DEFENCE

§ The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell)

In 1945, at the end of the war in Europe, a Labour Government was returned. Its task was three-fold: to promote, as rapidly as circumstances permitted, the switch-over from war to peace; to achieve economic recovery; and to implement the social service proposals which had for many years found a prominent place in the Labour Party's programme.

At that time, any question of a rearmament programme and the building up of our military forces in preparation for defence against aggression would have been regarded as completely irrelevant. During the war we were in alliance with countries whose military organisation was strained in the effort to gain supremacy over the enemy. In the process many of them, including ourselves, had impaired their economic strength. It was, therefore, vital to promote recovery. Moreover, the Soviet Union, whose valiant efforts during the struggle against the Nazis had won our approval and admiration, had accepted the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council and all the apparatus of international peace.

It was essential that we should effect a speedy demobilisation of our war-time Forces to enable our manpower to resume its ordinary occupations. Throughout the world, the desire for peace was manifest, though, as we know, conditions in some areas—especially in Asia—were very unsettled. In those circumstances nobody in this country or, for that matter, any political party, would have advanced a proposition for the expenditure of vast sums on new military equipment.

We were, therefore, compelled for a long time to make the best use of our war-time equipment, much of which was regarded as obsolete, while new designs embodying the lessons of the war were being developed. This was a transition stage— 468 and, as hon. Members will agree, perhaps the most difficult of all.

Even in those years immediately after the end of the war, the Government were concerned about the kind of Forces which our world responsibilities would require us to maintain. We decided to adopt National Service in order to build up an adequate body of trained reserves. This was an important step for which the Government have not always received proper credit. It was undoubtedly unpopular among many in the Labour Party and outside it. It might not have been undertaken by a Conservative Government—

§ Hon Members

Oh!

§ Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

What would the right hon. Gentleman have done in that event?

§ Mr. Shinwell

Alongside this we proceeded to make a substantial effort in the fields of research and development so as to ensure that we kept in the forefront of technical progress in weapons. There is no doubt that in those early years the Government did everything that could have been expected.

However, it was not long before unmistakable trends proved that our expectations were to be falsified. Instead of a period of peace we were confronted with what is described as the "cold war" and the development of a situation growing increasingly more tense as each individual event occurred—Greece, Persia, Malaya, Berlin, and now the aggression in Korea. As one situation eased, another emerged to occupy our attention.

We were, for example, able to withdraw our Forces from Greece but were faced with the difficult situation in Malaya. We have had apprehensions about Hong Kong following our withdrawal from Palestine. We had to maintain an Army of Occupation in Germany as well as our Forces in Austria and Trieste, quite apart from the special commitment of the Berlin air lift. We accepted trustee responsibilities in other areas pending a decision by the United Nations on their future.

Without these burdens to carry, we could have replanned our forces at leisure and built up formations and also made better use both of our Regular Forces and National Service men. But the Regulars have had to be used both to strengthen overseas garrisons and in 469 the training of National Service men—both extremely heavy commitments. At the same time, the introduction of the jet aircraft into the Royal Air Force involved what amounted to a complete revolution in operational training and maintenance, while the increasing mechanisation of the Forces also imposed a very serious burden on our manpower resources. And, as hon. Members know, there is a constant tendency for the tail to grow at the expense of formations. These things are common knowledge—they must not be forgotten in assessing the present state of our defences.

Whatever may have happened in the past, it is the situation we find today that must be faced. With the example of Korea before us, we have to consider the Far East, the Middle East, and, in particular, the defence of Europe and our own country. We have to put ourselves in a position where we can, with reasonable hope of success, resist aggression from the only quarter from which it might possibly come.

We have a great deal of information about the military expenditure of other countries, including the vast expenditure by Russia and the preparations that country is making behind their smokescreen of peace propaganda. I am not going to reveal to the world how much we know, except to say that we know a great deal. It is, however, certain that the defence expenditure of Russia alone is not less than 13 per cent. of her national income. She maintains an army of some 175 active divisions of which one-third are mechanised and tank divisions comprising about 25,000 tanks. Of these an appreciable number are at immediate readiness in the Soviet Zone of Germany. She has 2,800,000 men under arms and could double this number on mobilisation. This force is backed by about 19,000 military aircraft including jet aircraft of the latest design, both bombers and fighters. She has considerable naval forces, which include strong submarine fleets, many of them of modern design.

I cannot enter into greater detail nor indicate our knowledge about the serviceability of their equipment or estimate the capabilities of all these forces, but they are undoubtedly massive in land, sea and air. The existence of these vast forces in the hands of a totalitarian State, 470 where the pressure of public opinion does not operate and whose intentions are uncertain, represents a potential danger of which other nations must take full account.

There is, of course, no question of the United Kingdom facing that threat alone. The nations of the West, supported by the United States, have, during the last two years, developed a military association which has no parallel in time of peace in the history of the world. First came the Western Union Defence Organisation and then the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of which Western Union now, for practical purposes, forms a part.

This association is directed against no other Power. It has no offensive purpose. The North Atlantic Treaty is an association of peaceful nations banded together to resist aggression, from whatever quarter it may come, against their national territories or against their forces of occupation in Europe. It lies within the hands of one Power to take the steps which would reduce the tension and remove the anxieties and fears which have called this association into being.

We recognise the natural anxiety of the German people about the defence of their country. The defence of Western Germany is at present in the hands of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, whose forces are now stationed there. Security is thus provided for the Federal Republic and for Berlin, and it is already based to an appreciable extent on a German contribution in the form of the payment of occupation costs towards the maintenance of the Allied contingents.

There have been suggestions that a different and more active form of German contribution is required and that we should envisage a German contingent in the. Western Defence Forces. I have two comments to make on this. First, His Majesty's Government have repeatedly, and in conjunction with their Allies, declared their opposition to the rearmament of Germany. Any change in this policy must necessarily be the result of a joint Allied decision. Second, priority today in the supply of arms must be given to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

In any trial of strength between Russia and her satellites and the forces of the 471 democracies, there can be no doubt which would in the end prevail. The resources in manpower and material of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, and including the free countries of the British Commonwealth who would stand with us again in war, far exceed any opposing combination. They have vast resources in industrial skill and development capacity which would ensure that they could out-build and out-design their opponents. They have at their disposal the atomic weapon.

But I must make it plain to everybody that we do not seek, and neither do our Allies, seek, another world war in which the whole of mankind must certainly be the loser.

§ Mr. S. O. Davies (Merthyr Tydvil)

Why make war speeches?

§ Mr. Shinwell

It is our purpose to show, here and now, that aggression does not, and cannot, pay. It must also be our purpose to show that there will be no easy success to be gained by treacherous attack before the democratic powers have time to mobilise and realise their strength.

The House is rightly concerned today with our own Forces and our plans for the improvement of their battle-worthiness in the light of the present situation. But I must stress that it would be as contributors to an Allied Force, following an Allied plan, that our Forces would take the field in any future struggle. The principle of balanced international forces which has been accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation follows logically from this. We do not yet know what adjustments we may be called upon to make in accordance with this principle. A great deal of hard work and planning is proceeding and more will be required. But already it implies the acceptance by the participating nations of some modification of their sovereign rights to decide for themselves the kind of forces they should maintain. In the meantime, we have to judge for ourselves what is the best contribution we can make.

Since I took up office as Minister of Defence, I have made the strengthening of Western Union defence one of my main pre-occupations. Western Union is in many respects the key to our defence situation today. For it is in the West that the main onslaught may come, whatever 472 diversions may appear in other parts of the world. Because of this I have devoted close attention to the progress being made with agreed plans for building up the Forces of Western Union and providing them with the backing they would require in war.

The building up of the divisions required by the Western Union powers will be a most formidable problem. The urgency of the need is plain to us all; the difficulties to be overcome are equally plain. Manpower is available, but there are financial and political obstacles of the most severe kind. I have been in frequent contact with my colleagues. Only last week I was again in conference with the other Defence Ministers of Western Union. We reviewed, once more, with great care, the availability of Forces for the defence of Western Europe and the contribution which each of the Five Nations would be able to make. And again this week I have had the opportunity of consulting, on a very high level, with some of those who are associated with us in dealing with the problems of Western Union and North Atlantic defence.

I will not conceal from the House that the Forces at present available, or in sight, fall a long way short of requirements estimated even on the most conservative basis. There is nothing to be gained by failing to recognise this fact. What gives it special meaning is the deterioration in the international position in recent months. I am, however, satisfied that there is a general readiness to face up to the situation in a spirit of realism and determination. There has been a significant improvement in morale and that is an encouraging sign.

By itself morale is not enough, but it is the necessary foundation for action. The five countries are now aware of what is required; it rests with them to take the steps which are available, which their resources permit, and their spirit dictates to step up their contributions. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, I was able to assure my colleagues that we in the United Kingdom are taking and will continue to take appropriate measures.

With the consent of the House, we were able to provide in the Defence Estimates for the current year an expenditure of £780 million. This represents 23.6 per cent. of all the expenditure on Government 473 account, about 7.6 per cent. of our national income, and £15 per head of population. These figures bear comparison with those of any of our Allies and friends. But it is not my purpose to make comparisons. The scale of our defence effort is something we must judge for ourselves in relation to our responsibilities and our needs. There is no rule of thumb by which it can be settled. It depends on our scale of values.

The Defence budget today is admittedly a heavy burden on our resources, but relatively it is no larger than the £375 million which we were spending in 1938. In money, the Defence budget is 108 per cent. greater than in 1938, but the cost of many items of equipment has doubled and even trebled; the cost of the modern jet fighter is 150 per cent. above the cost of a 1938 Hurricane; the cost of a destroyer has risen by 100 per cent; and there are many items, especially signalling and radar equipment, which were in their infancy before the war.

Even as late as the end of the war, it seemed reasonable to hope that we might meet our Defence needs with a budget of some £500 million, but we have had to recognise the fact that we cannot continue to play a leading part in world affairs or protect the vital interests on which the standards of life of our people depend without the necessary forces as a contribution to Allied Defence. And we have to foot the bill.

As to the size of the bill, I do not recollect that demands have been made until quite recently that it should be increased. On the other hand, hon. Members opposite and on the Government benches have urged a vigorous assault on all forms of wasteful expenditure. We have done, and will continue to do, everything we can in this direction. It would be very foolish of me to deny that in a vast expenditure of £780 million there are not some items that could be pruned away. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition devoted much time and energy throughout the war to this very problem of combing the tail of the Forces—he was right to do so, and we are fully aware of its importance.

I repeat the pledge I gave the House a few months ago, that if any evidence of waste is presented to me, I will direct the most careful examination into any allegations. But I must say to the House, 474 very frankly, that there are no spectacular savings to be found by this process. For the money we get, there are dozens of important projects competing and we are hard put to it to decide what is the right way to spend it so as to get the best results.

The present efficiency and battle-worthiness of our Defence Forces may be considered under two main heads: men and equipment. In allocating the available resources we must strike a balance between the two. It is not only a question of deciding on the most effective balance between men and equipment in relation to a future conflict some years hence; we have to meet present needs, and these impose a special burden on the Army. This was the basis on which our inter-Service planning proceeded when we allocated the resources which early in this year we decided to devote to defence. We gave the highest priority to research and development in all arms, while the Navy and the Air Force were instructed to start on a planned programme of re-equipment and the Army had to concentrate on the cold war at the price of some sacrifice in making itself ready for any future war.

This brings me to the difficult problem of manpower. The basic element in the efficiency of any Armed Forces is the long-service Regular. This is emphasised today when he provides not merely the backbone of the Forces as regards discipline and tradition, but also the specialised trade skills which mean so much to the fighting efficiency of modern forces.

It was the original conception that in time of peace we should be able to meet our responsibilities overseas, apart from B.A.O.R., with Regular Forces and that behind these we should, as the years went on, build up substantial trained reserves which could be quickly mobilised in time of war. That concept, I admit, has been falsified: first of all, because the numbers of men needed overseas have been higher than we calculated, and second, because the Regular content of the Forces has dropped to a much lower level than we expected.

In particular the problem of the Regular content of the Army and the Royal Air Force gives us grave concern. So far as can be forecast on present trends, and allowing for the substantial run-out of men on short-term bounty engagements 475 in the next year or two, the content of the Regular Army will decline from 184,000 to perhaps a little over 150,000 by 1952. The Air Force will probably be able to stabilise at about 118,000 over the next few years. On these figures we shall not be able to maintain the full efficiency of these two Services.

We must, therefore, make an effort to ensure that a substantial proportion of the men already serving on Regular engagements will re-engage for a further period of service. This applies to all the Services, and we have to make the conditions of Service life sufficiently attractive in competition with civil life to hold out some prospect of reversing the present trends.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes (Ayrshire, South)

How can that be done?

§ Mr. Shinwell

This is not going to be easy. There are many factors which work against us in attracting recruits—such as objections to Service life with its chances and changes, the natural attractions of civilian life for most people, and the reaction due to war weariness.

We have also to realise that most men in industry today are earning good wages—better, in fact, than they have ever done. We must think very carefully before deciding on what changes are required to attract the recruits we need. Any revision of the whole system of pay and allowances is full of complications. But it is clear that there is a need for an improvement in the special rates for certain trade skills and flying duty. This is being attended to.

As the House already knows, in all three Services we have recently had under examination the whole trade and career structure in the Services, with the double object of improving efficiency and of opening up for the skilled man attractive career prospects. These studies have been undertaken with a full sense of the urgency of the problem.

The Royal Air Force have completed their study, and, as announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air yesterday, a new trade structure for the R.A.F. will be brought into force shortly. The main features of the new scheme are a substantial increase in the number of Regulars to whom long-service 476 engagements can be offered, and the introduction of a new ladder of advancement based on trade skill and experience instead of, as in the past, on powers of command and leadership.

On the question of National Service, there has been a good deal of speculation recently about the need to increase the present period of 18 months' whole-time service. This raises a whole series of problems, technical, economic and social. If we consider the training aspect alone and the building up of reserves in the less technical arms, 12 months would be enough. It was really the need to send National Service men overseas that led to the adoption of the present 18 months in December, 1947.

But even 18 months is not a sufficiently long period to complete the proper training of technicians in some arms, particularly signals; this applies with especial force also to the flying personnel and maintenance staffs of the Royal Air Force. At the same time, our 18-month period of service will stand comparison with that in force in other allied countries where they do not maintain, as we do, substantial and expensive naval and air forces. For example, in France the period of compulsory military service is 12 months; and in Belgium and Holland it is also 12 months with rather longer periods for officers and non-commissioned officers.

In present circumstances, we are not satisfied that an increase in the period of whole-time National Service would solve our problem. But this is a matter we intend to keep under constant review. If we find ourselves unable to build up the Forces we require, we should not hesitate to ask for additional powers.

The manpower problem which gives us the greatest worry arises in the more technical arms of the Services—and this applies particularly to the Royal Air Force. When I was at the War Office we worked out a scheme for the voluntary extension of whole-time service to meet this need; the Royal Air Force, too, have introduced special Regular engagements of short duration, designed to attract National Service men to extend their period of full-time service.

In addition to the active Forces we must have regard to our reserves. We are now beginning to derive benefit from the operation of the National Service Act. 477 Men will be passing steadily into the Auxiliary Forces at a rate of about 14,000 a month and in due time we shall have, at our disposal in the United Kingdom, an Army reserve trained under modern conditions amounting to 400,000 which can be rapidly deployed, if the need should arise.

The existence of this force does not reduce, on the contrary it greatly increases, the importance of the volunteer Auxiliary Forces. These number 107,000, including 86,000 in the Territorial Army, but more are needed and we are hoping to attract a substantial number of those who will be joining the Auxiliary Forces for part-time National Service to come forward and perform the full duties of other volunteers.

In the meantime, there is, of course, the large reserve of trained manpower available from the last war. This reserve totals something over 4 million though we recognise that it is to some extent a wasting asset. But, in the event of immediate trouble, the machinery is there for the recall of these men to duty. The Departments concerned have been improving the plans for their systematic recall to the Colours should they be required. Those plans are now well advanced, and should work reasonably well if put to the test.

We are checking the addresses of these classes of reservists to enable an individual call-up by the Navy and the Army—the Royal Air Force have throughout been in a position to do this—instead of a "block" recall by release groups; and also carrying out an occupational screening of those reservists who would be likely to be wanted in the first month or so of mobilisation. I am happy to say that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour has secured the good will of employers and trade union organisations in helping to get this operation smoothly and expeditiously carried through. These arrangements will be kept under review and perfected as time goes on.

I come now to the problems of equipment. We ended the last war with vast stocks of equipment, a great deal of which would be serviceable in a future emergency. The examination and classification of all this equipment has been an immense problem. The House should not underestimate the work that this has involved. We have been under constant 478 pressure from all quarters to dispose of stocks and to release storage space; and the work has had to be carried through with heavily reduced staffs. All this work is now, however, well on the way to completion.

The result has been to show that our stocks of serviceable equipment are, in many respects, unbalanced, and there are deficiencies which must be made good if our Forces are to be put into a condition to fight. At the same time, we have to be careful not to be stampeded into any premature re-equipment with old styles of weapon which would be out of date or. any modern battlefield. That is in many ways the crux of the present re-equipment problem.

§ Mr. Churchill

That is better than nothing.

§ Mr. Shinwell

I do not propose to give figures of our holdings, but I may say that we have adequate stocks of small arms, mortars, field guns and artillery with ammunition. We are taking steps to improve the position as regards antiaircraft guns and predictors, anti-tank weapons and specialised vehicles.

§ Mr. Churchill

What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by small arms? Rifles, in the main?

§ Mr. Shinwell

Yes, rifles, machine guns, sten guns and the rest.

§ Mr. Churchill

Did we not have more than five million rifles at the end of the war?

§ Mr. Shinwell

That may well be the case. Of course many of them have been disposed of under pressure, but we still have substantial stocks of these small arms. I do not mind who gets the credit for this as long as we have them. I pay tribute to those who had the foresight to provide them but the position is that we have them and to that extent the position is satisfactory.

As regards tanks, we have some 6,000 in reserve. These are, in the main, last war types, but the new Centurion tank, which could give a very good account of itself against any other known tank, is now in full production and is already in service in considerable numbers.

In the case of the Navy, apart from minesweeping craft, we have most of the ships we need, but the modernisation of 479 those ships with the latest anti-submarine equipment, firing control systems and means of mine detection and clearance is not as far advanced as could be wished.

There are two lines of advance which we can take to improve the equipment position. The first is to start or step up production of existing types where there is foreseeable use for them in modern war. This would include the overhaul of existing equipment. Second, we can divert greater resources to research and production on those projects which, within measurable distance, are likely to produce results in terms of production designs.

Under the first of these heads we are accordingly proposing to put in hand an increased and accelerated production of technical equipment for the Army and the purchase and overhaul of a wide range of weapons and stores which would be required in any early emergency, including equipment for A.A. Command, transportation and engineering stores, vehicles, weapons, signals equipment and clothing. The re-conditioning of tanks is being given a high priority.

The Navy will speed up the modernisa-of ships, particularly anti-submarine forces, make good armament, minesweeping, naval aviation and naval stores deficiencies and undertake some acceleration in their planned programme of new construction. The Royal Air Force will speed up the reconstruction of the radar chain, extend and repair certain airfields in the United Kingdom, acquire additional fighter aircraft and overhaul reserves of piston engine fighters as well as undertake some stockpiling.

The effect of these measures will be, over the next few months, a notable increase in our immediate capacity to defend ourselves. Forty-two per cent. of the present Defence budget, £327 million, represents expenditure on production, research and works. The measures we are now taking mainly in these fields will cost an additional £100 million, but this is no more than a small part of the cost which would be involved fully to equip our Forces to fight. Much larger sums would be required in order to put our Forces in a condition of readiness. Plainly, we can do no more from our own resources than make a beginning on such a programme.

480 We shall at the same time give an added impetus to research. We all understand the threat to these islands which modern weapons imply. It is true that our people have never yet been deterred from doing their duty by threats to themselves or their homes. But we should not allow reliance on the native courage of our people to make us minimise the dangers of modern weapons of mass destruction. The best defence will be to prevent an enemy getting near enough to our coasts to attack with either piloted or pilotless missiles. For this purpose development of the guided missile has a special significance, and while there is no doubt a great deal more work to be done before defensive guided weapons can be put into use, we have made good progress, and the work is being pressed on with enthusiasm and devotion by the men concerned. We shall give them all the encouragement they need.

Along with guided missiles there are a number of other fields of research scarcely less important. These include measures of defence against mining and submarine attack, the development of radar for an effective controlling and reporting system, means of increasing the effectiveness of fighter aircraft and the accuracy of bombers and, for the ground forces, development of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. In addition we cannot afford to lag behind in the fields of defence against either bacteriological or chemical warfare attack however much we may regret the need to expend our energies upon them.

In the course of the next few years all the projects to which I have referred will begin to pass from the research stage to development and then to production for service use. I should be less than frank with the House if I did not make it plain that the increasing complexity of designs is bound to be reflected, when that stage is reached, in a sharply rising curve on Defence expenditure if our Forces are to be fully and properly equipped.

I do not propose today to examine each of the Services in turn. I could not do so adequately in the time at my disposal. I want to say a special word, however, about the Royal Air Force. It is our intention, if war should come, to defend ourselves in comradeship with our Allies on the Continent. The last war showed us, however, how much the security of 481 these islands may depend on an efficient Air Force. No Government could ignore the lessons of that experience.

I do not pretend that the Royal Air Force today is as strong as we would wish to see it, though here I may remind the House of the additional strength now available in these islands as a result of the stationing here of American bomber and fighter squadrons. We are glad to have them by our side. The opportunity which their presence gives for our two Air Forces to continue to work in close partnership will undoubtedly be invaluable. But even this involves us in additional charges which we are, of course, happy to meet even though it may mean that we have less available to spend on projects which directly assist our own Services.

As regards the Royal Air Force itself, we must be prepared to face the consequences of building it up to a reasonable size and providing it with adequate war reserves in aircraft and men. This will take time but we cannot afford to delay. Front line strength alone is not an indication of the value of an Air Force. An adequately equipped and manned training organisation at the back of it is essential, and the relationship between the two must be on a sound and healthy basis. This has always been our aim and we have in a large measure achieved it.

We are not satisfied, however, with the training of Reserve air crews. We have substantial numbers of aircrew, especially pilots, in reserve but many of them are in need of refresher training before they could be employed in front line squadrons. This matter is under urgent consideration by the Air Staff. In addition, there is a further Reserve of several thousands of aircrew who are in training in non-operational commands, who could be released for combat duties by men called up from the statutory Reserves. As regards ground staffs, in the event of mobilisation there would be no serious difficulty.

The revolutionary change in aircraft design brought about by the jet engine, has, of course, introduced new problems in the field of air defence. We intend to ensure that our fighter force is equipped to the highest possible standards. Behind the front line there must be adequate stocks of reserve aircraft, including a due proportion of jet fighters, and one of the 482 biggest items in the additional £100 million will be for the provision of reserve fighter aircraft. In addition we have, of course, substantial stocks of combat aircraft of types used in the last war; these could certainly render valuable service in a future emergency, and we are speeding up the programme for bringing them to a state of readiness which would enable them to be brought without delay into operational use.

On the question of aircraft supplies, we have been criticised in some quarters for selling aircraft overseas. I can understand this view, but I do not accept it. It ignores the part which these orders play in keeping available here a larger war potential than the needs of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy alone would justify—design teams, craftsmen and specialised manufacturing space are kept employed which would otherwise be lost to the industry. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] The policy is a wise one. I have been asked "Why?" I venture to furnish the reply. Not only do we get the advantages of a contribution to the country's export trade, but these sales strengthen the Air Forces of Allied and friendly countries—[Interruption]—while linking them more closely with the Royal Air Force. This applies especially to the other members of the Commonwealth and North Atlantic Treaty countries to whom the greater part of such supplies have been sent.

I recognise that the building up of the Royal Air Force itself both as regards equipment and manpower—especially skilled manpower—is a matter of the highest importance. There can be no question of complacency about this. There is a great deal to be done before we can achieve that all-round strengthening of our air defence position that is required. That is our intention.

I come now to the question of Korea. The United Kingdom was among the first of the powers to respond to the resolution of the Security Council by making available forces to assist in repelling the invasion of the Republic of Korea. Units of the Far Eastern Fleet were placed at the disposal of the United States Commander and a squadron of Royal Air Force Sunderlands is now co-operating actively with the Fleet.

The House will have noted with satisfaction that the call for assistance in the 483 Korean operations was answered promptly by other member nations of the Commonwealth. Australia placed the Mustang squadron already in Japan at the United Nations' disposal forthwith and has sent naval vessels; New Zealand has sent two frigates and both Australia and New Zealand have today announced their intention to raise a special combat unit for service in Korea; Canada has sent a force of three destroyers and a long-range transport squadron.

These are heartening reminders of the identity of thought on matters of policy and defence of which the Commonwealth, without the need for any formal commitments, provides many examples. The recent visit of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to Australia and New Zealand, and the valuable discussions he had with the responsible authorities in those countries, affords a good illustration of the easy harmony which exists between the member nations of the Commonwealth in defence planning. It is a source of strength and encouragement to us to know that other free members of the Commonwealth have recognised, as we do, the implications of failing to answer the direct affront to the United Nations constituted by the aggression in Korea.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations recently invited member nations to co-operate by making available ground forces to assist those of the United States on whom the initial brunt has inevitably fallen. The House will be aware of the heavy commitments already being sustained by the United Kingdom in the Far East. Our Forces in Malaya are actively engaged in the restoration of order and it would plainly be unsound to withdraw troops from Malaya at a time when there is good hope that their operations will be carried through to a successful conclusion. Nor would it seem wise in present uncertain circumstances to reduce the garrison allocated to Hong Kong.

None the less, His Majesty's Government have no desire to escape their obligation to play their full part as a member of the United Nations in the restoration of order in Korea. It will not be easy for us to make forces available, but I can tell the House that we are today notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations that we are prepared to 484 send to that theatre, for use under the orders of the United Nations Commander, an effective land reinforcement which will be a self-contained force including infantry, armour, artillery and engineers, together with the administrative backing required to maintain it.

The House would not wish me to give further details of the composition of the force, which would clearly be of the greatest interest to the aggressor. We believe that this reinforcement will demonstrate in a practical way our full acceptance of, and support for, the principles of collective action in the maintenance of peace. We cannot, however, despatch such a force at a moment's notice; it will be prepared without delay and will be sent to Korea as quickly as possible.

§ Mr. Ellis Smith (Stoke-on-Trent, South)

Is it intended to include in that force any National Service men?

§ Mr. Shinwell

That is a matter now under consideration.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

Young conscripts!

§ Mr. Shinwell

At the present moment—[Interruption.] At the present moment I cannot give the House details of the composition of the force we propose to send, but no doubt in due course we shall announce those details.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us the principle? Will they be conscripts or not?

§ Mr. Shinwell

If we find it necessary to supplement the regular content of the force we send with conscripts who have had preliminary training in this country, then we shall do so.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

Shame on you!

§ Mr. Osborne (Louth)

The hon. Member should go and volunteer himself.

§ Mr. Shinwell

In the meantime, units of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force will continue to operate under General MacArthur's command. The Admiralty are, however, finding it necessary to increase the crews of the Far Eastern Fleet from the present peace-time standard to that required by their present tasks and to provide additional manpower to meet other special commitments.

The Government have therefore authorised the Admiralty to retain in the 485 Royal Navy and Royal Marines some officers and men whose service would otherwise shortly expire and to recall a certain number of naval and marine officers on the Retired and Emergency List and men of the Royal Fleet Reserve. Royal Proclamations are necessary for certain of these measures and will be issued shortly. Corresponding measures will be taken for the Army and the Royal Air Force if the situation should develop in such a way as to render them necessary.

In order that His Majesty's Government may have first-hand reports of the operations in Korea, it has been agreed that a senior British military liaison officer shall be appointed to General MacArthur. Air Vice Marshal Boucher, who commanded the Air Group of the British Forces of Occupation in Japan, leaves by air as soon as possible to take up this appointment. His duties will include the despatch of information concerning the tactics and technical equipment employed by the enemy.

The measures we are adopting to meet the present situation in pursuance of our obligations to the United Nations and to our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty must take some time to mature and reach their full effect. Such portions of the additional £100 million now authorised to be spent by the three Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply as can be spent in the current financial year will be dealt with in the Spring Supplementary Estimates in February next; the remainder will be included in next year's Estimates and will fall to be dealt with in next year's Budget. Further expenditure beyond this, will in all probability be required next year to enable us to play our full part under the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the present situation, only deeds will count. The President of the United States in his recent message to Congress has told the American people of the scale on which they must take action as part of a combined effort by the free nations of the world to step up their common security programme, even if it involved diverting additional economic resources to defence purposes. We too, despite all the difficulties of the economic position, must be prepared to respond to the needs of the situation. In this and subsequent years we must be prepared to make such sacrifices as are required to enable us to protect 486 the way of life that we have developed and which we cherish above all else.

It is tragic that we should now be engaged in these tasks a few years after the end of the last war. Again we are forced to build up our defences. The aggression in Korea should make the people of this country aware of the dangers to which we are exposed. We need more men and women both for whole-time duty in the Regular Forces and for part-time service in the Auxiliary Forces as well as for Civil Defence. The Government look for a speedy and favourable response to their appeal for volunteers to help us in the vital tasks of defence.

It is our desire to promote peace and to be on good terms with all our neighbours. We do not dispute the right of any other nation to adopt the way of life appropriate to its ideals and traditions. We claim an equal right. But we are determined to resist any attempt on the part of any nation to impose its will and its way of life on ourselves and our Allies. We believe that the world can live in peace despite ideological differences. We may dispute whether this ideology or that is best adapted to promote a better civilisation, but history will determine that for us.

Our concern is to build up living standards, to co-operate with other nations in improving the condition of backward races, to use world resources for all who need them and to promote the greatest measure of liberty. It is our hope that confidence and mutual trust should be restored among the members of the United Nations, and the peril of aggression disappear. It is in the hands of those who have the power to resume full co-operation that the decision rests.

§ Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

We gladly yielded our right to open this Debate to the Minister of Defence when he asked for this facility. It was certainly necessary that a statement should be made to the House before we separate. One of our reasons for asking for a Debate in public, after a Secret Session, or a Debate in private, had been refused, was to give the Government an opportunity of explaining their position and, to some extent our position, and it was very fortunate, I think, that we did so. Otherwise, the House would have had no opportunity, 487 according to the Government's plan, of debating the statement which has just been made to us. It is entirely due to our request that this difficulty has been surmounted.

I do not intend myself to discuss in detail this afternoon the proposals which the Minister of Defence has announced, though they appeared few and far between, or the general tenor and character of his statement. I will reserve what I have to say until we come to the Third Reading of this Bill tomorrow, either in public or in private session, as the House may decide.

Let me say at once that we shall give our support to any measures proposed by the Government which seem right or necessary in the public interest, whether they are popular or not. We may even feel it our duty to support measures which are not only belated but may be judged inadequate, while criticising them in these respects. I could not help feeling, while I listened to the right hon. Gentleman, that he gave no decided or clear answer on the question of lengthening the period of service, which clearly lies at the root of the economy of our Army. I ventured to say in the last Parliament that we should take fewer men for a longer period. I quite see the complications of that, but that is a great matter. I can only say that should the Government decide to embark upon that course, in some way or other—undoubtedly one which would not be popular to the country or in any part of the House—we shall give them our support, as we have done throughout the whole story of national compulsory military service in time of peace.

I must say in passing that one would have thought, to hear the right hon. Gentleman's speech about these great dangers, which were brought home to us by his candid statement of the vast strength of Russia in Europe, that he and his colleagues of the Socialist Government had only just come into power and that all this situation had developed overnight, as it were, whereas it has been building up for at least three years during which the Allied Forces were falling while the Russian power was steadily maintained and strengthened in every way. These are matters which we shall have to examine.

488 But, Sir, as we shall give the Government our support should it be needed at any time, they have no excuse for not asking for whatever they require, nor have they in the past had any difficulty because of the immense sums of money which Parliament has accorded them during these five years. During this period they have spent, I think, over £5,000 million in maintaining the Armed Forces. It is remarkable that by far the vastest proportion of this was spent during the period when, according to the right hon. Gentleman's argument, the danger was the least, and the amounts fell off steadily as the danger, by contrast, grew.

They also had the great advantage of starting with an enormous mass of munitions, much of which was quite new and some of which was even produced after the war had ended, because the factories were allowed to run to complete weapons on which they had begun—I do not say wrongly. Many of the rifles, which are the great foundation of the armaments of any nation, have been frittered away and squandered, but still there was a vast amount left. The artillery, in the main, is something which will last. A large portion of the munitions available at the end of the war could have been, if they had not been improvidently used, available for expanding the defensive Forces that we had, and developing them. It seems to me that all this requires fairly careful detailed examination. After all, even weapons that were new five years ago are better than no weapons at all. This also touches the question of arming the forces of other countries, and I trust it will be looked into and examined.

I do not intend to be drawn into any personal controversy with the right hon. Gentleman if I can help it. He stated at the weekend that I had no confidence in him. As I have said before, I have confidence that his heart is in the right place, and any reservations I might have to make would be in regard to other aspects of his suitability for discharging the tremendous tasks entrusted to him.

There is, however, one point which occurred in the House last week to which I must refer. The right hon. Gentleman, when speaking at Question Time, about the possibilities of a Debate on defence said that he quite understood my "natural curiosity." If curiosity were my motive, I might easily have satisfied it, because the 489 Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman himself have several times, even since this new Parliament was formed, offered to give me and any colleagues I might bring with me the fullest information in their possession.

I have not availed myself of this latest offer up to the present, for the following reasons. I did not find that the conversations we had last year, although conducted in a friendly manner on both sides, were fruitful in results. On the other hand, the fact that we had these conversations, which were in progress from June to October at intervals, undoubtedly made it difficult for the Opposition to examine in public the state of our defences and to make those criticisms which are usual every few months, or at any rate every year, in Parliament. In fact, the subject of our defence was not dealt with in a searching or controversial manner at all in the House last year by the Opposition.

The difficulty of the leaders of the Opposition parties receiving confidential information from the Government—the chief difficulty—is of course that their lips are thereby sealed in respect of everything they did not know before, and that these two fields of information—what they knew before and what they are told—overlap and affect one another in a manner which is certainly embarrassing to any public discussion which may follow. I therefore contented myself with saying, at the beginning of this new Parliament, that I accepted no responsibility for the present state of our defences, and, at my request, the Prime Minister altered the Government Motion on presenting the White Paper by substituting the words "That this House takes note of" for the original words "That this House approves."

Our position is therefore perfectly clear. We cannot take any course which may hamper us in the discharge of our duty as we conceive it, or prevent us giving any warnings to the House and also, in due course, to the country, which may be required as the situation develops.

I greatly regret that the Prime Minister and the Socialist Government persist in refusing a Debate in Secret or private Session. It might, I think, have been quite natural and in the public interest that after hearing a public statement by the Minister of Defence and after some public discussion upon it, we should have gone into private Session and talked 490 things over among ourselves as Members of the House of Commons.

The point has been raised, that, if we were to hold a Secret Session, it would be resented by the United States Government, who would want to know what had happened, but could not be told. I can assure the House that there is no validity in this suggestion. The Americans are very familiar with the procedure of secret sessions. The Congressional Committees often hold them; they are called Executive Sessions. These Congressional Committees, especially those of the House of Representatives, have enormous powers of obtaining information for their members. They can summon generals, admirals, air marshals and other experts before them subject only to the veto of the Minister in charge of the Department, very rarely exercised, and can examine them to any extent, either in public or in secret.

There is no doubt whatever that the American House of Representatives exercises its responsibilities towards its constituents in a far more vigilant and rigorous manner than anything we have adopted over here. We are a very ill-informed body on defence questions compared with them, and the idea that they would object to our having a Secret Session is utterly absurd, and, indeed would constitute an interference with our domestic affairs of which, I am sure, the United States would never be guilty.

It was also said by the Lord President of the Council that there was no precedent for a Secret Session except in time of war, but we are now at war technically. As a mandatory of the United Nations, we are technically at war with the Republic of Northern Korea, so that that agument, for whatever it was ever worth, is effectively disposed of.

I still hope that a Secret or private Session will be claimed by the House tomorrow. I do not understand why the Government do not wish to take the House into their full confidence, so far as that may be possible without revealing secrets not already known to the Soviet Government and to the General Staffs of Europe and of the United States. The discussion can be easier and freer when every word we say is not carried immediately all over the world. I believe that such a Debate might have the effect of bringing us more together and 491 promoting a better understanding between us in the facts of our grave common danger. I feel that Members of Parliament have a deep obligation to seek the fullest information possible about matters which affect the lives and safety of their constituents, and that they might well be held accountable to those constituents if, by their votes tomorrow, they put their veto upon such a discussion.

Considering how evenly the parties are balanced in this Parliament, and that the Prime Minister's party is in a minority in the country of nearly two million voters—

§ Commander Pursey (Hull, East)

Electioneering.

§ Mr. Churchill

—it is much to be regretted that he should adopt such an authoritarian attitude. I cannot think that his decision will be helpful, either to his party, or, what is of far greater importance, to the welfare of the country.

With regard to the Debate tomorrow, I must make the reservation that I may have to make certain changes in what I think it is possible to say to the House, in accordance with the decision to which we have come. With regard to the Debate in public this afternoon, there is a great deal that can be said, especially on the administrative aspects, and much can be said on the general issue, without trenching on facts which are not already public property and well-known to those who follow these matters with attention in every country. I am sure that my hon. and right hon. Friends on this side of the House will be able to throw much light on our problems within the wide limits that are open to us.

§ Mr. Peart (Workington)

We have just heard probably one of the worst efforts of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) in this Parliament. Certainly, the speech of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence has taken the wind out of the sails of any criticism which the right hon. Member for Woodford intended to make when he came to the House this afternoon. We welcome that new outlook on his part today.

I should like to ask the right hon. Member for Woodford how he got his figure of 492 £5,000 million expended on defence since this Government came in. I have looked through the information available to hon. Members concerning the Defence Estimates, and, for the years mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman, I have come to a figure of £4,799 million which actually includes this year and the Defence Estimates for this year have not been expended. Moreover, we must consider terminals, so that the actual figure is in the region of only £4,000 million. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman is actually £1,000 million out—not much for the right hon. Gentleman; just £1,000 million out in his statement that we have spent £5,000 million.

As I say, I should like to know where the right hon. Gentleman obtained his information. I can only say that he has made a statement which, if examined very carefully, is certainly extravagant. I, too, deplore the argument of the right hon. Gentleman that no information has been given. I can remember in the last Parliament many Service Debates and many discussions on the Estimates when several of my hon. Friends, who are also members of this Parliament, pressed the various Ministries and their own colleagues in the Government to give further information. I remember one long sitting which lasted into the early hours of the morning when hon. Members on this side of the House were not supported by a single Tory Member opposite in their requests for information.

The right hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Bracken) need not put up his hands; he was probably not here at that time. I believe what I have said to be true, and, if any hon. Member cares to look back through the various Debates recorded in HANSARD, he will find that my colleagues on this side of the House who pressed for such information were not supported by the colleagues of the right hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch.

§ Mr. Brendan Bracken (Bournemouth, East and Christchurch)

Since the hon. Gentleman challenges me, let me point out to him that his Government would have been defeated on conscription without the aid of the Opposition, and when the dummy dreadnought was Minister of Defence, we saved him time after time.

§ Mr. Peart

That really is a stupid intervention which has nothing to do with the 493 point I have raised. I know the right hon. Gentleman still thinks he may one day go back to the Admiralty, though, for the sake of the British Navy, God forbid that he ever should.

Actually, we have always pressed for information consistent with security, and I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition should try to make that point today. After all, even if there had been no cold "war, and even if there was no war by proxy in the Far East, in Korea, today, we should still need adequate defences. I think hon. Members on all sides would agree with that. We are a major military Power; we have our police commitments, we have to fulfil our obligations to see that the peace treaties are enforced, and we must see that we are well prepared if, unfortunately, war breaks out.

It is only right that today we should examine in detail the Defence Estimates which have been presented to us. I wish, very quickly, to go through some of the main Votes of the Service Departments for 1950–51. If we examine the Defence Estimates for the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Air Ministry, we have a total of £715 million. If we break down that figure and take the expense of civilians employed on Fleet services, we find in Vote 4 of the Navy Estimates that that represents the figure of £5,880,000, and if we look at Vote 8 we find that the Estimate for dockyard personnel is put at £25,768,000.

Again, if we take the Army Estimates, we find that under Vote 4, the Estimate for War Office civilians amounts to £44,605,000, and, if we look at the Air Estimates, we find that the Vote for Air Ministry civilians at out stations amounts to £19,152,000. Therefore, we get the large total of £95,405,000. If, apart from the civilians employed by the three Services, we take the headquarter staffs of the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry we get another large figure of £10,503,000.

Then, if we go further and take the non-effective charges which include Service pensions, gratuities, pensions to officers who have ceased to be effective—retired officers, etc.—we get a figure for the three Departments of £36,087,000. Thus the charges for civilians, headquarter 494 staffs, and for non-effective services in the Defence Estimates—covered by the global figure of £715 million, reach a figure of £141,995,000. Added to that, we must bear in mind the figure mentioned by the Minister of Defence in the Debate in March this year, a figure which has been further amplified today. On research, we are spending a sum of over £250 million. That amount must come out of the total of £780 million.

Therefore, we can see item after item of expenditure. No hon. Member opposite has really criticised any of these particular items in the various Estimates.

§ Earl Winterton (Horsham)

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but that statement is so monstrously inadequate that I really must, as one who throughout the last Parliament spoke for my party on the Estimates, point out that again and again we criticised items. We said then what the Minister of Defence said today, that we had to make the conditions of the Regular Army better. Four years later, he suddenly accepted our view.

§ Mr. Peart

The noble Lord says that he has criticised the various Estimates, but I have never heard in Service Debates any effective criticism of the items I have mentioned.

§ Air Commodore Harvey (Macclesfield)

Rubbish.

§ Mr. Peart

It is no good the hon. and gallant Member saying "rubbish"; that is an easy get out. I have never heard right hon. or hon. Members opposite criticise those sections of the Defence Estimates. If hon. Members opposite say that they have criticised them, then I invite them to go through the items I have already mentioned to see if there should be any economies made in them. The right hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch should remember that his party have been spreading throughout the country the idea that we have been extravagant in allowing money to be wasted in our various Services. But if we pinpoint right hon. Members about economies we never get an effective answer.

I agree with my right hon. Friend that in any defence programme we may embark upon, we must consider the needs of the Army, above all. Perhaps here 495 even hon. Members opposite who disagreed with my earlier remarks, will agree with me. The realities of Korea and Malaya prove, above all, that we need men who can use a rifle and men who are trained in artillery support. We need these people to make a really effective contribution if an emergency comes, and that is why it is so important for the Army that we should have a successful recruiting campaign. We should have more Regulars. After all, they are the backbone of the Army.

The Government have tried to increase the number of Regulars by various means. We have had considerable publicity and recruiting campaigns, also improved pay. I believe the figure for pay increases represents approximately £12 million. Moreover, we have had improved barrack accommodation. When my right hon. Friend was Secretary of State for War he energetically pursued a course to improve barracks and living accommodation for our Regular soldiers. We have also had improvements in the resettlement of soldiers and Service men in civil life.

I agree with hon. Members that we must seriously consider the improvement of pay for various people in the Regular Army—the technical people. But I would remind hon. Members who want improved Service pay for technical people, that the artillery officer and infantry officer are, in fact, technical persons. I know, from my own experience in the last war, that the artillery officer had to have quite a lot of technical skill. In A.A. defence he had to know his artillery and complex predictor work. The trained artillery and infantry men are actually skilled persons.

We must recognise that it is difficult to recruit men into the Regular Army whilst conditions outside in civilian life are attractive. I know hon. Members opposite will not relate the incidence of unemployment to recruiting before the war. I know they have tried to refute that argument. Their argument was repeated quite recently in the "Economist." I have tried to examine some of the figures for recruiting before the war, and if hon. Members obtain from the Library the annual report of the British Army for the year ended 30th December, 1936, they will see that the figures there 496 show the closest connection between the incidence of unemployment before the war and the number of recruits for the Army. This is not the actual number of men who are accepted, finally, for the Army, but the number of men who wished to enter the Army.

Obviously, we must take that figure because standards of recruiting vary from year to year. The difficulty that my right hon. Friend and the Service Ministers have, is how to recruit, from a civilian population which is enjoying for the first time in the history of the British nation a measure of full employment, men who are prepared to serve Regular engagements in the Services. It is a matter we should seriously consider, because we need more recruits. They are the backbone of the Army. They are also essential to the Army not only from the operational point of view but because their quality determines the quality of training of National Service men who come in.

Whilst we are discussing these vast Defence Estimates, I hope we shall recognise that they impose a burden upon our economy and that it would be very wrong of us to endanger our economy by too great an emphasis in one direction. My right hon. Friend Lord Alexander, who was then Minister of Defence, made a statement that a healthy national economy was essential to effective Defence Forces. He was not challenged by right hon. Members opposite. I think everybody in this House will agree that, obviously, our Defence Forces depend upon our ability to supply a war potential production.

The reorganisation of our industries, such as coal and steel, the development of an efficient transport system and efficient supply Departments are essential to the defence of the country. If we allow too great an emphasis on the teeth and neglect the tail—if I may use that expression—we are in reality harming our defence position in this country. Since 1945 to the present day, the Government have preserved a right balance. Today, our economy is healthy. We are making progress, and yet we are able to bear a large Defence Estimate.

I believe, from the statement that my right hon. Friend has made today, that there is no complacency. All of us desire to have such an effective defence organisation that we can win the cold war and 497 say to any other Power that wishes to aggress, that we will resist. I believe that my right hon. Friend has indicated that, within the circumstances of our national resources and the building up of our economy, we have preserved a proper balance between the three Forces and a proper balance between the Service Departments and those other Departments which, in the end, supply the weapons of war. I am very glad that the Opposition today has miserably failed.

§ Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing (Hendon, North)

I cannot let one or two remarks made by the hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) go unchallenged. I have before me the figures of unemployment during the years 1927 to 1938, against the figures of Regular recruiting. It must go on record that, although the total was higher just after the debacle of 1931 when the Socialist Party gave up power—

§ Mr. Manuel (Central Ayrshire)

We were never in power.

§ Mr. Orr-Ewing

I am very glad to see hon. Members opposite have risen to that fly. I expected it would be taken up, as usual. The recruiting figures for 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1938 were all better than the figures for 1931.

§ Mr. Peart

Is the hon. Gentleman actually quoting recruits accepted for the Army or the number of people who applied? That is the difference. If he looks at the Army Report he will see that he is entirely wrong in his argument. I invite him to go to the Library and get that Report.

§ Mr. Orr-Ewing

I should be delighted to check that point, and I will follow the hon. Member's advice. I am quoting recruits accepted from Royal Navy figures quoted in HANSARD, and the Army recruiting figures from the Annual Report of the British Army. However, I think we were all glad to hear the Minister of Defence say that whatever happened on the perimeter, where Russia is getting her servants to do her fighting, the crux of the whole problem must arise in Western Europe.

I have been at some pains to try to discover the strength of the Russian Air Force. It seems to me, judging from sources which may be far less reliable 498 than those available to the right hon. Gentleman, that the 19,000 front-line strength we heard about today is a modest estimate. It may well be higher than that and the sources to which I refer include both American as well as British authorities. I think it is worthwhile considering how it is split up. There are 375 heavy bombers—a comparatively small force, but with aircraft similar to the B.29, which is an efficient heavy bomber. There are 7,500 fighters, and the aircraft are modern fighters; these are not indifferent or old fighters.

Over Finland there have been seen large formations of fighters with swept-back wings, and I think that is extremely significant, because in this country we have no swept-back wing aircraft in operational use and I doubt whether any of our Allies have them. We have, therefore, to try to make up, with maximum speed, the five or six years partly eaten by the locusts. In the bomber field, they have already four-jet bombers in operational use. Here, again, we may not have time to catch up, but we must move extremely adroitly.

Lastly, there are 7,500 ground support aircraft based on the Stormovik. One of the first tasks which the R.A.F. will have to face in the defence of Western Europe will be the veritable swarm of these aircraft which will assail our ground forces and defences and the defences of Western Union. Perhaps we should cast our minds back to 1939 and to the task of our aircraft under those extremely difficult conditions. Under such conditions the Army is powerless to move by day; every movement, every reinforcement, every consolidation is seen and attacked from the air. The first job of the R.A.F. and its Western Union Allies will, therefore, be to keep the air reasonably clear of this vast number of close support fighter bombers and fighters.

Even if we succeed in the task, not only of keeping the air clear over the battle-front we must remember we must also strike at the enemy's bases—we should like to hear how soon we shall have the operational bombers which can strike at the enemy's bases. As we tackle these two tasks we must constantly remember that everything must still rest on the defence of this country. If we do not defend this country, the rest of Western Europe will collapse like a house of cards.

499 I should like the indulgence of the House to talk on a subject about which I have some personal knowledge—the radar defence of this country. In case there is any misunderstanding, I should declare my interest; I am the technical advisor to a radio firm which makes radar radio and television equipment. During the war we had good radar defences in this country. There is no argument on this point from either side of the House—it was said in the Cabinet in 1940 and has been said again and again since: radar is absolutely essential for the efficient operational use of the fighter defences. It is no use having a good fighter, however fast or however manœuvrable it may be, unless we have both the control and operational network by which that fighter becomes operationally effective. Without that network the fighter might as well be at the bottom of the sea or in the storage unit.

In the R.A.F. group which operated the radar of this country we had 17,000 people. Radar was a new idea. This group was made up with 95 per cent. of R.A.F.V.R. who are all now Class Z Reservists. At the end of that period 75 per cent. of the group were women. I want to know what we are to do about this Class Z Reserve. We have been asked Questions on this subject and we have been told that it is not in the public interest to inform us what percentage of the Class Z Reserve have had their addresses and occupations checked. We were glad to hear that the point about their occupations was covered in the right hon. Gentleman's speech and that now the Reserve is to be screened, but surely this is a little late. We have had five years in which to do that.

If we were gambling that there would be a period before which a hot war was unlikely to occur, then first attention should have been given to the trained personnel in the Reserve at that time and the equipment which was readily available. That has not been done. I am ready to believe that, through the food offices and the ration cards, the Government have been able to follow the movement of these men, but what has happened to the women? Very large numbers must have married and changed their names and addresses, and now have big family responsibilities. Does the right 500 hon. Gentleman, and do his Service Ministers, believe that we can call these women to the Colours at a moment's notice to man the operational rooms and all the paraphernalia by which we defend this country? I think this point should be clarified because we rested so greatly during the war on the efficiency and conscientiousness of the W.A.A.F.

We have been told that the manning of the fighter control units is progressing, that there are 26 of them and that they are now 25 per cent. manned. I cannot believe that the necessary pressure or enthusiasm has been put behind those units. The strength of the radar personnel in the unit based on London is 33 per cent. of establishment and in the one based in Scotland is 25 per cent. of establishment. Has attention been given to the provision of efficient and up-to-date headquarters?

On my way to the House I went into the headquarters in Queens Square and I was staggered to see the dilapidated condition of this five floor building which, 15 months ago, was earmarked for the fighter control unit for the London area—which must, of course, be in the best position to recruit and to receive attention. I was astonished to learn that the senior N.C.O.s, and other volunteers who came in the evening after a day's work, had to sweep the floor. There was not one cleaner allowed for the whole five floors. The top floor was a flat. I should have thought that any caretaker would have been delighted to occupy that flat, but I was told that that is not possible and that no establishment has yet been laid down.

Is this the pressure which, we have been told, is being applied behind the Volunteer Reserve and the fighter defence of this country? I think it is greatly to their credit that, after a long day's work, people are prepared to go in two evenings a week to this derelict headquarters and to give their services, not for any gain but for the sheer desire to see the country properly and efficiently defended. I hope very much that the right hon. Gentleman will put a great deal more enthusiasm behind this scheme. Will he see that attention is paid to these headquarters? Fifteen months is too long to wait.

May we have some assurance that those reservists who have to fill the gap for the next few months—and there is no 501 alternative source—are checked for their addresses, for their occupations, for their state of health and for information as to whether they are readily available in an emergency. If that is not done, we have no hope of defending this country should an emergency suddenly arise during the summer or in the early autumn, and I hope that first attention will be given to this matter.

§ Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery)

I was very glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence began with a survey of the general world position. I think it is right that we should keep it in mind at all times when we are discussing what our own individual position may be and what our own contribution should be. Very rightly, he ended with words something like these—that it is tragic that, five years after the destruction of Germany and the fall of Japan, once again we should be called again to face a situation in which another war is possible. It is indeed tragic that this generation should have been called upon, in the period since 1914, to face crisis after crisis.

But it is well that we should consider what is the world position. We thought in 1918 that the war then just over, was the "war to end war" and that we should be able to create one world. We thought the same thing in 1945 when we created the United Nations organisation. What we have to realise today is that there are, in fact, two worlds—the Communist world and the non-Communist world; and that in the Communist world there is a central organisation capable of commanding the tremendous forces which were referred to by the right hon. Gentleman.

We do not know where those may be used. We do know this, that no dictatorial Power in the history of man has so extended its borders within the course of 10 years as has this Power which is centred in Moscow, until now it stretches from the River Oder in Germany all the way to the China Sea. At this very moment, without a doubt—can anybody doubt?—without a doubt it is extending further into the Chinese seas through this aggression which is taking place in Korea. What is significant is that there is a central control over all the forces whether they be the army, the navy, or 502 the air force, and over the millions that are subservient to that central force; and one does not know at what particular point of the globe that force may be used. It may be used, as it is at the present moment, in the Far East. It may next be used in the Middle East; and next in Europe. We know not where they will direct it, for they are in full control.

Now, what is our position as free countries? We have been in the past individual countries, each pursuing its own way, with no central control whatsoever. We do not know which may be the next victim of this octopus. It may stretch out an arm to seize some victim or another. It seems to me we have not even yet in this free world, learned the lesson of 1918 or the lesson of 1945—that, surely, our only hope of safety and security lies in as much unity as we can possibly get. I would suggest to the Government that, situated as we are in this extraordinary position of being a part of Europe and the centre of a Commonwealth, we could call all the free nations to come together for our mutual defence.

That may take time, but surely it is essential that they should realise that safety lies only in combined action, and not in allowing each one to drift its own way, and become a victim in its turn. In the meantime we have these few that have come together for this very purpose, the chief among them being those adhering to the Atlantic Pact, and the others being the members of the Treaty of Brussels. I was very glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman say that they now really form one pact, under one central control. I should like to know: Has that now reached the point where there is a combined general staff having control over the whole area, and able at once to decide what is to be the contribution from each one of the countries that belong to it—a combined general staff as efficient and as effective as the one which was in existence in 1945?

I want to pass from that question for the moment back to the position as outlined by the right hon. Gentleman. Very rightly, he referred to the first years immediately after 1945, when the desire of all of us was to get back to our civil avocations; to disarm as much as possible, and to get back into the normal state of life. But we have been realising now, at 503 any rate for the last two if not three years, that we are face to face with a new threat; and, very rightly, he now says that this has been brought much nearer to us by what has taken place since 25th June in Korea and that now there is a real sense of urgency.

What I am wondering is, having listened to the right hon. Gentleman, whether that sense of urgency is present in the mind of the Cabinet of the day. That is what I am wondering. For look at the position. Here we are debating this on the last day but two of this Session. If there is this tremendous urgency, why do the Government then suggest to us that we can all go away until 17th October, that we can leave it safely in their hands, and that if things take a turn for the worse we can be called back at any particular moment?

Is that really the right way to treat a matter of this tremendous potentiality—if I may so put it—especially when we look now at what is happening in Korea? The area just now being defended by the South Koreans and the United States of America is getting smaller and smaller hour by hour, and we are now about to send troops out there to assist them. Very rightly a question was asked as to the composition of those troops, and the right hon. Gentleman was very careful not to commit himself one way or another. It may be—

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

It must be.

§ Mr. Davies

—it may be that some of the troops who will be sent out will be young, partly-trained men. It may be necessary. But surely before a great decision of that kind is taken this House should be informed, and this House should debate it?

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes

And vote upon it.

§ Mr. Davies

And possibly vote upon it. The right of hon. Members, or of any one hon. Member, to express opinions to this House and demand a Division upon them is one of the inherent rights of democracy.

§ Commander Pursey

Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman allow me to put a question to him? Is he debating this on the point of the training, or on training and age? What is the difference between a Regular going to Korea with 504 smaller training and less age and a conscript going there with training and age?

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