EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND TRIESTE

§ Mr. Philip Noel-Baker (Derby, South)

I must begin by saying how much my right hon. and hon. Friends, like all other Members, welcome the return of the Foreign Secretary to his office and to our debates, and how much we wish him all the health and strength that he requires. We regret that the first question that he should have had to handle on his return was the two-Power declaration about Trieste. It is about that declaration, the way in which it was drawn up and issued, the methods used and the failure of those methods, that I want to speak this afternoon.

I say this by way of preface. In everything that he does, whatever the individual question may happen to be, the Foreign Secretary is really dealing with one basic problem which he faces every day and hour: how Britain can help to stop another war. It is the significance of the two-Power Declaration in this broad basic problem that I want to show.

Thanks to Russia, we are facing now dangers in the world which mankind has never known before. Never has there been such a swift and terrible advance in armament technique as there has been since 1945. At present, our hope of checking aggression and stopping war lies in the defensive pacts which we have made to uphold the Charter of the United Nations. The Atlantic Pact has made greater progress than we could have hoped when we ratified it four years ago. Not only the northern countries, but also Italy, have been brought in. So have Greece and Turkey; and this year, Greece and Turkey made their treaty of mutual guarantee with Yugoslavia, founded also on the Charter of the United Nations. That treaty gave Europe a bastion it could have had in no other way, and I hope the House remembers how much Europe owes to the vision and generosity of the Greeks.

2809 These favourable developments could not have happened if Trieste had remained a point of conflict, as it was six years ago. If the intervening period has been tided over, if these favourable developments have occurred, it has been due in no small measure to the presence of British and American troops in Trieste. We are there by virtue of an Instrument, establishing a Provisional Regime, attached to the Italian Peace Treaty, and endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

When we accepted this mandate in 1947, we hoped that it was for a period of months. We hoped that a United Nations Governor would be appointed and the Free Territory set up without delay. It has lasted for six years. It has been an onerous mandate. It has cost us £2 million a year. It has locked up 5,000 of our troops. It has earned us the gibes of the Russians. But it has paid a very handsome dividend to Britain, to Europe and to the world. It has kept Trieste quiescent while the defence system of which I have spoken was growing up.

Now by their Two-Power Declaration, by their sudden unheralded publication of a unilateral decision to end our mandate, the Government have brought the Trieste question to a point of tension which it has not known since 1947. They have dealt a serious blow at the moral forces on which our defensive system rests. They have made Trieste a deadly weakness at the heart of Europe's line.

When I say that I am not speaking of the substance of the Declaration, of the territorial division which it proposed; I am speaking of the form and nature of the Declaration, the drafting, the way it was announced, and the grave mistakes of judgment and of tactics which the Government made.

Last week the Secretary of State said that in one respect what the Government had done was like what the Labour Government did when they made the Three-Power Declaration of 1948. It is true that Yugoslavia was given no prior notice on that occasion and that the Yugoslavs protested strongly, as they have done now. But there the likeness ends. The situation in 1948 was utterly unlike that of 1953. We had tried to get a strong and upright U.N. governor for Trieste, and Russia had vetoed every name. The 2810 Kremlin was still empire-building by political boring from within, and it was evident that they hoped by that system to capture Trieste, as they had already captured six separate satellite states. The seizure of Czechoslovakia had occurred only three weeks before. At that time Yugoslavia was co-operating with us in nothing. It was still allowing Russia to use its territory for the lamentable war on Greece. The whole situation was utterly different from that of 1953.

And the Labour Government's action was wholly different from the action now taken by this Government in 1953. The tripartite Declaration of 1948 was not a unilateral decision. It was a proposal—a proposal that, since the Peace Treaty Statute for the Free Territory had proved unworkable, the Treaty, by proper legal process, should be changed. We invited Russia to negotiate a protocol—a new protocol—to change the Treaty, and we said that if the protocol could be agreed it should then be taken to the United Nations for its approval.

U.N. approval was required because in 1947 the Security Council had formally endorsed the statute of the proposed Free Territory and had agreed to fulfil the functions which the Statute laid upon it—and which in fact it still fulfils. The Commandant of A.M.G. in Trieste still sends an annual report to the Security Council. We therefore said that no changes could be made unless the United Nations had approved. Our proposal remained a proposal and no more. Russia did not agree to make the protocol, the approval of the Security Council was therefore never asked for, the Provisional Régime continued, our troops remained until today.

That was entirely different from what this Government did in the Two-Power Declaration of 8th October, 1953. It is true that the Lord President in another place called that Declaration a proposal, but that only showed the strange confusion on that and other points which there has been. The Declaration of 8th October was not a proposal; it was a decision. It was a unilateral decision which the Government intended immediately to carry out. They said: The two Governments are no longer prepared to maintain their responsibility for the administration of Zone A. They have, therefore, decided to terminate Allied Military 2811 Government, to withdraw their troops, and to relinquish the administration of the Zone. They went on to say that the troops would be withdrawn, not after consultation, not when people had agreed, but "at the earliest practicable moment." To show that that was a final decision, that they were not proposing anything or asking anybody for approval, they began to move the wives and families of the troops away.

May I ask the Secretary of State some questions about that Declaration? First, may I ask him to explain a little further the strange conflict between the views expressed by himself and those expressed by the Lord President in another place about giving notice to the parties in advance? The Lord President was in charge of the Foreign Office until 5th October. The Declaration was issued three days later. The Secretary of State assured us that this question of timing, of when to tell the Italians and the Yugoslavs, had been given "anxious consideration," and the decision was to give them only a few hours. But the Lord President in another place said: The Yugoslav and Italian Governments were given … as far as I can remember, two or three days, and it may have been more."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords. 20th October, 1953; Vol. 183, c. 1264.] This is not a trifling matter. When our Ambassador presented the Declaration, Marshal Tito asked for 24 hours to consult his Cabinet. It was refused. That was a very grave decision and I hope the Secretary of State will say something about it this afternoon. The Marshal said it was a shattering experience to be so treated. and that "the impossible manner" in which this vital decision was communicated was "profoundly offending to his nation." It was an obvious risk that the Marshal would so react. It might gravely imperil the reception of the two-Power plan, as no doubt it did. But the Secretary of State told us that this risk had been calculated. We were trying to "lance the abscess." We thought we could shock or stun the parties into acceptance of a fait accompli and so avoid the complications that might arise if they tried to argue with us before the thing was done. We therefore decided to give no notice at all.

2812 Yet the Lord President said he thought we had given the parties two or three times as long as the 24 hours for which Marshal Tito asked in vain. The Foreign Secretary, no doubt with proper loyalty, told us that this mistake was "understandable." We do not understand it and unless the Foreign Secretary can clear it up, we shall conclude, with the Leader of the Opposition, that it simply shows the extraordinary confusion which there has been in the conduct of our foreign policy in recent months.

May I ask about the drafting of the Declaration? It was a decision to hand Zone A to the Italians. But it never mentioned Zone B or the Three-Power Declaration of 1948 at all. It never said, "This is partition, and that is that." A very revealing phrase was used by the "Manchester Guardian" diplomatic correspondent. He wrote: The advantage of the Anglo-American solution is that each of the parties concerned can represent the solution as final or provisional as they feel inclined. I have too much respect for the "Manchester Guardian" to think they thought that one up themselves.

What was the result of this criminal ambiguity in the language used in the Declaration? Signor Pella and his Cabinet immediately declared that this provisional decision did not prejudice Italy's rights to the entire territory and that it represented a substantial step forward to a just solution of the Trieste problem. That was evidently an interpretation of vital importance; but our Government let it pass in the silence which appeared to others to give consent.

Marshal Tito, of course, made the strongest protest and added the very natural observation that the Italian Cabinet could not possibly have said what they did say "without the Allies' permission." Again the Government made no comment on that. But 10 days later, in this House and in another place, they told us it was partition. The Lord President said that of course the Declaration was intended to be final, it was partition along the existing zonal boundary, and that all this was "inherent" in the statement that was made. But in those 10 days infinite damage had been done—illusions fostered, suspicions created, passions roused.

2813 I am not saying now that partition on the zonal boundary was right or wrong; I am not saying that the plan might ever have been accepted as it stood. I am saying that any chance of its acceptance was destroyed by its sudden delivery as an ultimatum, and by the deliberate ambiguity of the language that was used. That was an offence against the first rule of the wise conduct of foreign affairs, which is always to say quite frankly and quite plainly exactly what you mean. [Laughter.] Well, I learned that principle from Arthur Henderson long ago, and it gave him a great position in world affairs in a short tenure of office. The drafting of this Declaration is in great measure to blame for the dangerous tension and the risk of armed conflict that exist today.

Now may I ask the Foreign Secretary a question about France? France is our closest ally. She is our closest neighbour. It was with France, with Leon Blum, that, as an act of faith, we began the Western system of defence when we signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. France has played a leading part in the negotiations about Trieste: when the statute for a Free Territory was made, when the three-Power Declaration was drawn up—the three-Power Declaration which this two-Power Declaration is now to supersede.

France is vitally concerned in all Italian questions. Italy is in far closer daily contact with her than she is with us. How could the Government have left Prance out of this Declaration? How could they only tell them as a fait accompli just before it saw the light of day? Of course, that caused indignation and anxiety in Paris. It placed the French in a very difficult position, and I hope the Foreign Secretary will tell us that he intends to return to full co-operation with our friends in France.

May I ask some questions about the legal aspects of the two-Power Declaration? We stand for the sanctity of treaties. We have a negotiation on the subject going on in Cairo now. We are in Trieste under the Italian Peace Treaty and, as I have said, in virtue of a decision of the United Nations. How could we make, and intend to execute, a two-Power decision to end treaty undertakings which many other nations had signed as well? The Foreign Secretary will not 2814 argue that, because Russia and others have set their treaties aside, we can do the same.

When the three-Power Declaration of 1948 was discussed in the Security Council in August of that year, the American spokesman explained that we were "urging a change in the Peace Treaty," but that meanwhile we "regarded it as binding." The Secretary of State said just the same a year ago. He will remember that when we gave the Italians a large share in the administration of Trieste in May, 1952, he said that those were simply administrative changes "which leave the basic juridical position unchanged." He said: I cannot accept that there has been any violation of the Italian Peace Treaty. In other words, the Treaty was still in force. And he added something which reads rather strangely today: The new arrangements are entirely without prejudice to the final solution of the problem of the future of the Free Territory as a whole. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, what about the Treaty? Why did the Government propose simply to set it on one side and come away? How would they have cleared up the legal mess that would have resulted from its unilateral execution? Why did they throw doubt on this principle of the sanctity of treaties?

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman about what he said a week ago about the United Nations? He made some defeatist observations, as I thought them, about the Security Council. Of course we all want an immediate conference on Trieste, and we all hope it may succeed. But it may turn out that the only way to change the Treaty is through the Assembly of the United Nations. The Assembly has solved more serious and more dangerous disputes than this one. It has solved other problems arising out of the Italian Treaty—Eritrea, Somali-land, Libya—solved them with success after the Allies had failed. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will assure us that last week he was not shutting the door on the U.N., whose help may very obviously be required.

May I now summarise the questions I have put to the Foreign Secretary by saying that, as at present advised, and 2815 pending his reply, we think the Government have handled this two-Power Declaration in an ill-considered, irresponsible and foolish way? We think their methods reduced to a minimum the chances that it would succeed, and increased the tension until there is now an actual risk of war. By their methods they gravely menaced the major British interest that is involved, the steady development of the European defence system of which I have spoken, in which our Trieste mandate has played so large a part.

Let the House consider for a moment the results of this unilateral decision to scuttle from Trieste, this unilateral decision to renounce the U.N. mandate, to leave the Italians and the Yugoslavs to argue, and, perhaps, to fight, it out. In Rome the Italian Government are in a very difficult position. Read their papers and see their difficulties over E.D.C. and other matters which they have to face. In Yugoslavia there was deep national resentment. Some observers say that the confidence of the people in the West has been irreparably undermined. In Trieste the people are anxious and afraid. "The Times" reports that responsible Italians there say that the two Allies should have maintained the status quo, that hardly anybody in the city wants our troops to leave. On the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia the troops on each side are mounting guns, stacking ammunition, digging in. And the solution of the Trieste problem is now far harder than it was three weeks ago.

But, faced as we unhappily are with these results of what the Government did, everybody in every party must now try to help in undoing the damage that has been done. May I set out the principles on which I think the Government should proceed? The Trieste problem can only be settled, not by unilateral decisions, but by agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy and the other Powers concerned. Our troops should stay in Trieste until an agreement has been made. That is our mandate from the U.N. and we should see it through.

There should be a conference, at first a five-Power conference, which should meet with the least possible delay. Its scope should be entirely unrestricted, with nothing excluded and nothing 2816 demanded in advance. The conference should consider not only the two-Power Declaration but all the constructive proposals which both Italy and Yugoslavia have made. It should consider some of the principles on which the Statute of the proposed Free Territory was built—the de-militarisation of the two zones, freedom of transit and trade, guarantees for the rights of the minorities, with perhaps a U.N. arbitrator—the system which Lord Balfour and the League of Nations established with such remarkable success in Upper Silesia nearly 30 years ago.

Before the five-Power conference can meet, the Security Council will discuss this matter on the demand of Russia. It will do so on Tuesday next. I beg the Foreign Secretary that we should not just have another wordy wrangle with the Russians. Let the Council, in the name of the United Nations, the supreme authority concerned, call on the parties to this Trieste dispute to withdraw their armies and to cancel every preparation for the use of force which they have made. That would give the conference a better start, and it would give it, perhaps, a reasonable prospect of success.

There is another principle which the Security Council might very usefully proclaim. Under the Charter and the Atlantic Pact, no nation has a right to try to settle this Trieste question by the use, or by the threat, of force. It is our British right and our British interest, our most vital national interest, to see that that principle is upheld, to see that it is clearly comprehended and faithfully observed. The Security Council at least could do that for us with the Italians and Yugoslavs.

It is not only our vital national interest. It is the vital interest of Italy and Yugoslavia, too. Until the thought of force has been abandoned, this Trieste question can never be truly solved, and no settlement can really work unless both nations will co-operate for the common good of all. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton), I spent some years in the First World War on the Italian front facing towards Trieste. I was with the Serbian Army at Salonica and elsewhere. As a result, I still feel a warm and genuine personal friendship for the 2817 peoples of both countries. As a result, I know at first hand, and I respect, the deep national feeling which in both countries this Trieste question has aroused.

But the fact remains, and the two nations should face it, that the people in the Territory of Trieste number less than 1 per cent. of the total population of the two nations. A policy of conflict will gravely damage the interests of that 1 per cent.; it will endanger the interests of the other 99 per cent., and it will imperil the peace of all mankind.

I hope that the House will say this today to these two nations, both our honoured friends: Europe is doomed unless it can bury the suspicions and the hatreds of the past. And Europe means Europeans, British and French and Germans, Greeks and Bulgars, Italians and Yugoslavs. History will remember as our greatest men and nations those who make the reconciliations that are now so urgently required.

§ The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Eden)

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Noel-Baker) concluded his speech with a most eloquent appeal which I sincerely hope will be heeded by those to whom it was addressed. The earlier part of his speech was composed of more severe strictures upon Her Majesty's Government, and it is with that part that I shall try to deal in the course of the remarks which I shall address to the House.

I hope to reply to the right hon. Gentleman's questions in detail. The only point on which I may ask for a little latitude from the House is where actual discussions are still continuing. I think that the House will understand that in those circumstances none of us will want to say anything to make the position more difficult. For the rest, I shall do my best to meet the points which the right hon. Gentleman made.

As I heard the right hon. Gentleman's description of the problem and of the action which Her Majesty's Government were taking, I thought that there were two particularly dominating factors in the situation with which the right hon. Gentleman hardly dealt at all but which have been very much present in the 2818 mind of the Foreign Office all these months. I do not think that it is unfair to say that the right hon. Gentleman rather gave the impression that Trieste, after all, was not too bad at the time when we made this sudden move, that it was perhaps better than it had been for a great many years, and so on.

Unhappily that is exactly what the position was not. If it had been so, no one would have been more anxious than all of us to let matters stay as they were. As the House will recall—and many hon. Members will do so more accurately and in greater detail than I can because I was in Greece at the time—a very serious situation, to which I must refer in more detail later on, occurred in Trieste itself in July and August. It caused all the Governments concerned the deepest anxiety.

So we were faced, not, as it might appear from what the right hon. Gentleman said, with the choice between taking no action at all and events getting no worse, and making some constructive move. The choice presented to the Governments concerned was to let matters go on as they were, steadily and seriously deteriorating as they were judged to be, not only by what happened but by all the information which we could obtain, or taking some measure, drastic as I have admitted it was, to try to bring some amelioration to the situation. We have to understand that, if we are to follow at all the background in which these decisions were taken.

The second point which the right hon. Gentleman only touched upon quite lightly, and the second dominating influence, was the 1948 Declaration and I shall have to make some further reference to that in a moment. The right hon. Gentleman became almost poetic about how well the Government behaved at that time in handling the 1948 Declaration on Trieste and how badly we behaved. He said that the Government at that time wanted to negotiate with Russia and offered to negotiate. Does the right hon. Gentleman remember what they did? They published a Declaration and informed the Soviet Government at the very same time that they wished to publish a new protocol to give effect to it. There was no kind of discussion with the Russian Government at that time, and I 2819 do not think that the right hon. Gentleman's reproaches to us in this respect are entirely justified. I admit that, of course, no one pretends the circumstances were exactly similar. [Laughter.] Of course I do not, but I am going to show that they were very much closer than was suggested by the right hon. Member.

I must go back a little into the history of this business, because it is a diplomatic tangle of rather long standing and we hope, with patience and perseverance, to bring it to a settlement. We are not concerned in it alone. In all our efforts to find a solution we are working closely with the United States and with France, and I have special reason to be grateful for the part M. Bidault played during our discussions here in London and the part he has been playing ever since. But it is still true that our position and that of the United States is, in certain respects, different from that of the French, because we have forces in the Zone and the French have not. That does not mean that in this issue we would not want, and have not had—as I can assure the right hon. Member we have had—the closest possible contact with the French Government.

For a great many years this City of Trieste has been a bone of contention, first between Italy and the Hapsburg Empire, and, more lately, between Italy and Yugoslavia. It is what I suppose my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Lieut.-Colonel Elliot) would call "border country" between Latin and Slav. No one would deny that for the right hon. Gentleman who was then Foreign Secretary it was a very difficult problem for the peacemaker, but the idea was that the Italian Treaty would determine this frontier and meanwhile Allied Forces would occupy Zone A and Yugoslav Forces Zone B. In February, 1947, the late Government signed the Peace Treaty, but still there was no frontier at all in the Trieste area. They agreed to set up this independent sovereign unit to be known as the Free Territory of Trieste, comprising the present Zones A and B, independent both of Italy and of Yugoslavia, with a governor, who was to be approved by the Security Council. Our forces were to go very soon after the governor took office.

2820 If all our plans had gone through that would have provided the solution but, unfortunately, things began to go wrong and, after lengthy debates in the Security Council, there was failure to agree on the appointment of a governor; in other words, on the step necessary to bring about the Peace Treaty solution. Meanwhile, relations had steadily deteriorated between the Soviets and their satellites, on the one hand, and the free countries of the West, on the other; and the independent Free Territory of Trieste—I think this is the blunt truth—became one of the earliest victims of the cold war.

I am not criticising, but merely asking the House to note, that it was in those circumstances that the Allies made their tripartite Declaration of March, 1948, and that Declaration advocated the award of the whole of both territories, Zones A and B, to Italy. It has been suggested that in some way what the Government did then—the right hon. Member rather hinted it—was a less operative step—I think those were the words of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison)—than the decision we reached on 8th October. Of course it was less operative because it recommended the return of territory over which we had absolutely no control at all. Whatever one calls it, whatever name one attaches to it—the right hon. Member for Derby, South was careful this afternoon to call it a proposal—the fact remains that that Declaration has had a dominant influence in the whole course of discussions ever since, just as much as if it had been named by any other catalogue or description which the House might like to apply to it.

I must say a word about how that Declaration was handled, in view of the criticisms we have had. It was made in a tripartite statement by the three Governments. It was made when the Security Council was still actively trying to apply the Peace Treaty solution. No advance notice was given to the Security Council, none was given to Yugoslavia, but the Italian Government were consulted in advance. The Soviet Government and the Yugoslav Government were informed simultaneously with publication. As I said just now, the Soviet Government were asked to agree to a protocol. I must draw the attention of the House to the 2821 terms in which Mr. Bevin spoke of the Declaration. This is what he said: The history of recent months— This is the point about which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) asked me the other day— has shown that the Peace Treaty provisions for setting up Trieste as a Free Territory have been made unworkable;

§ Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

What date was that?

§ Mr. Eden

It was in 1948, in announcing the Declaration of 20th March, I think. I can give the hon. Member the exact date in a moment. It was the Monday after the Declaration was announced, at the weekend. Mr. Bevin was speaking on the Monday following. He said: The history of recent months has shown that the Peace Treaty provisions for setting up Trieste as a Free Territory have been made unworkable; the three Governments have now become convinced that the only satisfactory solution from both the economic and political standpoint is the reversion of the Territory to Italian sovereignty. I cannot imagine anything much more definite than that. Having reached this conclusion, the three Governments thought it best to say so. Later Mr. Bevin continued: We cannot get agreement on the setting up of the Free Territory. Therefore, we came to the conclusion … to try to break the deadlock by this proposal."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th March. 1948; Vol. 448, c. 2998–9.] There is not such a very great difference in purpose in what we have been trying to do at this time. [Interruption.] I do not run away from it, I have used that word myself. Last week, during my statement, I used a phrase to which the Leader of the Opposition took some exception. I talked about "lancing the abscess." My hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell), who is a more diligent reader of past issues of "The Times" newspaper than I am, looked up a leader in an issue of 27th March, immediately after the Declaration. It is interesting to note that the leading article opens with the sentence: The Free Territory of Trieste is an abscess on the map of Europe that is getting worse and has sooner or later to be lanced. The truth is that in the years that have followed since this admirable forecast it has become increasingly evident—this is what we have to face—that in practice there is no possibility of giving effect 2822 either to the Peace Treaty solution, unhappily, or to that advocated by the Declaration of 1948. We and America and France together have tried persistently I can assure this House, to promote agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia.

We knew and the whole House knows that there were areas in Zone A where Slovenes predominated and in Zone B where Italians were in the majority. We did not see why agreement could not be reached on a so-called ethnic line, leaving the smallest possible number of Italians under Slav rule and the smallest number of Slovenes in Italy. We made any number of proposals but none proved acceptable to both sides. Nationalist feeling was too strong to allow of a compromise. Every possible permutation and combination, ethnical, geographical and political, has been tried at one time or another. I do not think any other international question in which British interests are not directly involved has taken up more of my time and attention than this question of Trieste.

Now I come to another element in this situation, to which the right hon. Member did not refer and to which so little attention has been paid either in this House or in the country, but which I think we cannot afford to ignore. Ever since 1945—I do not think there is any dispute about this—Yugoslavia has been occupying Zone B. And gradually, stage by stage, it has been increasingly making the administration there conform to the Yugoslav system of government. As that is so, surely it is hardly surprising that Italy, which was given these assurances in the 1948 Declaration, should in turn be asking for a greater share in the administration of Zone A which is predominantly Italian in character.

It was in an attempt to meet this that we made the arrangements, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, in the summer of last year under which some of the functions of government were transferred. But the main problem was still unsolved. I had had discussions with the Italians. So when I visited Belgrade a year ago I determined to do all I could to explore with the Yugoslav Government a basis for agreement, and from these exchanges I concluded that a settlement along the zonal boundary—though 2823 by no means ideal—was the only practicable one in all the circumstances.

After the conversations, though they continued for some months with the Governments concerned, we still could not get agreement. This state of affairs persisted all through the summer until in the latter days of August it took this different and much more dangerous turn, and then the situation flared up in a manner which gave Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government cause for real anxiety. All this, of course, was merely symptomatic of the violent feelings that Trieste arouses in Italy and Yugoslavia, and it is because of that that we and our American friends consulted together about the middle of September.

It was then agreed between us that urgent and drastic action was necessary to deal with the situation which was becoming increasingly dangerous. The course we adopted was dictated by our belief that the only practicable solution was division along the zonal boundary, and I was glad to see that, much as the right hon. Gentleman criticised the method, he did not criticise the possibility of that proving the final solution.

We expected that our action would lead to a final solution and we made this clear—I ask the right hon. Gentleman to note in reply to his question—in our communications to the Italian and Yugoslav Governments. The right hon. Gentleman says our communiqué was badly drafted. It certainly was not easy to draft and what we said in the concluding sentence of the paragraph which deals with this matter was this: The two Governments expect that the measures being taken will lead to a final peaceful solution. I should have thought—[HON. MEMBERS: "Will lead to."] Those words were chosen as expressing our hope and wish and policy.

Here I come to the crux of the criticism so far as this debate is concerned. As I have said, the right hon. Gentleman did not complain so much about the merits of the solution put forward, but about the manner in which we acted. I shall try to explain why we adopted this method. We had concluded from our previous contacts that 2824 there was no chance of getting our solution, or any solution, accepted in advance by negotiation without vigorous intervention on our part. I am quite sure that judgment was correct. This being so, we thought there was a better chance that both sides would acquiesce if we announced our decision to both simultaneously and without prior consultation with either.

Admittedly there was risk in the action we took, but despite all the criticism, I am sure we had no choice but to take it, or to take no action. We foresaw protests and criticism. We foresaw violent reaction from both sides. What we did not foresee, and had not been led to expect, was the threat of military force, and there can be, I submit to the House, no justification for such threats.

I have been asked why did we not consult, for instance, the other signatories of the Peace Treaty and why we did not put the matter at once into the hands of the Security Council? The signatories of the Treaty include the Soviet Union, White Russia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Poland. If we were right in thinking we were dealing with a rapidly deteriorating situation, as I have described it, we could not have expected to get very far if we had to start by consulting all of them. As to approaching the Security Council in advance of our action, Mr. Bevin's words in 1948 are still more true today, and it is now four years since the Council debated this issue. But when the Council——

§ Mr. John Paton (Norwich, North)

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. He has used the phrase, "rapidly deteriorating situation" on a number of occasions. Would he be good enough to describe briefly to the House what that deterioration was?

§ Mr. Eden

If the hon. Gentleman will look up the files of the national papers, as I have done, and read them through carefully, not only the papers of this country but of Italy, Yugoslavia and France, in August of this year, he will see for himself what occurred. What actually happened was that there were first reports of a statement in the Yugoslav papers which appeared to indicate some sudden move in respect of Trieste. How it came about 2825 I do not know. That created an immediate reaction on the Italian side and the situation got rapidly worse. There were troop movements——

§ Mr. John Hynd (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

Why did not the right hon. Gentleman expect trouble? He has said he did not expect trouble.

§ Mr. Eden

I have made quite plain to the right hon. Gentleman in the earlier passages of my speech the conclusion which I reached from the contacts I have had, and I stand by what I said. I wish to deal with the point made by the right hon. Gentleman. When the Council debates Trieste as it shortly will, we shall welcome the opportunity to explain our action to the United Nations.

Now, if I may say something about what is the most important of all, the immediate future, as I told the House last week, we are trying to find means of bringing the parties into agreement. We think that the most helpful approach is to try to bring them to a conference in which we, and I am sure the United States and the French Government, would be ready to participate. There may be other ways. We are considering them all with our French and American friends. We are certainly not prepared to withdraw from the statement of 8th October. But the arrangements for the handing over of the administration and the withdrawal of troops are complicated, and must inevitably take a certain amount of time. A conference could well take place meanwhile.

Last week I invoked the overriding need for unity between nations who should be good neighbours. After all, others, as the right hon. Gentleman indicated, have set an excellent example in this respect in recent years. Greece and Turkey, for instance, both of them linked to Italy and Yugoslavia, have shown Europe how the feuds of centuries can be composed. It does not seem to us unreasonable to ask the countries most concerned in this dispute to approach their differences in a like spirit. If they will do so we have no doubt that those differences can be resolved.

We want a solution of this Trieste problem within the next few months, because we know that until we do so we 2826 can make no effective security arrangements at this vital point in Western defence. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to think all that was working out well. But that is not so, because the good work done between Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, the improving relations between Greece and Italy and Turkey and Italy, cannot find their full meaning unless Italy and Yugoslavia come to a real understanding. I cannot believe that this cannot be achieved.

There is a wider consideration which affects us all. Disputes of this kind between nations which have a common interest to remain united gravely weaken the whole position of Europe. There is a danger that, as we try to deal with the complexity of these individual problems, we may lose some of the impetus towards general unity which has carried us forward and strengthened us in recent years. In the action which we have taken, the Government, after careful thought and in agreement with the Government of the United States, believe that we can yet achieve a solution of this problem. It is to that that all our efforts and all our strength will be devoted now and henceforth, and we believe that we can succeed.

§ Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery)

With the last part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech I am sure everyone will be in a certain amount of agreement. The desire of everybody is to see a solution of the problem. What will worry many is how the right hon. Gentleman justifies the action which has been taken as a measure rightly taken to secure an immediate solution. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out that the situation was deteriorating so badly that anything might happen between the two nations with whom all of us are most anxious to remain friendly. Yet, with that deteriorating situation, he says that by the Governments' action in going out and leaving the matter so that the two nations will be opposing one another, there was no danger whatever of either of them resorting to arms. That is a suggestion that I cannot possibly accept.

There they were acting as a buffer state, acting as police, between two countries with a steadily deteriorating situation, and they say, "The proper solution 2827 is that we should depart and let these two face one another." That is not a method to bring about an immediate solution such as we all desire. I am afraid that this great port, the land which surrounds it, and the people who occupy it and the immediate neighbourhood, have too often been used as pawns in the hands of great nations without any regard to their desire, their future or the part they played in the past.

Trieste is a great port. It has been the mode of ingress into Central Europe and the mode of egress from Central Europe into the Mediterranean for hundreds of years. It is one of the main ports of Europe. For 500 years it was under the rule of Austro-Hungary, when it served not only the needs of Austro-Hungary but those of Southern Germany and Switzerland. For about 200 years it was a free port, until about 1880, when it became something of a closed port for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Then in 1915 it was used as a bribe to bring the Italian Government over to our side as an ally. A line was drawn delineating what should be future Italian territory without very much regard to the ethnological position of the inhabitants or their rights or desires. It was so badly drawn that when we came to the Treaty of Paris it had to be revised because President Wilson, who was certainly a very fair and just man, would not agree to the secret treaty that we made in London in 1915. The border was altered at that time, and so it remained under Italian domination until 1944.

In 1947 it was decided that a new Treaty should be made, and 21 nations agreed that the right thing to do was not to hand the place over either to Yugoslavia or to Italy. It was said that it served an area far wider; that it still was the most convenient port for Central Europe; that it was not the most convenient port for Northern Italy—Venice is that; and that it still ought to be supplying the needs of what had become Yugoslavia.

The new agreement then made was that it should be a free international port governed by its own people with a governor chosen by the United Nations. That was the fundamental idea. Unfortunately, there was then disagreement about 2828 who should be appointed governor. In 1948, within two years of the agreement to which we were a party having been made that this was a true solution in the interest of these people, in the interests of the hinterland and of Central Europe, the Government of the United Kingdom again changed their mind. One is tempted to think we did so for political reasons.

There was at that time a critical election taking place in Italy, and thereupon our Government and the Governments of the United States and France decided that they would now change their mind. There is a difference between what was done by the late Government and what has been done by the present Government. The present Government have done a definite act, or announced that they were about to do a definite act. What the other Government did was to say, "We have changed our mind and we are now asking that this matter be reconsidered by the other countries." I think that was on 20th March, and on 9th April, 1948, they sent a Note to Russia asking for the attendance of Russia at the preliminary conference, which was to be attended by the rest of the 21 nations, to decide what action should be taken. There was no unilateral action. A proposal for action could only be agreed to by the whole 21. That is a vital difference.

Because of disagreement whether or not that preliminary conference could be held, we come to the present situation. The right hon. Gentleman says that the situation is deteriorating. If that is true, before whom ought that situation to be placed for decision? Surely, it should be before the United Nations. We have no right, nor has the United States. We are trespassers unless we are there by the direct order of the United Nations, undertaking a direct duty to them. That is our only reason to be there. Otherwise, we have no right whatever to be there.

This is something we have undertaken which we could not possibly change without warning the people to whom we have given the undertaking. Yet, instead of putting it before the United Nations, instead of consulting the remainder of the 21, we suddenly make this announcement. I really do not follow the right hon. Gentleman when he says that that was the way in which he thought peace could be brought about. There we were, 2829 situated between the two nations, friendly nations so far as we are concerned, but both quarrelling as to their rights there. We were the buffer police standing in between, and then suddenly, without warning to anyone, we made up our minds that we had better go. The right hon. Gentleman says, "I thought that if we did that there would be no movement of troops." Why? He said that there was movement of troops and danger of movement of troops before he ever did that. I should have thought that the mere taking of that step would have increased the danger, and it is to that that I so strongly object.

There is not one of us who does not sincerely hope that out of this danger we may now, at last, bring about agreement. We are anxious that there should be agreement, but it cannot be as the result of unilateral action. Certainly, on our part, unilateral action should be the last thing that we should ever embark upon. We believe, or should believe, in the rule of law. We have condemned other countries for taking unilateral action. Above everybody, we should respect treaties. Yet, here was a treaty to which we put our signatures in 1947, and we are nevertheless now taking unilateral action, in conjunction with the United States, who ought also to be the last to break the rule of law.

I hope that the nations will come together and regard this, as "The Times" very rightly described it in 1948, as a dangerous abscess, and that we shall remove it, which can only be done by consent, by bringing in all the other people and then abiding by whatever is agreed, nobody taking any individual action on his own.

§ Mr. Kenneth Robinson (St. Pancras, North)

The whole House had some sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman in tracing the failure of this policy on Trieste and in trying to explain away a blunder for which he had no personal responsibility.

§ Mr. Eden

I take full responsibility, and Her Majesty's Government take full responsibility, for everything that has been done.

§ Mr. Robinson

Certainly. We all realise that the right hon. Gentleman's responsibility is complete in a nominal 2830 sense, but I can hardly believe that the negotiations which led to the decision were his doing.

This is not a simple problem, and nobody has ever suggested that it is. It has never been easy to reconcile the conflicting claims in Trieste. I do not think that any of us can envisage a solution which would be entirely satisfactory to all sides to the dispute, to the Yugoslavs, to the Italians or to the people of Trieste themselves. We know that the ethnic boundaries are inextricable and we know that national considerations of prestige are involved and bedevil the whole problem. The people of Trieste themselves want one solution or the other according to their nationalities, but I believe that, collectively, and above all, they want a final solution which will take them out of the battleground of nationalist feelings and politics.

They also want a solution which will give them some economic security, and that leads to the economic aspect of this problem, which is usually overlaid by the political aspect. Trieste has been enjoying a wholly artificial level of prosperity over the last few years, a prosperity based partly on the existence of British and American occupation forces in the Zone and partly on the action of the Americans in deliberately routeing every conceivable ton of Marshall Aid to Central Europe through Trieste.

Trieste is the natural port for that part of Central Europe, for Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and I think it is probably more likely in future to discharge the functions of the port for this part of Europe if it is a free port. We should remind ourselves that neither Italy nor Yugoslavia have any national economic need for Trieste as a port. If Trieste were Italian, any use which could be made of Trieste for Italian imports and exports would only be at the expense of Venice. And as for Yugoslavia, she has developed the port of Rijeka, which includes what used to be Fiume, and presumably that is capable of dealing with most of Yugoslavia's needs.

Everybody agrees that the time has come to find a permanent solution to the problem. It is long overdue, and eight years is too long for British and American troops to have been in Trieste. Every effort that has been made to solve the 2831 problem has been bedevilled by the tripartite Declaration of March, 1948. That was, in my view, an extremely unwise action, and it is perhaps kindest to regard it as a rather wild diplomatic shot in the cold war which was then just beginning. If it threw to the wolves any legitimate claims of Yugoslavia's, nobody worried very much at that time, because Yugoslavia was on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. The trouble was that a mere three months later Yugoslavia came over from the wrong side of the Iron Curtain to our side, and that completely changed the whole picture.

We have been offering our services as honest brokers during the last three or four years to try to find a settlement, but the important thing is that we have never rescinded the 1948 Declaration. It is perhaps natural that during these years Yugoslavia appears to have been more willing than Italy to negotiate; Yugoslavia could hardly get anything less than the 1948 Declaration promised, and Italy could not possibly get more.

It must also be said that for Italy the question of Trieste has long been an invaluable smoke-screen for the Italian Government. Whenever things got out of hand on the home front, it was always possible to divert attention in the direction of Trieste. Ministers could always buy a little breathing space by a chauvinistic speech about Trieste. Signor de Gasperi set the fashion. Signor Pella was very quick to follow it; he had hardly been in office a week before the latest crisis about Trieste blew up or was manufactured out of a fairly ordinary speech by Marshal Tito. As the right hon. Gentleman has told us, it was following that that the acting Foreign Secretary took counsel with the State Department and decided to cut the Gordian knot and settle the matter once and for all. "Yugoslavia is in occupation of Zone B. Will not Italy settle for Zone A?" That was the thought. It all looked very simple, and perhaps to the uninitiated it looked quite fair, but it overlooked the fact that Zone A has three times the population of Zone B and that the Slovene minority in Zone A is larger than the total population in Zone B.

The right hon. Gentleman told us that this was intended as a final solution and that he hoped it was a solution which would be accepted by both sides, if under 2832 protest. I presume he means that the Government thought they had reason to believe that Marshal Tito would not go to war over Trieste. Assuming that it was necessary to get a final solution, and a solution along the zonal frontiers, why did we not inform both sides that on a certain date, say three months' hence, we intended to remove our troops and that, in the meantime, both sides would be required to get round the table and negotiate an agreed settlement?

I believe that, given a definite time limit of that nature, agreement could very probably have been reached, and, certainly, it was worth trying. It is even conceivable that Yugoslavia might have agreed to some such settlement as that envisaged by the Government, with perhaps minor frontier alterations. But a settlement freely negotiated is a very different thing from a settlement imposed from outside by other countries. I do not think that any nation, least of all a proud and comparatively young nation like Yugoslavia, could possibly have acquiesced in what she regards, rightly or wrongly, as a sacrifice of her national interests and prestige.

Could anybody have been really surprised at the reaction in Belgrade—the reaction to a declaration made without any consultation in advance and without any notice beyond an hour or two of warning, and, above all, without any rescinding of the tripartite Agreement? If there was surprise at the Foreign Office, I think there was surprise in few other places, and I think it was an example of the extraordinary handling of this affair that when the acting Foreign Secretary came to the House of Lords a week or two afterwards he told the House of Lords there was, in fact, several days' notice given to Yugoslavia. I still find it extremely difficult to tie up that statement with the right hon. Gentleman's assurance that this matter was fully and carefully considered.

I certainly do not wish to condone the bellicose remarks and the threats of war made by Marshal Tito in the heat of the moment, but it is easy to understand his attitude. It is quite clear that he regarded this latest declaration of 8th October, coupled with the tripartite Declaration of March, 1948, and still operative, so far as he knew, as simply a gift 2833 of Zone A to Italy and an invitation to Italy to move into Zone B at some future date. Let us make no mistake about it. A Press statement issued by the Italian Embassy this week makes it quite clear that Italy does not renounce her claim to Zone B.

Is it to be wondered that Marshal Tito should recall the sufferings of his country under Italian occupation when she was fighting as our ally during the war? Is it to be wondered that he believed that his country's interests had been sacrificed by his allies of those days in favour of an ex-enemy? I do not say that his misgivings were justified, or that he correctly interpreted what the Government's intentions were, but I say that it is essential that his feelings should be recognised and understood. It is folly that they were not anticipated.

Why did not the right hon. Gentleman offer another chance, even a last chance, to get an agreed settlement? Why was it necessary to adopt this stupid and clumsy expedient of imposing a settlement without consultation and without warning? The trouble is, of course, that this blunder has had repercussions far beyond the mere question of Trieste. It has affected our whole relationship with Yugoslavia. On the only other occasion on which I ventured to address the House in a foreign affairs debate, about two years ago, I stressed the desirability of maintaining and strengthening the friendship between Yugoslavia and this country which had been built up under a Labour Government.

I may be wrong, but, in his winding-up speech, the right hon. Gentleman did not seem as keen about this as I was. I have watched with some pleasure for the last couple of years the right hon. Gentleman's steady conversion, and I think his visit to Belgrade a year ago and Marshal Tito's return visit to this country did enormous good. Now, in a single stroke, the whole of that goodwill is cast away.

I am not referring only to the anti-British demonstration in Belgrade. I should like to quote to the House a few lines from a despatch in last Sunday's "Observer," from their correspondent in Belgrade: Yugoslav confidence in the West has been shaken to its foundations and Yugoslav-Western relations have been thrown back into the melting-pot. 2834 The Yugoslavs are a proud and prickly people. More even than by the substance of the decision of October 8, they have been offended by the manner in which it was communicated to them, without any consultation or preparation. The parallel with the high-handed and brutal Russian behaviour which led to the break with Moscow, in 1948, is too striking to be overlooked by the man in the street. We have got to build up afresh, as it is still vitally important that this country and Yugoslavia should have the closest possible relations.

There is, of course, the other aspect of this decaration which was dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Noel-Baker), in his opening remarks. It is, of course, a breach of the Italian Peace Treaty, but Article 21 has been ignored for so long that the latest breach seems to be taken almost for granted. It was not, however, taken for granted by the Soviet Union, and another thing that the Government have done is that they have presented Mr. Vyshinsky with a superb platform on the United Nations Security Council, whereby he can pose, not only as one who respects the sanctity of treaties, but also as the friend of Yugoslavia in a friendless world.

I cannot imagine any other single diplomatic act which could have presented Mr. Vyshinsky with such an opportunity, and he has made good use of it. Was it not to be expected that, if we troubled the waters in this way, the Soviet Union would find it convenient to fish in them? Fortunately, there is no sign that Yugoslavia is likely to succumb to these blandishments, for I think that their experience of this particular embrace is too recent and too painful for that.

Finally, we have to ask ourselves "What next?" I should like to support very strongly the proposal put forward by my right hon. Friend for a conference, which I see also has the support of Mr. Foster Dulles and now of the Foreign Secretary. Why should it be a five-Power conference? There is, possibly, a case for a four-Power conference because there are only British and American troops in Zone A. But if we are going beyond that, why not a six-Power conference, to include the Soviet Union?

If we are sincere in our desire to bring the Soviet Union back into the councils of the nations, what better opportunity 2835 could there be to bring them, as a major signatory of the Italian Peace Treaty, into this proposed conference? I know that it might make matters even more difficult, but I think the risk would be worth taking. We have often said that if we ever did get any alleviation of the tension between East and West, it would start with something small. The right hon. Gentleman prefers the Austrian or German problem as a start, but here is an immediate opportunity on which we could invite the Soviet Union to take part.

§ Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South)

Would the hon. Gentleman tell the House whether he thinks that the membership of the forthcoming conference should be just those Governments which were signatories to the Peace Treaty?

§ Mr. Robinson

I do not think we want an enormous conference, but I do think that, as one of the main signatories of the Treaty and also as the Power which brought up the matter at the Security Council, there is a good case for inviting the Soviet Union. I think it would be wise to do so.

We all hope that there will emerge from this conference a final solution. It is quite clear now that the last final solution was not final. We hope that this conference will take place, we wish it well and we hope that this problem of Trieste will be settled once and for all. We cannot forget, and we are not very likely to forget, this latest chapter in the catastrophic handling of foreign relations by the present Government, in which they have apparently recklessly thrown away the friendship of one of our most valuable allies.

§ Mr. Christopher Hollis (Devizes)

Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have taken the opportunity of this debate to inquire into the Government's handling of this situation and no one can take exception to that. The Foreign Secretary himself would be the last person to complain, and, in the same way, no hon. or right hon. Member opposite could fairly take exception if my right hon. Friend or any other of my hon. Friends on this side of the House or, indeed, the hon. Member for St. Pancras North (Mr. K. Robinson) on the other side of the 2836 House, take the opportunity to ask what degree of responsibility for the present trouble arises from the 1948 Declaration?

But my concern in the very few remarks with which I shall trouble the House is not so much to ask how we have got into this trouble as to ask, how can we get out of it? Although it may be very necessary to have an inquest, we are not quite dead yet, and I do not want to spend too much time on a pre-mortem investigation. It is more important that we should see how we can remain alive.

I entirely agree with the general observations of the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) about the essentially international nature of Trieste. That is a profoundly important truth which should be generally understood, and therefore, it was a most reasonable ambition by those who drafted the Peace Treaty to try to give Trieste an international status. It certainly still remains true that, whoever may eventually be found to be its possessor, they will get very little good of it unless they are willing to treat it in an international rather than a national way.

I agree with the remark that has already been made, that it is not a port of Yugoslavia or of Italy but a port of Central Europe. But however desirable an international solution may be in theory, I think we have to face the fact, as my right hon. Friend said, that it is clearly not practical politics to get such a solution as an immediate solution of the problem into which we have drifted. It is rather to this question of the steps to be taken in the immediate future that I want to address myself.

I recently returned from Italy, and I have come back with three very definite impressions. I may be wrong in those impressions—I am often wrong—but they are what struck me, and I feel fairly confident that I am not far out. I should like to put them before the House if I may.

The first impression is that if such action were to be taken by the Western Governments as to give the impression that we are not merely going to withdraw our troops from Trieste, but that we were going to disinterest ourselves in the problem for the future, then there can be very little doubt that Marshal Tito would 2837 march into Zone A. Whether he would march into Trieste itself or be content to occupy the country districts where the Slovenes are in the majority; whether the Italians would react and seek to invade Yugoslav territory elsewhere; whether that would develop into a full-scale Yugoslav-Italian war; and whether that would develop into a larger war still is as it may be. Such action on our part would certainly lead to consequences that would be enormously critical and which we all wish to avoid. That is my first impression.

The second one is that we must look at the matter from the Italian point of view. It is no business of ours to pass judgment on the political situation in Italy or in any other foreign country. Nevertheless, it is right that we should appreciate what are the facts of the political situation. Signor Pella, as we know, is a very able and honourable statesman, but he is not in a very strong domestic political position. It was by no means easy for him to accept the declaration of 8th October, even in the sense in which he accepted it. Signor de Castro, the Italian representative in Trieste, was very strongly of opinion that Signor Pella should not accept it, and it was with very great difficulty that Signor Pella was able to induce him not to resign his office. If he had done so, there would have been a domestic Italian situation in which it would have been very difficult for Signor Pella's Government to survive.

It is very strongly my impression that if, as a result of what appeared to be the Yugoslav Government's pressure, the Western Governments were inclined to renege on their present offer of 8th October to the Italian Government—and I was very glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman give the assurance that they have no intention of doing so—then I think there may be very little doubt that Signor Pella's Government would fall from office, and there would come into power in Italy a Government which would not ratify E.D.C. and would seek to take the Italians out of N.A.T.O. altogether.

We have to recognise the constitution of the Italian Chamber with a very strong Left-wing group bitterly opposed to the association of Italy with N.A.T.O. If, on the top of that, a temporary alliance were formed with some rabid nationalists 2838 from the Right, there would clearly be a political situation in which Italy could not pursue its present foreign policy. I think that is a factor. I am not passing any judgment on Italian politicians. I am merely stating the statistics that we have to face.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Noel-Baker) put forward his constructive suggestion as to how the problem should be dealt with He suggested that it would be desirable, in spite of the 8th October Declaration, for the allied troops to remain in Trieste, and that a five-Power conference should meet to try to settle the differences that have arisen. The first obvious difficulty about that is that there does not seem to be any possibility of the Italians going into a conference on such conditions. Signor Pella has made it clear that he will not enter any conference unless he is on equal terms with the Yugoslavs; that is to say, that both sides must withdraw their troops out of both Zones, or that both sides must have troops in both Zones or at least be in command of each Zone.

I do not see how there would be any possibility of getting a five-Power conference under those circumstances, and, indeed, the attempt to pursue the policy which the right hon. Member for Derby, South advocated with complete sincerity would be to create a political crisis in Italy which would make the situation a great deal more difficult than it is.

Nor do I think the suggestion which has just been put forward by the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North, to turn the five-Power conference into a six-Power conference would be any help. Quite apart from anything else, I am not sure whether Marshal Tito would find the proposal made more attractive by having the five-Power conference turned into a six-Power conference. Surely, what we want is for the conference to agree on something, and to revise its conditions so as to make agreement less likely, as even the hon. Member himself admits, does not seem to me to be a very constructive or helpful suggestion.

There are these two dangers, and, with them on the one side and on the other, the question is, what ought we to do? As far as the immediate future is concerned, I must confess that I have formed 2839 a very definite conclusion and it is this: if and when we take our troops away from Trieste it is essential that we make it clear that even after our withdrawal we should announce that we would consider an invasion of Zone A from Zone B or of Zone B from Zone A—the former happens to be the more probable—to be an act of aggression. I think that if that were made clear there would be extremely little danger that Marshal Tito would move into Zone A before the matter was settled.

The present difficulty, however, is that there has not been forthcoming, either from Her Majesty's Government or from the American Government, any very clear statement of what we would do if, in point of fact, and contrary to our desires, there were a move from Zone B into Zone A. It is not sufficient to say that we would merely refer the matter to the United Nations or to the Security Council, because, unfortunately, the legal position is not nearly clear enough to be quite certain what would be the verdict. It would not require a lawyer of Mr. Vyshinsky's ability to spend weeks arguing whether the frontier between the Zones was, properly speaking, an international frontier within the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Therefore, it is essential for the moment that the position of the Western Powers on that point should be made abundantly clear. Far from that being a contribution to war, I think it would be the way to make quite certain that there would not be war. I do not say that that should be the sole policy pursued by the Western Powers. Having done that, then, by all means, let us go forward and have the five-Power conference as soon as possible, and settle, as soon as there is an atmosphere in which they can be settled, the problems of port facilities and the exchange of population.

We all know the history of how the ancient enmity between Greece and Turkey was ended by an agreement between those two countries for exchange of populations brought about by the statesman Kemal Ataturk. I think that might happen again between Italy and Yugoslavia. To hold the immediate situation, I think it essential that we should take the risk of making clear what would be our resistance to aggression, if risk there be.

2840 There is, on the contrary, a very grave and dangerous situation if our idea is to intervene, but we think it more tactful not to say so. I think there can be no harm in firmly stating our intention, and I hope that as soon as possible the position of the Western Powers on that point will be made clear. I deliberately say, "as soon as possible," because I fully understand that it will probably not be possible for the Under-Secretary of State, when he winds up, to make a statement of that nature in this debate for the very obvious reason that we must go hand in hand with the Americans on this point, and nothing would be gained if we added to the existing confusion the further confusion of an apparent disparity between British and American policy.

If the report of Mr. Dulles's Press conference, as reported in "The Times" this morning, is an accurate one, then it is a disturbing fact that there are points on which Mr. Dulles has not yet quite made up his mind. He has not quite made up his mind whether the 1948 Declaration is superseded or not. I think that is very serious, but it is essential that when we speak we speak in unison with him.

It is essential that a joint Anglo-American declaration should be made as soon as possible, defining what would be our action if any offensive action was taken by either of the two parties against the other. If we leave unsolved what the Western Powers are going to do, the consequence may well be extremely dangerous.

§ Mr. John Parker (Dagenham)

I wish to take up a point made by the hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Hollis). He stated that he thought that if Italy could not take over the occupation of Zone A fairly soon she would not sign on the dotted line with regard to E.D.C. Many people in Europe have interpreted the decision of the Americans and ourselves to allocate Zone A to the Italians as being a bribe to get their support for E.D.C. I think that in making this decision we have been backing the wrong horse.

Assuming the unfortunate event of a war between the West and Russia and her satellites, quite obviously the first 2841 thing that would happen in Italy would be a general strike; one-third of her population would be in revolt against the Government. The Italian forces, therefore, would be engaged in keeping the peace in Italy rather than in countering the invasion of Western Europe. That being so, the main effort of fighting such an invasion would have to fall on Marshal Tito's army.

I do not wish to go further into the point, but I think that if we get entangled in the argument as to whether we are to persuade Italy to go into E.D.C. by giving her Zone A, we are making a big mistake indeed.

§ Mr. Hollis

I suggested quite a different thing. I did not suggest that we should persuade Italy to do anything by giving her Zone A. I was discussing what would be the consequence after the declaration of 8th October—a purely hypothetical situation—if that declaration were not implemented.

§ Mr. Parker

I was following up the hon. Member by pointing out that many people took the view that the offer had been made to win Italy to E.D.C. I wish to take the question further and ask the House to consider what will be the result for Trieste of the various actions proposed by the Government or by hon. Members in this House. It is my opinion that if there is partition of Trieste, and if Zone A is given to the Italians, it will mean the death of the city as an important port. I think that the House should realise that fact if it is going to support that proposal.

Let us go into the past, because I think we ought to go rather carefully into the facts about Trieste. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) and others have made the point that Trieste grew up as a port for Central Europe. That wants analysing rather more carefully, and also whether it is now the port of Central Europe, and is likely to remain so in the future.

If the House looks at the facts it will see to the North-East of the Adriatic, there is not only Trieste, but also the port of Rijeka, better known as Fiume. Both ports were artificially built up at the end of the last century. They were small local ports, and only grew rapidly after 2842 railways came to them. These railways were built by the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, who spent a great deal of money on railway communications and port installations in order to build up the ports as outlets for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Between 1880 and 1913, these ports grew phenomenally as regards the amount of trade they carried, and also as regards their populations. The reason why these ports grew so successfully was due not only to the large amount of Government expenditure on port installations and communications, but also because of the Customs Union round the Hapsburg Empire. There was also a special Adriatic tariff giving low rail charges to the Adriatic ports. The Austro-Hungarian Empire thereby encouraged trade through these ports. The result was that the provinces of the North used Trieste to a very great extent, and Fiume to a lesser extent, during that period. The growth was very rapid indeed, but Trieste grew up much more rapidly than Fiume. It was able to develop its communications very much better through the famous Ljubljana Gap. On the other hand, Fiume was hampered by the fact that the railway communications had to go through the Dinaric mountains, which made it very much more difficult to handle heavy traffic going through that particular port.

I think it is well to analyse the traffic of Trieste before the First World War. In 1912 and 1913, 35 per cent. of the traffic with Trieste was with modern Yugoslavia—that is territory which is now inside Yugoslavia—and 30 per cent. modern Austria—mainly Vienna and that area; 20 per cent. was with modern Czechoslovakia and only 36 per cent. with Italy. That traffic between Czechoslovakia and Trieste only existed because of these special Adriatic tariffs. Even in those days the greater part of the overseas trade from Czechoslovakia went through Hamburg and the Northern ports.

§ Mr. M. Follick (Loughborough)

Also Rotterdam.

§ Mr. Parker

Yes, also Rotterdam and the other North Sea ports. But there was a very substantial trade at that time from the Czech area to Trieste. That has to be borne in mind when considering the pre-1914 position of Trieste.

2843 Secondly, there was enormous emigration in those years from the whole of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the United States. The "Bohunks," and all the other Central European people one knows of in America, poured from here into the United States, and that made a big passenger traffic through the port.

In 1919 came the victory of the Italian Irredentists in the war, and they took over both Trieste and Fiume. If one reads the Italian literature of the period it is interesting to see that they had the rather naïve idea that they could get both the ports and all their trade even though political barriers might be erected separating them from the territories serving them. In the peace treaties the Italians tried to get the old Adriatic tariffs retained, but the new countries did not keep up the special arrangements made by Austria and Hungary to develop the trade of these ports. I shall say more about Fiume later.

The traffic through Trieste fell very much, the population remained stationary, and the town was only really maintained by the fact that Mussolini pumped a great deal of money into Trieste by subsidising new industries. The Czech overseas trade mainly went northwards and is not likely ever to go south again to any great extent. The Yugoslav traffic disappeared very largely during these years and Trieste was left, in the main, with the fairly small traffic of the present Austrian Republic. The Italians tried to put a certain amount of trade through it but could not do very much about it because, as has been said, Venice and not Trieste is the best port for North-Eastern Italy.

I should like to say something about Fiume, because its history has a bearing on Trieste at the present time. There a free State was set up after the war. After d'Annunzio's Irredentists had seized it, the Yugoslavs finally accepted a partition by which the old town went to Italy and some of the suburbs—Zone B as you might call it—went to the Yugoslavs, including the town of Susak. Once that partition had taken place the Yugoslavs developed it as a port and sent most of their traffic through it. I am quite certain that partition of Trieste now would have exactly the same result. The town of Trieste would have grass growing on many of its quays and the Yugoslav 2844 would develop a new port in Zone B, probably at Isola. The Yugoslavs would have the advantage of using the Ljubljana Gap and developing their own port at the door of Trieste, in the same way as the Poles developed Gdynia, near Danzig, and as they themselves did with Susak. I would, therefore, say that in proposing to partition Trieste one must learn from the experience of Fiume and not make the same mistake again.

Returning to the position at Trieste at the present time, and taking the traffic of 1951 and 1952 which were very similar, the traffic, as has been mentioned, was much increased because the Americans and British had been bringing in their supplies for troops in Austria, and the Americans have been bringing in Marshall Aid supplies, to that port, so it has been artificially built up. That must be borne in mind. For the last year the total trade of Trieste has been 148 per cent. with Italy and 84 per cent. with the hinterland; Zone A had about 1 per cent.—and the 1951 figures were similar. Of that trade to the hinterland over 70 per cent. was with the Austrian Republic—Austria is the one country really interested economically in Trieste at the present time.

Taking her present overseas trade, 60 per cent. of Austria's trade is with Trieste, but 40 per cent. of the overseas trade of the Austrian Republic is not with the Mediterranean but with the North Sea and other Northern ports; already the North Sea and Northern ports have drawn trade from the South. One has to face the fact that they may go further in that, particularly when British and American troops are withdrawn. The situation is that, at present, Trieste has not good prospects as a port. Its main possibilities are with Austria, but that is threatened from the North, and it will also be threatened if the Yugoslavs build a rival port nearby which will have equally good communications with Austria, also through the Ljubljana gap.

Trieste has already got 18,000 unemployed, and about 10 per cent. to 12 per cent. of those who are employed are in the employ of the British and American forces. The town is not in a good position. Very little trade at Trieste is now done with Yugoslavia, partly because the Italian authorities for political reasons are not anxious to 2845 develop that trade and have restricted import licences, but there should be a good prospect for a certain amount of local trade—foodstuffs and timber being brought into Trieste, and Trieste selling some manufactured goods to the hinterland. Even all that possible local trade is not developed to the full. If the town goes to Italy there will still be a possibility of a certain amount of Austrian trade, but the town will in the main have to depend on extensive subsidies from Italy.

I think one should turn to see what has happened to Fiume. I visited that town recently and it is an absolute boom town, with two or three ships alongside each quay. Timber and maize were going out and machinery, etc., coming in. There is a mixture of the most modern cranes and motor lorries being used to handle the traffic, alongside horses and simple manhandling. The town is growing rapidly, and all the way round the hills behind new houses and flats are going up.

The population is a matter of some interest. In 1938 it was about 55,000 in the old town, and with Susak it was about 70,000. Of the 55,000, something over 30,000 were Italians. By last year the population was 130,000, and it is estimated that it will be 150,000 by 1955. In another 10 years it will possibly equal the population of Trieste itself. But the Italian population which was over 30,000 has dropped to 18,000. Some of the Italians emigrated after Mussolini went, but there has been an enormous influx from the surrounding Croat countryside and from the ports down the Adriatic coast. Incidentally, the mayor of the town is an Italian docker with a German name; he worked as a docker under Mussolini. That shows the mixture of the races in that part of the world. He is a staunch supporter of Marshal Tito.

There we have this boom town being developed and growing very much since it was in full Yugoslav possession. With the present industrialisation of Yugoslavia, obviously the port will have to be developed further. Its communications, however, with the hinterland are bad, and I am certain that with the growing industrialisation of that part of the world Trieste could also be well used by Yugoslavia. If they do not have the town themselves they will certainly develop a 2846 port in Zone B, with better communications with the interior than Fiume.

It is interesting to note in the "Manchester Guardian" that some of the leading citizens of Trieste have been to Rome and told Signor Pella what conditions in the town will be like in the event of partition. Can there not once more be an attempt to create a free city, covering both zones, with a free port for Austrian, Yugoslav and Italian traffic? There could be an Austrian governor and the members of the governing board could be drawn equally from Yugoslavia and Italy with some from the locality. Each commune in the area could use officially its own national language on the Swiss model. Italian, Croat and Slovene could all be used in schools.

I think that would be the best solution. If not, if the town is divided and Zone A is given to Italy, the future can only be what I mentioned earlier. I am certain that in the long run, the town having been ruined, the Yugoslavs will take it over, when a favourable opportunity offers, as they took over Fiume. It can only have an economic future if it is linked with its hinterland. I should point out that it is the only place left in Europe where an attempt is still made to have the port separated from its hinterland. That arrangement has already failed with Danzig and Fiume, and it will certainly fail wtih Trieste. It is a completely unsound economic and political situation.

I agree that we have this problem in what is largely an Italian town; I believe that a free state would be the best solution if it could be made to work. If not, we have to face the fact that an Italian town cut off from its surrounding countryside will not work. Multi-national countries like the Austrian empire had these multi-lingual towns. In the middle of the last century Budapest and Prague were German towns in the middle of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and so on. Later people came in from around, and they changed their character.

I hope the Government will try once more to get this free state created. If both Governments can be persuaded to unite the two Zones it will be the best solution. If they insist on Zone A going to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia, I am sure the whole area will eventually pass to Yugoslavia, after many of the Italians have left.

§ Mr. Philip Bell (Bolton, East)

Perhaps the hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker) will excuse me for not following him in what was, if I may say so, a very erudite history of Trieste. If I am no wiser, at any rate I am better informed.

I am sure every hon. Member is most anxious that we should not in what we say increase the tension which exists in that area, nor precipitate any recourse to arms. One thing is surely quite clear, and that is that the only reason that so many of us are so anxious about this matter and, indeed, why we are debating it, is that one country, believed to be civilised, which subscribes to the United Nations and to the Charter, has threatened war. Nothing else has caused any tension. There has been no threat of war by Italy.

§ Miss Jennie Lee (Cannock)

What!

§ Mr. Ernest Popplewell (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, West)

Will not the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that, while there may not have been any threat of war by Italy, there has been a tremendous amount of Italian troop movement along the borders?

§ Mr. Bell

I agree. Those are gestures, but there has been no public declaration of an invasion from Zone A to Zone B. There has been no suggestion that if the Italians were let into Zone A they would move into Zone B. What the Italians have said is that the Minister will resign if the Government withdraws from its position. We think it is rather more likely that the obligations of the Charter might not rest so heavily on the shoulders of a new member as perhaps as on Italian shoulders, and we are alarmed that he might carry out this threat.

§ Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East)

It has been agreed, has it not, that Italian troops intended to move into Zone A? Will the hon. and learned Gentleman tell me what more legal right the Italians have than the Yugoslavs to make such a move?

§ Mr. Bell

They will not move into Zone A except by permission and on the withdrawal of the existing armed forces of the United Nations.

§ Mr. Crossman

That is not a legal right.

§ Mr. Bell

I shall deal with that in a moment. I am interested when people have recourse to legality.

This is not a new point in Trieste. Let us consider the position at the time of the Declaration. When this two-part Declaration was made on 20th March, 1948, not surprisingly it brought back the Soviet into the arena. They had done nothing; they had refused to agree to the appointment of a Governor who should, in fact, have been appointed some two years before. Then, when this Declaration was made, they came to the United Nations and nominated a gentleman who came from Switzerland and who had previously been nominated as one of the possible Governors by Great Britain.

The British Administration at the United Nations then said, "We will not have that Governor—though he is a suitable man and he was our nominee—for this reason: You have delayed too long in setting up this Governor, who was supposed to be there by 15th September, 1947, and conditions have changed since there has been no Governor. In fact, Zone B has become a police State, and so we shall not agree to the appointment of a Governor."

It was in 1949 that our Administration said, "This part of the Italian Peace Treaty has become impracticable." That is what is being said today by the present Administration, by this latest declaration. It was a little ungenerous of the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Noel-Baker) to lay great stress on the legality of the position, when his own Administration were refusing to agree to the appointment of a perfectly suitable man as Governor as long ago as 1949.

In this debate the Government have been asked, "Why do you make a demarche like this without having negotiations? "One hon. Member asked why we did not put them on a time limit and tell them that if they did not agree within a certain time we should do something. That is what has happened. We have informed them that action will be taken at some date in the future, but it is open to anybody to negotiate in the meantime. Some people seem to imagine that as long as one gets everybody round a table they will all agree.

2849 Both the previous Government and this one have exhausted their ingenuity. Am I to believe that the Labour Government did not take every opportunity and exert every ingenuity to get a reasonable and fair settlement? There comes a time when it is only adding to the irritation, the nerves and the general upset to take no action. In these modern conditions the difficulty is often that the people who are in possession, so to speak, are in a strong position. On the question of Abadan, the real merits of the Persian case were that they happened to be in Persia and we were not. In Egypt we have the advantage that we happen to be in the Canal Zone and the Egyptians are not. In the Berlin air lift we had the advantage of being in a part of Berlin in which there were no Russians.

If they think that it is going to upset the equilibrium to attempt a positive and definite attack and initiate a hostile act, the persons in possession take advantage of that and the fact that there are only temporary or armistice lines, and dig in and say to the others, "I will not agree. You must be the one who starts the shooting. I shall never shoot, but if you want to do anything you will have to shoot."

There is, therefore, a good deal to be said for the British and United States Administrations in charge of this city for so arranging the position that the strike has to come from the other side. Nobody really believes that any strike could come from the Italians, once they were in Zone A. The whole burden of publicly having recourse to war is thrown on the other side. It is easy to leave matters as they are and say that we should do nothing, but in the face of our experience and the fact that there is an urgency about the situation why should not we believe—as the Foreign Secretary said he believed—that although there would be a great upset about it, and these two loyal members of the United Nations might take it to arbitration, or protest or agitate about it, they would not have recourse to war?

Why should we assume that Tito would have recourse to war? What is the prize or justification for it? It has been pointed out that the city of Trieste is in a parlous position, but it is not a prize of great value. We know that both in Zone A and Zone B the overwhelming majority of the population is Italian. That fact is 2850 put on one side by the Yugoslavs, who say that a lot of depopulation occurred during the Italian administration of their Zone, and the Italians reply by pointing to the last known census—the Austrian one of 1910—which showed an Italian majority in both Zones.

Hon. Members opposite must share with hon. Members on this side the responsibility for the fact that at the time of the tripartite agreement, taking into account the history of the city and the claims of population, we said that both Zones should go to Italy. It is not for us to argue now whether that is necessarily right, but it is for us to say that this Solomon's judgment of giving one zone to Italy and one to Yugoslavia is not manifestly such an injustice that a country, after having exhausted all other methods of redressing the balance, should have recourse to arms.

In my submission, the worst thing that could happen would be for us to be distracted from the main point, which is that although Yugoslavia has a claim it has not exhausted its claim by having a plebiscite or appealing to the Hague Tribunal or to the United Nations. Here is a country which has been in receipt of European aid for a great number of years and has recently received a considerable amount of recognition and hospitality from this country, and which, the first time it is thwarted, threatens to go to war or invade and take an area which is vital neither to its security nor to its life.

§ Mr. Popplewell

The hon. and learned Member again refers to this threat of war. This is a most important point. Would not he agree that a year ago in Bled, and also in London this year, Marshal Tito gave an undertaking to our Foreign Secretary that he would not resort to war over Trieste? Is it not very peculiar that something of a very outstanding nature has taken place, namely, the insult to Yugoslavia in not having received even 24 hours' notice, should have brought such a remarkable change, in view of the Marshal's pledge?

§ Mr. Bell

I hope that the first pledge which the hon. Gentleman mentioned stands. I understood that it was conditional, and that the person who gave the pledge, if he thought his feelings had 2851 been upset, was entitled to ignore it. I