DEFENCE

§ The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell)

I beg to move, That this House takes note of the Statement on Defence 1950 (Cmd. 7895). We propose to spend in the coming financial year the sum of £780 million on defence. Naval expenditure will be increased by £3¾ million, largely attributable to new production; the Army, although carrying the heavy burden of the cold war, will spend about £6 million less; the Royal Air Force, in recognition of its increasing strategic importance and of the vital role which it plays in the defence of the United Kingdom, will cost roughly £15 million more; while on the defence side the Ministry of Supply is allotted an additional expenditure of £7 million.

These large sums are necessary despite the application of the most stringent economies. Expressed in the shortest terms, our policy is to reduce manpower without detriment to the striking power of our forces, but to spend more in research and new production, recognising the need for priorities as between one Service and another.

It is right that the Government and our military advisers should submit their proposals to the test of constructive criticism. Hon. Members are entitled to the assurance that the maximum benefit is derived 1265 from this substantial expenditure on defence. I shall, of course, listen with respect to criticism from any quarter, accepting it in the spirit of a common concern to safeguard the country. When defence is under consideration there is no room for party manoeuvres—the issues are much too grave. While the responsibility for national defence is the Government's, they need to be sustained by the knowledge that their policy rests on a broad basis of popular approval.

A review of defence policy compressed into a fairly short speech must omit many items—often important—about which hon. Members desire information. I should, therefore make it clear that, in this review, I shall not deal with the individual Services. There will be ample opportunity to raise questions affecting those Services as the respective Estimates come before the House. Accordingly, I propose to concentrate on the more general aspects of defence policy.

The House is familiar with the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and San Francisco in 1945 from which the United Nations emerged. If our expectations had been realised, the Government would not now be making provision in Estimates for defence expenditure totalling £780 million. This figure represents some 7½ per cent. of our national income. We seek no conflict with any other nation or nations. Our policy will, therefore, continue to be based, so far as possible, on seeking peace and security through the international machinery of the United Nations, through which we have sought, among other matters, to obtain agreement for the international control of atomic weapons.

Unfortunately, we must face the unpleasant fact that progress in this field has not kept pace with our desires and that, failing agreement on collective security, there is no alternative but to pursue our object by other means. We have gone a long way towards achieving this in association with the other members of the Commonwealth, with the countries of Western Europe and with the United States. The Western Union Defence Organisation paved the way for the wider association of the twelve Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty which has now become the keystone of our defence policy. To quote the White Paper: 1266 Defence policy is based on the assumption that we should not stand alone in resisting aggression. Substantial progress is being made in military planning to translate the concept of integrated defence of the North Atlantic area into practical measures intended to deter any potential aggressor. Hon. Members will realise the limitations imposed upon me in disclosing fuller information. The burden of secrecy is not ours alone, but is held in common with our friends and Allies. However, I can say that, under the vigorous leadership of their first chairman, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Mr. Louis Johnson, the North Atlantic Defence Committee have made considerable progress with their tasks.

In October last my predecessor at the Ministry of Defence attended the inaugural meeting of the Committee in Washington, the main purpose of which was to determine the organisation to be set up. Two months later, in Paris, the military staffs brought forward for approval a strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic area. Since then, progress has been made in translating that concept into actual plans, in assessing the forces required for their implementation and in surveying all possible measures for co-ordinating and integrating the production effort of the signatory Powers.

I shall shortly meet my colleagues of the North Atlantic Defence Committee at The Hague for the purpose of reviewing all this work. We shall then have before us a picture both of what is required and the contribution which each nation expects to be able to make. We shall also know something of the deficiencies and will be able to discuss ways and means of making them good.

In this context I should inform the House that the Government have decided to mark the high importance they attach to our representation in Washington by reviving the separate post of Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission, theo holder of which will also become our representative on the Standing Group of the. North Atlantic Military Committee. The House will learn with pleasure that as from next month this post will be filled by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, who has unrivalled qualifications 1267 for this task, involving at it does cooperation with French and American colleagues at the highest level.

One of the most immediate results of the progress being made under the North Atlantic Treaty is the generous programme of military aid which the American Government are making available to their associates in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom. As a result of the treaties signed in Washington on 27th January last, the 1,000 million dollars appropriated by the Congress of the United States becomes available to strengthen the defensive power of the European signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is no secret that one of the greatest needs since the war ended has been to build up the armies of our Continental Allies, and therefore the major share of American aid will go to assist these countries in the efforts which they are making to re-equip their armies.

The United Kingdom expects in the first year to receive a substantial number of B. 29 aircraft. My right hon. Friend the House further information about these the Secretary of State for Air will give aircraft when he opens the Debate on the Air Estimates next week. In addition, we hope to get from the United States some assistance in the form of raw materials and machine tools for production of munitions in this country. We gratefully acknowledge this help from the United States.

I should like the House to recognise, however, that, relative to our resources, we in the United Kingdom have already substantially helped our Allies both of the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, and it may be convenient if I deal with this question before I turn to the purely domestic problems of defence expenditure. Large quantities of military equipment have been transferred by the United Kingdom since the end of the war to North Atlantic Treaty countries often at substantially reduced prices. As far as the Brussels Treaty is concerned, even more comprehensive measures have been undertaken. In March, 1949, the Brussels Treaty Consultative Council decided that the Western Union Powers would each make an additional effort in the production of military equipment required for their common defence purposes.

1268 The basis of the scheme was that the weapons and equipment most urgently needed for Western Union defence would be manufactured by the member countries best capable of producing them. At this time we were on the eve of signing the North Atlantic Treaty and we had in mind that this additional production effort would constitute a good foundation for the planning of Western European defence within the framework of the wider treaty. The existence of this commitment is the prime reason why—even at this time of great financial pressure—the Defence Estimates show an increase over those of last year.

The effective test of the worth of any association or alliance is whether the parties to it are willing in the common interest to make some sacrifice and extra effort to ensure the attainment of its objects. Western Union presented us with such a challenge. We could not in reason expect our associates to make greater efforts for defence unless we ourselves were willing to give an earnest of our sincerity. In the face of the dangers which had brought about the establishment of Western Union, the Government were convinced that it was right that we should at this time, in common with France and the Benelux countries, initiate an increased production programme.

The resulting increase of defensive strength cannot fail to play its part in bringing nearer to realisation greater stability in international affairs. Should such a result be achieved, a reduction in the burden of armaments may then become a practicable proposition.

§ Mr. Ellis Smith (Stoke-on-Trent, South)

May it be soon.

§ Mr. Shinwell

It is against this background that I turn to the problem of the general pattern of the U.K. Defence Forces in the year that lies before us. We retain, as do all the countries now joined with us, the full discretion to determine for ourselves, in the light of our resources and commitments, what Forces to maintain and to decide the nature of the contribution we can make to the common cause. But, when deciding the shape of our own Forces, we naturally must take into account the contributions made by others.

Here let me remind the House that in our approach to this difficult problem we 1269 must always bear in mind that the U.K. has world-wide responsibilities which must be sustained. Indeed at the present time it is these responsibilities that press most heavily upon us and which present difficulties in making a radical approach to the problem of adjusting the shape and size of the Armed Forces in the next few years.

The burden of our responsibilities throughout the world falls most heavily on the Army and, as a result, we have forces widely distributed overseas. We have therefore been unable to create, to the extent we should like, in the United Kingdom the balanced formations which are desired. But it should not be overlooked that in all the overseas theatres our Forces are engaged in intensive training in some cases under very arduous conditions.

The House is aware that last year the Government were presented by the Chiefs of Staff with an exhaustive review of the problem designed to bring into harmony our responsibilities, manpower and national resources. It is on the basis of the proposals then made that the Government have framed their Estimates for the year 1950–51. One of the factors brought out by the review was that, with war-time reserves coming to an end, a much bigger share of the budget must be devoted to equipment, although there could be some reduction in manpower. It would be a delusion to attempt to maintain Forces which could not be adequately equipped with up-to-date weapons. Therefore the Government had no hesitation in deciding that a greater proportion of our defence effort should go into production of equipment and also into research.

The second main result of the review was to underline the difference between the current roles of the three Services which affect priorities in relation to their needs and our resources. It is clear that the Army, on which falls the main burden of occupation duties and cold war operations must to some degree postpone the expenditure of its available funds on measures of re-equipment that will mature in future years. The Navy and the R.A.F. on the other hand must prepare now for the future development of their maximum defensive and offensive strength.

Thirdly, the review has enabled us to shorten the administrative "tail" of the 1270 Forces by pruning maintenance, training establishment and headquarters staffs. Considerable economies have been effected in this way, and I can assure the House that in this coming year the "teeth" of our Forces will be sharper and the "tail" will be much shorter. We simply cannot afford to divert men to duties that are not a necessary part of their training. In the Army every effort is being made to avoid the performance of routine duties of a domestic character. Whenever possible we propose to turn over these barrack housekeeping duties to civilians and to intensify the military training. That is also the object in the other two Services, and I give the House the assurance that I will carefully examine any evidence that can be produced to show a continued misuse of manpower.

We are determined that the country shall get full value for the large expenditure on defence. But sweeping generalisations about extravagance in the Forces will not help. When there is evidence of waste I promise the House that it will be vigorously corrected.

There is one comment I must make in passing. Hon. Members must recognise that under modern conditions, with the increasing complexity of equipment, there is no valid comparison that can be drawn with pre-war days, let alone the period after the First World War. Maintenance of equipment demands workshops on a much more generous scale than before, while technical developments in air forces require the building up of R.A.F. and Naval Air Arm ground staffs and services. Men so employed are not wasted, nor is it possible to strengthen the front line by raiding these services.

This review has undoubtedly been of great consequence for the well-being of our Forces, and I should like it to be known that it has afforded a convincing demonstration of the possibilities of securing, under the direction of the Ministry of Defence, co-ordinated and balanced planning by the three Services in co-operation, thus promoting, what is our principal objective, an efficient defence organisation. I do not pretend that we have made all the provision that our staffs would like—still less would I claim that we have reached finality. Our plans will require constant adjustment as 1271 new factors present themselves, and I intend that the study of our defence preparations should be progressive and that further changes shall be made as circumstances require and opportunity offers.

I turn now to the problem of manpower, with special reference to our Regular Forces. We have at present about 420,000 Regulars and recruitment is at the rate of about 50,000 a year. This is a substantial figure, but it does not meet our needs, and I regard the task of improving the rate of Regular recruitment for the Army and the Royal Air Force as one of the most important that we are called upon to tackle. The problem is not an easy one.

Attractions of civil life in conditions of full employment undoubtedly operate against us both in recruiting and in obtaining re-engagements and extensions of contracts of service. In some quarters it is urged that there is a simple solution to the whole problem by substantial increases in pay. Even if such a step were desirable at the present time, I doubt very much whether it would achieve the results claimed by those who advocate it. Many other factors are of equal importance.

First, there is the question of the conditions under which a man serves and the amenities which he can enjoy as a regular member of the Forces. The intensive character of training plays a big part in sustaining morale, and this is fully recognised in all three Services. Housing, particularly for the married man, is certainly a major problem. At the end of the war, there was a grave shortage of married quarters and much of the barrack accommodation inherited from the past affected adversely the contentment of the Forces. These things cannot be put right overnight but, as the House is aware, we are making a real attack on the problem. The last Parliament passed an Act giving the Service Departments borrowing powers for the provision of married quarters in Great Britain, and we intend to make full use of those powers. There will be an energetic drive to provide additional married quarters overseas.

Other important factors are that a man should have reasonable prospects of a career while in the Service and a chance of getting a good civil job when he leaves in which he can use his acquired skill. 1272 All three Services are at present engaged on a thorough examination of their trade and career structures. From these examinations we may expect proposals to emerge first for training and organisational changes designed to make the most effective use of available manpower and, second, for the provision of suitable careers which may succeed in retaining in the Services on long-service engagements, many more experienced Regulars than at present. In both these ways the size and quality of the Regular content of the Forces can be improved; it is not simply a question of improved recruiting.

As regards resettlement in civil employment, good work has been done by the Ministry of Labour and National Service in placing discharged men in civil jobs as is shown by the figures given in paragraph 26 of the White Paper. We are, in fact, engaged upon a comprehensive examination of life in the Services in all its aspects in relation to the current problems of Regular manpower, recruitment and re-engagements. Only from such an examination can the right answers emerge. I give the House an assurance that we shall devote to the problem a scale of effort fully commensurate both with its great importance and its difficulties. But I must utter a warning that there is no simple solution.

Whatever measures are taken, however, to attract Regulars into the Forces, it would be optimistic to expect, especially because men on short-service bounty engagements will be leaving the Forces in substantial numbers over the next few years, any dramatic improvement in net regular strengths. Accordingly, the commitments which have to be met demand the making up of the numbers required by National Service men. In addition to providing a reserve of trained manpower the National Service Scheme meets a vital present day need.

Nevertheless, there has been some argument about the application of National Service. It is suggested that the scheme is too rigid and involves our accepting a larger quota of men than the Forces really need because the whole yield in a particular age group has to be absorbed. The figures contained in paragraph 27 of the White Paper should finally dispel this notion. It is simply not true that at the present time there is an embarrassing surplus of men available.

1273 At the same time, I admit that, if it were practicable to take fewer men for a longer period, that might suit the convenience of the Services—it would certainly save money on training overheads, transportation and the like. But the convenience of the Services is not the only test of the soundness of a measure. We have to deal justly between man and man. The suggested ballot would not, in my judgment, be acceptable, especially if it were introduced so that those on whom the choice fell were required to perform an even longer period of service than 18 months, while those who escaped could follow their civil careers without any impediment.

National Service will be supported by the people of the country only so long as they believe the system to be necessary in the national interest and fair in its operation. Should there be a significant change in the world outlook, radical adjustments of the system might be considered, and in any event the whole position will have to be reviewed when we consider the extension of the present Act beyond the end of 1953. But at the present time, as the House must agree, the existence of National Service is not only necessary to meet our responsibilities but is recognised as clear evidence of our firmness of purpose and readiness to play our full part with our allies in the defence of our common interests.

In the course of 1950, the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces will begin to receive the first National Service men who have completed their whole-time service and will for the next four years be under the obligation to keep themselves efficient as part-time Reservists. In this development of the trained Reserves behind the Regular Forces we shall begin to achieve one of the primary objects of the National Service Scheme.

This year will, therefore, be a most important stage in the development of National Service in this country and the Services—the Army and Air Force are particularly concerned—are fully alive to the importance of the occasion. In the Navy, part-time training will be carried out either in H.M. ships, at barracks or at technical establishments as appropriate. In the Army, National Service men will be fully integrated with the volunteer element of the Territorial Army and Supplementary Reserve. In the Air 1274 Force, part-time training will generally be carried out at R.A.F. stations and will be linked with the Air Force training carried on there.

National Service men in all Services will be encouraged to undertake a greater training liability than that laid down in the National Service Act by volunteering —as the Act permits—for the various auxiliary branches of the Forces.

I cannot stress too highly the importance, if we are to derive the fullest benefits from the scheme, of further building up the numbers of volunteers in the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces. Volunteers have come forward in the past 12 months in good numbers, and all who have willingly given their services to the nation deserve our thanks. But we are still a long way from the target, and Members on both sides of the House could assist me by using every opportunity to make the needs of the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces widely known.

I must now speak on the problem of equipment. This has two aspects—research, with which I include development, and production. It is fundamental to our defence policy that we should devote to defence research the maximum effort. This is because technical superiority in weapons and equipment from guided missiles and aircraft through the whole range of warlike and non-warlike stores, may well, should any future struggle occur, prove decisive.

The main projects on which our scientists and technicians are engaged are the development of atomic weapons, jet bombers and fighters, including preliminary work on aircraft flying at speeds greater than the speed of sound, the development of turbo jet engines, guided missiles both for offensive and defensive purposes, radio and radar developments chiefly for the improvement of anti-aircraft defences, continued work on infantry weapons and artillery and also the design of advanced types of tanks.

In the field of naval research, the highest priority is being given to the development of anti-submarine devices and equipment. Under the general direction of the Defence Research Policy Committee, this work is being carried out by the scientists and technicians of the Ministry of Supply and Admiralty both in their own establishments and through 1275 private firms. Machinery has recently been set up to help the interchange of technical information with our Western Union friends with the object of avoiding duplication and overlapping of effort.

The Commonwealth countries are being invited to a meeting of the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science in this country during the summer for discussions on a wide range of subjects. All this research and development work is of the highest consequence to our defence potential, and I am convinced that we should continue to treat research for defence purposes as a top priority.

The House will expect me at this point to make plain our position with regard to the atomic bomb, and here I speak of the problem purely in its military aspects and not in its political aspects, which are the concern of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

We cannot, and do not, ignore in our defence planning the appearance of this new and terrible weapon nor its more deadly development, the hydrogen bomb, which now appears to be within the range of scientific development. We know that Soviet Russia has made progress more rapidly than at one time seemed likely; we also know that the Americans have continued to develop the industrial technique as well as the basic scientific knowledge required to improve on the bombs used in the last war and at Bikini. We ourselves, within the resources which we can allot to the task, are following our own programme.

But no one can contemplate this activity without the most sombre apprehensions as to where it may lead. Yet no solution lies in refusing to face the facts or in failure to measure up to the probabilities of the situation. I can, therefore, assure the House that the Chiefs of Staff in their strategic planning are giving full weight to this new military factor. Beyond that I cannot go today.

The main increase in this year's Estimates provision will he found under production and research which will cost an additional £34 million, and we shall devote practically £250 million or a little under one-third of our expenditure to those items. We can no longer draw equipment from accumulated war-time stocks, and we must face the formidable 1276 task of bringing into use the latest types and patterns of equipment available.

The cost of re-equipment is bound to be heavy. Items of equipment which were in use in 1939 and are still in use—for example, small arms ammunition—have increased in cost by as much as 200 per cent. But most items have also increased in complexity. Let me give the House some illustration of the way costs have risen. A heavy tank, for instance, which cost something like £18,000 before the war now costs twice as much. A.A. predictors cost five or six times as much as they did in 1939. It is difficult to compare such items as fighter aircraft because the types are different, but the Meteor and the Vampire cost 2½ times as much as the Hurricane and the Gladiator; the modern bomber is proportionately even more costly.

Perhaps I might add—in parenthesis—that, in an entirely different field, rates of pay and marriage allowance of other ranks have gone up by about 75 per cent. over 1938 and this increase applies to forces 80 per cent. stronger in manpower.

The House should not be under any misapprehension as to how far the increased provision for equipment will go. It will not, in fact, allow for more than a modest contribution towards re-equipment and modernisation. A substantial part of our production expenditure is devoted to the reconditioning of existing equipment and normal maintenance. New production for the Forces will include the production of jet fighter aircraft for the Navy and the Royal Air Force while the new Army provision will be mainly for A.A. equipment, tanks and non-armoured vehicles for front-line use.

The Navy will also proceed with the conversion of submarines to fast battery drive and the conversion of destroyers to escort vessels, as well as with conversion and modernisation of aircraft carriers. My Service colleagues, in presenting their Estimates to the House, will, consistent with security considerations, enlarge upon these programmes.

In addition to production for ourselves we shall, of course, in the coming year continue to make warlike stores available on repayment to friendly countries in the Commonwealth and elsewhere, in particular by way of supplying modern types of fighter aircraft to Western Union 1277 countries. There is some criticism of this proceeding, but the House should realise that exports of jet aircraft have not reduced the numbers available for the Royal Air Force. There is a limit to the amount of money which the Air Force can spend on equipment; while they do purchase large numbers of jet aircraft, they could not afford to buy the full output—

§ Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

Buy them from whom?

§ Mr. Shinwell

From ourselves. I should have thought that that was familiar to the right hon. Gentleman. We produce them.

§ Mr. Churchill

Why could the Royal Air Force not afford to buy from another Department with money voted by this House, the aircraft which that other Department was selling?

§ Mr. Shinwell

For the very simple arithmetical reason that it would mean an increase in our Estimates, and we cannot afford it. I should have thought the right hon. Gentleman was aware of that. Now that that is clear, and the right hon. Gentleman has been enlightened, I can proceed. Perhaps I had better repeat it for the enlightenment of the House.

I say there is a limit to the amount of money which the Air Force can spend on equipment; while they do purchase large numbers of jet aircraft, they could not afford to buy the full output, and, unless overseas sales were permitted, there would be no option but to cut down production. Overseas sales—I would draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention to this very vital element in the situation—help to maintain a flourishing aircraft industry and keep up our defence potential. They make in many cases a valuable contribution to our export trade and thereby assist in our economic recovery. Moreover, in the hands of our Allies and friends, these aircraft represent a strengthening of our common defensive arrangements.

Any review of our defence position would be incomplete without some reference to our close relation in all defence matters with the countries of the Commonwealth. Canada in the past year has become a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, and there is thus a formal 1278 relationship established. But the less formal character of our liaison arrangements with the other members of the Commonwealth is no obstruction to the development of full co-operation and consultation with them.

During the past year we have certainly made progress with the countries of the Commonwealth towards the close working partnership on defence matters which we regard as our goal, and we shall continue to study matters of mutual concern as they affect the different members of the Commonwealth in different parts of the world. We shall also continue to meet to the maximum possible extent, requests for assistance in building up the Fighting Services of the other Commonwealth countries. There is, in addition, a constant flow of officers and other ranks of the three Services on loan, on exchange or on courses among the Commonwealth countries.

The problem of Colonial Forces has also been receiving close attention. As with the United Kingdom forces, financial and economic considerations limit severely the local forces that can he maintained in the Colonies. The resources of many of the territories concerned are so limited that they are unable to afford even the scale of forces required to ensure their own internal security, and assistance has to be provided from United Kingdom funds. Moreover, in determining the size of local forces to be provided, regard has also to be paid to the needs of Colonial development and welfare.

A compromise solution has to be sought between the claims of defence and of economic and social development, and this compromise affects both the allocation of resources by the Colonies themselves and the nature of the assistance which is provided from the United Kingdom. With these factors in mind, planning has been proceeding in close consultation with Colonial Governments, and good progress has been made.

Let me now summarise the main elements of the defence plan on which we shall be proceeding in the year that lies ahead.

First: we shall continue with our Allies under the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties with the closer integration of our defences—this may involve adjustments and, where such adjustments are shown 1279 to be necessary in the common interest, the United Kingdom will readily respond.

Second: we must continue overseas to maintain the British Forces which are indispensable to security. This is a heavy burden falling primarily on the Army, and it must be recognised that for the time being at any rate it retards the creation of formations in the United Kingdom.

Third: we must continue to give the highest priority to defence research, including research into atomic weapons, and must increase our production of modern equipment. In this productive effort we shall give priority to equipment for the Royal Air Force and the antisubmarine forces of the Royal Navy.

Fourth: we shall seek to build up the Regular strength of the Army and the Royal Air Force by every means open to us, while maintaining National Service as an essential feature of our plans, both for the performance of current obligations and to provide for the build-up of the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces.

§ Mr. Blackburn (Birmingham, Northfield)

Does my right hon. Friend still accept the view that if it were possible to obtain the total number of men required by voluntary recruitment—which he has explained it is not—he would desire to go back to a system of voluntary recruitment?

§ Mr. Shinwell

I am bound to say that is a hypothetical question to begin with, and I cannot deal with a hypothesis. It is a question which cannot be replied to in a simple form, and I think it is rather a matter for debate.

The defence policy that I have outlined to the House is, in many respects, a compromise. In present circumstances, it could not be otherwise. It represents a balancing of conflicting factors—of short-term against long-term needs—of what is theoretically desirable against what is economically possible. No Minister of Defence can, in existing international conditions, be satisfied with the resources at his disposal. But, with such resources as are available, his task is to ensure that the maximum benefits in terms of defensive strength are provided for. To that task I propose to address myself, in the firm conviction that our Forces have a 1280 great and honourable rôle to play in sustaining the supreme policy of His Majesty's Government—the preservation of peace.

§ Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

No one will accuse the Minister of Defence of plunging the House into vehement controversy by the speech he has just made. He seems to have been guided throughout by a strong spirit of self-restraint and of moderation of statement rendered even more remarkable by the regular forms of official verbiage in which it was so happily expressed. So far as adding to the knowledge of the House upon this vast and grave topic, I can only say that I found his remarks about the atomic bomb a model of non-informatory eloquence. This is what the Minister told us about the atomic bomb, which is after all, a topic of some lively interest: "The Chiefs of Staff have given full weight to this new factor." There we may leave it for the moment. Let us hope it will be content with that position.

As the House knows, I, and some of my colleagues, at the Government's invitation, have had several conferences with the Prime Minister and Service Ministers in the last Parliament at which disclosures of matters not known to the House, or not fully known, were made. In my published correspondence with the Prime Minister I made the following stipulation: In order that the Opposition should not be embarrassed in Defence Debates, I must ask you, as I did Mr. Baldwin in 1936, that we should be free to use in public any information of which we are already possessed, with due regard to the national interest and safety. The Prime Minister agreed to that. Last year, we moved a reasoned Amendment on defence and we had thought of repeating it in the same terms this year.

I was not myself particularly anxious to have a Division on this issue at this time, if it could be avoided. I found it, however, impossible to commit myself and my colleagues even tacitly to the word "approve" which was announced to be a part of the Motion to approve the White Paper on Defence which is now before us. Such a step on our part might well be regarded hereafter, in view of the conferences that have taken place, as to some extent committing us to sharing, albeit indirectly, in the Government's responsibility. While recognising the efforts 1281 which have been made we could not take any responsibility for the present state of affairs in the Armed Forces. I am, therefore, obliged to the Prime Minister for being willing to substitute for the word approve "the words" take note of in the Government's Motion. I am sure that, in all the circumstances that prevail, this is a right decision on his part. Therefore there is no need to divide the House tonight.

I must now refer briefly to the disagreeable topic of the recent Ministerial appointments in the military sphere. I do not wish to dwell upon them unduly, but they cannot be omitted from any review of our defence position. I said in December, 1948, in this House: We all understand the difficulties of a party leader in these times when he has not only to conduct government but to preserve general good feeling among all his supporters. In these appointments"— I am quoting what I said a year and a quarter ago— I must say it seemed to me that the Prime Minister put party first, party second and party third. … I thought the appointment of the present Secretary of War was surprising… I believe that the Army would be better entrusted to men who are not engaged in the most bitter strife of politics. Nor should the War Office be regarded as a receptacle for Ministerial failures."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st December, 1948; Vol. 458, c. 2026.]

§ Mr. Shinwell

Would the right hon. Gentleman prefer to appoint his son-in-law to a post.

§ Mr. Churchill

I was not aware that he had been appointed to a high military post.

§ The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. James Callaghan)

Anyway, the right hon. Gentleman is the biggest party politician there is.

§ Mr. Churchill

I am merely reading what I said a year and a quarter ago. No doubt it has stung the right hon. Gentleman, but it is really not so much an attack upon him as a criticism of the method of these appointments. We now have a different situation. We have a new Parliament. We have other personalities, yet I cannot feel that my complaint of December, 1948, is not as valid and true as when I uttered it. Indeed, it seems to have had renewed confirmation. Under the Atlantic Pact we have much military business to do with the United States and other Powers, 1282 and I cannot feel that that business, or other aspects of our military organisation, will be facilitated by the Prime Minister's choice.

Coming to a more general question, it seems to me that more information should be given to the House about all the three Services. The guiding rule should be to tell Parliament everything that is certainly and obviously known to those foreign governments with whom we do not have confidential relationships in defence matters. That is a good working guide. It is not right, for instance, that the House of Commons should be so much worse informed about our defences than the Soviet Government. What is well-known abroad should also, in most cases, be imparted to the House of Commons which, after all, has the responsibility of providing the money now required on an unprecedented scale in time of peace.

I am sure it would be a great advantage if we could have a Debate in secret session on defence. We might then go into the atomic bomb question and see whether more information can be elicited than that "the Chiefs of Staff have given full weight to this new factor." I do not mean that the Government should impart all their secret information to the House Even if no further disclosure of military secrets were made, it would be much easier to discuss the whole question of defence without having every word reported and read all over the world.

It is sometimes one's duty to say things in public which give rise to anxiety and alarm. This may give satisfaction in some foreign countries and cause distress and want of confidence in us in others. I had to do this on several occasions before the late war when I was dealing with a Government and with Ministers at least as capable as those with whom we are now concerned.

§ Mr. Shinwell

Does the right hon. Gentleman's observation apply to the late Sir Thomas Inskip?

§ Mr. Churchill

Yes, Sir. I certainly think he had a far greater command of the large sphere of thought and action over which he presided as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence than—since the right hon. Gentleman puts the point—the right hon. Gentleman himself is ever likely to acquire. I carefully refrain from pressing the points against the right hon. 1283 Gentleman because, although he has many faults, I still believe his heart is in the right place. But he should not show himself so frightfully sensitive. We are only at the beginning of an ordeal which will be prolonged during this Parliament whatever duration it may be, and we earnestly trust the right hon. Gentleman will reserve some of his retorts and indignation for later phases in the criticism he will have to undergo.

I was on the question of the importance of having a Debate on defence in secret Session. I think it would be an advantage to have one in the next few months. I have never yet, in my experience, seen a secret Session from which the Government of the day did not derive advantages. I think there are a good many points which ought to be rammed home with more force than one would like to do on these topics in public hearing.

I therefore ask the Prime Minister to consider whether, in view of the balance of parties in the House and in view of the fact that the new House of Commons has been purged by the electors of certain untrustworthy elements, and that we are all united in our opposition to Communism, we should not have the advantage of the candour and freedom of speech together with any fuller information possible in a Session at which only the Members of both Houses can be present. If this request were refused, one would have to consider whether more would not have to be said in public upon matters already known to foreign governments in order that our own people should be more truly informed. This afternoon, however, I shall say nothing that is not public knowledge to the newspapers in this or other countries, or that I do not derive from my own knowledge and do not mention on my own responsibility

I will begin with the Army. In the forefront of Army policy comes the question of National Service. The Labour Government have enforced conscription in time of peace. Everyone is liable to serve in the Armed Forces for 18 months. We could not approve industrial conscription in peace-time, and I am very glad that it has been withdrawn, but we have felt it our duty to support, and we still support, the Government in maintaining the principle of compulsory National Service. It would have been 1284 very easy for us to gain popularity and votes at the recent election by denouncing it, as did the Liberal Party, but we felt bound to help the Government carry this burden.

We think National Service is necessary not only to maintain the structure of the Army but to preserve peace. If Britain were to repudiate National Service at this time, as the Liberals propose, it would mean, in my opinion, the downfall of the whole defensive structure embodied in the Brussels Treaty and in the Atlantic Pact, and now being very slowly brought into being. We therefore made our position clear during the last Parliament, and we adhere to it now.

I think we were somewhat ungratefully treated on this subject in the election. I was surprised to learn that an active whispering campaign was on foot, especially in garrisons abroad, in Germany and the Mediterranean fortresses, in Singapore and Hong Kong, that the length of compulsory service would be increased if the Conservatives were returned to power. [HON. MEMBERS: "We never heard of it."] We received numerous communications of that character. The troops were upset by the suggestion that they would be kept abroad for a longer time. We contradicted this false rumour as best we could, but it only shows how difficult it is to develop a true and wise national policy in a period when prolonged and vicious electioneering is the order of the day.

I still adhere to what I said last year: I am strongly of the belief that if the great policy and decision of national military service had been used properly and a smaller number called up for a longer time, great economies might have been made and might still be made in the military services."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th October, 1949; Vol. 468, c. 1625–6.] The right hon. Gentleman in one of his references did not challenge that. He said there were other considerations. Of course, that statement in no way affected men who were already serving, and I was much shocked to hear, for instance, that widespread rumour was being put about at Malta and everywhere that if the Conservatives were returned the men would all have their service increased.

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee)

rose—

§ Mr. Churchill

I did not say that the right hon. Gentleman said it.

§ The Prime Minister

The right hon. Gentleman is constantly talking about whispering campaigns. There was the ridiculous one which he suggested had been put about that he was dead. No one has heard of these whispering campaigns except the right hon. Gentleman. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Perhaps the hon. Members on the second Opposition bench will allow me to address their Leader. Unless the right hon. Gentleman can give us some evidence of where these whispering campaigns came from, he should not make charges of this kind. No one here has heard of any of these reports. I am unaware that anyone out in Malta has. it is extraordinary to have these constant suggestions by the right hon. Gentleman about these whispering campaigns being put about.

§ Mr. Churchill

I certainly do not withdraw what I have said. Hundreds of messages and letters were received. Of course, I have not suggested that the Prime Minister himself went about whispering, but that and other statements—

§ Mr. Paget (Northampton)

On a point of Order. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to certain documents. Ought not those documents to be available to the House?

§ Mr. Churchill

The hon. and learned Gentleman should learn a little more about our Rules of Order before he raises points of Order. All I can say is that I was very glad to be in a position myself to deny the rumour that I was dead, and I only regret it was not as easy to get upon the track of and kill a great many other falsehoods to which we were subjected. Personally I think it was very shabby for hon. Members and others, if they were engaged in the campaign at all—[HON. MEMBERS: "If"]—considering the help that we have given them in supporting National Service, to have taken every advantage that they could as occasion offered. Hon. Members do not disturb me at all by their indignation. I am only sorry that the topics I have to deal with this afternoon are of a laborious and technical character and do not enable me to stimulate them more vigorously than I shall be able to do.

§ Lieut.-Colonel Lipton (Brixton)

What about the evidence?

§ Commander Pursey (Hull, East)

What about the evidence from the Tory Central Office?

§ Mr. Churchill

I am now coming to the question of the structure of the Regular Army. Here I must say that I do not agree with the Government's view, expressed in the last sentence of the White Paper on Defence, which reads: The idea that the present principle of universality of national service should be abandoned in favour of a scheme under which a smaller number of men, selected by ballot or otherwise, would be required to serve for a period of eighteen months or more is, in the Government's view, impracticable. Nearly 300,000 men come within the scope of National Service every year. Of these the intake for 1950–51 is to be 168,000. I am quoting from the Paper. I do not suggest that this number should be increased. On the contrary, I think that by wise administration it might well be somewhat diminished. But I believe that the method of choosing those who are required could be greatly improved, and I do not exclude the principle of selective service by ballot from a proper application of our National Service law. I think it is a matter which should not be too lightly brushed aside.

I believe that if, by various inducements of a voluntary or optional character, men called up could be persuaded to serve for a somewhat longer period, important economies, easements and improvements would be possible in our whole military system. I am satisfied that conscription could be applied with less burden and with less expense, combined with greater efficiency, having regard especially to our peculiar needs; and I do not think the Minister of Defence disagrees with that. I do not propose, however, to go into details, but I renew the assurance, which I gave during the election, that the Conservative Party do not intend to use compulsory powers to lengthen the terms of National Service above the 18 months which now prevail—not compulsory powers.

One aspect of the evils of the present application of the compulsory Service Acts is shown in our lamentable inability to produce, even with the present severe measures of compulsion, any adequate reinforcement or expeditionary force even for the minor contingencies which arise in the world, and that for a nation 1287 whose responsibilities, as the Minister of Defence reminded us, are still so widely spread as ours. We have, of course, the German garrisons to maintain and more troops are needed in the Far East; but to set against this there is the relief of what used to he our prime burden of maintaining a great long-service Army in India.

Even with all the compulsory powers which the Government have taken, with 380,000 men in uniform, I do not believe there are a couple of well-formed brigade groups which could be sent abroad at short notice—I should be quite ready and very glad to be contradicted on that point—not a couple of well-formed brigade groups. That would compare with the six divisions produced under the Haldane scheme, without compulsion, before the First World War, or with the four or five divisions which stood ready at the outbreak of the Second World War.

Of course, things are cot exactly on all fours, I quite agree. There have been many changes, but such great contrasts should not be ignored and, with facts like these staring us in the face, it is hard to believe that we are presented with a successful solution of the military problem by those who have had unprecedented control for the last 4½ years. We have an enormous mass of men in uniform, and here we are reduced to this pitiful shortage of the means to send small reinforcements, modest reinforcements, abroad at short notice. It is not a thing to laugh at; it is a thing to puzzle at, and to try to find a way to do it. We shall not get through our difficulties by this attempt at geniality when under examination.

Time does not permit me this afternoon to recur to the extraordinary disappearance and dispersal of immense masses of war materials which were at our disposal when the present Government came into office. The right hon. Gentleman said something about it, and of course some weapons become obsolete in a few years but others, properly taken care of, especially artillery and rifles, of which we had enormous masses, can be kept in good order for a whole generation.

Now I return to the recruiting for the Regular Army and for the Territorial Forces. How seriously this has fallen off 1288 is shown by the figures on page six of the White Paper. There has been a fall in the Regular Army recruiting from 33,900 in 1948 to 23,800 in 1949—that is to say, a drop of nearly one-third. Yet it is on this Regular Army, so heavily burdened by the need of training the National Service recruits, and losing them as soon as they begin to be most useful, that there falls the task of providing not only our garrisons overseas, with units of real fighting quality, but also the supply of effective reinforcements available at short notice, which all admit are needed

I come to the wider aspects of our military affairs. The decision to form a front in Europe against a possible further invasion by Soviet Russia and its satellite States was at once grave for us and also imperative. There was a school of thought in the United States which held that Western Europe was indefensible and that the only lines where a Soviet-satellite advance could be held were the Channel and the Pyrenees. I am very glad that this view has been decisively rejected by the United States, by ourselves and by all the Powers concerned in the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact.

I find it necessary to say, however. speaking personally, giving my own opinion, that this long front cannot be successfully defended without the active aid of Western Germany. For more than 40 years—and what years!—I have worked with France. Britain and France must stand together primarily united in Europe. United they will be strong enough to extend their hands to Germany. Germany is at present disarmed and forbidden to keep any military force. Just beyond her eastern frontier lies the enormous military array of the Soviet and its satellite States, far exceeding in troops, in armour and in air power all that the other Allies have got. We are unable to offer any assurance to the Germans that they may not be overrun by a Soviet and satellite invasion.

Seven or eight millions of refugees from the East have already been received and succoured in Western Germany. In all the circumstances this is a marvellous feat. Another quarter of a million are now being or about to be driven across the Polish and Czech frontiers. The mighty mass of the Russian armies and their satellites lies, like a fearful cloud, upon the German people. The Allies 1289 cannot give them any direct protection. Their homes, their villages, their cities might be overrun by an Eastern deluge and, no doubt, all Germans who have peen prominent in resisting Communism or are working for reconciliation with the Western democracies would pay the final forfeit.

We have no guarantee to give except to engage in a general war which, after wrecking what is left of European civilisation, would no doubt end ultimately in the defeat of the Soviets, but which might begin by the Communist enslavement of Western Germany, and not only of Western Germany. If the Germans are neither to have a guarantee of defence nor to be allowed to make a contribution to the general framework of defence they must console themselves, as they are doing, by the fact that they have no military expense to bear—nothing like the £800 million we are now voting or the contributions of the French and other treaty Powers, or the far greater sums provided by the United States. They are free from all that.

The Germans may also comfort themselves with the important advantages which this relief from taxation gives to German commercial competition in all the markets of the world, growing and spreading with every month that passes. I cannot feel that this is a good way to do things, or that we should let them drift on their course. I say without hesitation that the effective defence of the European frontiers cannot be achieved if the German contribution is excluded from the thoughts of those who are responsible.

§ Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)

It is the result of unconditional surrender.

§ Mr. Churchill

I am not at all disturbed by the meaningless interruptions of the hon. Gentleman. Would he like to go on shouting?

§ Mr. Davies

rose—

§ Hon. Members

Sit down.

§ Mr. Churchill

The Minister of Defence did not attempt to deal with this issue, although it and others are the foundation of the responsibilities confided in him; but I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to speak to us about them tonight. The decision, of course, does not rest with this country alone, but we must have a policy, and the House ought 1290 to know what is our policy. To remain as we are now for a long period of time is certainly not the best way of preventing the measureless horrors of a third world war.

It is painful to witness the present indecision, and also the petty annoyances, by which the reconciliation of France and Great Britain with the German people is hindered, by the belated dismantlement of a few remaining German factories and the still more belated trials of aged German generals. All this plays into the hands of the Communist fifth column in Western Germany and the reviving Naziism, or neo-Naziism, which is only another variant of the same evil. All this squanders the precious years that still remain in which war can be averted and peace established on a lasting foundation. I felt it my duty to raise this subject today, and I think it would be altogether wrong that these Debates should proceed upon a basis of guarded platitudes and the avoidance of any real statement of the issues upon which our lives and fortunes depend.

Now I come to the Navy. Estimates of £193 million are put forward for the Navy, and a reduction is proposed in the manpower under Vote A from 144,000 at 1st April, 1949, to 127,000 in April, 1951. I do not quarrel with this. I have urged in successive years the combing of the tail and the numbers employed ashore in non-combatant jobs and in clerical duties at the Admiralty. I am glad to see that the Minister of Defence is a convert to this process. I am glad to see it has been going forward, albeit slowly and tardily.

I was sorry, however, to read in the Admiralty paper that for reasons of economy there will he no increase in the strength of the Royal Fleet Reserve during 1950 to 1951. The maintenance of the Royal Fleet Reserve is not expensive in proportion to the security which it gives and the service that it renders. I have also studied the tables given in the Admiralty paper of the strength of the Fleet, both active and reserve, and such information as is vouchsafed us about new construction, modernisation and conversion. I do not propose to make any comments in detail upon this, but rather to deal generally with the great change that has come 1291 over the naval position, and to try to focus for the House, so far as is possible, the new Admiralty problem.

This is not like the period before the First World War when all was thought to culminate in a decisive engagement between the battle fleets at sea; and we maintained the ratio of 16 to 10 over the German capital ships. There is no surface fleet potentially hostile to us in the world today. The only other surface fleet of consequence is that of the United States, nearly all of which—or a great part of which—has, with much wisdom, been placed in material reserve, protected from decay by costly but well worth while systems of preservation. In the Navy the war in the air and the war on the sea have become so closely interwoven as to be indistinguishable and inseparable.

It is obvious and imperative that the Navy should manage its own air service. Nevertheless, in the sea war of the future it is the air which will decide the fate and fortunes of ships of war. Therefore, the aircraft carrier with proper naval protection must increasingly replace the battleships of former times. But what kind of aircraft carrier, and how many of the large or small types? To decide this you must look at the actual problem which lies before us. The combat of gunfire between lines of battle is utterly extinct.

What we have to face in the next few years is the Germanised Soviet U-boat. The nation does not seem to know much about this, and the right hon. Gentleman did not mention it in his statement, but the salient facts are public property and govern the thoughts of all the staffs in many countries. I am not going to attempt to compute the Soviet U-boat force. According to Brassey's "Naval Annual," the strength given out by Soviet propaganda is 250, and Brassey's "Naval Annual" regards this as a reliable figure. Between 75 and 100 of these, according to this authority, are of war-time or postwar construction.

It may not be wise to publish what we ourselves have in anti-U-boat craft and forces, but there really cannot be any reason for the Government not stating broadly what we might have to (ace. At the end of the war the Soviets 1292 became possessors of a great part of Germany and of several of its Eastern Baltic ports. They engaged, by persuasion or pressure, a large number of German scientific personnel. They have made a great U-boat fleet, in the designing and building and even handling of which a considerable proportion of Germans are involved, by seduction or duress.

Certainly an immense advance has been made in the character and quality of the U-boat menace to the ocean life lines without whose maintenance we cannot live. An entirely new type of U-boat has been developed. Instead of a ship going eight or nine knots under the water and having to come up to breathe at comparatively short intervals, we have a type of U-boat which can manoeuvre below the surface at upwards of 20 knots or thereabouts. By the use of the breathing tube or Snorkel—or "snort" as we call it—it can make passages of thousands of miles without appearing on the surface where it might be detected.

The flotillas and anti-U-boat vessels which, in enormous numbers, broke the U-boat peril and saved our lives in the last war are now largely obsolete for this purpose. In those days we used to employ 12-knot or 14-knot ships to hunt the U-boats, and it was comparatively easy to multiply those; but now, with U-boats capable of moving, for a short time at any rate, at 20 knots submerged, all this great anti-U-boat fleet which we created would be useless. We should have to have much faster vessels going at 30 knots or more merely to do the same hunting as we did in the last war.

Here also is a sphere in which numbers are imperative, but to create vessels of 30 knots in the numbers required involves impossible expense. We have to have many scores of them and each one costs four or five times as much as the old kind and takes two or three times as long to build or adapt. The problem of mastering the new German-designed and Soviet-owned U-boat cannot be solved along the lines of multiplying flotillas of larger and faster vessels. If the story stopped here, I should feel gloomy about it. Happily, however, as is often forgotten, all things are on the move together, and here the naval air and longer-range land-based aircraft come to the aid of the Navy.

1293 The light type of aircraft carrier, if provided in sufficient numbers, can search immense areas of sea. There are also, no doubt, improvements in the methods of destroying U-boats. We have to find them, however, before we can destroy them, and only the air can do this. I submit to the House that the main emphasis of our naval effort at the present time should be to create the largest numbers of light fleet aircraft carriers and auxiliary carriers capable of carrying the necessary modern types of aircraft.

This is a time to concentrate upon essentials. It does not at all follow that this means a vast augmentation of expenditure. It is necessary to concentrate upon essentials and beware, of all things, of frittering strength away on remedies against dangers which have passed away in time. An intense effort should be made to improve the methods of detecting submerged U-boats from the air. Great advances have already been made. I heard no reference to this by the right hon. Gentleman, but I have already seen a precise demand made upon science by the military which has not been met. Perhaps the solution has already been found. At any rate, it may be possessed by others.

On 23rd February—a date when some of us were pre-occupied with other matters—the United States authorities published an official statement on new measures designed to combat the snorkel submarine. They said: The Navy has accepted delivery of a new model of the long-range Neptune, which will be the first aircraft specifically designed to meet the threat of snorkel type enemy submarines. This plane holds the world's non-refuelling distance record of 11,236 miles. Built by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the twin-engined Neptune carries the latest electronic and ordnance equipment. Its sensitive search radar permits detection of smaller targets, such as a snorkel tube, over a much greater distance than heretofore possible with long-range patrol planes. That shows that the information that other countries find it possible to give has all been made public; instead of the limits to which the House of Commons is confined.

To locate submerged submarines accurately, the P2V will utilise magnetic detection gear and sonobuoys. These small radio buoys are dropped in a specific pattern over the area where a submarine is suspected. Floating on the surface the buoy lowers a small hydrophone to the proper depth, where the noise of the 1294 submarine's propellers is detected by the hydro-phone and transmitted. Receivers in the aircraft permit the operators to plot the submarine's position by interpreting the relative noise level transmitted by the sonobuoys. I have not read anything so encouraging or hopeful for many a long day. I am bound to say I am astonished that more information should not have been volunteered by the Minister of Defence in the statement which he has made. If this should come true, the menace of modern U-boats may be finally overcome under the attack of modern aircraft launched from a sufficient number of small aircraft carriers. I think that the House ought to know and reflect upon these important facts in a debate of this character, and that they should play a real part in our consideration of these questions of defence policy.

Now I come to the general air problem —not the one connected with the Navy, but the general air problem. Here again, I shall only mention to the House what is already well-known to those who study such matters. In the forefront stands the enormous numerical strength of the Soviet air force. There never has been an air force of the size that the Soviet have built and are building in time of peace. In the air, quantity is best defeated by quality. That is how we got through in 1940 when all hung in the balance. But now we have a far greater disproportion of numbers to face, though happily of a lower relative quality.

Still no one can say that a sufficient quantity cannot overwhelm superior quality. If we wish to have that strength which will deter war, or if the worst comes to the worst, to enable us to win through, we require far larger numbers of the highest class aircraft than we now possess. Every sacrifice should be made on other branches of defence to make sure that that is not neglected. The highest priority should be accorded to it. Fortunately and providentially there is the American air force, far stronger than ours and of equal quality. We have allowed them to establish in East Anglia a base for their bombing aircraft, the significance of which cannot be lost on the Soviets.

We on this side supported His Majesty's Government in the steps they have taken. If any other party had taken such steps I do not know whether the 1295 Socialists in Opposition would have sustained them. Certainly they have not been put to that test. It was certainly a step which in any other period but this strange time in which we live might have led to war. What has distressed and disquieted me is that those who took it should appear not to be fully conscious of its importance. Our defensive forces in fighter aircraft should be raised and our radar precautions should be raised by our utmost exertions to the highest possible level.

We have the jet fighter. This is the product of British genius. There is nothing to surpass it in the world and it is continually improving. I was glad to read in the White Paper, page 5, paragraph 15, the plan for doubling the jet fighter strength of Fighter Command would be completed. I hope that means really "doubling" and not merely filling up existing squadrons and bringing them up to strength. I was glad to read it for what it was worth. But I cannot understand why a British Government which has established an American base in East Anglia should have allowed anything to diminish the supply of jet fighter aircraft upon which our deterrent against war and our survival should it come might alike depend.

Here again I base myself only upon what has been made public in the newspapers and is common property. The right hon. Gentleman made a reference to jet fighters. British jet fighters have hitherto been for many good but insufficient reasons—and a good reason if insufficient in a matter like this is a bad reason—dispersed and distributed in various quarters. I am content to deal only with those which have been sold to the Argentine, or written-off against what are called "sterling balances" to Egypt. I do not know how many have been sent or given—for that is what it comes to—to Egypt; but it is already public knowledge that 100 jet fighter aircraft have been sold to the Argentine for little more than £2 million.

There is a sense of disproportion about an act like this which passes the frontiers of reason. The Air Force lays before us Estimates for £223 million, and yet to gain perhaps little more than £2 million of foreign exchange—which the Liverpool Cotton Exchange could have earned for 1296 us in a year; a trifle compared to the vast scale of our expenditure—100 of these vital instruments have been sent away.

Even upon the basis of the facts known to the public I am prepared to argue this matter in a little further detail. A wise use of our jet aircraft would have enabled the whole of our Auxiliary Air Force squadrons to be at this moment effectively re-armed. I do not think that those who conduct the Government of the country, although animated I am sure by a sincere purpose, have comprehended this aspect of their problem. As far as I could understand him this afternoon, the Minister of Defence gave a most extraordinary reason. He said that the Air Force could not afford to buy them; and when I asked why they could not afford to, it was because apparently they had overrun the Estimate agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But all this is in the same sphere of ministerial responsibility, and money should be saved elsewhere rather than that a vital need of this kind should be denied to the Air Force.

I will try to put this problem in the simplest terms for the benefit of the right hon. Gentleman. Here we have an Air Force at an overall cost of £223 million, and to get £2 million of dollar exchange we deprive ourselves of this part of an element vital to our security. Let me take a really simple example derived from the days which some of us have lived in, in the early years of the century, of old-fashioned war. Suppose we had a regiment of Lancers 500 strong. It might have cost £100,000 a year. There were the overheads; there were the fine uniforms, there were the horses, the barracks, the band, and all that. What would have been thought of an Administration which cut off the steel spear points of 100 of the lances and sold them to the local ironmonger at half-a-crown apiece to reduce expense? I have put it simply to the right hon. Gentleman, and I hope he has managed to take that in anyhow. But that is exactly what this particular transaction of selling 100 jet fighter aircraft to the Argentine, published in all the newspapers and common knowledge all over the world, has amounted to.

We shall hear all sorts of excuses about the time it takes to lengthen runways on 1297 the airfields, the collection of skilled mechanics, the importance of building up, as the right hon. Gentleman told us, a future clientele of customers abroad, and the like. We have only to think of the total cost of the Air Estimates of £223 million to see what such arguments are worth. We have only to think of the time that has passed since we allowed the Americans to establish their bombing base in East Anglia to see how vain are these excuses for not having taken all the concomitant measures at the same time. If we had strictly safeguarded our jet fighter aircraft of the waste of which I have given only one example—and that because it is public—the whole of our Auxiliary Air Force could have been re-armed by now, and even further aircraft might have been made.

In putting this point before the House I must repeat that I am citing no fact which is not known to the world, or was not known to me apart from any information I have derived from discussions with the Government. I do not know how much of this sort of thing has been vitiating our enormous expenditure upon armaments, but I am sure that far greater value for the money we voted could have been achieved, and that far better use could now be made of our British resources. If we wish to prevent the fearful tensions which exist in the modern world we must not only be cool and patient, but also firm and strong. Here is one of the reasons why I could not possibly accept the word "approve" when errors of this kind have been committed in the open light of day.

Do not, I beg the House, nurse foolish delusions that we have any other effective overall shield at the present time from mortal danger than the atomic bomb in the possession, thank God, of the United States. But for that there would be no hope that Europe could preserve its freedom, or that our island could escape an ordeal incomparably more severe than those we have already endured. Our whole position in this atomic sphere has been worsened since the war by the fact that the Russians, unexpectedly as the Minister admitted, have acquired the secrets of the atomic bomb, and are said to have begun its manufacture.

Let us therefore labour for peace, not only by gathering our defensive strength, but also by making sure that no door is 1298 closed upon any hope of reaching a settlement which will end this tragic period when two worlds face one another in increasing strain and anxiety.

§ Mr. Hopkin Morris (Carmarthen)

When the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition talks on the question of defence there is no one, either in this House or out of it, who can speak with greater knowledge. Not only can he speak with great knowledge upon the subject, but he has matched that knowledge with a service to the liberty of mankind which is unrivalled. But it shows the difficulty of discussing this kind of subject for the ordinary Member of Parliament, even if he has been a Member of Parliament for a long time. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out the difficulty of obtaining adequate information. There is apparently an arrangement by which he and some of his colleagues meet the Prime Minister and discuss the question of the defence of the country.

§ Mr. Churchill

There was.

§ Mr. Morris

No one would criticise that occurring, but for the average Member of Parliament that knowledge is not available; he cannot discuss these Estimates, presented by the different Services, intelligently one way or another. In discussing these Estimates the Select Committee found that at least one-tenth of the Estimates were secret; as to one-tenth of the whole of the Estimates, no information of any kind was tendered to the Estimates Committee. The Estimates Committee acquiesced in that position on the representation of the then Minister of Defence. I am not criticising the Select Committee for accepting that position.

I have no knowledge, and I have no means of knowing, whether that decision was right or wrong; but whether that decision was right or wrong, it affects the position of this House—and it affects it seriously. If this House is to be in a position to discuss these Estimates, and to discuss them properly, to discuss their relative value, whether they are adequate or whether they are not to meet the existing international situation, it must first of all have the information before it. It must be in a position to know and to criticise.

There are difficulties which 1299 the Select Committee accepted. The appeal of the right hon. Gentleman that there should be a secret Session of this House, in which information could be given to the House to enable it to form some conclusion, must be reinforced by every Member, because no information is available at the moment.

It is important, when these Estimates are being considered, to have criteria by which they can be judged. One criterion adopted by the Minister of Defence was to compare the position today with that in 1938–39. That is an idle comparison. It occurs in the report of the Estimates Committee, where figures are given for each of the Services for 1938–39 and the comparable figure for 1949–50. It goes on to show that the cost figures of the earlier year are roughly one-third of today's total for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the same applies to personnel, but when we compare those figures, there is no means of making them intelligible.

We are living in a totally different world. The world of 1939 and that of 1950 are in no ways comparable. There is no method of making the figures even intelligible. It is not merely that the war has taken place, but we have to remember that we are living in a quickly-changing world. The position even since 1945 has so completely changed that there is no meaning in comparing 1950 with 1945—never mind 1939. This seeking for a standard year is a statistical device without any value in any sphere whatsoever.

Let us take the position today and compare it with that in 1945. Then we were hoping that the three great Powers who had won the war together, Russia, the United States and ourselves, would, through co-operation, secure a decreased armaments bill, which by 1950 would be much smaller. Five years later we find that the armaments bill in this country has grown to £780 million—£21 million more than last year. What has happened to the hopes? Instead of the realisation of our hopes that these three great Powers would co-operate, we have an iron curtain over half of Europe, and for the Western side of the Continent we have the Atlantic and Brussels Treaties. They are not the measure of the realisation of our hopes in 1945, but the 1300 measure of our failure. They may be a necessity. The ending of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was a true description of the position as it is today, but it is a grim picture and a grim outlook.

The Minister of Defence says that we are seeking in the Atlantic Treaty closer co-operation between the nations of Western Europe and the United States of America. Is that closer co-operation going to operate through National Service? If so, what arrangements has he come to with France about National Service?

§ Mr. Shinwell

They have got it.

§ Mr. Morris

They are a great land Power, but we were never a land Power until the last war, though some would say that we were not one even then. We are a great naval Power and a great air force Power. The speeches on the subject of defence which interested me in this House are those of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). He is always a very courageous speaker and he has always something to say. He has two tests which he applies to the efficacy of these Estimates. The first test is the foreign policy of the Government; and the second is the economic capacity of this country to bear the burden. They are good tests. But the hon. Member for Coventry, East, although very courageous in his speeches, lacks his usual courage in one of his articles, because he says that the Government today are to be supported on these Estimates by Members above the Gangway, and therefore the Left wing of his own party can be free to criticise on any aspect. That is not a very courageous action.

§ Mr. Harold Davies

When did he say that?

§ Mr. Morris

It is in an article in the "New Statesman and Nation."

§ Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East)

It is a little unfair to attribute to a journalist articles written in the paper to which he contributes, but which are unsigned. It is not exactly etiquette.

§ Mr. Morris

I do not want to take any advantage of the hon. Gentleman. I merely say that the voice seemed to be his voice. The hon. Gentleman nodded his assent when I said what his criteria were. I do not see that there is much 1301 difference in quoting the other part which I mentioned. It is an important point. It is said that it will be safe for hon. Members opposite to criticise these Estimates because the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and his party support national military service.

It was not safe to criticise the Control of Engagement Order, nor to challenge the House upon it last week. Therefore, the Minister of Labour came down to the House and, without taking time to notify the Lord President of the Council, proceeded to annul the Order. In outlining the Business for this week, the Lord President of the Council last Thursday announced a debate upon the Control of Engagement Order. It was not safe to challenge the Government on that, so it was withdrawn. It is safe to challenge the Government on National Service because the Leader of the Opposition and his friends above the Gangway will support the Government in imposing such service.

§ Mr. Blackburn

I did not understand that the annulment of the Control of Engagement Order was a sudden thing. I do not think it is true to say that this decision was taken at the last minute. It was taken a long time ago.

§ Mr. Morris

I have no private information on the subject, but I am content to rely on HANSARD, and HANSARD states that last Thursday the Lord President of the Council, announcing the Business for this week, stated that there would be a debate on the Control of Engagement Order. Then the Minister of Labour announced its withdrawal.

This question of conscription is of importance to the safety of the realm. I am not going to repeat tonight the arguments the House heard when the Measure imposing it was first proposed. This country went into two wars a free country, and one of the reasons the Leader of the Opposition successfully led this country was that it was a free country. We are not going into the next war as a free country.

§ Mr. Ellis Smith

Let us hope there will be no next war.

§ Mr. Harold Davies

We did not come out of the last war a free country.

§ Mr. Morris

When the next war comes, the position will be totally different, and the greatest danger confronting this country is the imposition of this conscription. I want to turn for a moment to Western European Union. What is the defence for imposing military conscription? What about the wastage in the Regular Army which takes place to enforce conscription? That wastage has not been repaired. Our military service is for 18 months, six months longer than in France, which is a first-class military Power. We are using our young men at the age of 19, a year before they are fully trained. We are sending them abroad without being fully trained, and not even fully equipped. From a military point of view there is scarcely any value in the system.

The Minister of Defence said that we were gradually devoting more money to research and equipment. Is that due to a preconceived and deliberate plan, or is is being forced upon the Government because they are not getting their Regular recruits? The Minister of Defence shakes his head, but that is part of the necessity of the situation. The numbers of our Regular Forces are diminishing and are not being repaired by recruits under the National Service Acts. We are given the numbers estimated to be called up in 1950, 1951 and 1952, but we are not given the numbers to be registered. We do not know what the wastage is there, either by deferment or as a result of medical examination. No information is given.

I want to come now to the really important point. Either we cannot afford this money economically, or we are not doing enough to carry out the foreign policy of the Foreign Secretary.

§ Mr. Crossman

I agree with the hon. and learned Member about the preferability of voluntary service, but would he say that the cost of attracting volunteers would be less than the present cost of conscription?

§ Mr. Morris

I am not saying anything of the kind.

§ Mr. Crossman

The hon. and learned Member said we could not afford it.

§ Mr. Morris

I did not say that we could not afford it. I was coming back 1303 to the test applied by the hon. Member himself and I did not express an opinion on the matter. Of one thing I am quite sure; we can afford a free country and the security of a free system far better than we can afford a compulsory system. The free system is the only security that can be provided. I am not going into the quarrel between the hon. Gentleman and his Front Bench. The fact remains clear that there is something of very important consequence in his first point that the foreign policy of this country requires re-examination. The key to the situation is not in the Services but in the foreign policy of this country. If it is not being pursued with vigour, the result is this policy which the Labour Party are foisting upon us by way of conscription.

Here is the position: United Europe, the Brussels and Atlantic Treaties—I admit their necessity, owing to the developments of the last five years. The admission of that necessity is the measure of our failure. We have to start again and see whether we can find some other way. The hydrogen bomb is not the most dangerous bomb at the present time. The most dangerous is the belief that the State can be supreme throughout the world. Every country trying to build up a planned economy in the Western area, which always used to stand for freedom, is imposing upon itself under that planned scheme the same pattern of life against which it is protesting east of the Iron Curtain.

§ Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East)

The hon. and learned Member for Carm