Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— [Mr. William Whiteley.]

5.7 P.m.

Mr. R.S. Hudson (Southport)

I think I ought to start by saying that we on this side of the House appreciate the action of the acting Leader of the House in realising what I think everyone outside must realise by now, that the country is facing a situation of unparalleled gravity, and that this honourable House is., accordingly, entitled, at the earliest possible moment, not only to discuss it, but to hear a very much fuller account of the causes that have precipitated it, and the reasons for the lack of foresight and action on the part of His Majesty's Government in preventing it, than we have had up to now.

I think it will probably be common ground on all sides of the House that the experience of years proves that it is essential, if the country is to continue without a breakdown during the winter, to accumulate large stocks of coal during the summer. In the days when coal, as we know, was in ample supply —Members opposite were never tired of telling us that the difficulty was not a shortage of coal, but unemployment among miners —it was always recognised that during January, February and March the public utility companies, electricity and gas, had to "live on their own fat," that they could not get through the winter unless adequate supplies and stocks of coal had been accumulated during the summer. We all know the difficulties which faced this country during the war, and we all appreciate the difficulties which have faced it since VE-Day. But the fact remains that the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Fuel and Power and his colleagues in the Government did fail singularly to accumulate anything like adequate stocks during last summer. He, indeed, would be the first to admit it. He admitted it during the Debate in the House on Friday, and in case any hon. Member was not present, or has not read the Debate, I quote what the right hon. Gentleman said: I will agree that it the stock position had been good in he last three or four months, we could have avoided any difficulties that are likely to emerge in the next few days But the stock position has been bad."—OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th February, 1947; Vol 132; c.2181] The gravamen of the charge we have to make against the right hon. Gentleman is this —that he was warned repeatedly about the inevitable results of allowing the stock position in the summer to be so bad and yet took no adequate steps to build up those stocks. He refused to admit that the situation was so serious —or I should say that, at one moment, he admitted that it was serious, and, at another, he became optimistic and contradicted the warnings which he had previously given. In spite of knowing, as he must have known, that stocks were perilously low, he made no adequate plans to meet the emergency that was almost bound to arise. What were the warnings that were given to the right hon. Gentleman? The warnings came from all quarters —they came from the industry, from all on this side of the House, and from his predecessor in office, my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pembroke (Major Lloyd-George). As long ago as 16th June, 1946, the electricity supply companies issued a statement that coal stocks for electricity undertakings stood at a "dangerous level." On 23rd June, the Chairman of the Midland Counties Electric Supply Co. said: Before the. war, eight weeks' supply —summer or winter —was considered the barest minimum by the gas and electricity supply industries. There are many companies today with less than two weeks' supply. That was in June. The results of a breakdown in coal supply will mean reduced railway operations, fewer bricks, less steel and a blow to the export trade. On 24th June, my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pembroke, speaking from these benches, gave a similar warning. On 13th September, the Preston borough electrical engineer issued a warning: The coal position is very serious indeed, and unless there is a very material improvement in the coal delivery situation, it may be necessary during the coming winter to reduce supplies. On 13th September, the Public Relations Committee of the electricity supply companies issued a statement: Our object is to warn the public of the gravity of the position as we see it. Since the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Fuel and Power is so confident about the coal position, the industry would be glad to be taken into his confidence as to how, when and where the additional coal required will be forthcoming. Speaking from these benches, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan), on 20th November, said: Ministers must know the magnitude of the dangers which approach us, but their pronouncements alter with irritating inconsistency, from the most pessimistic to the most rosy tints.' — [OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th NOV., 1947; Vol.430, C, 876.] If any one wants proof of that, I would ask him to listen to the two statements made by the Minister of Fuel and Power —not at long separated intervals —but in the same month, the month of October. On 8th October, the right hon. Gentleman, in opening the Conference on "Fuel and the Future," is reported as having called for a voluntary cut of ten per cent., in order to avert a breakdown in supplies in the depth of winter. That did not prevent him from saying on 24th October: Every one knows that there is going to be a serious crisis in the coal industry, except the Minister of Fuel and Power. I want to tell you there is not going to be a crisis in coal, if, by crisis, you mean that industrial organisation is going to be seriously dislocated and that hundreds of factories are going to be closed down. Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that hundreds of factories are going to be closed down, and that industry is being seriously dislocated at the present time. At least, he refrains from making that claim.[Interruption.] The country is faced with a state of affairs that transcends mere party points of view. I said that we admit that the right hon. Gentleman was faced with difficulties in the summer in building up stocks of coal. But admitting that there were those difficulties, and knowing the failure to build up stocks, surely the position that was likely to arise this winter could have been foreseen, and, if it had been foreseen, steps could have been taken to deal with it in advance, and plans prepared to deal with all the possible eventualities. The right hon. Gentleman in his speech excused himself on two grounds. First, he said, in answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), that we were consuming coal —let me give the exact quotation: The consumption of vital commodities in this country —and certainly in the sphere of fuel and power' — I call the attention of the House to this — is higher now"— let the right hon. Gentleman take note — than at any time in the history of this country The statement was untrue. It is not higher, and, if he doubts it, I will refer him to the statistics issued by his own Department. He will find that the annual tonnage of coal consumed in Great Britain, including shipments to Northern Ireland, expressed to the nearest millions of tons, was 185 in 1946 as against 196 in 1940; 198 in 1941; 197 in 1942. The first excuse of the right hon. Gentleman does not bear examination for one moment.

The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Shinwell)

When I made that statement, I expressly stated that I was referring to the peacetime consumption, and not the consumption during the war.

Mr. R.S. Hudson

I will read the whole statement from HANSARD: I repeat there are 19 million and more persons in this country engaged in gainful employment. The consumption of vital commodities in this country —and certainly in the sphere of fuel and power —is higher now —let the right hon. Gentleman take note —than at Any time in the history of this country". I am not being unfair, for I am quoting from HANSARD. That is the first excuse put forward by the right hon. Gentleman, as recorded by HANSARD. It is completely without foundation. I turn to the second excuse which the right hon. Gentleman makes. It is that consumption has gone up unexpectedly. Perhaps I had better quote the exact statement as recorded. The right hon. Gentleman said: We assumed that with the rising output —and it was a fair assumption —and provided consumption did not rise unduly, we should escape difficulty"— I suppose the right hon. Gentleman will not challenge that sentence — estimates that have been presented to me by the Central Electricity Board, which proceeded from 545,000 tons required for the electricity supply to 560,000.…'' — [0FFICIAL REPORT, 7th February, 1947; Vol.432, c.2171–5.] —and so on. The right hon. Gentleman implied that it was unreasonable to expect the Government and himself to have anticipated increased consumption, but why? Have not hon. Members opposite and Members of the Government been going up and down the country for the last 12 months saying, "Look how magnificently we have turned over from war to peace; look how many people are employed; look at the output of goods for home consumption "? Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have boasted of the increased number of electric fires and other electrical appliances for the house-S hold sold. People do not buy electric fires in order to look at them cold, or to decorate their houses. They buy electric fires because they are afraid their houses will be cold. If the right hon. Gentleman had had any foresight, he would have known that there was bound to be increased consumption. Has his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade never told him there were more electric fires being made? Has the Minister of Supply, who boasted in July of the way in which people were getting to work again in peace time, never told him that if there was reconversion and if there were more people employed, the consumption of power would be bound to go up? The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in his excuses today, mentioned the fact that owing to the cessation of the blackout, the reconversion of industry, and the larger number of people at work in this country, consumption has gone up. Of course, it has, and it was to be foreseen. The gravamen of our charge today is that the right hon. Gentleman either did not foresee, or if he did foresee it, took no adequate steps to meet it.

I go further. The right hon. Gentleman talks about an increased consumption of electricity as though that were the whole of the trouble. Far from it. It was not only increased consumption; it was not only that in certain weeks the actual consumption of coal by the electricity companies rose above the average figure of 557,000 tons given by the Central Electricity Board. That was not the only trouble If it had been, and there had been adequate stocks, we should not have been in this mess. The trouble is that the right hon. Gentleman failed consistently throughout the summer and the winter to provide adequate supplies of coal, or even the minimum supplies of coal that were required. Let me give some figures, because it is as well that the country should realise where the blame for this state of affairs truly lies. I apologise to the House for dealing at length with this point, but it is important, because it meets and rebuts the excuse made by the right hon. Gentleman. I think it was wise of him to send out to have this checked by his officials. It will be interesting to see whether they are able to rebut it.

Electricity, coal and gas coal are what is known as "programmed." Estimates are given in April for the next six months to October, and later in the summer estimates are made for the six months October to April. Those estimates are furnished by the electricity and gas industries to the Ministry of Fuel and Power. The right hon. Gentleman will not deny that. Electricity estimates given in May, 1946, for the six summer months showed that, to build up a stock of only 4.3 weeks consumption —I pause to remind the House that in peacetime a minimum of eight weeks in the winter was regarded as necessary for real safety —to build up only 4.3 weeks supply at the end of the summer, it would be necessary to deliver to the electricity industry 507,000 tons of coal a week. It was estimated then that, by reason of the increasing demand in the summer and the anticipated increasing demand in the winter —because even though the Minister did not realise there was likely to be an increased demand, the electricity industry and the companies budgeted for an increased demand —the new programme, translated into what would be required as weekly deliveries to the, electricity industry, would collie to 559,000 tons a week during the winter. Of the 507,000 tons a week in the summer required to build up a stock of 4.3 weeks supply, in only four weeks out of 26 weeks was this delivery surpassed. In all the other 22 weeks, deliveries ranged from 372,000 to 435,000 tons, against a requirement of 507,000 tons.

The House will realise, and the right hon. Gentleman could or should have known from the statistics available in his Department, that all through the summer the deliveries of coal to build up the 4.3 weeks stock were falling short. The right hon. Gentleman and his officials could not have been under any illusion as to what the country would be faced with this winter. Therefore, we started the winter of 1946, on 1st October, with only 3.6 weeks coal supplies in stock, but since 1st October —this was a point also which the right hon. Gentleman talked about —the increased demand by the electricity industry rose from 559,00o tons to 575,000 tons, then to 600,000 tons, and finally to 700,00o tons a week. But the Minister was told at the beginning of the winter that the electricity industry would require 559,000 tons a week, and only in five weeks out of 16 to date has this delivery been exceeded, and in the remaining weeks it has been from 425,000 tons to 557,000. The House and the country will realise that not only during 22 weeks out of 26 weeks in the summer was coal short delivered to build up stocks, but also that, since October, in only five weeks has the estimated minimum requirement of the electricity industry been met.

It is clear, therefore, that this excuse which the right hon. Gentleman put forward on Friday, that the crisis has come about as a result of an unexpected demand since October, will not bear examination for one moment. The fact of the matter is that even had there not been this bad weather, it is almost certain from the figures I have given that a similar crisis to that with which we are faced today would have come upon us some time either at the end of this month, or early in March. The right hon. Gentleman and many of his friends and his supporters in the Press are trying to blame this on the weather. This is not the first severe winter we have experienced in our history, but it is the first winter that has brought us to disaster. I hope that I have made it clear to the House that the right hon. Gentleman knew from the intake figures of the electricity industry, that a crisis was imminent. The particular week in which it was going to break does not matter.

What has the right hon. Gentleman done to meet this crisis? His first plan was the plan of a voluntary cut. That failed, and then we had the plan of allocations. Thirdly, we had the plan associated with the name of the President of the Board of Trade, which was called realistic allocations. Now we come to the present plan. I should like the House to recall for one moment the history of this plan. Last Thursday the acting Leader of the House poured scorn on a request from this side of the House for a Debate on coal. He talked about the new-found zeal of the Opposition, and but for the insistence of Members on this side of the House arising out of a Question by the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. Ellis Smith) we should not have had the Debate last Friday. What I should like one of the right hon. Gentlemen who is to reply to tell us is whether on Thursday, at 3.30 p.m., when the acting Leader of the House of Commons was resisting our demand, he was aware of the critical position that faced the industry of this country.

The prime Minister in his statement today in answer to a Question by my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) said that the Government only came to their decision on Friday morning. They may only have come to their decision on Friday morning, but what I should like to know is, what was the advice given by the Central Electricity Board and by the Electricity Commissioners? Was it only on Thursday night that the Electricity Commissioners and the Central Electricity Board told the right hon. Gentleman how desperately serious the position was? If, on the contrary, it was known to members of the Government on Wednesday, how can the right hon. Gentleman account for what I can only describe as the levity with which the acting Leader of the House dealt on Thursday with the request for a Debate?

I come now to the behaviour of the Minister of Fuel and Power himself. We learnt to our surprise, and I am sure too, the general surprise, that when my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Prestcott) had written to the Minister of Fuel and Power saying that he had got the Adjournment for Friday, and proposed raising this matter, the Minister attached so little importance to it that he was not even going to bother to be present. It was only after considerable urging by this side of the House that he consented to attend on Friday. When he did come, what did he do? One is entitled to assume that, but for the action of my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen in calling the Minister's attention to this Debate on the Adjournment, this vital announcement, affecting the whole country, would have been made in some hole and corner way, and not to this House.

Why did the right hon. Gentleman want to wait as long as he did on Friday to announce the details? It is perfectly true that according to the Rules of the House it was for the hon. Member for Darwen to open the Debate, which he did. However, there was nothing to stop the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Fuel and Power getting up and saying, "I have a serious announcement to make to the House. Here it is." Instead, what did the right hon. Gentleman do? Again I turn to HANSARD. It was 2.31 before the right hon. Gentleman got up to speak. He went through a long rigmarole attacking my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), and it was not until 3.10 that he disclosed to the House this vital information and the decision of the Government, which the Prime Minister told us today had been reached on Friday morning. Why did he want to wait? Quite obviously because he did not want to face a full discussion. I venture to suggest that it was gross contempt of the High Court of Parliament, but it compares with the other things which he has done. I now pass to the present plan. I should like to know what consultations the Government had with the people who are mainly concerned in carrying out this plan.

Mr. Wyatt (Birmingham, Aston)

Before the right hon. Gentleman passes to the present plan, would he tell the House how he would raise the coal stocks?

Mr.R. S. Hudson

At a more appropriate moment. It so happens that my job now is to be the interrogator, not to be interrogated.[Interruption.] I am very glad indeed that hon. Members opposite dislike so intensely the interrogation I am making. What I want to know about this plan is: Was the industry consulted? After all, it is not the Central Electricity Board and the Electricity Commissioners who have actually the detailed job of translating this plan into action but the power companies. I have information on the subject, and I give this information, which has reached me, as an illustration of the failure of the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues to make any plans beforehand.

I said earlier that they ought to have known that an emergency of this kind was likely to come about. One would have thought that ordinary prudence would have dictated that they should make preparations beforehand. They should have anticipated and foreseen the possibility of increased consumption, and laid their plans accordingly. They should have worked out some scheme to come into operation either in October, November, or December as the case might be, according to the extra consumption that was anticipated. As I said, one would have thought common prudence, owing to the low stocks of coal in the country, would have compelled them to make some plans to ensure that what stocks there were diverted to electricity rather than to other industries. One would have imagined that, having been warned on all sides that an emergency, with which we are now faced, was if not probable at all events possible, plans to meet this emergency would have been worked out beforehand. So that all that would be required would be to put them into immediate operation.

My information is that so far from that being the case, in fact, on the operating level —that is to say the level of the unfortunate engineers and so forth who have actually to run the generating stations —the first intimation they got was on Friday evening through the Press. It was not until Saturday morning that the power companies, who, after all, own the generating plants with I believe one exception, were called in and told, "Here is the Minister's decision. What are you going to do about it? How are you going to translate it into effect?"

Quite clearly it was impossible to take any effective action even to translate the Government's decision into effect, unless one knew which were the industries and the essential services that were to be preserved in operation. That information was not available until the Minister met a Press conference on Saturday afternoon, and the companies concerned were not, in fact, informed until after nine o'clock on Saturday night, because the full list was not available even to the B.B.C., who were anxious to broadcast it if they could. Can anyone conceive a greater dereliction of duty first to have let us get into this mess, and secondly to have made no preparations at all for meeting it?

I pass over what is going to happen in the future, or how long it is going to last; that will be bad enough when we have to meet it. The main thing we have to face today is that, although planning may be all right, if we want to plan then, for Heaven's sake, have a plan to meet the different emergencies. What this planning Government has done is to interfere with private plans to get on with industry, and, as far as their own duty was concerned, not merely to fail to make plans for an emergency, but also to refuse to believe that an emergency was likely to arise.

5.42 P.m.

The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Shinwell)

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Southport (Mr. R.S. Hudson) has, quite properly, claimed the right of the Opposition to interrogate the Government, and it is the Government's responsibility to answer. Last Friday, in the course of a brief Debate, hon. Members and right hon. Gentlemen opposite interrogated the Government. Within the recollection of hon. Members who were present, they interrogated the Government in violent and abusive tones. What did they expect? If, as apparently was the case, the Opposition got more than they bargained for, they must not complain. This afternoon, however, the right hon. Gentleman has interrogated the Government in moderate terms, and I shall respond by addressing myself to these interrogations in language as temperate as the circumstances demand.

The last thing I would seek to do is to minimise the gravity of the situation. However brief in duration this disturbance may be, it is bound, in the very nature of the case, to impair our industrial economy at any rate to some extent, and that we are all anxious to avoid. Let us address ourselves to the vital and integral elements of the situation with which we have been confronted, not for the last few weeks, the last few months, or, for that matter, since the advent of this Government, but for several years past. The right hon. Gentleman directed the attention of the House to the inadequate stock position. That is fundamental, and it is the pivot on which the whole of our economic system must turn. But this inadequate stock position is by no means new. The inadequacy of our coal stocks as a cardinal factor in relation to our national economy began to emerge after the French disaster in the war in 1940. No one is more conversant with that fact than the right hon. Gentlemen the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill). What happened on that occasion? A vast amount of coal, produced in this country and designed for French operations, military and civil, was held hack. There was obviously no purpose in sending the coal to France in view of the collapse.[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That was the opinion of the experts at the time —let there be no mistake.

Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

It was also the opinion of some of the right hon. Gentleman's colleagues.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman has just confirmed what I have stated by saying that it was also the opinion of some of my colleagues who were then in the Coalition Government, so we are on common ground. Obviously, the Coalition Government were blameless in the matter, but what emerged from that situation? Men were allowed to drift from the pits to go into the Forces and into munition factories, and elsewhere, and the pits were denuded of the lusty, vigorous labour that is so essential in coal production. Then, when coal stocks had dwindled, as they were bound to in the circumstances, because of excessive consumption, men were sought for but were not to be found. The Government of the day, quite rightly, refused to bring men back from the Forces except in small numbers, and men themselves were averse from being directed back into the pits from the munition factories where they had gone. At that time the wage situation in the coalfields was far from satisfactory. How often in this House did we hear the argument, "How can you expect men earning £10 a week in munitions to come back into the pits for £3 or £4 a week? "So, the Bevin boys were brought in. Although willing to assist to increase the production of coal, they were unsuited to the pits, they naturally became discontented, and indeed they created more trouble than they were worth.

So towards the end of the war we had emerging a situation of inadequate stocks accompanied by dwindling manpower. Those were the twin features of the situation. The Labour Government were returned and had to grapple with that situation. It was impossible, in spite of intense propaganda and exhortation and, over and above that, the Essential Work Order which was then in operation, to retain men in the pits. On every kind of pretext they were leaving. Medical certificates were granted in great volume. When I came to the Ministry of Fuel and Power the number of persons on tit:, colliery books was over 700,000, but in the course of a few months it had dwindled to 694,000. That was not the worst of it. The trouble was that we were left with many men who were aged —more than 40 per cent. of the men in the pits at the time were over 45 years of age and were tired out.

That was the situation facing us. So we sought to deal with the situation and prepared a plan. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) asked on Friday whether we had a plan. I reminded him of our plan, and I repeat it now. Our plan was to create the right atmosphere in the mining industry to induce men to come in willingly—not under direction—particularly as we knew that sooner or later we should have to abandon the Essential Work Order, because one cannot go on directing miners if one does not direct other classes of workers. That was our plan. I claim that we succeeded, at any rate, so far as that plan was concerned, because in spite of the unwillingness, the resistance and the reluctance of the men to come in, we attracted 76,000 men and boys into the industry in 1946. Does any one pretend that that was due to exhortations alone? Of course not It was attributable—I ask hon. Members to note this because it is so vital in this matter of production—to the new atmosphere that was emerging because the men were being assured of reforms for which they had long asked.

Major Guy Lloyd (Renfrew, Eastern)

rose —

Mr. Shinwell

I cannot give way. Many reforms still remain to be conceded, and I want to tell hon. Members on both sides of the House that unless reforms for the miners in this unattractive industry are conceded, we shall not get the volume of coal which is essential.

That was the situation. The right hon. Member for Southport has now told the House what is the gravamen of the charge against us—inadequate stocks. Is it any use pretending one can build up stocks unless one has the men to produce the stocks? There is something even more difficult—one may have the men but one may not have the right men. There is something more to be added. It is that we must have the right organisation in the pits. There has been far too much talk of introducing thousands of additional men into the pits without regard to the conditions in the pits. It has been known that the mines of this country require large-scale and long-term reorganisation, but it cannot be done in 18 months. Indeed, I have to tell hon. Members that the National Coal Board may find themselves in this difficulty—they may have to arrest their long-term plan in order to speed up production in the short run. They are addressing themselves to that subject. But will hon. Members understand that the National Coal Board have only taken over in recent months?

If I am told—I have no doubt that is the intention—that there has been Government control for quite a long time, that is perfectly true, but what kind of Government control? Government control that means that the Government or some corporation run the mines of the country? Nothing of the sort. The owners were in possession; the mine managers were under their direction. Great difficulties have been encountered in this matter. I do not desire to dilate on these matters which by now are familiar to hon. Members, but I am bound to point out that it is no use pretending that stocks can be built up to a higher level unless we have not only the volume of labour but the right kind of labour and the right kind of organisation. I have said in the country—I will not seek to deny that I have made the statement over and over again, and I stand by it—that if we had 700,000 willing and able miners in the pits and if we had the right organisation, we could get all the coal we want. I am fortified in that statement by experts from the mining industry such as the President of the Yorkshire Miners' Association and others who were associated with the other side of the in- dustry We have to get those conditions, and it has been most difficult to secure those conditions in the last 18 months.

Now I come to the question of the coal stocks at our disposal—and I am stating the facts and no more and no less. At the beginning of the coal year in 1946— for the benefit of hon. Members, the coal year is not a calendar year but begins on 1st May—all I had was 6,800,000 in stock. That was not a Government dump. That represented distributed stocks of coal for household, gas, electricity and industrial purposes. It was because of the inadequacy of that stock position that I came to the House in June, a few weeks later, and presented what was known as the "Coal Budget." Hon. Members will recall the occasion when I disclosed the serious gap between production and estimated consumption. It amounted to rip million tons. I also disclosed to the House that we intended to bridge at least five million tons of that gap by oil conversion, by stepping up opencast production and by adopting other devices. The right hon. Member for Southport says that no warnings were given. I would remind him of the statements I made in that coal budget speech, which is available to hon. Members.

We built up that stock position from 6,800,000 tons at the beginning of May to almost 11 million tons at the beginning of the coal winter in October in spite of the fact that the miners—I will certainly make no complaint of this—had more and, I hope, better holidays in 1946 than ever in their history. They were entitled to it, but every week of holiday meant less production, and I confessed to the House that I was apprehensive about the dwindling production due to the extended holidays. At the same time, I hoped that the recuperation which resulted from those holidays would lead to higher production later on, and I was right in that assumption, because we started with almost 11 million tons of stock in October and, in spite of rising consumption, we held our ground to the end of the year. Why? Because the miners put their backs into it and produced more, and they were producing more coal by 150,000 tons and sometimes 200,000 tons a week with fewer men than they had done in the same period in the previous year. I say to hon. Members that, in all the circumstances, that plan succeeded. It was an achievement. But the right hon. Gentleman has a perfect right to say that I should have been far from satisfied with the position. That is his contention. I agree unreservedly.

Mr. R. S. Hudson

No, I did not say anything of the sort.

Mr. Shinwell

I gathered from what the right hon. Gentleman said—and this was the gravamen of the charge—that I had not taken adequate steps to build up the stock position in advance. Therefore, he must have suspected that I must have been satisfied with the position. Well, I was not satisfied with the position; on the contrary, I repeated my warnings in almost every speech I made.[HON. MEMBERS:"NO"] If hon. Members want me to put in the OFFICIAL REPORT all the reports of the speeches I made week after week at miners' gatherings, exhorting them to produce more, I should be very glad to do so, but I am afraid it would rather overwhelm them. But when we came to October, the beginning of the coal winter, with about 11 million tons of stock, in view of the estimated consumption I made a speech, of which the right hon. Gentleman reminded the House, at the Fuel Efficiency Conference. If hon. Members will bear with me, in the circumstances, I think I am entitled to quote what I said. It will be noted that this was a conference designed to promote fuel efficiency. We were concerned with getting more manpower, stepping up the output, promoting economy measures and, so far as it was possible, inducing consumers of coal to exercise proper efficiency in the use of fuel. I was referring to a shortage of manpower and materials and I said: Meanwhile, we cannot escape the difficulties of transition from war to peace.… We have to address ourselves to the problem of how we can get through the coming winter, without dislocation of our national life—how we are to avoid a shortage of domestic fuel and the curtailment of industrial production. Then I said: Making every allowance for possible increases in production, and after arranging to reduce our distributed stocks to the, lowest limit that we dare, we run a very grave danger of breakdown. In the public utilities, there is one additional danger arising from lack of plant. Then I went on to say: We must seek for a reduction in consumption. The alternatives are to step-up at once our efforts to economise, or to face, in the depths of the coming winter, a breakdown in supplies.… I am obliged to set a target for this effort, and to ask for an all-round voluntary saving in consumption of at least so per cent. This saving of 10 per cent. is needed in coal, gas and electricity, and must apply to all consumers, not only in industry, but al3o in the home and in public and commercial undertakings. Then I added this: At the moment it is clear that although production is rising, consumption is outstripping it by far. There was a warning if ever there was one.[An HON. MEMBER: "When was it? "] On 8th October. That was at the beginning of the coal winter. The right hon. Gentleman asked why nothing was done to safeguard the position in view of dwindling production and rising consumption. I understand that the charge against the Government is this—it has been made by the Press, and about the Press I will not comment at this stage; perhaps on a future occasion I may be allowed a little latitude on another platform on that very interesting topic, but, for the moment, I say nothing. However, it has been suggested in the Press, in speeches of hon. Members last Friday and in the right hon. Gentleman's speech today, that we should have rationed, should have prepared a scheme long before now. In face of the change in the atmosphere in the industry, and in face of estimates we received from the public utility undertakings' experts, we were justified in proceeding on the assumption that if we could secure economies—and we were seeking to promote economies—and with the rising trend in production during the winter, we could manage to scrape through. But suppose we had formulated a rationing scheme at that time, what kind of scheme would it have been? It would have been, in the circumstances, the fuel allocation scheme that the Government have just embarked upon. That is the only kind of rationing scheme you can have if there is a shortfall in a particular commodity and you have to spread it over a great field. Obviously, if there is inadequacy, some people have to go short, and it would have meant that at that time, in the summer and in the early winter, a rationing scheme which would have led to short time in almost every industry.

Mr. R. S. Hudson

And unemployment.

Mr. Shinwell

Unemployment, I agree, and impeding our export efforts which were vital at that time. Over and above that, if we had adopted such a scheme at that time, and if by chance we had avoided this severe spell during the winter, we should have been told that it was a mistake to adopt a scheme of that kind promoting intermittent employment when all the facts were against it. If it comes to a question of rationing, I am bound to say this: the Coalition Government—I excuse them for not doing what some asked they should do—could have adopted a rationing scheme in 1942. We might have saved ourselves a lot of trouble. Probably they had very good reasons. I can tell one reason. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that this question of rationing, particularly of electricity and gas, has obsessed my mind almost from the time I went to the Department, but there are practical difficulties in the way, one being this: we have to be exceedingly careful that we do not promote too much austerity. The right hon. Member for Woodford would have had something to say about that, and I can imagine what the right hon. Gentleman would have said if we had promoted a rationing scheme in the autumn. He would have said: "After six years of war, to give the people of the country more austerity!"

Now I come to the question of consumption. I listened with attention to the right hon. Gentleman's statistical observation on this matter. I can only give him the statistics that are derived from expert accumulation. It does not matter which Government happen to be in power, they have to rely on expert opinion and on estimates provided by experts. The fact is that I have consulted the experts, the Central Electricity Board and the Electricity Commissioners. When the electricity undertakings, both municipal and private, seek guidance, they do not come to the Ministry of Fuel and Power. They go to the Electricity Commissioners and the Central Electricity Board. They have furnished estimates, and I ask the House to note what they were. In the summer, the original estimate for taking us through was 417,000 tons a week. The estimates for the whole of the winter were 575,000 tons a week, compared with 529,000 tons in the winter of 1945–6.

Mr. Pickthorn (Cambridge University)

Can we have the date?

Mr. Shinwell

I have given the date.

Mr. Pickthorn

The date when the estimate was made?

Mr. Shinwell

I am sorry; I cannot give that actual date.

Mr. R. S. Hudson

The basis.

Mr. Shinwell

I am asked about the basis of the estimate.I am not in a position to say how the technical experts arrived at these estimates, except on the assumption that a certain amount of electricity would be used by industrial undertakings and a certain amount by domestic consumers. I expect they have great difficulties in arriving at any conclusion about the matter. I can imagine what difficulties they have, because of my difficulty in arriving at a conclusion.

Mr. R. S. Hudson

I quoted the figure given to me of 507,000 tons per week in the summer. The right hon. Gentleman has quoted the figure of 417,000 tons per week. I think probably I had in mind consumption, and what he meant was stocking up.

Mr. Shinwell

It may well be that the right hon. Gentleman is right. It is not merely an estimate based on the actual consumption during a given period, but for increasing the stock. But it does not affect the position.

Mr. Hudson

It does.

Mr. Shinwell

Up to Christmas, 1946, it was expected that we would consume 557,000 tons a week. I have already given the estimate for the whole winter of 575,000 tons per week, but up to Christmas it was 557,000 tons. These estimates had to be revised in November, and we discovered that they wanted 648,000 tons a week to the end of January, 1947. That was a vast difference. Actual consumption rose in the summer of 1946 from 474,000 tons in May, to 513,000 tons in October. It had risen to 584,000 tons in November, and by the week before Christmas there was an increase of 140,000 tons more than in the corresponding week of 1945. The highest point was the week ended 31st January, 1947, when it was 727,000 tons, as compared with 576,000 tons a year before—an increase of 26 per cent. The right hon. Gentleman may say that we ought to have anticipated this rise in consumption. I quoted from my speech at the Fuel Efficiency Conference. We expected that the jump would be high, but did not expect that it would be so high.

Now I come to the question of a plan. As I have reminded hon. Members, at the Fuel Efficiency Conference I asked for a voluntary saving of 10 per cent., but, in the course of a few weeks it was clear that we were not going to get that saving. So we decided to adopt other measures—

Mr. R.S. Hudson

To improvise?

Mr. Shinwell

Not to improvise; the right hon. Gentleman is quite wrong. We decided to adopt a scheme which would mean a reduction not only in solid fuel, but in electricity and gas. We were in course of preparing the scheme, and the intention was to put it into operation on 1st December, 1946, but the employers did not consider that it went far enough. As a result, the scheme had to be revised. Therefore there was delay, and it could not come into operation on 1st December. Then the intention was to introduce it on 1st January, but eventually, because of the difficulties which emerged—all kinds of industrial organisations querying the plan itself—it was decided that it should operate from 20th January. That was the fuel allocation plan. The right hon. Gentleman appears to think that one can have a plan without consulting anyone.

Mr. R. S. Hudson

The right hon. Gentleman did not consult them—

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman has made an observation that we did not consult them—

Mr. R. S. Hudson

—in time.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman says we did not consult them in time. The right hon. Gentleman is quite unaware of the facts. There is an Advisory joint Production Council associated with the Board of Trade which is in almost continuous session. It offers advice and guidance to the Board of Trade and, no doubt, to other Departments concerned in production matters of this kind. The intention was to put this plan into operation. On Friday the right hon. Member for Warwick and Learning-ton referred to the "gravest disaster in the last 20 years." He did so before I had made my statement on the present position. He made the statement about it being the gravest disaster for 20 years on the basis of the fuel allocation plan, which meant short time in certain industries. I challenge hon. Members opposite, I challenge the right hon. Member for Woodford, if he is going to reply, to say whether it is possible to put any plan into operation, provided the stocks are inadequate, that does not lead to short time.

Mr. Churchill

I hope to be able to say a few words in the course of the evening's discussion. The gravamen of the charge the right hon. Gentleman has to meet is not the general difficulties of the coal situation, but his precise conduct in not having a practical plan for dealing with the electricity supplies of the country when a serious emergency arose.

Mr. Shinwell

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I have the highest respect, and a great admiration, for his qualities, but honestly I am bound to say that that is about the weakest observation that has ever fallen from his lips.[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer it."] Hon. Members are well aware that if I am challenged I respond. I am asked to answer Notice what the right hon. Gentleman says—he cannot help that—the stock position, the manpower position, that is in the past—the gravamen of the charge is that we did not prepare a considered plan in view of the increasing consumption of electricity.

Mr. Churchill

No, I did not say that. I said, in view of the possibility of an emergency arising through weather conditions— [Hon. MEMBERS: "Oh."] —in view of an emergency arising. I do not think that that varies my statement at all. Obviously, an emergency would be most likely to arise through a change in the weather.

Mr. Shinwell

If it is possible, I should like to clarify this. As hon. Members are aware, it was intended that the fuel allocation plan, agreed to by the industrialists and the trade unions on the National Joint Advisory Production Council, should come into operation on 20th January. Even with the best will in the world, that plan would have led to some short time in industry. Before the scheme could come into operation this country was struck by a blizzard unexampled for the last 50 years.

Hon. Members

Nonsense.

Mr. Shinwell

I can tell hon. Members that we have consulted the experts on this subject, and we are informed that not only as regards severity, but as regards universality, this is the worst blizzard since 1894— [Interruption.] Hon. Members can challenge that if they like. If they like the winter they can have it. I can assure them that the sooner we escape from it the better it will be for all concerned. The general severity of the weather broke before this scheme could come into operation. Obviously it had a profound effect on the whole situation. What has been the effect of the weather? We have had ships held up in the North, as the Prime Minister told the House when he made his factual statement in reply to the right. hon. Gentleman. The electricity and gas undertakings in the London area, for the most part, depend on 'seaborne coal coming round from the Tyne. Blyth was blocked, Seaham Harbour was blocked, and is still blocked, ships could not get out. The Tyne was invisible for miles. Skippers of vessels refused to take their ships out. Many of them are flat-bottomed craft which could not be taken to sea, and we have had great difficulty in that regard. They are still held up. Unfortunately, my latest information on the subject is that up to 12 noon yesterday only six colliers had arrived in the Thames. I am bound to confess that that is a rather serious position, and this morning there was fog in the Thames, and there are greater difficulties.

Mr. Pickthorn

rose—

Mr. Shinwell

I am hoping—

Mr. Pickthorn

I thought that when the right hon. Gentleman was challenged, he responded.

Mr. Shinwell

—that the weather conditions will improve and enable us to keep the electricity stations in the London area—

Mr. Churchill

For the information of the House, could the right hon. Gentleman state what is the practical difficulty which prevents the ships from leaving the port of Blyth, or the Tyne? What is the physical difficulty?

Mr. Shinwell

One of the difficulties is the severe weather. I queried that myself, and indeed we have asked whether the Admiralty could assist us in the matter.

Mr. Churchill

Surely the right hon. Gentleman ought to have known that months ago.

Mr. Shinwell

What is the actual position as regards the electricity undertakings in the London area? We are concentrating on the eight main stations, the largest stations and we require to provide for a consumption of 18,000 tons daily at those stations. The average stock at the present time, as the Prime Minister told the House, is about 6½ days—some have to days' stock, some 3½. If we can hold down consumption for four or five days, perhaps a week at most, and build up the stock pile —get another week out of it—in addition to the stocks available to the undertakings at the present time, we can get through, and that is what our aim is.

I come finally to the charge made against me by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that we did not last Friday acquaint the House early enough about this scheme to enable the House to debate it.

Mr. Churchill

We would not have been debating it at all if we had not asked for it.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman is quite inaccurate, and I will tell hon. Members why. To begin with, the reason for last Friday's Debate was because the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Prescott) had intimated that he would raise the Lancashire position on the Motion for the Adjournment on Friday. Incidentally, the right hon. Member for Southport said that I had told the hon. Member for Darwen that I would not be present. The reason was, as the hon. Member knew, that as it was a question affecting industry, I had told him that I was not responsible for the actual allocation, and that he must go to the Department concerned.

Mr. Stanley Prescott (Darwen)

Is it not a fact that I twice wrote to the right hon Gentleman and spoke to him twice about the matter, that I indicated that I should have to raise a matter affecting his administration over a long period, that he was vitally concerned, and that I requested him particularly to be in his place?

Mr. Shinwell

I do not intend to ride off on the fact that I was actually in my place, in view of what transpired, but when the hon. Gentleman spoke to me, and after I had read his letters, I came to the conclusion that it was not a matter for my Department, and I advised him to go to the appropriate Department.

Mr. Prescott

Yes.

Mr. Shinwell

Let us consider the chronology of the situation that emerged last week. On Wednesday we were informed that the situation was serious in respect of the stock position. Because of the weather the ships were not coming round. We were trying to get coal in by rail from South Wales to Battersea Power Station and to others. Ships were held up in the Bristol Channel and could not come round with the usual stock. Therefore we decided that drastic action would require to be taken. We considered that matter on Thursday, but in view of statements made to us about a possible clearing up of the weather situation in the north—55 ships had been held up the previous night, 20 had got away—we considered that we might wait a little while, to see if sufficient stocks would come in.

I put the matter frankly before the House, and will hon. Members please understand that we do not take action of that kind without consulting the experts in the electricity undertakings? The right hon. Gentleman said that we have not consulted the electricity undertakings. We always consult the Central Electricity Board and the Electricity Commissioners. They speak for the undertakings, as far as they can. I know there have been some representatives of electricity undertakings who have spoken during the last couple of days and said that the scheme is unworkable. Some have even gone so far as to say that they would not work it. I think they are a little more subdued now than they were. On Friday we came to the final decision that this scheme must be put into operation.

Mr. Prescott

At what time?

Mr. Shinwell

In the morning. If it is of any advantage to the hon. Gentleman, it was in the morning before 12 o'clock.

Mr. Prescott

Before I spoke.

Mr. Shinwell

Hon. Members who were present last Friday will recall that the hon. Member for Darwen was taking advantage, quite properly, of the Adjournment Motion when I arrived in the House. The Debate had begun. The hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. Ellis Smith) had intimated the previous day that this was an urgent matter, the general position was urgent, and he intended to speak. Naturally, I wanted to hear what the House had to say. Then the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington leapt to his feet and traduced me in the most vile fashion for which, of course, I readily forgive him. As a result, I had to reply to what he said. I could not allow the argument of the right hon. Gentleman, so far as it was an argument, to go by default. People would have said that I was yellow if I had failed to reply to the right hon. Gentleman. I referred immediately to what he had said about a grave situation. I said this to him, and HANSARD will verify what I am saying: I shall have something to say in a few moments about a grave crisis."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th February, 1947; Vol.432, c.2177.] I also said that in all the circumstances, in view of the emergency which had been thrust upon us at the last moment, in view of the severity of weather conditions, and the inability to get stocks at the last moment, we had no alternative but to take the action we took.

Mr. Eden (Warwick and Leamington)

I would like to say a few words on this subject. I would only say that if the right hon. Gentleman had made an intimation to me, to my right hon. Friends, or to the hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, that he had a statement of importance to make, we on this side of the House would have been only too glad to hear it before passing to a general discussion.

Mr. Shinwell

Well, I will not join issue with the right hon. Gentleman. It may well be that instead of having a general Debate I could have intervened and said, "I have a grave statement to make." But the hon. Member for Darwen and my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke had already intervened.[Hon. MEMBERS: "No."] Also the hon. Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) had raised a vital issue, and in those circumstances we had a general Debate. Finally, the right hon. Member for Southport tells us that what we ought to have done in face of that grave emergency was to have had detailed discussions with the people concerned, with the industrial undertakings, the newspapers and with everybody concerned in this cut. That is what he argued. That was his case. I say we have—

Mr. R. S. Hudson

I never mentioned the word "newspapers." I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be a little more accurate in his statements.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman is quite right. He did not mention newspapers, but he referred to those who were affected by the cuts and, as certain periodicals are affected by the cuts, I included them in my general statement. At any rate, it would have been a dereliction of duty if we had not responded to the emergency of the situation and acted accordingly. That we did. I have dealt with the stock position and the manpower position. I say to the House that it may well be that although this is a grave crisis in our national life, that although our industrial economy is imperilled, it may prove to be a blessing in disguise because it will focus the attention of all the people in this country on our vulnerability—not the vulnerability of the Government, but the vulnerability of this country—unless we can promote in the mining industry the atmosphere that will bring in willing men to produce the coal. That is what we are endeavouring to do. That is why we promoted nationalisation. Out of that new beginning we hope to produce a chapter without blemish in the history of this country.

6.38 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery)

I am sure that the country will be glad that the Government acceded to our request this afternoon for this Debate. I regret that there should be these political challenges and counter-challenges across the Floor of the House. There can be no doubt that the country is passing through a grave crisis. From the attitude which has been adopted during this Debate one would think that hon. and right hon. Members have forgotten that here, in midwinter, a great number of industries have stopped work, and that, there are, without exaggeration, some millions of people out of work In addition, many householders are experiencing difficulty. I hope that before the end of this Debate we shall get a more definite statement of the position and of the measures that will be taken to meet the difficulties, as well as an estimate of how long it will be before we get back to normality.

The main portion of the Minister's speech was confined to the measures taken for the production of coal. That is quite proper, because he is the Minister responsible. I go a long way in agreeing with the right hon. Gentleman's recital of the history which has led up to our present position. I mentioned some figures as recently as last Friday. There is not the slightest doubt that the production of coal in this country had been decreasing steadily before the war broke out in 1939. At that time there were 800,000 miners at work. By May, 1940, as the right hon. Gentleman will remember, in spite of protests which he and I made at that time—we were pretty nearly lone voices—the figures were allowed to fall until there were only about 740,000 miners at work. Down went the figures until, at the end of 1940, there were only about 700,000 people at work. Furthermore, those who were at work were getting older; new and younger men were riot entering the industry, and that position has continued until the introduction of that very bad scheme of the Bevin boys.

I admit that this was the position when the right hon. Gentleman took over in July, 1945, but what happened afterwards? Did the right hon. Gentleman realise then, as did others in the coal industry, the great difficulty of increasing production in view of those figures, and the great difficulty of getting men to enter the mining industry? It had been common talk for a great number of years that, if the Essential Work Order was removed, a large proportion of the miners would leave the mines never to return. We were up against the enormous difficulty of increasing the number of men who would enter the industry, and of increasing the production of men who were already getting older. That was one of the main reasons why I and my colleagues were in favour of the nationalisation of the coalmines. The Government, straight away in the Speech from the Throne, said they were going to do that. They said they would see to it, that they gained the psychological advantage of being able to say to the miners that nationalisation for which they had been asking for generations, was about to come to pass. Thanks to the efforts then made, there was an amazing recruitment to the labour force, and the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly entitled to be satisfied with the entry of 76,000.

But the right hon. Gentleman knew that, until we have a more complete reorganisation, until we got more mechanisation, which was bound to take a considerable time, it would be a long time before he could make his production figures satisfactory. I have always felt that the least that was really required here, was something in the neighbour hood of 225,000 tons. I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman will remember it, but I believe he joined with me, during those war years, in urging upon the Government that they should take all necessary steps to see that production should not fall below 200,000 tons, but they did fall below that point. That was the situation that existed then, and it is more or less the position today. There has been a slight increase, it is true, and here let me pay my tribute again to the amazing work done by the miners. There is need for this country to focus attention on the debt which it owes to the miners, and of the need for making that industry more attractive to younger men.

So far, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. But I wish he had turned his attention more to the employment of foreign labour. I do not merely mean the Poles. It is a very extraordinary story that Belgium has to tell us. They have recruited from Germany, from Poland and also from Italy, and they have made a bargain with Italy, that, in return for several hundreds of Italians who will go to help them, they will send much more coal to Italy. I wish that the right hon. Gentleman had paid some attention to that, because, in time of national emergency, one should not be guided too much by possible difficulties by the leaders of the trade unions. One has to face the situation and have the courage to do what is necessary for the sake of the nation.

I have dealt with the production side. I now turn to consumption and distribution. The Government knew what the situation was. What were the difficulties of the right hon. Gentleman? One of the things that worries me is this. After the Minister had seen to it that the coal had been produced, who was responsible for its allocation and distribution? We know now, from the way in which Questions have been answered and action taken, with regard to industry, that the President of the Board of Trade had a great deal to say. The Minister of Supply had a great deal to say, and also the Minister of Transport, who told us this afternoon of the serious position of our rolling stock and engines and of the dangers of a breakdown there. Who will collate all that information in one Department and see that proper action is taken to meet the situation? Knowing, as the Government should have known, that there was an increased consumption of coal in this country; remembering that, during the war, there was a cut in coal for household consumption of about 13 million tons; remembering, as the Prime Minister said this afternoon, that, during the war, we had the blackout and two hours' extension of daylight saving, so that there was an increased call on coal for household consumption—remembering all these things, why did not the Government take adequate steps to see that there was the right distribution? That is the gravamen of the charge against them.

The right hon. Gentleman used words and quoted figures showing that he had come down to the House in October and warned the House of the difficulties ahead, but the words he used today were "We hoped that we should scrape through." We have not scraped through. The country today is in a situation in which it has never been before. There was a gamble on scraping through, and the Government are not entitled to gamble with the country—I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman was responsible, I think, he is mainly responsible for the production side, while somebody else is responsible for the rest. But although it would have been an unpopular thing to do why did he not introduce the scheme which met with the approval of the President of the Board of Trade in 1942? Those of us who were in the House at that time remember how the President of the Board of Trade came down to the House and stood at that Box and warned us that there might be disaster and irretrievable crisis in this country if the rationing scheme which he then proposed, was not accepted by this House. For some reason or other, pressure was brought to bear, and they withdrew that scheme. I should have thought that if they felt strongly that that was the way to save the country, it would have been better to have resigned, and to have given the House their reasons for so doing.

Mr. Cobb (Elland)

Would the right hon. and learned 'Gentleman give way for a moment?

Mr. Davies

No, I will not. I listened to the right hon. Gentleman's speech very carefully. He said that under the scheme which the Government are introducing, there will be shorter working time, and that people will not be employed to the full capacity to which they should be employed. I honestly fail to understand why this was left, first, to exhortation; and then to a voluntary request; why the scheme was left over till 1st December, when winter was upon us, before it was even put before the industrialists; why it was withdrawn because they disagreed; introduced against on 1st January, and then, finally, reintroduced on 22nd January in the very middle of winter with, all the time, danger looming above the heads of the industrialists and the people of this country, because we could not possibly increase the amount of coal being produced. It is in that respect the Government have failed.

We now want to know who is to be responsible and what Department will be answerable for the proper distribution. We also want to know what is to be the position during this week; what are the proposals for the next fortnight or for however long may be necessary, before we get back to semi-normality, and how the Government are then going to work this plan for the rest of the period. Not only industrialists are entitled to this information; every one of us is entitled to know. This situation would be serious at any time, but it is doubly serious at a time when we are not only short of goods for home consumption, but in dire need of goods to send abroad to produce the exchange with which to buy our food and raw materials. I hope that whoever replies for the Government will go into the matter of the great need for proper distribution and allocation, so that we may know where we are.

6.53 P.m.

Mr. Bing (Hornchurch)

In opening this Debate, the right hon. Member for Southport (Mr. R. S. Hudson) said that this matter transcended party lines. I listened to his speech to see what else he said to justify this. But let us suppose for a moment that what he said is correct, and let us put one or two questions to hon. Members opposite on the assumption that they are going to do something about it. What suggestions have they to offer? The argument put forward by the hon. Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster) in the course of Friday's Debate—I notice that there is now some suggestion that we should shift from that ground—was that the Government should have got more men into the mines and produced more coal. The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) said that hon. Members on his side of the House knew all the time that this was the great difficulty. That being so, I thought it would be very interesting to see what was the first recruiting speech for miners made by hon. Gentlemen opposite. Perhaps the House will excuse me if I quote from it, because a certain number of the tenants of the Front Bench opposite had not, at that time, arranged for their return to this Parliament.

Quite early in the Session, the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Teeling) made his final appeal for further men to work in the mines knowing, as the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington had said, the seriousness of the manpower position. Speaking of volunteers, he said that these young men will be wrecking their lives.[HON. MEMBERS: "Who said that?"] The hon. Member for Brighton.

Sir William Darling (Edinburgh, South)

Which one, the senior or the junior Member?

Mr. Bing

I am not quite certain which hon. Member actually takes precedence, but, if I may, I will identify him by saying that he was the hon. Member for whom the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) pressed so strongly against another candidate. I should now like to tell the House what the right hon. Member for Wood ford's special candidate thought of this matter of crisis. He said: These young men will be wrecking their lives. There is a possibility in years to come that they will be the first to be on the dole and will also be physically wrecked He then said, after, apparently, making a very thorough tour of the area just to see what the mining conditions were like: Do not let us ever imagine that they intend to stay in the mines longer than necessary. I have been talking and traveling with hem during the last month in Yorkshire, Northumberland, Cumberland and South Wales, and 1 can say without exaggeration that I did not meet more than I per cent. who had any intention whatever of going on with mining. What was his suggestion? What ought we to do for these boys? How were we to persuade them to carry on? He had one simple plan, not that they should be forced by regulations, but that we should pay them a gratuity. He said: Men in the three Services are to get gratuities. Arc there to be gratuities for the Bevin boys when they come out of the mines?"[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd October, 1945: Vol.4r4, c 1922, 1923, 1924.] When we recruit for one of the most skilled and most dangerous professions in the country, we should not treat the matter in the same way as hon. Members opposite treated Australia 100 years ago —as a sort of place where nice people do not go.

I will now come to the question of more men for the mines, and I should like to have an answer to the following question from the party opposite. Do they think that, had the mines remained in private hands, we should have had more men going into the industry and more coal?

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot (Scottish Universities)