spirit could animate our relations with the Soviet Union with which we have again great differences on how to organise our internal society and also about certain world problems.

At one time in 1955 to 1956 I thought it was becoming possible that there could be an improvement in the spirit in which we could discuss our differences, but during the past year I think there has been little or no improvement. Mr. Gromyko, as I have already said, made a bitter speech in the United Nations at the Special Assembly and I said in my 331 reply that his speech put me in a quandary: if one did not reply then it was said that his accusations were therefore proved to be true, and if one did reply one was accused of engaging in polemics, in carrying on the cold war.

I turn again to the technical discussions in Geneva. I profoundly hope that the spirit of those discussions will be reflected in the political talks which will begin tomorrow. I have said repeatedly that I believe the Soviet Union will keep agreements which are negotiated with sufficient care and precision. We should like to see our trade with the Soviet Union increased. We have succeeded in arranging greater opportunities for trade between this country and the Soviet Union, and we have done it without quarrelling with our Allies.

I should like to see the exchange of information, of newspapers and periodicals, the unjamming of wireless broadcasts, personal contacts of every sort and kind. I should like to see them greatly increased, because I think we want to create a public opinion which demands a more friendly relationship. The difficulty is this. Specific agreements, trade and personal contacts cannot achieve that end unless they are accompanied by a determination not to seek to do harm to one another. That is the difficulty which I have about so many Soviet actions. But there are in the world today such infinite possibilities of peaceful co-operation that I would much rather not have to look at these matters in terms of a conflict. Mankind has within its range enormous potentialities for economic, scientific and cultural development. Western Europe has torn itself apart in two world wars this century. Our mission must be to see that mankind does not tear itself apart, for that would be the consequence of another world war whatever the weapons used. In that spirit we shall seek to carry out the policies outlined in the Gracious Speech.

§ Mr. Aneurin Bevan (Ebbw Vale)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman was able to say that the adventure of Great Britain in Jordan has now been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the second occasion on which this country has been extricated from its embarrassments by the United Nations and by the 332 unflagging energies of the Secretary-General.

It is the common line now for the party opposite to say that they break the rules merely in order to call attention to them; that all along, of course, it was the United Nations they were thinking about. They said it over Suez. They say it again. It is a very curious line of argument. The usual argument proceeds by opposites: after all, if there were not sin we would not be able to recognise virtue. So they themselves continually offend against international comity merely, apparently, in order to reinforce it.

Let us, if we can, look at the Jordan issue a little more objectively than we were able to do before. What really has happened? It is said by the Government that our intervention in the affairs of Jordan on the invitation of King Hussein had nothing at all to do with what was happening in Bagdad. Nobody in Bagdad believes that, and very few people in this country believe it.

§ Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

It was not what they said at the time.

§ Mr. Bevan

Well, the association of the British expedition to Jordan with events in Bagdad was obviously realised throughout the Middle East and throughout the world. It is quite correct that the Prime Minister used very careful language about it when he was asked in the House whether it was intended either that we should cover a Jordanian attack on Iraq or whether we were poised for an attack on Iraq. He called our attention to the logistics of the situation, because at that time the Government were quite uncertain as to how developments were going to mature in Bagdad. It was believed in some quarters that the rebellion, or the revolution, would prove either abortive or would give rise to civil war. So uncertain were we about the situation in Iraq, so ill-informed were we, that we did not realise that the insurrectionaries there commanded the overwhelming support of the population. Indeed, it is a fact, and we might as well face it, that our association with Nuri es-Said as the champion of the Western Powers in Bagdad undermined his position with the Iraqi people. We destroyed him. All I hope is that we shall not seek to destroy by the same methods the existing Government in Bagdad.

333 It really must be realised, humiliating though it might be to some people, that the association of the Western Powers with the leader of an Arab State does not reinforce his position with his own people, and that it would be a very great mistake for us to try to induce, cajole, seduce—or use whatever adjective you like—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am sorry, verb—the present Government in Bagdad to follow the same line as was adopted by Nuri es-Said.

Now we are out of Jordan and, apparently, we were not there because we feared any general uprising in the Middle East. That being the case, the question which then arises is: what do we do if we are invited back? If I may say so, with all respect, the difficulty with the Prime Minister is that he sometimes overstates his case. The right hon. Gentleman said that we were there in Jordan as a result of international morality and honour. The Prime Minister reminds me of some writing of my friend Miloran Djilas in a recent book, where he describes another highlander, a Montenegrin, as one— …who held a high line of talk as if he were always on horseback. What does the Prime Minister do if King Hussein invites him back? What happens to the promptings of international morality and honour? Do we go back in again? And if we do not go back in again, are we unfaithful to the promptings of international morality and honour? Really, we must have some reply about this, because if we are going to rush in as a bodyguard for King Hussein every time he gets into difficulties, it is putting us in rather a ridiculous position. We ought to be told—we were not told today—what are the circumstances in which we would again come to the rescue of King Hussein, because the situation inside Jordan is precisely what it was before.

The King has no general support among the people of Jordan. The other day there was a meeting, I believe, of the very much curtailed Chamber. At that meeting, Dr. Khalifah, the President of the Chamber, announced that the Chamber had never approved the calling in of British troops. This mild criticism from even a purged Chamber apparently frightened the Jordan Government. No further debate has been held. So it was necessary even for people of mild, liberal 334 opinion to dissociate themselves from King Hussein's invitation.

The King again rules by martial law. The political parties were dissolved and their leaders are in exile and, being in exile, they will do what leaders always do in exile; they will try to get back home again. If they attempt to do that, because they will be doing it from a foreign nation, it will once more look like intervention in Jordan's affairs, another example, of course, of "indirect aggression". But they cannot do it from anywhere else; they cannot fall off the earth. What they are really attempting to do in Jordan is what every exiled Government or party tries to do; it tries to get back home. If, as a result of that attempt, there may be some reciprocal sympathy in Jordan itself and some disorders and King Hussein again asks us for help, do we go back in? Or will it be the fact that the prompting of international morality and honour will no longer apply because there will be no trouble in Bagdad? Really, it is necessary that we should get rid of this high-falutin' nonsense and come to the practical facts.

There is only one way in which, I hope, the Government have been attempting to influence King Hussein in this direction. There is only one way in which we can get something approaching stability in Jordan. That would be for the King to invite the exiled leaders to go back home again, to allow the political parties to emerge into the open, to permit of political liberty being once more established, and to allow a general election. Unless he does that, this danger will recur.

British troops ought not to be expected to risk their lives in order to maintain unpopular kings on their thrones. Whatever may have been the reasons which led the Government to their adventure in the first instance, I believe I am expressing the point of view of hon. Members in all parts of the House when I say that, if this situation again occurs in Jordan, there will be no justification, even if King Hussein requests it, for British troops to be sent in. We ought to make it quite clear to the King now, because unless we make it clear he will not be influenced to take the steps that he should take in order to rehabilitate himself with his own people.

I should also like to know whether we are going to provide Jordan with more 335 subventions. The difficulty about Jordan is that it is a piece of fruit that nobody wants to pick up, for it is not a viable country. But arrangements may be made, and could be made, for the future of Jordan if the King could reconcile himself to his people. If he could establish some form of democratic Government. it might be possible to fit Jordan into the context of the Middle East, but so long as there is a monarchical dictatorship in the country, it is bound to become a thorn in our flesh all the time. So I hope the Government will use what influence they can to bring about an improvement in the situation in Jordan itself.

Before I leave the subject of the Middle East, I wish to make one or two references to the discussions which took place in the House before the Recess. We had, I thought, a very useful discussion about the Middle East, and I had the honour, on behalf of the Opposition, of putting forward certain proposals for the future of the area.

I believe it is true to say that the Arab League is undergoing a certain transformation. The Egyptian influence inside the Arab League is not as powerful as it was, for the very simple reason that there are two currents running there concurrently. First, there is Pan-Arabism, and second, there is Arab nationalism; and I tried to say on that occasion that they are not the same thing. The Arab nations are not prepared to substitute the hegemony of Egypt for that of the West. They are perfectly prepared to enter into a loose confederation with Egypt, but they are not prepared to accept the domination of Egypt. This is a very important development, because if we recognise that Arab nationalism is not necessarily a pillar for Egypt but can give rise to loose confederations, we ourselves, it seems to me, ought to be sympathising with and encouraging that development.

In my view, it would be a very great mistake for us to repeat our former policy of trying to divide the Arab nations one against the other, because those Arab leaders who express sympathy with the West or appear in the eyes of their fellow countrymen to be instruments of Western diplomacy lose influence with their own people. Therefore, what we should be doing is trying to promote Pan- 336 Arabism as much as possible in the form of a loose confederation so that the desires of the Arab masses to be one with each other could be realised, at the same time satisfying their aspirations for national independence.

Therefore, if we support these two things, it seems to me that we should not only be doing our best to promote peace in the area, but should at the same time be promoting our own interests. For example, I should like to know what we are doing in Kuwait. We have there a very special position, not only because it is a place from which we get a very large amount of oil and a very considerable reinforcement of our dollar balances, but because we are in treaty with Kuwait on very special terms. In 1899, we signed the treaty, which read: The said Sheikh of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government. No one can say that he did not tie himself up. He cannot move hand or foot without the permission of the British Government.

At the same time—this is a very serious matter, because we do not want to have another difficulty in Kuwait—those living in Kuwait include a very large number of ardent Pan-Arabs; very large numbers of those now living there have come from adjacent territories and nations, for the development of the oil resources of Kuwait far exceeded the population there and people had to be brought in from outside. Has the head of the State asked us for our advice in the event of his wishing to join the Arab Republic, and if so, what have we said? Would it not be desirable for him to do so, provided, of course, that all the while it can be done without prejudice to the interests of other people? It will be a moderating influence inside the confederation. It would satisfy the aspirations of his own people, to which he himself has shown himself sensitive recently, and it might prevent in Kuwait trouble, which would be exceedingly dangerous for us.

337 Is it not far better for us to take the initiative in this direction, rather than having to meet conflict when it arises? I know that the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) is angry about these things; he calls it chucking things away. He still thinks that we can get oil from the Middle East with gunboats. I thought we had resolved in this House—though not with the consent of the noble Lord, I know, and I should have been astonished if he had done so—that we would only be able to get oil from the Middle East safely and smoothly by commercial methods and by wise diplomacy, and not by strong-arm methods. If anything has been established, that has been. It is also established in the Middle East, as I have said earlier, that there is a desire on the part of the Arabs to move more closely together, and that desire is not inimical to our interests if we anticipate these developments before they become too intransigent.

Therefore, I should have thought myself, though maybe I cannot get the answer today, that the advice we should give to the head of the Government of Kuwait now is certainly to enter into such relations as he thinks wise with the Arab Republic, provided, of course, like the Government of Iraq, he maintains inside that federation independence for Kuwait. This is the position taken up by Iraq. It was feared on the Government side of the House—a fear which I did not share at the time, and I said so—that the insurrection in Iraq was inspired from Egypt and was really an Egyptian coup d'état. It proved not to be the case, and there is no reason at all, I repeat, why we cannot reconcile all these movements in the Middle East.

I most especially welcome the decision of the Arab nations to set up their own development fund. I hope we shall give it every kind of encouragement we can, because I am satisfied, not only that the peace of the Middle East depends upon that, but I believe that if only we can make the Arab nations outward-looking and give them more prospects of economic development, the ancient feud between Israeli and Arab will slowly die down. That is all I want to say about that subject.

I now want to say a few words about the Far East, and I hope the right hon. 338 and learned Gentleman the Foreign Secretary will pardon me if I address most of my reply to the Prime Minister. In fact, we shall have to do that more and more, because there is hardly anybody else in the Government except the Prime Minister. Even "Macleod" has had to give way to "MacWonder". On Tuesday, the Prime Minister chided my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in the most remarkable way for wanting to have some declaration of Government policy about the Far East. I must con-fess—

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan)

I chided him for not mentioning it.

§ Mr. Bevan

No; the right hon. Gentleman chided him for wanting the right hon. Gentleman to make a declaration. Certainly, that is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman said. I have got the quotation here. He said: Nothing will persuade me that public recrimination is the best method of diplomacy between friends and Allies."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1958; Vol. 594, c. 36.] This is a new line for him. I do not mind the Prime Minister becoming a reformed character, but why should he be so unctuous about it?

It is only about a year ago that the Prime Minister was a member of Sir Anthony Eden's Government. He was regarded by us as the third man in it. He proved to be the second man in it. On that occasion, he did not take the same line. In fact, President Eisenhower was very angry with him. Do hon. Members remember President Eisenhower's broadcast of 31st October, 1956? This is what he said: On October 30th, the British and French Governments delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to Egypt, now followed up by armed attack against Egypt. The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of this action. Nor were we informed of them in advance. That, of course, is not recrimination; it is deceit. Apparently, open disagreement with our friends and allies is not justified, but if we from this side of the House suggest that the Government's policy should be made known, that is terrible. President Eisenhower went on to say: As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right, if our judgment so dictates, to dissent. 339 If this claim is made by the President of the United States, why cannot we make the same claim?

The alternative to deceit is not necessarily subservience. There is no reason why this nation should not have made its position known to the whole world, and to the American people in particular, about what we thought of events in the Far East. Is there any reason why we should not say what we believe about the offshore islands of China? I do not understand the Prime Minister's point of view here at all. After all, we are entitled to know what advice he gave the American President, and what the Foreign Secretary said to Mr. Dulles. What have we come to when we seem to be on the edge of war and our own leaders cannot tell the nation what our point of view is?

The Foreign Secretary makes his visits to Washington. He has told us what he said to the United Nations. Is that all he said to Mr. Dulles? If it was all he said to Mr. Dulles, why could not the right hon. and learned Gentleman have said the same thing? But, apparently, that was not all, because if the right hon. and learned Gentleman had said what was the Government's policy, it would have been recrimination. Why should it be recrimination, unless they disagreed with the Americans? It is a very strange line of reasoning. What are we coming to when we are told that for us to ask that our national policy should be made known is brash, amateurish and clumsy? These are the skilled diplomatists, going almost secretly to the United States to say what they want to say. We do not know. The right hon. and learned Gentleman takes his suitcase and his portfolio, and we are not told what instructions he had from the Government. We do not know: it is all secret.

It reminds me of the old chestnut about the Hollywood actress who was wheeling a perambulator down the street one day and, when someone looked into the perambulator, it was found that there was nothing in it. People asked, "Where is the baby?" and the reply was, "The father is the invisible man." It is an old chestnut, I know, but one worth recalling on this occasion. We do not know what is in the perambulator, what is in the suitcase, or what advice we gave to the United States.

340 The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the view of the Government was that the status of these islands should not be determined by force. They have been determined by force. The position of Formosa, Matsu and Quemoy has been decided, ever since the Chinese revolution, by the force of the United States. What is this one-eyed way of looking at the thing? One would have thought that the United States and Chiang Kai-shek had held the position of these islands in doubt for all these years.

It has been our view, expressed by Sir Anthony Eden, that these offshore islands are part of the territory of the mainland of China. However, during all these years our Government and the United States have done nothing. There has been no shooting and no firing, and Chiang Kai-shek has remained in possession. There has been no attempt whatever to meet the Chinese case. No concessions have been made, but when China takes the action she has taken, it becomes impossible to make concessions for fear it will be seen as concessions to force. If force is not used, no concessions are made.

It is an impossible position and one about which we have complained over and over again. It is not good enough to try to put out the flames of conflict when they arise but to do nothing at all in between. Decisions should have been made about the offshore islands long ago.

When the British Labour delegation went to Moscow in 1954, we did our very best to prevail upon Mr. Malenkov, the then Russian Prime Minister, to influence the Chinese Government not to raise too many difficulties about Formosa at that time. [An HON. MEMBER: "And look what happened to him."] Do not be so silly. We do not want to discuss the fate of politicians, because there is a whole row of them over there. It is quite true that they are made, not managers of power stations, but directors of banks.

What we then said—and we were perfectly serious—was that it was unwise to press the claims of China upon Formosa at that time because the prestige of the United States was too deeply involved and the United States would not be able to make a concession at that time without losing face. It was therefore undesirable to allow the Chinese to press their claims to the point of a show-down.

341 The Chinese did not press their claims. They continued to hold them, and if we were Chinese we would do the same thing. After all, Formosa was taken from China by the Japanese as long ago as 1896, and it was a very natural ambition of the Chinese patriot to consummate the defeat of Japan. We would do exactly the same thing. It is absurd to say that the Chinese are being unreasonable. However, we believed that it would be unwise for the Chinese Communists to press the position of Formosa at that time.

These offshore islands are in an entirely different category. We are told by hon. Members opposite and by some American publicists that to make these concessions to China now would undermine the whole of the Western Powers' position in the Far East. We get into a difficulty which arises as a result of not permitting China to join the United Nations, not allowing her to join the family of nations and thus being unable to make arrangements with the Chinese without appearing to do so as a surrender to force.

We have got into a terrible situation. When we are attacked by hon. Members opposite for taking this apparently pro-Communist line, I must say that our view that the Chinese should be represented in the United Nations is shared by the vast majority of the American people themselves. The American Democratic Party takes our view, and a very large number of Republicans take our view. I have not been able to understand how it is that the policies of the White House have not more closely adjusted themselves in the circumstances to what is known to be the point of view of large numbers of American people.

How long can that continue, because international relationships are being poisoned by this situation? How can we continue to keep 650 million people outside the comity of nations? How can we hope to get peace in the world when we behave in that way? We are supposed to recognise Communist China, but in the United Nations itself we do not assist in the recognition of China. On the contrary, the other day we gave our vote to postponing consideration of the matter for another year. This is not peace-making, and I am certain that it does not accord with the wishes of the British people.

342 The overwhelming majority of the people of this country would prefer to see Great Britain speaking more clearly and independently to the United States of America on this and other questions. That would not affect our friendship at all, for the Americans would understand it. It is certainly not consistent with our dignity that not only should we not press these policies on America but should be conniving at their opposite in the United Nations. If there is any cessation of the firing against these islands, I hope that we shall do our best to make use of the interlude to try to bring about a settlement.

The right hon. Gentleman has quoted Mr. Foster Dulles. Anybody can quote Mr. Foster Dulles. We can say things on this side of the House which it would be undiplomatic to say on the other side. It would be a real triumph if the right hon. Gentleman could bring one success from his next visit to America, that Mr. Dulles should not make a speech for at least one week. I have quotation after quotation of a most mischievous kind, in which, for example, Mr. Dulles says that he regards the Communist régime in China as temporary. We used to say the same thing about the Russian Revolution.

§ Mr. K. Zilliacus (Manchester, Gorton)

Mr. Dulles still does.

§ Mr. Bevan

I beg hon. Members opposite to consider the lessons of recent history. Since I became a Member, I have heard debate after debate about Russia. I am sure that many of the excesses of the Stalin régime were the consequences of the fact that we drove the Russians into complete isolation for so many years. Many of the excesses which are taking place in China may be due to the same thing.

What folly it is to compel the Chinese to learn Russian. What folly it is when all the artifacts—to use the American expression—of the Western world could be made available to the Chinese, when they could be sending their technicians to us and we could be sending our technicians there to teach them how to use Western machines. In the last six or seven years, we have compelled them to have Russian technicians and to learn Russian and to bind themselves more and more closely to Russia, although there were very many traditional influences in 343 Chinese society inimical to a closer relationship with China's northern neighbour.

We neglected it and followed the United States too closely in this matter. The result is that the world is torn into halves and we are not making any progress in this matter. If there were a Labour Government, we should insist upon using all our influence in the United Nations to bring in Communist China as quickly as possible. We should try to repair the mischief that has been done and try, if we could, to hold back some of the consequences that will inevitably follow if the Chinese are kept in isolation much longer. We would do it even though we, were met with some hostility from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, because we accept the point of view of President Eisenhower that when nations differ from each other, even though they are great friend and allies, it is best, in the interests of all, that they should make their point of view known.

I am sorry to have occupied so much time. I want to say a word or two about the situation in Cyprus. I want to call the Prime Minister's attention to what he said on Tuesday. It is not good enough for him to say that the proposals of the Government about Cyprus had the general approval of this House. He said: It was generously responded to by the Opposition …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1958; Vol. 594, c. 37.] That is not true. It is quite incorrrect. It is not quite right to speak in this way simply because we did not divide against the Government. It has been a long-established convention of this House that on foreign affairs the Opposition does not divide the House except where it is at great issue with the Government.

If every time we do not divide the House on foreign affairs it is to be assumed that we support the Government of the day, it will make it very difficult for us to continue that convention. We do not want to divide the House every time on foreign affairs, but if we do not divide we do not want the Prime Minister to say that we support his policies.

In fact, we criticised his proposals in three very important particulars. We said, first, that the proposal to have Greek and Turkish representatives on the Governor's Council was a mistake. We 344 said, further, that it was a mistake to go on with the proposal about dual nationality, and, thirdly and most important, we said that we thought it was a great mistake to go on with communal representation without at the same time making provision for an all-Cypriot legislative assembly.

Then the Prime Minister paid his visits to Ankara and Athens. and after those visits he modified the British plan—the so-called partnership plan—in two particulars. First, he decided that the representatives of the Greeks and the Turks should not be full members of the Governor's Council, but should act in an advisory capacity. He further decided to drop the proposal for dual nationality. In these two respects, he conceded the Opposition's case. But on the third one he was ambiguous and, to some extent. provocative. He said: The establishment of this system of communal assemblies charged with certain specific functions, and of the Governor's Council, charged with other more general duties does not exclude, and should, with general good will, facilitate the development of some form of representative institution serving the interests of the island as a whole. It is the Greek case, and it is our view, that the establishment of a central national assembly should go on pari passu with the communal councils, because it is the Greek fear that unless that happens the establishment of the communal councils would not facilitate the establishment of a national institution but would lead rather to the permanent partition of the island. There we accept the Cypriot view. Why do not the Government say so? Why do they use all this ambiguous language?

If it is the view of the Government—and I hope that they have been brought to it now—that Cyprus should look forward in future to independence and self-government, inside the Commonwealth, as we hope, why do not they say so? Would it not be very much better if they said, "In our view, Enosis is out, and partition is out"? The Greeks have said that they eventually look forward to self-government for Cyprus, in the Commonwealth. Even after all this bloodshed and terror, and these very regrettable happenings, the Greeks still say that they would rather have Cyprus independent and inside the Commonwealth, and Greece inside N.A.T.O.—and it may be Cyprus also 345 inside N..A.T.O., with a N.A.T.O. base on Cyprus.

What is wrong with that? Why did not we say so? Is it because the Turks would not like it? It is time that we stopped sacrificing British lives in Cyprus in order to meet the Turkish point of view. It is nonsense to suggest that 18 per cent, of the island should frustrate the wishes of 80 per cent. Why are we not stronger about this matter? The more time goes by the more difficult the problem is. We on this side repeat that we have implored the Cypriots to desist from violence. We are deeply angry and moved by some of the murders committed in Cyprus recently.

We do not like to see British troops in circumstances of this kind. I have said before, and I repeat, that it has always been a very proud tradition with us that whenever British troops have been in different parts of the world, in the most difficult circumstances, they have been messengers of peace and good will. It happened after the 1914–18 War. When the British troops were occupying Germany, they actually broke the blockade; they insisted on sharing their rations with German civilians. It happened after the last war, when non-fraternisation broke down because the British Tommy would not support it. It is not right to put decent human beings in intolerable positions.

Some of the events which have taken place through the actions of both sides in Cyprus have caused anxieties on both sides of this House. We should not allow our troops to be put into a context where their normal discipline is liable to break down. We therefore seek a political solution of this matter. Truce after truce has been held in the island—three of them—and the opportunity has been lost. That is our accusation against the Government. When there is no violence, they believe that there is no need to act; when there is violence, they cannot act because of the violence. By not acting when there is no violence, they put a premium on violence.

We are democrats in this House. Let us face it; there is no moral argument against violence if people are denied liberty. We would not accept the argument. When people demand liberty and national independence, if they are unable to frame the policies of their country 346 willingly and freely, there is no moral argument against violence. The Declaration of Independence of America goes even further than that. Therefore, if we are to stop violence in the island, we should create conditions in which the Cypriot people can freely discharge their responsibilities and lead their own lives.

We want to bring British troops home from Cyprus as quickly as possible. We do not like this hideous story of murder, assassination, ambush and cruelty. It is not a soldier's solution that must be found; it must be a political solution. I beg and pray, even at this last moment, that some concession may be made to enable the Greeks to join this conference.

I think that M. Spaak made the suggestion that other representatives should be present at the conference. What is wrong with accepting the Spaak proposal? He would be chairman.

§ The Prime Minister

Other representatives have been accepted.

§ Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

I said in my speech that we had accepted that the representatives of two other N.A.T.O. Governments should be present.

§ Mr. Bevan

Is this a recent decision? This is not my information. I was going to say this: I do most earnestly hope, on behalf of the Opposition, that the Greek Government will participate at the conference, but I say it would facilitate that very much if the Government could be more forthcoming on the question of Enosis and partition. It is very difficult for the Greeks. The right hon. Gentleman should really consider this. If he wants somebody to deliver the goods, he must not make it too difficult for him to do so.

Already Archbishop Makarios has had difficulty among his own followers by his rejection of Enosis. His position would be made much easier—and we want it to be made easier if we want a settlement—if we could say at the same time that the Turks must abandon partition. I hope, therefore, that the Greek Government will participate in the conference and that we shall be able to make that statement so as to facilitate the conference.

I apologise to the House for keeping it so long, but I want to end with just one thing. We on this side of the House 347 deeply deplore the fact that it was impossible for the British Government and the American Government, or so they thought, to accept the Russian proposal for the suspension of tests last March. If that suspension had taken place, something in the region of forty to fifty nuclear test explosions would have been avoided.

The Russians found that their invitation met with no response and they resumed their tests. Now we do not know what is going to happen. Do I understand from the right hon. Gentleman that if the Russians continue their tests we shall continue ours? Is that the intention, because he left that rather ambiguous? May I have a reply? When the conference meets tomorrow, if the Russian tests continue, do we continue ours? I should like to know. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] We shall have a reply at the end of the debate, I understand. Really, it will be a shocking situation if these talks are being held with the tests going on all the time.

I hope sincerely that we shall be able to respond to what the Russians did by saying, "We are stopping our tests. If you go on with your tests, that is your responsibility." as the Russians said earlier. "We will stop our tests, and if you go on with yours that is your responsibility." Surely the time has come for someone to take the initiative to put an end to this hideous round.

Are Her Majesty's Government quite satisfied that their proposal for suspension for a period of one year is altogether satisfactory? Have they considered the psychological situation created by them? After all, a year is just about enough time to digest the results of the last series of tests and to prepare a new series. It is exactly that period. By having the period of a year, if no effective progress is made—I do beg of them to consider this—that is to say, if there is a great deal of discussion and no agreement has actually been reached and the tests have been stopped for a year, the resumption of tests at the end of that period will create an appalling impression throughout the whole world. Everybody will be dismayed.

One year is too short. The Russians have said that they want the tests to be abolished entirely. We say one year. Is there no possibility of some half-way 348 ground there? Can we have a longer period? Can we have concessions from both sides, because what we have said here is that we believe that the actual suspension of tests themselves, if that suspension continues long enough, will create conditions favourable to progress in other directions. Therefore, we hope that the Government will move from there, because if at the end of this year tests are resumed, this will send a shudder of disappointment and dismay throughout the whole world.

We are starting another Session of Parliament, maybe the last Session before a General Election. I can see nothing at all in the world at the present time, except that these two conferences are going to take place, that gives rise to optimism. I think that all the factors in the world are making for disaster. These technical conferences, important though they are, and these political conferences following them, would be successful only if we could get hold of a new vision, if we could really start taking a few risks for peace, if we really could realise that the old attitudes, passions and instincts of man are no longer any guides in the world today.

We have created a situation without precedent in the history of mankind, and the old dispositions are no longer an effective equipment to deal with them. We require to have from statesmen not only vision but courage; not only courage but persistence; and not only persistence but patience. We have not had enough of that so far. We have had too easy a disposition to fall back on old ways and not face the new situation with a new vision. It is time that we had it.

§ Mr. Ronald Bell (Buckinghamshire, South)

I want to comment upon the opening and very mischievous part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) which related to Jordan. The right hon. Gentleman said, for example, that in relation to Jordan we had broken rules in order to call attention to them. I do not know what rules the right hon. Gentleman had in mind. We did not break any rules in going into Jordan.

It was never said on this side of the House that we had broken any rules, 349 and I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman, who showed himself a little bit out of date on the Cyprus negotiations, could have really read the debate which took place in this House about the despatch of British troops to Jordan, because it was virtually conceded from his own Front Bench that the despatch of British troops to Jordan, in response to the request of the Government of that country, was in accordance with international law.

Therefore, I wonder just what the right hon. Gentleman meant, if he wanted to mean anything at all, in saying that we broke the rules in order to call attention to them. I am afraid that this was characteristic of what he had to say about Jordan and the British action in Jordan. It left me with the impression of being said for effect rather than having been thought out and verified and said with knowledge.

§ Mr. Bevan

The answer is, when I spoke of the rules not having been kept, that I closely associated British intervention in Jordan with events in Bagdad. That was the rule we intended to break.

§ Mr. Bell

I do not begin to understand what the right hon. Gentleman means by that reply. The right hon. Gentleman said that we broke the rules in order to call attention to them. I asked him which rules were broken and he has not given me any answer to that, except a rather misleading reference to Iraq.

Then the right hon. Gentleman said that we had been extracted by the United Nations from an awkward situation. This is in relation to Jordan. If ever there was a part of the world where the existing mess is the product of the United Nations it is Jordan. I will concede this much, that the party opposite, by its action in 1948, has to share the responsibility for the situation in the Middle East with the United Nations, but, nevertheless, the primary responsibility for the situation there rests squarely upon that international body, which by its evasion and avoidance for ten years of its main duty, created a situation from which so many damaging incidents have arisen. Our despatch of troops to Jordan was a very timely and necessary action to alleviate a very special situation. We were absolutely 350 right, not just in international law but in expediency and wisdom, in sending troops to Jordan.

The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale and the Leader of the Opposition asked what we had gained by that operation. There is a very simple answer. We gained time, and time was invaluable in the situation. Our action certainly linked up with events in Iraq; I am sure that if we had not sent troops when we did the impetus of revolution would have been irresistible. There was a feeling abroad in the Middle East and in the world that the régime in Jordan came next. After Nuri es-Said went, anything could happen and nothing could stay the same. In any country, and especially in the Middle East, a belief of that kind is halfway to achieving a revolution, but by sending British troops we gained King Hussein a breathing space which has allowed time for thought.

We have allowed just that necessary time for the other nations of the Middle East to think where they were going and perhaps to do some arithmetic about the financial liability. It allowed time for the situation in Iraq to settle down, and it certainly allowed time for Nasser to assess much more sensibly the consequences if Jordan should fall into his hands and Israel be presented with a vexatious and difficult dilemma. All these matters fell into shape while British troops were stationed in Jordan. Though we are withdrawing them now we must remember that all the problems in that part of the world are not solved. Indeed, they are not; but, on the other hand, the situation in October, 1958, is very different from the situation in July. It has been the presence of British troops in Jordan which has allowed that change to take place.

Nobody could honestly doubt or deny that Jordan has been the object of intense subversion, which weakens a country in many ways. The first way is by direct attack upon its rulers. Jordan has had a very bitter experience of that, in attempt after attempt made upon the life of its King. Those attempts were undoubtedly mounted from outside and were only circumvented by the splendid efficiency of the Jordan intelligence service, which has intercepted all these assassins without a single failure.

§ Mr. S. Silverman

Not more than one failure would have been needed.

§ Mr. Bell

That is precisely the problem in that part of the world. I say to the hon. Member who interrupted that it is not a laughing matter but a very serious and sad one that the prosperity and peace of that part of the world should depend upon the preservation of the life of one man, although a very courageous and able young man.

The second way in which subversion weakens a country like Jordan is by distracting the attention of its people from the positive work which remains to he done there. The third example, and in some ways the worst, of the ways in which subversion works, is by spreading suspicion and making it necessary to have precautionary purges in the government of the country, which deprive the country, as Jordan has been deprived, of the services of some of its best and most valuable citizens.

That is not to say that I do not think King Hussein has been absolutely right in making these purges; for without them he would not be alive today and his country would not be independent. When these things happen, the innocent sometimes suffer with the guilty and the number of able men who can be used in the country's government becomes very limited.

§ Mr. Silverman

If there is a good deal of misunderstanding about the internal situation in Jordan, does not the hon. Gentleman think that it is only increased when the King, whose position is maintained, as the hon. Gentleman has said, only by British troops, exercises a personal right of discrimination among Members of the British House of Commons so that he allows into his country members of the Conservative Party but keeps out members' of the Labour Party?

§ Mr. Bell

I am well aware that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has not visited that country recently, and has no authority to talk about it. His exclusion from there had nothing whatever to do with his being a member of the Opposition side of the House. I visited Jordan recently, as he knows. I did so also in January of this 352 year, with two of his Opposition colleagues. We had a very profitable visit and were most courteously welcomed. We were shown round the country by the Government of Jordan. The politics of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne have nothing whatever to do with his exclusion from that country.

§ Mr. Silverman

The hon. Gentleman seems to know a great deal more about it than anybody else. If he really knows what it was, I wonder whether he will be courteous and tell the House what it was.

§ Mr. Bell

The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that it was his religion—

§ Mr. Silverman

Is that what British troops are defending?

§ Mr. Bell

The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well what the position is. Jordan and Israel are at war. Israel is explicitly a religious State and by its laws every Jew throughout the world is a citizen of Israel. Jordan is bound to take account of that fact. I am not here to justify or explain the rules which govern the armistice between the countries of the Middle East, but to make a speech about what I think Government policy should be. [Interruption.] I hope that the hon. Member will allow me to go on. All that I have just been saying is familiar to every hon. Member, including the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne.

§ Mr. Silverman

rose—

§ Hon. Members

Sit down.

§ Mr. Speaker

If the hon. Member who has the Floor does not give way, it is disorderly for any other hon. Member to remain standing.

§ Mr. Silverman

I would have yielded to the hon. Gentleman's request not to interrupt him if he had refrained from making a personal accusation which is quite untrue and which he ought to withdraw.

§ Mr. Bell

I do not know what the accusation is.

§ Mr. Silverman

The accusation was that I knew perfectly well before I asked my question the explanation and justification of the permission given by the Jordan Government to the hon. Member to go to that country and their refusal 353 to me to go. I know no such thing. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

§ Mr. Bell

I gladly accept that explanation, but it appears to me to be very much worse than the explanation which I ascribed to the hon. Gentleman. He ought to know something which has been common knowledge in the world for at least ten years, as The Times commented at the time.

Why is Jordan vulnerable to this subversion? That is a matter about which the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale had a great deal to say. I think there is no doubt at all that die King and Government of Jordan are vulnerable to subversion primarily because of the collapse of the policy of the League of Nations Mandate which, of course, is rightly associated with Great Britain. We are the country that made the Balfour Declaration, we are the country which administered the Mandate and we are the country which, in 1948, turned on our heels, dropped the Mandate on the floor and walked out. I support the Balfour Declaration. I think it was a wise act of statesmanship. I think that we administered the Declaration policy wisely and well. I could make criticisms of the way in which we walked out in 1948, but I understand why that decision was reached in principle.

The fact remains that we, more than anyone else, are regarded as responsible for the 600,000 refugees sitting in the camps around the border. We are regarded as responsible for having introduced the problem of Israel into that part of the world and, of course, the Hashemite Kings of Jordan are known to have been friendly to Great Britain. What is more, they are known to be and to have been moderate and realistic men.

Everyone knows that Abdullah was quite willing to recognise the existence of Israel and to make a working agreement. That was why he was killed. Everyone knows that his successor, King Hussein, is also a moderate and realistic man, who, again, does not talk about driving Israel into the sea. He has maintained his contacts with the West and would welcome a sensible settlement of the Middle Eastern situation. For that reason, and for no other, he is vulnerable to subversion.

354 King Hussein could arm himself against these attacks and against this subversion quite easily if he liked to play the rôle of a Nasser, to be a bitter enemy of the colonialist, imperialist Powers, to be the leader of the Arab world in denouncing Israel, to break all his ties with the West, and so on. If, in fact, he abandoned all that is good in himself and what he stands for, if he abandoned everything we believe in in the Middle East, he would be secure from subversion. He is exposed to it, in fact, because he stands in the Middle East for those things for which we stand in the Middle East, for moderation and realism and acceptance of the idea that Israel is a country which is to remain in the Middle East and build itself up, the belief that these countries must live together and reach agreement.

Those are the policies which the Hashemite Kings, both in Jordan and in Iraq, have stood for and have been associated with in Arab minds. That is why one of them has been murdered and one is in constant danger of being murdered like his great uncle, who was, in fact, killed beside him as they walked into a temple in Jerusalem. I would tell the right hon. Member that that is why, as the Prime Minister rightly said, it is a debt of honour for the British people to go to his aid at his request when his life is threatened by subversion fostered from outside and based upon those grounds.

§ Mr. Bevan

The hon. Member calls it subversion, but he is confirming everything I said about this question. I said that if any leader in the Middle East came to be regarded by the Arab masses as an instrument of the Western Powers he destroyed his support among the Arab people. That is entirely what the hon. Member is saying and I agree with him.

§ Mr. Bell

The right hon. Member has not said the same thing at all. The trouble about the right hon. Member is that sometimes he is at the mercy of his own phrases. He used one phrase, "the instrument of the Western Powers", which, of course, gives a twist and meaning to everything he says and which completely subverts it.

§ Mr. Bevan

The hon. Member must do justice to me. I did not say they were instruments of the Western Powers. I said, "if they came to be regarded as 355 instruments of the Western Powers". I think that the hon. Member is far more confused by his own failure to understand than I am at the mercy of my own phrases.

§ Mr. Bell

I always try to understand the right hon. Member, because I find it a very profitable exercise, as it usually clarifies my mind as to why I disagree with him. I hope that he is not now trying to say that if, in fact, any leader of an Arab country, through pursuing policies which, shall we say, for the sake of argument, coincide with those of the West, and which reasonable people outside the area should approve, is wrongly regarded as an instrument of the Western Powers, the Western Powers should abandon him to his fate. Is that what he is saying?

§ Mr. Bevan

I said no such thing.

§ Mr. Bell

That is what the argument of the right hon. Member amounts to. I want to make clear that that is not an argument with which I agree and I do not know of any hon. Member on this side of the House who would agree with it either.

The right hon. Member said some most offensive and untrue things about the present King of Jordan. He described him as an unpopular King, who received no support from his people. That just is not true. I have never met a Jordanian who had anything to say against the King. I have met plenty of Jordanians who had plenty to say against their Government and Prime Minister, and so on. That is not unusual in any country, but I have not found anywhere in Jordan, even in the refugee camps, anything but personal admiration for the King, both for his courage and for his ability. If the right hon. Member carefully read that report of the meeting of the Jordanian Parliament from which he quoted a short extract, he must have been struck by seeing how, in speech after speech, members sometimes criticised the Government, but always praised the King.

§ Mr. Bevan

That happens everywhere.

§ Mr. Bell

The right hon. Member says that that happens everywhere, but it does not look as if there is an unpopular King there who enjoys no support from his own people. The exact reverse is the case.

356 The right hon. Member has not said it today, but it has been widely said, that Jordan and its Government are open to subversion because Jordan is a backward and feudal country and we are wrong to prop up the rotten monarchies of decaying States. That is absolute nonsense. Jordan is one of the advanced countries of the Middle East. Eighty per cent. of the children there receive secondary education. The biggest export is of technicians to other parts of the Middle East. It is absurd to compare that country with backward countries like Saudi Arabia. Egypt, Syria, or even Iraq.

Israel and Jordan are the two countries of the Middle East where there is a dynamism which is capable of opposing Nasserism. In my belief one can only beat Nasserism by opposing it by an equal dynamism. There is a great difference in degree between Israel and Jordan; I am not pretending that there is not. On the one hand, there is the tremendous vitality of people building up a new State, which will become one of the most powerful units of the Middle East, but, let us make no mistake about it, on the other hand, in a city like Amman there has seen an increase from 300 to to nearly 300,000 population in thirty-five years, and there is certainly dynamism there, too.

In my opinion, Jordan has in itself all the requisites for growth and independence without British troops. Jordan has an enlightened and courageous leader. It is a desert country with plenty of water—which sounds a contradiction in terms, but is not—an educated young population—and no oil. Oil is morally the football pools of the Middle East. It is the possession of oil which has held back countries like Iraq, because the wealth which comes from it comes in an unrelated and irrelevant way and has nothing to do with the efforts of the people in the country.

It often seems to me that these great controversies are almost won or lost by a battle of phrases at the beginning, and Nasser has half won this battle by capturing the phrase "Arab nationalism". He captured it from the Hashemite Kings, of all people. It seems to me that in the Middle East there are two opposing forces. On the side of one we must be, and the other must go down in failure. The true Arab nationalism has descended 357 from the revolt in the desert and the King Hussein who led it, through the Hashemite dynasty and to the present King of Jordan.

On the other hand, we have Abdul Nasser, who preaches throughout the Middle East something called Arab nationalism which, in fact, is nothing but xenophobia. It is a complete contrast. I gather that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale does not think that Nasserism is a form of xenophobia. I am truly astonished. What Nasser preaches day by day and week by week is the regeneration of the Arabs by turning out the imperialists who have tricked them of their greatness.

At no time has Nasser ever concentrated on building up his country from the bottom. He may have considered that for a few weeks when Neguib was President, but he speedily turned his back on it and reverted to xenophobia—the old feeling of the Arabs that their greatness would come back to them without any labour on their part and by simply turning out the imperialists. His speeches are full of it. When he seized the Suez Canal he said, "Now we have laid the foundations of freedom, of independence and of grandeur", when all he had done was to seize somebody else's property.

The other kind of nationalism is that of Ataturk, which consisted of building up a country from the bottom. We shall not see Nasser going round the Egyptian villages with a piece of chalk teaching the children the Roman letters, as Ataturk did, building up his country slowly and painfully by hard work, abandoning all external expansion and even giving away the territories which he had.

§ Mr. Harold Davies

That is very romantic.

§ Mr. Bell

I do not think that the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) regards Turkey and her politics as friendly to him.

§ Mr. Davies

The hon. Member must not make assumptions.

§ Mr. Bell

Perhaps the hon. Member is not an impartial judge of the remarkable regeneration of Turkey.

That sort is the true Arab nationalism, which aims to restore the greatness of the Arab countries by hard work, building them up from the bottom.

358 Perhaps I may make two suggestions on how we can preserve the independence of Jordan, now that British troops have been withdrawn, not just from year to year by subsidy or by any palliative but by a permanent policy. I think that the whole propaganda presentation of the case in the Middle East has been wrong and has been simply acting as a long-stop to the propaganda of the Voice of Cairo. There is a living theme to be put over that Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism is pure xenophobia which appeals to the worst in everybody; it is the dream of Cairo, while nothing goes on except a few grandiose projects. True Arab nationalism is to be found in Jordan under the Hashemites, and it is the painstaking and slow way upwards. If that theme is consistently presented to the people of the Middle East, they will begin to see things in their true proportion.

The power of propaganda is formidable. When I visited British troops at Amman airfield I found that the parachute regiment there were unable to persuade the friendly Jordan Army that they were, in fact, units of the Parachute Brigade, because the Jordanians said that the Parachute Brigade had been destroyed in the fighting at Port Said. They had heard this so often on the wireless that they believed it, even though they were friendly towards us. I am sure that if we present this thesis consistently to the Middle East we shall achieve a positive result there.

The second suggestion I make is that we must clothe it with reality, and that is best done through the Arab Development Agency which may be coming into being. There are so many things which could be set under way in Jordan to make that country independent and prosperous and which are held up. There is, for example, the Johnson plan, which is held up because part of the scheme is in Syrian territory. This is an almost irrelevant objection, but it has held up a great project for years.

These difficulties can be overcome only by co-operation between the Arab countries and, of course, by a Western initiative—economic and political—to help the projects forward so that this great progress in Jordan can be triggered off. I am sure that if this is done we shall have defeated Nasserism at the source. It is the only way in 359 which we can preserve the Kingdom of Jordan without subventions from outside, making it the focal point of true Arab nationalism and the centre of a dynamism comparable with that of Israel and infinitely greater than that of Nasser.

I say these things, at the risk of speaking for a long time and possibly not even interesting the House in them, because I feel that we have been far too much on the defensive about our rôle in the Middle East. I feel that the Kingdom of Jordan has been too much on the defensive about even the possibilities of its existence. I say them, too, because the presentation of the situation in the Middle East from July onwards which reached our people through the British Press has been very one-sided and, I believe, inaccurate. Jordan has been represented as a tottering régime which we have propped up with British troops for a few months, but which is inevitably destined to be turned over by the tide of events as soon as we have gone.

I have heard that said time and time again. It was said today in the House. I have read it in the most respectable newspapers. But I do not believe that it is true. The only way to make it true would be if everyone went on saying it until people began to believe it. It is not true. On the contrary, Jordan is not a rump end, an irrelevance. It should be the main line of Arab development in the Middle East, and we can make it so. Very little is needed to trigger off a great future for that country.

I hope that we shall apologise for nothing that we have done and that we shall do a great deal more. I hope that King Hussein's life will not soon again be in danger, but if it is, I hope that we shall send troops there. It is only two years since we had British troops stationed permanently in Jordan under a treaty made by the Labour Party. I think that our action in July has been amply justified by its results, that we shall never regret it and that we have good friends of the West in the Middle East who will remain good friends and good Arabs if only we have the decency and the courage not to be ashamed to support them for being good Arabs. It is my belief that we should lend all the 360 moral support of the British nation to the constructive focus that exists in the Middle East at the present time.

§ Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

It will take somebody more talented than the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) to reply effectively to the criticisms levelled against the Government's Middle East policy by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). I cannot understand how anybody can defend the Government's Middle East policy since 1951. It has been a rake's progress.

The hon. Member spoke about the nationalism inspired by Nasser, but Nasser owes much of his present posi