DEFENCE OF CRETE.

§ Mr. Lees-Smith (Keighley)

The attention of the country is, at the present moment, mainly concentrated on the Eastern Mediterranean, and I wish to confine my remarks mainly, though not wholly, to that area of the war. I may say that I should be very surprised if there should be a rancorous Debate on this subject, and I think it will be found that this Debate will be useful. There is quite a number of questions in the public mind and I shall endeavour to formulate those questions as shortly as possible. I think that, at the end of the Debate, it will be found that very useful purposes will have been served, if the Prime Minister has the opportunity of giving such answers to those questions as he thinks are in the national interest at this moment.

In regard to this Eastern Mediterranean theatre of war, we must keep the background of recent events in our minds.

64 For very many months we had, in this area, a spectacular series of victories, during which we defeated the Italian Fleet, broke up the Italian forces in Libya, destroyed the Italian Empire in Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland and opened the Suez Canal to American supplies. Looking back for some months we find all that record in the background of more recent events. Recently, German armoured divisions have made a disturbing appearance on the West of Egypt, we have evacuated Greece and the evacuation of Crete has given the enemy considerable freedom of action in the Ægean and the Dardanelles and, more important than that, it will undoubtedly limit the action of the British Fleet in preventing supplies for the German Panzer Divisions getting from Sicily across the Mediterranean. I think it will be useful to have a Debate like that on which we are now entering, in order to elucidate the question of whether any of these recent events have been due to mistakes from which conclusions can be drawn as to future operations.

Before stating the questions which I want to ask, there is one fact which has to be borne in mind throughout. In all this area of warfare, the overriding difficulty is not mistakes, but the simple fact that General Wavell has to conduct a number of campaigns simultaneously, in each one of which he is out-numbered and out-machined. That is due to the facts of the past. It seems to me that he always has to be like one of the jugglers one sees at shows throwing up half-a-dozen balls at the same time. The whole possibility of his avoiding serious reverses has depended upon the most precise timing by which it has been necessary for him to bring one campaign to a conclusion and transfer his troops just before the other campaign reached its peak. I am not surprised that there may have been certain breakdowns in the interval. As a matter of fact, looking back to the past, I think we can congratulate General Wavell and congratulate ourselves that the campaign in Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland was practically concluded while the Germans were still held in Libya, and that the campaign in Iraq has been practically wound up just before the campaign in Syria has begun. Therefore, I say that I shall not be surprised if the answer that is given to a number of the 65 questions which I shall now ask lies in the fact I have just pointed out, that you cannot have British forces and British machines everywhere at the same time.

To turn to Crete, certainly I shall not question the decision to defend that island. This country is at the moment fighting a great delaying action, which began with the fall of France and will continue right into next year until the superiority of material is on our side. It is a delaying action of almost two years, and during that delaying action it is absolutely essential that Hitler should be held up and delayed everywhere where resistance is possible. In the case of a campaign such as that in Crete, we may all be very wise after the event, but, in fact, nobody could foresee what would be the issue of a battle for which there was no precedent in the history of war. We know what our own losses have been, but we do not yet know to what extent Germany's striking power has been affected and to what extent that may influence the result of the other campaigns to which the war has already moved.

I will try to put shortly what I think are the public anxieties arising out of the Crete campaign. I have no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister will reply to such of these questions as may be desirable. The first question is the most obvious one. We had been in control of the three aerodromes at Malemi, Heraklion and Retimo for about seven months, and yet, at quite an early stage of the battle, our Air Force was withdrawn because of the lack of aerodromes. Undoubtedly, it was the withdrawal of our Air Force from Crete which led to the reverse; and of course, the public wants to know why. I have seen the explanations which have been given. The main explanation is that when you are operating from three small aerodromes and the enemy are operating from nine large aerodromes within striking distance, both your Air Force and your aerodromes may be driven out by sheer weight of numbers. That is the main explanation I have seen; but if that be the explanation, it leads to further questions. That possibility must have been foreseen all along; and it raises the questions, Was it impossible to enlarge those aerodromes during the seven months, was it impossible to create new 66 aerodromes during the same period? Those are obvious questions.

The other series of questions arise from this fact. It is clear that, although we had ourselves evacuated the aerodromes, if nevertheless we had been able to deny them to the enemy, to make it impossible for the enemy to take them, even then the battle might have been saved, because I think it is pretty clear that even after our Air Force was withdrawn, it was a very closely-run thing as to whether we should not still be able to hold the situation. But it is clear that it was the capture of Malemi aerodrome which was the turning point in the battle. This raises the questions whether it would not have been possible in the intervening period to fortify those aerodromes, to provide them with tanks in sufficient number and of sufficient size to attack any forces which landed, to mine the aerodromes in advance so as to blow them up and make them very difficult for landing, and to cover them with heavy artillery which would break to pieces any forces which actually occupied them. Those are questions that have been asked. There is another question. After our Air Force was withdrawn, there was an interval before the alternative air support from Egypt came upon the scene. There was an interval of 48 hours, and, of course, those 48 hours were far more vital to the operations than any 48 hours which came afterwards; but during those 48 hours we had no Air Force over Crete. I think those are the most important issues which are in the public mind.

There are, then, one or two other matters that are taken from the reports of the battle. It is clear that in the actual land fighting the main weapon seems to have been the Tommy gun. It is rather surprising that in this weapon the Germans who had to land from the air were better equipped than our own Forces which had been there for seven months. I see that our troops very quickly learned the use of the Tommy guns when they had them, but they relied largely upon those which they captured from the Germans. There is then a last question which has been put to me by one who is very well acquainted with Crete. Why was not more use made of the Cretan fighters, as distinct from the Greeks? I have been told that there are at least 20,000 Cretans between 20 and 40 years of 67 age. I have been told that they are very tough, that they are superbly courageous, that they are well accustomed to guerilla warfare in their own hills, and that most of them are very good shots. As a matter of fact, they had been disarmed before the war began, during one of those insurrectionary periods through which Crete used to pass. Therefore they had no rifles when the war began, whereas if, during the intervening seven months, we had provided them with rifles, they would have been an immense accession to our fighting powers.

To sum up, I would say that the general impression which is widely felt is that this war in the Middle East was not viewed sufficiently as a whole, and that there was insufficient long-distance foresight in the situation which might arise in Crete. It could have been envisaged since Italy attacked Greece. If Italy had failed, the Germans could not have allowed that failure to stand, and if Germany herself had conquered Greece, then Crete was very obviously the next strategic stage in her advance. It is suggested that although these possibilities were foreseen, it was assumed that Germany would attack by the more orthodox method of an invasion by sea, with which the British Fleet could deal, and with which the British Fleet did deal, but that we were unprepared for the new technique which Germany adopted, which we had to deal with by hasty improvisations which came too late in the day. That is the summary which, I think, can be made of the questions being asked by the public on this small-scale campaign.

Apart from an inquiry into why certain things happened, a Debate like this will be quite useful if we bear wider considerations in mind. After all, this was a very novel campaign, and I think we can profitably discuss whether there are not certain conclusions which can be drawn from it with regard to the defences of our own Island. Surely that is a subject into which this House can very profitably inquire. We have all read Goering's order to his air forces after his capture of Crete.. He stated that the capture of Crete has shown there is no unconquerable island. Undoubtedly the German methods, as applied to Crete, have been carefully worked out to the last detail. They have been scientific, absolutely regardless of 68 life, and they have been unorthodox. It would be perilous if we ignored the possibility that some of these methods might be used in an invasion of this Island. I have heard a number of discussions on the conclusions which can be drawn from what has happened in Crete in regard to the defence of this Island. I have noticed that the answer which has been given is that Germany's success is Crete was due to the fact that she obtained complete mastery of the air, and that in an attack on this country she would not have that mastery, and therefore there are no lessons to be learned and no parallel to be drawn in an attack on this Island.

I am not satisfied with that summary of the situation, although it has been made in very authoritative papers. Germany has adopted novel methods, and one of them, which has particularly impressed me as probably altering our ideas about the defence of this country, is her use of crash-landing aeroplanes. I gather from accounts of the battle that so far as parachute troops are concerned they are not regarded as being very dangerous, but that it is the crash-landing aeroplanes which are the danger. Hitherto it has been assumed that if air-borne troop carriers were to land, they would require fairly suitable ground, but experience in Crete has shown this view to be obsolete. The air-borne troop carriers used in Crete were furnished with old and derelict engines which were regarded as quite good enough, and were practically constructed of plywood. They carried a number of men in organised formations, and these planes were crashed in the most surprising places. If a certain proportion of the troops emerged, they were organised into formations at very short notice. I have heard that this type of troop-carrying aeroplane, which is required to make a single journey only, can be produced in Germany at the rate of 100 per week. I am not talking about gliders. This, I think, affects our plans for dealing with an invasion in two ways. The Government must have made calculations on the number of troops which will come by sea, and the number of invading troops which will come by air. It seems to me that experience in Crete shows that the number of divisions which may invade us from the air may be very much larger than the number we have hitherto estimated, and that our plans should be adapted to meet 69 that situation. The other fact which emerges is that formations from troop carriers come into action as soon as they land, and that they land as formations. Formations from parachute troops have to get together after they land. Therefore, the calculations which have been made as to the amount of time that will elapse before air-borne troops could attack will very likely have to be altered on account of this recent experience.

I call the attention of the Government to one area of danger to which I think this experience lends more anxiety than has hitherto been felt. It is clear that attacks from troop carriers crash-landed, would the most effective if they were in a fairly isolated district where they could not be immediately reached. There is a very isolated district from the defensive point of view, and that is Southern Ireland. Anxieties have been expressed about the Irish ports, but this is another anxiety— Ireland as a landing ground for attack. I do not know what the strength of the Irish defensive forces is, but I know that at the beginning of the war they had a regular army of 6,000, and an air force of less than 20 machines. Taking the experience of Crete, the establishment of a German force in Southern Ireland would be a matter not of days but of hours. I fully realise that the conquest of Southern Ireland is not the conquest of Great Britain, but, nevertheless, if you had German forces established in Southern Ireland, they would have to be driven out, and the process of driving them out might divert very large bodies of troops which would be needed in other areas at the very moment when we are fighting for our existence.

There is one further fact which was drawn to my mind by a question that was put about the order of Business today. It was suggested that the Prime Minister might make a statement at some time, not with regard to a particular area of war, like the Eastern Mediterranean, but a statement setting that area of war in the framework of the war as a whole, because I think there is a certain danger in a series of Debates in which, quite naturally, we concentrate upon our difficulties and upon those areas where we are at the maximum disadvantage. Neutral opinion is very closely trying to make up its mind as to how the war is going, and neutrals may get a very 70 erroneous sense of proportion if we always concentrate upon those areas. It is, therefore, necessary, even in a Debate like this, to make it quite clear that the Eastern Mediterranean, important though it is, is not the primary theatre of war, where the war will be won or lost. The primary theatre of war is this Island and the Atlantic Ocean. If Hitler wins there, he wins, but let neutral opinion understand that, if he does not win there, whatever may be happening at this moment to these small countries which he can easily conquer, when the time arrives when we can take the initiative, and will arrive if he does not win the Battle of the Atlantic, those small countries will be a liability to him rather than an asset. He has not conciliated them. He is stretched all over Europe. He has immensely long lines of communication, and in each of those countries they are waiting for a frightful vengeance and are ready for the attack when the material superiority has passed out of his hands. So that the main battles of the war are being fought by the public opinion of the United States, and those battles are coming our way day by day. That is why I think it would be useful, for a general survey of the war, to show that when you take it in its entirety neutral countries can see that we have more solid reason for confidence to-day than at any previous stage.

§ Mr. Hore-Belisha (Devonport)

Whether or not they were asked to do so, the Government have undoubtedly been wise on this occasion to take Parliament, which is the source and sanction of their authority, immediately into consultation upon recent serious developments culminating in the abandonment of Crete. The event is one of unusual significance. For the first time in history an island has been captured by air-borne attack. That in itself is an occurrence— let us hope not a portent—on which we, situated geographically as we are, cannot fail anxiously to ponder. Yet we are under some embarrassment in that no statement has been made by the Government at the opening of this Debate, and I say candidly that the course of one's remarks might naturally be influenced by an authoritative pronouncement. However, in the absence of such a statement, one must draw one's own conclusions. The war deepens and widens—or shall we say contracts—around us. I trust that 71 the. Debate will be helpful, for, if the reverse which we have suffered were to prove insufficient to impart its plainly-spoken lesson, what but an act of Providence could assure the vindication of our cause and the safety of our country?

Military setbacks are a part of the fortunes of war and, in so far as they are incidental, do not necessarily affect the ultimate issue. When a commander, having appreciated a situation, reaches a decision and executes it with real skill and energy, it would be as churlish to complain when things go against him as it would be ungracious to withhold praise when he succeeds. If, however, the reverses are due to errors and miscalculations of strategy, the consequences are more far-reaching, and the causes and character of the errors and miscalculations should be objectively examined with a view to ascertaining in what quarter and how they have arisen, and to applying remedies without delay. It would be helpful for the future if we were to ask ourselves whether at Dakar, in Cyrenaica, in Greece, and now in Crete the forfeits which we have incurred have not been at least in part due to an imperfect assessment of possibilities, and indeed of probabilities, and consequently to ineffective preparation. Except in the case of Greece, these are all areas in which the initial advantages and the opportunity of exploiting them have been with us. In Greece there was a period of six months to prepare before the arrival of the Germans. Neither the boldness of the enemy in overcoming obstacles, neither his ingenuity, his speed, nor even our own experiences seem to have been taken into full account.

What is the course of events leading up to the loss of Crete, and what is the interpretation which has been put upon them as they have occurred? Let us make the perspective clear. Up till last October the sole major base of the British Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean was Alexandria. The lack of a safe alternative harbour close to Italian waters circumscribed the range of the Royal Navy. Similarly a lack of landing grounds within the necessary proximity deprived us of the opportunity of bombing Italy which we should have desired. By a stroke of good fortune, as it then appeared, the entry of Greece into the war on our side 72 gave us unexpectedly the use of Suda Bay and aerodromes on the island of Crete. In acknowledging these acquisitions to our strength my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister informed the House that they would enable us "Sensibly to extend the activities and radius of the Navy and of the Air Force." That, of course, was true. The distance to Taranto had been almost halved. Our warships could thenceforward refuel in relays and thus maintain a more continuous vigilance. It became hazardous for the enemy to attempt to dispatch transports to Libya, and the campaign which General Wavell initiated was made all the more easy. Crete, which in British hands was a great protection to the Imperial Forces operating in the Western Desert, being only 200 miles from Tobruk, under enemy control, now offers a serious menace to them as it does indeed to the major base at Alexandria, on which severe attacks are now being made. It was no doubt partly for this reason that my right hon. Friend coupled both these places together when he said on 7th May: We intend to defend to the death, and without thought of retirement, the valuable and highly offensive outposts of Crete and Tobruk." — [OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1941, col. 940, Vol. 371.] Further potential benefits accrued to us through our occupation of Crete which I need not examine. If during the six months we had in Greece and Crete in which to beat the Italians out of the Balkans, and if possible, out of the war, we were not able to exploit our opportunities, it was, as we have since been told, due to a lack of aeroplanes or of aerodromes. The same deficiency stood in the way of our success in Greece. A hundred more Hurricanes, all the war correspondents concur, would have given us a margin with which to break the enemy's domination. It was heartbreaking, they wrote, to watch formations of German bombers escorted by numerous fighters flying over at regular periods, day after day, and strafing our troops and lines of communication with impunity. Despite the fact that there was a plan which promised good prospects of military success, the task of the Armed Forces in these circumstances—in the absence of air support—became impossible. This was the crux of the whole matter. After the evacuation of the mainland of Greece, and 73 considering its lessons, the War Office spokesman in a broadcast on 15th May said: In the first few days the German bombers had the air to themselves. We could not help sympathising with the Royal Air Force. Hopelessly outnumbered from the start and finally driven off their last aerodromes by the advance of the German Panzer divisions, they had to abandon the fight since the fighters could not get from Crete to the battle and back again. Then he added, by way of consolation: Though we are out of Greece, we remain in Crete. This Island, if you look at the map, is right at the centre of the Eastern Mediterranean; it has airfields and an excellent harbour. It is important to us. … These words were used by Major-General Collins five days before the new attack opened. Already, General Freyberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial and Greek Forces, had proclaimed in an order of the day: We will not only maintain the integrity of the soil of Crete from any invader but we shall also, by God's grace, in time go forward from this base."— —this highly offensive outpost— to restore the freedom and independence of the whole of Greece. It was on the same day that my right hon. Friend made his statement about defending the island to the death. Then came the news of very heavy concentrations of German aeroplanes on the aerodromes in Southern Greece which we had been unable to use, some of them indeed being in the Peloponessus, which the Germans occupied only after our evacuation of Attica. Summarising the position then, before the invasion of Crete was launched, it must have been obvious to the responsible authorities firstly, that the Army had been driven out of Greece because of a lack of aeroplanes or because operational use of aerodromes could not be made; secondly, that experience had shown that the Army, despite its valour, could not hold its ground without such support; and, thirdly, that the preliminaries to an air-borne attack on Crete were in train. Every one of these lessons was discarded. No adequate measures for defending aerodromes were instituted in an island of which we had been in occupation for seven months. The Army was not given its air support—indeed, this was withdrawn shortly after the battle began. Although it was known that the preliminaries to an air-borne attack were in train, 74 the official view persisted that this was impossible, and statements continued to be made that Crete would be held. Air-borne forces by themselves won't capture that island, broadcast Air-Comomdore Goddard on 22nd May, two days after the invasion and when air support had been withdrawn. He said: Crete, so far as we are concerned, must be the business of soldiers and sailors. It did indeed become the business of soldiers and sailors, and sacrificially they discharged their allotted task; but at what cost! A bare description of what they were enduring in this desperate battle aroused the deepest emotions and, indeed, the gravest forebodings. Yet confident statements continued to be made by military spokesmen in Cairo. Reinforcements were sent, but unfortunately not of a kind which could alone have saved the situation. Without the requisite overhead protection the Navy lost, as far as we have been informed up to this day, four cruisers and six destroyers sunk, and several warships were damaged—casualties greater than those we inflicted on the Italians in the battle of Cape Matapan.

Why was the Fleet called upon to operate in narrow waters and the Army required to undertake so desperate a task in circumstances which neglected every dictate of experience? The Government were formed following the events in Norway. There it had been shown under what a handicap the Fleet laboured in the discharge of operations within the range of the land-based Luftwaffe. There it had been demonstrated that an Army could not be maintained without aerodromes from which it could be given cover. Since then these tactical facts have been reinforced. They were reinforced in January in the Sicilian Channel, where our direct line of communication was interrupted and where we lost the cruiser "Southampton," and where the aircraft-carrier "Illustrious" was hit and the destroyer "Gallant" damaged. They were reinforced so far as Armies are concerned, in the Low Countries, in Yugoslavia and in Greece. Why were they not applied?

Surely it has become urgent to draw a distinction between the Royal Air Force operating strategically—that is, long distance bombing against the enemy or in countering long-distance bombing by the 75 enemy—and the tactical role of the air in aid of the two other services. Aircraft must be recognised to be as integral a part of a Navy or Army as any other weapon. We have gone part of the way in the Navy by establishing the Fleet Air Arm, which has amply justified itself. Why should not the process be carried as far as this in the Army and to its logical conclusion in the Navy? Should we not give to the commander in the field or the commander conducting operations at sea, control over the land-based aircraft which are shown once again by these events to be essential to his task? As matters now stand the vital arrangements to be made by them before and during an action are for argument, negotiation and compromise between those who naturally take different views of the obligations and possibilities of their respective Services. Such a process may result in failure to provide what is required initially or in a delay or incapacity to obtain it while the action is proceeding. How can those charged with formulating plans or in executing them be trained or accustomed to think in terms of the air as in terms of the sea and the land if they do not habitually dispose of their own aircraft as effectively as they do of their other weapons?

It is, however, not only in the actual battle that the defects of the present system are apparent. The trouble goes further back. The Air Ministry—it is only natural—will always attach greater importance to having machines for long distance bombing, which it holds will win the war. The Army, for its part, is unlikely to obtain quickly a sufficiency of the types which it requires, such as dive-bombers, ground strafing machines, or even transport planes, indispensible to its success, if it falls to the Air Force to balance the urgency of these requirements against its own particular needs. The present arrangements have hitherto been defended on the ground that they worked. The answer given in Crete is plainly that they do not. The Fleet Air Arm could not bring its full weight to bear against relays of bombers operating from the shore. The Imperial Forces were lashed mercilessly by the Luftwaffe, which had the air to itself. From the opening day of the attack, although the German bombers were not able to come into action until the positions of their own troops were 76 clear, none of our planes was available to resist them. One or two, it appears, still remained undestroyed on the Maleme Airfield, but from then until the end not another British machine was to operate from the soil of Crete.

Never again should a contingent of the British Army be placed in such a position. It is improvident to allow the best fighting material which we have in the Empire to be immolated when vaster and unknown tasks may lie ahead. Is it not inconceivable that the land commander or the sea commander in Crete, if either had had complete control, would not have made provision for the air support required for his operations, or would have allowed such air support as was available to be withdrawn from him at a critical juncture when he knew that by so doing he would be placing the other arms, which had to remain, under an impossible handicap?

§ Mr. A. Bevan (Ebbw Vale)

Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that the Air Force was withdrawn from Crete on the initiative alone of the Air Ministry?

§ Mr. Hore-Belisha

I was going to ask that very question. On whose decision was this course taken? Was it taken by the Army Commander or the Air Commander or in Cairo or in London? Who took the decision? If proper air support could not be given why were those ships and the Army left to undergo what they did? On what grounds was it stated that the island could and would be held? Perhaps my right hon. Friend will tell us that. It has been suggested that the tragic outcome of the decision to leave the Navy and Army to hold Crete without the necessary protection was because our side had no aerodromes and not because they had no aeroplanes.

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill)

Who said that?

§ Mr. Hore-Belisha

That is a phrase which my right hon. Friend used in his statement in the House on 22nd May. It was before the final evacuation and in a statement made just before the House rose. On the other hand, it has been stated that even if we had had the aerodromes we could not have spared sufficient machines from the total force available in the Middle East. Between these two opinions lies the central fact that a 77 successful airborne invasion was not regarded as a possibility. You do not prepare against what has never entered your mind.

Now, however, we must realise that an airborne invasion over 100 miles of sea can be successful without surface command of the waters, if the Navy is not given full support from the air. Simultaneously the Army will require such support. The Air Force must, therefore, have numerous and well distributed bases from which to work. The defence and rapid construction and repair of aerodromes, when damaged, demand their place in the most urgent category of our requirements. It is to be assumed that the methods of defence will be taken into prompt review and that assurances will be given before the end of the Debate that provision will be made against the new contingencies. It is evident that the unprotected man, even though conventionally armed, is not able to resist an overwhelming descent effected by surprise. The armoured fighting vehicle is required to give the necessary shield and mobility. In the construction of aerodromes and in their repair when damaged the Germans clearly have a more speedy procedure than we employ. They were able to bring their new aerodromes in Greece into operation within 18 days. We have it on the authority of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour, in his speech at Wimbledon last Friday, that we are behind with our aerodromes as we are with some of our factories.

I do not in the least wish to attribute blame in that matter to the Air Ministry, whose programme, I am sure, is satisfactory. I have made what examination I can of these matters with experts, and I am advised that for the purpose of repair, at any rate, it is not sufficient to rely on maintenance contractors. Their plant, tools and the man-power of which they dispose are strictly limited. If 50 or 60 aerodromes in an area, or, as matters now stand, two or three, were to become objects of determined simultaneous attack there would not only be an inadequacy of labour but of machines and of material. The Air Ministry might be well advised to have a corps of its own, like the Royal Engineers or Pioneers, under orders and trained as fighting personnel, organised in mobile units in each area. Each unit would have on its charge a mechanical 78 excavator, a caterpillar tractor, a concrete mixer and hydraulic tipping trucks. I am told that at present when such equipment is required it may in certain parts of the country have to be brought from over 100 miles away. As heavy machines can only be moved along our roads at an average rate of five miles an hour, it will be seen that unless some improved system is instituted the Germans if they could penetrate our defences and destroy a large number of aerodromes would, as in Crete, be able to dislocate the operations of our Air Force for a protracted and certainly at a critical time. If the Air Force had such a corps, detachments would be available when we occupy new territory to prepare the landing grounds.

It is quite evident from the happenings we are examining to-day, and from the events which have preceded them, that in the sphere of strategy there has been on our side no adjustment to the tempo or resourcefulness of the enemy. What is equally serious, however, is that the great enthusiasm and impulse which were imparted to the whole people, irrespective of class, and to the whole of our efforts, when my right hon. Friend came into power, have faltered. They must not be further dissipated. They must be revived. When I say this I do not disparage the great efforts made by my right hon. Friend. It is desired on all sides to strengthen his hand. He has referred to the actual equipment situation in terms of some optimism. Within the last few days he has informed Mr. Menzies that the strengthening of supplies to the Mediterranean was limited neither by British will nor British resources, but entirely by the physical problem of transportation. That, of course, can only be remedied to some extent by further economising shipping space, by a more rapid and widespread concentration of industry, and by the strictest and most equitable rationing of all articles. After the Secret Session another encouraging statement was made by the Ministry of Supply on progress. Again, when I ventured to urge that tanks should be given the same priority as aeroplanes, I was informed that as many heavy tanks were being made in a month as were at the disposal of the War Office at the time of my departure. That is a matter for great rejoicing. I do not place myself in competition with my right hon. 79 Friend either in achievement or in opportunity. He enjoys plenary powers, which I hope he will fully utilise, powers enjoyed by no previous administration. I wish I had enjoyed them, or, rather, I wish the Ministry of Supply had enjoyed them in my time.

§ Viscountess Astor (Plymouth, Sutton)

Why did you not get the Ministry of Supply in your own hands instead of giving it to the right hon. Member for Luton (Mr. Burgin)? [Interruption.] It is true.

§ Mr. Hore-Belisha

I am flattered by the Noble Lady's intervention. My right hon. Friend has the whole motor-car industry at his disposal, which is not allowed to make a single private car unless for a special purpose—all now engaged on production of aeroplanes and tanks. I wish that had been the case in my time. He has no restrictive trade union regulations. He has all parties at his back. I do not know how far the satisfaction which my right hon. Friend has expressed is positive or relative, nor am I in a position to vouch for the accuracy of the diagnosis recently made in the Deputy-Director's Office of Production Management in the United States. It is a very grave statement. Mr. W. L. Batt, Deputy-Director, Office of Production Management in the United States, said: There is not one shred of evidence that Britain's industrial military strength, plus what we are sending and have promised to send at the present time, is strengthening her position in relation to Germany's. Then follow a number of supporting statements of a very grave character, which I will not read, and the statement concludes:— For us to suppose that Britain is growing stronger every day in relation to Germany is criminal folly. On such information as is available to me, I deem it my duty to warn the country that it is only by handling our problems, admittedly stupendous, with more vigour, dynamism and imagination that we can obtain victory. No false loyalties or personal considerations or second best standards must be allowed to stand in the way of achieving this result.

§ Mrs. Rathbone (Bodmin)

On this, the first occasion that I have ever had the opportunity to address the House, I beg 80 the indulgence of hon. Members. I should have felt inclined to wait a very much longer time before giving voice to my opinions, but I have literally been forced to my feet to-day, not only by my own convictions, but by the countless distressing and appealing letters which I have had from my constituents. We have just listened to a most interesting and highly-analytical speech from the right hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha). I do not propose to go into any such detailed recriminations about Crete or any other of our past failures. I want to put before the House the general feeling which there is in my constituency and certain matters which disturb me personally very much indeed. It will be universally agreed that recriminations are futile and are a complete waste of time unless we learn very definite lessons from those past experiences, such as Crete. But I feel that the time for learning lessons is becoming rather short; the people of this country, who have been so willing to accept explanations in the past, are not feeling so ready to accept them to-day. They want to see action, vigorous action, which will in fact bring alive the determination which they feel in their own. minds. In fact, I feel that there are too many avenues which have for too long had traffic diversions round them. I want to point out one of these to hon. Members.

We have seen, as speakers have said before, the invasion of an island successfully carried out from the air. I want to ask the Government: Is the scope of our strategical and our tactical planning for the defence of this Island broad enough? Does it include the possibility of impossibilities? Are our preparation and our training fast enough and careful enough? If not, why not? We must stop thinking in watertight compartments, even as between one Government Department and another or as between the Defence Forces, or even within the confines of one particular branch of our Defences. One example comes to my mind from my own personal experience, but it is difficult to speak about it, because if one gives details, one is perhaps giving more information than one should in public; but it is commonly recognised that the R.A.F. and the Army must work in more close co-operation, not only in battle but in the defence of our aerodromes in this country. We, as a nation, have been 81 perhaps a little too inclined to look back to "1066" and to our coastline and to forget that our aerodromes are our frontline defence too.

I want to ask how much training the Home Guard and the Army are having, one in conjunction with the other. I know many areas where this contact is working extremely well, but I know many areas where there is no contact at all. In other words, this particular form of practical training is left almost entirely to local initiative and to local commanding officers, who are willing to give extra time and attention to the matter. Surely it should be recognised that this should be a universal form of very vitally necessary training. The Home Guard should be an auxiliary arm of the Army, just as civilians should be an auxiliary arm of the Home Guard. Mutual instruction and training of this kind in the giving and the taking of orders is the only possible way that we shall be able to see the greatest confidence and co-ordination, which are needed in a time of crisis. It will surely offer the very best antidote to any fifth-column activity. The machinery for such co-ordination and such liaisons ' should become absolutely automatic in this sphere, as in many other spheres of our war effort. It should become a habit of mind.

The Government have told civilians in this country—and here I come to a point which is disturbing the minds of my constituents considerably—to stay put. I ask hon. Members to bear with me for a moment while I recall the Story of a refugee who is staying as a visitor in a house in my constituency. On the first day when she heard gunfire, the refugee packed her bag, took her children and set off down the lane. Her hostess took her aside and said, "The Government have told us to stay put. You must go back." The refugee answered, "I come from a country in Europe, and I have seen. You have never seen. I do not stay put." The British people are a law-abiding race. They have the temperament to stay put. We must give them the training. In how many villages in this country has there been a mock invasion from the air, from the land or from the sea? In how many civilian homes have tests been put as to how they will carry out their plans in the event of invasion? I would go a step further, 82 and perhaps be a little irrelevant, and ask how many civilians have been trained to wear their gas-masks at regular intervals?

This is one cog in the wheel, which I have brought to the notice of hon Members. I realise that it is not the only sphere where clarification, simplification and greater efficiency are needed. I feel that there should be no need for a suggestion to arise at a time like this that an Army air arm should be created, when we are fighting the greatest battle that we have ever endured. Surely there can be sufficient co-operation between the Army and the R.A.F. to make such a move unnecessary. Surely we should be wise to have a nation-wide spring-clean, now that the Crete dust is settling. The Prime Minister has led this country vigorously, unitedly and with singleness of purpose and directness of approach; I wish his method and spirit were as contagious as the measles. We might not be capable in this country of Nazi ruthlessness and tyranny, but we can and we must be capable of ruthless efficiency.

Arising out of the post-morten which we are holding here to-day, I go so far as to say that I should like to see an Order of the Day issued to the people of this country to stimulate simplification and co-ordination in industry and in every branch of our war effort, and to appeal to people finally to discard once and for all the fetters and the red tape which hold up our war effort. I could read, but I wish to be brief, a letter which I have here from a constituent of mine, who is a member of one of the Civil Defence forces. He tells me that it takes months to get a decision of any kind, because matters must filter from London through Truro, Bodmin and Liskeard, to wherever he lives, through sub-unit and sub-sub-units. That is not good enough when we are fighting a war of this kind. I would like to see us like an athlete preparing for the last great match. We, as a country, should go into a period of strictest training. There would be a tremendous response to such a call, provided that Government Departments themselves gave very close scrutiny to possible weaknesses which might exist in their very midst. We must put first things first. This is not the eleventh hour; it is the half-past eleventh hour. Our people are more 83 grimly determined than ever, and I pray that the Government will realise that fact and lead with renewed vigour.

§ Sir Percy Harris (Bethnal Green, South-West)

I am very privileged to follow the hon. Lady who has just made her maiden speech. It was like a breath of fresh air from America across the moors of Devonshire [Hon. Members: "Cornwall."] Well, it is all the more bracing. Her speech was full of knowledge, common sense and understanding and was a most valuable contribution to our Debate.

I was one of those, and I plead guilty, who were in favour of a Debate to-day. I was convinced that the country and the newspapers were full of rumours, leading articles and correspondence and, needless to say, that the Lobbies were full of discussion. It is far better to have a discussion in the House of Commons, where complaints and criticisms may be answered by responsible Ministers. It might have been better had it been possible for a Minister to open the discussion, but it is very satisfactory to know that the Prime Minister himself will wind up, and that he will answer the points made by the three previous speakers. Those who heard the three previous speakers will agree that they made in each case a valuable and constructive contribution. The right hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) was critical. I did not agree with all his criticisms, yet the speech was worth making. It is much better to make it in the House of Commons, where it can be answered, than to be written in the form of articles in the Sunday Press.

We want to get the Battle of Crete in its proper perspective. After all, it is only part of a battle spread over three Continents, to say nothing of the Atlantic. We must read it with the victories, which have not yet been mentioned to-day, in East Africa, Abyssinia and Iraq. We as a nation are rather inclined to underestimate our achievements and to be over-conscious of our failures. That is healthy, because it means that we are not suffering from over-optimism. Nothing that has been or will be said to-day will, I am quite sure, prejudice our new campaign in Syria. It is a campaign of great significance, because alongside us stand the Free French as active partners. We are 84 all conscious that the whole world is listening to our Debate, not only the Germans and Herr Goebbels, who we all know distorts and twists whatever is said, but the neutrals, the Dominions—particularly the Dominions, which have already been discussing the Crete campaign because they were very concerned in it—and above all the United States of America. I am not one of those who under-estimate the happenings in Crete, although I think the right hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate was somewhat inclined to do so.

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport that Crete was of vital strategic importance. The Prime Minister said so in the Debate on the Vote of Confidence. He said that we should defend Crete to the death and without thought of retirement. There is a public listening more conscientiously than we are aware for every statement made in the House of Commons, and that public was buoyed up to believe that failure in Greece would be followed by a great success in the neighbouring island. That was emphasised by the fact that great publicity was given to the transfer of the Greek Government to Crete as a permanent base for keeping alive Greek independence. Therefore, when things did not go as well as was expected, when the news of setbacks gradually trickled out through the Press and the B.B.C., inevitably there were disappointment and criticsim. The country, which follows these things to-day far more closely than it did in the last war because there are now far more people militarily educated than there were then, could not help realising that for over six months there had been time to prepare the defences of this most important strategic island.

One gets the impression that in this case the Government, or whoever was responsible for the defence, grossly underrated our enemy. We now hear many explanations of what has happened, and why it was that when we were in occupation of Greece we had not enough aerodromes to retain that country, whereas as soon as the Germans came into possession they were able so to organise matters that aerodromes became available for a massed attack on Crete. I know there is a possible explanation, which we shall perhaps get to-day, to the effect that the Germans succeeded in having enough aerodromes 85 for this great enterprise where we failed to do so because the weather had changed, and drier weather made available aerodromes which might not have been of much use for our original purpose. But neither do we understand, and it is difficult to explain, the under-rating of the power of the parachutists to seize vital points and of the power of air-borne troops to organise large-scale operations quickly and efficiently. I should have thought that our experience in Norway, Holland and Belgium would have proved to the responsible officers that preparations for such large-scale attacks ought to have been made. These are points which might well be explained by the Prime Minister when he comes to reply.

It is clear that air power is now a serious competitor to sea power. The technique of war is completely changing. If we have learnt that lesson as a result of our experience in Crete, the battle will not have been fought in vain. It is quite clear, as the right hon. Gentleman said, that the Army is powerless without an adequate Air Force. He pressed home his particular belief that just as the Navy has its own Air Arm, so should the Army have its Air Force. But technical opinion up to the present suggests that that might dissipate our force, and instead of strengthening our air power, dividing its use between three authorities would almost certainly weaken it. I think we are entitled in the course of the Debate to have an assurance that there is close and adequate liaison between the two Services. I know, according to what the Prime Minister told us in the recent Debate, that there are regular meetings of the Chiefs of Staff almost daily, and that the Prime Minister himself presides over those meetings. In addition there is the Committee of Imperial Defence. But is there a staff representing all three Services working out the strategy of the war as a whole, and not merely from the point of view of each separate service? It is clear that the German staff work out their plans in the minutest detail. Nothing is too unimportant, nothing is left to chance, and it is clear that the two services in Germany work as one.

I noticed in the '' Times'' an interesting report of the comment of an Australian correspondent, who said that German methods are dangerously unorthodox. We are not, in the German sense, a military 86 nation. In peace-time we have only a small standing Army, and therefore our officers, and our staff officers in particular, must be small in number in proportion. In the first year of the war general strategy was in the hands of the French, and I think we should like to know— and we may well be told—whether in the meantime machinery has been set up to secure comprehensive plans for combined operations.

May I now for a few minutes turn to another matter? There has been a general impression in this country, and certainly in the Dominions, that the Australian and New Zealand troops have borne more than their share of the fighting in Greece, in Crete, and, I may add, in Libya. I have lived in New Zealand, and I know New Zealand people well enough to realise that they are proud to be in the forefront of the battle. But the population of New Zealand is only about 1,500,000, and that of Australia at most 7,000,000; between them, they have about the population of Greater London. Perhaps the publicity is to some extent to blame. Hardly any mention has been made of the particular British troops concerned. No reference to the regiments or to the kind of troops involved has been made. The impression has certainly been given that the strain and stress of these three difficult and dangerous campaigns, which involved heavy loss of life, has been mainly borne by Australian and New Zealand troops. It is clear that they do not complain. That is not their spirit. They are as loyal as any section here to the cause which is the cause of the British Empire as a whole.

But the case has been made for a closer association of some Dominions statesmen with the direction of the war. I advocated that in this House as long ago as last August. I admit that I believe I am pressing at an open door, and that if a suitable politician from the Dominions was able and willing to help us in our councils, the Prime Minister would welcome him. But the leaders in the Dominions have their home problems. General Smuts, now Field-Marshal Smuts—a happy gesture to South Africa—has a difficult task to lead his people to close co-operation in this war; Mr. Mackenzie King, I believe, is 1oth to leave his own country at a time like this; while Mr. Menzies has a majority of one, and, therefore, if he were to leave his Dominion a position of great difficulty 87 and delicacy might result. But I would remind the House and the Prime Minister that when General Smuts was in the War Cabinet during the last war—and I think my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) will testify to the great value of his wise counsel and military knowledge— he was not Prime Minister of South Africa. General Botha was Prime Minister there. There may be available, although I am not prepared to name him at the moment, some Dominion statesman of character and experience, capable of understanding the military problems, who would be of very great assistance, and who, above all, would show by his inclusion that we were not looking at problems merely from our own point of view but that we were considering them from an Empire point of view. The case for such a proposal is strengthened by the happenings of the last few months. The fact that we have been so dependent upon help in the Near East from the Dominions emphasises the case which I put forward last summer.

I do not want the House to feel that Crete is too serious a setback. I have a vivid recollection of defeats in the last war which were upon a scale 10 times greater than anything that has happened during the last 12 months. There was Vimy Ridge, there was terrific destruction of life in France, there was the battle of Salonica, and there was the Dardanelles campaign. There were, as a result, bitter and acrimonious Debates in this House. These things loomed very large. I am sure that the Government are wise to allow us this early occasion of discussing the whole situation. But when we discuss these problems, let me show that we have no lack of faith either in the Government or in the great and wise leadership of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is our greatest asset. Nothing that we say here should suggest that we have lost faith in his ability to lead us to victory. That does not mean that it is not our duty, as members of Parliament, to ventilate the grievances of the public outside, and to make clear what their criticisms are.

§ Mr. Stokes (Ipswich)

I, like other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who have spoken, find myself in a difficulty because no statement upon Crete has been made from the Government Front Bench. I am not in possession of more facts than have 88 either been stated by other speakers or have been culled from the daily Press. I want, therefore, to spend a few moments in reviewing the strategy which has led up to the present position. We know that we have in our Armed Forces the bravest men, and that we have the best equipment, although we have not at present, perhaps, enough of it. I have some serious doubt, however, as to the wisdom of some of our war strategy. The general position as I see it, is that Hitler, with his forces, is on a mainland, and that we are on an island. His difficulty is to know how to get at us. Obviously, the tactic that he should follow is to lure us out of the island on to the mainland.

Whenever we take upon ourselves the job of invading the Continent, we are surrounding ourselves with just those difficulties that Hitler would surround himself with if he endeavoured to invade these shores and from which he shrinks. His war machine is mainly a land and air machine, while our power, surely, lies mainly upon the seas—and in course of time it will be in the air as well. Every time we land on the Continent and get kicked off, we lose both material and prestige. That has a deplorable effect upon small nations. It has just the effect that Hitler desires, giving them the conviction that he is invincible. In fact our strategy might almost be described as "playing Hitler's game." I should like to call to mind the various expeditions we have indulged in since the war started. Naturally, with France as our great Ally, we had no alternative when the war started but to send an expeditionary force to France. But what have our other expeditions been like? I will refer first to the Norwegian fiasco. I remember that when the German invasion of Norway took place, the Prime Minister said: All German ships in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat will be sunk, and by night all ships will be sunk as opportunity serves. But were they? He said: For myself, I consider that Hitler's action in invading Scandinavia is as great a strategic and political error as that which was committed by Napoleon in 1807 or 1808, when he invaded Spain. But has it proved so? He said: I feel that we are greatly advantaged by what has occurred, provided we act with unceasing and increasing vigour to turn to the, utmost profit the strategic blunder into which 89 our mortal enemy has been provoked."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th April, 1940; cols. 747–8. Vol. 359.] What, in fact, happened? We sent an inadequate and badly-equipped force to Norway, including insufficiently-trained Territorials; with the disastrous result to which I need make no further reference. I would only add that it was followed by that deplorable event, the loss of the "Glorious," a ship which went down overcrowded with men and aeroplanes, and with inadequate escort, apparently owing to the nature of the instructions that were sent out. Our next mistake, I think, was the Dakar fiasco, and here again, except in so far as it caused obviously great complications with the French, no further reference is now necessary.

Is there any real sense in luring these small nations on the Continent—I suppose there are none of them left now—into fighting a war against odds which to them alone are absolutely insuperable? I submit that in doing so we neither help ourselves nor them, and that the only effect most of these expeditions have had has been to cause them bloodshed and ourselves to lose equipment we can ill afford to spare at the present time. I ask the House to compare the strategy which we followed in this matter with what Hitler does. I presume that at one of these many meetings on the Brenner, after the invasion of Albania by the Greeks and after the invasion of Libya by ourselves, representations were made to Hitler that help should be forthcoming for his Italian ally. I do not know any more than anyone else in this House what transpired, but it would be more than likely that Hitler's reply to any appeal for help would be in effect to say that he would not come until he was ready, and that when he was ready there would be available all the support that it was really possible to command. With regard to Greece, if Hitler ever had any doubts as to whether we would send an expeditionary Force to Greece or not, I suggest that the butterfly wanderings of the Foreign Secretary made it clear to him that, if he cared to invade Greece, a force of ours would be there to meet him, thereby providing him with yet another opportunity to punch us on the nose. One of our leading critics of strategy said at that time: 90 Our Grecian strategic blunder placed two armies, where Hitler wanted them; ours in Europe—his in Africa. As to the Greece episode, which seems to have a complete bearing upon what happened in Crete, Mr. Menzies, in a communication which he sent to Australia, said: After consulting naval and military advisers the Cabinet felt that the adventure into Greece held a real prospect of military success. I want to ask a question—I do not know whether I shall receive an answer to-day—and perhaps the Secretary of State for War will put it to the Prime Minister. It seems to me, with but a bare travelling knowledge of that part of Europe, that the sending of help to Greece would be futile unless the Greeks themselves could be persuaded to withdraw their armies from Albania. I ask whether that stipulation was made to Greece before the Expeditionary Force was sent, because without that condition such forces as we could send, small as they were, were bound to be faced with defeat. If they refused to withdraw their troops from Albania, surely the right policy to follow would have been to say, "We are not landing any forces here. We are prepared to aid you to the best of our ability from the sea and by sending air units, with, naturally, aerodrome protection, but we are not going to land anything in the nature of an Expeditionary Force." The second question I want to ask is, Had we really sufficient equipment to spare from Libya? I would remind the House again of what the Prime Minister said upon the Libyan campaign. On 9th February he told us that: Egypt and the Suez Canal are safe, and the port, the base and the airfields at Benghazi constitute a strategic point of high consequence to the whole of the war in the Mediterranean. Presumably he meant till the end of the war.

Did General Wavell then really agree to a Grecian Expeditionary Force? The Foreign Secretary said that the generals in the East were in full agreement. We all know what that means. It means, very likely, that the venture was put up from this end and that the generals had nothing to do but agree to it. Was it initiated by the generals, or was it started at this end and the generals on the spot forced to agree to it or resign? Did it affect the 91 position in Libya at all? If in fact, as it proved, it was impossible to hold Crete, it makes it all the more insane to send land forces to Greece at all. Supposing instead of losing our material in Greece we had landed it in Crete, would that have made a considerable difference to the outcome of events on the Island?

There has been a good deal of criticism, and statements have been made with regard to the relative effectiveness or success of the Navy with an Air Force against it. It is utterly wrong to allow the impression to grow that the Navy cannot face the air power, and that the Navy was beaten by air power in the Battle for Crete. Surely the facts are quite to the contrary. The two seaborne invasions attempted from Greece into Crete were completely driven off by the Navy. It is agreed that there was considerable loss as a result of air activities, and presumably had our own Air Force or Naval Air Arm been stronger these losses would not have been as large as they actually were. The point I would like to make is this: We went to Crete in November. The Admiralty presumably knew that sooner or later that island would have to be held. I ask the Secretary of State for War whether, at the time that we went to Crete in November, the Admiralty insisted upon such dispositions "with regard to future Air Forces as would enable the Navy to receive proper protection and support from those Air Forces in the event of an ultimate battle such as finally took place, which they knew six months ago was bound to come?

Much has been said about the dive-bomber and the effect of it. I am one of the fortunate Members of this House who has not been dive-bombed, but I have talked to a great many people who have been so bombed. The newspapers seem to have got hold of the idea that flesh and blood cannot stand dive-bombing. I do not believe that. Lots of people who have faced dive-bombing admit that really it is psychological, rather than damaging to life and limb. I cannot believe that any kind of dive-bombing can possibly equal the kind of intensive barrage with which troops had to put up day after day and night after night in the last war, and which must have been far more damaging to life and limb than any of these dive-bombing efforts have been. It would be quite 92 wrong, and an insult to our troops to say that they cannot face it. I would recall to the House the story of Corporal Neill referred to as the "Mad Marine," who on the island of Crete disregarded the dive-bombers and shot them down with a machine gun. Corporal Neill's example could be well followed, and on reflection it reminds me of a story told of George III. When it was reported to him that General Wolfe had gone mad, he said, "Then I wish he would bite some of my generals." I would suggest that if Corporal Neill could come home and bite some of those generals who are responsible for the training so as to make sure that the Army is inoculated with the idea that bombing can be faced if the men are properly equipped and trained, it would be to all our advantage.

I do not wish to detain the House with unnecessary amateur opinions as to what should or should not be done with the Navy or any other of our Forces, but I do suggest that if we admit, as we must, that our final success depends upon our ability to overcome our enemies in the Atlantic, then the Navy has a greater job to do than escorting and evacuating the forces required for what I would term these pseudo-Marlburian adventures into Europe. In conclusion, I want to say this: I feel that the strategy on which the war is being conducted is inadequate, and to show that that feeling is abroad may I quote from a message from Australia which appeared on the tape machines three or four days ago? It says: It would appear ⁺hat a stage has been reached in which the fighting places and necessary strategy are dictated mainly by the enemy. The Australian people would certainly welcome some new species of strategy, some plan of campaign, more comprehensive and more farsighted than anything at present being attempted. Questions of resources in fighting men and their equipment are vitally important but no less so is the need for a plan of campaign fully-rounded and all-inclusive. I agree with every word of that, and I am sure, from the many talks I have had with people in this country, that there is a general feeling that our war strategy is not on a sufficiently broad or understandable basis. No doubt this Debate will roll on to its inevitable conclusion—a rhetorical Blenheim—but oratory will not win wars, and I have nothing but praise for the Prime Minister's pugnacity and energy. It is just what you want 93 in time of war. He himself epitomises his own description of the British bull dog —" God so designed the British bull dog that he can hold on and still breathe." I recognise him as a great leader, but from the strategical point of view I think nobody should follow him.

§ Mr. Beverley Baxter (Wood Green)

I think the House will agree with me that this Debate is taking place as a result of the demand in the country, and I deem it the duty of Members of Parliament to express what the country is feeling. There has been very broadly and very deeply a disquiet among all classes which does not by any means reach discouragement. There is a feeling that in Norway, Dakar, Greece and Crete—with all of which the Prime Minister was intimately associated in the decisions that were taken—there has no: been a sufficiency of thought as to what might happen. There have been flair and imagination, but there has been a lack of real thought, and if you take one instance at Crete when our fighters flew away, think of the effect of that upon our soldiers, who once more had to pit their young bodies against the merciless attack from the air which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) looks upon with commendable philosophy but was worse than he imagines.

§ Mr. Stokes

I do not want for one moment to belittle the effect of dive-bombing. I am sore ii is a most terrifying experience, but experience in France showed that it proved the least effective way of inflicting casualties.

§ Mr. Baxter

The hon. Gentleman suggested that our troops were terrified—

§ Mr. Stokes

The newspapers said so; I did not.

§ Mr. Baxter

Perhaps we may leave it at that, but I think the decision to withdraw our fighters or failure to place enough of them on the island of Crete is perhaps the most serious point before the House to-day. Who decided that we would have only so many planes there? Who decided that they should be withdrawn? Did some constituted authority, presided over by the Prime Minister, say, "If we withdraw the three or four squadrons there "—I do not know the number—" are we ready to give in return 94 four cruisers and six destroyers? "That is the direct answer. These ships sailed into the battle of Crete with no air protection, and I think the House has a right to know who decided that we could afford these ships better than we could afford 50 aeroplanes.

It is possible that the Minister of Aircraft Production—at that time Lord Beaverbrook—had something to say as to how many planes should be sent to Crete? As a member of the War Cabinet, he had a perfect right to do so, but is it possible that there was a cleavage between the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production? I do not know, but I have a suspicion that there may have been. I will not pursue that point any further, but we must find out who took that gravely serious position which resulted in what we have heard to-day—losses greater than we inflicted upon the Italian navy at Mata-pan. Who decided on the number of planes we would send to Greece? I do not want to labour that, but it seems to me that decisions are being taken hurriedly, without proper thought of all the consequences, and not giving to the country the feeling that there is a real strategy beyond opportunism, successful withdrawals and consecutive miracles by the British Navy.

The British Navy must be getting tired of performing miracles; certainly we here in this country are beginning to get a little weary of it too. It has been said that before every great advance in a country or every great decline there is first a spiritual advance or a spiritual decline. Nothing exemplifies that better than the sad and tragic collapse of France, but I would say, with great deference, that with all the greatness, bravery and simple humanity of this country we are in the grip, not of a spiritual decline, but of an intellectual decline. We are at the mercy of the grooved mind, and that does not apply only to the public school tradition, although it is a profound producer of the grooved mind. It is in the trade unions as well. It is in every rank— ("an Hon. MEMBER: "Even among journalists"). I quite agree. There is a respect for the grooved mind which is much overdone. We are now facing men of criminal character but men with tremendous intellectual power. It would be foolish for us to ignore this. Their souls may be as black as the pit, but their brains are 95 working, unexpectedly and untraditionally. When they improvise something, they carry it through mercilessly.

I wish to put to the House very seriously something which has been in my mind for a very long time. With the greatest respect to the Prime Minister, whose courage, whose language, and whose leadership are inspiring, I do not believe that the Government in their present form can lead us to victory, at any rate, in time for it to be anything but a universal collapse of Europe. I do not believe that in their present form they can do it. The War Cabinet is too large. It has inside its ranks Ministers of ability, Ministers of character; it has one or two brilliant Ministers, and three or four Ministers whose brilliance we must accept because they have not had an opportunity to demonstrate it in their careers up to date. We must in kindness accept it. There are in the War Cabinet Ministers who are good husbands, good party men, patriots, but who are not war-minded, and we cannot run a war with men who are not war-minded. Moreover, there are in the War Cabinet men of conflicting temperaments, Ministers with great Departmental duties and clashing Departmental interests. The War Cabinet is unwieldly and the result of that is demonstrating itself. Too much is put upon one man, the Prime Minister. We have only one Minister who can speak for the country. If he tires, the whole country is unexpressed, because we have one Minister only who can speak for the country to America or to the nation itself. I think there is too big a strain upon him. He is a dictator without the advantages of a dictator.

I think we must have a new system which is in essence a smaller War Cabinet. That observation has been made so often that it is dull. I do not think we can get the results we require merely by cutting the present Cabinet in half. I do not consider that you necessarily improve a lemon merely by squeezing it. I do not think this War Cabinet would be right even if it were cut in half. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris) spoke about an Empire Cabinet. That is especially dear to my heart, but an Empire War Cabinet falls on one thing. Especially in 96 these days when so much is being required of the Dominions, a Dominion Prime Minister cannot leave his country for any length of time. If he sent somebody in his place, what could that person do? He could get on the telephone every night, and say, "This is what we said; what am I to do?" It would be impossible for a Dominion Prime Minister to delegate his authority so that his nominee could sit at a table with the British Prime Minister on equality. Therefore, that suggestion falls, except possibly, as in the last war, for a month or two. Yet this is an Empire war, and it is time that the Empire had more to say about the colossal sacrifices which are being asked of it and of Britain as well.

I wish to make a suggestion to the House. It is that, instead of having an Empire Cabinet, the strategy of the war should be placed in the hands of a directorate of Empire men. I have in mind the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Field-Marshal Smuts, Mr. Menzies, and—a name which may not seem at first quite to conform to the requirements—General McNaughton of Canada. I believe that if an announcement were made that a non-Ministerial directorate of those four men had been formed to direct the strategy of the war, it would galvanise the whole country. As I conceive it, it would operate in this way. The British Government would remain complete masters of the situation of this country. The War Cabinet would be abolished, but the Cabinet itself would continue. The directorate would have no direct power. It would be presided over by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Therefore, when it came to a conclusion about strategy, the Prime Minister would then convey to the Government the directorate's decision, which would be his, and the machinery of Government would go into operation. That seems to me to be perfectly clear.

§ Mr. Bevan

In what way would such a proposal differ from having on the War Cabinet representatives of the Dominions —a War Cabinet having no departmental responsibilities?

§ Mr. R. J. Taylor (Morpeth)

Will the hon. Gentleman explain to the House the position with regard to New Zealand? Why should not Mr. Mackenzie King be on such a directorate?

§ Mr. Baxter

I must apologise. I failed to say that, before such a directorate was formed, Field-Marshal Smuts and Mr. Menzies would have to resign as Prime Ministers in their countries. They would not come here as representatives of their country.

§ Mr. Shinwell (Seaham)

Would it be desirable for Field-Marshal Smuts to resign his position in the Union of South Africa, where he is so vital?

§ Mr. Baxter

I believe that if Field-Marshal Smuts left South Africa to come here as one of the four supreme directors of the war, that would have a big effect in South Africa, and might balance his not remaining there.

§ Mr. Benjamin Smith (Rotherhithe)

Would our Prime Minister resign?

§ Mr. Baxter

No, the Prime Minister of Great Britain is the head of the British Government, and he would sit on the directorate as chairman and Prime Minister. I realise that hon. Members on the benches opposite look upon this suggestion as Utopian.

§ Mr. Bevan

No; it is generally regarded on all sides of the House as being an ill-thought-out plan.

§ Mr. Baxter

I have given much thought to this plan, which the hon. Member says is an ill-thought-out one. What is ill thought out about having four great figures of the Empire, not officially representing their own Dominions but nevertheless being identified with them, sitting here as a non-ministerial directorate to advise on strategy? What is ill thought out in that? Once more we are up against the grooved mind.

§ Captain Poole (Lichfield)

Or a journalistic stunt.

§ Mr. Baxter

We may have to call in some journalists to save men like the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield (Captain Poole), who has not had an original thought for 45 years. I will not press that.

§ Captain Poole

The hon. Member said that I have not had an original thought for 45 years. As I have not been living that long, I did not start thinking as early as he did.

§ Mr. Baxter

I am sorry. I must have put my case badly. In conclusion, may I ask whether this House is the place where, at a moment like this, one must not put forward an idea which is capable of argument? Must it be so crushed, and the inspiration so filled with sawdust, that it is presented as a corpse to be dissected? It seems to me that of all places the House of Commons is the place in which to put forward an idea. If it is unworkable at the moment, surely it is possible for it to be made workable by the House itself? The neglect of the Empire, and it has been nowhere more neglected than in this House, is one of the most serious things in our public life. If the House will forgive me, I would point out that I made my maiden speech, in 1935, to an empty House. The House was empty not so much because I was speaking, but because the Debate was on the Empire. For five years I have seen the House fill up for any foreign affairs Debate, and it did not matter what scarlet-painted hussy of Europe was to be debated; but in an Empire Debate there were only 12 bores talking to each other. In that maiden speech I stated that we should either have to develop our Empire and become Empire-conscious, or the very existence of the Empire would bring this country down. We are trying to fight this war under the direction of the British Government, with its own Departments, its own Civil Service, and all the impedimenta which go with it. I say that we must make this an Empire war and call in these Empire figures, but if my plan will not work, then I pray that this House will find some plan which will embody that spirit. But let us have it, because we badly need it.

§ Lieut.-Colonel Macnamara (Chelmsford)

It so happens that the hon. Member for Wood Green (Mr. Baxter) and myself made our maiden speeches on the same day, and during an Empire Debate. He followed me, and now I have the honour to follow him, but he will excuse me if I do not carry on the same theme. A few days ago I enjoyed one of those rare events—a few days of Army leave. I went to my constituency, and I found that there was far more concern among my constituents than I found in the Army, in which I am serving, over the circumstances and the result of the battle of Crete. I also found that there was concern 99 in this House, not only in the Chamber, but in talking to Members outside. I am not personally worried over this battle, but I feel there are many lessons which must be drawn and acted upon. I am not one of those who, after we happen to have lost the battle, wish now to criticise the Government, the generals or the soldiers who fought there. I believe the decision to fight in Crete was a right and wise decision. It was all part and parcel of the battle of Greece, a battle with which I found myself in full agreement. Personally, I believe we should take the opportunity of fighting the Germans in many places and of stabbing them. I believe that by constantly stabbing them we shall one day find, as they found in their tactics, the weak spots, and through those weak spots we shall be able to probe and ultimately drive through them. It is no good carrying on a war unless you are prepared to fight it in many places and take every opportunity of killing as many Germans as you possibly can, even though it may mean risking a certain number of casualties on our side. We might as well say that the retreat from Mons was of no avail in the last war. We may as well say that the Spanish resistance at Alcazar was of no avail to the side which happened to be fighting there during the Civil War. We might also say it is of no use from the enemy's point of view for Italy to fight a rearguard action in Abyssinia. Of course it is, and so are the battles of Crete and Greece of use to us. We retreated from Corunna and Gallipoli, yet on both occasions we won those wars.

Once again I say that I consider the Government's decisions, and the decisions of the generals, were right. Nor do I feel any despondency on the matter. On the contrary, I am strategically confident, and I consider that the strategic decisions were wise. In a nutshell, the war strategy, as I see it, is as follows: At the beginning of the war we had large possessions and we had small forces to hold those possessions, whereas Germany was able to put down at any one point a larger army than we could bring there to meet them. Gradually that war strategy is changing entirely in our favour. We now see the contrary developing. Germany has great possessions, and soon she will find, the more she stretches herself out, that she will have 100 inadequate forces to hold them, and ultimately we shall be able to put down at any one spot, at our own choosing, and when we have command of the air and sea an army which will defeat her at that particular spot. War strategy, as it has existed, is changing into the exact opposite, and is going in our favour.

I have just said that I am strategically confident, but at the same time I am not tactically confident—the two are not quite the same. The Prime Minister cannot be held personally responsible for tactics and administration of any army, or any part of the Army, or part of the Services. He is responsible for the major strategy, and that is going well. But all his wise strategy, including the handling of Allies, is of no avail unless backed up by perfect tactics and administration in the field. The House will remember that in the last war, when it was necessary to have steel helmets for the troops in France it was almost impossible to get them through until someone wearing a steel helmet caused a sensation by jumping from the Gallery into the Chamber of the House of Commons. I am not going to jump from the Gallery here, but some of the things I am going to refer to, although I have to refer to them with diffidence and with care, are just as important as if someone had caused such a sensation. I speak with difficulty because it is obvious, in the position in which I am, that I must be careful not to give away any secrets, and I ask to be excused, if I refer to my notes, not so much as to what I want to say but more as to what I must not say.

To return to Crete, what has caused this despondency in one's constituency, or possibly even in the Chamber? I do not know the numbers, but I imagine that we had something like 30,000 to 40,000 troops, British, Greek and Allied, in Crete. The Germans had none, but in 12 days they were in full possession of the island. Naturally, when one thinks of it, people are upset by that tactical fact. They heard that there would be no retreat, and yet there was. Furthermore, we have been told that the battles of France and so on were won by the breakthrough of the German tanks, yet there were no German tanks in the battle of Crete. Nevertheless, they were in full control 12 days after the invasion was launched. We may have been able to 101 get some of our troops away by sea after the battle, but undoubtedly our full use of the sea was hampered by enemy air action. The Germans, on the other hand, had no sea support. They had command of the air, but yet we had very few real casualties. I mean that quite seriously. There were also very few casualties at Dunkirk. If we add up all the small casualties, British, German, French and Italian, and lump the whole lot together, after getting on for two years of war I doubt whether they would mount up, in killed, to the casualties in one day of the Battle of the Somme, and that is a lesson that we must take well to heart.

What are those lessons? First of all, the Navy cannot operate effectively in waters near the enemy land bases. The next is that air-borne troops can quite well land anywhere if they can land in Crete, as Crete is a most inhospitable country and, what is more, they can be reinforced. Air-borne troops can come overnight. Let us take that for granted. The third lesson is that though our troops did not have very many casualties men may apparently be still easily demoralised by dive-bombing and machine-gunning from the air, which does not give casualties but, on the other hand, makes noise. It sounds a strange thing to say, but I am sure it is true, that one of the greatest and most effective weapons which have been used against us so far in all the theatres of war is noise, and it is a matter of training, which should be considered by the Army authorities. We must train against it. It does not matter about Crete. What we are really thinking about in our hearts is this country. I do not believe that these lessons have yet been taken to heart here. I do not believe they have been taken to heart in any circle, including military circles.

Let us apply everything that we have talked about now, not to Crete, but to this country. Crete is past history. It is no good recriminating about it. Let us see how the war is going to work out against this country. I am sure that Hitler will make a peace drive. That will fail. I am sure he will try to liquidate the second front in the Balkans, and either liquidate Russia or come to some agreement with her, and neutralise Turkey and so on, but even if he does all that, and has failed with his peace offensive, still he has to face up to the bombing of Germany next winter with ever-increasing force by our 102 Air Force based on this country. Will he stand up to it? My opinion is that he does not want to stand up to it and that he will try to bring this country to its knees before he has to face it. Therefore Germany must break us if she wants to win. Sooner or later she must make the plunge against this country, provided we have the guts to see everything else through. She will make the invasion, as far as I see it, as follows:

First of all, there will be a circling movement through Spain to Africa and then northwards to Greenland and Iceland, which is an island defended by our troops, and all really part and parcel of the defence of this country, to the Faroes, the Hebrides and so on, all islands, all very much part and parcel of this country's defence, with air-borne troops, and to various other places in the north. Next I am pretty certain in my own mind that they will go for Southern Ireland. Is Eire properly defended? If not, why not? We may have no control over Eire, but we have to begin thinking about it. After all, we have to think of ourselves, and there are such things as free Irishmen as well as Free Frenchmen. Have we ample troops now in Ulster with ample armoured support ready to go in and take over, the very first hour that the German troops start landing? Are Ulster, Wales, Cornwall, and the Scilly Islands studded with aerodromes prepared to give the necessary support to the Irish, North or South, against any invasion, and are those aerodromes themselves protected? Are they underground? Are there aeroplanes on the mountain sides and so on? After having attacked Eire the invaders will come direct to this country. They will come, in my opinion, first of all like this: They will strike a tremendous blow simultaneously at every single aerodrome they can in this country. On some aerodromes they will use bombs, on some they will use paratroops and glider troops, and others they will just neutralise by throwing down blister gases.

I am going to ask these questions: I do not necessarily want the answers, a great many of which I know already, but I would like the people responsible to check up if they will. Is there an alternative aerodrome to every one of these aerodromes? Is every aeroplane at all times kept in a blast-proof shelter constructed above ground, half-way under ground or 103 below ground, so that they will not be caught unawares by such a sudden attack? Is every aerodrome adequately defended, not by the youngest of our soldiers, but by A1 troops who are actually on the spot, not an hour's journey or a three hours' attack from them, but actually on the spot with the weapons and with the proper armoured fighting vehicles or whatever may be necessary to deal with an attack? Are the airmen themselves all trained as infantry soldiers to take part in the defence of their aerodromes? Sometimes one sees 2,000 airmen at one spot. Are they being trained as infantry to take part in the defence of those aerodromes? Are they physically fit to take part in that defence; do they do the route marches, five miles across country, and everything else that gives them physical fitness to take part in what may be a very fierce battle? Is every aerodrome 1oo per cent. proof against gas, and, what is more, is it possible immediately to decontaminate every single aeroplane? Probably it is; I merely want the matter checked up.

After the aerodromes have been attacked and, as I say, probably simultaneously attacked all over the country, next in the invasion will come the landing of air-borne troops. That is nothing new. The attack on Crete is nothing new. We ought to have learned our lessons in Holland, where an air-borne division landed behind the Dutch lines. I suggest that something like 60,000 German troops could be landed in one sortie alone.

§ Captain Poole

Does the hon. and gallant Member not seriously think that he might run the risk of giving some very valuable information to the enemy? I suggest, with all due respect, that his speech is at any rate to some extent dangerous.

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