3.53 p.m.

The Chairman

It might be convenient to the Committee if I intimated at this stage that I propose to call the Amendment standing in the name of the Minister of Defence—in page 1, line 15, to leave out "eighteen," and to insert "twelve." I think it would also be for the general convenience of the Committee, if the Amendment on the same lines in the name of the hon. Member for Harwich (Sir S. Holmes)—in page 1, line 15, to leave out "eighteen," and to insert "nine,"—were discussed at the same time.

Mr. Cocks (Broxtowe)

I ask for your guidance, Major Milner. The Amendment to be moved by the Minister of Defence concerns those Members who want the period of service reduced from 18 months to 12 months but there are others who want it reduced to nothing. For the convenience of the Committee, could you say whether we can debate the latter aspect of this Amendment, or whether we must wait until the Motion "That the Clause stand part of the Bill"?

The Chairman

That question is not appropriate for discussion on this Amendment. We must confine ourselves to the precise terms of the Amendment.

Mr. Cocks

Will such debate be allowed on the Question "That the Clause stand part of the Bill"?

The Chairman

That is a matter which will arise later and certainly is not one for decision now.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. A. V. Alexander)

I beg to move, in page 1, line 15, to leave out "eighteen," and to insert "twelve."

This Amendment, together with consequential Amendments to other Clauses, has the effect of reducing from 18 months to 12 months the period of whole time service of men called up for the armed forces of the Crown after the provisions of the Bill come into effect. Without exaggeration, I think I can say that the tabling of these Amendments by the Government has provoked a lively, and even controversial, discussion. Not unnaturally, in this process the period of 18 months has been vested with a rigidity and a sanctity beyond its true deserts. It is entirely true that the Government, for reasons which I am about to explain, changed their mind on the period of whole-time service. On the other hand, it is entirely untrue for anyone to suggest, either that 18 months was visualised as the irreducible minimum for whole-time service under the Bill, or that there was a clear-cut and inescapable answer on what the initial period should be. The decision always had to be based on a balance of conflicting considerations. The Prime Minister when he dealt with this question on 12th November last during the Debate on the Address, indicated that it was far from easy to determine what the period of whole-time service should be. He said: It is difficult to lay down exactly what the time should be. We should propose to take power that it shall not exceed a period of one and a half years. Whether we shall want that or not depends very largely on the amount of voluntary recruiting and the condition in which the world is settling down. I cannot insist too often on the fact that in all these matters we are dealing with a vast number of entirely unknown factors. However, as at present advised, I consider it will probably be wise to start at one and a half years and to come clown. I would rather not start at a lower rate and have to go up. My hope is that it will be able to come down."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1946; Vol. 430: c. 41–42.] The original decision to embody in the postwar National Service Scheme a period of 18 months full-time service in the Forces was in fact taken by the Government, after consultation with their expert advisers, in October of last year. In the interval, a good deal has happened. The survey of the economic position of this country, which the Government published as a White Paper at the end of January, and which was subsequently the subject of a three day Debate in this House, brought home to Members and advertised to the country and to the world the seriousness of the current and prospective situation in the economic sphere. However, opinions in the House and the country might vary on the root causes of our present economic problems, there was a consensus of opinion that only by the most energetic efforts could a healthy and sound economy in this country be restored.

Let me mention a few relevant dates. It was during the Debate on the Economic White Paper that the National Service Bill was published and given its First Reading. Within the next 10 days each of the three Service Departments' Estimates was considered in Committee of Supply; and on 19th and 20th March came the Debate on the Defence White Paper. A further week elapsed, and then the National Service Bill had its Second Reading Debate, on the last day of March and the first day of April.

All these Parliamentary occasions which I have mentioned had this in common: they were, to a greater or lesser extent, the opportunity for Members of this House to consider, and to express their views upon, the defence commitments of this country, the size of the Armed Forces necessary to carry out those commitments, and the all-over provision, in men, money and materials, which the country should provide for sustaining the Armed Forces both for the immediate defence needs of the coming year, and in the years that lie ahead of us when the world will, we hope, find itself in more settled conditions of peace.

From their further study of the economic situation, and from the series of Debates to which I have referred, the Government drew the moral that the long-term demand which a peace-time system of national service in the Armed Forces must inevitably make on the manpower of this country, and, therefore, upon what is probably the most important factor in our economic rehabilitation, must be reconsidered; and reconsidered, first and foremost, in the light of the urgent need for husbanding our strength, and directing it to those requirements which come first in the order of things necessary to put us firmly again on our economic feet. I will even risk quoting to hon. Members opposite the Defence White Paper published last February, because to my mind it puts into one sentence the crux of the problem we are now discussing. In paragraph 7 it reads: a successful defence policy must find its roots in healthy social and economic conditions. It goes on to add later in the same paragraph that the Government are fully resolved to strike a considered balance between the needs of the defence of this country and the urgent requirements of the post-war national economy as a whole. It is in the exercise of that responsibility for balancing the needs of defence and the national economy that the Government have decided to recommend to the Committee that the period for which men called up under the present Bill should be removed from civil employment for continuous full-time service with the Forces should be 12 months, and not 18, as originally proposed in the Bill.

4.0 p.m.

Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Alexander

I do not propose to be interrupted if I can help it.

Mr. Churchill

Was the right hon. Gentleman not aware of all these facts when he asked us for our support on the Second Reading of the Bill?

Mr. Alexander

If the right hon. Gentleman had been able to restrain himself throughout my speech, I do not think that he would have asked that question.

This decision does not affect the Government's intention to terminate the liability for part-time service, as stated in Clause 2 of the Bill, with the expiration of the seventh year after the beginning of whole-time service. But it does mean that the aggregate of 60 days' part-time service and of 21 days in any year of that service, which liabilities the Government do not propose to vary, will be spread over a period of six years after the termination of a man's whole-time service, instead of over 5½ years, as it would have been had the period of whole-time service remained at 18 months.

Before dealing with the military implications of the Government's decision, I ought perhaps to mention one consequential effect of the reduction to 12 months of the term of full-time service proposed in the Bill. In the White Paper on the call up to the Forces in 1947 and 1948 issued in May last year the actual period of service of men called up during 1948 was specified, such period tapering from two years in the case of men called up in January, 1948, down to 18 months for those called up in December, 1948. The release of those called up during 1948 would have been spread over the first six months of 1950.

In the changed circumstances of the full-time service of men called up after 1st January, 1949, being limited to 12 months, there is clearly ground for reconsidering the periods of service of men called up in 1948 as set out in Command Paper 683I. They would otherwise be serving after the release of those called up in the early months of 1949 under the new Bill, though on the other hand it must be remembered that they are under no liability for reserve service. Nevertheless, it will be the aim of the Government to ensure that so far as practicable all men called up before the new Bill comes into force on 1st January, 1949, will be released from whole-time service with the Forces before the first of the men called up under the Bill. But I should make it clear that it may not be possible to avoid exceptions to this aim in individual cases and for short periods. For example, where it may be administratively impracticable to bring a man home from overseas in time to release him by the due date, or where some unavoidable delay occurs in the provision of reliefs. It should also be understood that periods of non-effective service, such as periods of desertion or imprisonment, will not be taken into account in determining due dates for release.

With that exception, the major provisions of this Bill do not affect the call-up to the Forces, and do not therefore begin to affect the numbers in the Forces, until the beginning of 1949—a date which is still over eighteen months ahead. As the Government have indicated in their Defence White Paper, it is hoped that many of the current overseas commitments of our Forces will have been liquidated before the expiry of that time. What we have every reason to think will still persist are those longer term defence commitments which are concerned primarily with the security of the country, with the safeguarding of commonwealth communications, including the security of our overseas trade routes, and with our obligations to the United Nations. Later in my speech, I hope to deal in more detail with the effect of the reduction of full-time service, proposed by this Amendment, on the ability of the Forces to meet our likely overseas commitments in peace-time.

The point I would make here and now is, that an essential purpose of the proposals in the National Service Bill is to build up a body of trained reserves, who will stand ready to take their part in our defence in an emergency without requiring the lengthy training which the auxiliary forces needed in 1914 and in 1939. If the international position worsened in the next two years, and if, against all our policy, plans and desires, we were again threatened by imminent war, the Government of this country would have to consider whether the plans they had made for building up the Forces, which in their long-term aspect are largely reflected in this Bill, were adequate for a new and changed defence situation. But on a reasonable forecast of the defence needs of the next few years ahead, the Government are satisfied that the security of the country and the adequate safeguarding of its defence interests are not placed in jeopardy by the change in the Bill proposed by the present Amendment.

This is, naturally, not a matter on which the Government have reached a decision without consulting those who, by the appointments they hold and their professional experience over a lifetime in defence matters, are most competent to advise them on the defence aspects of the change now proposed in the Bill. There has been a good deal of ventilation in the Press of the relationship of His Majesty's Government with the Chiefs of Staff on such matters as the present proposal, and, in case further references are made in the course of the Debate, it might be well if I define that relationship as the Government see it.

I ought perhaps to add that the Prime Minister has approved the terms of the statement I am about to make—[Interruption.] I should not have thought that the right hon. Gentleman opposite, when he was Prime Minister, would have regarded it as irrelevant to mention that he had approved something of this nature. The Chiefs of Staff are responsible as professional advisers on defence policy to the Government and it is the practice to seek their advice on all defence matters or matters with defence implications. The Government, of course, always have the absolute right to reject or adopt in a modified form the advice tendered by the Chiefs of Staff. But in order to preserve the confidential relationship between Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff, and in view of the secret and often delicate nature of the questions involved, the advice which the latter give would not normally be disclosed.

In certain circumstances it might be desirable to state specifically and publicly that the advice of the Chiefs of Staff had been sought on some particular question. But such a statement would merely emphasise that the normal routine had been followed and would not in any way be an indication of what advice the Chiefs of Staff had tendered. If the Government proposed to make a statement concerning the advice they had received, the Chiefs of Staff would be consulted beforehand on the proposal itself, and on the form of the statement. The Chiefs of Staff were in fact consulted by the Government over the change proposed in the present Amendment.

Mr. Churchill

I must interrupt the right hon. Gentleman. He used the word "consulted." A great deal turns on that. What did he mean by "consulted"?

4.15 p.m.

Mr. Alexander

Exactly what it always meant when the right hon. Gentleman consulted the Chiefs of Staff. The decision to make that change was however that of His Majesty's Government, for which they take full constitutional responsibility.

I come now to certain of the more detailed considerations which the Government had to weigh before deciding on the reduction of full-time service under the Bill. There are two reasons for a system of compulsory national service in peacetime. The first, and, I myself should say, the main reason is the one I mentioned a few moments ago, namely the production of trained reserves readily available for service in the event of a major emergency. The second is to enable national service men, during any period of their full time service with their ships or units to make some contribution to the fulfilment of our defence commitments.

It is of course, self-evident that for these purposes 18 months' full-time service would be more satisfactory to the Services. First, it would provide greater -numbers of national service men in the Forces at any one time than would the shorter period. Secondly, it would admit of national service men giving a greater degree of useful service in units or ships in assisting the regular forces in meeting our current defence commitments. Thirdly, it would undoubtedly admit of a generally higher standard of training being reached by a national service man before he is transferred to the reserve.

I should like to deal with the last point first. The original proposals in the Bill contemplated 18 months' full-time service, and the Service Departments saw their way clear to attaining within that period what they considered would be an adequate standard of military efficiency for men constituting the reserve. It was, however, always arguable that the object of building up the necessary numbers of trained reserves, ready to take their part in emergency without delay in filling up the ranks of our Defence Forces, could be achieved on the basis of 12 months' whole-time service, followed by adequate refresher training in the succeeding years of liability for part-time service prescribed in the Bill. Training programmes are not rigid; they can be—and, twice in a generation, against the urgent background of actual war, they have been—pruned, condensed and intensified so as to produce the same standard of military efficiency in a shorter length of time. Faced with the urgent economic necessities of this country, the civil population has got to work harder and more intensely if we are to win through to our object of again attaining economic stability. Similarly, the men in the Forces, and those who train them, will have to approach their tasks with a heightened sense of urgency, and will so order matters that little actual training efficiency is lost by a more intense training over a period of 12 months, as compared with a more leisurely spacing of the training programme over 18 months. I would add that I believe that they can do it.

Mr. Drayson (Skipton)

A 40-hour week?

Mr. Alexander

I believe that they can do it. It goes without saying that, just as the training programmes of the Services will have to be intensified for this purpose, so the Service Departments will have to give particular attention to the process of selection and posting in order to ensure that the fullest advantage is taken of the specialised aptitude of a man when he is called up—

Mr. Drayson

Trainees.

Mr. Alexander

—and that broadly speaking his service employment is aligned as nearly as possible with his civilian trade. In this way not only will there be some continuity of experience for a man during what is a relatively short interlude in his civilian career but the Services for their part will be able to reduce to a minimum the amount of specialised training which they will require to give to fit men for the Service employment to which they will be posted, and for which they will be destined during their reserve liability as against the needs of a future emergency.

The main effect which the reduction of full-time service under the Bill will have is to reduce the period, after completing the ground work of his Service training, which a man will spend applying that training as a working member of a unit or of a ship's complement. I am not in any way going to minimise the great value which accrues from that later period, when a man applies the instruction which he has been receiving and, in combination with his fellows, learns his job as a part of the military machine. [Interruption.] I do not minimise that at all. The aim of the Service authorities will be to condense the earlier part of the period of basic instruction to the greatest extent possible, and to allow the longest practicable time within the 12 months' limit for a man to do effective service as a member of which of the three Services he is in.

I come now to the second of the two objectives of the Bill, that is to enable national service men to make an effective current contribution, in aid of the regular forces, to meeting the defence commitments of the country. As was made clear in the Defence White Paper, and during the debate on it in the House, the regular component of the Armed Forces ran down to a dangerously low level when regular recruiting was discontinued (except in the Navy) during the war years. As the House will know, the Government have embarked in these last few months upon a publicity campaign to attract recruits to regular engagements in the Forces. Conditions of Service and the scale of emoluments, as revised and improved in the last year or two, are such that the Government feel there is a satisfactory career, reasonably well rewarded as compared with civil life, for young men who are attracted to a professional life in the Services, and with the willing help of the Press they have been at pains to set out the advantages of a Service career to the youth of the country. There has in recent months been an increasing response to this campaign; but the regular forces are still well below their pre-war numbers.

This means that for some time yet, national service men will be required to supplement the regulars in meeting the current defence commitments of the country. The lessened availability of national service men for overseas service will of course mean that a more difficult problem will face the Government in sustaining overseas garrisons at the necessary minimum strength. But there will be a greater reason for the Government to sustain and indeed to intensify their efforts to attract men to regular engagements in the Forces, and that is our intention. One result of the reduction of full-time service to 12 months will be that national service men will normally be sent out of this country only to the nearer overseas stations, mainly to units in Europe, since it would be uneconomic to waste weeks of their limited service on long sea voyages. While Service training must continue to be based on this country and must have here all reasonable facilities, by way of land, etc., required for the purpose, the Services—and most of all the Army—will have to train their national service men to an increasing extent in the Armies of Occupation in Germany. I hope those who have urged this particular suggestion will feel some small satisfaction that circumstances have enjoined upon the Services a training policy which will go some way towards carrying out their desire.

In closing this part of my statement on the military effects of the proposal in the present Amendment, there is one point I wish to state with emphasis. The actual number of reservists who will, after their period of full-time service is finished, be passed to the Reserve, and thus become available to meet the first objective of the Bill, will not in any way be made smaller by the reduction in the period of full-time service. Incidentally, the reduction will mean that the process of building up a National Service Reserve will begin six months earlier than would have been the case with 18 months' whole-time service.

Mr. Frank Byers (Dorset, Northern)

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman why he does not make the period of training six months, and so start another six months earlier?

Mr. Alexander

As I have already stated, twelve months is the period selected in which we can use some of them for overseas service.

There will, of course, be a substantial financial saving resulting from the proposed reduction of the period of whole-time service from 18 to 12 months. With an 18 months' period, assuming an intake of about 200,000 men into the Forces each year, the total number so serving at any one time would have been about 300,000. The reduction of whole-time service to one year means that there will not be more at any one moment than 200,000, and therefore the maintenance cost of 100,000 men with the Forces will be continuously saved throughout the period of currency of the provisions of the Bill.

Mr. Pickthorn (Cambridge University)

Read it slower.

Mr. Alexander

I usually speak very clearly.

Mr. Pickthorn

You are not speaking, you are reading.

An Hon. Member

We want to know what it is about.

Mr. Alexander

His Majesty's Government have to make a realistic approach to this problem of the peace-time security of this country and the maintenance of its essential defence responsibilities. They were forced to the conclusion—[Interruption.] Perhaps hon. Members will wait for the rest of the sentence.

Mr. Eden (Warwick and Leamington)

We know what it ought to be.

Mr. Alexander

They were forced to the conclusion that only a system of peace-time national service could achieve the necessary standard of defence—

Vice-Admiral Taylor (Paddington, South)

Can the right hon. Gentleman say on what date?

Mr. Alexander

Perhaps I may finish my sentence? I am entitled to make quite sure, after all that has been said on this matter, that I am perfectly clear and accurate, and also, I am not to be drawn. His Majesty's Government having, as I say, come to that decision, there were two main considerations which they had to reconcile. The first was to obtain from a system of peacetime national service the essential results for which it was to be introduced, or in other words, to provide for the Forces their minimum foreseeable requirements in manpower year by year, both for the active troops and in reserve. And, secondly, they had to weigh very carefully the optimum needs of the Services against the disadvantages unavoidable in removing appreciable numbers of the youth of the country temporarily from its civilian economy. Their original decision taken after careful consideration of the circumstances as they then presented themselves last autumn, was to ask for 18 months' full-time Service. Five months later—[An HON. MEMBER: "Last March."]—the Government have tabled this Amendment to reduce that period to 12 months.

Mr. Pickthorn

Not too fast.

Mr. Alexander

Like many major decisions of policy in the past which appeared, on the face of it, to have been taken precipitately, the considerations which led to this one had been building themselves up for some time. In the light of the facts of the economic situation and of the views expressed in the successive Debates on the Service Estimates, on the Defence White Paper, and on the Second Reading of the Bill itself, the Government decided that this 18 months period must be reviewed against the great stringency of the resources of the country in the next few years, and more especially as regards its manpower. The Government came to the conclusion that the maintenance of 18 months' whole-time Service from 1949 onwards, however desirable from the point of view of the Services, could no longer be justified in the face of the substantial advantages which would accrue to the national interest from the adoption of the shorter period.

It was clear that the longer period proposed originally in the Bill was a matter of considerable concern not only in Parliament but in the country. It is essential, when a Measure of this kind involving a radical change in established policies, is introduced, that it should not only be necessary in the interests of maintaining the Services to meet their commitments, but also that its essential relation to our defence needs and its priority in relation to other competing demands must be demonstrably clear to the nation as a whole. Only if it satisfies this last requirement, will the scheme embodied in the Bill obtain ready acceptance by the great majority of the people in the country, and will its young men accept the obligations of the Bill as their bounden duty in the national interest. It is the privilege of democratic governments to lead and, on the other hand, to consider public opinion.

The Government commend this Amendment of the Bill for approval by the Committee as a proposal designed to reconcile the two essential requirements of sustaining the Armed Forces in their role of national defence and of pressing forward with the rehabilitation of our national economy.

4.30 p.m.

Mr. Churchill

I have been looking around for something upon which to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman. After some difficulty, I have found at least one point on which I can offer him my compliments, and that is the control of his facial expression, which enabled him to deliver the ridiculous and deplorable harangue to which we have listened, and yet keep an unsmiling face. Indeed, there were moments when I was not quite sure whether he was not taking his revenge on the forces which compelled him to his present course of action, by showing them how ridiculous their case was, and how absurd their position would be when it was presented to the House of Commons. I spoke yesterday of the care and thought given to the social and industrial side of the Bill as explained by the Minister of Labour, and I am willing to believe that equal attention was given to the military side. That is the foundation of the complaint which we make. Let me read what the right hon. Gentleman said, not in the autumn of last year, but on 20th March of this year of grace, 1947. I must read to the House what the right hon. Gentleman said, because I was naturally greatly impressed by it: At the direction of the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staffs in the autumn prepared their considered appreciation of the defence requirements of this country. They put forward their detailed Estimates of the manpower requirements of the three Services as the minimum necessary to implement the defence commitments. The Chiefs of Staffs—I want to emphasise this point strongly—did not produce their considered p10posals without relation to considerations of the available manpower re- sources of the country and of all the realities of the manpower situation. They presented to the Government a severely practical statement from their point of view of the manpower requirements of the Services, not based on the numbers ideally required to carry out those commitments satisfactorily, but upon an appreciably lower scale on which they thought they could manage … To put the matter in a sentence, I would say that the numbers required by the Armed Forces to carry out the defence commitments of this country have been very carefully screened by the Chiefs of Staffs in their report to the Government. That is a curious phrase which has crept in. "Sifted" would have been a more natural word, and would avoid any ambiquity with the word "concealed." "Screened" is a modern vulgarism. I continue the quotation: Those proposals were, in turn, considered in relation to the realities of the economic position. The report of the Chiefs of Staffs was scrutinised with extreme care and in great detail. So was the initial sketch estimates prepared by the Service Departments on the basis of that report, and of the production programmes put forward by the Joint War Production staff. The main burden of that examination fell on myself and my Service colleagues assisted on the production aspect by the Minister of Supply. Discussions subsequently took place in the defence committee and in the Cabinet. As a result very substantial reductions of the original proposals were achieved, with the full co-operation of the Service Ministers and of the Chiefs of Staffs. The Estimate, in its first form, as submitted to me, envisaged a total expenditure of £1,064,000,000 and that figure was eventually cut to £899,000,000, involving a reduction of £165,000,000, or more than 15 per cent. of the original p10posal. Substantial reductions were also achieved in the manpower figure for the Services themselves and for their production. In particular, the size of the Forces, already put by the Chiefs of Staffs below which they regarded as necessary for our commitments, was fixed at a still lower level."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th March, 1947: Vol. 435, c. 610–11.] I think I am justified in saying that great and close attention was also given to the military side. This, I repeat, was said not in the autumn of last year, but on 20th March, 1947, and it was the right hon. Gentleman who was speaking. He will not deny that it was he who said that. I have HANSARD here—a real copy of the OFFICIAL REPORT. Only five or six weeks ago the right hon. Gentleman used those heavy, serious arguments, showing the care with which everything had been examined, and the refinements and judgments at each stage by the natural and normal processes of Parliamentary government, and showing at every point, how the Chiefs of Staffs had produced what they thought necessary, until finally an agreement was reached on which all could in saying that it was the minimum. I do not think any one can fail to be impressed by the powerful character of the statement made to the House, and we on this side of the Committee were impressed by it. But now the right hon. Gentleman comes down and tells us in elegant language that what he said on 20th March was all "piffle and poppycock." [An HON. MEMBER: "Touché."] I would not dream of using terms like that unless they were quoted on the high authority of a Minister of the Crown.

How can the right hon. Gentleman now bear, with composure, the fact that he used those words, which we thought were used in good faith, which we thought were based on a real solid decision, and conviction, and study of the question on its merits? How can the Prime Minister sit at his side, with all this great responsibility, and now pretend that, owing to a study of the economic position achieved in 48 hours—after 70 or 80 hon. Members below the Gangway had voted against him—the whole scene is transformed? One can only leave these matters to the broad judgment of the country as a whole, and I am quite sure that nothing could have more weakened confidence in the present Administration than the light-hearted way in which they immediately respond to the pressure of their tail below the Gangway. This is a scorpion organisation, with a sting in its tail. How can it be pretended that the new 12 months' system has been thought out carefully, in proportion to our needs? On 20th March the right hon. Gentleman was speaking in the words which I have read to the Committee. He then based himself on the elaborate schemes so carefully prepared in the autumn. Two days later than the Division, he has prepared an entirely different scheme, based on 12 months' service. He must have worked very hard during those 48 hours to make all the tremendous changes and recasting of the immediate and intricate Service problems, in all three Services—all in 48 hours. It is wonderful what great strides can be made when there is a resolute purpose behind them.

The right hon. Gentleman has not concealed the fact that he still thinks that the 18 months was most highly desirable and necessary, but in his statement he made explaining this somersault, or tergiversation—however one likes to express it—he admitted, nakedly and squalidly, that the reason was political He said nothing about this wonderful revelation of economic difficulties in which our country stood, which came to him on the morrow of the Division in the House. What he said was in the light of the Debate in the House of Commons—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Certainly, but one had hoped that the arguments he put before us for 18 months were based on a long and careful study. That they should have been cast aside and thrown overboard as a result of 70 or 80 Members voting against the Government is, if I may say so, a degradation and disreputability of government which has rarely been seen in this House.

I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman—I do him justice for this—did not pretend that the Chiefs of the Staff were in agreement with what had been done. He used the word "consulted." Well, one can always consult a man and ask him "Would you like to have your head cut off tomorrow?" and after he has said, "I would rather not," cut it off. "Consultation" is a vague and elastic term. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman made no pretence that he was acting on expert advice in this matter, or that he had behind him the authority of the Chiefs of Staff. It is not the business of the Chiefs of Staff to decide these matters. I am a Parliamentarian myself, I have always been one. I think that a Minister is entitled to disregard expert advice. What he is not entitled to do is to pretend he is acting upon it, when in fact he is acting contrary to it. I am not accusing the right hon. Gentleman of violating that canon. He has made it perfectly clear that this is a political manœuvre for a political purpose, and founded on political arguments and political arguments solely.

I must say I am very sorry for the Minister of Defence. His naked, squalid confession that all design, planning and expert advice were thrown aside, although he had received a 300 majority from the House, of which we contributed 132, lowers his position as Minister of Defence, and I am afraid that he will never be able to retrieve what he has lost. What confidence can we place in his future statements about the defence of the country when it is quite clear that if 70 or 80 pacifists or "cryptos," or that breed of degenerate intellectuals who have done so much harm, vote against him he is prepared to run away, abandon all his prepared plans, worked out over months, and produce, in 48 hours, anything that can be rushed out to placate his critics?

I have here a quotation from Burke which he used about a Government in bygone days. It does not quite apply; I will show afterwards why it does not. It reads: They never had any kind of system, right or wrong, hut only invented occasionally some miserable tale for the day in order meanly to sneak out of difficulties into which they had proudly strutted. The reason why that quotation does not wholly apply is that, in this case, the Government did have a careful system and argument and scheme prepared, and they have cast it away in order to avoid their Parliamentary difficulties. At any rate, the right hon. Gentleman may be quite sure that people will no more, in the future, believe what he says about national defence than they believe what the Minister of Fuel and Power says about the state of our fuel stocks. It is quite certain that all the Army plans, based on 18 months' service, must be completely altered for 12 months' service. This would apply even more to the naval and Air Force plans.

4.45 p.m.

I am rather distressed by the problem which will now be put to many young men. Although a 12 months' period looks easier, there might be an advantage to be gained both by the State and the individual by having an 18 months' period, which will not be gained from the 12 months' period. There is the case of a young man I know, who was an apprentice electrical artificer, a clever lad, who was called up to the Navy the other day. I asked him how he felt about going. He was rather sorry to leave his job for 18 months but he was very ready to go. In 18 months he could have been bent into the electrical work of a ship of war, whereas to attempt to do that in 12 months would be a sheer loss and waste to the Service, without even getting to the point where he would be able to bring his specialised technical acquirements to the handling of the ever-increasing electrical complications of a warship. The effect of this upon the Navy and upon the Air Force, neither of which have stood in very great need of conscription—

Mr. Paget (Northampton)

How long in war did it take to bend an electrical artificer into the working of a ship? Six weeks.

Mr. Churchill

There is rather an argumentative point about that—what does "bend" mean? I submit to the Committee that there was a chance of making these young men who are called up, and who have to make a considerable sacrifice, much more effective in the technical aspects than they can possibly be in the period of a year's training, the great bulk of which will be used for the more primitive forms of training. Anyhow, it is quite certain that no plan for the 12 months could have been made in 48 hours. Surely, the right hon. Gentleman and the Prime Minister will admit that. When, I would like to know, did he make up his mind? How long after the Division figures had been published did he take to decide that it must be 12 months instead of 18 months? How was he able to pass this whole vast scheme and system through his head, and make all the consequential changes that were necessary? What happened was simply sheer panic in the face of pressure from a minority, and a minority which had been decisively outvoted by the House of Commons.

The party on this side of the House have suffered a great deal from the taunt of "guilty men," which was made great use of at the Election, and which hon. Gentlemen think they can jeer about today., But nothing I have seen in my Parliamentary experience, and I have a right to speak on this matter, has been equal, in abjectness, in failure of duty to the country, and in failure to stand up for convictions and belief, to this sudden volte face, change and scuttle of which the Prime Minister and his Minister of Defence were guilty. They may never be called to account in the future for what they are doing now, but it is perfectly certain that, henceforward, we have no foundation to rest upon in respect of defence. The title of the Minister of Defence should be changed. He should be called the "Minister of Defence unless Attacked." What a lamentable exhibition he has made of himself—one which must be deeply injurious to the reputation which he built up for himself during the war, when he had different leadership.

I am not going to keep the Committee any longer, because many hon. Gentlemen on this side will go more into the details of this matter. As soon as I heard of the change—it was astonishing, considering we supported the Government in the Lobby with all our strength, that not even a word was said to us on a matter of this kind—as soon as I heard it on the telephone, I issued a statement saying that we must consult together to reconsider our position. We have done so. [An HON. MEMBER: "The boys had told you off."] The hon. Member, no doubt, has been snooping around to try to collect information from the meetings of the Conservative Party. I can assure him that I have not changed my view one-eighth of an inch since this business started. We have come to the conclusion that in spite of this change—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) is very hilarious. He is entitled to be. He is the one who has forced this change on the Government. As a matter of fact, for the purpose of our national defence he ought to be sitting in the place of the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence.

Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East)

I supported the Government.

Mr. Churchill

In spite of the change, I say, we shall continue to support this Bill.

Mr. Mikardo (Reading)

Then what is all the fuss about?

Mr. Churchill

When the Question is put, "That the word 'eighteen' stand part of the Clause," we shall vote for it, in exactly the same way as we did on the Second Reading when we were appealed to so strongly by the Government and the Minister of Defence to support this period of 18 months. Then we relied on the assurances of the Government that the 18 months' period was absolutely necessary for our security and the discharge of our obligations. Nothing having been said to relieve us of that argument, we shall continue to vote as they urged us to vote on the last occasion. We are sorry that His Majesty's Ministers and the 250 Socialists who voted for 18 months' service a month ago, will not have the courage to come into the Lobby with us. They have this consolation, for what it is worth. They will be able to say to their constituents, "We voted for 18 months because we thought it was right. But please remember—credit us with this—that we ran away as soon as we heard it was unpopular." When this matter is discussed in constituencies I doubt if the principle will be much a matter of controversy, but if it is, it is not credit that hon. Members will gain by their "right about turn" but widespread and deeply felt contempt.

No one has ever suggested that the Liberal Party have acted with inconsistency in this matter. I was, however, very glad to see that the Parliamentary group in the House had been decisively overruled by the Liberal Conference, who considered that the national interest should prevail, and were quite ready to cut themselves off from the chance of picking up a few stray Labour votes at by-elections or on other occasions.

Mr. Byers

Before the right hon. Gentleman makes charges of that nature, he might have the decency to read the resolution which was passed.

Mr. Churchill

I was paying compliments. I was complimenting, first of all, the consistency of the Labour Parliamentary Party in what has long been a tradition of Liberalism. I was complimenting also the larger body outside. with whom they are in relation for the courageous and firm steps they have taken. I hope the presentation of these bouquets will not be attended by such violent reactions as seem to animate my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Mr. Byers).

If Ministers should succeed in defeating their own original proposal of 18 months, we then come to the insertion of the word "twelve." If we were looking at this question from a narrow view of party interests, we could have said "As this Bill no longer represents a considered scheme or the conviction of the Government or of their experts, we will no longer support the Measure, and give the Government an awkward Division." But we think that this matter is above party and above Parliamentary tactics. We support the principle of national service because it sustains the moral health and the safety of the nation. We shall, therefore, vote with the Government for the insertion of the word "twelve" while entering the strongest protest against the levity, opportunism and panic-stricken cowardice which they have shown

Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South)

We have just listened to a speech which is remarkable for at least two things. First, the right hon. Gentleman announces that his party proposes to vote both for an 18 months' and for a 12 months' period of service. Having achieved that somersault, the right hon. Gentleman then fails to give the Committee any reason at all why he considers that either is the correct period. Throughout his speech, I think it is fair to say, we have not heard a single word about the substance of this Amendment. He did venture an interjection on the subject of electrical artificers and was promptly punctured by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). He introduced the matter and he should not complain and say that it is a difficult matter to argue when he is told that the appropriate period for training during the war was much shorter than the 18 months of which he spoke. The interesting thing about the contribution from the Leader of the Opposition is that as a Parliamentarian he is in favour of Parliament having the last word. He said, "I am a Parliamentarian," but then he rebuked the Government for having heeded the word of Parliament and the feeling in the country.

Mr. Boothby (Aberdeen and Kincardine, Eastern)

Has the hon. Gentleman forgotten the fact that the 18 months proposal was carried by an overwhelming majority?

Mr. Callaghan

It is within the recollection of most hon. Members, and it ought to be within the recollection of the hon. Member, that a number of us said that we specifically supported the principle of the Bill. There were some who said that they did not support the period included in the Bill, and others who remained silent on that point. Surely, it is not to be contended that when an hon. Member votes for the Second Reading of a Bill he votes for everything in it. If so, why have we all these Amendments on the Order Paper, some of them admirable Amendments which will improve the Bill considerably?

Mr. Hollis (Devizes) rose—

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Callaghan

I would readily give way to the hon. Member, but I must make some sort of connected contribution, and I cannot allow myself to be led astray so early. The main issue—the right hon. Gentleman was correct in concentrating on it—is, Who is to decide, and having decided, shall they stick to their decision and not alter it? I have always been in favour of a period of 12 months and I have said so on many occasions. There are many Members on both sides of the Committee who are in the same position. Some hon. Members opposite will be extremely embarrassed when they are asked by their leader tonight to support a period of 18 months. If the period had not been altered, I am willing to prophesy now that there would have been some Conservative Members in the Government Lobby, if such an Amendment had been put down. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] An hon. Member opposite says "Nonsense," but there are writings in existence by Conservative Members, which lead one to that conclusion.

The main issue here of course is that the Chiefs of Staff may not have the final word, That theory was all very well in the 19th century, when the call which the Chiefs of Staff made upon the resources of the nation were of such a small character that they could be absorbed by the nation and a bit of slack pulled up to cover what they needed, but in time of total war the needs of the Chiefs of Staff have to be amalgamated with those of other sections of the community. I suppose that the first time that fact was demonstrated was during the first world war when coalminers serving in the front line were recalled in order to serve in the pits. I imagine that that was the first time we departed from the principle that the Chiefs of Staff were entitled to have all that they thought they ought to have. Certainly, during the war, during the inter-war years between 1918 and 1939, and during the recent war, it was clear that the Chiefs of Staff had to take their share, and their share only, of the full ration available to the nation as a whole of our industrial strength.

There have been many occasions, and the right hon. Member has been closely connected with them, when political considerations have prevailed over military considerations. Was Field-Marshal Lord Wavell wholly in favour of the excursion into Greece, during the recent war?

Hon. Members

Yes.

Mr. Churchill

Certainly, he was in favour of it.

Mr. Callaghan

I am bound, in view of what the right hon. Gentleman says, of course, to accept it; but I can only say that there were expeditions mounted, of which I had some knowledge, and about which we were firmly of the opinion that political considerations had prevailed over military considerations, and quite rightly. For example—and here I revert to the expedition into Greece—one of the reasons why political considerations prevailed so strongly at the time was not because of the feeling in the House of Commons and not even because of the feeling in the country, but because we thought it worth while in view of its effect on the peoples of Europe that political considerations should prevail over the military needs of that time. There is every case for saying that on these occasions and in these matters, political considerations must weigh with us, and often prevail. and because of this, I thought it was a little bad for the right hon. Gentleman to get that snarl into his voice when talking about the politicians who had forced this matter on to the Government as though it were an improper thing to do.

A stronger point which can undoubtedly be made is that when a Government have made up their minds they should stick to it. As the right hon. Gentleman said, this matter, presumably, was thought out extremely carefully and no doubt a great deal of thought was given to it beforehand. But it is not the first time a Government have changed their minds after giving a great deal of time to an important issue. The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt remember the 1937 Budget. He took some part in discussing it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was Mr. Neville Chamberlain and he introduced the ill-fated and ill-starred National Defence Contribution. A tax of that kind is not suddenly slipped on to the Table. It is the product of the long, careful, and detailed study, that proceeds for months before a Budget is presented. The right hon. Gentleman will remember, indeed he made some comments on the matter in the Debates, that the tax was withdrawn as a result of representations. That important tax to raise revenue was completely withdrawn, and a new tax substituted after it had been put into the Budget. It was withdrawn because of the representations of the Chambers of Commerce and of the Federation of British Industries. I admit that the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day became Prime Minister between the withdrawal of the tax that met with such resentment, and the introduction of a new tax. The right hon. Gentleman will remember how gentlemen in the City of London formed themselves into N.D.C. clubs and resolved upon "No Darned Contribution" to Tory funds.

Mr. Michael Astor (Surrey, Eastern)

On a point of Order, Mr. Beaumont. Has this matter anything to do with the Amendment under discussion?

The Deputy-Chairman (Mr. Hubert Beaumont)

The hon. Member is using an illustration for the argument he is presenting to the Committee.

Mr. Callaghan

There is no need for me to labour the point. The right hon. Gentleman will agree, of course, that there is every precedent upon an important issue of this sort for a Government, including Governments with which he has been associated in the past, to change their minds when they come up against a considerable body of feeling. In this case it happens to be the feeling of the people, and not the feeling of gentlemen in the City of London. In short, my argument is that the decision of the Chiefs of Staff must be subject to criticism and open to revision by Parliament.

Then, with that remarkable fertility of language that he possesses, the right hon. Gentleman went on to comment on "this abject, squalid policy of scuttle." Really, I am not sure that he is not failing a little, He has used the words "demoralised," "squalid," and "scuttle" in at least the last three Debates. The richness of his language is such that I am sure he will be able to find new adjectives. For him to evoke cheers from the party on that side when he refers to us in those scathing terms would lead to the impression that that party had never changed its mind. Was that not the party which was returned to maintain the country on the gold standard in 1931, and then came off it a few days afterwards?

The Deputy-Chairman

I cannot allow the hon. Member to pursue that argument any further, as it is irrelevant.

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite (Holderness)

On a point of Order. In addition to his irrelevance, is the hon. Member in Order in straying into inaccuracy as well?

The Deputy-Chairman

Inaccuracy is not out of Order, but irrelevancy may be. It is not for me to judge inaccuracy in speech. I have called attention to the irrelevancy of the hon. Member's argument.

Mr. Callaghan

There is enough evidence for my purpose without going through the record of the party opposite to enable us to say that allegations as to an "abject policy of scuttle"—the words which the right hon. Gentleman used—do not lie in the right hon. Gentleman's mouth when he leads a party which betrayed Abyssinia—the party of Munich.

I know it is unusual to do so in these Debates, but I would now like to deal with the merits of this matter. Perhaps I might address myself to the period of time now proposed by the Government. I am certain that history will demonstrate that the Government have taken the right decision. I believe there are many sound grounds for substituting a period of 12 months. I would divide those grounds into three—economic, political and military. On the economic side, it is clear that this nation is as fully strained in its resources today as it was at any time during the war when the Chiefs of Staff had to be rationed. We are scratching round for miners; we are trying to find agricultural workers; we are asking women to go back into the textile factories. On the economic side there can be no doubt—it is part of the Government's case, and it has been accepted by the Opposition—that we are strained for manpower, and, therefore, the Government have to make up their mind whether it is more worthwhile to have 90,000 men in the Services for an extra six months than to have them in industry. To that there can be no two answers. The real foundation for the strength of the country lies in its industrial machine, and not in having men wearing khaki. Provided the men are sufficiently trained in the basic arts of war, provided they can be called up quickly, it is far better to have them in the factories pro- viding this fundamental basis strength than it is to have them sitting in the Army in order to make a prestige demonstration, or whatever it may be, in some foreign capital.

On the political side, there is no doubt that this decision has been welcomed by the country. The Leader of the Opposition said that we had fallen so low and the country knew we had fallen low. Well let us wait and see what Jarrow says today. The by-election there will not be a bad test if the situation is really as deplorable as the right hon. Gentleman's language suggested. On the political side, I have no doubt that by this move we have gained a great deal for the principle of national service. I am in favour of it, and I voted for it on the Second Reading, as did most hon. Members on this side.

On military grounds, there is ample evidence that a man can be trained in the basic arts pf war in the period of 12 months. We know in what a short period of time it was done during the war. We know that when there was pressure on the Services during the war, they were able to train men in a much shorter period than 12 months. We know that the Military Training Act, 1939, laid down a period of six months. If that was not regarded as being adequate in those days, why was six months suggested. I think six months was too short, and that developments during the last war demonstrated that it was too short; but do not let us forget that in 1939 we were going to call up men for six months for military training purposes, and it is now proposed to double that period. In my view, and in the view of many of us who served in the Forces, there is no doubt that basic training and corps training can be done in 12 months, and there can be a margin left over in practically any basic arm of the Services. As regards the specialist arms—for example, the radar operators in the Navy—of course, they cannot be trained in 12 months, but nor could they be trained in 18 months. The pilots of the R.A.F. could not be trained in 18 months, and they will not be trained in 12 months. It is clear that the Navy and the R.A.F. will have to rely mainly upon volunteers, whether the pediod is 12 months or 18 months, and the reduction in the period will make no difference. On the military side there are others who are better qualified to speak than I am.

This is a political decision. We ought not to shrink from it because of that. I think history will demonstrate that we have taken the right decision in reducing the period from 18 months to 12 months. I believe it demonstrates that the House intends to take not only an active but an intelligent interest in the length of time for which the Armed Services will require these young men. We are reinforcing once again the control of the House over every section outside it. During the war, there was no doubt that certain sections tended to escape from that control. I am delighted that the Government have taken this action. I am certain it is a right action. I am certain they have acted wisely and have not been panicked into this decision by political pressure. There are really sound fundamental reasons for reducing the period from 18 months to 12 months, and on those grounds, we shall be very happy to support the Government.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. Niall Macpherson (Dumfries)

The hon. Member for South Cardiff (Mr. Callaghan) taunted the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition with the fact that he had advanced no reasons for being in favour either of 18 months or 12 months. The hon. Member then devoted a long part of his speech to political considerations, but, unlike the Minister of Defence, he gave some military reasons for the reduction of the period of service from 18 months to 12 months. I think the Committee will agree that not a single reason was given by the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence from a military point of view for the reduction of the period of service. All that he said was that it should be possible to compress the training. In dealing with this matter, there are two considerations that present themselves to me as being the most important. They are, first, how we are to get the best citizen reserve, and, secondly, how we are to get the most recruits for the Regular Forces. I would like at once to say that the Amendment on the Order Paper in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Sir S. Holmes) and myself does not commit the Liberal National Party. It is our Amendment, not the Party's, and the views I am about to put forward are my own views, and I do not in any way commit my hon. Friends on this Bench.

There is one thing which has to be made clear at the beginning. It would be neither possible nor, I think, desirable, to seek in a period of national service to turn out fully trained soldiers, sailors and airmen. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence said that he had been advised that 18 months would give "an adequate standard of military efficiency." I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that that does not mean that they will be fully trained members of the Forces. The training will merely give an adequate standard of military efficiency, adequate, that is to say, for a citizen reserve force. The conditions which I wish to put before the Committee are designed to show that it ought to be possible to obtain that result in a shorter period.

I would like, first, to quote what the Minister of Defence said in winding up the Second Reading Debate: What is essential, when it comes, if it ever should unfortunately come, to a major war breaking out again, and coming with all the suddenness with which major wars will come in the future, is that we should have adequate forces available which will not require long training. He went on to say: The number of men that we have had in our Regular Forces, knowing we shall have to maintain certain commitments such as the occupation of Germany for some time to come in addition to the ordinary duties of the Forces abroad, will be such that we may have to call upon certain sections of those who are called up for training, after they have done 22 months, to do the remainder of their service overseas."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st April, 1947: Vol. 435, c. 1960–2.] I submit to the Committee that if these men are sent overseas for so short a period we shall never have a force of any efficiency whatsoever anywhere. A force which is continually contracting and expanding as recruits are put into it and turned over will be no use militarily, and what is more, the right hon. Gentleman knows that at the present time the amount of training that force is doing in Germany is negligible. I was very sorry to hear in the course of the right hon. Gentleman's speech today that in spite of the reduction from 18 months to 12 months it is still the intention to send men overseas to do part of their training. I would put this to the right hon. Gentleman: has he taken the necessary measures to ensure that when they do go overseas they will get the training, or will they be doing as they are doing at the present time, losing such military aptitude as they have acquired, and, what is far worse, losing any taste for future military service. One thing that national service must seek to do is to ensure that the period and the quality of training given will be such as to encourage young men to go into the regular Forces or into the volunteer forces when they come out. Unless that is done the National Service Bill will have failed in one of its purposes.

I would like to put forward one or two considerations, which I hope will be answered, to show that if it is only a question of training—if a period of service overseas doing occupational duties is ruled out —a period of 12 months is too much. I say that because, if the efficiency and the nature of the training given is of a sufficiently high standard, we shall probably be able to attract into the regular Forces enough men to compensate for the loss of the six months' curtailment of service. We shall get sufficient volunteers, and it will then be possible to have a far more efficient standing Army than we are likely to have if the Regular Army in Europe acts more or less as a cadre for taking in recruits and turning them over. The shorter and more intensive the training the better. It must also be remembered that a certain proportion of those who will be trained will never make any use whatsoever of their training, but will subsequently enter reserved occupations; it would therefore be useless to have a longer period of training than is strictly necessary.

Another and even more cogent argument is that if the training is simply designed to give a military or naval background, to teach adaptability rather than to teach the use of certain weapons, certain techniques and certain tactics, it will be possible when the time comes, if ever it does, to train them much more rapidly to new weapons and new ideas. What would be fatal would be to do as France did between the two wars and build up a vast bureaucracy within the forces whose function was simply to take in national service personnel and turn them over. It became inflexible; the men were wedded to the weapons they learned, which meant that tactics were wedded to the weapons and made no advance at all with the re- sult that when the war came. France was fighting the last war all over again.

It would be a surprising paradox if the present Government, in this instance alone, were to level up instead of levelling down; I mean by that, if a man can be trained to an adequate degree of efficiency in a period of nine months in nine-tenths of the branches of the Services, it would in my view be wrong to retain him in the Services another three months simply because in the other one-tenth it was necessary to have a longer period of service. This follows to a large extent on what the hon. Gentleman opposite has just said. There is no doubt that there are trades which it will not be possible to man at all under the National Service scheme. I would like to suggest one or two ideas to cover that. If a branch requires a longer period of training it might perhaps be possible, to start with, only to accept into it those who have done a preliminary period of training in the Sea Cadets, the Army Cadet Corps, or the Air Training Corps. I also think, though this may be an unpopular doctrine, that a man called up for national service should not be paid on the same level as if he subsequently volunteers for the Regular Forces—efficiency pay apart. The advantage of this would be that at the end of the period he would have an additional inducement to stay in the Forces. During the period of national service he is doing a national duty; he is continuing his education; he is learning to defend his country, his home and himself; and after that he should have the opportunity of joining the Forces with a substantial increase in pay.

I would like to refer to the obvious impossibility of training an officer in the period of nine months—even an officer who will continue his training later in the Territorial Army. We should have put down an Amendment on this subject if the Government Amendment to reduce the period of service to 12 months had not been put on the Order Paper in the meantime. In the period of 12 months, however, given real national service training, it may be quite possible to turn out sound officers for the Territorial Army.

There is one essential condition, referred to by the right hon. Gentleman, of any reduction of service, and that is that the service must be really efficient and intensive. There is not a little disquiet in the country about the method by which basic training is at present being carried on. Is it really satisfactory that young men, as soon as they are called up, should be allowed to stay out all night and be allowed to go away for weekends? Comparing that with the system by which an esprit de corps was built up before the war, of an initial training period of some 17 weeks before a man became entitled to leave, there is a very great disparity. If a young man goes to Oxford or Cambridge he is not allowed out all night; why should he be allowed out all night in the Forces? Surely it is necessary to get the same idea of duty and discipline in the Forces as at the university?

All these purposes would be achieved if the right hon. Gentleman were to make it clear beyond any dispute what this period of national service is to be for. Is it to be a period of training only, or is it to be a period partly of training and partly of service abroad? If it is to be both, then what are the proportions?

5.30 p.m.

The Deputy-Chairman

The hon. Gentleman is now getting beyond the matters which are dealt with in the Amendment. These are points which arise on other Amendments.

Mr. Macpherson

I am much obliged for your guidance, Mr. Beaumont, but the fact remains that we are considering length of service, and I submit that it is inevitable that we should also consider how that service is to be employed.

The Deputy-Chairman

No. It would not be in Order to pursue that line of argument, because we shall be dealing with that matter later.

Mr. Macpherson

I am grateful for your guidance, Mr. Beaumont, and I conclude by saying that the reason why we put down the Amendment standing in the names of my hon. Friend and myself is simply because the right hon. Gentleman has said that it would be the first object of this Bill to create a trained reserve. We contend that, if that is the main object of this Bill, then a shorter period than 12 months is sufficient. It will be for the right hon. Gentleman to say for what additional purposes he requires these men. There may be strong masons for having a longer period, but I will go even further and say that, if there are other duties than training to be performed, a period of 18 months is not sufficient, and, in my view, the period should either be shorter than 12 months, or more than 18 months.

Mr. Blackburn (Birmingham, King's Norton)

I must say that it strikes me as a little surprising that the Opposition should have decided to take this action in relation to voting for 18 months, because the burden of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was—and I should have thought he said it with some justification—that they could no longer rely upon the assurance given to them by the Minister of Defence on a previous occasion. How can the party opposite vote for 18 months on the basis of an assurance which they say they can no longer accept? It seems to me to be entirely illogical. If they adopted the logical course, they would abstain from voting.

I agree that there is some doubt in the minds of hon. Members of my party who voted for 18 months and are now asked to vote for 12. It is quite true, and I entirely accept it, that they did not vote for 18 months as such. They voted upon the principle of the Bill, and it is logical for them to say, "We are voting for this Bill on Second Reading, but we will put down Amendments to it, and, if necessary, we are prepared to vote against the Government." That position is perfectly logical. It seems to me that the really serious aspect of this matter has been brought out by the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman). I see that my hon. Friend is not in his place at the moment, but I' warned him that I was going to refer to what he said, and perhaps his private secretary, the hon. and gallant Member for Dudley (Colonel Wigg)—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for East Coventry made a speech which was accepted by the newspapers as a most important speech and one which affected the position of the Government. The hon. Member for South Cardiff (Mr. Callaghan), whose ability and whose qualities of good humour and courage I have admired on many occasions, I thought made a rather serious error in his speech, because he more or less admitted that the Government had acted under political pressure. I do not think that that was the burden of the speech of the Minister of Defence, and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the fact that he de- fended this new proposal upon its merits, and not upon the grounds of having acted under political pressure.

The hon. Member for East Coventry, in his speech on a previous occasion, said that foreign policy and defence policy were separate problems. There is no truth whatever in that statement, which is completely contrary to what the Prime Minister said when he told us that foreign policy and defence policy are aspects of one and the same policy. I hope that we shall get a very clear statement later in the Debate on this question of need. I do not really know where either party stands at the present time. Are the Government in favour of national military conscription for its own sake or not? Is the party opposite in favour of national military conscription for its own sake or not? As I understand it—

Colonel Wigg (Dudley)

On a point of Order. Is it in Order for the hon. Gentleman to refer to