3.36 p.m.

Mr. Eden (Warwick and Leamington)

I beg to move, That this House requests His Majesty's Government, in the interests of peace and full employment, to accept the invitation to take part in the discussions on the Schuman Plan, subject to the same condition as that made by the Netherlands Government, namely, that if the discussions show the plan not to be practicable, freedom of action is reserved. This Motion stands upon the Order Paper in the names of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, the Leader of the Liberal Party, and other hon. and right hon. Gentlemen above and below the Gangway on this side of the House. First let me say that hon. Members in all parts of the House will regret that the Foreign Secretary should have been prevented by illness from attending this Debate. We are sorry for the fact, and we are still sorrier for the reason.

We cannot, in my judgment, usefully consider the proposal which is now honourably associated with Mr. Schuman's name unless we examine it in the perspective of history. Relations between France and Germany have been the dominant political theme for a century; they have determined the lives and deaths of millions of our fellow men and women in every country and continent. The problem is still there, and exists in a world where the threat to peace is immediate and deadly. We have had an example of that this very morning, and the news from Korea surely urges the need for all free countries, East and West, to align themselves and their policies and agree upon their plans without delay. Certainly no event could give more confidence for the present and more hope for the future than to find practical means to reduce, and finally to eliminate, the possibility of future war between France and Germany.

Sometimes we stand too near to great events to see them in their true perspective, and that the Schuman Plan can be such an event I have no doubt. It is universally recognised, except by the Communists, that the French initiative towards an entirely new relationship with Germany is fundamentally a movement for peace. I do not think there is any argument anywhere about that. It must not, it cannot, be allowed to fail. That is the spirit in which we must approach it.

Now, what of the German attitude? Of course, there may be some who would say that the Germans welcome the plan because they hope ultimately to dominate Europe, particularly if we are not parties to the plan. It is likely enough that there are some Germans who take that view, but I have little doubt that the vast majority generally welcome it as a contribution to enduring peace with their French neighbours. I read an article from Germany the other day by a most experienced correspondent of the "New York Times,' known to many Members of this House, Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick. I shall not read a lengthy extract, but I should like to read to the House two sentences. It is written from Dusseldorf.

The extract is: It is fair to say that the Ruhr as a whole is tired of being a forge of war. Many voice fears that eventually re-armament will be forced on the Ruhr by the Allies. This is especially true of the young. It is one reason among many that the Ruhr is enthusiastic about the Schuman Plan. … For the present, at least, the idea of the Ruhr as a forge of peace has real popular appeal. … Labour is for the new organisation because it expects to take part in it. The history of recent Anglo-French diplomatic exchanges has not been a very happy one. That is a gentle under-statement. It is not part of my purpose this afternoon to apportion blame on that account. There have no doubt been faults on both sides, but this Debate will not have been in vain if we can make some contribution to setting them straight.

I begin by submitting to the House that it is an essential British interest that the Schuman proposals should succeed, and to enable them to do so Britain should take her part in them. In examining these proposals, I shall not burke the issue, which I fully understand has to be faced, of how far we could have gone—or how far we could go now, because the present is more important than the recent past—to meet the conditions which the French sought to impose before the conversations opened. If I am to do this intelligently, I must take the House back a little in point of time.

The Prime Minister, it may be remembered, in November, 1945, not long after he took office, in one of the first Debates on international affairs that we had in that Parliament, spoke to us on his return from discussions on the control of atomic energy which he had had with the American and Canadian Governments, and he brought with him a Joint Declaration, which I have here, to set up within the United Nations an Atomic Energy Commission. The fate of that Commission we know only too well—or rather the fate of its work. It is not the fault not succeeded.

The point that we should keep in mind is that the form of that keep in mind is that the form of that proposed International Atomic Development Authority stretched far above and beyond the rule of Governments. For example, it was proposed that it should have powers of inspection and the power to give or withhold licences for atomic research. It proposed, among other things, that the ownership, management and operation of dangerous facilities should be by that authority, and that this international agency should own nuclear fuels and source material and that it should inspect to prevent clandestine activity.

In view of the decisive nature of this atomic weapon, what more truly supranational authority could there possibly be? Yet this conception was accepted by the present Government and by all the other Members of the Security Council at that time, save only the Soviet Union and the satellite Ukraine. The Russian argument, it is interesting to note, turned time and again on their refusal to accept what they chose to consider the surrender of sovereignty. That was the Russian argument. Here arises a crucial point relative to our discussion this afternoon. I ask the House was it really surrender of sovereignty that was involved in these proposals to control atomic energy? Or was it, in practice, a fusion of sovereignty, or if you will, its merger or extension, in a cause which all but the Soviet Union agreed must transcend the national prerogative? I myself said in that Debate in November, 1945, that I was unable to see any final solution which would make the world safe for atomic power save that we all abate our present ideas on sovereignty. I still believe that.

So, although there is no exact precedent for M. Schuman's plan, as he himself states, or for the authority he proposes, we cannot fail to recognise the trend among democratic nations throughout the post-war years to make arrangements among themselves touching very nearly this question of sovereignty. Curiously enough, no nation has been more sensitive upon this point than the Soviet Union. It was very quick to make the defence of sovereignty the formula, the House will remember, for refusing to take part in the Marshall Plan. When the Soviet Union set up the Cominform, its manifesto said that the Communists must take into their hands the defence of the national independence and the sovereignty of their own countries. That phrase was repeated by Mr. Stalin when he received a group of Socialist Members of Parliament in October, 1947, and explained to them that Soviet interpretation of the Cominform's purpose.

Indeed, the Marshall Plan was and remains an act of inspired and most generous American statesmanship. It was also, at that time, an unprecedented step, and it set us on the road towards measures of political as well as economic inter-dependence with Europe. It called for the adaptation of national plans by mutual consultation between Governments responsible for widely differing economic systems. O.E.E.C. is an intergovernmental organisation, but its responsibilities are, I am sure the right hon. Gentleman would agree, more than national. No one would deny that. I mention it in the context of this Debate not because there is any strict parallel between its work and the Schuman proposals, but to emphasise how far we have moved from certain aspects of nationalism which have lost their reality in the urgent struggle for the recovery of Europe.

It soon became clear that economic recovery in the West was going to be open to continuous attack from the East, and, therefore the instrument of Western security was created and was indeed indispensable if our economic efforts were not to be dissipated. So we agreed on the really remarkable advance of the Atlantic Pact. For this His Majesty's Government and the Foreign Secretary are certainly entitled to their share of credit, although it is equally true that my right hon. Friend's Fulton speech inspired it, although it was not uniformly well received at the time.

Under this Pact, there is a pooling in times of peace of military information and resources which would certainly have been considered a surrender of sovereignty even a few years ago. Here again, the needs of the hour called forth, have compelled, an international co-operation on the widest scale. Military and political thought have encouraged national specialisation in certain essential components of equipment; so we have a policy which has led to inter-dependence between the armed forces of Western Europe and North America which has no parallel in the past. I suppose that we had the most absolute merger of sovereignty we had ever known in the organisation we called S.H.A.E.F., under General Eisenhower's so deeply-trusted leadership, because it had powers exceeding the military sphere, as hon. Members will remember. It. would seem illogical to make concessions to win a war but to hesitate to make them to prevent a war.

However that may be, we have gone forward in all these new organisations. We have undertaken direct or implied commitments, without regarding them as incompatible with our sovereignty or incompatible with our position as the heart and centre of the British Empire and Commonwealth. We of the Opposition have given our wholehearted support to the Government in these matters, and Commonwealth statesmen of every party, let it be said, in their turn have supported with admirable foresight our closer association with Europe and the United States. I quote only one, Mr. Menzies—perhaps it is more favourable to this side of the House than to Members opposite—who expressed it very well in a recent speech. He said: A peaceful and prosperous Europe would be a godsend to British people the world over. I, for one, am not, therefore, hostile to the basic idea of European union, but friendly to it and hopeful for it. I say that Commonwealth understanding of our special responsibilities in Europe deserves the greatest tribute we can pay, which is to pledge ourselves to take no steps of Commonwealth significance without broad consultation with them. One sphere where our mutual interest can never be denied is the sphere of security. Twice in our lifetime the Empire has stood loyally by us, and fought with us and in wars which had their origin in Europe. They are the first to recognise how vital is their interest that some progress should be made in European relations.

The post-war trends to which I have drawn attention have all of them had the search for security as their basis, and so has the Schuman Plan. I am quite sure that the problem which the resurgence of Germany must create has not been underestimated by observers in the Commonwealth. For the same reason, I am certain that the significance of the Schuman proposals is well understood in the Commonwealth. The fact is that Germany is ready—and we have helped to make her ready—to enter the international field once again. Not only Europe, but the whole world is watching that reentry. The fact that it is a partitioned Germany that we are watching adds to the crucial character of the decisions, which may now be taken, for Eastern Germany, however unwillingly, is already committed as a Communist satellite State.

It therefore follows that Western Germany, with its immense potential in the Ruhr, stands poised between the threat of Soviet expansion and the hope of a saving solidarity with its Western neighbours. It is certain that the threat, if it were fulfilled in Germany, would shatter our own hope of Western European peace. If we acknowledge that, if we acknowledge that we cannot afford to allow such an event to happen, then neither can we afford, I suggest, to inject weakness into the European structure which we have so patiently built up. But that is exactly what we shall be doing if we allow Franco-German relations to develop apart from us. That political separation, if it once crystallises, may easily extend to separation in matters of defence as well as economics.

I beg the Government to consider this, that if Germany obtains the dominant rôle in that partnership—it might not be a revised militarism so much as an artificial bid for neutrality—it would have disastrous consequences for us and immense advantages for Russia. I say deliberately that in all its dreams of wedge-driving Russia could hope for nothing better than the reduction of Britain to the status of observer in Franco-German relations. That would run entirely counter to our Commonwealth interests and to our responsibilities as a world Power, which we share with the United States, and that no doubt is why the Kremlin wants it so very, very much, as Members know if they have studied the Kremlin's outpourings in these last few days.

These are all reasons which the Government say they recognise, but I have gone over them, I fear in a little detail, because they are also, in my submission, reasons why we ought to have been better prepared for that French initiative, and why we ought to have been ready with proposals of our own, or best of all why we should have taken the initiative ourselves some time since. After all, if the manner of the French proposals was surprising—and it was, I agree—the matter was no more than the projection of a trend clearly marked out in recent years through the inter-play of Franco-German ideas. From the point at which the Ruhr Statute was agreed by the six Powers, its temporary nature ever since has been the subject of speculation. The problem was how to fit that limited control of Germany's iron and steel into an international framework which might include the basic framework of Western Union.

The French did not disguise their uneasiness of the Ruhr becoming a "closed shop" in antagonistic hands if a European solution were not found. Personally, I shared this uneasiness. I remember saying at the time, in December, 1948, that I would like to see our Government working to evolve collaboration between the Ruhr and its complementary industries in France, Belgium and Luxemburg so that Germany could be woven, into a pattern of the free Western democracies. It is the French and not ourselves who have felt compelled to take the initiative, and to do so in political terms which have roused the hopes of the world.

The French communiqué, I observe—I have read it through carefully—does not include that hideous phrase "supranational"; I have not been able to find it in the White Paper. I have searched a little to see whether I could trace the origin of this hybrid monstrosity. Going back a little in time, I have found it about two years ago.

Mrs. Middleton (Plymouth, Sutton)

It was long before that.

Mr. Eden

The hon. Member may have had experience of it, in which case I can only condole with her.

Mrs. Middteton

It goes back 20 years.

Mr. Eden

I have found it in a context I thought sufficiently interesting to trouble the House with it. It is in the terms of a resolution moved by Mr. Benn Levy, who was the Member for Eton and Slough in the last Parliament, at the Labour Conference at Scarborough in 1948, and approved by the Conference. I will read the last sentence, because it is quite interesting and not entirely irrelevant. It urges the Labour Party to co-operate with the European Socialist parties in taking practical steps to achieve the United Socialist States of Europe (including the establishment of supra-national agencies to take over from each nation powers to allocate and distribute coal, steel, timber, locomotives, rolling stock and imports from hard currency countries) in complete military and political independence of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway (Eton and Slough)

I want the right hon. Gentleman to emphasise that the resolution urged the socialisation of these industries.

Mr. Eden

I am grateful to the hon. Member for having made sure of that point which had not escaped me. I can assure him that it had not. That resolution goes far beyond anything in the Schuman proposals, except that all the parties to it are to be Socialists. If that is the policy of Members opposite, we should like to know. Perhaps we shall be told in due course. The hon. Gentleman will be aware how completely this conflicts with the indignant repudiation made by the Prime Minister the other day that any suggestion of ideological influence could have anything to do with His Majesty's foreign policy at all. It will also be immensely interesting to know how the hon. Gentleman will reconcile this doctrine, defensible as it is politically, with our undertakings under O.E.E.C., of which, no doubt, we shall hear something from the Chancellor of the Exchequer in due course. I observe that the "Herald-Tribune" asks that question this morning, and I have no doubt it will be asked again.

I read extracts from those proceedings because they are immensely instructive, and I note that they were wound up by the right hon. Gentleman who is now the Minister of Town and Country Planning. I must be absolutely fair to him, I have read through the whole of his speech, and he did let fall some cautionary observations, including comments on the meaning of several words. He asked the Conference to endorse the resolution, and it did so without any disturbance so far as the paper records go. This was a unanimous resolution passed in 1948. I leave it for the House.

There is no mention in that resolution of how this would upset the Empire so badly, as we are now told these proposals would. On the contrary, the right hon. Gentleman used words, which I would certainly entirely endorse, and I hope he does not mind me saying that. He did not accept the dilemma between moving nearer Europe and away from the Empire. Nor do I. He said: I think we can move closer to Western Europe and at the same time maintain in all its fullness"— and I hope perhaps extend and expand— our relations with the countries of the Commonwealth. That is grand, I agree, but what about all this indignation, including that of the Minister of Health at the weekend, as to the damage that was going to be done? Damage is only going to be done to the Commonwealth, it seems, if the Governments of Europe are not Socialist. That is a very strange doctrine, especially at a time when the Governments of the Commonwealth are not Socialist either.

The French in their document use the words "a common high authority," under which Franco-German production of coal and steel would be pooled. Then we come to the statement that the decisions of this common high authority would be binding on the member Governments. To this all the other excellent, and courageous proposals in this document have been subordinated, because the French requested acceptance of the principle of a high authority as an essential preliminary to the discussion of any ensuing plan. Our Government took a literal view of this condition, and felt it to be an insuperable obstacle; that is to say, they felt that if they accepted those terms, the Government would have run the risk that, having got into the discussions, they might not have been able to agree with the final conclusions. That is perfectly true, but it is my own strong impression that the risks of having to withdraw from the negotiations were and are less serious than those of failing to attend the negotiations at all.

Events are already showing that we were right in that judgment. M. Schuman, very early in the discussions of the six Powers, stated: we shall pool our ideas, confront them and choose between them. Already the conception of a high authority seems to have been considerably modified. Most of us with any experience of international negotiations could have been fairly sure that that was precisely what would happen. But still, I admit there is a question which must be faced, and I propose to face it. Would we be prepared to enter discussions as a result of which a high authority would be set up whose decisions would be binding upon the nations who were parties to the agreement? My answer to that question would be, yes, provided—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ah."]—that we were satisfied with the conditions and the safeguards.

It was rather interesting to note the divergent views on the benches opposite. I notice that right hon. Gentlemen who have experience of negotiations nodded their heads, whilst there was ribald laughter from behind them. I ask hon. Members to ponder this—provided we are satisfied with the conditions and the safeguards. Of course, that is a reasonable basis on which to enter any negotiations, and a perfectly defensible one.

The House ought also to bear in mind that there are any number of questions which still have to be determined. Is there, for instance, to be a right of appeal and if so, to whom? Is there to be any form of voting? If so, will there be taken into account the proportionate production of coal and steel in the countries concerned? In this respect our claims would be immensely strong, for, of course, we hold the predominant position in the production of coal and steel. For that reason and for others, I think some hon. Gentlemen opposite are taking counsel unduly of their fears when they think that if we were to enter an organisation of that kind everybody would be "ganging up" against us. I do not believe that that is how it would work out.

There are lots of other questions; I will not worry the House with them, but one of them is this: Is the authority to control the size of domestic production? Has any country to have the right to stockpile if there is a surplus? Is the authority to regulate international exports between the participants in the pool or is some wider plan contemplated? All these are issues upon the answer to which our ability finally to take part in such a plan would admittedly have to be largely determined.

But surely we should be better placed to make a constructive contribution and to model the agreement in a form which we could accept if we were ourselves taking part in the negotiations. That is why we have stated that we would have accepted on the terms the Netherlands have used, and I will read to the House what those terms are. I do not know what the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) finds so very amusing. I am doing my best to put forward a serious argument.

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

It is merely the proposition that he would give a conditional answer in the affirmative, which is exactly what the Government gave, and those conditions were what were unobtainable.

Mr. Eden

If the hon. Gentleman will consult the Front Bench he will find the position is not as he thinks it is.

The terms of the Netherland answer were these: Although the Netherland Government sincerely hope that the forthcoming negotiations which it deems to be of pre-eminent importance for the future of Europe, will lead to satisfactory results, it has, nevertheless, considered it necessary to inform the French Government that it wishes to reserve its freedom to go back on the acceptance of these general proposals during the negotiations if, contrary to what it hoped, it should prove in the future that the application of these principles raises serious objections in practice. That was the Netherland position and that should be our position. If it is the Government's position I shall be delighted to hear it, but nobody in Europe at the moment thinks so. I know it may be argued that it is all very well for the Netherlands to come into these discussions—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] All right—because they are more in sympathy with the federal conception than we are. That is a fair argument, but also it should be remembered—

Mrs. Middleton

They are smaller producers.

Mr. Eden

I do not think that that is a good argument, because the more the contribution the more the influence a country is going to have upon the discussions that take place. Those who have, most cause to be apprehensive of an international arrangement are those who have the least to put into the pool.

As regards the federal line, the acceptance of European federation was no part of the political declaration signed by the six Powers, and was at no time a condition of the negotiation. I do not think that that can be challenged. I did not think there was anything so revolutionary in the proposal that the French Government have made as appears to be thought by some. At any rate it falls very far short of the words the Prime Minister used—he may perhaps remember them—in a remarkable speech which he made to his party early in the war, before he was a member of the Government, defining the aims of a peace settlement. He said: In the common interest there must be recognition of an international authority superior to the individual States and endowed not only with rights over them but with power to make them effective, operating not only in the political but in the economic sphere. Europe must federate or perish. I do not personally take that view. I think that when these closer relationships develop they are more likely to take the form of a confederation than a federation, and more likely to be Atlantic in area than European; but there was nothing in entry to these negotiations which compelled the Government to make up their mind on this issue.

Unhappily there cannot be much doubt, whether deservedly or not, that these events have deeply injured our authority in Europe. For instance, the House may have seen a letter in the "Manchester Guardian" on Saturday from a most distinguished Dutch journalist known to many of us in this House, Mr. H. J. Huizinga. He has been in this country for many years. This is his opening sentence: As an old and devoted friend of this country I am appalled at the sudden and vertiginous drop in British prestige abroad. With the whole of the terms of that letter I do not agree, but it is extremely worth reading as an exercise in seeing ourselves as others see us in this respect, and it is disturbing evidence.

Mr. John Paton (Norwich, North)

It is also disturbing evidence of complete confusion of thought.

Mr. Eden

That is just the same mood as there is in the wretched khaki document. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely certain that everything that Socialism says or does must be absolutely right, and that no power on earth except the Socialists know anything about European federation. If he could just imagine how that tone and temper grates on our friends in America and elsewhere, he would not use it so often.

Mr. John Cooper (Deptford)

As a very young Member of this House, I only want to say that, apart from our certainty in these matters, we have never drifted this country, so far, into war.

Mr. Eden

I do not quite understand the particular relevance of that remark in connection with the argument which I am using. The hon. Gentleman may have an opportunity later to explain it in his own speech.

It is certain that less uneasiness would be caused both in Europe and elsewhere by the Government's recent action in respect of the Schuman Plan but for two other factors to which I must briefly refer. The first is the record of hon. Gentlemen opposite in regard to the movement for a united Europe ever since my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) launched it. It has always seemed as though they were perpetually hanging back because it is associated, and must always be associated, with his name. I am not going to recapitulate—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]. Of course, it is associated with his name. There is nothing for anybody to be ashamed of in that.

I should be delighted if any international agreement were perpetually associated with the name of any hon. Member opposite. The Foreign Secretary had a considerable share in picking up the Marshall Plan and carrying it forward in the way that he did. We need not carry our party prejudices so far. The sending of delegates to The Hague was frowned upon, and some were strongly discouraged from attending, yet that conference did result in Strasbourg and in the Council of Europe, now accepted by all the Western Governments.

The other factor which has added to the suspicion which some have felt has been the insistence, not by the Foreign Secretary but by others in high places, upon the need for Socialist Governments in Europe if United Europe is to succeed. I have no doubt that many hon. Members, when they read this document issued by the National Executive, recalled the Debates we had in 1948 about this very doctrine. I am not going over that ground again now, but I will only say that it was the insistence upon the need for Socialist Governments if United Europe was to succeed which I felt to be so utterly deplorable. I want the Prime Minister to believe—not because I am opposed to Socialism which I do, I admit, happen to be—that I am absolutely convinced that we can never succeed in uniting a free Western Europe, at any rate in the lifetime of anyone in this House, on the basis of one party political creed. I am certain of that.

The Prime Minister told us at the time that the timing of this document was unfortunate. It certainly was. Nobody will argue about that now, and I do not want to go into that business any more, except to ask the Prime Minister this: Did he really not know that the document was going to be published a fortnight ago? After all, it did not glide coyly into the world. Its arrival was heralded not only at the Press conference but even before that, heralded and trumpeted. Did not the Prime Minister know it was to be published? Did not any of his principal colleagues come along to him and say: "Look, this document is coming out"? Did they not tell him?

I knew that it was coming out. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes, I did. I read it in the "Observer" on the Sunday before. There was no secret. I was not in any confidential council. I say that because I see the Lord President of the Council looking a little uneasy. I read it in the newspaper, and surely somebody else must have read it in the newspaper, that the document was to come out. It was called: "The greatest pronouncement on foreign policy that the Socialist Government have put up since the war." There were great big headlines in the middle of the "Observer." It must have been known to Ministers that the document was to appear. Did they approve its appearance or did they not? It almost seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Town and Country Planning is carrying more than his share of responsibility.

At any rate, as the result of this, there is at least a suspicion at home and abroad that the Government's attitude to the Schuman invitation would not have been so rigid if the Governments with whom they had been dealing today were socialist Governments. There is no response to that from the other side. The Minister of Town and Country Planning was asked that question at his Press conference. He said: "Wait and see." I must therefore ask the Chancellor or the Prime Minister this question: Would they have found the proposal for a high authority so insuperable an obstacle if it had been put to them by a Socialist bloc of States?

Is it not far more likely that if they did not wholly agree with the terms put to them they would have strained every nerve to come in and to influence the situation from inside? That is precisely what we would have done. The difference is that we would have been prepared to take this step whatever the political complexion of the democratic party with which we had to deal. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Oh, yes. We have often done it. We have dealt with Socialist Governments on all sorts of difficult matters in the past. It did not create the embarrassment which hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to think it does. His Majesty's Government do not want to do it when the other Governments are not Socialist. That is the impression which exists. If it can be contradicted, let it be.

Should this Schuman Plan break down, I fear that we should see a return to the narrowest forms of European nationalism with far-reaching repercussions and a general weakening of our security and the defence of Western Europe against Communism. That is what I believe. If anyone has any doubt about it he has only to check it against Kremlin propaganda in the last few weeks. Weighing these considerations in the scale, and the still larger one of the immense gain to civiliation if France and Germany could be brought into working partnership—[Interruption.] Oh, yes—I say that the Government could well have taken the greater risk, if risk it be, in the matter of this high authority.

As to the economic consequences should the Schuman Plan break down, some admirable words were written by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) the other day which I will read: Whatever the fate of the Plan, it is unlikely that the European Iron and Steel Industry will remain in its present disorganised form. That is true enough. He went on: Last December, there were unofficial conversations between iron and steel industrialists of the pre-war cartel, exploring the possibilities of re-creating it. If the British Labour Government does not try to make the Schuman Plan succeed, the Plan will almost certainly fail. But it will be replaced by a Franco-German cartel which will try to obtain new affiliates in Western Europe, and which will be a danger to Britain's interests. The hon. Member is absolutely right in every word which he has there set down. I agree with him. I will tell him that the greatest of these British interests which will be in jeopardy are peace and the employment of our people.

Let me now sum up. If our Government had felt a profound necessity to be present at Paris in its proper rôle of European leadership, I am convinced that it would have found a means to satisfy M. Schuman of its sympathy with the spirit of the proposals. I admit that this could only have been done had there been a real basis of mutual confidence between the two Governments. It may be that we must face the fact that this indispensable confidence between the two Governments does not exist. If it does not, are we so self-righteous as to declare that the blame lies only with the French?

We have had from the Prime Minister in his statement on the Schuman proposals just one glimmer of flexibility, and that was in his closing words when he said that we were approaching: A formative and decisive phase in the organisation of the Atlantic Community. This will require, by a more effective pooling of resoures, the surrender in an unprecedented degree by each country of the ability to do as it pleases."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th June, 1950; Vol 476, c. 37.] Here is something which goes to the heart of the matter, and if the Prime Minister means that, if he realises, as he cannot fail to do, that the majority of the Atlantic Powers are now meeting in Paris for such vital purposes, surely he must seize the opportunity to undo the harm which has been done by our absence.

I believe that there may now be such a chance. The French Government, so I am informed in the Press this morning, have tabled further proposals which have not yet been published. These are, I believe, in the hands not only of the participants of the conference but of our Government, too. There will be a number of points—perhaps a large number—in this document with which we shall not agree, but the most important consideration surely is that this text, as I understand it, is a working draft which is open to suggestions for amendment.

If that is so, I ask the Government, on the basis of that, to reconsider their decision. Here is another chance to share in these conversations and to mould final decisions of historic importance. If the Schuman proposals were not to succeed, nobody denies that this would be a calamity for peace. If they were to succeed without us, there would be real dangers for us, I think, political as well as economic. The Government must feel, as we do, that, whatever the mistakes or differences of the immediate past, here is an opportunity to play our part not only in uniting this nation but in uniting the free countries of Western Europe. Our appeal to the Government is to seize that opportunity. I pray that we shall not appeal in vain, remembering always that if this country is to be worthy of itself, it has not to follow but to lead.

4.25 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery)

I, too, desire with the deepest and most sincere pleading to join in that appeal which has just been made by the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) to His Majesty's Government. The French communiqué on 9th May, with its offer and its high purpose, has been welcomed by all free countries of the world. I know of no country outside the Communist and the Communist-dominated countries which has not welcomed it and, indeed, has not, rightly, paid the highest tribute to France, to its Government and to its leaders.

Today in the Amendment which is on the Order Paper the Government in effect repeat the commendation made by the Prime Minister himself on 11th May to this House when he said that this was a notable contribution towards the solution of a major European problem. The main purpose of the French proposal is to secure peace; in the first place, peace between France and Germany; in the second place, peace among the free peoples of Europe; and, thirdly, the ultimate aim must be to secure peace not only in Europe but throughout the whole world. Surely this is a high and noble purpose which should commend itself to all right thinking men and women, and it demands also from them their active support and assistance.

Let us, therefore, consider what was proposed. It was that the Franco-German production of steel as a whole should be pooled and placed under a common authority to act within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. For over 80 years now it is the possession and the working of coal and iron ore deposits in Alsace Lorraine, the Ruhr and the Saar which has provided the main cause of disagreement between France and Germany, and, what is more, it is the ill-use of those materials which has enabled Germany to throw Europe and, indeed, the world, into the horrors of two mighty world wars.

If the possession of these materials and the industries which depend upon them is given to one, then there arises the bitterest feelings in the other. The Treaty of Paris after the First World War failed to settle this question, and the steps which have hitherto been taken since the end of the Second World War have failed to bring about even the likelihood of a permanent solution. But now France—France which has suffered so much from the invasion of her territory by Germany in the space of a lifetime of many in those three wars since 1870, France with her national pride which in intensity transcends, I believe, that of any other nation—has come forward with this proposal to pool her coal and steel production with that of Germany and with that of any other country which is willing to come in and work within the framework of the organisation. Very rightly, France claims that if this immediate purpose is achieved, war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible.

Surely that is the greatest step towards peace in Europe which has ever been taken. Surely it is worth while paying even a great price for that. France and Germany, ourselves, the countries of Europe, the countries of the Commonwealth, and the United States of America have paid an enormous price in blood and in material because we failed in the past to make war between France and Germany unthinkable and impossible materially. The world is suffering today and will continue to suffer for some considerable time because of our failure in the past to achieve a sound basis for peace between France and Germany.

That, then, is the first and the highest purpose embodied in this proposal. It entails, however, a great deal more. It extends the area of production. It will tend to ensure greater and better and cheaper production. It will make possible the modernisation of production with improved quality, the supply of coal and steel on identical terms, and the development of common export to other countries. It will tend also to the comfort as well as to the improvement of living conditions of workers in those industries. It is proposed that the movement of coal and steel between the member countries will immediately be freed of all customs duties, and there will be equalisation of transport rates.

It is well worth looking at the French communiqué, document 10, page 10. paragraph 7 where they meet the point that might be made by the British Government, namely— The British Government are of course legitimately preoccupied with following a policy of economic expansion, of full employment, and of a rising standard of living for the workers. The proposed scheme, far from obstructing such a policy, is calculated in the view of the French Government to avoid the dangers which may suddenly obstruct its course. For competition based on exploiting labour will be substituted a concerted rise in workers' conditions; for the restrictive practice of cartels, the development of outlets; for dumping and discrimination, the rational distribution of products. The policy of full employment only reaches its true objectives if it provides labour with the most productive occupations, and it cannot finally be carried out under pressure of the development of unemployment in other countries. The task entrusted to the high authority thus excludes the possibility of its work compromising the results achieved by this policy where it is already being carried out, and means that it will favour a general expansion, allowing rationalised production to be reconciled with the maintenance of full employment. That is what is stated. Does anybody quarrel with that?

So it is that while the great aim and purpose is the securing of peace, it carries with it a better economic condition, increased and better production, the availability of steel and coal to all member countries without their being hampered and handicapped by tariff barriers, the extending of the area where the market shall be free, and the goods that are needed shall be available to the people as they are wanted. That in itself, of course, not only tends to raise the standard of living for all those people but it helps to do away with the envies, the jealousies and the frustrations which can bring hatred and which might lead to disputes and ultimately to war.

The wider the area, the better it will be. The removal of national restrictions which hamper trade should be encouraged and the goods produced made available to all. That again underlines this. Undoubtedly this will lead to increased production, to better production, to better quality and, with modernisation of the ore and coal available without the added cost of high tariffs, it will make production cheaper. It will also increase the demand which so often today is throttled down by high prices. So it will lead to more stable employment and to full employment.

There is nothing more likely to lead to unemployment than the restriction of trade; there is nothing more conducive to full employment than the expansion and extension of trade. So this offer made by the French Government and people, which has now been accepted by Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and which they are today discussing in Paris, is designed to achieve these purposes.

Now what of ourselves? Why are we not in Paris? Why do we remain outside? We have welcomed the proposals—we are welcoming them today; we are anxious that the discussions should succeed and have a fruitful end; we are anxious to know what is taking place, and the French have told us that we shall be so informed. We are even engaged in working out for ourselves proposals which we can make, but, in the meantime, we are to remain outside. Why?

We have said in our communiqué that we have been most anxious to be associated with these discussions but that we cannot pledge ourselves in advance. Pledge ourselves to what? Let us consider that. We are glad that the six Governments are determined to pursue a common action. We know that the purposes they have in mind are threefold—first, peace; secondly, European solidarity; thirdly, economic and social progress. We say that all those are estimable and right. These countries have, at the outset, however, said that the way to achieve these purposes is to place the following objectives before themselves: first, the immediate pooling of the production of coal and steel; secondly, the institution of a new, high authority whose decisions in respect of that coal and steel will be binding upon the countries taking part.

For ourselves we have objected, although the French Government have made it quite clear that not only must the proposals be fully discussed, but then, if agreement is reached, the proposals are to be embodied in a treaty to be signed by all the Governments. Even then the treaty will not be binding until its terms have been debated in each Parliament and every country and every Parliament has approved and ratified. So all that France was asking for was that we should have as our immediate objective these two purposes—the consideration of how pooling arrangements could be brought about, and what kind of authority could be created to see that the arrangements were carried out fairly and equitably—and they asked that attention should be focused upon those points.

Surely France was right in asking for this? We have all had experience now of the continual conferences and meetings where discussion is at large and where there is endless talk and little achievement. So many high hopes have been raised during these years and so many hopes have been disappointed. We are getting no nearer, even today, to the solution of peace. We have made agreements for common defence. There are the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact. We have proposed to pool our defences and we have by those means limited our own freedom, quite rightly, and so have other countries. Again, the three countries of Benelux came together and took quite a notable step forward to remove the causes of disagreement and inequalities.

Mr. Thomas Reid (Swindon)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman supports this Motion which says that we should go in and discuss these things with the other Governments. Is he and his party in favour of binding ourselves to these commitments for which the French Government ask?

Mr. Davies

Certainly; that is why I signed it. I am willing, and so is everyone in our party. It may interest the hon. Gentleman to know that every Liberal council and committee that has met since this proposal has been made has passed a resolution in favour of it. It is quite in accordance with the principle underlying the great Liberal doctrine, namely, that we shall not get peace unless we get barriers removed and people working together for one common cause. This is a far greater step towards removing the causes of disagreement than even the broadest defensive alliances, and it should take a far more prominent place in ensuring peace.

What did the Government say?—" Your ideas are excellent, we hope you will succeed in making them practical. It may be, after you have succeeded, we will have something to say, but at the moment we are not prepared to come in and sit with you and help to work out the ideas which might be fair to everybody, including ourselves, for we are not prepared at this moment to say that it is, or it might be, a good thing to join with others in pooling our coal and steel production."

And although we think it is a good thing for the others to have in mind the creation of an international body that will see to it that these proposals, when accepted, are carried out, we are not prepared at this moment to contemplate them for ourselves. That would be surrendering part of our sovereignty and we are not prepared even to contemplate that, even in the interests of peace, of European solidarity, of economic and social progress, or even in the interests of full employment.

There would have been nothing to prevent us sitting round that table, putting before the others our difficulties and asking them to consider our position, for example, as the centre of a great Commonwealth and Empire, and to consider our desire to work even more closely than we do today with the United States of America. Surely, we have something in mind; otherwise we would not at this very moment be preparing our own proposals. We must be ready with concrete proposals to try to help in securing these great aims, and surely the right time and the right place at which to put forward those proposals would be now, at the outset, in Paris, sitting round the table with the others at the beginning of the discussions, and not at the end.

Indeed, our very own proposals might be of vast assistance in bringing about an agreement, and it may be that owing to our very absence the conference of Paris will fail. Would that be a matter at which any hon. Member would laugh? Is anyone here desirous to see it fail? If it does, what a tragedy it would be. Each of us once again would be following our own independent paths, fending for ourselves, watching our neighbours and not assisting them, putting up tariff barriers and all the handicaps that hinder production and trade, and yet we all of us know that we have one mighty common interest: the safeguarding of our own lives and our own civilisation, and the improvement of the condition of life in all the free countries.

But, "No," said the Government. "We cannot at this stage even contemplate saying that we think it would be a good thing to join with others in pooling our resources in coal and steel." Still less, they say, can we contemplate giving authority over coal and steel to some outside body. We cannot contemplate either of those proposals, although later, perhaps, we could assist and ultimately agree, if so minded, upon the terms and conditions of the pooling and even upon the nature and the limitations of the supreme body.

I should like to know what has become of the fifth point, to which the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) referred, which was made by the Prime Minister in that speech of his at Caxton Hall on 8th November, 1939. It is well worth our while considering again the terms of that fifth point: Fifthly there must be acceptance of the principle that international anarchy is incompatible with peace"— I find myself in complete agreement with that— and that in the common interest there must be recognition of an international authority superior to the individual states"— That is still the Liberal doctrine. Is it still the doctrine of the party on the other side of the House?— and endowed not only with rights over them, but with power to make them effective"— Is there any hon. Member opposite who would challenge that today?— operating not only in the political but in the economic sphere. Europe must federate or perish. Then the right hon. Gentleman added: Bold economic planning on a world scale would be an imperative necessity to meet the post-war situation and to avoid recurrent economic crises. International institutions for this purpose must be created. What is this but an international institution which is now put before the Government, and yet, in spite of that clear declaration made in 1939 by the Prime Minister, it is today rejected? Nor will they play a part in creating that international institution. Have the Prime Minister and the Government abandoned that fifth principle, or is there some new doctrine now which seems to visualise a new sort of Cominform—the Western Cominform—and that agreement can be made only with countries that hold the same doctrine and want to socialise everything so as to have a Socialist State? I hope that this is not the view of the Prime Minister, and I sincerely hope that he will remain faithful to that fifth point which he laid down so clearly in 1939

Federation is a long way off. It would take a long time to get a federated Europe, but that is no reason why we should not continually move along the road which makes co-operation between these States not only easier, but more effective. That is no reason why we should not extend the area of free trade and mutual help. We should make every effort to break down, remove or even to lessen the barriers which divide us, and give freer play to trade and movement, both of goods and of people. Surely that is the way which really leads to greater prosperity and to a greater standard of life for all and will bring us towards the road which leads towards universal peace. It is the way which leads us also towards a stronger defensive position against any aggressor that would take away from us our freedom and impose an alien way of life. To me, this is a way of mutual agreement. It is a democratic way, by consent and not by force.

It may be said that any such agreement as is contemplated in Paris might imperil our position with regard to the Commonwealth. I do not think for a moment that that is so, nor do I think that it makes it difficult for us to maintain to the full our obligations and commitments towards the Commonwealth. Nor do I think that the Government see any difficulty in that respect. Otherwise, instead of using the language which they have done in the communiqués back to Paris, they would have made that the major point and said at once that it be impossible owing to our close relations with the Commonwealth and Empire to join in any such pact.

Furthermore, such an agreement, if it could be made satisfactory to all, does not interfere in any way with our good relations with the United States. The American Government and people have all along hoped that such an agreement could be made. Moreover, it was implicit in the Marshall Aid offer. We all know the keen disappointment in America because we have found it impossible at this moment to join with the others in Paris, and we all know the dismay that has been caused there by the issue of this document, "European Unity."

It may be said that there is a danger that there will be an international cartel. I think that there is a far greater danger of cartels if the meeting at Paris fails to come to an agreement. If we object to cartels, as I most strongly do, if there is any danger that the agreement will tend to allocate production, still more to allocate it in some way unfairly and likely to do harm to a particular country, surely the right place in which to emphasise the objections to cartels and allocations is at the conference table at Paris, where the whole of the facts and figures, the ramifications and repercussions, can be thoroughly explored, discussed and finally agreed.

Further, I should like to have seen some step taken, and taken at once, for I am hoping that this will be only the first step and that it will be followed, and followed soon, by other steps which will bring us all closer together and make our economic position more stable, make it easier for all of us to work and trade together and give us a stable currency, and make it possible for us to trust and help one another in every way.

So it is that now, even today, I implore and beg of the Government to reconsider their attitude. They have said that they are anxious that this should succeed. They are working even upon the proposals which they are prepared at some time to put before the others at Paris. Why do they stand outside? All we have done in this Motion is to request them to reconsider the matter, and go to Paris and take part with the others in working out these proposals for the benefit of all. If they do this it will have a lasting effect, I am quite sure, throughout Europe and all free countries. It will be welcomed everywhere in the Commonwealth, and I am perfectly sure it will be welcomed by the people of this country.

There is an opportunity arising today; I only hope and pray the Government will take advantage of that opportunity now and withdraw from their present position, go to Paris and assist those others in bringing about a decision which will be fair to all of us.

4.51 p.m.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Stafford Cripps)

I beg to move, to leave out from "House," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof: welcomes the initiative of the French Foreign Minister of 9th May and, while recognising that it was not possible for His Majesty's Government to take part in the international consideration of his proposals on terms which committed them in advance of such consideration to pool the production of coal and steel and to institute a new high authority whose decisions would bind the Governments concerned, approves the declared readiness of His Majesty's Government to take a constructive part in the conversations with the hope that they may be able to join in, or associate themselves with, this common effort. I have been very puzzled, as I think a great many people have been puzzled, at the form of the Motion put down by the Opposition and even after the two speeches introducing it that we have heard from the coalition of the Opposition we are not very clear whether it is intended to be a vote of censure, or indeed, if so, what it is that is being censured. However, we shall feel obliged to treat it as such.

Some Members of the Opposition, for in this matter quite clearly there is no unanimity of views between them, have suggested that His Majesty's Government were not helping forward European cooperation to the extent that they would themselves be prepared to do, and with that general suggestion I will deal presently. But there is another and more limited criticism which is apparently represented by the Opposition Motion, to the effect that in the negotiations as to the Schuman Plan we should have adopted a more forthcoming attitude, and, instead of taking the line that we did, we should have followed that of the Netherlands Government. From what the two right hon. Gentlemen have said on that subject matter, they have either completely misunderstood the situation, or else they have completely misrepresented it to the House, and I hope I shall be able to make clear what the situation was.

When discussing the Schuman Plan, the House will, I am sure, bear in mind the immense importance of the steel and coal industries to our own economy. All our great manufacturing industries and particularly the engineering industry which is now so vital an element in our export trade, are dependent upon coal and steel, so that any weakening of our coal and steel industries would be bound to have the most profound effects upon the whole of our external and internal trade. Our special trading relationships with the Commonwealth and Empire must likewise be greatly affected by the conduct of these two basic industries. Not only so, but the location and distribution of these industries in Western Europe are matters of the highest strategic importance.

We cannot, therefore, enter light-heartedly upon any scheme or plan which may affect profoundly these two basic sections of our industrial and economic life. Any action which may interfere seriously with them must be preceded by the most thoroughgoing examination of the proposals made and of the consequences that would flow from them. It is very relevant to the consideration of this matter that the output of British coal accounts for about one half of the total coal production of Western Europe, and that in the steel industry our output is the largest of any single country and about one-third of the total. Thus we have a greater economic interest in these proposals than any other country and we must, therefore, be very much concerned with them.

But there is a strong political reason for our interesting ourselves in them. As the right hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate stated, twice within our lifetime we have been drawn into a world war through our close and vital connection with the Continent of Europe, so that anything that can help towards the maintenance of peace in Europe is a matter of the most urgent and deep concern to all of us in this country. No one who has followed the sustained efforts of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to organise and strengthen the power of Western European democracy to resist aggression and to ensure peace can possibly doubt the sympathetic interest of His Majesty's Government in the Schuman Plan. It was indeed as a further step in the strengthening of European peace that we first welcomed the initiative of the French Foreign Minister.

His plan, as introduced in Document 2 of the White Paper, stressed particularly the "Franco-German aspect of the scheme," and, in the Prime Minister's first and immediate welcome to the proposals on 11th May, my right hon. Friend stated: It is the declared policy of the Western Powers to promote the entry of Germany as a free member into the comity of European nations. The French proposals are designed to facilitate that process and must consequently be regarded as a notable contribution towards the solution of a major European problem."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1950; Vol. 475, c. 589.] The subsequent documents set out in the White Paper deal with the participation of this country in the immediate negotiations and it is the Government's handling of this matter which is, I understand, the subject of condemnation by the Opposition.

The main point of the French Government's proposition is to be found conveniently set out in Document 12 of the White Paper. The communiqué annexed to that document was stated in the document to: express the unity of view which is indispensable for the successful prosecution of the negotiations. In other words, if we could not share that "unity of view" it was no good our entering the negotiations. The unity of view that was demanded by the communiqué was in these words: the immediate objective of the pooling of coal and steel production and the institution of a new high authority whose decisions will bind the participating Governments. The negotiations proposed were to be for the purpose of working out the terms of a treaty to accomplish those common objectives, which would be assumed to be accepted by the parties and would not of themselves be subject to negotiation at all.

Our reply is to be found in Document 13. We say: After careful consideration we have come to the conclusion that there is still a difference of approach between the two Governments as to the basis on which the negotiations should be opened. If His Majesty's Government accepted the revised wording they would feel committed in principle to pool their coal and steel resources and to set up a new high authority, whose decisions would bind the Governments concerned, possibilities which they do not exclude but could not accept without full knowledge of their political and economic implications. From what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) stated, I imagine that the Opposition agree with the attitude thus expressed—they do not have any qualifying idea—that is, that we could not bind ourselves to these two principles in this vital matter without first discussing and ascertaining their implications and their effect upon our other international and inter-commonwealth relations and upon our own economy and commerce. If the Opposition do not agree, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will explain in the course of this Debate what other attitude they would have adopted at that point of time.

The French reply in Document 14 accepted the situation that there existed a complete difference of view. The French Government stated that they for their part remain convinced that the inevitably complex negotiations necessitated by the proposal contained in their declaration of 9th May"— let the House mark these words well— cannot hope to succeed unless the countries taking part have already from the start indicated their unity of view upon the objectives of these negotiations. Nothing could have been more frank and friendly than that reply, making clear beyond all doubt that the French Government desired to enter upon the negotiations only with those who were already agreed upon the objectives. Would the Opposition have been prepared to accept that point of view of the French Government, or would they have wished to try and force themselves into the negotiations upon a basis which the French had stated was unacceptable to them? [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] I do not want them to answer now. They can answer tomorrow.

The House will remember that we suggested at this point a meeting of Ministers, seeking a reconciliation of these two different points of view, but this was not considered appropriate by the French Government, who made these observations as to it: Such a meeting would have the effect of delaying the opening of the negotiations"— and the House will now mark these words— without offering any real possibility of reconciling divergent policies. That made it even clearer that there was an irreconcilable divergence between the points of view of the two Governments, each of whom fully appreciated the other's outlook. It was as a result of this understanding of one another's differing approaches to the negotiations that the final communiqués were drafted, and in Document 16 we stated: His Majesty's Government do not feel able to accept in advance, nor do they wish to reject in advance, the principles underlying the French proposal. … An unhappy situation would arise if, having bound themselves to certain principles without knowing how they would work out in practice, they were to find themselves, as a result of the discussion, compelled to withdraw from their undertakings. That surely is a frank and honest statement of our position with which the whole House must agree and it was fully accepted by the French Government in their admirably friendly communiqué set out in Document 17.

What hon. Members must remember in considering this matter is that very understandably the French Government did not want to negotiate the principles which they and the German Government had already accepted, and that it would not only have been embarrassing but it might have been destructive of that vital initial Franco-German agreement if we had entered into the negotiations and insisted—as we should have had to do—upon discussing not how to put into operation the principles but whether the principle, for instance, of the new high authority with supra-national powers was or was not acceptable.

I should like here to comment that this very friendly conclusion as to the differences of view was possible because at no time in our history has the understanding between this country and France been greater than it is today.

Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

Utter rubbish!

Sir S. Cripps

I think I am in as good a position to judge as the right hon. Gentleman. I have spent more time in association with French Ministers than he has over the last few years, and I think that the visit of the French President earlier in this year must have made that situation clear to everybody in this country.

It is suggested by the Opposition that we should have adopted the same attitude as the Netherlands Government. This, of course, raises the further question as to whether, if we had done so, we could have persuaded the French to admit us to the negotiations and to allow us to discuss the very questions of principle which we could not accept without discussion and which they thought it vital not to discuss.

Let us, therefore, first see exactly what the reservation of the Netherlands Government amounted to. I quote from their original acceptance of the French invitation, including a sentence which the right hon. Gentleman omitted: However in view of the fact that this text"— that is, the communiqué— involves the acceptance of certain principles underlying the French Government's memorandum"— and note that it involves the acceptance of those principles— the Netherlands Government feels obliged to reserve its right to go back on the acceptance of these principles in the course of the negotiations in the event of their proving impossible to translate into practice. That is a reservation, of course, upon the feasibility of translating the accepted principles into practice. It does not entitle the Netherlands Government to do what we insisted we must be able to do, and that is to discuss whether in principle a new high supra-national authority could be made acceptable to our Parliament and people.

It is, of course, by no means certain that the French would have been content with such a reservation from us. It is one thing to contemplate the possibility of the withdrawal of a Government responsible for only one-fortieth of the coal production and 1/150th of steel production and quite another to risk the withdrawal on this basis of a country with one-half of the coal and one-third of the steel production. The two cases are not comparable and we take the view that it would have been most undesirable—

Mr. Churchill

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, is not it a fact that the French have said that the Motion we have placed on the Order Paper contains terms which would be acceptable to them?

Sir S. Cripps

No. We have had no such communication of any sort or kind from the French Government; and we have the closest liaison, organised with them, by which we are being kept informed every day of what their ideas and thoughts are upon the Schuman Plan.

I was just remarking that the two cases, of the Netherlands Government and ourselves, are not comparable, and we take the view that it would have been most undesirable to try to evade the declaration of unity of objective which the French desired by some sort of acceptance with a reservation, when, whatever we might have said, we meant that we could not accept the principle of the supra-national authority without very full discussion as to its implications, which are only now becoming apparent as further details of the proposals are put forward. I am bound to say that such indications of the draft Treaty as have so far appeared do not in any way dispel our doubts.

I can easily understand the Netherlands Government being prepared to take a risk in view of the small part of their economy that will be affected and accepting the principle without knowledge as to how it was to be applied or whether it could be applied, but I could not understand any British Government taking that risk with a major part, indeed, it may almost be said with the whole, of its economy at stake. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to make it quite clear to the country, if this is his view, that the Opposition would have taken such a risk, and that the only other implication is not correct—that they would have wished to camouflage their refusal with words that might be taken by others to imply some sort of acceptance when, in fact, there was none.

I am certain that the sensible and candid agreement arrived at between the French Government and ourselves, that we should not participate for the time being at least, is a far better solution and less liable to damage our future relations, than if we had put ourselves into a position in which we might well have been accused, at a later date, of either going back on our promise or of wrecking the negotiations by our refusal to agree to the principle upon which they had been launched.

I am not sure how far hon. and right hon. Members are aware of the complexity of the matters that must come under review before a decision can be arrived at in this vitally important field. From come of the observations of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr. C. Davies), it seemed to me quite obvious that his party could not have been so aware. I will refer them to one or two aspects of the problem which arise directly or indirectly out of these proposals, as examples of the sort of matters that any responsible British Government must examine and decide upon before agreeing to the principles underlying the Schuman Plan.

First, there is the question of access to raw materials—many of which we now import from other European countries. What effect will supra-national control have upon that? Then there is the question of access to markets as affected by tariffs, quantitative restrictions, subsidies and so forth, and the effect upon our export trade to the Commonwealth and Empire, where we enjoy preferences in exchange for those we give to them. The whole price structure of the two industries is, of course, vital to the standard of living of the workers and to the other industries which depend upon them for their fuel and raw material.

Another vitally important matter, especially to this country in view of the condition of our coal and steel industries, is that of capital expenditure and its bearing upon the efficiency of the industry. We are today, for instance, shutting down uneconomic pits and opening others. Is this question to be left to the direction or recommendation of this supra-national high authority, who could cause a whole coalfield or steel centre to go out of production without any social or political responsibility for their action? There is here a dangerous echo of our own experience with shipbuilding between the two wars.

These are only a few of the sort of points that must be clarified and decided before we can come to any conclusion. I hope I have said enough on this point to show that no responsible British Government could enter into such a matter blindfold and without the fullest consideration.

Mr. Boothby (Aberdeenshire, East)

May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman one question? Are not all the points which he has now enumerated eminently suitable for discussion during the negotiations?

Sir S. Cripps

The main point with which I am dealing is whether you can put the whole of these important responsibilities on to a supra-national body. It is not open for discussion in the negotiations. That has been expressly stated by the French.

Mr. C. Davies

Surely the powers of this body are to be discussed round a table, and such limitations may be put upon them as are agreed?

Sir S. Cripps

The question whether this is the right way in which to bring about a pooling of the European coal and steel industry is not open for discussion. The question as to the precise powers to be exercised is quite another point, but this is, in our consideration, a matter of vital importance.

The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington introduced the case of atomic energy. That is an inter-governmental body, not a supra-national body at all. The O.E.E.C. is another intergovernmental body, and none of these bodies has been a body of six or nine people set up by Governments who thereafter had not a word to say in regard to the conduct of those bodies. They are international bodies on which the Governments concerned can instruct their representatives, and that is a completely different thing from what is proposed here. I venture to think that that is something which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have not yet appreciated.

Mr. Churchill

Oh, what nonsense!

Sir S. Cripps

I am glad to think right hon. Gentlemen opposite do appreciate it, but I am surprised at the attitude they have taken.

Mr. Churchill

We appreciate it at its proper value.

Sir S. Cripps

It must be remembered that these two sections of our industry are so extensive that whatever happens or is done with regard to them must have an effect upon the whole of our industrial life. If, for instance, our share of the extra-European markets for coal and steel was to be seriously reduced through the action of the supra-national authority, how should we continue to get the essential imports that we need? And yet this question of our imports would be of no interest to the supra-national authority. It could not be. They would have no knowledge of it, and would have no rights in regard to it.

Mr. Churchill

Have the French ever used this expression "supra-national authority"?

Sir S. Cripps

No; I am using it because it was used by the right hon. Gentleman opposite.

Mr. Churchill

No, the right hon. and learned Gentleman uses it because he is the inventor of it. He has used it before, and in fact invented it.

Sir S. Cripps

The right hon. Gentleman opposite is quite wrong. I am not the inventor of it. The right hon. Gentleman used it no doubt because he thought it a convenient phrase, and it has been used by a few others.

Mr. Churchill

An odious phrase.

Sir S. Cripps

It may be odious, but it is also convenient. Quite a lot of things are odious but convenient—even Oppositions.

What I should like to know is whether the Opposition are telling the country that they are satisfied that we could safely and honestly have accepted the principles underlying the French Government's memorandum, as did the Netherlands Government. They accepted the principles. Is it now said that we ought to have accepted the principles—because that is not what the right hon. Gentleman said in his opening speech? Whatever reservations we subsequently added --that is another point—we must be honest about whether we accept the principles or do not accept them.

To have accepted them would have bound us, provided a practical way could be found of doing it, to remove from the control of the Government of this country and of Parliament not only all matters concerning the production of coal and steel in this country but in fact a great range of other matters that would inevitably be affected by decisions in these large sections of our industry. I therefore ask the House to say that we adopted the only honest and sensible course that was open to us, and so to reject the Motion of the Opposition, and to substitute our Amendment for it.

I must now say a few words about the suggestion which, as I have said, lies behind a good deal of the criticism on this subject matter, that is, that the Government are less concerned with European co-operation than is the Opposition. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am glad to get confirmation that I am right in that assumption. In this connection I think no argument can be more convincing than a review of the facts of the situation over the last five years. The contribution of the British Government has been a remarkable one, as I shall show, and it has very largely been due to the energy and imagination of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary that so much has been accomplished. I only wish, as the right hon. Gentleman said in his speech, that my right hon. Friend could have been here himself to speak of his own work.

Let me here mention a matter which has led to a good deal of comment during the last few weeks—that is the Labour Party pamphlet. The Labour Party, upon whose support, curiously enough, this Government is based—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—curiously enough, in the view of the Opposition. They seem to be surprised. The Labour Party has certain very definite economic beliefs, and the party has expressed those views in a pamphlet which opens with these words: Ever since 1945 the Labour Party has been guided by a firm conviction that the peoples of Western Europe must, work closely together and that Britain must play a leading part in their co-operation". That, I venture to say, has been the keynote of the work of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, as I shall show.

The party have expressed the view that no full and final integration of European economy can take place except upon the basis of common economic policies, and that such policies should be those of a planned social democracy. This they have stated in their pamphlet upon European Unity, and it is no more surprising to find such a statement than it would be to find the Conservative Party stating that such an integration should be on the basis of the sort of unplanned economy in which they believe.

But that has no relation whatever to present Government policy which must, as always, deal with the factual situation. And the fact is that there is not an identity of view in economic matters between the principal Governments of Europe. The Government therefore approach their problems upon the basis of this known fact and attempt to get agreement upon practical action, leaving aside unnecessary theoretical discussion. That is the practical job of Government whatever party is in power. Thus the history of the advance in European co-operation since the war, in which this Government has taken a leading part, is largely the history of a series of practical steps which have gradually extended the mutual trust and confidence in political and economic co-operation so that it may one day, we hope, grow into something even closer.

It was immediately at the end of the war that we began our help to the recovery of Europe, despite our own very great difficulties at that time. We gave financial help by way of gifts to Western European countries amounting to some £180 million in the form of relief and medical supplies, surplus stores, and so on, and granted loans to the value of £450 million. Since then we have in addition made available a net amount of £80 million under the European Payments Schemes. These figures exclude the very substantial gifts to other European countries made through our contribution to U.N.R.R.A. A great deal of this assistance was, of course, before the Marshall Plan and was during those early years when we were still hoping and trying to continue over the wartime partnership with the Soviet Government into the period of post-war reconstruction.

Mr. Churchill

Not before the £1,000 million loan.

Sir S. Cripps

I did not say that it was before the £1,000 million loan.

Mr. Churchill

I noticed that.

Sir S. Cripps

There is nothing peculiar to notice about it. In this matter our special position in relation to the sterling area and the free use of sterling, which we were able to maintain within that area, gave us special opportunities, and so responsibilities, for aiding our European friends and Allies. In those first post-war years the wide availability of s