EUROPEAN SITUATION.

§ The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald)

I take the first available opportunity of informing the House regarding what happened whilst the Foreign Secretary and myself were at Geneva and Rome. We were asked by our colleagues here to go to Geneva first of all because every report showed that there was a grave danger of a somewhat immediate collapse of the Disarmament Conference, and we felt very strongly that it might be possible to avert such a collapse. Our first business was to discover how matters actually stood, and for that purpose we interviewed for some two or three days the leading delegates from the various nations. It was perfectly plain that the Conference work had somewhat lost itself in details. In saying that, I am not making any complaint. If any hon. Member had been at Geneva and had had to face the extraordinary difficulties of conducting such a Conference, attended by the representatives of 60 nations, with diverse interests, diverse points of view, and diverse needs in armament, he would not join lightly in those rather superior reflections about the Conference which have been passed by people who had remained at their own fireside, and had nothing to trouble about except what they imagined whilst they sat at the fireside.

Facing that conference and its committees and sub-committees, finding the tremendous differences that separate delegations from delegations and nation from nation, and getting conclusions, is going to be no immediately accomplished job. We have to build long bridges over the differences that separate one from another. But in going along we have to remember that there must be frequent transformations from the expert study of detail to the production of practical plans in order to meet this very obvious difficulty, that when the conference absorbs 512 itself for the time being in detail, then the various nations, asked to give up this or to agree to that, quite naturally say, "But to what plan am I working? I cannot agree to give this unless I know the complete system into which my sacrifice, as I imagine it to be, is to be set. Is it to be all sacrifice, or am I going to receive compensations which I can value as at any rate some measure of security in return for the sacrifices I make?" Moreover, whilst of course we must 134 the very highest respect and regard to what is known as expert advice, we must remember, and we must take upon ourselves the responsibility of remembering, that the last word in these matters is a political word. Both of these things had become very evident to those who had been at Geneva and had become prominent quite steadily and persistently in our investigations on the condition of affairs there.

We therefore decided to assist the Conference by the production of a plan that would cover the whole field and would deal with questions like security, consultative pacts, land armaments, naval armaments and air armaments, that would deal with the use of poison gases, that would embody rules of war, the complete effect of which was disarmament and security. I need not go into the details of the plan. It has been published as a. White Paper. But plans that are to be of any use at Geneva now must not be merely mathematical plans to reduce things by one-third or one-quarter or one-fifth. Geneva has gone far beyond that kind of plan. If plans of any value are to be produced now they must have relation to the differing needs of the nations. I do not know how far our plan was successful in that.

I explained to the Conference that I believed that the first reaction would be that everyone would be opposed to it, but that the second reaction, after some consideration would be that everyone wanted to take it as the basis for further consideration, and immediate consideration, under the belief that on such a basis an agreement could be reached. I was right regarding my first prophecy as to what the first reaction would be. I think that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and myself have detected in various parts of the Continent that we had a good chance of being right regarding the second part of the forecast. It 513 will take a little time, and we can wait, because every nation has at last been faced with proposals. It knows perfectly well that this Conference cannot go on indefinitely. [An HON. MEMBER: "No hurry!"] There is hurry, and there is no use in making those observations. But in order to do the work well and efficiently it must not be a quack business. Every nation knows that the time is limited, and every nation now is compelled to face up to what is to be the alternative to failure.

There were two essentials in that plan of ours. First of all it contained for the first time figures regarding various arms. I confess that when that was put up to me first of all, I was very doubtful as to whether it was desirable or necessary. On full consideration all doubts were removed from my mind. Until figures had been produced there would be no progress, because the thing that every nation wanted to avoid was the production of figures. Yet, curiously enough, delegate after delegate in the course of interviews begged me to have the courage to produce figures for them. I did not. My colleagues did it. I cannot pretend that I went through the figures myself. I make myself responsible for them certainly, but the figures were produced by two or three of the most admirable servants that a Government has ever had looking after its interests in an international Conference. Theirs were the figures. Some of them had been at almost every meeting of the Conference since it was opened, and at a good many committees and sub-committees. They knew their problem; they had what was desired at their fingers' ends. The figures were produced. When the Conference resumes—I understand it is to be resumed to-morrow—it will be upon those figures, I hope, that the time and hopes and work of the Conference will be concentrated.

There is another point. We are pledged to give equality to Germany. The time has gone by when by a combination of any Powers any European people can be kept down by obligations which it regards as being inconsistent with its self-respect and its honour, and we have now to make it perfectly clear that the obligations that are to be placed upon the nations of Europe are to be obligations of honour and moral re- 514 sponsibility, obligations which will be all the more serious for them, since they have taken them upon themselves in a voluntary way, But, as again I said at Geneva, events have happened recently that have enormously increased the risk of taking a big step like that at the present moment, and our plan presupposes, quite clearly, a transition stage. During that stage of progress towards equality, equality itself will not be carried out, but during it there shall be no re-armament and no question of re-armament.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

I am sorry to interrupt the Prime Minister, but is he now using the word "equality" without any of the refining definitions which have hitherto been attached to it—qualitative and so forth?

§ The PRIME MINISTER

My right hon. Friend is on the wrong point. I do not want to make a long statement, and I do not want to be drawn on to a side issue, but he w ill remember that a great claim was put in by Germany for equality of status. Then they left the Conference, and then the Five-Power Conference came, and, as a result, they returned to the Disarmament Conference on a pledge that under conditions we were all in favour of the principle of equality. Events have happened since then which make that more desirable and more necessary than ever.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

Equality of status.

§ The PRIME MINISTER

That is so. The immediate result, at any rate, of our intervention has been that the hope of agreement has been restored and the Conference is heartened once more to pursue its work upon a definite sketch plan which it can consider in detail and, I hope, for not too long a time—a plan which it will amend if it likes, but which would be the foundation of further consideration and give form to the final convention when that convention has been drafted. That is the result of our intervention at Geneva. The Conference is going on in the hope of agreement and we have provided the form in which agreement may be reached.

I have already said that at Geneva we were conscious of something outside the absolute business of the Disarmament Conference. I felt day after day whilst 515 there as though I was looking upon a stage with something moving immediately behind the footlights, but as if there was something else there of a different character—an ominous background full of shadows and uncertainties. Europe is not settled. Europe is very unsettled. Europe is in a very nervous condition. Unfortunately, the one thing that can save us all, and that is well-founded confidence in each other, is more lacking to-day than it has been for a very long time. Events have happened and speeches have been made which naturally and properly have added to that sense of insecurity, and it was after we had arrived at Geneva that some of those incidents happened. I hope that this country will not allow those events to divert it from the path which it has mapped out for itself as the only path on which security and peace can be found. I have nothing now to say about those events except in relation to their international effects; but we cannot expect other nations to be indifferent to them. If we did I could report to the House after the last fortnight's experience here and there in Europe and meeting not only European representatives, but representatives of other parts of the world, that the nations outside are not indifferent to those events. Part of the responsibility of any Government which claims to be pursuing peace and making certain moral claims upon the consideration of other nations is to make a contribution to the proper transquility of mind of those nations to enable them to do the right thing. This background, however, must be dealt with and it has given us a great deal of thought for a long time.

I remember a speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) some months ago, in which he told us what he thought we ought to do and my remark was that he might have been sitting under the table while we were discussing the troubles that were in our minds. [An HON. MEMBER: "Perhaps he was!"] I would ask my right hon. Friend and those who are with him to remember that they are not the only people who have been aware for months and months that certain actions taken some years ago are now coming to flower and fruit and that it is upon us living in these days that the responsibility of dealing with the ripened event 516 is falling. At Lausanne, not in connection with its financial provisions, but in connection with certain political conversations, and approaches, this matter was foreseen. Even before that—my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) will remember the occasion in Paris when the League of Nations constitution was being drafted —Article 19 was put in; and Article 19 provided that the Assembly of the League should advise consideration of international conditions whose continuation might endanger the peace of the world.

It was clearly foreseen. When at Geneva, seeing that background, feeling that background, it came to my knowledge that Signor Mussolini would welcome a meeting as he wished to inform me of some views he held regarding the establishment of peace. On the invitation being received, with the approval of my right hon. Friends I accepted it, and proposed Rome as the place of meeting. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and I, therefore, spent the last week-end in Rome, and I would like to add this: Before we replied to Signor Mussolini's invitation, but after we received it, I managed to get an interview with the French Prime Minister at Geneva, and informed him how we proposed to reply to the invitation, and next day, in making some remarks upon the speech which I made before the Disarmament Conference, he was good enough to wish us both bon voyage. I am afraid that I cannot answer without notice any questions that may be put at the present moment, but I shall be very glad indeed to answer questions of which I have received notice. The position is still in a very unformed condition, but it is like this: On our arrival, a short document was handed to us, Which roughly and generally gave Signor Mussolini's views, showing that his mind had been running on an effective policy of collaboration between the four Western Powers to maintain peace in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and of the No-Force Pact which had been contemplated by the Five-Power Conference as a return for Germany getting a declaration in principle of our willingness to grant her equality of status—a declaration that none of those five Powers should resort to force to try to solve any of their immediate political difficulties. He felt that Article 19 of the Covenant re treaties 517 was not meant to become dormant. His view was that while the Covenant of the League of Nations enforced all respect for treaty obligations, it also contemplated the possibility of a revision of treaties when conditions arise which may lead to a conflict of nations.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

Clemenceau said so.

§ The PRIME MINISTER

Yes. There are two principles in the Preamble and Article 19. The first is that a treaty made should be observed, and should only be altered by the consent of both parties to the treaty. But Article 19 also says that treaties containing provisions which, in the efflux of time, have raised problems which may result in most undesirable conflicts, ought to be subject to revision. As a very distinguished politician has said. "Every treaty is holy, but no treaty is eternal." The plan laid down that the proposed co-operation should be carried out within the framework of the League of Nations, and 10 years was indicated as the first period for the treaty should it be possible to arrange it. Indications were given that if this conception of understanding and co-operation between the Powers were adopted as an immediate aid to peace, as an immediate contribution to the solution of Europe's difficulties and dangers, the friendship thus engendered would have further beneficial consequences. That would be necessary, and the British Government will work out further details in this respect.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

Details of what?

§ The PRIME MINISTER

Details of the plan, so that the plan may not merely have as its general purpose peace and its big and almost only detail, revision of treaties. The whole plan I am explaining we discussed with Signor Mussolini on Signor Mussolini's invitation. I hope that that is plain. We received a certain plan from Signor Mussolini. I have been explaining what the idea was. In our working at it what I observed at the moment was that it would be necessary that the plan should be as comprehensive as possible, and not merely relate to one or two points. Some of the suggestions made to us quite plainly could not be accepted as they were, but, in conversation, we found they were very largely 518 verbal differences, and that, by a slight redraft, Signed Mussolini's opinion and ours might coincide.

I am sorry to have to refer to these things, and I am only doing it on account of various statements which have been made, especially in foreign newspapers, about what we did discuss, not one word of which is true. The point, for instance, that my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) made the subject of a question to-day about Tanganyika. I know he was disturbed by a statement that we had in some degree or other offered, it was said, Tanganyika as some sort of sop to Herr Hitler. There is not a word of truth in the statement. Tanganyika was never even mentioned, and that is why I say that the conversation was of the most general kind on those points which I have mentioned as having been contained in Signor Mussolini's paper which was presented to us through our Ambassador as soon as we arrived in Ostia on Saturday afternoon, We were not asked to approve or disapprove. We were only asked to say at this stage whether we were ready to study the matter further. We expressed ourselves at once as being very much interested, and we promised to study the matter in relation to all its settings and to get into communication with other friends on the subject.

The idea, we pointed out, required close examination and we indicated some matters of essential detail which had to be provided for—for instance, how the smaller States affected could be consulted. Some of them, I see by the newspapers, are beginning to fear consequences. It is very natural, on account of what has been reported in the newspapers, but I can give them an assurance that, so far as the conversations are concerned, they have no foundation whatever for their fears, and I wish to make it clear that, in our view, these smaller States have a right to be consulted wherever their special interests are concerned, and that that will be done. The motive and the plan are undoubtedly to remove causes of war in Europe, the emphasis in the plan itself being upon the League of Nations taking up the responsibility imposed upon it by Article 19 of the Covenant; but it must not exclude smaller States 519 from playing their proper part in the consideration when it is undertaken. In some respects the smaller States have a greater interest than the larger ones in removing causes of irritation and feelings of injury from the nations of Europe. They should be swift to provide this security and protection for themselves, and they may be sure that every support which can be given should the matter be pursued to that point—the point when the League of Nations is really taking the matter up—every support in that respect shall be given by His Majesty's Government. On the way through Paris we informed the French Ministers of our conversations, and they made public their desire for loyal co-operation in the interests of peace between the four European Powers who are permanent members of the League of Nations.

The Government welcome Signor Mussolini's idea. There is no greater immediate danger to Europe than that, when the inevitable nationalist revival occurs, Peace Treaties may be the subject of a challenge initiated by one only and under conditions which will only renew enmities and ruin the prospects of a friendly accommodation. It might also be that the greater Powers would be driven by circumstances into opposing views. This project, if made to work, if we can get the idea accepted and carried out, will prevent all that. If we fail in courage and be afraid to remember that we all signed the Nineteenth Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations, we shall not evade the difficulty which its provisions sought to avert. It will still approach us, but it will be far more difficult to deal with later on than it is now. Meanwhile, the unsettlement will keep Europe unwilling to disarm.

The conversations at Rome amounted to this, that now, when it is perfectly plain to everybody that national life is being revitalised in Europe, the four Powers should meet, before they may be driven apart, to try to remove by negotiation the dangers which will have to be met in any event. I express no opinion, though I entertain strong hopes of the result, but I do say that were any of the four Powers to reject forthwith, and without full examination and consideration, the idea about which we were informed at Rome, or were they to put 520 obstacles in its way until men's minds have become weary of it and it has passed into the mournful stores of lost opportunities, or if, appearing to accept it to promote peace, they were to use it for their own self-regarding purposes, immeasurable will be the responsibility for what may follow.

The British Government is now working at a plan, trying to fit it for its purpose and to devise a means of handling what is admittedly a problem of the greatest delicacy. The re-consideration of treaties, however, is not enough. The other nations have to make a contribution of their own, and that contribution must be a substantial one. It must be such a contribution, in such form and of such an importance, as will place beyond the shadow of doubt that when these changes are made they are not to pursue anything in Europe but a co-operative and a friendly policy. If the four Powers come together, if a way can be devised for joining with their views those of the smaller nationalities concerned, and for examining the causes of fear leading now to an unwillingness to disarm, who would dare to deny but that the most effective work for peace which has been done since the War will have been accomplished That may well have been begun by the Italian plan.

In any event, in addition to recognising most warmly the generous hospitality of the Italian Prime Minister and his Government while we were in Italy, we pay a hearty tribute to the humanity of the intentions embodied in their project, and hope that the means of co-operation for which they are in search will be found. Co-operation may have as its nucleus the four Powers, but co-operation which is by no means confined to them, this co-operation which may be begun, quite rightly, in Europe ought not to have the intention of ending there. Let it be co-operation in a form and in a spirit which may well draw to it the sympathy and the aid of our powerful friend beyond the Atlantic. I hope that these views will commend themselves to the House.

§ Mr. DAVID GRENFELL

I am sure the House will join with me in expressing regret that the wife of the Leader of the Opposition is seriously ill, for which reason he is unable to be present, and I have been asked to fill my right hon. 521 Friend's place on this occasion. We have no advance information and we have no official guide or printed word to help us in the very difficult problems with which we are concerned. Indeed, the Prime Minister gave us to understand that when he went to Geneva he found that a certain amount of hurried improvisation was necessary, and although we have been told the detailed character of the armament proposals which he made at Geneva, the House of Commons has not to-day received the particulars or the explanation which I believe the House desires and requires in order to adjudicate fairly upon the value of his conversations.

The Prime Minister said that when he went to Geneva he found the delegates of the leading countries immersed in details and unable to settle down to any particular aspect of the problem, the details being so confusing and perplexing by their very weight and number, and the right hon. Gentleman said that, although principles and proportions, limitations and restrictions had been suggested, no exact proposals expressed in figures had ever been made, and he came to the conclusion that tangible proposals should be put before the nations. He said he was the more convinced of the necessity of doing that, because no single nation was prepared to submit figures for itself, and he undertook the responsibility of proposing figures not only for Great Britain, but for each of the other countries, in a plan which he thought might be the basis of future discussion and negotiation.

We recognise the dangers in putting figures forward in that way, and those of us who have read the proposals find grave apprehension indeed in those figures, because if figures at this stage are advisable, many of us on this side believe that the figures should be very much smaller than those proposed by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. I have gone into those figures, and I find that there is room for considerable reduction before any marked advance is made in the direction of disarmament. The Prime Minister said that give-and-take became impossible unless you knew exactly what plan was to be carried out. I am not satisfied that that give-and-take has been helped very much by the publication of his figures and these proposals and the conditions under which the figures are prescribed. I am rather 522 afraid that the disadvantage of having these figures far outweighs any advantage; I am rather afraid that, these figures having been suggested, there will be considerable reluctance on the part of any of the nations receiving a satisfactory Allocation to reduce those figures, and indeed the authority of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the great country which they represent will be used in justification of a refusal to make further concessions in, the armaments of any of those countries.

I would like the House to look at those figures with me, and I think we shall find that the best proposals that the Prime Minister could make provide for a personnel of 2,000,000 in land forces serving at home in Europe, with an additional 500,000, or 2,500,000 in all, for service at home and abroad. Those are the figures prescribed in the Prime Minister's plan for disarmament—2,500,000 land forces, making no allowance for the forces by sea or in the air. Those figures, we submit, are much too high and do not register any marked advance towards disarmament. In our case there is no reduction. We are to have, under the plan, 200,000 soldiers for serving at home, and we are to have an additional 200,000 for service at home and abroad.

§ The SECRETARY of STATE for 'OREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon)

What figures is the hon. Member quoting?

§ Mr. GRENFELL

The figures are here, and I am sure they are accurate. I have gone to the trouble of counting up the details in each case, and I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will find that my total of 2,000,000 land forces for service at home, or 2,500,000 including those for service abroad, is strictly accurate. We find, in addition, that the figures provide for 5,000 military aeroplanes, including 500 reserved for the United States of America. There are limitations as to the calibre of guns, but none regarding the number of guns, and no limitation of the number of naval vessels until 1935, when a further conference may decide either upon a reduction or an increase of naval forces.

My first general criticism of the Prime Minister's proposals is that they start too high, that they more or less stabilise armaments at those high levels, and that 523 under them there is no indication of our reaching any considerable measure of disarmament in the next five years. The Prime Minister went on to say that not only would the figures be of value in further negotiations, but that negotiations regarding the character of war itself were provided for in the plan. While no one on this side objects to any proposals or plans whereby certain lethal weapons can be prohibited altogether, if the Conference has already reached the stage which the Prime Minister has described, there is very little likelihood that, because the Prime Minister has introduced these figures for the several countries and they are published, he will be able to get consent for the abolition of the lethal weapons and the control of arms should war occur. We do not attach very much importance to the possibility or the prospect of controlling the use of gas, for example, or the use of submarines or the use of civil aeroplanes for military purposes. Very little importance can be attached to any such proposals if hostilities once break out. Therefore we have not so much faith in the other proposals as we would have in proposals permanently reducing the personnel and the war material of all the countries involved, and, above all, making provision for a progressive reduction of armaments in all countries of the world on a pre-determined scale.

The Prime Minister said there was a prospect of Germany being brought in. We very much fear that if the indications of the Prime Minister's plan point to anything at all, they point not to a reduction of the armaments of other countries to Germany's comparatively low level but to the possibility of an increase in German armaments to equal the higher levels elsewhere. In the present state of Europe that would be a greater danger than allowing Germany to remain where she is. Germany armed, and armed with the consent of one or two of the larger Powers, might, indeed, be an added menace to the peace of Europe and the peace of the world. The Prime Minister went to Rome and said he found the background darkened with shadows—using his greater gifts of description and diplomacy to say probably the same as I am saying in my much more downright manner. If I am too plain I am sure the House will forgive me. We all appreciate 524 that there are shadows looming everywhere. Mars, the God of War, is throwing his baneful influence all around, and the Prime Minister need not have gone to Geneva or to Rome to ascertain the position. He might have discovered the object casting the shadow if he had gone to certain places which have to remain unnamed in to-day's discussion.

When the Prime Minister went to Italy we were surprised. I am not making a personal attack on the Prime Minister. He went as the representative of a democracy. He himself was at one time the leader of democracy in this country. He went to Rome to meet the one who has looked with contempt upon democracy, the one who has poured scorn upon Parliament, and he went as a suppliant to Rome. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies need not make any of those comments. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"] The Prime Minister went as the representative of a representative Government to consult and to receive guidance from one who has poured scorn upon representative government for many years. He found that Signor Mussolini had a plan. It was not the Prime Minister's plan but Signor Mussolini's plan. We have not this afternoon been given the details of that plan. Has it been worked out in detail? At what time shall we know the details? I have been compelled to fall back upon information in a French newspaper reporting an interview between the Prime Minister and M. Daladier and M. Paul Boncour which appeared in Le Temps. There we are told that this is what the plan contains: The Convention is to be concluded for 10 years. We were not told that this afternoon and, subject to one year's notice by one of the co-signatories, shall continue automatically for another 10 years. This is a 20 years' plan, unless one of the four contracting parties denounces it or gives notice to terminate it before the first ten years: Secondly, animated by the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, the four great Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, engage to co-operate to preserve peace. Third, all other Powers or any other Powers are free to join the Pact.

Fourth, obligations assumed by the four Powers are of two kinds. (a) The said Powers declare, in conformity with the pro- 525 visions of the Covenant of the League of Nations that the question of revision of treaties can be raised. (b) France and Britain and Italy engage to consider Germany's claim to equality of status in military matters. Then comes the fifth paragraph, and this is dangerous: The four Powers in matters outside Europe and in matters of Colonial affairs to follow a line of common conduct. That is the draft, as I understand it, of the four Power pact proposed by Signor Mussolini. In view of the shadows falling upon Europe from all directions one wonders whether this is really a contribution to the future peace of Europe, one wonders whether this is not the greatest of all the shadows over the prospects and peace of co-operation over Europe. I have not been able to make as detailed an examination of the Prime Minister's plan for disarmament as I should have liked, on the ground of lack of time and because we do not know sufficient about the details of his plan, but we do know that there is considerable difference of opinion in European countries regarding the effect of these proposals.

I understand that the Geneva Conference is to meet again to-morrow with these proposals before them. We, on this side of the House, do not wish for the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference; we are anxious that it should succeed, but we must state in this House our own view of what should be the basis of all the discussions on this very important question. We believe that disarmament should be discussed not with a view to maintaining the balance of Europe, not with a view to maintaining the relative strength of the great Powers compared with the small Powers, not with a view of satisfying the ambitions of any one country at the expense of the other, but we believe that disarmament should be discussed as a problem of real disarmament, of doing away with arms. We understand that the House, and the Prime Minister too, at one time, believed that safety was not possible so long as we carry arms in our hands. No safety can be found in that way. The only way to get safety and security is by renouncing war, as it has been done in the Kellogg Pact, the Pact of Paris.

We have said that war is not a proper instrument for the settlement of human affairs, and it is in the spirit of that 526 renunciation that we would like the Conference at Geneva to take up the further consideration of the matter, to take these figures as they have now been offered, but not as figures for give and take. These figures should be regarded simply as a temporary measure of proportions. The figures themselves are too high. Perhaps the proportions might be fixed to give approximate satisfaction, but all the figures are too high. Figures having been introduced we believe that the aim of the Conference should be to work those figures down to the very lowest possible limit, and to make the very closest approach possible to disarmament. This is very important, because the Prime Minister rightly said that Europe is passing through a period of great travail, a period of very great hardship, hardship more due to economic causes than to political causes for the moment, but the political and the economic causes are closely interlinked, and no doubt the economic difficulties are themselves the cause of the military preparations which we fear so much.

While we on this side of the House would like to see disarmament hastened we attach perhaps more importance to the World Economic Conference, which is vitally necessary if the causes of rivalry in arms and the apprehensions which exist at the present time are to be removed. We find new world conditions in which industry has spread to all parts of the world. It is reaching out and gathering raw materials from all directions, passing those raw materials through the machines and producing commodities in over-abundance. We find every country busily building up tariff walls and obstacles to prevent this abundant outpouring of goods from crossing the national frontiers. The fact is that there are no physical boundaries separating countries at the present time. This new industrialism knows no boundaries. There is no room for tariff boundaries, no room for customs posts, no room for the obstacles which prevent humanity from enjoying the hugemeasure of wealth at its disposal, and it is in the World Economic Conference getting down lace to face with these facts and with a mutual desire to improve conditions all round, that we shall find the means by which these shadows to which 527 the Prime Minister has referred can be dispelled and removed from the lives of men.

The battle is a battle for livelihood. It is the fear of hard times and of poverty which causes individuals and nations all over Europe to be so apprehensive. Looking at Europe at the present time, we find sovereign States in large numbers trying to defend themselves from their neighbours, and we find that there is no unity of purpose even within those national States. People are divided by rivalries of political organisation in nearly every country in Europe. Dictatorship and democracy are contending against each other, and everywhere dictatorships are springing up, with the weapons of murder and destruction, with the morality of the thug and the method of the bully, oppressing and coercing people all round. As against that, you will find in every State a body of people who believe in peace at home and abroad, in peaceful development, in progress, liberty and ordered advancement. You will find in Europe those two forces contending against each other, and the contest reflected in every conference, whether the conference be at Geneva, Rome or Paris, and whether it is Prime Ministers who meet each other face to face, or lesser people. You will find the shadow of dictatorship and the threat of it all over Europe, intimidating and coercing the people.

We believe that this country of democracy ought to make its pronouncement in these matters, and that in the World Economic Conference there is an opportunity for removing some of the causes of militarism and dictatorship. I hope that I shall carry the House with me when I say that the principle of dictatorship is not progressive but is retrogressive and reactionary. It is taking the direct way back to the cave and to barbarism and savagery. This country ought certainly to have something to say on that matter. I hope that wherever we can we shall make a generous contribution towards the solution of the question of armaments and shall give a lead, which we are still fortunately free to offer, in the matter of the economic reorganisation of the world, because we have not suffered as severely as have our neighbours on the Continent from the economic confusion which has over- 528 whelmed the world. Every country has its tariff walls, its own national currency and its own banks and banking reserves, which it jealously guards, making no attempt at collaboration or co-operation to share the huge accumulated wealth produced in the world by modern industry. We believe that this country can make proposals to which the world will gladly listen. We are not in so desperate a plight as are some of the other countries which we shall have to meet at the World Economic Conference. I believe that the Prime Minister has gone a very long way indeed in a very short time to compromise the principles, of which he was an original exponent, of international relations based upon identity of purpose and community of aim. I believe that he has gone a long way already, in neglecting to state the case as it should be stated on behalf of this country.

On this side of the House, we shall not lose an opportunity of saying that we are opposed to dictatorships of every form and in every country. We stand here and say that we believe that the world should organise on lines of co-operation and mutuality. We believe that no good can come to the world, even by compromising or co-operating with those who believe in dictatorships. We are very anxious that we shall not, either by the consideration of this Pact, or by any negotiations into which we may enter, or by any compromise with people who do not believe as we do—people who have already repudiated democracy, who are ready to suppress opinion and are ready to persecute. [HON. MEMBERS: "Russia!"] I shall not name anybody. We have gone some distance, but I hope that we shall preserve that freedom and that valuable heritage which we possess still in this country. I believe that we should use that freedom wisely to speak against tyranny and oppression wherever it may show itself. I am very anxious that we shall not lose contact with the machinery and the great asset which is provided for the world by the League of Nations, but I am very much afraid that the Pact, of which the Prime Minister appears to be so proud and in regard to which he has great expectations, may be taken as a substitute for the League of Nations. It may indeed grow to supersede the League of Nations, and the League of Nations may become lost to us. I know 529 that in the object already described that is not intended, but things change by negotiation in the course of time. Knowing the spirit of those who have moved that Pact, I am very much afraid that the democratic principle of the League of Nations may be lost to us.

Lest I miss this opportunity, I want to say a word about Russia, of which some hon. Members have just reminded me. I almost made my speech without reference to it. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has given me the occasion for this reference. We heard him on Monday last answer a question about the arrest of British subjects in Russia. I am sure that neither the hon. Gentleman nor the House had a full realisation of the effect of his words. He is not a rash man, and I know that he chose his words carefully, but he has not yet carried those words and their implication as far as they should be carried in a matter of this kind. The hon. Gentleman said in regard to the Ambassador at Moscow: His Excellency has now reported that he has made urgent representations on behalf of the prisoners emphasising that Anglo-Soviet relations will suffer seriously unless they are liberated."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th March, 1933; col. 19, Vol. 276.] I want to see where we are to go, with a declaration of that kind. There were a number of British subjects under contract of employment with a British firm doing constructional work in Russia. There were no complaints about their conduct or about their treatment, until a certain date when the Russian police, according to the testimony of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, entered the offices of their employers and took away certain papers. Since then, a number of the employés have been arrested and two of them have been released. Others are detained awaiting trial. There has been a complaint that the charges against these men have not been fully specified, and that there is a doubt as to whether these men can be adequately defended unless they are given due notice of the nature of the charges against them. The hon. Gentleman said that the British Ambassador was urging upon the Russian Government the need for adequate defence.

We all agree. Nobody wants these men in Russia to be apprehended and charged, unless they are to be given the very 530 fullest opportunity of proving their innocence; but see where the hon. Gentleman led the House, and see where the House went. Unless these men have liberty, and not unless these men are properly tried or unless they are given full facilities for their own defence, the Government are taking action harmful to Russia and to ourselves, and very prejudicial to ourselves in the matter of trade. When this matter was being discussed in the House, another equally unfortunate person was in the Tower of London. A man who had sworn to defend his country with his life was confined to the Tower, because, apparently, he had neglected the interests of his country—I shall not put it too high. That is an example of an officer of the British Army who is now charged with having betrayed the interests of his country, and yet right hon. and hon. Gentlemen in all parts of the House were angry, indignant and violent because it is suggested that Englishmen might have done something to the prejudice of Russia. The whole thing is childishly inconsistent, and we become ridiculous in the eyes of the world when these things happen.

I ask that no further action be taken to destroy trade between this country and Russia, or to prejudice the employment of even a small number of our work-people. We shall join with opinion in all parts of the House on every occasion to ask that adequate protection shall be given to a British subject, wherever he goes in any part of the world, but we shall deal equally generously with people who are unfortunate enough to find themselves in difficulties in this country. That is true internationalism. We ask that the House shall not commit itself so deeply, because of this relatively small incident—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—a relatively small incident which can be cleared up.

§ Sir WILLIAM DAVISON

They are taking a long time clearing it up.

§ Mr. GRENFELL

I hope that there is no hon. Member who would like to see these men liberated without having established their innocence. If I were charged with an offence, either in this country or abroad, I should deem it a great privilege to be allowed to stand a fair trial in order to prove my innocence. I hope that this incident will not be magnified out of its proper proportion. I hope that 531 we shall not add another difficulty to our overwhelming difficulties and that we shall not throw a still darker shadow across our path by quarrelling with a country which has nothing to gain by quarrelling with us at the present time, and which, in my opinion, has no desire to quarrel with us. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have worked assiduously in the matter to which they referred to-day. We believe that they and the Government they represent are working on the wrong lines in regard to the pact but if that pact is to extend friendship to Germany, what is there to stop the Government from including Russia or from entering into the most intimate relationship with all countries, and thus showing our belief and confidence in democracy and in our own political system? We may thus be able to help to rid the world of some of the darkest shadows which are upon it and to which reference has been made to-day.

§ Major Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR

I do not propose to follow the hon. Member for Gower (Mr. D. Grenfell) in the very eloquent condemnation which he uttered of dictatorships. For my own part, I thrilled to his eloquence. I loath dictatorships, whatever form they take, whether of the right or of the left, but I am convinced that the form of Government in any country is a matter only for the citizens of that country, and I believe that the responsible Government of this country must do all they can to encourage good relations with countries, even though we detest the Governments of those countries. I have always striven for that, whether the country concerned has been ruled by dictatorships of the left or of the right. I am always for good understanding with the peoples of every country, and I therefore applaud the effort that the Government are making now to restore good understanding with all countries irrespective of the form of Government under which they suffer or which they may enjoy, as the case may be. Indeed, looking back upon the situation as it was ten days ago, with disquieting incidents at Dantzig and in the Rhineland, with public opinion in France legitimately apprehensive, and with a background of war in China and in South America, the most despondent pessimist and embittered critic of the Prime 532 Minister must concede that his week of work and travel abroad has wrought a beneficent change and that the outlook is more promising. While I do not think that the Prime Minister would expect us to express a considered judgment on the necessarily vague outline which he has given us of the project upon which he is now engaged, I think that we should welcome him back with grateful recognition of his exertions in the cause of peace.

The draft disarmament convention which he has brought back from Geneva will not please everybody. It does not please the hon. Member for Gower, and for my part I wish that it had been framed on bolder lines and promised a far greater alleviation than it does of the burden of armaments. It falls short in many respects of the demands that have been made on other occasions from these benches. When the hon. Member for Gower talks about the disadvantages of figures, he is obviously making a point with which the Prime Minister has already to some extent agreed. In his opening remarks the right hon. Gentleman said that he had been fully alive to the embarrassment of putting figures down on paper. I can well believe that the situation as it existed at Geneva justified the risk. The dispersion of the Disarmament Conference after 14 months' work with no result except an agreement to meet again would indeed have been a tragic and disastrous end of its labours. As the Prime Minister said, it could not go on indefinitely; the Conference was regarded with despair a fortnight ago, when its best friends in this country were advising its almost indefinite postponement. Therefore, if the Government in the discharge of their responsibilities, and with the knowledge which they alone possessed of the situation at Geneva, with 60 nations there, as the Prime Minister said, with diverse interests, diverse points of view and diverse armament needs—if the Government tell us that this project indicates the lines upon which progress can most swiftly be made at the present time, and if there is a real prospect that a convention of this kind can be concluded, the Government are entitled to the fullest and strongest backing which the House can give them.

The larger question with which the Prime Minister dealt in his speech goes 533 to the very root of the disarmament problem. Armaments will decline as the respect for law in Europe grows, and respect for the public law of Europe, as of the laws of our own country, must be based upon a substantial measure of consent. Not until we can win such a measure of consent for the post-war order in Europe shall we restore confidence and attain the goal of disarmament which the hon. Member for Gower and I equally desire to reach. As long ago as 1870 Mr. Gladstone said: The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics. To-day it is enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and all the members of the League are pledged to uphold it. We must uphold it firmly against any challenge from any country in Europe, but we must recognise also that the settlement of Versailles was never intended to be stereotyped. There is, on the contrary, Article 19, to which the Prime Minister referred, which provides for its revision by agreement, and that Article is as binding upon the signatories of the Covenant as those which forbid the revision of the Peace Settlement by force. We have heard enough in discussions of foreign affairs during the last 10 or 15 years of that phrase which has for many of us who were alive in 1914, and always will have, a sinister ring—"a war to end war." We want no more wars to end wars. We want a peace to end war, and because I believe that the Prime Minister's efforts have been directed to winning for the public law of Europe a greater measure of consent, and therefore to laying the foundation of a permanent peace, and that the laying of this foundation is a prerequisite of disarmament, I am disposed to welcome the efforts that he has made.

I hope that it will be found that, during the 10 years which the Prime Minister told us is the contemplated currency of this agreement, there will be no rearmament of Germany. I hope that this Disarmament Convention will not involve that. He spoke of the contribution which will be expected from those who will be the beneficiaries of the project of action under Article 19. I hope that one of the contributions which will be made by Germany will be an undertaking not to resort to any form of force for the settlement 534 of disputes which may arise, and that while the right to equality of Status will be conceded, it will be freely conceded on her part that she will not add to her armaments in the meantime any more than other countries will under this convention be able to add to theirs. The Prime Minister then said that the question arose how the smaller countries of Europe were to be brought into this arrangement and how they were to be consulted. I cannot help feeling a little disquiet at that question having been posed because the answer seems to be obvious. Surely it is through the League of Nations. We are told that this project will be within the framework of the League of Nations, and I hope that it will be possible even at this stage, for the Minister who will reply to this Debate to give us the assurance that this project will be worked out within the framework of the League of Nations and that the small nations of Europe will have their rights as equal members of the League to take their part in working it out.

The only other point I would like to make in connection with this project is this. As the Prime Minister said, it is at this moment in a very unformed condition, and it is impossible for us to form a definite judgment on it. I hope that it will be clear that before any commitments are entered into we shall have an opportunity in the House of a discussion of the project with fuller knowledge of its details, or, at any rate, of the main principles upon which it will be framed. It will be useless to have the discussion after the agreement has been come to, once an agreement has been come to with the other powers concerned we may have a discussion in the House, but we cannot alter a line or a comma of the agreement. The honour of the country will have been pledged. I therefore venture to hope that we shall be given an assurance that before any commitments are entered into we shall have a discussion in the House with full knowledge of the lines on which the negotiations are proceeding.

I pass from the main subject of this Debate to some remarks of the hon. Member for Gower about the British subjects who have been imprisoned in Moscow. Public opinion has been deeply and rightly stirred by this imprisonment of six British subjects, of whom four re- 535 main in custody. I will also mention, what the hon. Member did not mention, that there are two British subjects in custody in Berlin, but the same publicity has not been attracted to that fact, and I am sorry that the same interest has not been taken in it in the House. I feel sure that the whole House will agree that a British subject, in whatever land he may be, whatever his colour, race, creed or politics, is entitled to know that, in Lord Palmerston's famous words: The watchful eyes and strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong. In the Moscow case the public is rightly indignant at the refusal of the Bolsheviks to allow these captives to see the British Ambassador in private; at the reported refusal to allow them to discuss their treatment in prison with the British Ambassador; and at the statement that the men who were released were cross-examined for as long as 19 hours on end. I should like to know if that is true, and also as to the apparent reluctance of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs to impart information about the charges, or the trial, or even to give an assurance that the cases will not be summarily disposed of by the Ogpu. With regard to the refusal to allow a British counsel to plead, that would be a mistaken demand for us to make, for we should not allow a Russian counsel to plead in our courts. We should like, however, to know about the reported refusal to allow a British counsel to be present during the trial—a reasonable and, in the circumstances, necessary demand. The Government have done well to press for satisfaction on all these points.

At the same time, it is clear that those who go to a foreign country, as, for instance, to Russia, must subject themselves to the laws of that country. No British Government can accept responsibility for the conduct of its nationals in foreign countries, and Lord Palmerston, in that famous speech from which I have quoted, said that the first redress of any British subject abroad must be from the courts of the country in which he finds himself. I must, therefore, say that I think the Government went too far in asking the House and the country to assume the innocence of these men. I think it is clear that we cannot call 536 upon another country to assume the innocence of a British national just because he happens to be British, and demand that he should be immediately released. The effect of that is, naturally, to excite feelings of national pride in the other country, and to make the settlement of the case far more difficult than it otherwise would be. While, therefore, I approve otherwise of the steps the Government have taken to protect these men, I hope that the case will be conducted firmly but in such a way as not to arouse bitter and hostile feeling in the Russian people. The state of the world to-day is not such that we can afford to rouse feelings of enmity in any quarter; we should look rather in every quarter to increasing peace, to increasing trade, to increasing co-operation between nations, and I believe that in that way we shall be following also the best path to help our nationals abroad.

As regards the German case to which I have referred, we have had much less information. It was the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) who asked the first question regarding the protection of the lives of British subjects in Germany, and he was told by the Foreign Secretary that, as regards the safety of British lives and property, it must be assumed that the German Government would continue to discharge their responsibility in reference to British subjects in Germany. That, of course, was before we had any definite information that any British subject had been imprisoned. While I take no exception to the Foreign Secretary's answer, I hope it does not mean that he is not going to do his utmost to extend his protection to those British subjects whom we know to have been imprisoned, and that his confidence in the German Government will not lead him to doubt the necessity for extending that protection. The right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) asked a further question, about, in particular, Mr. Nambia, and he was told, I must say I think a little casually, by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the German authorities had some two hundredweight of literature to examine in connection with that case. Then the right hon. and gallant Gentleman asked where the man was in prison and how he was being treated, and the 537 Under-Secretary said that he would try to get the information. I suggest that the Government ought to have moved far more rapidly. They ought to have moved with the same promptness with which they moved in Moscow. The British Ambassador ought to have gone at once to the German authorities and found out in what prison these men were confined, and to what treatment they were being subjected. I applaud the action of the Government in the case of the British subjects who are imprisoned in Moscow, and I only wish that their action had been as prompt in the case of those who are imprisoned in Berlin.

Let me, in conclusion, say a few words on another subject, which was raised by the hon. Member who has just spoken, namely, the subject of the World Economic Conference. We on these benches welcome the recognition that has been accorded in recent speeches by Government spokesmen of the vital importance of that conference, the latest of which was the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer last night. Abroad, the outlook on that conference is more hopeful than it has been for a very long time. President Roosevelt, Senator Hull, and Mr. Roper, the new Secretary for Commerce in the United States, have recently made most encouraging declarations. "When we play the game, other nations will too," said Mr. Roper. He advocated a tariff policy of common sense and decency to other nations. The United States delegation to the World Economic Conference, he said, should adopt an attitude of real co-operation and sympathetic neighbourliness. Unfortunately, it is rather in Britain—the country which stands most to gain from the new realisation abroad of the importance of international trade—that the Government still speaks with a divided voice. For example, one Minister is permitted to say that quotas are insane, and another to say that quotas have come to stay. The Prime Minister will be chairman of this conference, and upon his power to give a bold and, above all, a consistent lead the success of the conference will very largely depend.

If we come to an agreement in Europe on the question of Disarmament, the next objective must be to reach an agreement with the United States on War Debts and on those general economic questions 538 which will subsequently be brought for final adjustment within the purview of the conference. But even to attempt that will be futile if, simultaneously, we are trying by artificial restrictions and artificial barriers to divert trade from those very countries with whom we are negotiating, to the Dominion countries. The Government's task in making a success of the conference is immense. If it concentrates upon that task, and only if it concentrates upon it, subordinating to it all other considerations of policy, it will be possible, not only to save our country from the evils by which it is now beset, and from the still greater evils by which it is threatened, but to lay the foundations of a civilisation of greater wealth, variety and power than we have ever yet dreamed of.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

While I was listening to the very agreeable speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir A. Sinclair), I could not help feeling how great was the love of comfortable words in his heart, and to how ardent an extent it has become the prevailing mood of the party for whom he spoke. There must be comfortable words. All the phrases must be smoothly turned. Every proposition must be put in such a form that it means all things to all men. At one moment our patriotic "dander" was stirred by his references to Lord Palmerston's ringing phrases about the vigilant eye and strong arm of England; and at the next moment we were to be enthusiastic about the measures of the Disarmament Conference still further to weaken that strong arm. At one moment my right hon. and gallant Friend was complimenting the Government on the vigorous action they had taken in regard to the British prisoners in Russia, and hoping that similar Vigorous action would be taken in regard to British subjects in Germany—with which we all cordially concur—and at the next moment he was warning the Government that in taking this vigorous action, and acting in such a firm manner, they must be very careful not to give any offence to the susceptibilities of the peoples of these great countries. Finally, my right hon. and gallant Friend expressed the very greatest hopes for the World Economic Conference, about which he was good enough to say some very 539 complimentary things; but he indicated that his hopes of the success of the World Economic Conference were contingent upon the immediate abandonment of every form of trade protection or quota, or anything in the nature of attempts to divert trade by this country. If his hopes are based on that foundation, let me tell him that he is on a trap-door. So much for my right hon. and gallant Friend's comfortable words.

I am in agreement with him upon the objects which we all have in view, and which the Prime Minister has in view, in connection with the great question which is before us in debate at the present moment. We all desire to see peace established, good will among the nations, old scores forgotten, old wounds healed, the peoples of Christendom united to rebuild their portion of the world, to solve the problem of their toiling masses, to give a higher standard of life to the harassed populations committed to their care. We all desire to see that, and we can all expatiate upon it. The differences which arise are those of methods. They are the differences which arise when our well-meant sentiments come into contact with extremely baffling and extremely obstinate concrete obstacles. Then there are differences, and one may reasonably doubt whether a right course is being pursued, and one is certainly bound to discuss and debate very carefully issues of that kind, because all the good sentiments in the world, all the high objectives in the world, will not prevent an unwise or imprudent or unskilful course from landing us in a hole—and we are in a pretty good hole at the present time.

I am anxious to develop this afternoon, though not at undue length, the argument which I submitted to the House before Christmas about foreign affairs, and to which the Prime Minister gracefully referred for a moment in the course of his speech. Our first supreme object is not to go to war. To that end we must do our best to prevent others from going to war. But we must be very careful that, in so doing, we do not increase the risk to ourselves of being involved in a war if, unfortunately, our well-meant efforts fail to prevent a quarrel between other Powers. It is by this test that I wish to examine the 540 foreign policy of my right hon. Friend. During the whole of the last four years he has directed, and not only directed, but dominated, our foreign policy, and no one can pretend that the results are satisfactory. On the contrary, the state of Europe, the condition of the Far East, our relations with Japan, the authority and prestige of the League of Nations, the security of this Island—all have in various degrees sensibly deteriorated. It may be that events have been too strong for the Prime Minister. There are tasks beyond the power of mortal man. It may well be so, and his friends will naturally like to adopt that view, but others may think that the course that he has adopted, from the highest motives and with sentiments as soothing and inspiring as those which have just fallen from my right hon. and gallant Friend, has actually aggravated the state of affairs at present. That is what I am going to ask permission of the House to look into for a short time to-day.

The staple of the policy of the right hon. Gentleman has been Disarmament. During the whole of the four years disarmament has been his staple. Of course, it is true that in that respect he was only following the policy to which all parties were committed and to which many nations were committed by treaty. Nevertheless, I submit to the reflection of the House that it is true that the undue insistence upon disarmament, the prolonged attempts at Geneva of one nation to disarm another, and latterly of each nation to put some other nation in the wrong before public opinion—I believe this prolonged process, which began before the Prime Minister was responsible for our affairs, but which he has impelled with all the resources at his disposal, has not had good results at all, or scarcely any good results at all, and that, in fact, it has in some respects worsened the relations between the great Powers. I have held this view for some years, and I see it continually confirmed by events. I am very doubtful whether there is any use in pressing national disarmament to a point where nations think their safety is compromised while the quarrels which divide them and which lead to armaments and lead to their fears are still unadjusted. The elaborate process of measuring swords around the table at Geneva, which has gone on for 541 so many years, stirs all the deepest suspicions and anxieties of the various Powers and forces all the statesmen to consider many hypothetical contingencies which but for this prolonged process perhaps would not have crossed their minds and would only have remained buried in the archives of some general staff.

But this forcing into the minds of all the leading men of Europe these narrow measurings of the relative strength of the different Powers has been a fertile advertisement of all the apparatus of war and of all the ideas and conceptions of war which perhaps, but for this, would have been to a very large extent thrown into eclipse by the gravity of the economic situation. I have always hoped and believed that a continuance of a long peace and the pressure of taxation would lead to a gradual, progressive neglect of armaments in all countries, as was the case after the conclusion of the great Napoleonic wars. I say nothing against private interchanges in secret diplomacy between the Foreign Offices of the different countries of a friendly character—"If you will not do this, we shall not have to do that," "If your programme did not start so early, ours would begin even later," and so on—such as have always gone on, and may perfectly legitimately go on. I believe a greater advance and progress towards a diminution of expenditure on armaments might have been achieved by these methods than by the conferences and schemes of disarmament which have been put forward at Geneva. It is in this mood that I look at the Prime Minister's latest plan as set forth in the "Times" of Friday last. I do not know whether there is a White Paper on the subject. I took it from the "Times" and, if that is wrong, I fall with that high authority. [Interruption.] I read it in the "Times" and I do not think there is any difference. If there is, I am bound to say that I am deceived. I took it from the newspaper, and I was not aware that there had been a publication.

Taking the figures there—I stand to be corrected if by any chance the "Times" is wrong—I do not quarrel with this plan at all from the purely British standpoint. We have already disarmed, alone among the nations, and it is very natural that we should like to see other countries fall- 542 ing neater to our level. Therefore, I have no objection from the British standpoint. It is evidently the Prime Minister's opinion that we should be a one-Power standard in the air, because our quota of aeroplanes is fixed at the highest level permitted to any Power. That is a very significant declaration in so formal a document by His Majesty's Government, because I presume, if others do not reduce to our level, the obligations of national safety would require us to make necessary increases in the Force. The Prime Minister said he did not go through these figures himself. I presume they were all most carefully examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence. Is that so?

§ The PRIME MINISTER

Committee of Imperial Defence advice is not disclosed to the House. The Government take full responsibility.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

It has frequently been said in this House that matters have been carefully considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, of course, by the naval and military experts. I do not say that Ministers cannot act apart from them. All I say is that they confer a very much greater degree of responsibility if they take measures of this kind, which are highly complicated and technical, without 'having gone through all the careful processes that are necessary.

Taking a layman's view of these facts and figures, I cannot say that they are injurious to our defensive interests, but I doubt very much indeed the wisdom of pressing this plan upon France at the present time. I do not think it is at all likely that the French will agree. They must be greatly concerned at what is taking place in Germany, as well as at the attitude of some others of their neighbours. I daresay that during this anxious month—we seem to have passed through a, very anxious month—there are a good many people who have said to themselves, as I have been saying for several years: "Thank God for the French army." When we read about Germany, when we watch with surprise and distress the tumultuous insurgence of ferocity and war spirit, the pitiless ill-treatment of minorities, the denial of the normal protections of civilised society to large numbers of individuals solely on the ground of race—when we see that occurring in one of the most gifted, 543 learned, scientific and formidable nations in the world, one cannot help feeling glad that the fierce passions that are raging in Germany have not found, as yet, any other outlet but upon themselves. It seems to me that, at a moment like this, to ask France to halve her army while Germany doubles hers—that is the scale of figures—to ask France to halve her air force while the German air force remains whatever it is—I am aware that there is no military air force permitted to remain —such a proposal, it seems to me, is likely to be considered by the French Government at present, at any rate, as somewhat unseasonable. The figures that are given in the plan of the strength of armies and aeroplanes secure to France only as many aeroplanes as would be possessed by Italy, leaving any air power possessed by Germany entirely out of consideration.

We must look at facts in this matter. Others are looking at them. Do not let the House be alarmed that we are doing any harm by looking at the facts. We may as well face realities. Germany and Italy, if united, would immediately have actually larger armies than France, 450,000 to 400,000, even if the whole of the French Colonial force were safely brought back across the Mediterranean, and this disposition of force, it must be remembered, corresponds to populations of 100,000,000 in the two countries I have mentioned as compared with less than 40,000,000 in France. I do not say for a moment that this contingency of a combination of Italy and Germany against France is likely to occur. No one has a right to think such a thing. I absolutely disclaim any such intention of making such a declaration. But there is very great anxiety in Switzerland, as the Prime Minister knows. They fear that some day or other it might be marched through by armies in a state of war, and certainly it seems to me that the French Government would be bound in self-preservation to bear these possibilities in mind when they are examining the figures which the Prime Minister never had time to look through himself, but which he has presented and for which he has made himself responsible to the great Powers of Europe—to all the Powers of Europe, great and small.

It seems to me unlikely, therefore, taking a general view, that these figures will be found acceptable not only to 544 France, but to various other countries concerned. I do not mean for a moment that they will be rejected out of hand. On the contrary, all the nations at Geneva have developed a very elaborate technique in dealing with disarmament proposals which do not suit their needs or which they think are dangerous or inconvenient. They have learned very well to talk the language which is agreeable to the League of Nations Union, which would warm their hearts and wing the eloquence of my right hon. Friend. They think they do it very well there. They have had a lot of practice at it. They never refuse at first sight any proposal, however injurious, visionary or foolish they may think it. On the contrary, they make praiseworthy speeches. They interchange agreeable compliments —"How interesting!" "How hopeful!" "What a meeting of our point of view is embodied in this." "It is the first time we have really had a helping hand in this difficult situation." "What noble sentiments have inspired this theme for which we are indebted to the genius of England." And then, having read it a second time, to use our Parliamentary form, amid prolonged enthusiasm, they adjourn to the banqueting hall and leave it to be killed in committee by a lot of minor objections to detail, or by putting forward counter-proposals which only make confusion worse confounded.

I understand that already—here again I am basing myself only on the newspapers—there are 56 Disarmament plans. Perhaps the Prime Minister has the right figure. It may be more now, because he has been two or three days away from Geneva. Fifty-six well-meaning plans, which certainly suited very well indeed the interests of the country which proposed them, have Already been disposed of by this machinery, and it seems not unlikely that the 57th will share the common fate. But although the plan of the Prime Minister may not be accepted, it cannot, I fear, fail to arouse distrust in the breasts of those from whom it asks the most hazardous sacrifices at the most inopportune time. Here, I say very little of the Prime Minister's oratorical style. We are familiar with it here. We know that he has, more than any other man, the gift of compressing the largest number of words into the smallest amount of thought. We have heard him on so many topics, from India to unemployment and 545 many other matters, providing us, apparently, with an inexhaustible flow of vague, well-sounding exhortation, the precise purpose of which is largely wrapped in mystery and which, as far as it can be discerned, can be understood differently in different quarters, according to taste. The only comment I would make upon his eloquent speech at Geneva is that when he said to the assembled nations that if they would not adopt the proposals they would be mannequins—not manikins—the functionaries who, I believe, are employed by French milliners to exhibit their wares to the best advantage. They would be mannequins, and not men. I cannot help thinking that he lapsed a little from those standards of international decorum which we expect in a representative of the British Empire in such circumstances. When I think of the figures which I have just been mentioning—[Laughter]—I am afraid that I was dealing with statistics, and not with fashions—when I think of the statistics which I have been mentioning to the House, I am not at all sure that the French will find such remarks even amusing.

All these considerations lead us ton very grave matter. I think that it is undoubtedly dangerous to press France at the present juncture to disarm because of the effect which that must necessarily have upon our obligations and our liabilities under the Treaty of Locarno. We have serious obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, but they are provided with various important safeguards which ensure our having a wide discretion whether we should or should not engage, on one side or the other, in a European war. I am going to mention those safeguards because they are of the utmost consequence to all of us in this country who wish to be assured that we shall never see our men dragged into another tremendous Continental struggle. The Council of the League of Nations must be unanimous. It would probably not be unanimous. In fact, in the grouping of the Powers, it could hardly be unanimous, apart from the fact that we ourselves would be an indispensable factor in that unanimity.

There is the emergency obligation under Clause IV. This operates in the case of what is called a 546 flagrant violation of peace constituting an unprovoked act of aggression, which by reason of crossing the frontier, or the outbreak of hostilities, or the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone requires immediate action. "Immediate action" means, before the Council of the League of Nations can be invoked. I know that that is often mentioned, but here, again, I think that a considerable latitude of judgment rests in the conditions of the Treaty. The word "flagrant" in this case embodies not only the idea of a grave breach of law, but it also involves the elements of magnitude, danger and urgency. It is of the utmost importance that those elements should be read into the meaning of the word "flagrant." We should be entitled to consider all these aspects before we felt ourselves bound to join in a European war without even having the opportunity to discuss the matter upon the Council of the League of Nations.

It must always be assumed, of course, that Great Britain will stand by her obligations. Probably she will be better than her legal word, but I do not admit that the Treaty of Locarno deprives us of the right to judge the facts and circumstances, even in an emergency, according to what we think right in our interests and for our duty. All these refinements, which may be of vital consequence to the people of this Island and of the British Empire, will be swept away—I warn the Government—if we press France to disarm and encourage Germany to re-arm to a point where dangerous conditions are created. If you press a country to reduce its defences beyond its better judgment, and it takes your advice, every obligation you have contracted, however carefully it has been expressed, will be multiplied in force, and you will find your position complicated by fresh obligations of comradeship, honour and compassion which will be brought very prominently to the front when a country which has taken your advice falls into grave jeopardy perhaps as a result of what you have pressed upon it.

I remember what happened before the Great War. The growth of the German Navy obliged us to concentrate all our battleships in the North Sea, and we withdrew our squadron of battleships from the Mediterranean. The French moved all their battleships into the 547 Mediterranean. There was no bargain. The two operations took place independently. But although there was no bargain, when the peril of war came and all Europe was seen to be rushing towards catastrophe, the Ministers of the British Government who were the most resolved against participation in the War admitted the force of the argument, that, since the north coasts of France were undefended in consequence of their having moved their battleships, we should be bound to make sure that she did not suffer in that respect, and long before any agreement was reached as to whether we should participate in the War, a united agreement was reached in the Government, as my right hon. Friend well knows, forbidding the Germans from sending any warships into the Channel. That shows the enormous danger of pressing people to disarm beyond their better judgment, or becoming too closely intermingled in their defensive arrangements. What terrible consequences they may have upon your freedom of choice at some future time! I am profoundly anxious that we should preserve and enjoy the full freedom to judge of our obligations under Locarno without any additional complications. Therefore, I urge the very greatest caution upon His Majesty's Government at the present time in pressing the French Government to weaken their strength relatively towards Germany.

There is another and more obvious argument against our trying to weaken the armed power of France at the present juncture. As long as France is strong and Germany is but inadequately armed, there is no chance of France being attacked with success, and, therefore, no obligation under Locarno will arise for us to go to the aid of France. I am sure, on the other hand, that France, which is the most pacific nation in Europe at the present time, as she is, fortunately, the most efficiently armed nation in Europe, would never attempt any violation of the Treaty which exists or commit an overt act against Germany without the sanctions of the Treaty, without reference to the Treaty, and, least of all, in opposition to the country with which she is on such amicable relations—Great Britain.

The Prime Minister spoke of what he has put up to-day as the greatest effort 548 for peace since the Great War, doing, I think, little less than justice to the author of the Locarno Treaty, because certainly on the morrow of that we reached a position of far greater tranquility and security than we have ever been able to obtain since. How glad we should be to go back to that shining morrow of Locarno, and the hopes that were expressed there. It seemed to me at that time that as long as France was armed and Germany was disarmed, we ran no great risks under the Treaty of Locarno. We had an opportunity of bringing these two countries together in friendly intercourse—bringing France and Germany together in friendly intercourse.

Although bringing France and Italy together in friendly intercourse is a most important work, yet the master key of Europe is some understanding and relationship between its two greatest nations, Germany and France. If we are now going to try to establish conditions of equality—the Prime Minister used the word "equality" in a very loose way this afternoon, and I had to press him and make him add the enormously important words "equality of status"—if we are now going to try to create conditions of equality between France and Germany in armaments, or even an approach thereto, because the potential alliances of Germany must be considered, we shall invest the whole situation under Locarno with a far graver, far more imminent and more practical character than it possesses today. If you are going to take this step to reduce the Armies to the levels set out in the White Paper, then I say, that before that result is achieved Parliament ought to review the whole position of our responsibilities under the Treaty of Locarno. It is my sincere belief that if the armies of Europe had been measured during the last month or the last six months, especially the last month, as they are set forth in this White Paper, those very horrors that it is our whole aim to avert from us would have leapt out upon us already. If Europe has enjoyed peace this year, it has been under the shield of France. Be careful not to break that shield. It is perhaps not a broad basis on which we should like to see the harmony of Christendom stand, but it is a shield. Beware that you do not lower it or weaken it by any action in your power before you have, at least, something 549 which gives as good practical security erected behind it to put in its place.

Now I come to the proposals which the Prime Minister laid before us of a pact between the four great Powers—no doubt, technically within the League of Nations—to preserve the peace and to plan a revision of the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. I have always been attracted by this idea which Signor Mussolini has made so prominent. I have spoken for years of a pyramid of peace, which might be triangular or quadrangular, three or four great Powers shaking hands together and endeavouring to procure a rectification of some of the evils arising from the treaties made in Vile passion of war, which if left unredressed will bring upon us consequences we cannot name. The Prime Minister is, I think, a new convert to this idea. I have not had time to examine all his past utterances, but I had an impression that he had always condemned anything in the nature of a four-Power or a three-Power agreement and had considered that that was, as it were, inconsistent with the general authority of the League of Nations, on which so many Powers are represented. However, let that pass. Whether he was converted by the eloquence of Signor Mussolini, or by the strong personality of Signor Mussolini, or whether he had it in his mind before he went to Rome, are mysteries which are naturally hidden from us.

Although I have always been in favour of something of this character and have thought it the best line of approach to solid peace and to getting rid of the war peril, I am bound to say that the situation has deteriorated to such a point in the last year that such a plan is not nearly so hopeful now as it would have been some years ago or as it might be perhaps at no distant date in the future. I am very doubtful whether the Prime Minister has been wise to launch it in the way in which he has done at the present moment. I should have thought that it was indispensable before this plan of a four-Power pact could have a fair chance, to have got the Disarmament Conference laid to rest, and not to be assailing the nations involved with doubts as to their military strength and anxieties about their security at the same time that you are going to ask them to undertake the appallingly dangerous and difficult duty of endeavouring to get some 550 revision of the peace treaties. I have always tried to urge upon the House that to redress the grievances of the vanquished should precede the disarmament of the victors. This is a new idea and you must revise your other procedure in relation to the new idea, if you are to give it a chance. It is just like when we quitted the Gold Standard and we went on with ideas appropriate to our continued adherence to that standard. So in this field, when the Disarmament Conference has reached a point when it will absolutely conflict with treaty revision, through the desire of the four great Powers, the Prime Minister is still endeavouring to drive both these teams forward at the same moment.

To sum up, I trust that the Government will not press the disarmament proposals upon France unduly at the present time, for certainly the satisfaction of reaching an imposing conclusion of the Disarmament Conference would be far too dearly purchased at the cost of any aggravation of the danger of our being drawn into war, and even if it became an impediment to the progress of this larger and more dynamic idea of the four-power pact. I thank the House for allowing me to unfold a view which is not, I daresay, widely shared, but on which for a good many years I have been poring, as a result of some experience and study of these matters. In conclusion, to end where I began; I must say that the Prime Minister's interventions in Foreign Affairs have been—not through any fault or desire on his part—remarkably unsuccessful. His repeated excursions have not led to any solid, good result. Where anything has been achieved it has nearly always been at British expense and to British disadvantage. On the whole, his four years of control of our Foreign relations have brought us nearer to war and have made us weaker, poorer and more defenceless. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Hon. Members say "No." You have only to study what is the position of Europe to-day. You have only to listen to what has been said from that Bench to know that we have been brought much nearer to war. [HON. MEMBERS: "No." "By whom?"] I do not wish to place upon one man the responsibility for that, but at the same time when any one man has for four years held the whole power of this country in foreign affairs in his hands, and when he has pursued the lines of policy which I have indicated, you are 551 making a profound mistake if you think the efficiency of our public service will be enhanced by pretending that there is no responsibility to be affixed anywhere. Certainly not.

I withdraw nothing. I repeat what I have said, that, with the best of endear yours, with the most praiseworthy exertions, the right hon. Gentleman's efforts have not been attended at any point with a measure of success. [HON. MEMBERS: "Lausanne."] Lausanne. All right. Under Lausanne we have now accumulated the gold to pay an additional instalment to the United States. Under Lausanne we have already told the French and the Germans that they need not pay us anything. Is that a great success? If eventually you reach good results and all War Debts and Reparations are forgiven and forgotten, then will be the time for these perfervid tributes to the Prime Minister. Then will be the time for hon. Gentlemen to range themselves up on the platforms of railway stations, but that is not the position now. The position now is that we have let everybody off, and we are going to pay everything ourselves.

Then there was the Naval Treaty of London, which I am glad to think the Conservative party voted against. It is cramping and fettering our Naval development, not merely the scale but the actual form and shape of our naval expenditure, in a manner which is certainly detrimental. Then there is the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, a solemn and prolonged farce, which, has undoubtedly lowered the prestige of the League of Nations and irritated many of the countries affected. Then there is the arms embargo, to come to more recent times. So little am I prejudiced that I welcomed it in all the innocence of my heart, carried away by the excellent speech of the Foreign Secretary. I said that I thought it was the best thing to do. What happened to me? I had hardly had time to turn round when the Government themselves had abandoned this policy, which they had put forward not only on the grounds of a policy and expediency but on those higher considerations of honour and avoidance of blood-guiltiness which made such a very great appeal to their audience. Let me say that this treatment of the arms embargo has seriously affected our relations with 552 Japan. We have abandoned the arms embargo now. We have not the advantage of the high morality which the Foreign Secretary preached to us, and we shall have to pay for it very considerably in after years if, as may well be the case, some special intimacy should grow up in trade matters in that part of the world between Japan and Germany. An hon. Member mentioned Lausanne. I have supplied him with other instances and illustrations of my theme.

Lastly, there is the visit to Rome. I do not wish to treat it too seriously. No doubt it was a pleasant expedition. No doubt it gave the right hon. Gentleman a great deal of pleasure to see Mr. Mussolini; the same sort of pleasure that 1,000 years ago was given to a Pope when an Emperor paid a visit to Canossa. It was certainly a striking spectacle to see these two heads of Governments, the master of sentimental word and the greatest master of grim and rugged action, meeting together in such friendly intercourse. I associate myself with my right hon. Friend in welcoming the Prime Minister back. We have got our modern Don Quixote home again, with Sancho Panza at his tail, bearing with them these somewhat dubious trophies which they have collected amid the nervous titterings of Europe. Let us hope that now that the right hon. Gentleman is safely back among us he will, first of all, take a good rest, of which I have no doubt he stands in need, and that afterwards he will devote himself to the urgent domestic tasks which await him here, in this island, and which concern the well-being of millions of his poorer fellow-subjects, and leave the conduct of foreign affairs, at any rate for a little while, to be transacted by competent ambassadors through the normal and regular diplomatic channels.

§ Brigadier-General SPEARS

I shall not attempt to follow the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) who has poured a great deal of criticism upon the visit of the Prime Minister to Rome. That is not the opinion of the overwhelming majority of this House nor is it, I am confident, the opinion of the majority of the people of this country. I am afraid that I did not follow all the implications of the visit to Rome—no 553 doubt it is due to nay own stupidity—but I wish I could feel as happy concerning the disarmament proposals put forward by the right hon. Gentleman at Geneva as I do concerning the visit to Signor Mussolini. The one thing which is particularly needed in connection with disarmament is security. In fact, so important is the question of security that, in my opinion, it is not worth while to deal with any of the other proposals put forward by the Prime Minister at Geneva until the question of security has been settled. They are purely subsidiary points. The one thing that matters is the question of security, and when that has been solved the whole problem of disarmament has been solved. Obviously, there is not enough security, and the proof of that is that the nations of Europe have not disarmed.

What is the basis of the understanding between the nations which is so inadequate that they feel they cannot reduce their arms? We have the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Kellogg Pact for the outlawry of war. The Kellogg Pact is of extreme importance because it includes the United States and Russia. It has been interpreted by Mr. Stimson, and we now know that the United States, should there be a breach of the peace and should the Council of the League of Nations declare that a nation has broken the peace, will not claim its rights as a neutral. That is very important, it has helped to clear up the whole situation. But knowing that the United States would not claim its rights as a neutral, in spite of the Kellogg Pact, and in spite of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the nations of Europe have not disarmed.

It was at this point that the right hon. Gentleman stepped in. What does he propose to-day? He proposes that in the event of a breach, or a threat of a breach of the Kellogg Pact, there should be a conference, if any five nations, including at least one of the Great Powers, should so request. That is the fundamental proposal, the keystone of the proposals, which we laid before the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Is that the sort of proposal which is going to lead nations to disarm? Is it going to make them feel secure? I very much doubt it. At the present moment one single nation can lay its case before the Council of the League, but now you must 554 have five nations, one of them being a Great Power, in order to convene a conference of the League. A conference convened by five Powers, according to our proposal, may be summoned through the machinery of the League of Nations. Why the word "may."? By that form of words not only is the League of Nations being cold-shouldered, but it is positively being pushed aside. Look at the proposals a little further: Any conclusions reached at the conference must be concurred in by the representatives of all the great Powers and by a majority of the other governments participating in the conference. Formerly there was to be unanimity of all the Powers, with the exception, of course, of the nations involved in the dispute. Now all that matters, apparently, is that there should be unanimity among the great Powers; the little Powers are left aside. The effect of this seems to me to make the League of Nations completely powerless save as an instrument for enforcing the will of the great Powers on the small Powers. I cannot see how a suggestion of this kind can possibly claim to make a nation feel safe. I agree that the great Powers should have a voice at Geneva proportionate to their responsibility, but there is something very ominous in this "Great Powers" business, which is so constantly insisted upon in the documents we submit at Geneva. We seem to have travelled very far from the spirit of the League. The "Great Powers" mean a group of Powers. I cannot imagine a number of great Powers acting as a block, as one. They are bound to be divided by conflicting interests sooner or later, and will form themselves into groups. Inevitably, you will have a situation very much resembling the situation we had before the War. It would have been much wiser not to submit fresh disarmament proposals at the present time.

There is no need to travel all over Europe to find out what the people are thinking. They are terrified, and, in my view, they have every reason to be terrified. What amounts to a claim to re-arm has been made by Germany. Certain Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles may have been violated. Article 162, which lays down the extent of the police allowed to Germany, most certainly has been violated. Yet instead 555 of protesting we select this very moment to make new disarmament proposals. What possible deduction can people make? There is only one conclusion to which they can come, and that is that we are afraid of declaring ourselves, that we are terrified of being called upon to fulfil our obligations. I hope that that is not true, but it certainly is the impression that we create. Personally I believe one thing to be true of the people of this country, and that is that they are absolutely opposed to unilateral repudiation of international undertakings. If we did not hold that point of view our attitude towards the Irish Free State would be indefensible, and the payment of our debt to the United States last December would have been sheer stupidity.

To my mind, just as a door must be either open or closed, so a Treaty must be observed in every point; otherwise you might just as well tear it up at once and have done with it. If you allow minor violations without protest, you have not got a leg to stand on if you wish later to protest against major violations. To my mind—I know the point of view is shared by many people who think out these problems—there is only one way of avoiding a conflict in Europe to-day, and that is by the greatest display of calmness and even of firmness by this country at the present moment. Have we displayed that firmness? I doubt it. Have we made it clear to Europe that we would not tolerate any attempt to tear up the treaties by armed violence? We have not done those things. All we have done to a distracted Europe was to offer yet one more disarmament plan. What a moment to choose. When there were disturbances outside this House a few months ago the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister did not select that moment to come down to the House and say, "We are very hard up. Let us save some money by doing away with the police who protect this building." If he had done so it would have been said that his suggestion was very oddly timed. Yet in fact that is exactly what we are doing to the people of Europe to-day.

To deny the very dangerous militaristic spirit that is abroad in Germany to-day is to deny the evidence of our senses. I 556 think that we can all feel sympathy for Germany. She wishes to purge herself of the sense of defeat. She is suffering from what is nowadays called an inferiority complex. That feeling is inevitable after a lost war. In fact it is one of the most dangerous aftermaths of war. That feeling was increased tenfold in Germany by the ill-judged and all-advised invasion of the Ruhr. Germany has brooded so long over her wrong, she has been so self-centred and has spent so much time considering her own grievances, that she has entirely failed to perceive the new pacific, friendly spirit that has developed in France. France, on the other hand, witnessing the ghastly outrages that have been taking place in Germany, has been filled with fears and bitter memories, memories which the overwhelming mass of her people would fain have forgotten. I think we can sympathise with the French, because it was at this time of the year 16 years ago, in fact on this very day in March, 1917, that the Germans withdrew to the Hindenberg line, and our armies advanced over country on which not a single house was left standing, where there was not a single fruit-tree but had been cut down.

We, too, have hoped that these evil legacies of the War would have been forgotten by now. We had hoped that the German people were sick of violence. How can we believe that now when we see a whole nation apparently attempting to throw over all restraint? It seems to me that there was a perfectly simple course open to us, and that was to suggest a postponement of the Disarmament Conference, not indefinitely but to a given date, say three months hence, on the ground that it was impossible really to study disarmament and to come to satisfactory conclusions in the present disturbed state of Europe. The Government might have declared that meanwhile it would tolerate no infraction of the Treaties, especially in the matter of re-armament. To that statement should have been added another, and that was that when the Disarmament Conference reassembled we were absolutely determined to find a settlement that was fair to Germany. We can only insure against war in Europe—if it unfortunately broke out it would be certain to involve our vital interests—by extreme fir