NATIONAL SERVICE

§ Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

I beg to move, That, in the opinion of this House, the time has now arrived for a review, preferably by a Select Committee of this House, of the operation of the National Service Acts in the light of existing circumstances and commitments and, in particular, as to whether the period of National Service should still remain at two years. This matter of compulsory military service has been debated several times in this House, and once again the Opposition ask for an inquiry into the operation of the National Service Acts. On three previous occasions we have urged the Government either to reduce the length of conscription, or alternatively to hold an inquiry or to review the matter every 12 months. On every occasion our demand was rejected, and now we are making a further effort. I hope that we may achieve greater success on this occasion.

1075 Nobody will deny that this subject is of immense importance to the whole country. It concerns the lives and future of hundreds of thousands of our young men. It is a constant source of anxiety to many parents, in particular to the mothers of those young men. It is also related to our industrial and food production. Moreover, it raises the question whether much of the time of our National Service men is being wasted, about which many complaints have been made from time to time in the House. Nor can we ignore the disparity in the length of service among the North Atlantic Treaty countries, which shows beyond any doubt that a heavier burden is imposed upon our country than upon our Allies in the West.

These are matters which, in the view of my hon. Friends and myself, call for the closest examination in a democratic country. The demand for an inquiry does not mean that Labour's views on defence and the need for national security have changed. We shall always seek to reduce our defence expenditure and to adapt our military organisation to correspond with changes in overall defence strategy. Nevertheless, as long as there is any danger of war and while the channels of diplomacy are blocked, we shall continue to accept our responsibility with others for providing some measure of defence.

When the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) and the present Prime Minister were in opposition, they frequently assailed the Labour Government, and, in particular, the Service Ministers, on the subject of our defence measures and organisation. They expressed a lack of confidence in the Labour Government's Service Ministers and in all that we were doing, but when they became the Government the scene was immediately transformed. They immediately discovered that the defence organisation was in a most satisfactory state and went to the length, most remarkable indeed, of almost enthusiastically praising the Ministers whom they had previously condemned. This, of course, is the inconsistency, almost amounting to deception, frequently practised by the Tory Party, and no doubt it will be developed on a wholesale scale in the forthcoming Election.

1076 While the Labour Party prefers the voluntary system, we may agree that, provided there are proper safeguards and exemptions, either for those who are unable to serve or for those who for conscientious reasons are unwilling to serve, National Service is not inherently unsound in principle. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that many people are violently opposed to conscription. Even many of those who believe that there is a need for it object to its continuance when it seems to be no longer required or when the circumstances justify a shorter period of service.

I propose to pose a series of questions to the Government. The first is whether conscription is necessary at all and, if it is, what period of service is required? Should it be two years or 18 months or 12 months, or even six months? [HON. MEMBERS: "The right hon. Gentleman tried them all."] The Secretary of State for War pricked up his ears when I mentioned six months—and for a very good reason; because when he was in Opposition he subscribed to the following opinion, which, I think, ought to be placed on record: I am not certain that I would at present entirely jettison National Service but I would perhaps call on every man for a short period of, say, six months or less in which he would be given the fundamental training common to all three Services, … The right hon. Gentleman then added: There are I know, all sorts of difficulties, including that of policing Germany, … but they would be overcome."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1947; Vol. 445, c. 2028.]

§ The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)

That is such a favourite quotation of the right hon. Gentleman that I think I should remind him that when National Service was introduced it was introduced by the then Government for one purpose—to train reservists. It has completely altered now, in so far as it increases the size of the active Army. The circumstances, as the right hon. Gentleman knows full well, are entirely different. At one time it was a question of not placing a burden on the Regular forces for training reservists. I think it would be fair of the right hon. Gentleman if he admitted that.

§ Mr. Shinwell

I am surprised at the right hon. Gentleman running away from this quotation. He is, of course, correct when he says that the original purpose 1077 was to train a large number of reservists, but in point of fact that has been the intention throughout National Service, except when international tension became more acute, arising out of the Korean War, when the period of service had to be increased.

It should be placed on record that the right hon. Gentleman is not alone in this matter, for the Under-Secretary of State for Air, whom I see in his place, said: This conscription is killing the Auxiliary Air Force. I do not know whether he has changed his mind. If he has, would he like to comment? All contributions are gratefully received.

I pose a further question: what is the reason for the shortage of Regular recruits and of non-commissioned officers? That is a very important question, as no doubt the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the Service Departments will agree. There is a further question: if the reason for increasing the period of service to two years was the Korean War, as undoubtedly it was, now that the Korean War is over, why not revert to 18 months or even less, should it be found sufficient for our needs?

Before I put a further question, I should like to add something which many hon. Members have apparently overlooked. Had it not been for the Korean War the period of service would not have been increased from 18 months to two years. At that time there was no demand from any quarter of the House, certainly not from the Tory Opposition as it then was, for an increase from 18 months to two years. That action was taken, it is true, by the Labour Government of the day, because of the Korean War and, in particular, because of the physical difficulty of sending men out to the Far East, leaving them there with sufficient time for training and any other activities required and bringing them back again before their period of service had expired.

Moreover—and in my view this is one of the most important questions of all, and one which certainly requires an answer—why should our men serve two years when scarcely any other country imposes the same burden? Here I must place the facts on record, and I will quote from the official figures. National Service primarily concerns the Army. The Navy is not very much concerned about it and 1078 the Air Force cannot have much anxiety because when the men have to be transferred to the Auxiliary Force we find that there is nothing for them to do and they are transferred to Civil Defence. We are thus concerned primarily with the Army.

What is the length of National Service for the land forces in various countries associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? Belgium has 18 months; Canada has no compulsory military service at all; Denmark, 16 months; France, 18 months—at any rate, on paper; Greece, 18 months; Italy, 15 months—

§ Mr. Shinwell

The hon. and gallant Gentleman can shake his head until it falls off, but those are the facts. The figure for Italy is 15 months. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] Let hon. Members produce their figures. These are the figures for July last year. If there are later figures, let them be produced. I challenge the Minister of Defence to produce the figures and to show that my figures, taken from the records of last year, are incorrect.

Luxembourg—which does not matter much in this context—has a period of 12 months; the Netherlands, 18–21 months; Norway, 16 months; Portugal 18 months, and Turkey two years. We are the only other country in N.A.T.O. which has as long a period as that. The United States of America has a period of two years, but the system is run upon a selected service basis, which means that there is a vast number of exemptions of various kinds.

§ Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison (Glasgow, Scotstoun)

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would be prepared to add to his list—because it is important to consider the period of service operated by a possible adversary—the Soviet Union, where the period of service is four years in the Navy and three years in the Army and Air Force.

§ Mr. Shinwell

It may well be that the hon. Gentleman is correct about the period of service in the Soviet bloc, but I am concerned with the period of service among our Allies. As the hon. Gentleman must have heard when he was at the War Office, there has always been a demand for uniformity and standardisation. Why should our men have a greater 1079 burden imposed upon them than those of other countries in N.A.T.O.? That question demands an answer, and I suggest that it had better be left to the Minister of Defence rather than to the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) who appears to be amused, and whose knowledge of these matters is very imperfect.

What is the case advanced by the Government? I want to be fair, or even generous to them, and I shall endeavour to state their arguments in accordance with statements which have been made in the House from time to time. First, they argue that this period is necessary because of our overseas commitments. I do not seek to escape from this argument. These commitments, naturally, must always be a matter of anxious consideration; but what are the facts? Our troops are out of Korea, apart from a comparatively small number of men—and what they are doing there it is difficult to say; as far as I know they are not engaged in military activities. There appears to be no reason why any of our forces should remain there and, at any rate, the large number which we had there during the Korean War and for some time afterwards have been withdrawn.

The same situation applies in the case of Egypt. The argument adduced by the Government was that we required to have about 70,000 men, or possibly more, in the Canal Zone. Many of these men have already been withdrawn, and all will have been withdrawn within the next 12 months. That commitment has, therefore, also disappeared. The same applies to Trieste and, shortly, the same will apply to Austria. So one argument upon which the Government founded their case for retaining a two-year period of service has gone.

§ Mr. F. M. Bennett (Reading, North)

Good old Tory warmongers.

§ Mr. Shinwell

To the hon. Member who has interjected I would say that it is amazing how one small head can carry all he knows.

§ Mr. Bennett

The right hon. Gentleman should know.

§ Mr. Shinwell

I advise him to be a little more relevant to the subject when he interrupts again, and also to remember that this is a very serious matter—as he 1080 will discover when the Election comes along. I would remind the Prime Minister that we have raised this matter upon three previous occasions, and we have as much right to introduce it at an Election as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to introduce an electioneering Budget—although that has gone off at half-cock already.

A further argument adduced by the Government, which has been used frequently by the Secretary of State for War, is that there is a shortage of Regulars. They always say, "There is a shortage of Regulars." Who is to blame? The Secretary of State for War used to say, "Increase the pay. Go on increasing the pay, and get all the men you want." So we increased the pay beyond the anticipations either of the Tory Opposition or of the men themselves. Whether the pay was increased to an extent consistent with what the men believe they are entitled to is another matter, but the pay was increased. Yet the shortage remains; indeed, the position has become very acute. We should be told why.

The best way to find out is not to ask the Secretary of State for War, who is, naturally, biased in these matters, but to ask a Select Committee of the House to inquire quite impartially into the shortage of recruits and of non-commissioned officers, and to inquire not only into the question of pay but of conditions, the way men are treated, and the misunderstandings—I use the term advisedly—to which the right hon. Gentleman referred the other day when standing up to a barrage of criticism by hon. Members on this side of the House. I need not retail the figures illustrating the rapid decline in recruitment, which is getting worse and worse. I will hand them to the right hon. Gentleman to make what use he likes of them.

There is also the argument that we need more and more reserves. I agree—but what are the facts? We already have more than 500,000 trained reserves as a result of the National Service Acts. We can still draw upon the Class Z reservists. Many of them have become older—

§ Mr. Kenneth Thompson (Liverpool, Walton)

All of them have.

§ Mr. Shinwell

—and there is a considerable wastage, but there are still many who are available.

I agree that the position in relation to reserves is of fundamental importance. As has been pointed out, it does not so much matter how many men one has in the field; what matters is the number of reserves that may be speedily thrown into the battle line in time of trouble. I agree that the position is difficult, but we have vast numbers of reservists. Moreover, I am satisfied that we can train them in a shorter time. We do not require more than 18 months, except in the technical branches.

Another argument which is adduced by the Government, and which will no doubt interest the Prime Minister, is the state of world tension. They say, "Look at the international situation—with the cold war and the various possibilities." But the Government cannot plead, as their reason for maintaining a two-year period of service, that we are still in a condition of acute international tension and, at the same time, continually boast and brag that as a result of their diplomacy the position has considerably eased.

They cannot have it both ways. If the position has eased, and there is not so much danger of the cold war continuing, or a shooting war emerging, the Government can claim to have achieved something, in which case they must agree that it is time to have an inquiry into the operation of the National Service Acts, and to see whether the whole of our military organisation requires adjusting or reorganising. Either the position has eased or it has not; we can have one or the other, but not both. I suggest that the Prime Minister might give his attention to that matter.

Now it is argued further—and I saw this most interesting argument in "The Times" leader this morning—that we must have a strategic reserve. [HON. MEMBKRS: "Hear, hear.'] All right, but we have a strategic reserve. Usually, a strategic reserve is in the Home Command. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman opposite will challenge that. Germany is part of the Home Command. We have four divisions there. If it is argued that we cannot take men from that Home Command for the purposes of operating elsewhere, may I remind the Minister of Defence that only the other week I 1082 directed his attention to the fact that the French Government had taken from their forces under N.A.T.O. Command a large number of men for service in North Africa, with the consent of N.A.T.O.

Similarly, it could be done in our case. There is no real difficulty there. [Laughter.] Of course there is not. If it is good enough for France it is good enough for us, Does anybody suggest that France has no overseas commitments; or that their commitments in North Africa are not as important to the French as are ours elsewhere? Anyway, we are Allies and we have as much interest in North Africa as presumably the French—because they are in association with us in N.A.T.O.—have interest in Malaya or Kenya.

The Government argue that they have instituted frequent inquiries into this matter. By whom were they conducted? By biased persons who have an interest in the matter. If the Government want an independent inquiry, they should not ask the generals. They always want more men. I have never met a general at the War Office or elsewhere who did not ask for more men. The demands of generals are insatiable. We want a Select Committee of the House which would be presumably unbiased and would regard the matter objectively in the interest of the nation as a whole and not in the interest of the War Office.

The Government have said that the matter is under constant review. Of all the platitudes indulged in by the Government, that is the most trite. The Government talk about the need for security in military matters. If a Select Committee were foolish enough to allow private information of a security character to leak out, that would be bad, but I would be prepared to trust a Select Committee of the House to inquire and, when a subject related to security matters emerged, to by-pass, or, at any rate, deal with, that with the tact which I am sure hon. Members can use.

These are the arguments which are adduced by the Government. Nobody would deny that the situation has changed since the two-year period was adopted. I have already spoken about Korea and Suez but there is something more than that, which is familiar to every hon. Member as a result of recent debates and of what has appeared in the Press and in 1083 articles in military magazines and the like. Our military strategy is being speedily revised. That will not be denied by the Minister of Defence. If he does deny that, it is a very serious matter. N.A.T.O. has declared its intention to revise military strategy and to adjust itself to the emergence of the nuclear weapon.

I admit that the question whether, as a result of the advent of nuclear weapons and new N.A.T.O. strategy, it is possible to dispense with our land forces is controversial and not a very easy one to answer. Quite frankly, I do not believe that that is possible, at any rate for some time. I know that Sir John Slessor, a Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Captain Liddell Hart, and many other military experts have their theories on this issue. I may be right or wrong, but while there is some need for adjustment of our land forces, I am not sure that at present we can dispense with them entirely—and not because I accept what the right hon. Member for Woodford said about broken-backed warfare. If I may use an expression which I think the Financial Secretary to the Treasury used the other day, that is "boloney."

To dispense with land forces entirely is, in my judgment, inconceivable at present. We must see what can be done in respect of disarmament and what development takes place in the adjustment of military strategy in general, but surely this is a matter that can be inquired into. I know that we have debates on Defence and on the Service Estimates to which hon. Members on both sides of the House, and particularly those who are well-grounded in military matters contribute, but however well-informed they may be, it is quite impossible for hon. Members to express a competent opinion based on all the facts, taking into their stride the whole situation. It seems to me that we require a Committee capable of focusing attention on these matters so that the House and the country may be well-informed.

I have already stated what can be done in the case of reserves; and, by the way, our demand is supported by the Trades Union Congress. I should like the House to understand that. The T.U.C. has had this matter under consideration. It has 1084 looked at it not so much from the military point of view as from the industrial point of view and it has expressed very strong views about it. I agree that the T.U.C. has not made a declaration in support of a reduction of the period of service, but it has demanded an inquiry and its views are entitled to consideration.

If the Government reject our demand, which is supported by the T.U.C, what alternative have we but to appeal to the great body of the electorate? If the Government turn down an inquiry, if they are completely satisfied with the situation, if they are content with a declaration that the matter is under constant review and that they hope whenever possible to review or to adjust the period of service, that is not enough.

I utter this warning. We are drifting into a condition of permanent conscription. The Government seem to like it. They have become familiar with conscription. It is the easy way out. Then they do not have to trouble about recruiting Regulars. They will rely on the men who are forced into the Services. I would say that the divergence of view between the other side of the House and ours amounts to this, that hon. and right hon. Members opposite are satisfied with conscription and the two-year period—

§ Mr. Cyril Osborne (Louth)

That is not true.

§ Mr. Shinwell

—whereas we on this side have never regarded conscription as a permanent feature of our national system and are anxious to reduce it as rapidly as possible, because we do not believe it to be any longer necessary

§ Mr. Osborne

That is a very serious statement. What evidence can the right hon. Gentleman give for the statement he has made about this side of the House?

§ Mr. Shinwell

I only require to give the answer that if the Government believe it is worth considering whether there should be a readjustment of our National Service Acts; and if they find it impossible to agree to a proposal to reduce the period by six months immediately or within the foreseeable future, let them agree to an inquiry such as we have requested.

§ Mr. Osborne

That is not answering my question. The right hon. Gentleman made a most serious statement. I want to know, and he ought to say in fairness to the House and to the country, what evidence he has to justify his statement about this side of the House.

§ Mr. Shinwell

This is infantile on the part of the hon. Member. I credited the hon. Gentleman, despite his lugubrious appearance, with more intelligence. I am sorry that he does not reach the standard I ascribed to him.

We have to rely on the statements made by members of the Government, and we have to rely on the Amendment to this Motion, which indicates that the Government regard conscription on a two-year basis as essential for a considerable time to come.

I add this: whatever may be the opinion of the back bench supporters of the Government—and I prefer to think they like conscription on the present basis—it is certainly true that the Government's military advisers, having secured, as a result of world tension, a two-year period of service, are determined not to yield an inch. That is my opinion. It is my firm opinion that there is not a single one of the Government's military advisers who is prepared to give way on the question of having an inquiry of an independent kind, even by a Select Committee, or any reduction in the period of service.

§ Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing (Hendon, North)

The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the Government's Amendment to his Motion. Does he not appreciate the last words of the Amendment? They are: … the declared intention of Her Majesty's Government to lighten the existing burden of National Service as soon as circumstances permit.

§ Mr. Shinwell

With great respect to the Government and to hon. Members on the back benches opposite, I think that the Amendment is just a continuation of the kind of platitudes they have indulged in all along.

For example, the Amendment begins with an expression of gratitude to the National Service men. Is not that quite gratuitous? Does anybody ever complain about the National Service men? It is the National Service men who are complain- 1086 ing about the treatment they receive from the Government. As for the rest, the Amendment talks about lightening the burden of National Service as soon as possible. What does it mean? We know the kind of answer we get from the Government. We ask when something is to be done, and we are always told, "As soon as possible." What does it mean? Through the months and years we have got the same answer to our questions on this subject. That answer is not enough. The Government have to be very much more definite.

If the Government, in reply to our Motion, were today to say that in the course of the next six months, if they should be in power still—which I do not expect will be the case—they would reduce the period of service, or at any rate have the inquiry for which we have asked, it would be a different matter. They have refused every time, and we are entitled to reach the conclusion that the Government are quite content with the present system and intend to retain it. The military advisers are not prepared to recommend that the Government should yield. They will not yield themselves.

I therefore make this declaration on behalf of the Labour Opposition, that we intend to reverse the position. It is our intention, if we are the Government, immediately to institute an inquiry into the operation of the National Service Acts. I beg hon. Members not to treat what I have said with derision, because in a few weeks they may very likely discover that the matter is out of their hands.

Finally, I say this. We are not departing in any way from our views about defence. Readjustments are, perhaps, necessary. That, I think, will be generally agreed. However, we stand by our defence position as long as the international tension continues; but we do believe there is a case for some readjustment here. The Government refuse to accept our view. Then, clearly, it is either because they regard conscription as a permanent condition of our national life, or because they have not undertaken the inquiries to which they frequently refer. I ask them to depart from that attitude and to give us the inquiry we want, and to place the matter unreservedly in the hands of a Select Committee of this House and to accept whatever conclusions result.

§ The Minister of Defence (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)

I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: this House expresses its gratitude for the services rendered by National Service men in maintaining the safety and well-being of this country in the present world situation; and approves the declared intention of Her Majesty's Government to lighten the existing burden of National Service as soon as circumstances permit. I think it is common ground that the Government should be constantly considering the implications and the operation of the National Service Acts. I think it is right that the House should from time to time debate whether compulsory service as organised at present is the most effective use that can be made of these young men in the national interest. I therefore welcome this opportunity of examining the position, and I shall try to do that without undue polemics—though I must say that I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), in one or two of his remarks, rather let the cat out of the bag about the purpose of the Motion which he has moved.

When National Service was introduced, it is quite true, the then Government gave two main reasons for it. The primary purpose then was to build up large, well trained reserves for use in emergency. The second reason was the need to supplement the Regular component of the active forces with the National Service element, so that they could carry out their world-wide commitments.

The international scene then was very different from what it has turned out to be since, and the strategic background of global war was rather different. I quite concede that as time has gone on the emphasis has rather changed. At present, the emphasis is much more on the maintenance of our active forces, and that is the compelling need at the present time. Some of the quotations which the right hon. Gentleman made referred, I think, to a rather earlier period.

I do not propose to inflict many statistics on the House, but there are certain basic figures. At the beginning of April, 1955, the total strength of our Armed Forces was about 825,000. Of those, just under two-thirds were Regu- 1088 lars and just over one-third National Service men. During 1955, the overall numbers will be reduced by about 35,000, and the reduction will be in the Regular element. Therefore, by this time next year the same number of National Service men will be in the forces but their percentage of the total will be rather increased. So far as the percentage of Regulars and National Service men, Service by Service, is concerned, in the Navy the men are almost entirely Regulars; in the Army the number is about half and half; and in the Air Force there are three Regulars to each National Service man. Those are the facts at the present.

From them it will be seen how important is the contribution made by the National Service man, and I should like, and I think the whole House would like, to pay a tribute to the National Service men. I understand, and I think that all my hon. and right hon. Friends understand, the disadvantages of peacetime conscription. I think it is quite obvious what are those disadvantages, although it does not necessarily follow that, on balance, the consequences are harmful to the individual concerned. I am very conscious of the industrial argument, in particular, at the present time.

However that may be, this obligation has on the whole, I believe, been willingly and cheerfully undertaken. I had the opportunity, in 1952, of going with the then Minister of Defence to Korea, and I saw for myself the high morale and cheerfulness of units of which National Service men formed a considerable part. I think that our view once again should go on record, that these young men have made a vital contribution to peace and to the security of their country, and it is right that they, and their parents, should know that that is what we think about them and the work they have been doing.

On the other hand, we have to be very careful about how we deal with the matter, because the production of uncertainty, the raising of false hopes or impressions, may have the most unsettling effect upon morale and upon the way in which the obligation is undertaken.

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman leaves the statistical part of his speech, would he be good enough to give us one figure for which we have pressed for many months? Will he be kind enough to tell 1089 us the number and percentage of men who are serving on the new three-year engagement in the Army and how many of them have taken on? This question and its answer are at the core of this matter. We have pressed for an answer over and over again, and we have been refused the information. We were promised it in the first weeks in May, but in a few days the House will be dissolved and there will be a General Election. Can we be told what this vital figure is?

§ Mr. Lloyd

I certainly cannot give it to the hon. Gentleman this afternoon, but I will see whether it can be given to him.

When examining this general matter, we have to consider British commitments and the international position. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Easington, who left the Chamber a few moments ago—who has now returned to the Chamber—devoted part of his speech to dealing with the international situation. That seems to me to be one of the difficulties about the Opposition's Motion, because a judgment upon those factors cannot be remitted even to a Select Committee of this House. Only the Government of the day can have the necessary knowledge on which to form a judgment as to the existing circumstances.

§ Mr. Shinwell

May I remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that there is a precedent for this? During the war, in 1941, the Coalition Government remitted to an independent committee an inquiry into the use of skilled manpower in the forces. In those circumstances, there can surely be no objection to having an inquiry now.

§ Mr. Lloyd

That is an entirely different matter, and one which does not seem to me to have been a matter of policy in the broadest sense bearing upon the international situation. As I say, only the Government can form an estimate of what the international situation is likely to be, and only upon such an estimate can realistic conclusions be arrived at.

§ Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman realise that the whole structure of the Army, as it substantially exists today, was the result of the Esher Committee, which was appointed by this House?

§ Mr. Lloyd

We are dealing now with quite a different situation. We are now considering whether, in view of the international situation and of our commitments overseas, it is possible to reduce the period of National Service from 24 to 18 months. It is not primarily really a question of the formation of our forces, but a question of what forces we need to carry out our existing commitments.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington referred to certain matters. It is quite true that, comparing today with November, 1951, there has been a steady improvement and a steady development in the processes of pacification. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, there has been the cease-fire in Korea. That would not have happened, I believe, but for the Indian Resolution at the United Nations dealing with the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war. In procuring acceptance of that Resolution, British diplomacy played a decisive part.

I remember four or five anxious weeks in New York, and, but for the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at a critical point, I do not think that that Resolution would have been passed, and I do not think that the Armistice would have been possible. The war in Indo-China has ceased, and, whatever the uncertainties in the present situation may be, fighting has stopped and the grave risks of an extension of that war which existed at this time last year have been averted. The whole House has acknowledged the part played by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in that.

There has been the settlement with Persia, which has been of real benefit to Britain and British interests. I am developing the right hon. Gentleman's argument rather more fairly, perhaps, than he developed it. There has been a settlement with Egypt, and our forces have been freed of very heavy burdens there. Sudan has now decided to settle its own future. The Trieste problem has been settled in a manner acceptable to both Italy and Yugoslavia. All that, I think, has been due to British and American diplomacy.

There has been an agreement with Iraq, and, as a result of our policy, it looks as if at long last, there may be a settlement of the Austrian Treaty. The 1091 Government's policy to clear up situations one by one has worked. I believe that considerable progress has been made towards peace. The direct consequence of this has been that we have been able to begin to redeploy and to build up a strategic reserve at home, which is where it should be.

I do not think it is sufficiently realised, particularly by those who listen to the kind of speech made by the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon, that in November, 1951, this country was heavily over-committed overseas, having regard to the forces available. Then there was practically nothing available in this country to send out by way of reinforcements or to deal with a new situation.

In March, 1952, apart from troops engaged in ceremonial duties in London and at base and training establishments, the only infantry battalion available with which to meet any further emergency was the demonstration battalion at the School of Infantry.

§ Mr. Shinwell

This is so inaccurate and deceptive that the right hon. and learned Gentleman ought to be ashamed of himself for saying it. Is he not aware that, at that time, we had more than 11 divisions overseas? The right hon. and learned Gentleman has already said that the state of international tension was most acute at that time, and to say that we did not meet our commitments—[HON. MEMBERS: "He did not say that."] That is what he said. He said that we had nothing left in this country. Even that is absolutely inaccurate, because, at that time, there were nearly 200,000 troops still in this country. How they were deployed is another matter, but the fact is that a very large number of troops were still in the country.

§ Mr. Lloyd

It seems to me that if they were improperly deployed, that was the responsibility of the right hon. Gentleman. But the fact of the matter is that in March, 1952, the only infantry battalion available to deal with any emergency which might very easily have arisen in the circumstances of the cold war, and so on, was the Demonstration Battalion at the School of Infantry. I agree that we may have had 11 divisions overseas.

§ Mr. Wigg

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman pardon me for a moment?

§ Mr. Lloyd

I am sorry, but I must get on.

The fact of having no available trained reserves at home undoubtedly weakened our international position, both as regards friends and enemies. Furthermore, it was a great strain upon the Forces, upon their family life and upon their morale. It really was an intolerable situation.

There were these two aspects to it: as I say, in the world in which we live, the cold war is, unfortunately, a reality and the warm war a possibility. If we are not to be over-committed or overextended, we must have a strategic force at home capable of going to any threatened point. Secondly, it is of equal importance from the point of view of our Regulars that an undue proportion of their service should not be overseas service, because, if it is, we shall lose the Regular content of the forces. I maintain that, in present circumstances, it is entirely right to build up this strategic reserve.

Another matter arises in connection with the suggested reduction from 24 to 18 months. There is the question of the timing of a change. I think that, at the moment, we are entering upon a decisive phase in our attempts to pacify the world, and I think that there is a possibility of further negotiations. Reference was made in the House last week and again this afternoon to the point. I quote the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) because I thought he asked a very apt supplementary relating to Austria the other day, when he said: Would it be fair to describe this Austrian agreement as the first fruits of ratification, and does it tend to indicate that as a result of the ratification of the Paris Agreements it is now much easier to negotiate with the Russians?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th April, 1955; Vol. 540, c. 32.] That, in other words, is the maintenace of peace through strength. I am glad to have the hon. and learned Gentleman's support for that.

In addition to that, we have tabled far-reaching proposals on disarmament, and we still hope for progress there. In my submission, it would be folly just at this time to make a change in, or to indicate a new departure from, our National 1093 Service arrangements. If we were to cast away our present power to meet our cold war obligations, it might destroy the prospect of successful negotiations, because, after all, in spite of the improvements stated and admitted by the right hon. Gentleman, there are still many doubts and uncertainties about what the Soviet Union means by "peaceful coexistence." That is a question to which many people still do not know the answer.

I saw the other day a quotation from a pamphlet recently published by the Soviet Ministry of Defence, in which it was stated: Communists are against Imperialistic wars as being counter-revolutionary wars, but they are in favour of liberating anti-Imperialist revolutionary wars. "Peaceful co-existence"—on those terms? That statement, of course, may have been only for internal consumption, but these questions, as to what the Soviet Union mean by "peaceful co-existence," we have constantly asked. Is it their purpose, while avoiding major military entanglements—

§ Mr. Wigg

On a point of order. As it is impossible to get any information from the Minister except what he cares to read from his brief, may I ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker? I understand that the Motion before the House is on the rather narrow point of setting up a Select Committee to inquire into the operation of the National Service Acts. It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman finds it more convenient to make a speech on foreign affairs. Has he by chance brought the wrong brief down to the House? Perhaps you can give us some guidance about that?

§ Mr. Speaker

That is not a point of order. It is a point of debate. I think it is common ground between the two right hon. Gentlemen who have been speaking that the factor of the commitments of this country must come into any assessment of this problem. I did not hear the right hon. and learned Gentleman who is now addressing the House transgress the bounds of relevancy in that respect.

§ Mr. Wigg

Further to my point of order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman deployed at some length an inquiry into the nature of "peaceful co-existence," which is a very interesting subject, but what has that to do—

§ Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Member must leave the matter of relevance to me. The Motion refers to "existing circumstances and commitments," and I think that was perfectly relevant.

§ Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

On a point of order. I should like to ask your guidance, in view of what has been said. Will it be in order, throughout the rest of the debate, for the rest of us to discuss what the Soviet Union means by "peaceful co-existence"?

§ Mr. Speaker

I think the hon. Member had better try it on, and see what happens.

§ Mr. Silverman

I apologise, Mr. Speaker, and I am sure it was actually my fault, but the hilarity with which your answer to me was received prevented me from hearing what it was.

§ Mr. Speaker

The hon. Member can rest assured that its purport was that I could not give a Ruling on points of order in advance. If the hon. Member makes a speech, whoever is in the Chair will tell him whether it is in order or not.

§ Mr. Lloyd

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for his intervention, because I think it underlines what is one of the primary points in this debate, because whether it is coexistence or "peaceful co-existence" vitally affects the number and the disposition of the forces which we have to have available. That is the whole essence of the debate.

I was saying that it is very difficult to find out yet what is the answer to that question. I tried again and again with the late Mr. Vyshinsky, but I never got an answer from him on these matters. I am convinced that this is the wrong moment in the development of our international policy to make a change or a new departure.

We must examine, in the light of the terms of the Motion, what would be the consequences of a reduction in the period from 24 to 18 months. The strength of the forces would fall by over 80,000. With the reduced numbers, we could not meet our requirements; in particular, the Army could not build up a strategic reserve, and the R.A.F. could not man its existing front line. But it is not only a question of numbers. The last six months of a National Service man's time is by far the most useful. He is then 1095 trained. If he served for a shorter period, the time taken to train him would be just the same, but the period of efficient service would be substantially reduced, and that would particularly apply to men trained in medium skilled trades. It might not even be worth while to train him in certain trades.

The figures given in "The Times" today show the extent to which the Services, and the Army in particular, rely upon National Service men for officers, non-commissioned officers and tradesmen. Of the officers in the Army, 5,000 are National Service men, while 25 per cent. of the corporals, 50 per cent. of the lance-corporals and over 50 per cent. of Army tradesmen are National Service men. The latter part of their service is not only valuable to the forces, but, I believe, these junior leaders also derive considerable benefit themselves.

The loss of six months in present circumstances would directly affect the efficiency of the forces, and I think this is a consideration which not only the men in the forces themselves but also their relatives may have in mind. Efficiency, and indeed safety, in training and operations does not depend solely upon Regulars. It depends considerably upon the more experienced National Service men, and they must serve an adequate time with their units. We cannot build up the high morale which we have learned to expect from British troops if the personnel is constantly changing.

There would be other consequences. It would mean a shorter time of overseas service, which would increase the movement problem, and it would mean larger administrative staffs and would make it quite impossible to build up the strategic reserve.

§ Mr. Shinwell

Does not all this mean exactly what I have said? If the Government rely on National Service men in the fashion which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has indicated, does that not mean exactly what I venture to suggest—that the Government intend to continue with conscription for all time?

§ Mr. Lloyd

If the right hon. Gentleman will permit me, I shall come to the point of what the Government's inten- 1096 tions are. His inference is quite inaccurate and incorrect. I have said that, in present circumstances, as our forces are disposed, these would be the consequences, and nobody can deny that they would be the consequences at present.

It seems to me that no committee of inquiry could or should take the place of the Government of the day in assessing the international situation, and no committee is necessary to tell us about the consequences which I have just detailed to the House. But that does not mean that we think that the two-year period has come to stay for ever, and our intention is to reduce the burden of these obligations as much and as soon as possible.

I should like to quote what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War said in the House on 15th February of this year: The Government stated last year, and we state again now, that it is our object and policy to reduce National Service by as much as possible as soon as possible, but that depends on events, and events at present do not allow that it should be reduced by six months."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th February, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 169.] Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen may laugh at the word "events," but was it not events which caused the increase to 24 months? The right hon. Gentleman gibed about generals, but I have the authority of my right hon. Friend for saying that the War Office would be very pleased to do without conscription and have a solely Regular Army, if that were possible. It is the Government's intention to reduce the burden as soon as possible. The Opposition Motion suggests—

§ Mr. Paget

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has pointed out the Government's desire to reduce this burden as soon as events will permit. How can he react to events as they are occurring unless he has had an inquiry to see what effect various reductions would have on the forces? I should have thought that an inquiry was essential if the right hon. and learned Gentleman is to be in a position to react to events.

§ Mr. Lloyd

I will deal with the point about what this inquiry should do if the hon. and learned Gentleman would permit me to do it in my own way.

This Motion suggests a general inquiry into the operation of the National Service 1097 Acts in the light of existing circumstances, with the particular direction that the Select Committee is to consider whether the period should remain at two years or be reduced to 18 months.

There seem to me to be two objections to that. First, it would be too large a task for any Select Committee to undertake if it were to conclude its investigations within a reasonable time. I will develop that point in a moment. Secondly, this is really a matter of policy which must be for the Government of the day, and no Government should seek to shuffle out of their responsibilities by trying to shelter behind the opinion of a Committee upon a matter of this nature.

That does not mean that we believe there is no scope for inquiries into the efficient use of manpower in the Services, because I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that economies in the use of men obviously help to bring nearer the day when the period can be reduced. We are not opposed to examination or reexamination of particular aspects. All the Service Departments have standing machinery for reviewing complements and establishments. [Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman should wait a minute or two to hear what I have to say.

Small savings are being made all the time and they mount up. We welcome specific reviews with the help of outside experts on special matters, and notable help in these independent inquiries has been given in the past by people from both sides of industry. Since the end of the war there have been 21 of these inquiries in the three Services, covering a wide range of subjects. Many of them were set on foot by right hon. Gentlemen opposite. I will mention a few of them. I can read out the whole 21 if the right hon. Gentleman wants it, but I will mention just a few.

In 1952, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett) conducted an inquiry into the methods of maintaining ships in reserve and the method of maintenance by civilian contract. As a result of this inquiry, 5,000 officers and men were saved. General Templer made an inquiry in 1951 which, I think, was originated by the right hon. Gentleman—he is one of those generals the right hon. Gentleman was talking about—into the 1098 distribution of military and civilian manpower in the Army, and a saving of about 6,000 resulted from that inquiry. General Callander, in 1951–52, made an inquiry into headquarters and administrative units overseas with good results, and in 1953 Sir James Reid-Young, the managing director of Vickers Limited, Chairman of Vickers-Armstrong, and Chairman of the Advisory Panel of the Organisation and Methods Division of the Treasury, conducted one into static administrative installations in the United Kingdom. He found that, in general, there was an efficient use of manpower, but he did make a number of detailed suggestions.

In 1949, the then Secretary of State for Air, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) asked Mr. Quig, the Deputy Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries, to examine the whole organisation of the Air Ministry. My noble Friend, the Secretary of State for Air mentioned in another place that promising experiments were being undertaken in organisation and methods in units of the Royal Air Force and he was hopeful of savings of thousands rather than of hundreds. Experiments were made possible in this field by the improved level of manning in the supervisory ranks and the most highly skilled trades.

There are many other inquiries, but I think I should refer to one more, and that is the Eighth Report of the Select Committee on Estimates, when hon. Members undertook a very laborious task. Here is the evidence of what was done in regard to one small aspect of the use of manpower in the Royal Air Force.

§ Mr. Shinwell

Did it do any harm?

§ Mr. Lloyd

It did a substantial amount of good, and made several recommendations.

If another committee were appointed the whole point that I am making is that it could cover only a very small part of the field. Even with these 21 inquiries the whole field has not been covered, and if the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion is to set up a Select Committee to go into all these matters it would be sitting for years. Did I hear the right hon. Gentleman say that we should then have the matter out of the way?

§ Mr. Alfred Robens (Blyth)

I said that these inquiries have done a certain amount that will not require to be done again.

§ Mr. Lloyd

I do not think that that is in accordance with the facts, because some of these inquiries were several years ago and conditions have changed. It would have to be considered how, in the changed circumstances, any further examination would have to be done.

There is no doubt that any Select Committee charged with this task, if it were to be properly done, would be undertaking something which, I think, would tax its resources over a matter of years. Incidentally, in regard to the Report of the Select Committee on Estimates I think it is right that I should tell the House that there was very little in the findings that suggested there was any misuse of existing manpower in the Royal Air Force. I suggest to the House quite seriously that because of the nature of the inquiry no one committee could do the job within a reasonable time. We shall continue to appoint such inquiries as seem fit and proper to examine specific points.

One other point on these inquiries. I should say—because a great deal of time and energy is put into them—that it is essential that principles which are worked out should be applied in practice. The problem is one of management, and most commanding officers are fully alive to the importance of maintaining good morale. But in any large organisation such as the Armed Forces there are bound to be dull but necessary jobs, and the problem is to ensure that the National Service man who spends some time daily doing a fatigue or a boring job should not lose sight of the essential part he and his fellows are playing in the defence of the country.

The young National Service men in Korea were in no danger of losing their sense of proportion in that way. They were engaged in active operations, but I think it is very important that those in the Services should take every step to see that the young National Service man who has to spend part of his time on this kind of job should be kept interested and educated.

There is one other aspect of this matter to which the right hon. Gentleman 1100 referred and that is the N.A.T.O. aspect. It is true that the periods of service in N.A.T.O. vary, but the right hon. Gentleman is not accurate about the period of service in the Italian Army. The period is 18 months as he will see from HANSAKD of 3rd December. That of the United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey is 24 months, though Turkey may be rather more. The others are rather less. It is said because of that we should reduce our period. Upon that point, I have two observations to make. First, the United Kingdom has commitments far beyond those under the North Atlantic Treaty. We are an international Power with commitments all over the world, and what we do must be determined by our own needs.

Secondly, other countries have to decide for themselves. Her Majesty's Government have consistently taken the line that the period of service should be adequate to enable the country to carry out its obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It is for each country to decide its own period in the light of its own financial and economic position and its commitments both inside and outside N.A.T.O.

N.A.T.O., after all, is an association of free partners and the essence of that partnership is that each State should decide for itself how to carry out its obligations. But I think it would be wrong not to record disappointment at certain decisions that have been taken. My hon. Friend the Member for Scotstoun (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison) made a relevant observation when he referred to the Soviet Army conscript. He is called up for 36 months counting from 1st January of the year following the call-up, and in the case of N.C.O.s and specialists the period is four years and some military training in addition is given preparatory to the call-up.

The N.A.T.O. point is a fair matter to raise, and I do not think it should lead us to reduce our own period of service at the present time, but rather to hope for a greater effort on the part of some of our friends in N.A.T.O. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the processes of persuasion or admonition or encouragement are much better carried out privately in a matter of this kind.

§ Mr. Shinwell

Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman asked our partners in N.A.T.O. to increase their period of service?

§ Mr. Lloyd

The matter has been discussed in N.A.T.O. privately, and as I said to the right hon. Gentleman—perhaps he was not listening—in a matter of this kind between Allies these processes of persuasion are much better carried on privately.

To sum up, the desire of Her Majesty's Government is to lighten this burden as much and as soon as possible. We understand the industrial argument, but to announce any such intention now would cast away many of the advantages we have been able to achieve. I believe that the Soviet Union deals in facts and not in words. Its leaders appraise what we and our Allies have the physical strength to do, and they make a hard-headed conclusion after examining the facts.

The shield of physical defence for the free world, built up during the past three and a half years or more, is a decisive feature in the present situation, just as the possession of an effective deterrent will be a decisive feature in the future. To reduce the period of National Service now would affect our power to play our part in the world. It would discourage our Allies and would encourage our enemies, and so far from reducing world tension, it might increase it.

I believe that the common sense of the British people will acknowledge the logic and the wisdom of what I have said, and that they will accept these obligations until it is safe to make a change. It is significant that in their Motion the Opposition do not recommend a change. When the change has to be made, it should be made upon the responsibility of the Government of the day. Therefore, we cannot accept this Motion, and I commend the much more realistic Amendment to the House.

§ Mr. John Strachey (Dundee, West)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister of Defence took a long time to come to the subject mainly under discussion this afternoon. We could not help feeling on this side that he was taking into his new office—on which we congratulate him—not so much thoughts of his previous office but of the office before 1102 that. The right hon. and learned Gentleman was taking his Foreign Office connections into his new office; and although in some senses they were relevant, we were relieved when he came to the subject under discussions.

When the right hon. and learned Gentleman came to it, it seemed to us that every word he uttered was directed to showing that this country must have a two-year period of National Service in perpetuity. I could not understand his argument as meaning anything other than that our present Forces are essential for our present commitments and that they could not be raised in any other way than by two years' National Service.

The most effective answer to that is not to go into questions of detail about the composition of the Forces but to remind the House that immediately before the Korean War, when our commitments were much larger than they are today, we managed with a period of 18 months' National Service. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman says it is impossible to have that now, how was it possible immediately before the Korean War? I can testify, my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) can testify, and all my other right hon. Friends who were in Service Departments can testify that at that time none of the military experts claimed it was necessary to increase the period of military service to two years.

It was only the Korean War which made anyone think of doing so. Now that the Korean War is long over; and not only so, but now that by far the biggest overseas commitment of all, that of Egypt, is being steadily liquidated, we are told that it is unthinkable and impossible to return to the period of National Service with which we managed perfectly well in the period before that war. This shows the great danger of getting stuck with these long periods of National Service, and it requires an answer from the Government.

The argument seemed to me so extraordinary that I could not altogether escape the impression that the Government contemplate, if they remain the Government, undertaking additional distant commitments which, of course, would enormously affect the period of National Service. The argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman made me want to 1103 ask this question of the Prime Minister. In the event of his remaining Prime Minister after the Election, does the right hon. Gentleman contemplate the possibility of this country undertaking further and larger commitments in the distant theatres? Has the attention of the Prime Minister been drawn to the statements, which are frequent now in the American Press, that in the event of the present Government being returned this country will undertake a commitment to maintain, with our Forces, the Government of Chiang Kai-shek on the Island of Formosa?

§ The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden)

I do not want any currency given to that suggestion. There is no truth whatever in our having entered into such an engagement, or having contemplated entering into such an engagement, or having been asked by anybody to enter into such an engagement.

§ Mr. Strachey

That is reassuring as far as it goes, but may we have an undertaking now, before the Election, that if the Government remain the Government in no circumstances will they enter into a commitment to defend the Chiang Kaishek régime on the Island of Formosa? The Prime Minister can set all our doubts at rest if he will give us that assurance.

§ The Prime Minister

My statement covered everything.

§ Mr. Strachey

The right hon. Gentleman will see quite clearly, when he reads the OFFICIAL REPORT, that his statement did not cover such an assurance as I am asking for, that in no circumstances would a British Government presided over by the right hon. Gentleman, enter into a commitment to maintain the Chaing Kaishek régime on the Island of Formosa. The Prime Minister is not claiming that he has given me that assurance, is he? Why will he not give me that assurance? Surely it is desirable to do so, desirable for him and for the country. It is extremely disturbing if the right hon. Gentleman will not give us such an assurance, because it is the easiest thing for him to do, and it is to his advantage. Why will he not do so?

Only yesterday we were told in the "Herald Tribune"—I quote from an article written by Mr. Stewart Alsop— 1104 … the 'not a single Tommy for Chiang Kai-shek' line has been so successfully propagated in Britain that any British commitment of any sort to defend Formosa would be highly dangerous politically. For this reason it is most unlikely that any agreement will be reached before the British elections of May 26. But if the Conservatives are triumphantly re-elected, an Anglo-American deal on Formosa will certainly be up for most serious consideration. There are undoubtedly very great expectations on this matter on the other side of the Atlantic.

I say at once that some sort of guarantee under the United Nations for a neutralised Formosa on which the Chiang Kai-shek régime had ceased to exist, on the lines on which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition spoke, would be one thing; but there should be no guarantee such as is being proposed here to defend the Chiang Kai-shek régime of which one may say frankly that its only hope is to foment a third world war. Anything like that is something which I am sure the whole country would bitterly resent.

The Prime Minister should at once give the simple assurance that so long as he is Prime Minister he will not contemplate anything of the sort. No one can say that in the American Press we are not being told that that is precisely what is being contemplated; otherwise, it is so very difficult to understand the arguments of the Minister of Defence in which he quite clearly shows he cannot contemplate any cutting down of National Service to the 18 months period, which sufficed perfectly well for us before the Korean War, when we had much larger commitments than today.

§ Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing

How does that make sense with the right hon. Gentleman's appeal in the defence debates last year and in the year before that we neeeded in this country a large strategic reserve? He seems completely to have forgotten that in his calculation.

§ Mr. Strachey

I have not forgotten, but I shall come to that in the course of my remarks.

I next want to deal with a subject which my right hon. Friend touched on—the immense new factor of nuclear force which has entered into these calculations. When we discussed the Defence Estimates it seemed that the Government were beginning to try to make the enormous readjustment necessary in all 1105 our defence thinking in regard not only to the arrival of the atom bomb but of the hydrogen bomb.

§ Mr. Ian Harvey (Harrow, East)

Is the right hon. Gentleman now really proposing that we should use the H-bomb on a cold war commitment?

§ Mr. Strachey

Where on earth did the hon. Member get that from? Where have I made a single remark that could bear even on the wildest interpretation a similarity to that? The hon. Member keeps nodding his head. All I said was that it seemed to me that the arrival of nuclear warfare made it absolutely imperative that we should readjust our defence thinking. I certainly said that in the defence debate, and I say it again today. I cannot understand what the hon. Member has in mind.

I certainly do think that the speech of the Minister of Defence today represented entirely pre-nuclear thinking. He seemed to be regarding not only our cold war obligations—there is sense in that, I agree—but our whole position as a member of the N.A.T.O. alliance, and the defence contribution of this country to a deterrent, purely in terms of land forces. Surely that is a fantastically out-of-date position. It is certainly not one that the N.A.T.O. Command takes today.

I would agree, and I shall give reasons for it in a moment, with my right hon. Friend who opened the debate that the arrival of nuclear forces does not mean that conventional land forces are out of date. There are, of course, very important reasons why they must be maintained. But surely the arrival of nuclear forces does totally change the rô le of the land forces—and sea forces for that matter, although that is not so relevant to this debate. Surely we must see that, but there was little recognition in the Minister's speech—far less than in the speech of the former Prime Minister in the defence debate—that these nuclear forces had made any change in our defence thinking at all.

This is not some wild dream of the future. We are speaking today in the presence of world forces like the United States Strategic Air Force, for example, which is equipped with hydrogen bombs and, I suppose—although I do not know—between 1,000 and 2,000 stratojets; a 1106 force with a power of destruction incomparably more terrible than anything the world has ever seen. The existence of such a force as that surpasses, in terms of world war, almost all other considerations.

For us, however, the most urgent question is not so much the existence of the United States Strategic Air Force but whether a parallel and equal force exists in Soviet Russia today. One gathers from the authorities that the accepted view is that such a force does not yet exist in Russia. Their lack is not so much that of an adequate stockpile of hydrogen bombs as of methods of delivery. One also gathers that the Russian lack of the power to develop a force of equal size and equal powers of delivery to the United States Strategic Air Force will not take more than two or three years to remedy.

It is the considered view of the N.A.T.O. authorities that in two or three years' time there will be in the world, on both sides, forces which can wreak destruction on a scale such as we have never before contemplated. I suppose that either force could destroy 100 cities a night in those incalculably terrible first few nights of any future war. If that is so, then to suggest, as the Minister of Defence has just been arguing, that the period of our National Service is particularly relevant to the question of a deterrent to a third world war seems to me to be a totally out-of-date point of view.

The argument for the necessity of the maintenance of land forces—and sea forces, for that matter—is surely a different one. It is that if we did not maintain those conventional forces we should be prepared for nothing except total war.

For this country, above all, that of course would be an impossible position. If we had only nuclear forces and weapons and the means to deliver them we should have no means of using a limited amount of force on a limited scale in a local situation. That would be the most terrible and the most unwise situation that we could get into.

If that is the real reason why we want conventional forces, let us face the fact that we do not really want them in terms of a third world war, or even as a deterrent, at all. It is an extraordinary thing to say, but it appears to me that the situation may well arise, if it has not already arisen, where conventional forces 1107 will become less and less relevant in terms of a world war; a situation in which they are appropriate for so-called cold war purposes alone. One almost catches one's breath in saying that, because it represents a military revolution of the most far-reaching character.

If that is the case, then it must affect enormously the method by which we raise our conventional forces and the character which they should have. What does it mean? One cannot tell what sort of forces one will want until one knows for what purpose they will be needed. I suggest that on inquiry we would find that there are three main purposes for which we want, at any rate, land forces today.

One is to form, at least for the moment, a screen across Europe, largely I think for psychological reasons; but these psychological reasons are very important. Then there are what are called Commonwealth purposes—discharging our commitments in the Commonwealth. The character of the forces we want for this purpose is surely very different from anything which we used to consider suitable for a regular army. I was impressed by the suggestion of the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) that this sort of obligation—the Kenya type obligations, the Malayan obligations—are better discharged by a special corps raised for this purpose which is not equipped with heavy equipment like Conqueror tanks but is a force raised for that special purpose. I realise the very great difficulties and complications, but I still think that there is a good deal in the suggestion.

Finally, we need forces for limited and local conflicts within the Korea level. That is the third purpose and for that, of course, a strategic reserve in this country is the obvious answer. I entirely agree with that. I put it to the House that if those are the three purposes for which we want regular land forces today, it is fantastic to suggest that a period of two years' National Service is the best way to raise such forces. A two-year period of National Service may be the appropriate way of creating a great mass reserve for an old-fashioned mass army, such as existed in previous wars, but which will never exist again in a future war. On the other hand, it leaps to the mind that a long-term, highly 1108 professional army, limited in size, but highly mobile and well equipped, is the answer for the three purposes I have mentioned.

I am not suggesting that we can pass to that immediately. Of course we could not abolish National Service tomorrow. I do not think anyone on this side has that illusion; but all the evidence is pointing in that direction, and an inquiry as to whether we cannot start moving in that direction by a reduction in the period of National Service is the very least for which we can ask. In some ways I regret the fact that the evidence does point in that direction.

In many ways the concept of a universal, citizen army is very fine and democratic. But we really cannot continue imposing a two years' period of National Service on the people of this country, if that is not the best way of discharging our defence obligations. I suggest that prima facie the case that this cannot be the best way of discharging those obligations is becoming stronger and stronger. The very least for which we can ask is a most searching inquiry into the matter.

§ Mr. Hugh Fraser (Stafford and Stone)

I feel that the suggestion for an inquiry by Members of the House of Commons on this supremely important matter of National Service is a very dangerous suggestion indeed. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence has pointed out, it would be impossible for any Government to entrust to a Committee decisions which have to be taken on this most vital and tedious business which has to be undertaken by all young men in the country.

There are considerations which involve not merely military decisions, not merely decisions of strategy, but decisions of technology, of the economy in general, of employment and other factors making it perfectly impossible for any Committee, except a Cabinet Committee responsible to the House, to undertake such an inquiry. For hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite to go campaigning in the country on the ground that they want a reduction on National Service by allowing the House of Commons to have a Committee to investigate it is asking the Government, or the next Government 1109 returned, to abrogate their responsibility as the Government of the country.

Some of the arguments put forward this afternoon have not been convincing. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) tried, not very successfully, to trail his cloak about the Formosan situation. "Whose finger on Formosa?" is to be the next little bit of campaigning, I suppose. However, it is fair to say that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has done far more to ease tension in the Far East and has done far more than the rather foolish statements made by the Leader of the Opposition when he returned after his fly-hunting expedition in the Far East.

Let the right hon. Member for Dundee, West pose to himself the questions on commitments which he tried to pose to the House and say where commitments at this stage could be cut down. He compared the pre-Korea and the post-Korea periods. The outstanding fact of the pre-Korea period was that on the whole Russian armaments were not increasing at the pace at which they have been increasing since about 1950. No hon. Member more than the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt)—whose political demise nobody regrets more than I—has pointed out again and again to both Governments the immense armaments programme in conventional weapons which was going on in the Soviet Union.

Since 1950 or 1951 the amount of conventional weapons available to the Soviet bloc and the numbers of new divisions raised by the Russian and Chinese armies have been out of all proportion to any advance we have made here. Right hon. Gentlemen in replying to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence have to make perfectly clear which commitments they believe can be cut down. They have to make it clear that the advice of General Gruenther and others in charge of N.A.T.O. makes it absolutely clear that while these Russian conventional armies continue at their present scale Western Europe has, if anything, to do rather more than less.

The right hon. Member for Dundee, West took up my point on colonial forces. What I said was that as a preventative measure it would be a good thing to divide colonial police forces into two sections, those who were normal police 1110 and the gendarmerie. The right hon. Gentleman has been on patrols in Malaya, he has been in the jungle and he knows that at this stage it would be absolutely hopeless to attempt to reduce our commitments in Malaya, as it is in Kenya. We are committed there through the fault of various reasons, but there we are committed. To reduce the commitment is extremely difficult.

The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) made no serious suggestions on these matters. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West suggested that in the distant future reductions might be possible. On this side of the House we, too, believe that. We believe that the success which the Government are having in international affairs is based not only on skill and patience, but also on the strength we are developing. We believe that when these activities reach fruition, when it is possible for the Disarmament Commission to go further—it may be that happy results will flow from the Big Four meeting—then will be the time for the Government to discuss having a special Committee of the House to see how our commitments can be reduced and how, in turn, the term of conscription can be lowered.

Surely no Government, whatever Government it may be, could be other than desirous on the eve of a General Election of being able to say to the people that they propose to reduce the period of National Service; but today in this state of world affairs what could be more irresponsible than the attitude of Her Majesty's Opposition?

§ Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew)

Mr. Bellenger.

§ Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

On a point of order. Am I to take it that the only Members to be called from this side of the House are to be Members of the Privy Council?

§ Mr. Deputy-Speaker

Members who catch my eye will be called.