WAR SITUATION.

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill)

Almost a year has passed since the war began, and it is natural for us, I think, to pause on our journey at this milestone and survey the dark, wide field. It is also useful to compare the first year of this second war against German aggression with its forerunner a quarter of a century ago. Although this war is in fact only a continuation of the last, very great differences in its character are apparent. In the last war millions of men fought by hurling enormous masses of steel at one another. "Men and shells" was the cry, and prodigious slaughter was the consequence. In this war nothing of this kind has yet appeared. It is a conflict of strategy, of organisation, of technical apparatus, of science, mechanics and morale. The British casualties in the first 12 months of the Great War amounted to 365,000. In this war, I am thankful to say, British killed, wounded, prisoners and missing, including civilians, do not exceed 92,000, and of these a large proportion are alive as prisoners of war. Looking more widely around, one may say that throughout all Europe for one man killed or wounded in the first year perhaps five were killed or wounded in 1914–15.

The slaughter is but a fraction, but the consequences to the belligerents have been even more deadly. We have seen great countries with powerful armies dashed out of coherent existence in a few weeks. We have seen the French Republic and the renowned French Army beaten into complete and total submission with less than the casualties which they suffered in any one of half-a-dozen of the battles of 1914–18. The entire body—it might almost seem at times the soul—of France has succumbed to physical effects incomparably less terrible than those which were sustained with fortitude and undaunted will power 25 years ago. Although up to the present the loss of life has been mercifully diminished; the decisions reached in the course of the struggle are even more profound upon the fate of nations than anything that has ever happened since barbaric times. Moves are 1160 made upon the scientific and strategic boards, advantages are gained by mechanical means, as a result of which scores of millions of men become incapable of further resistance, or judge themselves incapable of further resistance, and a fearful game of chess proceeds from check to mate by which the unhappy players seem to be inexorably bound.

There is another more obvious difference from 1914. The whole of the warring nations are engaged, not only soldiers, but the entire population, men, women and children. The fronts are everywhere. The trenches are dug in the towns and streets. Every village is fortified. Every road is barred. The front line runs through the factories. The workmen are soldiers with different weapons but the same courage. These are great and distinctive changes from what many of us saw in the struggle of a quarter of a century ago. There seems to be every reason to believe that this new kind of war is well suited to the genius and the resources of the British nation and the British Empire and that, once we get properly equipped and properly started, a war of this kind will be more favourable to us than the sombre mass slaughters of the Somme and Passchendaele. If it is a case of the whole nation fighting and suffering together, that ought to suit us, because we are the most united of all the nations, because we entered the war upon the national will and with our eyes open, and because we have been nurtured in freedom and individual responsibility and are the products, not of totalitarian uniformity but of tolerance and variety. If all these qualities are turned, as they are being turned, to the arts of war, we may he able to show the enemy quite a lot of things that they have not thought of yet. Since the Germans drove the Jews out and lowered their technical standards, our science is definitely ahead of theirs. Our geographical position, the command of the sea, and the friendship of the United States enable us to draw resources from the whole world and to manufacture weapons of war of every kind, but especially of the superfine kinds, on a scale hitherto practised only by Nazi Germany.

Hitler is now sprawled over Europe. Our offensive springs are being slowly compressed, and we must resolutely and methodically prepare ourselves for the campaigns of 1941 and 1942. Two or 1161 three years are not a long time, even in our short, precarious lives. They are nothing in the history of the nation, and when we are doing the finest thing in the world, and have the honour to be the sole champion of the liberties of all Europe, we must not grudge these years or weary as we toil and struggle through them. It does not follow that our energies in future years will be exclusively confined to defending ourselves and our possessions. Many opportunities may lie open to amphibious power, and we must be ready to take advantage of them. One of the ways to bring this war to a speedy end is to convince the enemy, not by words but by deeds, that we have both the will and the means, not only to go on indefinitely but to strike heavy and unexpected blows. The road to victory may not be so long as we expect. But we have no right to count upon this. Be it long or short, rough or smooth, we mean to reach our journey's end.

It is our intention to maintain and enforce a strict blockade not only of Germany but of Italy, France and all the other countries that have fallen into the German power. I read in the papers that Herr Hitler has also proclaimed a strict blockade of the British Islands. No one can complain of that. I remember the Kaiser doing it in the last war. What indeed would be a matter of general complaint would be if we were to prolong the agony of all Europe by allowing food to come in to nourish the Nazis and aid their war effort, or to allow food to go in to the subjugated peoples, which certainly would be pillaged off them by their Nazi conquerors.

There have been many proposals, founded on the highest motives, that food should be allowed to pass the blockade for the relief of these populations. I regret that we must refuse these requests. The Nazis declare that they have created a new unified economy in Europe. They have repeatedly stated that they possess ample reserves of food and that they can feed their captive peoples. In a German broadcast of 27th June it was said that while Mr. Hoover's plan for relieving France, Belgium and Holland deserved commendation, the German forces had already taken the necessary steps. We know that in Norway when the German troops went in, there were food supplies to last for a year. We know that Poland though not a rich 1162 country usually produces sufficient food for her people. Moreover, the other countries which Herr Hitler has invaded all held considerable stocks when the Germans entered and are themselves, in many cases, very substantial food producers. If all this food is not available now, it can only be because it has been removed to feed the people of Germany and to give them increased rations—for a change—during the last few months. At this season of the year and for some months to come, there is the least chance of scarcity as the harvest has just been gathered in. The only agencies which can create famine in any part of Europe now and during the coming winter, will be German exactions or German failure to distribute the supplies which they command.

There is another aspect. Many of the most valuable foods are essential to the manufacture of vital war material. Fats are used to make explosives. Potatoes make the alcohol for motor spirit. The plastic materials now so largely used in the construction of aircraft are made of milk. If the Germans used these commodities to help them to bomb our women and children, rather than to feed the populations who produce them, we may be sure that imported foods would go the same way, directly or indirectly, or be employed to relieve the enemy of the responsibilities he has so wantonly assumed. Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full and let the peoples of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the day when that yoke will be broken. Meanwhile, we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of German forces, and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our best to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including—I say it deliberately—the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.

Rather more than a quarter of a year has passed since the new Government came into power in this country. What a cataract of disaster has poured out upon us since then. The trustful Dutch over- 1163 whelmed; their beloved and respected Sovereign driven into exile; the peaceful city of Rotterdam the scene of a massacre as hideous and brutal as anything in the Thirty Years' War. Belgium invaded and beaten down; our own fine Expeditionary Force, which King Leopold called to his rescue, cut off and almost captured, escaping as it seemed only by a miracle and with the loss of all its equipment; our Ally, France, out; Italy in against us; all France in the power of the enemy, all its arsenals and vast masses of military material converted or convertible to the enemy's use; a puppet Government set up at Vichy which may at any moment be forced to become our foe; the whole Western seaboard of Europe from the North Cape to the Spanish frontier in German hands; all the ports, all the airfields on this immense front, employed against us as potential springboards of invasion. Moreover, the German air power, numerically so far outstripping ours, has been brought so close to our Island that what we used to dread greatly has come to pass and the hostile bombers not only reach our shores in a few minutes and from many directions, but can be escorted by their fighting aircraft. Why Sir, if we had been confronted at the beginning of May with such a prospect, it would have seemed incredible that at the end of a period of horror and disaster, or at this point in a period of horror and disaster, we should stand erect, sure of ourselves, masters of our fate and with the conviction of final victory burning unquenchable in our hearts. Few would have believed we could survive; none would have believed that we should to-day not only feel stronger but should actually be stronger than we have ever been before.

Let us see what has happened on the other side of the scales. The British nation and the British Empire finding themselves alone, stood undismayed against disaster. No one flinched or wavered; nay, some who formerly thought of peace, now think only of war. Our people are united and resolved, as they have never been before. Death and ruin have become small things compared with the shame of defeat or failure in duty. We cannot tell what lies ahead. It may be that even greater ordeals lie before us. We shall face whatever is coming to us. We are sure of ourselves and of our cause 1164 and here then is the supreme fact which has emerged in these months of trial.

Meanwhile, we have not only fortified our hearts but our Island. We have rearmed and rebuilt our armies in a degree which would have been deemed impossible a few months ago. We have ferried across the Atlantic, in the month of July, thanks to our friends over there, an immense mass of munitions of all kinds, cannon, rifles, machine-guns, cartridges and shell, all safely landed without the loss of a gun or a round. The output of our own factories, working as they have never worked before, has poured forth to the troops. The whole British Army is at home. More than 2,000,000 determined men have rifles and bayonets in their hands to-night and three-quarters of them are in regular military formations. We have never had armies like this in our Island in time of war. The whole Island bristles against invaders, from the sea or from the air. As I explained to the House in the middle of June, the stronger our Army at home, the larger must the invading expedition be, and the larger the invading expedition, the less difficult will be the task of the Navy in detecting its assembly and in intercepting and destroying it on passage; and the greater also would be the difficulty of feeding and supplying the invaders if ever they landed, in the teeth of continuous naval and air attack on their communications. All this is classical and venerable doctrine. As in Nelson's day, the maxim holds, "Our first line of defence is the enemy's ports." Now air reconnaissance and photography have brought to an old principle a new and potent aid.

Our Navy is far stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. The great flow of new construction set on foot at the outbreak, is now beginning to come in. We hope our friends across the ocean will send us a timely reinforcement to bridge the gap between the peace flotillas of 1939 and the war flotillas of 1941. There is no difficulty in sending such aid. The seas and oceans are open. The U-boats are contained. The magnetic mine is, up to the present time, effectively mastered. The merchant tonnage under the British flag, after a year of unlimited U-boat war, after eight months of intensive mining attack, is larger than when we began. We have, in addition, under 1165 our control at least 4,000,000 tons of shipping from the captive countries which has taken refuge here or in the harbours of the Empire. Our stocks of food of all kinds are far more abundant than in the days of peace and a large and growing programme of food production is on foot.

Why do I say all this? Not assuredly to boast; not assuredly to give the slightest countenance to complacency. The dangers we face are still enormous, but so are our advantages and resources. I recount them because the people have a right to know that there are solid grounds for the confidence which we feel, and that we have good reason to believe ourselves capable, as I said in a very dark hour two months ago, of continuing the war "if necessary alone, if necessary for years." I say it also because the fact that the British Empire stands invincible, and that Nazidom is still being resisted, will kindle again the spark of hope in the breasts of hundreds of millions of down-trodden or despairing men and women throughout Europe, and far beyond its bounds, and that from these sparks there will presently come a cleansing and devouring flame.

The great air battle which has been in progress over this Island for the last few weeks has recently attained a high intensity. It is too soon to attempt to assign limits either to its scale or to its duration. We must certainly expect that greater efforts will be made by the enemy than any he has so far put forth. Hostile air fields are still being developed in. France and the Low Countries, and the movement of squadrons and material for attacking us is still proceeding. It is quite plain that Herr Hitler could not admit defeat in his air attack on Great Britain without sustaining most serious injury. If, after all his boastings and blood-curdling threats and lurid accounts trumpeted round the world of the damage he has inflicted, of the vast numbers of our Air Force he has shot down, so he says, with so little loss to himself; if after tales of the panic-stricken British crouched in their holes cursing the plutocratic Parliament which has led them to such a plight; if after all this his whole air onslaught were forced after a while tamely to peter out, the Führer's reputation for veracity of statement might be seriously impugned. We may be sure, therefore, that he will continue as long 1166 as he has the strength to do so, and as long as any preoccupations he may have in respect of the Russian Air Force allow him to do so.

On the other hand, the conditions and course of the fighting have so far been favourable to us. I told the House two months ago that whereas in France our fighter aircraft were wont to inflict a loss of two or three to one upon the Germans, and in the fighting at Dunkirk, which was a kind of no man's land, a loss of about three or four to one, we expected that in an attack on this Island we should achieve a larger ratio. This has certainly come true. It must also be remembered that all the enemy machines and pilots which are shot down over our Island, or over the seas which surround it, are either destroyed or captured; whereas a considerable proportion of our machines, and also of our pilots, are saved, and soon again in many cases come into action.

A vast and admirable system of salvage, directed by the Ministry of Aircraft Production, ensures the speediest return to the fighting line of damaged machines, and the most provident and speedy use of all the spare parts and material. At the same time the splendid, nay, astounding increase in the output and repair of British aircraft and engines which Lord Beaverbrook has achieved by a genius of organisation and drive, which looks like magic, has given us overflowing reserves of every type of aircraft, and an ever mounting stream of production both in quantity and quality. The enemy is, of course, far more numerous than we are. But our new production already, as I am advised, largely exceeds his, and the American production is only just beginning to flow in. It is a fact, as I see from my daily returns, that our bomber and fighter strengths now, after all this fighting, are larger than they have ever been. We hope, we believe that we shall be able to continue the air struggle indefinitely and as long as the enemy pleases, and the longer it continues the more rapid will be our approach, first towards that parity, and then into that superiority in the air, upon which in a large measure the decision of the war depends.

The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the 1167 British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of world war by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. All hearts go out to the fighter pilots, whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day, but we must never forget that all the time, night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness by the highest navigational skill, aim their attacks, often under the heaviest fire, often with serious loss, with deliberate, careful discrimination, and inflict shattering blows upon the whole of the technical and war-making structure of the Nazi power. On no part of the Royal Air Force does the weight of the war fall more heavily than on the daylight bombers who will play an invaluable part in the case of invasion and whose unflinching zeal it has been necessary in the meanwhile on numerous occasions to restrain.

We are able to verify the results of bombing military targets in Germany, not only by reports which reach us through many sources, but also, of course, by photography. I have no hesitation in saying that this process of bombing the military industries and communications of Germany and the air bases and storage depots from which we are attacked, which process will continue upon an ever-increasing scale until the end of the war, and may in another year attain dimensions hitherto undreamed of, affords one at least of the most certain, if not the shortest of all the roads to victory. Even if the Nazi legions stood triumphant on the Black Sea, or indeed upon the Caspian, even if Hitler was at the gates of India, it would profit him nothing if at the same time the entire economic and scientific apparatus of German war power lay shattered and pulverised at home.

The fact that the invasion of this Island upon a large scale has become a far more difficult operation with every week that has passed since we saved our Army at Dunkirk, and our very great preponderance of sea power, enable us to turn our eyes and to turn our strength increasingly towards the Mediterranean and against that other enemy who, with- 1168 out the slightest provocation, coldly and deliberately, for greed and gain, stabbed France in the back in the moment of her agony, and is now marching against us in Africa. The defection of France has, of course, been deeply damaging to our position in what is called, somewhat oddly, the Middle East. In the defence of Somaliland, for instance, we had counted upon strong French forces attacking the Italians from Jibuti. We had counted also upon the use of the French naval and air bases in the Mediterranean, and particularly upon the North African shore. We had counted upon the French Fleet. Even though metropolitan France was temporarily overrun, there was no reason why the French Navy, substantial parts of the French Army, the French Air Force and the French Empire overseas should not have continued the struggle at our side.

Shielded by overwhelming sea-power, possessed of invaluable strategic bases and of ample funds, France might have remained one of the great combatants in the struggle. By so doing, France would have preserved the continuity of her life, and the French Empire might have advanced with the British Empire to the rescue of the independence and integrity of the French Motherland. In our own case, if we had been put in the terrible position of France, a contingency now happily impossible, although, of course, it would have been the duty of all war leaders to fight on here to the end, it would also have been their duty, as I indicated in my speech of 4th June, to provide as far as possible for the Naval security of Canada and our Dominions and to make sure they had the means to carry on the struggle from beyond the oceans. Most of the other countries that have been overrun by Germany for the time being have persevered valiantly and faithfully. The Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Belgians are still in the field, sword in hand, recognised by Great Britain and the United States as the sole representative authorities and lawful Governments of their respective States.

That France alone should lie prostrate at this moment, is the crime, not of a great and noble nation, but of what are called "the men of Vichy." We have profound sympathy with the French people. Our old comradeship with France is not dead. In General de Gaulle and 1169 his gallant band, that comradeship takes an effective form. These free Frenchmen have been condemned to death by Vichy, but the day will come, as surely as the sun will rise to-morrow, when their names will be held in honour, and their names will be graven in stone in the streets and villages of a France restored in a liberated Europe to its full freedom and its ancient fame. But this conviction which I feel of the future cannot affect the immediate problems which confront us in the Mediterranean and in Africa. It had been decided some time before the beginning of the war not to defend the Protectorate of Somaliland, and when our small forces there, a few battalions, a few guns, were attacked by all the Italian troops, nearly two divisions, which had formerly faced the French at Jibuti, it was right to withdraw our detachments, virtually intact, for action elsewhere. Far larger operations no doubt impend in the Middle East theatre, and I shall certainly not attempt to discuss or prophesy about their probable course. We have large armies and many means of reinforcing them. We have the complete sea command of the Eastern Mediterranean. We intend to do our best to give a good account of ourselves, and to discharge faithfully and resolutely all our obligations and duties in that quarter of the world. More than that I do not think the House would wish me to say at the present time.

A good many people have written to me to ask me to make on this occasion a fuller statement of our war aims, and of the kind of peace we wish to make after the war, than is contained in the very considerable declaration which was made early in the Autumn. Since then we have made common cause with Norway, Holland and Belgium. We have recognised the Czech Government of Dr. Benes, and we have told General de Gaulle that our success will carry with it the restoration of France. I do not think it would be wise at this moment, while the battle rages and the war is still perhaps only in its earlier stage, to embark upon elaborate speculations about the future shape which should be given to Europe or the new securities which must be arranged to spare mankind the miseries of a third World War. The ground is not new, it has been frequently traversed and explored, and many ideas are held about it in common by all good men, 1170 and all free men. But before we can undertake the task of rebuilding we have not only to be convinced ourselves, but we have to convince all other countries that the Nazi tyranny is going to be finally broken. The right to guide the course of world history is the noblest prize of victory. We are still toiling up the hill, we have not yet reached the crest-line of it, we cannot survey the landscape or even imagine what its condition will be when that longed-for morning comes. The task which lies before us immediately is at once more practical, more simple and more stern. I hope—indeed I pray—that we shall not be found unworthy of our victory if after toil and tribulation it is granted to us. For the rest, we have to gain the victory. That is our task.

There is, however, one direction in which we can see a little more clearly ahead. We have to think not only for ourselves but for the lasting security of the cause and principles for which we are fighting and of the long future of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Some months ago we came to the conclusion that the interests of the United States and of the British Empire both required that the United States should have facilities for the naval and air defence of the Western hemisphere against the attack of a Nazi power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of Western Europe and its formidable resources. We had therefore decided spontaneously, and without being asked or offered any inducement, to inform the Government of the United States that we would be glad to place such defence facilities at their disposal by leasing suitable sites in our Transatlantic possessions for their greater security against the unmeasured dangers of the future. The principle of association of interests for common purposes between Great Britain and the United States had developed even before the war. Various agreements had been reached about certain small islands in the Pacific Ocean which had become important as air fuelling points. In all this line of thought we found ourselves in very close harmony with the Government of Canada.

Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in the United States about the air and naval defence of their Atlantic seaboard, and President Roosevelt has recently made it clear that he would like 1171 to discuss with us, and with the Dominion of Canada and with Newfoundland, the development of American naval and air facilities in Newfoundland and in the West Indies. There is, of course, no question of any transference of sovereignty—that has never been suggested—or of any action being taken, without the consent or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned, but for our part, His Majesty's Government are entirely willing to accord defence facilities to the United States on a 99 years' leasehold basis, and we feel sure that our interests no less than theirs, and the interests of the Colonies themselves and of Canada and Newfoundland will be served thereby. These are important steps. Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organisations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.

§ Mr. Lees-Smith (Keighley)

The speech of the Prime Minister is apt to turn the rest of the Debate into an anticlimax. He has spoken for a united nation, and he has spoken in the name of free men in every country in the world. He has announced two very far reaching decisions which I merely mention, because it is not necessary, in view of the spirit of the House, to enter into any discussion in regard to them. He has announced the decision that we shall not flinch in exercising the full strength of our blockade, and he has announced the decision that we shall afford to the United States full facilities for acquiring the bases she needs for the security of her nation. Both these decisions represent decisions of a united nation, and public debate in the House of Commons gives an opportunity to state that fact. Some Of the most stirring and, I think, moving parts of the Prime Minister's speech dealt with the large general issues of the war—its past and future. I shall, I think, most 1172 fittingly confine myself to a limited number of quite specific points, and the first to which I should like to call the attention of the House arises out of the great air battle, which, after all, is at the present moment more predominantly before men's eyes and minds than anything else which is happening in any other theatre of war.

The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has given certain figures with regard to the comparative results to the enemy and to ourselves, but I should like to give the House some other figures which in some ways are even more reassuring as to the future. It is a comparison which is quite well known, and one which I have made for my own comfort. Before the war the Prime Minister used to take part in the Debates on the Air Estimates, as did others, and I remember that at that time it was always estimated that if there were air attacks on this country, and the enemy squadrons steadily lost each time they came over, some said 5 per cent., and the most careful said 10 per cent., the air attacks could no longer be sustained. They would gradually peter out, to use the phrase of the Prime Minister. What are the results of the eight days' air battles that have taken place as from last Sunday week, applying that test? Since that time, at the beginning, the average of enemy losses amounted to 10 per cent., and last Sunday and the day before they rose to 18 per cent. and 20 per cent.—these are the percentages of the machines coming over, as estimated by the Air Ministry. The average up to the present is nearly 15 per cent., or three times the rate of losses which was generally admitted in this House to be one which no Air Force could long sustain. That is a figure which is most reassuring, and the percentage has risen as the days have gone by.

The Prime Minister uttered one sentence which I should like to use as a text bearing on certain results appearing from this air battle. He said that this war is a conflict between totalitarian uniformity on one side and tolerance and variety on the other. I think what has happened in the last eight days is a very good test of the different military results of the two systems. About eight or nine days ago I listened to a broadcast by an airman which gave a dramatised account of what 1173 takes place in an air squadron just before it is about to proceed abroad. It gave the instructions of the squadron leader, the conversations between pilots, their arrangements to protect each other's tails, and so on. It made it clear that an air squadron goes abroad like a well-seasoned football team, bound together by a corporate spirit almost stronger, I suppose, than anything else upon this earth to-day. What is the Nazi system? There, in order, I presume, that they may conceal their losses from their own pilots, they pick out one or two machines from different squadrons, collect them together just before the squadron starts, and then send them over. Where is the backbone to a squadron like that? What are the consequences? I think this is a test, and the result has shown the immense loss in military efficiency which the Nazis have to pay as the price for imposing upon their pilots the system they impose upon the whole country—that they must not be told the facts.

I should like to draw another lesson suggested by a remark made by the Prime Minister, a remark which I think we may take to the credit of this House as a whole. Every now and then I listen to broadcasts from German stations, and a few nights ago their claim was this, that the size of their Air Force is so many multiples greater than the size of ours that, if they go on and on—and as the Prime Minister said, it is the German temperament to press things to the end: they will not stop, that is not their method of warfare—then finally, whatever their losses they will be able to destroy our Air Force and have some surplus at the end, and that even though it were a small surplus it would give them the mastery of the air. That was the prospect, but, as the Prime Minister has pointed cut, that prospect has been, I presume, completely falsified, all their calculations have been falsified, by, as he said, the astounding increase in our machines during the new Administration which was brought into being as the result of the last public debate in this House upon the war. That indicates to me that this House is not only the most civilised body in times of peace but the most formidable engine of war, far more formidable than the Nazi system; and this House will see this war through as, for hundreds of years, it has seen the wars of this country through to success.

1174 I gather that Herr Hitler's time for conquering this country by invading it is getting short. I have been discussing matters with officers and others, and for some time a certain date has been given to me, and that date is the equinox. I am told that after the equinox, owing to the gales and the rough weather, the possibilities of invasion will very greatly diminish. I find that the equinox is on 21st September, so my impression is that the time of danger is in the next month, and within that month probably the attempt to defeat this country by invasion will either succeed or fail.

This leads me to an aspect of the present attack upon this country which I do not think is so satisfactory and which I think it is necessary for us to discuss. If Herr Hitler does not beat us by physical invasion in the next month there is no doubt he will turn to the other alternative, which to many people has always seemed a good deal more dangerous, the alternative of trying to defeat us by his blockade, trying to defeat us by sinking our merchant ships. The figures there are not as satisfactory as the figures of the air war. I take the communiqués of the Ministry of Shipping. I admit that in the one o'clock broadcast to-day a rather better figure was given for last week, but up to then the average sinkings of our merchant shipping had been about 67,000 tons a week. That is half what they were in the worst week of the last war. I see that calculations have been made, and I think it is fair to assume that we cannot be rebuilding at anything like that rate. That is potentially serious. By the way, I was not entirely satisfied by a certain calculation which the Prime Minister put before the House. He said that if we took British merchant tonnage at the beginning of the war and compared it with the tonnage under the British flag to-day we should see that there had been an increase, but, of course, in that phrase "tonnage under the British flag" he has taken in Allied and neutral tonnage—

§ The Prime Minister

No, only the tonnage we have got by purchase or by transfer—not the other large body of tonnage.

§ Mr. Lees-Smith

I am very glad that that has been made clear, because I had not quite understood it, and it did not seem to tally with what I had read else- 1175 where. However, there is the point that we are losing tonnage at the rate of some 67,000 tons every week, and I think it is worth while, in a Debate like this, to let the world realise where it is fairly evident that our difficulty lies. We overcame the submarine menace some months ago, but at that time ports like Plymouth and Portland, opposite the coast of France, were to the west of the German bases, and we could meet their submarines as they came out. As the Prime Minister has pointed out, the ports of France are now at the disposal of Germany. Brest and others lie to the west of Plymouth, and we cannot meet the submarines from those ports as they go out. They can go out to the west of the Irish Coast where, I imagine, most of these sinkings must be taking place. I think it is worth while pointing out to neutral nations what we are paying for our principles. Why cannot we deal with those sinkings off the Coast of Ireland? Because we cannot use the territorial waters of Southern Ireland. The ports in Southern Ireland were handed over by us just a little time before the war. If we could use, say, Berehaven not only for our ships but for our patrolling flying-boats, I believe those sinkings would be reduced to so small a figure that they would cease to be a major problem at all. I think the world should realise what we are paying for our principles. There is no doubt of what Herr Hitler would do under those conditions, and the world can now see the spectacle of this country watching every month scores of ocean-merchant ships being sunk and thousands of British seamen being drowned, because the Navy cannot use ports within our own Commonwealth, the ports of Ireland, which but for the Navy would be where Belgium, Holland and Denmark are now.

The Prime Minister spoke about Somaliland and made a statement of great gravity, which probably will have a good many ultimate repercussions. About that war in Somaliland there is one point I should like to make. This morning a communiqué was issued by the War Office which made it clear that as soon as France capitulated it became inevitable that Somaliland would have to be abandoned. I presume there is some sort of liaison between the Service Departments and the newspapers and the B.B.C., and it is most unfortunate and 1176 most misleading that both the B.B.C. and the newspapers, even very responsible papers like the "Times"—its Cairo correspondent—should have put out statements practically saying that the Italians have undertaken a task of immense difficulty and that their difficulties would increase every time they advanced towards the coast.

§ The Prime Minister

If you do intend not to use more than a certain amount of force in delaying the enemy it would be most important not to let him know beforehand what you were going to do.

§ Mr. Lees-Smith

I doubt, in fact, whether the B.B.C. and the "Times" Cairo correspondent were a part of our British diplomatic methods, but if that is so we are going to be in great difficulties, because it means that the public can be at any moment misled as to an issue.

§ The Prime Minister

If the enemy had not advanced in great strength we should not have gone, but when he did advance in great strength it was not to our interest to remain there and to expend a great deal of our strength in doing so.

§ Mr. Lees-Smith

To go back to the point, what led me into this discussion was the communiqué from the War Office this morning, which indicates that the prospect of abandoning Somaliland became inevitable as soon as the French capitulated.

§ The Prime Minister

If the attack continued.

§ Mr. Lees-Smith

That was not very clear. I did not think that that was made part of the admission at all. The Prime Minister spoke of the Mediterranean, and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. It is clear that that is a vital theatre of war. Alexandria is our base in the Mediterranean, and therefore is a vital key to the future of this war. I do not think we can go into the details of this matter in public and I shall not do so. I therefore say that I welcomed the Prime Minister's statement that large armies and means of reinforcement are at present in the Eastern Mediterranean and that we intend to discharge our obligations. It is obvious that one of the great prizes of the war waits either for the Axis Powers or for ourselves.

1177 There are two features relating to our machinery to which I take this opportunity of calling the attention of the Prime Minister. He appointed a committee to inquire into certain aspects of our Secret Service and Intelligence Departments. It would be well if he probed more deeply into the Secret Service and the Intelligence Departments than merely into the subject of their overlapping and under-lapping, which he mentioned last week. In the last war, our Secret Service was the best in the world, but in this war it has been singularly unsuccessful. One of the reasons was indicated in a remark by the Prime Minister last week, but it cannot be discussed. My general opinion is that any Government Department which cannot be discussed or criticised in this House has behind it no guarantee of efficiency. My impression is that the Secret Service goes up and down according to the personalities who happen to be in control. I do not understand why it is essential that the Secret Service should be attached to the Foreign Office, the traditions of which are not suited for dealing with the particular methods which have to be adopted when one is confronted wth a régime of the Nazi type. It was not successful in times of peace, when the Secret Service under the Foreign Office failed. Nobody made it more clear than the Prime Minister. In time of peace he had his own Secret Service which proved to be right, when the official Secret Service proved to be wrong, and it is no more successful in war. Those who have the opportunity to know, staff officers and others, regard the Secret Service as the weakest of the arms with which we are fighting this war. It is well worth considering whether the Secret Service should not be handed over to another Minister. Lord Beaverbrook has been mentioned. There is a Member of this House sitting on an opposite bench now who, I think, would be better attuned to meet Nazi methods than Lord Halifax or Lord Swinton. I make that suggestion.

I have one other suggestion to make. I am getting the view that we have no machinery for what I would call long-distance strategy and planning, as distinct from the task of grappling with the immediate difficulties of the war. The chiefs of staff, and the Cabinet, have no time for this long-distance work. I believe that, from time to time, certain officers are appointed and told to concentrate 1178 upon something, but I am told also that, after a short time, they are roped in, owing to the urgency of the general problems of the day, and then there is no machinery for the purpose for which they were appointed. We are now talking of the war continuing until 1941 or 1942, and we must form some picture of what the course of it is likely to be. Preparations for the future involve commitments, and preparations for months and perhaps for a year ahead. There is this defect in our machinery, and I should like to see it closely considered.

The Prime Minister entered into certain generalisations as to the war; may I venture to do the same? It appears to me that the great advantage which Herr Hitler has had has been in machines in the air and on the land. The Prime Minister has explained that we shall gradually catch up with that advantage, but the chief problem seems to be not only to prevent Herr Hitler using that advantage in the intervening period but to dislodge him from his position when the time comes. If we can do that, it seems to me that the end is in sight. Men who have come back from France all agree that if you take the modern German soldier out of his machine he is not as good a man as his father was in 1914. The Germans are certainly no better on the sea or in the air. One of the great lessons of the last week which, I think, is of vital significance, is that our young men, in this new element of warfare, have a genius for the air as strong as is our genius for the sea. The Germans will not even tell their own pilots of the losses which they have incurred, and therefore, the fact is clear that, when the time comes that we have an equality of machines, and can meet the Nazi products on level terms, the end of the war will be in sight.

§ Sir Percy Harris (Bethnal Green, South-West)

I wish to pay a tribute to the magnificent speech of the Prime Minister. I should like to see it translated into the languages of those countries now under the heel of the Nazi Government, and scattered broadcast, to give inspiration and hope because of the words uttered by the Prime Minister in the British House of Commons. Nothing would give more heart to those people in these difficult times. I should assure the Prime Minister, if he were here, that not 1179 only the House of Commons, but the country as a whole, stands four-square behind him. It is always a mystery and a marvel to me that, in spite of his manifold duties, he has time to prepare his great, classical orations which are, in form and character, a model of what such speeches should be. It is good that from time to time, and in open Session, we should have these speeches, especially when they are made by the Prime Minister, with his great gifts of oratory.

No Prime Minister has had greater responsibilities or more difficult problems to solve than he. Not even Chatham, the younger Pitt, or Palmerston, or the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) had such great difficulties and responsbiilities. In previous wars, except perhaps in 1806, we had always our Allies to look to. Even in the darkest hours of the last war we looked to France to collaborate in the battles of the Continent. Now we have to face the enemy in Europe more or less single-handed, and the Prime Minister is entitled to know whether he has behind him, as I believe he has, the nation, serious and united and determined to see this war through to the bitter end.

I think we should exploit to a greater extent the degree of help which we are receiving from our Allies in Europe and in the New World, and particularly from our own Dominions. They have come to our aid from all parts of the globe. We remember what happened in the Battle of the River Plate and again in the Mediterranean, where the cruiser "Sydney" did wonderful things to show Mussolini that the Mediterranean is not an Italian lake. Airmen have come in their hundreds—I think I should be right in saying thousands—to this country at a critical time from Canada, Australia and New Zealand and South Africa, and they have done splendid work. They have given us, too, from their supplies of food and raw materials, and they still have immense productive power which has not yet been fully exploited. That applies equally to India, which has vast resources in men and war materials yet to be fully used in a war in which India has a material interest.

In the last war the help given by the Dominions was expressed in the existence 1180 of the Imperial War Council. I expected that something of that kind would be brought into being in the early months of this war. It will be remembered that General Smuts was a member of the Inner War Cabinet. Those who have studied the records and have read the literature will know the great service he was able to render in every way. It may be that, owing to the special calls on his time and the fact that he has his own problems and difficulties in South Africa, he may not be available, but I think it would be a good thing if the Prime Minister could at the present time not only call upon representatives of the Dominions to sit as an Advisory Council in the same way as during the last war, but if some recognised leader of Dominion opinion could be brought into the inner Cabinet. There is, for instance, Mr. McKenzie King, a wise and experienced politician, who has the confidence of his own country. But it is not for me to say who the man should be. It would be a symbol to the world that we are not fighting the war single-handed, but that we have powerful allies—free peoples—who are coming to our aid. I do not suggest that the absence of such representation in any way weakens the efforts of the Dominions. Recently, I came across a very remarkable statement by a member of the New Zealand Government which I think is worth repeating to the House. He said: We can do nothing else but help Britain, and we are going to help her to the maximum. If she goes under. God help us They realise that our battle is their battle, and that the war we are fighting calls for the full effort which they are able and ready to give. It is clear to anybody who has made a study of these problems overseas that sometimes the Dominions have a different angle of approach from our own. For instance, they are more conscious of the vital importance of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to their political and economic interests. Perhaps, too, they realise the significance of Somaliland, and of some of the battlefields in various parts of Africa. Certainly, this applies to South Africa. I believe it would be an encouragement to the Dominions to, perhaps, an even greater effort and an even greater sacrifice than they are at present making if it were brought home to them in a practical way that they are equal partners with us in the direction of the 1181 war. I know that the Dominions appreciate that their safety depends upon the strength of the defence of this country.

The ordinary New Zealander, Australian, and Canadian, only too often speak of this country as old. In talking to Canadian, Australian and New Zealand soldiers whom I have taken round the House, I have noticed that they appreciate perhaps even more than many people in this country the true significance of the ideals and inspirations behind the war. When they come to the House and see some of the ancient traditions which the House embodies, they realise perhaps more than many of the people of this country what we are fighting for—the ideals of democracy and liberty. We want every help, material, men and organisation, from every part of the British Commonwealth, and I believe it would be an encouragement if the Prime Minister would consider more intimately associating Dominions statesmen with some of the direction of our war policy. I want to conclude by thanking the Prime Minister for his statement. I hope he will continue to make such statements from time to time. I am satisfied that at this critical time in the war his speech will be an inspiration to our countrymen, and that if it is translated into foreign languages and scattered abroad, it will bring hope to the sorely tried people on the Continent of Europe who are under the Nazi heel.

§ Mr. Profumo (Kettering)

It is with great temerity and humility that I rise to make my maiden speech on this occasion. I would not presume upon the House were it not for the fact that I wish to focus attention for a minute or two upon an aspect of our present outlook which I believe, in conjunction with our united war effort, will be a decisive element towards the final crushing of Nazi Germany and all that for which it stands. It has been made very plain by the Government—and indeed the Prime Minister's statement to-day was a strong endorsement of this—that it is not our policy merely to defend the shores of this Empire, our homes and this Island, but that we intend once and for all to rid the world of this Satanic power which, at the present moment, is menacing the whole of civilisation.

There are, in my humble opinion, three things which together with the 1182 Armed Forces and our economic warfare, will make it possible for us to bring this about. They are unity—unity of purpose and spirit; courage—courage with which to strive; and faith—faith that our cause is right. The qualities of unity and courage are those qualities which in the past have made Britain Great Britain, and they are to-day very evident and very present in the Fighting Forces. Day after day and hour after hour indescribable acts of gallantry and valour are being performed. By no means all of these come to public attention, but they are noticed and appreciated by the fellow men of those who perform them, and they serve to strengthen their determination. At the present time, the Royal Air Force is in the battlefront of the battle for Britain. Three days ago, I was standing outside my air-raid trench watching British fighters chasing two German bombers which had realised that they had met their mark, and were, as usual, making back for their base. I took my eyes for a moment off the air and they chanced to alight on a private soldier standing next to me. He came to the salute, and there was more in that salute than any general could have got out of him. The spirit which exists in the Services to-day is "Let's get at it." Throughout the Services there reigns a calm and confident spirit that if we stand united no one can break us.

But we must not forget that we are up against a vile, venomous and vicious enemy, an enemy with whom we have got to deal. Herr Hitler has not only his armed forces, on land and in the air, but he has something much stronger with which to fight—the blind faith of Nazism, that faith which has poisoned, doped, and drugged millions and millions of human minds, and made out of them war machines to do the work of destruction of one mad mind. But there is one setback to all that, and it is that that faith which has been injected into the German people from the moment that National-Socialism started to write its first chapter is of necessity faith in a man, a man who, despite his immense possibilities and his immense opportunities, has proved himself to be a wrecker, a mass murderer and a baby killer. Has Herr Hitler forgotten that we, too, in this country have a faith, and that our faith is not in a man? I do not pretend for one moment 1183 that we can win battles and wars by faith alone, but the reverse is equally true. Here we have these magnificent forces of men prepared to do anything they are asked, and behind them is a far greater army. I refer to the army of the civilian population. They have to meet sadness, anxiety and sacrifice just as much as do the front-line troops, but they are not armed with steel helmets or machine-guns. In the dark days that assuredly lie ahead of us, they will need all their courage and perseverance in order to enable them to carry through to final victory. To this end, faith in our cause will be of inestimable value. I do not for one moment seek to sponsor any group or any society—the very word embraces only a section of our population—but I do most earnestly ask for a national effort to strengthen faith and belief at this time. I believe that it matters not if a man is a Jew, a Roman Catholic, or, as I happen to be, a member of the Church of England, as long as that faith is alive. An American contemporary writer has written: It is no good having a faith if you are going to lock it up in a drawer, because when you open the drawer and look for that faith, it will not be there. There is one thing faith cannot stand. It is neglect. Here, surely, is something that every man and every woman, whatever their age or infirmity may be, can do to contribute towards our war effort, not only in this country but throughout the vast new world, and indeed, wherever freedom is held sacred. I will detain the House no longer, except to say that we have been compelled to take up arms against force, mad brutality and Nazi tyranny. Nor will we rest before right has been proved stronger than might, before the refugee can smile again, before God rules once more in the hearts of men; and just as every day, as the Prime Minister told us, our bombing aeroplanes go out over enemy territory and with sure precision drop their bombs on military objectives, thereby crushing the future initiative of the war machine of the Nazis, so must our message, with one heart and one mind, go out day after day to the Nazi leaders, so squashing their initiative and their morale; and that message should and must be—while we breathe, we live! 1184 while we live, we fight! and when we fight, we win.

§ Mr. Hore-Belisha (Devonport)

In accordance with the custom of the House, I wish to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Profumo) on the maiden speech which he has just made. He has made an enlightened contribution to the Debate, and he has spoken with first-hand experience. I hope, as I am sure the House will hope, that we shall hear him on many subsequent occasions.

In all the great succession of speeches which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made, I feel that he has made none greater than that which he delivered this afternoon. He expressed our cause and our purpose in fitting language, and we may be proud to have a leader of that stamp at this time. It is, however, not only for my right hon. Friend's speech that we need be grateful this afternoon. We can depart for this brief Recess enheartened by the knowledge that in one important respect the fortunes of war have been decisively turned in our favour. No more formidable challenge has been offered to us, in this or in any other war, than that which we are now meeting. By repelling, so frequently and so intrepidly, superior numbers, our fighter pilots have indeed placed us in their gratitude. They have definitely checked the unbroken sequence of Hitlerian victories, and have disproved the legend of Hitler's invincibility. At the same time, our bomber pilots have been doing most effective work over a widespread area; and we have learned this afternoon that our production is such as to entitle us to the hope that, within a measurable time, we shall enjoy command of the air. Throughout this war, by endurance and sacrifice, our Navy has maintained command of the seas. Will it be sufficient, for us, however, when we have supremacy in both these elements? I think not.

My right hon. Friend spoke so encouragingly of the future that one was almost compelled to forget the slight reverse which we have had in British Somaliland. It is as well to face the position candidly. The Italian victory is part of a great design. It brings to our enemy certain advantages, although one must not exaggerate them. It cuts 1185 off Jibuti from us on the landward side—and we might need at some future date to advance up the railway to Addis Ababa. It removes to a greater region of improbability the long-awaited Abyssinian revolt, and blunts the sword which we held into one of the Italian flanks. It enables the enemy to concentrate the better on his great purpose. However, for my part, I am entirely satisfied with what my right hon. Friend said in regard to what is erroneously called the Middle East; that we intend to discharge, faithfully and resolutely, our obligations in that part of the world. It would be most distressing if the Italians were able to get a footing in the Middle East proper, because if they did so they would effectively break our blockade. Quite apart from any damage to our prestige, they would obtain access to the one commodity which our enemies show a tendency to lack—they have made good their deficiency of iron ore—they would obtain access to supplies of oil. Undoubtedly, the defection of the French has placed us in a difficult position. The difficulty of that position arises chiefly on land. Therefore, I hope that the Government are planning to create a large army—very much larger than we should have found adequate if the French had remained in the conflict. We must have a striking force not only to recover what we have lost but to hit the enemy at a convenient time on European territory. That army must be equipped in a way which embodies all the lessons of our recent experience. In particular, it ought to have its own air arm. I am sure my right hon. Friend at the War Office would concur with me that a commander in the field must control all his supporting arms. He must control his air arm in exactly the same way as he does his artillery and his tanks.

The creation of an army depends upon supply. We cannot hope to defeat the authoritarian powers, who are waging total war and who have the whole of their populations mobilised, unless we rapidly mobilise ourselves. They have great armies, they have great air forces, and they have expanding fleets. In addition, they have kept their industrial organisation concentrated on the war effort. We are not doing that. There is no time to lose. You cannot win a war with 1186 800,000 unemployed. The winning of a war is a conscious process. You must reduce the manufacture of goods which are not necessary, and turn over your production to the war effort. It is no use relying on appeals. You have to do that as a deliberate act. People speak as if you could maintain an export trade in an unlimited manner. Surely, your export trade must be kept at as low a level as is compatible—in addition to your other resources—with paying for the goods you must import. The whole of your industrial machine must be concentrated primarily on the war effort. This must be done speedily. We have to remember that the Nazis dominate Europe, and that the situation is not stationary. They are applying their propaganda every day in the conquered areas, educating the youth in those araes in accordance with their own ideas; and unless we act promptly, we may not be able to fan this spark of hope into a flame, as my right hon. Friend suggested. We must act quickly, and we must obtain as many friends as we can by our diplomacy. Diplomacy is as essential a part of war as are armies, navies and air forces. We cannot claim in this war to have won many friends. However, what my right hon. Friend has said about our new relations with America atones for many diplomatic omissions. If that should lead to the same kind of relationship as we hoped for in the case of France, and to eventual common citizenship, the evils of this war will have been almost worth while. The purposes I had in rising were to congratulate my right hon. Friend, and to beg the Government to create, as speedily as possible, a large army, to mobilise the whole of our industrial production, to remove now this scourge of unemployment—which in any event it must be one of our war aims to remove, because we can never tolerate it in our civilisation again—and, in short, to wage total war.

§ Earl Winterton (Horsham and Worthing)

I desire to reinforce the appeal which my right hon. Friend has just made, not in a spirit, as I understood, of criticism of the Government, but in order to raise a point which it is desirable should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity in this House. A distinguished diplomatist, a representative of a friendly neutral country, whom I 1187 had the pleasure of meeting on a social occasion recently, said to me, "There are four things which ought to be burned into the mind of every member of His Majesty's Government and of every Member of the House of Commons. You have in the British Empire four strong points, which you must in all circumstances defend. Those strong points are the British Isles, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and Aden." He proceeded to give his reasons, and I entirely agreed with them. Incidentally, he said—and I do not necessarily support this criticism—that it was unfortunate, from the point of view of neutral opinion, that we had given an indication that we did not believe in the strength of one of those strong points, the territory known as the British Isles, because we had hurried away the children of the rich and poor alike. I do not necessarily support him in that view, but it is just as well that we should have the view of a neutral stated here. He went on—and I entirely agreed—to speak of what might be done by propaganda and blockade.

The other point that I want to make is this. We have to visualise at some time land operations on a great scale. Unless we can knock out Italy in the next few months, it is impossible to conceive that Signor Mussolini can refrain from throwing in the weight of his army against us somewhere. He has been talking for years about what the Italian Army was going to do—even more than about what the Italian Air Force was going to do. I should like to mention some facts which ought to be understood. There are, as I understand, something like 68,000,000 persons of European descent in Britain and the Dominions. There are in Germany 75,000,000 to 80,000,000 people who can be reasonably relied upon to support the war. That is to say, in Germany there is a larger population than the whole of the European resources of the British Empire, and, in addition, they have the 40,000,000 of Italy. I do not want to anticipate a Debate which I have been pressing for very strongly, and which, I understand from a member of the War Cabinet—I do not think that this is breaking any confidence—is likely to take place in September. But, sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, we shall have to develop to the fullest possible degree the almost illimitable re- 1188 sources in men and material of Africa and India. I hope that when we get that Debate we shall consider this matter in this House.

I do not want to press for any premature statement, and I resent the suggestion which has been made in some papers that we should enter upon a period such as the Government's predecessors in the 18th century entered upon, when they sent small expeditions all over the Continent, one after the other. But we should get into a frame of mind of thinking upon that line. I do not think that even the Prime Minister, with his great knowledge and experience, can say whether this is to be a land war or not, but we should be prepared for immense land operations. I wish therefore to reinforce everything that the right hon. Gentleman said, and I hope that the Government as well as the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and India will set their minds to raising the greatest land armies that this world has ever seen.

§ Mr. Bellenger (Bassetlaw)

Almost invariably when the Prime Minister makes a statement nowadays it takes the wind out of the sails of most of the speakers who follow him, and there seems to be some unwritten law that after the Prime Minister has spoken there should be very little criticism of what he has said [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Whether it is an unwritten law or not, I have noticed that coincidence on many occasions after the Prime Minister has spoken. I do not think that it would be a breach of confidence if I said that it has sometimes been hinted by Members of one's own party that one should be extremely careful what one says after the Prime Minister has had his say. I do not want to give voice to any carping or destructive criticisms at all, but I want to recall the attention of the House to the actual state of affairs in which we are situated to-day, and to some of the mistakes that we have made in the past which have precipitated these unfortunate events which we are now experiencing.

I entirely agree with the optimistic note of the Prime Minister about the exploits of our Air Force. They are magnificent, but, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) has just said, they, in themselves alone, will not win this war. Those of 1189 us who have seen the German Air Force at work overseas know that they alone did not bring those great victories—and they are great—which the German forces have accomplished, but they helped very considerably, in co-operation with their land forces, to drive a splendid, a wonderfully equipped and a valiant Expeditionary Force out of Northern France in double quick time. I think that most hon. Members who know anything about those forces know that they are smarting under what they think was really an unjust defeat. Those who took part in that campaign know that they were not given a fair chance and a fair opportunity.

I want to emphasise here that those mistakes which occurred in the past and which resulted in the defeat of those forces must not occur again. I refer to them particularly now as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War is here. I say without fear of contradiction that the forces that we had in this country up to the time when the campaign was started in May were not adequately trained. The amount of training which was done in this country during the eight months preceding the campaign in May was ludicrously small compared with the forces that were mobilised. We are approaching another winter, and it would he a tremendous mistake if we allowed our Army, which has reached considerable numbers, to slip back into the apathy which was widespread—let the House mark this—among commanding officers, high commanders and men during the last winter. Whatever the Prime Minister says about a long war—and he has given expression to views to-day which we heard at the beginning of this war—the people in this country, and the people in enemy countries, do not want extended wars. Hon. Members may smile at that remark, but there is a great deal of truth in it. The Germans have keyed-up their young men to march into battle by the promise of a speedy victory, and I am certain that if their troops had thought that this was going to be a long war they would not have marched as they did through France. They have been buoyed up by these promises. When the people in Germany realise that their Führer's promises are not going to come true, we may see a lowering of the morale in Germany which may precipitate, as it did in the last war, the overwhelming defeat of the enemy.

1190 But let us make no mistake. The peoples everywhere do not want long wars. It may be that we cannot avoid them, but do not let us get into the habit of talking, as Lord Kitchener did at the beginning of the last war, of "three years or the duration." We want to finish this war as quickly as possible and are therefore prepared to make all sorts of sacrifices, even to the extent of great casualties, which, I think, we shall have to face when we start our offensive, as long as we can see in the near future a chance of winning this war totally and completely. We can do that only if we train our Armies on a much better system than that upon which we have hitherto trained them. The German armies were trained and keyed-up to a remarkable pitch, and our Armies were not. I certainly hope that the Secretary of State for War, upon whom devolves the main responsibility for the training of our Armies, will see to it that the conditions existing during last winter do not prevail again.

If I might make a suggestion to him, I would say that it is not possible to train armies and to incorporate in them the understanding and the drill and the tactics that they must know and thoroughly understand if they are to march into battle properly equipped, if they are constantly in civilian billets at home. I know the argument will be put up that you should house the Army as comfortably as possible, and I know that every soldier likes to have the best billet he can possibly get, but I experienced, while with a unit at the outbreak of the war, the extreme difficulty of training troops, when at night-time they went home to civilian billets and there was no bugle sounded in the morning calling them from their slumbers. The German army were not trained on that model, and we should learn from the German army in that respect. The motor-cycle combinations, with Bren guns, which I have seen going about our country lanes, would have been invaluable when the German army were over-running us in France. I would welcome any attempt to copy any good military methods which the German army produced in France.

I do not want to criticise the speech of the Prime Minister, because I believe that in the Prime Minister we have the only possible leader in the present circumstances, but I am not prepared to place 1191 my future and the future of my children entirely in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman, because he is not infallible. As I say, he is the best man in the circumstances, but I cannot forget the mistakes of the past, and although I am prepared to pay tribute to the valiant efforts of some of his Government—and I will not name them—since the Government have been reformed, the fact remains that it may take a long time to get out of those lethargic methods which existed in the eight months which followed the outbreak of war. If there are any suggestions I and others can offer, and those who have seen the war at close quarters can offer suggestions which may be of value, we shall be only too pleased to do so. I am glad to hear from the Secretary of State for War that he is utilising the experiences of junior officers who have come close to the enemy and have experienced enemy tactics and have even countered enemy tactics with homemade methods. I am glad that he is utilising their services, and I only wish that he could utilise them more. We cannot entirely rely upon the professional soldier to win the war for us. It is a civilian Army in the main that we have now mobilised, and why should not more of the good brains which were very successful in peace time in various businesses be utilised in the higher circles of command? The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War knows very well the difficulty of men of that calibre rising even to the rank of a battalion commander. Every hon. Member of this House will know that it is on the battalion commanders that the Army really depends. If you have bad battalion commanders, any amount of brilliant Staff work will not bring victory. We want a combination of the two—good Staff work and good regimental commanders. If you can get them—and I believe you can, if you search for them in a much wider field than has hitherto been done—I believe that we shall have some chance of victory.

But do not let us minimise the struggle we are facing. Let us, if anything, overestimate the German forces. We know what they have accomplished so far, and we know, with much sorrow and regret in our hearts, that so far we are not able to retain the British Empire in its entirety. You may give any reason you 1192 like for the evacuation of Somaliland, but the fact remains that it is another evacuation, and we do not like it. How can we avoid it? I suggest, by some of the methods that I have indicated to the House this afternoon. Our spirits have to be raised and to a much higher pitch than they have been so far. We saw it particularly in the speech of the Prime Minister this afternoon. The people are sound. We can get the production, I believe. We can certainly get the fighting men, but they are of no use unless they are organised and directed properly.

§ Lieutenant - Colonel Moore - Brabazon (Wallasey)

A Debate like this presents very grave difficulties to private Members, and yet this afternoon we have had a collection of the shortest and most inspiriting speeches that I have heard for a long time, and I would like to pay particular tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Profumo), who has now left the House, who made a maiden speech, without any notes, from the back benches. It was quite an astonishing performance, and I only hope that we shall hear him again. I am not Scotch, and I do not know how to pronounce the Scottish language, but I feel towards the Government, rather as the great poet Burns felt towards the mouse when he said to him, as I say to the Government: The present only toucheth thee: But oh! I backward cast my e'e, On prospects drear! An' forward, though I cannot see I guess an' fear. That is very suitable as a just criticism of the Government. Nobody who would dig up the past would enjoy it, but of the future we are told nothing, and so all that troubleth the Government is the present. I pointed out before that the position during war between the executive and the country and more especially the executive and the House of Commons is bound to create a gap which will get bigger and bigger. The prosecution of war is a secret affair. One cannot give away things to the enemy and consequently the House knows less and less about what is going on and less and less about plans for the future. Everybody accepts that one cannot be given even in Secret Session general hints and indications of what the Government have in mind as to the future from the point of view of 1193 military operations. But I think the speech from the Prime Minister this afternoon will give to the whole country great encouragement because there were hints lying in that speech of future initiative and enterprise abroad. You have to remember this, that as we stand to-day we are facing a winter with the biggest Army we have ever seen in the United Kingdom. I do not think that even my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War would say that the civilian Army of the present day is the disciplined force that the old Regular Army was. Complaints of lack of discipline throughout the whole country, although of a trivial nature, are not so pleasant to contemplate for the whole winter. I would not like to blame any particular person except the inventor of the battle dress. I am perfectly certain that few soldiers feel smart in battle dress, and that has, I believe, a very serious effect on discipline. But whether this great Army is to remain here for an entire winter or not is a Government secret which we cannot expect to be told anything about to-day.

There is, of course, a bright spot—the doings of the Royal Air Force. They are busy doing their job as an Air Force, and we must remember that we were the first country to visualise the all importance of an Air Force qua Air Force. Even in America, Germany and France the Air Force has always been split into two parts—one for the Army and one for the Navy. Our conception was, I think, a sound one. I have always backed it and I think that what we are seeing to-day proves that to be sound policy. Long-range bombing is having its effect to-day; it is the most efficient seen since the war started, and the defence of the country by our fighters has earned the admiration of the whole world. But when all that is said, that is not the end of air power. When we saw the Germany Army advancing to great successes, without the great casualties of the last war, we saw that they were clue to the striking power of the Air Force linked with the Army. What have we done to get a similar thing? If we advance across Europe, our Air Force will be doing its job, and its job is not close co-operation. The former Secretary of State for War pleaded for further co-operation of the Army, and I made a speech some weeks ago upon that line, saying that I hoped that sort of thing would be brought about 1194 But the powers-that-be showed no interest; nobody asked me a question about it. It seemed that the complacency and self-satisfaction of some of our Ministers know no bounds. There may still be time, however, to put this right before our vigorous offensive takes place.

I wanted to say a word about Lord Beaverbrook. I have some knowledge of the difficulties inside the Air Ministry and supply therein, and I think he deserves the greatest praise from this House and the whole country. The way he has cut through red tape and "got a hustle on" is really quite extraordinary. There is no doubt about it that when you hurry to the future by long-range planning you have to pay for it, but still the defence of this country was of paramount importance, and he has played a valiant part in that. We have to remember that we now have split the Air Department into two parts. There are the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. How are they getting on together? We are told that the production of the aircraft is to be stupendous in the near future and even more so in the New Year. How is training getting on? I hear that in the early spring personnel will be behind production, and there is this point that I want to press upon the Secretary of State for Air. I ask him not to think it is possible to train in this country the vast number of pilots we must get. It is absolutely impossible. I have no doubt that some aerodromes have been chosen outside this country, but all initial training must take place outside Great Britain. We heard last year of training schools which for two months did not have one hour's flying training, whereas if they had been situated in other parts of the world, they would have trained many pilots. Only the other day we saw that one of our flying instructors in an Anson machine met an enemy aircraft over his aerodrome. He was unarmed, and he rammed the enemy—one of the most gallant things ever done. But my point is that he should never have been put into the position where he had to do that. Soon every available aerodrome in this country will be wanted for aircraft, either for defensive or offensive purposes, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to tell us that training is going ahead by leaps and bounds on other soils than this country.

1195 May I say a word about the close cooperation and equipment of our Army with our Air Force, not the Air Force as we know it, but by machines of the type of flying infantrymen which will help an army to advance in tactical movement? These machines would not be used at any other time than when such a movement was contemplated. Think of the responsibility and the great work we have to do in the future. There is no doubt about it: we must have armies in France, in North Africa, the Near East and possibly the Far East. However many aeroplanes Lord Beaverbrook may be able to manufacture, there will never be enough for that close co-operation with the Army. That question must be given the consideration and drive it deserves.

There is another point on which some explanation is wanted. Here is Lord Beaverbrook in one of the key positions of the war, and the Prime Minister has put him into the War Cabinet. Was it not laid down that people busy with great Departments of State had not the time to be in the War Cabinet? Was that not generally accepted? Somebody may quote the fact that Lord Halifax, who is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, is also in the War Cabinet. That, I think, would be a most unfortunate comparison, because it entirely proves my point. I know perfectly well that we must not discuss the personalities of the Government. We have learned lately that leopards can change their spots when they join the Churchill troop, and as I look at the row of gentlemen on the Front Bench, there is not one member of the Government there who appears to me to possess anything but a "schoolgirl complexion." However, I need not pursue that point.

The Prime Minister said some words to-day about America which, I must say, stirred my heart. They were significant, and they were moving, and I think people with imagination can conjure up some of the vast post-war problems which this nation will have to solve. I think that the idea of the English-speaking races policing the world is one of great attraction. It may be that our great Prime Minister, with his great English ancestor—and we must remember that he has American blood in his veins—may, in conjunction with us, put right some of the follies of the past and 1196 that these two great countries will work together in the near future for the peace and prosperity of the whole world.

Here I want to say that we have had an expensive organisation under the Ministry of Information to tell the Government what the people are thinking. Well, I can do some of this "on the cheap" this afternoon. They first of all hope and are rather optimistic that the invasion scare is over and that the defence of this country can be left to the Home Guard. They are, in general, pining for planning. They are pining to be told something and have the curtain lifted up just a little. There is growing up in this country a tremendous power against the enemy, and it goes further than just defeating Germany. It is based on the good sense of the English people and the knowledge that aggression must be stopped. They saw it born in the Japanese affront on China and saw it followed by Italian aggression against Abyssinia and later by German aggression against other countries. We intend to deal with all of this, though perhaps in reversed order. Down in the hearts of the English people there is decency, and they object to bullying. As our Lord said: Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me. It is that which the British people mean to see put right. They looked around for a leader to represent this great country, and they found the Prime Minister. I maintain that they found the right man, but the position of the Prime Minister is one of tremendous responsibility. The people of this country honestly do not care about anybody else on the Front Bench; all they think of is the Prime Minister, and I say to him from the bottom of my heart, Lead and be strong.

§ Mr. Cocks (Broxtowe)

The hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down made a speech which we all enjoyed, and with which many of us agree, and during it paid a well deserved tribute to the work which Lord Beaverbrook has been doing as Minister of Aircraft Production. I would like to support that, and I hope the Government have succeeded in obtaining a man with his dynamic personality and organising powers to take charge of the production of tanks, which is almost 1197 as important. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) said in his speech that we could not win the war so long as we had 800,000 unemployed. He pleaded for the mobilisation of the nation so as to produce an immense striking power, adequately equipped. I heartily support him in that suggestion. He also said he hoped we should endeavour to gain friends to support us by diplomatic methods. About that I propose to say a word presently.

This is the first time since the invasion of Holland and Belgium, and the fall of France, that the House has been given an opportunity to take a survey of the war situation. I welcome that opportunity. I am glad the Government have given it to us, because surely to-day more than ever, far more than when the words were first written, we are "the one voice in Europe, and we must speak." We must speak freely and frankly to the world. We must speak to France, to Spain, to Russia, to Japan and to America. To Germany we shall only speak with guns. To the people of France we speak with sorrow and sympathy. They have been broken by treachery and betrayed by corrupt and faithless leaders. But the soul of France is not dead and can never die. The French people, who once showed "a light to all men" and "preach'd a gospel all men's good," will one day with our help, and perhaps before long, rise against their persecutors and betrayers and proclaim again to the world the triumphant principles of the French Revolution. To the Government of Vichy we speak only with scorn and contempt. For the third time in French history a Marshal of France has proved false to his rank and his dignity. Marshal Marmont betrayed his Emperor: Marshal Bazaine surrendered Metz. There has been left to Marshal Petain the supreme disgrace of betraying and surrendering France.

Let us leave this aged defeatist and reactionary to the pitying contempt of posterity. As for M. Laval, he has followed the crooked course that he has always pursued. In private life his standards have not been high. In public life they have been even less elevated. May he meet, with his colleagues, their just fate, amidst the execrations of the French people where better men than he have met it, under the guillotine. Now this camarilla of 1198 dastards and usurpers, slobbering over the jack-boots of the Nazis in the vain hope of saving their property, are placing on trial for their lives men whose only crime is that they have sought to defend their country. Save perhaps in the case of Marshal Ney, it would be difficult to find a parallel to this in the pages of French history. It is to be hoped that, for the honour of the French nation and the French name, the people of France will rise in their masses and rescue these patriots from the hands of the modern Bourbons of Vichy, who, without the dignity which marked the old regime, have like that old regime preferred class to their country.

In the meantime German anti-British propaganda is being carried out effectively amongst the French people. Every effort is being made to turn the French people against Britain, and with some success. I do not think that up to now that propaganda has been effectively countered by the Ministry of Information and by the British Foreign Office. The Foreign Office has not had many successes to its credit in recent years, and I hope that no tenderness in that quarter for Marshal Pétain or General Weygand or any fear of the possible consequences of a popular rising in France will deter the Government from appealing to the democratic instincts of the French people and supporting General de Gaulle in his efforts to place the real responsibility for the surrender and collapse of France on the shoulders of the valetudinarians of Vichy.

Now I will say a word about Italy. I view with some concern the attitude which has been adopted, since the war started, by the Foreign Office towards Italy. One of the greatest mistakes of the war, in my view, is the fact that we did not send an ultimatum to Mussolini to tell him that, unless he gave us concrete pledges that he would remain neutral, he would be subject to immediate attack I believe that if this had been done, and he had chosen the second alternative, Italy would have been knocked out long ago, France might still have been fighting and Somaliland would still be ours; and why are we dithering about Abyssinia? A successful revolt in Abyssinia might disconcert the Italian designs—and they are formidable designs—in the Middle East. Why do we not 1199 promise the Abyssinians their independence and help them to rebel? The Government have been asked to do this, and this is their reply: His Majesty's Government have let it be known that, in view of Italy's act of deliberate aggression in resorting to war against this country, they feel entitled to reserve complete liberty of action in regard to any commitments entered into in the past with the Italian Government relating to the North and East African and Mediterranean areas. This declaration covered the de jure recognition under the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1938 of Italy's conquest of Abyssinia. We ask for a clarion call to the Abyssinian people, and all we get is the muffled muttering of mealy-mouthed mediocrity. It is quite certain that that dismal formula was not drafted by the Prime Minister. We can tell that from internal evidence. Let the Prime Minister utter a few clear and plangent sentences telling the Abyssinian people that we want them to be free, that we will help them to be free, and that we ask them to fight for their freedom and for the world. That is what I hope he will do. On this point let me ask one question. The British Government have stated that they will resist any attempt on the part of the enemy to occupy Syria. Does that apply also to Jibuti? I hope so. I hope that, if the Italians attempt to occupy that port, we shall immediately blast them out.

Now I should like to turn to Spain. Here again is a delicate situation which I will endeavour to deal with delicately. Here the Prime Minister is reaping the tares sown by past politics, an agricultural proceeding of which he himself had considerable doubt at the time. Spain at present under Nazi influence has ceased to be neutral and has become non-belligerent, as Italy did a few months ago. The pressure of the Axis upon General Franco's Government is increasing. Anti-British propaganda in Spain has been increased, and it is said that General Franco has voiced the desire for the return of Gibraltar. It is rumoured, it was stated in the "Times" yesterday, that Spain may enter the war on the opposite side to us. In these circumstances I hope that no futile policy of attempted appeasement will be pursued by our Ambassador. His Excellency the Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) has been to closely associated with M. Laval 1200 and with the mischievous Anglo-German Naval Agreement, to which the Prime Minister and others objected at the time, for us to have any excessive confidence in his judgment. I hope that, if General Franco demands the cession of Gibraltar, we shall return an uncompromising negative. If Gibraltar is attacked, another Elliot will be found to defend it, and, if the Falangists want another Peninsula War, let us tell them they can have it, and that 2,000,000 gallant Spaniards who are in exile or in prison will help us to victory. It was the Spanish ulcer that ate into the vitals of Napoleon. It may yet prove the cancer which Hitler so much dreads.

No great success has yet been attained in the Balkans by our diplomacy. Before the war I suggested to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that we should send a special envoy to the Balkans, with headquarters at Sofia, with the special object of promoting Balkan unity. One of his aims would have been to persuade Rumania, in return for the guarantee which we had given her, to make territorial concessions in the Dobrudja to Bulgaria. If that had been accomplished, a Balkan bloc might have been formed under British and Turkish auspices capable of affording effective resistance to Nazi aggression. What might have been done under British leadership is now being done under Nazi leadership. Germany, very anxious not to impede the flow of food and raw materials from the Balkans to the Reich by any conflict in that area, has used her influence to try to bring about a Hungarian-Bulgarian-Rumanian agreement. Negotiations are now proceeding, and certain concessions are to be made by Rumania both to Hungary and Bulgaria. The effect of that agreement will be to weaken very considerably the position of Yugo-Slavia and Greece. It goes without saying that, if Greece is attacked by Italy, we shall come to her assistance, and I hope Turkey will do the same, because an Italian conquest of Greece would make the position in the Near East one of extreme danger.

I have no illusions about Russian policy. I have not any delusions either. Russian policy is dictated entirely by self-interest, and she is not the only country of which that can be said. The Russian Government have no love for us, 1201 and they have no love for Germany either. Germany has a powerful military machine and has land frontiers coterminous with that of Russia. If she came into conflict with Russia, she would damage Russia very considerably, and might almost destroy her. We are not in a position to defend the Soviet Union to any appreciable extent in those circumstances; therefore any hope that we can bring Russia upon our side at present is entirely futile. At the same time, Russia has no wish to see a German victory, because, if Germany won this war and we were defeated, nothing on earth would prevent Germany turning upon Russia, seizing the Ukraine and the shores of the Baltic and the Black Seas. Once the tide begins to turn and it is seen that we are getting the upper hand, there will be some hope of the Soviet Union coming into the conflict and helping us to bring the war to a swifter conclusion. In the meantime there is no need to antagonise Russia unnecessarily. I hope that the question of the gold balances of the Baltic States will be speedily settled. The last time a thing of that kind occurred the Bank of England handed them over to Germany, and I hope they will not do the same thing this time. I trust that the negotiations for a trade agreement will be pressed forward as rapidly as possible. In the meantime, we ought to cultivate the most amicable relations possible with Russia although I doubt whether Lord Halifax, who has visited Hitler and Goering—and it has been noted in Russia—but has never been to Moscow, is the man to acomplish this.

I want now to go further East, to Japan. Here again the Prime Minister is the unfortunate inheritor of a policy which he never supported and never approved. If the amiable and ineffective gentleman who now adorns the Woolsack had been promoted to that high position eight years ago, we would not be faced with the present grave situation. But the position is very grave, and every consideration must be given to the Government in this matter. As the Prime Minister has told us, we are engaged in a life-and-death struggle, and the world does not end to-day. The result in the West will determine in the long run the result in the East, and our attitude towards Japan in future will be largely influenced by her attitude towards us today. Considering our commitments— 1202 and I will not go into them in detail, for obvious reasons—I think the Prime Minister has been acting wisely and prudently in endeavouring to stave off a further conflict in the Far East. We have already seen that his policy is bearing fruit. Tension seems to be less, and anti-British demonstrations in Japan have ceased, according to to-day's newspapers. The exchange of diplomatic Ministers between Australia and Japan is an excellent augury for the future. I see no reason why the Rising Sun and the Southern Cross should not both have their places in the Pacific sky.

We all welcomed the words of the Prime Minister about America. We are glad to know that our relations with America are growing closer every day. We have welcomed the agreement between the United States and Canada for a joint board for mutual defence. There will be widespread approval for the suggestion that certain places in our Dominions and Crown Colonies might be leased to the United States for a term of years for the construction of naval and air bases. All these proposals, signs of the voluntary coming together of free peoples, like the offer of unity which was made to France, are in striking contrast to the designs of Nazi Germany. We all know what those designs are. In Europe France is to be broken up and turned into an agricultural State and is to cease to be an industrial State. All non-German races in Poland, Holland, Scandinavia, everywhere, are to become the slaves of their Nazi conquerors. In pursuance of that policy the British Empire is to be destroyed as a step towards the conquest of the world.

Hitler has made great territorial gains very rapidly. They are comparable to the conquests of Alexander the Great, and they have been made by much the same methods, by the use of a new machine and new tactics. Hitler is now facing the problem which would have faced Alexander the Great if he had lived to turn westward and encountered the legions of Rome. It has often been a controversy among some historians as to what would have happened then. Hitler is facing Rome to-day because the British people, I have always believed, are the true inheritors of the civilisation of Rome and Greece. We are awaiting his onslaught with courage and confidence. There are 1203 reasons for our confidence in the deathless deeds of the Royal Air Force and in the valour of our soldiers, sailors and Home Guard, keeping ceaseless watch on our seas, on the cliffs and the coasts, and on our countryside. We have reason for confidence, too, in the calm fortitude of our civilian population. Most of all, we have confidence because we are now standing with our Allies as the sole champions in Europe of freedom, that freedom whose banner, torn yet flying, streams like a thunder cloud against the wind"— the fiery blast that blows from Nazi Germany. But freedom cannot die, and amidst the thunder of British guns and the lightning of British steel, freedom will triumph over the most evil forces that have ever threatened civilisation with death.

§ Captain Duncan (Kensington, North)

We have just listened to a stark, interesting and amusing speech from the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks). He will forgive me if I do not follow him right round the world, but I would like to say a few words about one or two of the countries he has mentioned. With regard to Abyssinia, it seemed to me all right that the British Government should announce officially that Haile Selassie had reached