DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

I was very glad yesterday to be confronted with the indisputable evidences of the Prime Minister's physical vigour. I have been away from the House for some time, and one read statements in the newspapers which gave me an altogether false impression, and I was very happy yesterday to have my anxieties removed. When I heard the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister—these two veteran Socialists—going at each other hammer and tongs across the Table, with many thumps of the Box and much vociferation, I felt that I really could begin my speech by offering the Prime Minister, with all the feelings of one fractious invalid for another, my most sincere congratulations. I am very glad to do it, because I am afraid that they are very nearly the only congratulations that I shall offer him in the speech which I am going to make to the House.

It is about a year now since I stood here and welcomed the National Government on their assumption of their great responsibilities. It is not quite the same Government to-day. Two out of the three official parties and organisations in the country are tirelessly working against it, and, on the other hand, of course, the natural elements of Conservative strength and tradition are not developing the same degree of partisanship on its behalf as is usual in party Government. Still, there they are. Then I see behind me my right hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel), who last summer would have rebuked me so sternly and majestically 74 for any criticism of the National Government at a time of such great emergency, but who has now betaken himself to a sniper's post. I do not know how much assistance I shall be able to give to the Government, but there may be occasions when I shall be very ready to stand between them and the advice which he may tender to them.

We have had a year of conferences. There have been quite a number when one comes to think of them: the Lausanne Conference, the Danubian States Conference—dead almost as soon as it was born—the first Geneva Conference, the Ottawa Conference, the third Round Table Conference on India, and now Geneva again. Very little success, I think, has attended these conferences, except, of course, Ottawa. There may be a good many people who do not think much of Ottawa now, but perhaps their children may think more of it, and their grandchildren more still. That, at least, is our hope, and it is in that hope that this great act of faith and Imperial consolidation has been performed. But, with regard to the other conferences, I am bound to say that they all seem to me to fall under the criticism of trying to pay off realities with words.

There was one conference of which I had great hopes. All my life I have been a political opponent of the Prime Minister; it is one of my most consistent themes; but, at any rate. I think he will admit that I offered him good and loyal counsel when I urged in June that a World Conference should be called upon the money problem. I was very glad to see that the terms of the invitation sent by His Majesty's Government to the United States were in accordance with the suggestion which I ventured to make, namely, that war debts and tariffs should be excluded from, and that silver should be included in, the agenda. Of course, nothing would be excluded from the minds of those who were present at such a conference, but it appeared to me to be essential, if a close understanding were to be established between Great Britain and the United States upon this great undertaking, that the invitation should be couched in that way. I am sure that the best method of advancing this conference will be for the United States and Great Britain, as far as possible, to reach some informal understanding be- 75 forehand on a general basis. The moment they have done that you may be sure that the nations of the Continent will be most eager not to be absent from a conclave so solemn and so august.

But what has happened to the World Conference? I must say I thought the announcement by the Prime Minister yesterday was very disconcerting. He told us a little while ago that he hoped it might meet before Christmas. Now it is clear that it cannot meet till mid-April. What has happened? Obviously, the right hon. Gentleman must have been completely out of touch with what was going on and with what the experts were doing. It is no good putting all the blame upon the experts. They may have mishandled the position but they only mishandled it because they have lacked that continuous supervision and that close touch that they require from their political chief. I really think this is a very serious and unfortunate development. It is too bad that they cannot meet till April. It is lamentable. Indeed, I go so far as to say that it is discreditable to the executive machine. It appears to indicate a lack of thoroughness and efficiency in the day-to-day conduct of business and in the following up of decisions where taken which, if extended over the whole field of Government, would be an explanation of many of the troubles from which we suffer.

I would urge the House not on any account to under-rate the paramount importance of this World Conference. During the year that the Government have held office the four main evils which afflict this country, and afflict the whole world as well, have all got worse. Unemployment has got worse. Taxation has got much worse. The obstructions to world trade have got worse and the price of gold mounts ever higher and higher in relation to the commodities it presumes to measure. The peoples of the world make a very simple request of their rulers. They say, "Give us a fair, stable standard of value by which we may measure the products of one country against another, of one class against another, of one trade against another, by which we may measure the services of the past against those of the present and of the future," and they say, "Give us a standard which will not. make 76 us worse off the harder and the better we work." I do not believe that problem is insoluble. Mankind has achieved far greater discoveries and far greater triumphs than this new discovery which is now required if all the other discoveries and triumphs are not to go for nothing. But if all that the rulers of the different countries—I am not making any complaint particularly of our rulers—can say is that the currency question is unworthy of attention, that there is nothing for us but to tighten our belts, that there is nothing for us but to restrict both consumption and production—that is what is going on now; consumption by economy, production by regulation—and that this must continue until more gold is dug up or disgorged from its hoards, if they proclaim that plenty is no longer a boon to mankind, if they deny to millions and to hundreds of millions access to the richer tables, which science can now spread for them, not only will the World Conference share the fate of many other conferences but we shall be overwhelmed by miseries quite as real and terrifying as those of actual war.

I will ask the House to come with me and look at the various booths which are open at our world's fair. There is the Indian Hound Table Conference. I am not going to say very much about that because I understand that it is purely consultative in its character. It has no power to commit Parliament. There is no danger of our being told at a later stage: "This is all settled with the Indian representatives. You cannot go back on it. You must take it or leave it." I hope the Government will correct me if I go beyond what I ought to say in the matter. There is no question of striking a bargain at this Conference, of equal parties negotiating a treaty or anything like that. How could there be when the Indian delegates have no representative capacity of any kind? They are merely cultivated and estimable gentlemen and ladies whom the Government have desired to talk things over with, and they obviously have no power to give effect to any agreement that might be entered into between the two parties at this Conference. If that is so, I see no reason to complain that the British representatives are so entirely one-sided in their views—that they represent only one single point of view. The executive Government have the right to consult anyone they like 77 and to employ any agents, however well trained or docile they may be, to enter into discussions on their behalf. But where the importance of the matter will arise is when we come to the composition of the Joint Committee. That is far more important; indeed it is crucial. It would be most improper if that Committee were a packed body, if both sides in this controversy were not fairly represented there.

After all, there are two sides. There is the view of the late Socialist Government, which has been adopted by the present Government, that there should be immediately erected a federal executive responsible to an All-India Parliament elected upon a democratic, or at any rate an extensive franchise. Then there is the view of the majority of the Conservative party and the overwhelming majority of the people who know anything about India. Those are not my words. I would not presume to make such a declaration. They are the words of the "Morning Post." This second view is not, as it is represented to be, a reactionary or die-hard point of view. It is that it would be, on the whole, better if we rested for the present within the ambit—I do not adopt all its proposals—of our own statutory commission, the Simon Commission, which recommended specifically that a provincial experiment should precede, and not be simultaneous with, an attempt to set up an All-India Parliament. Those are the two views, and I hope and trust that His Majesty's Government—in fact, I have great confidence that they will—will deal fairly by both of them. There is not the slightest reason why the Government should not have an effective majority. Of course, they must have an effective majority on a commission of this kind, but I hope they are not going, after having an effective majority for themselves, then to give the necessary representation to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Lansbury) and to my right hon. Friend behind (Sir H. Samuel) because that would obviously distort the whole character of the commission. It would not be a commission on which a fair representation of both points of view could take place. After all, for this purpose, the right hon. Gentleman and my right hon. Friend are more Governmental than the Government. In 78 so far as they differ from the Government, it is only in their excessive ardour. They are the storm troops in this attack upon our Indian position. I am bound to say that I think their representation ought to be included in whatever is the adequate majority which the Government think necessary to maintain. I hope that we shall have some insurance on this point during the course of the Debate or at a very early date, or at any rate that we shall have no difficulty in pressing for very specific claims during the long and strenuous Session which the right hon. Gentleman so eagerly forecast for us yesterday.

I come now to another Conference which deals with affairs nearer home, although it is situated abroad. I come to the Lausanne Conference. Everything which has happened since July last shows how unwise it was to bring the Lausanne Conference to a conclusion, and to bring it to a conclusion in the way in which it was presented, and to trumpet its results all round the globe before the elections in the United States of America were over. If we look back on those July days, when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was welcomed in triumph on his return, with all the Cabinet and Under-Secretaries drawn up at the railway station like a row of Grenadiers of varying sizes, we can see how absurd were the claims which were then advanced that Lausanne had "saved Europe," and that a "new era" had opened for the world. There is quite a lot still to be done to save Europe, and for many people it is very much the same old era in the world.

There is no doubt whatever that a great deal of harm and injury was done to the prospect of the settlement of the War debts by what happened at Lausanne. I ventured to warn the Government before this happened, in May or June of last year, of the extreme un-wisdom of making the Debt Settlement an issue at the American elections. The consequences of Lausanne have been to force all the candidates for Congress and the Senate, on both sides of politics, to give specific pledges and to make definite declarations upon this subject. We all know what happens at elections of that kind. We had one in this country after the 79 War when a Cabinet Minister distinguished himself by saying that he would "squeeze the Germans until the pips squeaked." You have to recognise the weaknesses in human nature, and those weaknesses are not confined to this side of the Atlantic Ocean. The question of the settlement of War Debts has been largely removed, I am afraid, from the high circle of American statesmen who understand all the world position and all the arguments in this matter, and is largely now in the hands of obdurate assemblies, newly elected, whose members have all given specific pledges to their constituents. [Interruption.] I deeply regret that the problem which His Majesty's Government have now to face is the most torturing one a British Cabinet could have to decide. I need scarcely say that I will not anticipate their decision in any way, but I will say that I believe we are all agreed on one thing. If we alone among all the combatants of the Great War, victor or vanquished, were to be condemned, after receiving nothing from our debtors, to pay, for nearly two generations, a vast overseas indemnity as a punishment for the exertions we made in the War, and as a penalty for our good faith afterwards, it would be a situation which would indeed be intolerable.

If the House will be persuaded by me they will now embark upon a short voyage over a placid lake and come from Lausanne to Geneva. A melancholy scene will await them there. They will walk through streets crowded by machine guns, whose pavements are newly stained with blood, I presume, because of the conscientious scruples which prevented the use of the perfectly harmless tear gas, and they will enter those halls of debate where, with a persistency which rivals in duration the besiegers of Troy, the nations are pursuing the question of Disarmament. It is a melancholy scene. I have a great deal of sympathy with, and respect for, the well-meaning, loyal hearted people who make up the League of Nations Union in this country, but what impresses me most about them is their long suffering and inexhaustible gullibility. Any scheme of any kind for, disarmament put forward by any country so long as it is surrounded by suitable phraseology is hailed by them, and the 80 speeches are cheered, and those who speak gain the meed of their applause. Why do they not look down beneath the surface of European affairs to the iron realities which lie beneath? They would then see that France does not stand alone in Europe. France does not speak for herself alone when she speaks at Geneva. France is the head of a system of States, some large, others minor, States, including Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, comprising many millions of human beings, all of whom depend for their frontiers upon the existence of the present Peace Treaties, good or bad, all of whom are armed and organised to defend themselves and to defend their rights, and all of whom look to France and the French army in very much the same sort of way as small nations before the War used to look to the British Navy in the days of its power. That is one side of the picture.

On the other side there is Germany, the same mighty Germany, which so recently withstood almost the world in arms; Germany which resisted with such formidable capacity that it took between two and three Allied lives to take one German life in the four years of the Great War; Germany which has also allies, friends and associates in her train, and a powerful nation which considers its politics as associated to some extent with hers; Germany whose annual quota of youth reaching the military age, whose annual contingent is already nearly double—I am not sure that it is not actually double by this time, at any rate it soon will be—the youth of France; Germany where the Parliamentary system and the safeguards of the Parliamentary system which we used to be taught to rely upon in the Great War, are in abeyance. As to Germany's Parliamentary system, I do not know where it stands to-day, but certainly military men are in control of the essentials of the position.

Germany has paid since the War an indemnity—the figures are disputed—of about one thousand millions sterling, but she has borrowed in the same time about two thousand millions sterling with which to pay that indemnity and to equip her factories. Her territories have been evacuated long before the stipulated time—I rejoice in it—and now she has been by Lausanne freed virtually, for all in- 81 tents and purposes, from all those reparations which had been claimed from her by the nations whose territories have been devastated in the War, or whose prosperity, like ours, has been gravely, I will not say fatally, undermined by the War. At the same time, her commercial debts may well prove ultimately to be irrecoverable. I am making no indictment of Germany. I have the greatest respect and admiration for the Germans and the greatest desire that we should live on terms of good feeling and fruitful relations with her, but we must look at the facts, and I put it to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the House, that every concession which has been made—many concessions have been made and many more will be made and ought to be made—has been followed immediately by a fresh demand.

Now, the demand is that Germany should be allowed to rearm. Do not delude yourselves. Do not let His Majesty's Government believe, I am sure they do not believe, that all that Germany is asking for is equal status. I believe the refined term now is equal qualitative status, or, as an alternative, equal quantitative status by indefinitely deferred stages. That is not what Germany is seeking. All these bands of sturdy Teutonic youths, marching along the streets and roads of Germany, with the light in their eyes of desire to suffer for their Fatherland, are not looking for status. They are looking for weapons, and, when they have the weapons, believe me they will then ask for the return, the restoration of lost territories and lost colonies, and when that demand is made it cannot fail to shake and possibly shatter to their foundations every one of the countries I have mentioned, and some other countries I have not mentioned.

Besides Germany, there is Russia. Russia has made herself an Ishmael among the nations, but she is one of the most gigantic factors in the economy and in the diplomacy of the world. Russia, with her enormous armaments, her enormous, rapidly increasing armaments, with her tremendous development of poison gas, aeroplanes, tanks and every kind of forbidden fruit; Russia, with her limitless man power and her corrosive hatreds, weighs heavily upon a whole line of countries, some small, others con- 82 siderable from the Baltic to the Black Sea, all situated adjacent to Russian territory. These countries have newly gained their independence. Their independence and nationhood are as sacred as anything that exists in Europe, but we must never forget that most of them have been carved, in whole or in part, out of Russia, out of the old Russian Empire, the Russian Empire of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. In some cases these countries are already in deep anxiety about Germany.

I have marshalled the facts, but I am sure I have not overdrawn the picture. Can any reasonable, fair-minded peace-loving person wonder in the circumstances that there is fear in Europe, and, behind the fear, the precautions, perhaps in some cases exaggerated precautions, which fear excites. We in these islands with our heavy burdens and with our wide Imperial responsibilities ought to be very careful not to meddle improvidently or beyond our station, buyond our proportionate stake in this tremendous European structure. If we were to derange the existing foundations, of force though they may be, we might easily bring about the very catastrophe that most of all we desire to avert. What would happen to us then? No one can predict what would happen to us then. If we had the sense that by the part we had played in European affairs we had precipitated such a catastrophe, then I think our honour might be engaged in a way beyond the limitations which our treaties and agreements prescribe.

We must not forget, and Europe and the United States must not forget, that we have disarmed. Alone among the nations we have disarmed while others have re-armed, and we must not be expected to undertake a part larger than is in our capacity to make good. For that reason the Note which His Majesty's Government—the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, it is no use pretending that they are not all acting together in the matter—sent to Germany a couple of months ago was a wise, a prudent and a necessary document. I think they might have prepared the public here and in Germany a little more for the terms of that Note, but that it was absolutely necessary I have no doubt. If at that moment, 83 when General Schleicher, one of the most powerful men in Germany, had openly said that in certain circumstances Germany would arm whatever the law and the League of Nations said, if at that moment when all parties in Germany were competing against each other as to which could put up the bravest front against the foreigner, when electioneering was going on with foreign politics—a dangerous and delicate proceeding—if at that moment when it seemed, perhaps unwarrantably, that Italy was lending encouragement to the German view, we had added our approbation, or allowed it to be assumed that we approved of such a claim made by General Schleicher, His Majesty's Government would have incurred the most hideous responsibilities without any effective means of discharging them. I thank His Majesty's Government for their Note, and I should regret if anything has been said since which in any way weakens its effect.

Coming more closely to Geneva, I would like to say that I have watched the Disarmament Conferences which have now been going on for many years, and I have formed certain opinions about them. Disarmament divides itself into disarmament by scale and disarmament by ratio. Disarmament by scale is not so important, but disarmament by ratio, the altering of the relative positions of nations, is the part of the problem which excites the most intense anxiety and even passion. I have formed the opinion that none of the nations concerned in the Disarmament Conferences except Great Britain has been prepared, willingly, to alter to its own disadvantage its ratio of armed strength. I agree that there have been diminutions of armaments, but they have largely been produced, as they always will be produced, by the pressure of economic and political factors in a time when there is peace, but I do not think that any of these nations have intended to do anything which would destroy the status quo, and certainly they are not willing to impair their factor of safety. I prefer the expression "factor of safety "to another expression which has been used—insurance. Insurance is not a good word, because it does nothing to ward off the danger and it only compensates, or attempts to compensate, after the evil or misfortune has occurred. "Factor of Safety" is the 84 phrase which I prefer, and I do not think that any nation has been willing to impair that factor. Therefore, the first phase of the Disarmament Conferences, going on for four or five years, the Preparatory Commission and so on, consisted in every one of these nations trying to disarm some other nation and a whole array of ingenious technical schemes were put forward by military experts, each of which was perfectly fair and reasonable until it was examined by the other side. Only in one case has this first phase of altering the ratio produced a success. The United States wished to secure complete naval equality with Great Britain, and we complied with their request. For the rest, I do not think that anything so far has been achieved by the discussions.

But for some time the second phase has supervened at Geneva. The expectation of general disarmament upon a great scale has failed. The hope of one nation being able to disarm its rival has been frustrated by the very stout and stubborn resistance which every nation makes to that process. Now, I am afraid that a large part of the object of every country is to throw the blame for an impending failure upon some other country while willing, if possible, to win the Nobel peace prize for itself. Again, we have had an elaborate series of technical manoeuvres by military experts and by Governments and their advisers. I am not going to particularise, I am not going to put too sharp a point to my remarks, because I do not like to say anything which might be offensive to great nations who have put forward schemes for disarmament which place them in such a satisfactory light and cost them so very little in convenience. But every time one of these plans is launched the poor good people of the League of Nations Union clap their hands with joy, and every time they are disappointed, nay, I must say, deceived. But their hope is unfailing. The process is apparently endless, and so is the pathetic applause with which it is invariably greeted. I repeat, that we alone have been found willing to alter continually our ratio of armed strength to our disadvantage. We have done it on land, on sea, and in the air. Now His Majesty's Government have said that we have reached the limit, and I think we 85 shall all agree with them in that statement.

I am sorry to be so pessimistic, but really it is absolutely a/ duty to put the rugged facts as 1 conceive them before the House. I have constantly predicted, as the Prime Minister and the Lord President of the Council will bear me out, publicly and privately, that these Disarmament Conferences will not succeed in removing the danger of war, and I doubt if they will succeed in substantially reducing the burden of armaments. Indeed, I have held the view that the holding of all these conferences over the last seven or eight or nine years—I think they have gone on as long as that—that this process has actually had the opposite effect, has actually prevented the burden from being lightened as it would have been if we had trusted to the normal and powerful workings of economic and financial pressure. But these conferences have focussed the attention of all nations, of the leading men in all nations, upon the competitive aspect of armaments, upon the technical questions connected with questions of national security which they never might have heard of in the ordinary course. I believe it is quite true to say that this process has intensified the suspicions and the anxieties of the nations, and has brought the possibilities of war nearer to us than they were some years ago. That, I fear, is proved—I do not see how it can be disputed, startling and unpleasant as the statement can be—by anyone who looks at the facts of the European situation to-day.

We have steadily marched backward since Locarno. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) is not in his place. Many criticisms have been applied to him. All I can say is that since the War, Locarno was the high-water mark of Europe. Look at what a distance we have fallen since then. Compare the stats of Europe on the morrow of Locarno with its condition to-day. Fears are greater, rivalries are sharper, military plans are more closely concerted, military organisations are more carefully and efficiently developed, Britain is weaker. And Britain's period of weakness is Europe's period of danger. The war mentality is springing up again in certain countries. All over Europe, 86 except here, there is hardly a factory which is not prepared for its alternative war service; every detail worked out for its immediate transformation upon a signal. And all this has been taking place under governments whose statesmen and diplomatists have never ceased to utter the most noble sentiments of peace amid the cheers of the simple and the good.

These are not pleasant facts, but I believe they are facts. I am sure they must be painful to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Everyone knows how ardently he desires to work for peace, and everyone knows that there are no limits to his courage in such matters in such a calling. He said last month, to a deputation from the Churches which waited upon him: I hope you will go on pressing and pressing and pressing. Do help us to do the broad, just, fundamental, eternal thing. We all admire such sentiments. Dressed in noble, if somewhat flocculent eloquence, they obtain the allegiance of all. But let it be noticed that there is just the same vagueness in this sphere of disarmament as is complained of in many quarters upon the Government's utterances in regard to domestic matters, and particularly unemployment. More precision is required. The question is: Have we gone the right way to achieve the purpose in hand? For more than three years my right hon. Friend has been Prime Minister and largely Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This is the sphere which he has chosen to make peculiarly his own. It must be very depressing for him to feel that the position has definitely got worse during his stewardship, and to see how much worse it has got since Locarno. Everyone would like to do the "broad, just, fundamental, eternal thing," whatever that may be, but they would like to do it in a way which made things better and did not make them worse. I will not predict that no agreement will be reached at Geneva. Indeed, I think it would be disastrous if no agreement were reached there. But I do not believe that what is going to be done at Geneva is going to mean any great or decisive change in the position of the world, is going to mean any real progress towards the consolidation of European and world peace. On the contrary, I think it may well be that matters may so be handled 87 that the situation will be greatly exacerbated by the termination of the Disarmament Conference.

I remember that after the Great War had begun a complaint used to be made by very upright men and women: "Why were we not told about this before? Why did we not hear before about all that was going on?" Everyone can remember that. And when the War was over there was a strong feeling in favour of what is called open diplomacy. In my experience, which extends over nearly a quarter of a century, of interior knowledge of the working of Governments, I cannot recall any time when the gap between the kind of words which statesmen use and what is actually happening in many countries was so great as it is now. These habits of saying smooth things and uttering pious platitudes and sentiments—I do not wish to choose invidious words—to gain applause, without relation to the underlying facts, is more pronounced now than it has ever been in my experience. Just as the late Lord Birkenhead used to say about India—I think it the beginning and end of wisdom there—"Tell the truth to India," so I would now say, "tell the truth to the British people." They are a tough people, a robust people. They may be offended at the moment, but if you have told them exactly what is going on you have insured yourself against complaints and protests which are very unpleasant when they come home, on the morrow of some disillusion.

There is a certain amount of exaggerated talk of what is called French ascendancy. I do not like the present situation; no one does. But there is this to be said about French ascendancy, the French system in Europe, or whatever you like to call it—it gives stability. As Lord Grey has recently reminded us, France, though armed to the teeth, is pacifist to the core. All the countries associated with France have no wish to do anything except to maintain the status quo. They only wish to keep what they have got and no initiative in making trouble would come from them. At the present time, and until or unless Germany is re-armed, France and her associates are, I believe, quite capable of maintaining themselves and are in no 88 immediate danger of being challenged by countries which are dissatisfied with the status quo. There is nothing wrong in that. I am not saying that it is the last word. It could be improved, but there is nothing wrong in it from a legal or public point of view. The case of France and her associates stands on exactly the same treaty foundations as the League of Nations itself. Not only have they ample military force, as I believe, at present, but they have the public law of Europe behind them until it is changed.

I think we ought to feel assurance that there is something equally solid that can replace the French system before we press them unduly to weaken the military factors of safety upon which their security depends. Europe might easily go further and fare worse. I am not saying that I am pleased with the situation as it is. I am pointing out how easily we might, in trying to improve it too rapidly or injudiciously, bring about what of all things in the world we wish to avoid. I say quite frankly, though I may shock the House, that I would rather see another 10 years or 20 years of one-sided armed peace than see a war between equally well-matched Powers or combinations of Powers—and that may be the choice.

That I am a realist in these matters I cannot deny, but I am not an alarmist. I do not believe in the imminence of war in Europe. I believe that with wisdom and with skill we may never see it in our time. To hold any other view would indeed be to despair. I put my confidence, first of all, upon the strength of the French army; secondly, upon the preoccupation of Russia in the Far East, on account of the enormous increase in the armaments of Japan, and, thirdly, I put it, in the general way, upon the loathing of war which prevails among the nationals of all the countries not dissatisfied with the late peace. I believe that we have a considerable breathing space in which to revive again those lights of good will and reconciliation in Europe, which shone, so brightly but so briefly, after Locarno. We will never do that merely by haggling about cannons, tanks, aeroplanes and submarines, or measuring swords with one another, among nations already eyeing each other with so much vigilance.

Are there no other paths by which we may recover the spirit of Locarno? I would follow any real path, not a sham 89 or a blind alley, which led to lasting reconciliation between Germany and her neighbours. Here at this moment if the House will permit me I would venture to propound a general principle which I numbly submit to the Government and the House, and which I earnestly trust they will ponder. Here is my general principle. The removal of the just grievances of the vanquished ought to precede the disarmament of the victors. I hope I have made that quite clear. To bring about anything like equality of armaments, if it were in our power to do so, which it happily is not, while those grievances remain unredressed, would be almost to appoint the day for another European war—to fix it as if it were a prize fight. It would be far safer to reopen questions like those of the Dantzig Corridor, and Transylvania, with all their delicacy and difficulty, in cold blood and in a calm atmosphere and while the victor nations still have ample superiority, than to wait and drift on, inch by inch and stage by stage, until once again vast combinations, equally matched, confront each other face to face.

There is another reason why I commend this to the House. I do not intend to detain hon. Members much longer but I am anxious to complete my argument. It must be remembered that Great Britain will have more power and will run far less risk in pressing for the redress of grievances than in pressing for disarmament. We can only promote disarmament by giving further guarantees of aid. We can press for the redress of grievances by merely threatening, if our counsels are not attended to, to withdraw ourselves at the proper time from our present close entanglement in European affairs. The first road of pressing for disarmament and offering more aid only leads us deeper and deeper into the European situation. The second either removes the cause of danger or leads us out of the danger zone.

I must illustrate this point a little more. Just look at where our present policy is leading us. Look at the situation into which we are apparently marching blindly and with a sort of helpless chorus of approval. We say to France and to Poland "Why do you not disarm and set an example, and respond to our gesture, and so on?" They reply, "Will you help us to defend ourselves supposing that you are wrong in your 90 view of what our factor of safety ought to be?" Nobody keeps armaments going for fun. They keep them going for fear, not for fun. "We would gladly reduce," they say, "provided we get you in line with us for certain. If you will take some of our burden off our shoulders there will be no hesitation on our part in transferring that burden." And what they say to us, they say still more to the United States—or if they do not say it, they think it. But surely this is very dangerous ground for us. We are to persuade our friends to weaken themselves as much as possible and then we are to make it up to them by our own exertions and at our own expense.

It is as if one said—and I hope the Prime Minister has never said it and never will say it—"I will go tiger-hunting with you, my friend, on the one condition, that you leave your rifle at home." That is not the kind of excursion on which our old men ought to send our young men. We have, of course, serious obligations, which we have no intention of discarding, under Locarno. But under Locarno we remain the sole and free judge of the occasion, the sole and free judge of the interpretation put upon these obligations. Without our own vote on the Council of the League of Nations, which must be unanimous, we cannot be involved in war. But see now what the French propose in this latest scheme. They propose, quite logically and naturally, in responding to the pressure of Britain and the United States on disarmament, that the decision of the Council should be by a majority. That would mean that our fate would be decided over our head. We might find ourselves pledged in honour and in law to enter a war against our will, and against our better judgment, in order to preserve those very injustices and grievances which sunder Europe to-day, which are the cause of present armaments and which, if not arrested, will cause another war.

All I can say is that I am sure the Government will take no steps in that direction. It would be madness. These are not the days when you can order the British nation or the British Empire about as if it were a pawn on the chessboard of Europe. You cannot do it. Of course, if the United States were willing to come into the European scene as a 91 prime factor, if they were willing to guarantee to those countries who take their advice that they would not suffer for it, then an incomparably wider and happier prospect would open to the whole world. If they were willing not only to sign but to ratify treaties of that kind, it would be an enormous advantage. I say that it is quite safe for the British Empire to go as far in any guarantee in Europe as the United States is willing to go, and hardly any difficulty in the world could not be solved by faithful co-operation of the English-speaking peoples. But that is not going to happen to-morrow. It is not in our power to anticipate our destiny. Meanwhile, we ought not to take any further or closer engagements in Europe beyond those which the United States may be found willing to take.

I hope that the League of Nations is not going to be asked now to do the impossible. Those who believe, as I do sincerely, that the League of Nations, is a priceless instrument of international comity, which may play as great a part as the most daring, hopeful founders ever forecast for it, should be especially careful not to put upon the League strains which in its present stage it is utterly incapable of bearing. I deprecate altogether the kind of talk that, unless the League can force a general disarmament, unless it can compel powerful nations in remote regions to comply with its decisions, it is dead—away with it. All that is as foolish as it is to grudge the small sums necessary to keep this precious international machinery in being. He is a bad friend to the League of Nations who would set it tasks beyond its compass.

There is only one thing more to say before I sit down, and it is suggested to me by the speech which my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council delivered last week. I did not hear it, but from all accounts it was one which profoundly impressed the House, and revealed the latent and often carefully concealed powers which reside in my right hon. Friend. But that speech, while it deeply impressed the House I have no doubt—and I have read it with great attention—led to no practical conclusion. It created anxiety, and it created also perplexity. There was a sense of, what shall I say, fatalism, and even perhaps 92 helplessness about it, and I take this opportunity of saying that, as far as this island is concerned, the responsibility of Ministers to guarantee the safety of the country from day to day, and from hour to hour, is direct and inalienable. It has always been so, and I am sure they will not differ from their predecessors in accepting that responsibility. Their duty is not only to try, within the restricted limits which, I fear, are all that are open to them, to prevent war, but to make sure that we ourselves are not involved in one, and, above all, to make sure that if war should break out among other Powers, our country and the King's Dominions can be effectively defended, and will be able to preserve, if they desire to do so, that strong and unassailable neutrality from which we must never be drawn except by the heart and conscience of the nation.

§ Mr. NEIL MACLEAN

The speech to which we have just listened from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) seemed to me to cast a doubt upon the integrity and sincerity of the Ministers not only of this Government but of the different countries on the Continent of Europe who are taking part in the Disarmament Conference. He has laid down a formula which, in his opinion at least, ought to be accepted, but I can remember in this House when the right hon. Gentleman was among that crowd of Ministers who were demanding, in the language that he used in reference to a colleague of his at that time, that they must squeeze Germany until they made the pips squeak. I can remember in 1918, when the right hon. Gentleman was standing for Dundee, that he was asked the question if he were in favour of making Germany pay for the War, and he said, "Yes, pay to the last penny."

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

I have an extraordinarily good record on that point. I stated £2,000,000,000. Well, that was the figure fixed by the Young Plan 12 years afterwards, and I never swerved from it.

§ Mr. MACLEAN

I must take exception to the right hon. Gentleman's correction, and I wish to correct him. The figure to which he is referring was with regard to the tonnage that had been 93 sunk—2,000,000. I answered a question about the same figure the following evening when fighting that election, but I took an entirely different attitude and outlook from the right hon. Gentleman. He stated then that he was in favour of making Germany pay for the War. He stated that they had sunk 2,000,000 tons of British shipping, and that he was in favour of making Germany replace every ton of British shipping that had been sunk. I can remember also when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) returned from the Peace Conference when this House stood and cheered him. I can remember the speech he delivered shortly afterwards, in which he stated the purpose of the conquerors with regard to the German Kaiser, and his war advisers, and he promised this House, with the right hon. Gentleman sitting beside him, that he would have the trial of the Kaiser held in London. That was 14 years ago. Now the right hon. Gentleman comes to this House and tries to tell us that if they had accepted his advice, what a wonderful country this would have been. He spoke of Russia. He spoke of the wonderful war material that had been collected, and of the menace it would be if a conflict arose in the Far East. Does he not remember his own responsibility in the arming of Russia? Does he not remember that he, as Secretary of State for War at that time, handed over £100,000,000 of British money and war material to the White Russians in order to prosecute a war against the Republic which shortly before had been inaugurated? Does the right hon. Gentleman remember that?

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

indicated assent.

§ Mr. MACLEAN

Then how dare the right hon. Gentleman come here to-day, 14 years later, and warn this country against the likelihood of a war in the Far East because of the wonderful war equipment of the Russian Republic? When one listens to the right hon. Gentleman in the speeches which he delivers in this House from time to time, one wonders if he has any memory. One wonders if he only lives from day to day, if the things which he said yesterday are completely forgotten, and the things which he said a year ago were, in his opinion, never said at all.

§ Duchess of ATH0LL

Does the hon. Gentleman not realise how very much Russia has added to her armaments under the Five-Year Plan? The situation is quite different from that of a few years ago.

§ Mr. MACLEAN

It is true that it is quite different, because the Noble Lady evidently does not understand it She does not get Russian news first-hand, but gets it from White Russian translations. Meanwhile, I am dealing with the right hon. Gentleman, who has been the individual who has tried to lead the House up the garden in following his ideas. I can remember also what happened with regard to France and Italy, which countries should know the ability of this country to be generous. The right hon. Gentleman sat as a Cabinet Minister in the Government which excused France from paying us £400,000,000 out of a total debt of £600,000,000 I should like the right hon. Gentleman's attention. I am replying to him, and, no matter how humble may be the speaker who is replying to an ex-Cabinet Minister, he should receive the courtesy of attention while the reply is being made.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

I have been attending most carefully to the hon. Gentleman, but I have never known the custom of the House interpreted in such a way that a Member cannot turn aside for one moment to address a colleague on the bench beside him.

§ Mr. MACLEAN

It is not for one moment, but several moments, and it has happened several times. I want to draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the fact that this country, through his action as Chancellor of the Exchequer, wiped out £400,000,000 of a French debt to us of £600,000,000 and that he also wiped out £524,000,000 of a total debt from Italy of £610,000,000, and agreed to accept only £86,000,000 of that total debt. He has been most generous with this country's money.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL

How much did I let off Russia?

§ Mr. MACLEAN

I am afraid you did not let anything off Russia. Russia, seeing how generous you were to France and Italy, anticipated your generosity. The right hon. Gentleman is now stating in this House what we stated at the Inter- 95 national Socialist Conference prior to the Great War, and what I stated at this Box in 1919, when I said that if and when a Labour Government came into power in this country, we would revise every one of the treaties that had been passed that year. Now the right hon. Gentleman is beginning to realise that the working man who was speaking from this Box at that time was anticipating his own desires and intentions by several years. He has been compelled by the events of the last few years to come round to the attitude that I and the party to which I belong took at that time, and I submit that it is trespassing upon the intelligence of this House, and is the height of effrontery, for an ex-Cabinet Minister who more than any other has been more responsible for landing this country into the mess in which it finds itself to-day, to come here and ask us to listen to his advice when his advice and his conduct of the affairs of the nation in the past have been largely responsible for the hideous and terrible condition not only of this country, but of the whole of Europe as well. I submit, therefore, that the next time the right hon. Gentleman addresses the House he should consider his own past and approach the House with sufficient humility to let them understand that he has a changed outlook entirely and that he is not blowing hot and cold upon peace and war as he has done today.

With regard to the Government's programme for the coming Session, as stated in the King's Speech, it is amazing to find in that Speech so little that really matters to the people of this country. The very first business that is to be taken is the London Transport Bill. One would have thought the large amount of unemployment and distress in the country would have made the Government realise that something other than a Transport Bill should be among the first Measures to be considered by this House. The Transport Bill, a mere reference to an Unemployment Bill, some talk of what is to be done with regard to foreign affairs—these things comprise the whole of the King's Speech, and, as was stated yesterday by a colleague on this side of the House, it is one of the vaguest of King's Speeches that has ever been addressed to this House.

96 The Government have now been a National Government some 13 months, and what has been their record during that period? They have extracted £10,000,000 from the unemployed by the operation of the means test; they have reduced benefits by £12,500,000; they have increased contributions from those who are in employment by £5,000,000; they have reduced the pay and pensions of soldiers, sailors, and airmen by £3,600,000; they have reduced teachers' salaries by £6,000,000 and general education by another £4,500,000; they have reduced the National Health Insurance grants by £850,000; they have reduced disablement benefit to unmarried women from 7s. 6d. to 6s. and to married women from 7s. to 5s.; they have reduced sickness benefit to married women from 12s. to 10s.; they have abandoned schemes amounting to £75,000,000 which were for the purpose of putting unemployed into work rather than hanging about in the manner referred to by the Prime Minister yesterday; they have cut down municipal housing schemes and scrapped proposals for land reclamation, smallholdings, rural housing, and slum clearance; they have refused to operate the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Act of 1931; and they have abandoned the Land Taxes and scrapped the valuation machinery. That is their record, though it is not complete, because it could be extended by the inclusion of a number of other things of a like character, and with that record they ask the people of this country to pin their faith in and base their hopes upon them.

We have had the Liberals retreating from the National Government. They have refused to countenance any longer co-operation inside the Government, and they have retired from participation in its affairs. They still support the Government in the Lobbies on occasion, but they told us when they resigned from the Government that they could not continue in it any longer because of tariffs. Their souls were shocked at the idea of imposing tariffs upon the people of this country, and their Free Trade principles would not allow them to continue longer in the Government. It was too much for their consciences. Their political consciences were severely troubled, and so they had to leave the Government, but their consciences were not troubled when the Government, of which they then formed part, 97 were cutting down unemployment benefit, were reducing National Health Insurance benefit, and were setting up Poor Law machinery for the administration of the means test. What an elastic conscience is the Liberal conscience of to-day, shocked at the idea of imposing tariffs, but able to carry on in a Government that was starving the people of this country and breaking up families in the working-class areas because of the means test.

I want to ask Liberals in this House, who seem to treat this as a joke, why this country, which could afford to be so generous towards France and Italy as to wipe out hundreds of millions of pounds which they owed us, should find it necessary to be so harsh towards our own kith and kin. Many an unemployed ex-service man who is to-day drawing a disability pension and has been placed upon transitional payment has had a proportion of his disability pension taken away from him before he received any unemployment benefit under the means test. We could afford to be generous to France and Italy, but not apparently to our own soldiers disabled in the War. Why is it that this country should continue to rob the various funds that have been set up for specific purposes by this House 1 I ask that question deliberately and definitely. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) is not in the House at the moment, because here is another of the little matters of which he was guilty when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1925. I will quote a statement made by Viscount Snowden in 1929 with reference to the right hon. Gentleman, who was later a supporter of the Noble Lord: He robbed the Unemployment Fund of a revenue of £10,000,000 a year. If the revenue had been maintained at the figure at which it was in 1925, instead of there being a debt of nearly £40,000,000 to-day, there would not have been one penny of debt."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th December, 1929; col. 2212, Vol. 233.] That means that if that sum had been permitted to accumulate at the rate at which it was accumulating in 1925, mounting up by £10,000,000 a year, there would have been £60,000,000 in the fund in 1931, and the £115,000,000 which the Labour party borrowed, which, gave rise to the accusation that they landed the country into financial difficulties, would have been 98 reduced by £60,000,000. The unemployed and the general public of this country are suffering to-day from the gross incompetence of the so-called statesmen during the past 13 or 14 years. They have robbed funds that were set up for specific purposes, so that they could make a particular item in the balance-sheet square. They have imposed taxation for one purpose and used the money for something else. If the Government desired to be perfectly fair and honest with the people, they would go to the country and ask them to ratify all the Measures which they have put through during the past year, and to agree to the Measures which they propose to put through during the coming year. I am certain that the results would be much different from the results of 12 months ago. There would not be the great majority behind the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council that he has to-day, and there would be a much bigger representation in the House of the actual mind of the people and a clearer expression of what the people really think.

I want to ask the Leader of the House if there is any likelihood of any of the suggestions in the report of the Committee on Finance and Industry being taken up and put into operation by the Government. I notice from the King's Speech that it is the intention of the Government to accept at once the report of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance. [Interruption.] I may be mistaken, but it is well that we should put our assumptions to the Government, and, if we are wrong, that we should be told so. Only in that way can we draw from the Government some of their intentions. There has been presented to the House the report of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, and, following upon that, is an intimation in the King's Speech that it is the intention of the Government to bring in a Bill to deal with the unemployed. We surely cannot be blamed for associating the effect with a cause and for believing that the Bill will be shaped somewhat on the lines of the report of the Royal Commission. I do not know whether the Government intend to accept the majority or the minority recommendations. That, of course, will be understood by us when we see the Bill. Of one thing I am certain; the answer from the Government 99 will be that the best thing we can do is to wait and see.

I would like to know whether there will be any Bill, or a series of Bills, brought in to carry out the pertinent recommendations of the Committee on Finance and Industry. Surely if the Government can be so swift in their decision to bring in a Bill framed on some of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, it is not too much for us to ask them to bring in a Bill to put into operation some of the recommendations of the Committee on Finance and Industry. I understood from the Prime Minister's speech yesterday and from the King's Speech that the' Government are gravely concerned about the large number of people who are unemployed. They want to do something for those who have never been employed and to give them training. They want to see trade revived. I suggest to the Government that if they are anxious to do anything for the unemployed, anything to absorb those who cannot find employment, one of the first things which they might attempt is to bring in a Bill to shorten the working day. I will quote figures which I quoted a year ago at this Box when I put a question to the President of the Board of Trade. I am still waiting for an answer, and I hope that it will be forthcoming to-night. The figures have reference to shipbuilding. In 1923, 408,000 tons of shipping were built, and the number of workers in the shipyards producing that tonnage was 156,000. In 1929, the tonnage was 931,000, and the number of men employed, 157,000. In 1930, the tonnage was 879,000, and the number of men, 141,000.

I want to draw the attention of the Leader of the House to the significant fact revealed by these figures that in 1923 the average output of shipping per man was 2j tons. In 1929, the average was 5J tons, and in 1930 it was over 6 tons. There was thus a jump in eight years in the average productivity per man in the shipbuilding yards from 2j tons to over 6 tons. That is a net increase of 3| tons per man, or more than double the output of each man in 1923. Why is that? It is due to the reorganisation in the shipyards, to new methods of production, and to new types of machinery. I want to ask the Members 100 of the Government, who have been so keen on tariffs and on telling the people about the prosperity that tariffs will bring and the increased amount of work they will provide, what hope can be held out to the workers in the shipbuilding industry where the productivity per man has increased to such a degree that in 1930 one man can do practically the work performed by two men eight years ago? Unemployment has gone up in the shipyards, and there will be no hope for them, even with their peak output, except by putting into operation a method of reduction of hours. Lord Leverhulme made a statement based upon his experience at the Ministry of Munitions during the War. He said: We can get into a working day of six hours all the work we are capable of when that work is monotonous, tending machinery and general work in a factory. To get the work condensed into six hours would enable us to produce not only everything we require, but to produce it without fatigue. What are the intentions of the Government with regard to the working day? Since they came into office, one of the things which they have done, which I did not mention in the record which I gave to the House earlier in my speech, is to reverse the seven-hour day laid down for the miners. They also turned down the recognition of the Washington Eight Hours Convention. In all matters affecting the rentier and capitalist class, however, the Government have taken measures through tariffs and taxation to make things easier and better for them. So far as conditions applicable to the working classes are concerned, the Government have gone about it to make matters harder, to make conditions worse, to make their lot in every way less endurable than it was prior to the present Government taking office. What do the Government intend doing in that respect? It is not merely a question of finding work for the individual. The finding of work for the individual may mean only a few individuals going back to work in their trade, because the figures I have just given regarding increased productivity in the shipbuilding trade can, with variation, be applied to practically every other industry. Rationalisation, new types of machinery and new methods of production have made it possible for the workers to produce greater wealth with less effort than 101 was possible a few years ago; yet, in spite of that, the Government have evidently not yet realised that the reduction of hours is the solution to the problem if we are to find employment for the unemployed workers.

I would ask the Leader of the House to consider the points that have been put, and I hope that whoever is to reply to the Government will make a clear and definite statement of their intentions. It is not sufficient for them to say that they are going to open training centres for those young men and young women who have not yet seen the inside of a factory. For years there has been a large and ever growing number of young persons leaving school for whom no place can be found in industry, and appeals have been made to different Governments in the past as to the steps they would take to see that these young persons were absorbed into industry. There is the same problem in the case of the unemployed, for we have no work for close upon 3,000,000 people. There is a superabundance of wealth and yet people are starving. Evidently this country is not wealthy enough to feed them, it can give them only the meagre subsistence afforded by unemployment insurance benefits and transitional payment.

I hope that before many months are over the people will realise how hopeless is the outlook for them from any measures the Government have adumbrated in the King's Speech. I hope they will realise that, so far as they are concerned, it is not a question as between tariffs and Free Trade, because in neither will they find salvation. We have had 80 years of Free Trade and before that there had been 200 or 300 years of Protection, and under both systems we have had poverty and starvation and workers unemployed. More and more the people are beginning to turn to the view which we have been advocating for years. They are coming to understand what we mean when we preach to them the doctrine of Socialism. Sooner or later, probably sooner, than Members who support the present Government expect, and sooner also than some of them wish, the people will realise that it is only by voting for the programme of Socialism and sending Socialists to this House in as overwhelming numbers as they have sent the supporters of the present National Government, that there will be any hope for 102 them and for the country, or any hope for the world.

§ Mr. GODFREY NICHOLSON

I do not agrees with very much of what has been said by the last speaker. Personally, I have every confidence both in the good intentions and the ability of the present Government, and I believe that future years will prove that during the past Session the foundation of a new economic life for this country has been well and truly laid. For that particular reason, I feel distinctly ungenerous in mentioning yet another burden that will be laid upon the shoulders of the Government, for I rise to call attention, as briefly as possible, to a very striking omission from the Gracious Speech. I refer to the omission of any mention of the coal mining industry. I do so with diffidence, because I can scarcely believe the Government are not well aware of the critical situation that may ensue shortly, and I cannot bring myself to believe that they have no plans to cope with it. I do so with the more diffidence, also, because the last thing I wish is to make more embarrassing an already difficult situation, or to be accused of tending to manufacture a crisis when none exists except in my own ignorant and disordered imagination. But, speaking not only as a mining Member, but also as a member of the genera] public, I must call the attention of the Government and of the House to I was going to say the folly of imagining that this Session can pass without well-considered legislation for the coal industry being placed 'before the House. The purpose of my speech is to beg the Government to make some announcement which will secure some measure of stability in that industry, because I believe that, in common with all other critical aspects of the world to-day, the great thing which is needed is certainty. What I ask from the Government is not so much a particular decision; I am not concerned so much with the decision they take as with the fact that a decision should be taken. The criticism I have to make of the Government is this: either they have not got plans laid to meet the situation that may arise on 7th July next, or else, having such plans, they do not realise the harm which is being done through the absence of a declaration of their policy, or how it is 103 playing into the hands of the extremists both among the owners and the men. There is no need, I think, for me to go over the recent history of the mining industry. It is common knowledge that this industry, like all the other primary industries throughout the world, is suffering from the threat of over-production.

Last June the House passed the Coal Mines Act, 1932, one of the main provisions of which was to continue for a further period of five years Part I of the Coal Mines Act, 1930. That Act, by a regulation of production and prices, attempted—attempted, I say—to secure a fair return for both capital and labour. The first thing to remember is that no Government in this country, so far, has been concerned with the internal organisation of industry. It is only concerned with the reactions and the repercussions which trouble in any industry may have upon the rest of the country, and Part I of the Act of 1930, although it was a direct interference with the internal management of the industry, was only intended as a stop-gap compromise until the industry reorganised itself. In other words, the reorganisation of the industry is in the hands of the industry. That this is the policy of the Government is proved by the words of the late Secretary for Mines on the Third Reading of the Coal Mines Act last year. He said: All I can say of Part I is that we have, by the passing of this Bill‥‥given to the industry what they have asked in the sense of giving them five years for the working of Part I. These are the important words: On the implied condition that they will use that time to set their house in order. We cannot check the evasions, but they can. Further on, he said: We hope to receive their report, That is, the Report of the Mining Association, with but very little delay, probably in the next few weeks or month or two, and then there will be the consultations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd June, 1932; cols. 1468-9, Vol. 266.] That was on June 2nd. I think it is universally admitted that continued evasions have made of Part I a travesty of an Act of Parliament. I am not attempting to blame anybody, or to 104 point out who is the villain of the piece. I believe that here, as always, the villain of the piece is to be found in human nature and circumstances, and I think it is hopeless, especially in the coal industry, to try to fix the blame on somebody, to go back into the past and conduct a species of search for the villain. Part I, when passed, is no business or concern of His Majesty's Government as such, except in so far as the failure of the mining industry to return to capital reasonable profits or, indeed, any profits at all makes the maintenance of the present level of wages impossible. That the coal industry is losing heavily is proved by the quarterly summary of the coal mining industry published by the Mines Department. In the June quarter Scotland lost as much as 9½d. per ton and Northumberland 7½d., and the average loss all over the country was nearly 2d., and that is not including matters like debenture interest, the expenses of keeping idle pits free from water, or bank charges. I think I am right in saying that to-day the economic position of the industry is infinitely worse, thanks to the fact that evasions of the minimum prices fixed under Part I have inevitably—I am not blaming everybody—spread like a rapid contagion in a crowded city.

This is the crisis before the country—that in July next the "gentlemen's agreement" not to reduce wages comes to an end, and at the moment the industry is making heavy losses, and unless something is done by somebody it will be impossible, with the best good will in the world on the part of the owners, to maintain the present level of wages. As to the present level of wages I would remind the House that the cost of living to-day is about 43 per cent, above pre-War, and in one of the economically worst-off mining districts, that of Northumberland, the level of wages is only 24 above pre-War. Further, the miner is not like the railway-man or the worker in an ordinary factory. He has no guaranteed week, and unless the pit in which he is employed stops for three days in the week he does not receive the dole. A very large colliery undertaking in my own constituency was this summer idle for over 50 days out of 90 working days. When I say the level of real wages is much below pre-War, or only just what it was before the War, I 105 want hon. Members to remember that the miner is a day-to-day worker, almost literally.

It is my submission that the failure of the Government to declare a policy—though I have every confidence that there are adequate reasons for it, and it is those reasons that I wish to elicit—has put the Government, the owners and the men in a false position. The Government are waiting for the owners to produce Amendments to Part I, and the owners have given months of time, trouble and energy to trying to come to an agreement. I think it was unfair of the Government ever to expect the owners to come to an agreement. It was not realised that the mining industry is one composed of different and often mutually competitive parts, and that the diversity of interests between the different districts is such as effectually to prevent any real degree of unanimity being arrived at regarding reorganisation. Reorganisation must come from above. The Government are the only body capable of conducting negotiations with sufficient power behind them to enforce a decision. The men have tried district by district, to stave off the inevitable attack on wages, by entering into negotiations with the owners for a national wages agreement. The Government made a declaration of policy on the 25th October, when the present Secretary for Mines said: It is the desire of the Government that national conciliation machinery should be set up, by agreement between parties, for the discussion of all matters of national interest to the coalmining industry, not excluding questions relating to wages and conditions of employment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th October, 1932; col. 786, Vol. 269.] On the 8th November the Miners' Federation met the Secretary for Mines, and in effect asked him to put this declaration of policy into practice. The lack of decision of the Government forced the Secretary for Mines to say that he was unable to ask the Mining Association to enter into negotiations touching wages and hours nationally, but that he would be very pleased to write and ask them to enter into negotiations on other matters. I ask hon. Members, what other matters are there respecting the industry nationally? The Government have been put into an utterly false position.

106 The owners are forced into breaking the law. They are as honourable a set of men as; any, and it does not give them any pleasure to break the law. Although it seems an unusual thing to say about business men, breaking the law makes them absolutely miserable. The present situation is ruining the morale of the industry. The parties in it can never come to a decision among themselves. The men find themselves ignored by both owners and the Government—I mean the constitutionally elected leaders of the men's unions. One very serious aspect of this failure of the Government to declare a policy is that it is playing into the hands of the extremist section of the men. I think that there is a real possibility that the extremist element may take control of the mining industry. It is an element which does not believe in combined negotiation or in keeping to agreements. I do not wish to be an alarmist and I do not prophesy trouble, but I prophesy a situation which, if improperly handled, will result in trouble.

I do not ask to be told the Government's policy, but I beg the Government to make an announcement that they will not be content with another eleventh-hour promise or so-called decision, and that they are determined that the industry shall be so reorganised as to enable the present wages rate to be maintained. I have every confidence in the good intentions of the owners, and I know that the men are well led. I know that the Government are full of good intentions. I suppose that what I am doing is to blame the present political system. The man at the helm is so occupied in putting the vessel head on to every approaching wave, that he has no time to look at the breakers which may be farther away. Every Government in Europe is being forced into the position of an extemporised midwife as every crisis arises. I beg the Government to give this crisis a little pre-natal care.

§ Mr. AMERY

I hope that the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. G. Nicholson) will pardon me if I do not attempt to follow him in dealing with the very important issue which he has raised. It is clear that he has done well in drawing the attention of the Government to the grave 107 troubles that may so easily arise in the mining industry, and in asking them to come to a definite policy in as early a time as possible.

I should like to turn back to the first two paragraphs of the Gracious Speech which deal with the World Economic Conference, and with the conference on Disarmament, subjects which, from their position in the Speech and from the language employed about them, are evidently not considered as the least important of the subjects which are covered by the King's Speech. In the first paragraph, the Speech says, rather vaguely, I admit, that it is the earnest hope of the Government— that the conference will be able to reach agreement on the measures required to deal with the causes which have brought about the present economic and financial difficulties of the world. There is at any rate one cause which, though contributory, cannot very well be dealt with at the conference itself, and which ought to be dealt with before the conference can meet. That is the question of our American Debt. There is no question which at this moment commands greater interest from the public and in regard to which there is a greater measure of uncertainty as to what we are going to do. There is one thing which we shall not do, and that is to repudiate our obligation. Repudiation is a double-edged weapon. It is not for us to reject Mr. de Valera's arguments, and to follow his example.

What my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) said is perfectly true, that if we are forced to pay, while others will not pay their debts to us, our position will be intolerable, in a moral, though not in a physical, sense. I do not believe that that burden, tremendous though it would be, would be actually beyond our capacity, if we have the courage to take the steps, unpleasant and difficult as they may be, that will be required. Let me remind the House that the problem lies not in the amount of the debt but in its transfer in dollars or gold on the other side of the Atlantic. The debt in itself, heavy though it is, is only a fraction of our domestic debt. The annual payments are only some 7 per cent, or 8 per cent, of our Budget. The difficulty lies in find- 108 ing dollars and gold on the other side of the Atlantic. It is a difficulty caused in part by the policy of the United States. If the United States had been willing to accept our goods readily and freely, or had been willing to pursue a policy of consistent investment in this country it would have been far easier to have secured dollars or gold.

On the other hand, the difficulty has also been created by our own policy of the continuance of free imports, in a world where that policy only served to accentuate the dislocation of the world balance of trade. Ever since the War, we have bought from the United States on the average at least £150,000,000 a year more than we have sold them. That has constituted a debt, an immensely burdensome debt, and it is because the £50,000,000 or so of our War obligation has to be paid on top of that first £150,000,000, that it is so difficult. Further, our returning to the Gold Standard, and playing our part in a course which has appreciated the value of gold and depreciated the value of goods and services, has doubled the burden of the debt that was contracted some 10 years ago. To-day, happily, we are free both of Free Trade and of the Gold Standard. We can rectify our trade balance with the United States as we choose by imposing the necessary restrictions. We can pay in gold which is no longer wanted for the purposes of reserve to our currency, and which is kept in the vaults of the Bank of England more as a tribute to an old superstition.

In this situation, if I were challenged by an American to say how I would pay the Debt to him, I would say: "Here is £100,000,000 straight away, three years' payments. We do not want the gold in the Bank of England. We are not going to return to the Gold Standard for a long time. You can have it. We also give you notice of the termination of our commercial treaty, so that at the end of 12 months we shall be free to impose a special tariff upon the United States. The duties shall be paid in gold or in dollars, and, if American goods still come in under that tariff, that will provide the gold and dollars towards the Debt. If the goods do not come in, our trade balance will be so rectified that the task of finding the necessary money will be an infinitely easier one than at the present 109 time. If that, and kindred measures, are unpalatable to the United States, I shall be prepared to consider any proposals from your side for the modification of the present arrangement." I put the thing somewhat crudely, in order to emphasise my point, which is that we are not in a position of complete helplessness, and that, while it is the duty of the Government to try to secure modification of an arrangement which I believe to be not only unfair to ourselves but prejudicial to the general economic situation, there is no reason for us to go in an unduly suppliant attitude or to accept any terms or conditions that may be suggested.

This question is, however, only one of the contributory causes to the world position, contributory with many other causes to the main cause, namely, the dislocation of the world's monetary system, which has brought about the disastrous fall in wholesale prices. It is now 18 months since the Macmillan Committee pointed out, with immense authority and with irrefutable argument, that the depression of the world and the condition of unemployment and of industrial stagnation were due in the main to causes which, whether in their origin monetary or not, were focussed through monetary action and led to the abstraction of a greater part of the world's gold supply from active service. That situation has destroyed the incentive to profitable production throughout the world, and has particularly hit the primary producer.

It is vital for us to know what is the Government's policy in this matter. They have had 18 months, and yet we have not had more than a very general and uncertain indication of their policy. We are told in the Gracious Speech that the whole situation of agriculture cannot be remedied until world wholesale prices have risen to a more normal level. But that statement is not accompanied by any declaration as to what the policy of the Government is with regard to restoration to a normal level. And yet everything depends on it—not only agriculture, but the whole of the arrangements that were made at Ottawa. Every arrangement made at Ottawa is in the air so long as the question of price level is not settled. If the currencies of the Empire cannot be maintained in stable relationship with each other, then clearly the whole effect of any particular preference may be wiped out at any moment by this 110 or that Government going 10 per cent, or 20 per cent, off its present relationship to sterling. The Governments of the Empire presented that point with all earnestness at Ottawa. Mr. Bruce pointed out that the very first dry season would mean a curtailment of his country's imports and another depreciation of the pound. I see that at this moment the Government of New Zealand is on the very verge of being forced to abandon its present relationship to sterling. Again, as long as the Dominions and India have no purchasing power under present price conditions, so long will their preferences to us be little more than a gesture. As Sir Henry Strakosch pointed out at the Conference, at present prices no amount of preference would lead to the Dominions or India buying United Kingdom goods beyond an indispensable minimum. The Macmillan Committee laid down the objective of our policy in this respect. They said: Our objective should be, so far as it lies within the power of this country to influence the international price level, first of all to raise prices a long way above the present level, and then to maintain them at the level thus reached, with such stability as can be maintained. We recommend that this objective be accepted as the guiding aim of the monetary policy of this country. It would be interesting to know whether that is the guiding aim of the policy of this country, and what steps the Government mean to take to attain that objective, both here and at the World Conference.

So far as the latter is concerned, one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that there is no chance of establishing a single international monetary standard, gold or otherwise, in the immediate future. A single world standard would no doubt be an ideal solution if you could make certain that that standard was going to work, and was going to maintain such reasonable stability of prices as to prevent a recurrence of the disaster which has befallen the world in the last few years. Gold has entirely failed to fulfil that function, and I see no evidence in any direction that, under present world conditions, it can fulfil that function again. There is a world-wide depression, but it is world-wide, not because depressions must be world-wide, but because the world has been unwise enough to tie itself to a single worldwide standard which has proved unwork- 111 able. I believe it would be far better for the nations to follow the advice which I gather was given them by the President of the Board of Trade the other night, and to allow the exchanges to find their natural level instead of trying to correct them by all these devices of additional tariffs and quotas and exchange restrictions, which are not the causes of, the present world trouble, but are symptoms of the desperate anxiety of Governments to remain tied to a standard which has long ago lost any real value.

I believe that any talk of restoring a world gold standard is pure waste of breath. I am certain that the industries of this country would never tolerate any such suggestion if it were made by the Government at the World Conference. The best that we can do is to encourage the nations, the United States particularly, by parallel action with ourselves, to do what they can to restore a normal price level. The best encouragement that we can give in that direction is by our own action, by giving a lead, and not by waiting, as seemed to be suggested at Ottawa, for a lead to be given to us by others. After all, we are in a much better position to give such a lead than most other nations. Once we are off the Gold Standard, we are in a position to have any price level that we like. I need not go into details, but it is perfectly possible for a Government which has a purely paper currency, such as we have, to fix that currency at such an amount and make such arrangements for its use in the credit system as either to raise or to lower the price level. The trouble is that, although we have had that power for over a year—and we have at any rate been saved from following the further disastrous decline in world prices—we are still, apparently, frightened to use our power. Those who are responsible for the monetary affairs of this country are like prisoners whose chains have been knocked off, but who have not the courage to get up and walk out of an open door. I should like, in this connection, to put the matter, not on my own authority, but on the authority of a very well-informed article in the very conservative "Times." It said: A country not on the Gold Standard is able to reflate independently. If it proves impossible to persuade other countries 112 to commit themselves to really effective measures, Great Britain can proceed with reflation on her own account. … There is no need to wait for the conference before taking action. The attempt to persuade others will be immensely facilitated if we are already showing that we have the courage of our own convictions. Our international prestige is now high; it is a unique opportunity for this country to set an example and resume international leadership. The opportunity may not recur. The report of the Macmillan Committee was made 18 months ago. Matters were so urgent then that it ought to have been acted upon at once; and so prophetic was its forecast of the disasters which have since followed as to give it to-day infinitely more authority than it had then. I earnestly beg the Government to come now to a definite decision to frame a sterling policy suited to the needs of this country and of the British Empire, and of such other countries as are willing to attach themselves to sterling, and to make a success of that policy without delay. Then, when they go to the World Conference, they will be able to point to its success and endeavour to enlist the support of others in accepting the principle of our policy in measures which, under their varying conditions, they can adopt, and so pave the way to a situation in world trade which may perhaps subsequently lead to the possibility of the restoration of a single uniform standard. Let it be remembered, however, that stability of prices within an individual country is of far more importance than a rigid stability in all countries, however much this latter may interest bankers and traders.

There is one other point in connection with' the World Conference on which I should like to support the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) in appealing to the Government to give a definite lead. That is with regard to the most-favoured-nation Clause. The most-favoured-nation Clause in its present form may have been of some use to us when we had no tariff with which to bargain. But to-day it is an obstacle to any negotiations with foreign countries. We cannot make any special arrangement with countries that we wish to favour without having to give away far more than we get. And the same is true internationally; it has long been an obstacle to a mutual lowering of tariffs. I would add' that, apart from our own interest in the matter, the most- 113 favoured-nation Clause to-day stands in the way of better mutual arrangements among other nations, such as the scheme for a mutual lowering of tariffs which has been recently advocated by Belgium and Holland. That scheme is definitely thwarted arid impeded by the most-favoured-nation Clause. I trust that we shall be broad-minded and generous enough not to insist upon the letter of our rights against any scheme that would make it more possible for the nations of Europe to bring down the innumerable and unnecessary barriers between them, and to do for Europe what we have attempted to do for ourselves at Ottawa. It would mean much, not only for economic regeneration in Europe, but also, I believe, for the restoration of political peace. I make bold to say that to get rid of the most-favoured-nation Clause—and no method would be easier than by a general resolution of the World Conference—would do far more for world peace than is ever likely to be done at the Disarmament Conference.

It is to that subject that I should like to turn next. In my belief the statement contained in the second paragraph of the King's Speech, to the effect that disarmament by itself will provide a foundation for lasting peace," is based upon a profound delusion. I believe that nothing has done more harm to the cause of peace since the Great War than the constant reiteration of the idea that armaments as such are the main causes of war, and that disarmament as such will bring about peace. Armaments are, of course, the instrument by which the disturber of peace will endeavour to achieve his purpose. But armaments are equally an instrument—and, indeed, the only instrument—by which those who wish to preserve peace can secure and preserve it. Armaments are the only weapon to-day, and have been throughout history, by which peace-loving civilisation can hold its own against the barbarian. Where would the peace of India be without the British Army? After all, this country enjoyed 300 years of profound peace and a higher degree of civilisation than it knew for more than 1,000 years afterwards, under the protection of the Roman legions and the Roman galleys. You have only to read the unhappy accounts of the British 114 chroniclers from the time when the Roman legions and galleys were withdrawn to know what happens to disarmed civilisation in face of the cheerful, aggressive barbarian. Again, competition in armaments is not the main cause of war; it is a symptom of those strained political situations which may lead to war, but which the competition in armaments may often postpone.

I would ask the House to face this immensely serious question, and ask themselves whether they can think of a single war in the last 150 years that was brought about by competition in armaments. Take the Revolutionary War. Was it competition in armaments between France and the rest of Europe, or was it the terror lest revolution might spread throughout the world, that led the allied countries against the revolution 1 Since then wars have arisen, in Europe at any rate, almost entirely in order to satisfy the ideal of nationalism—to give to subject nationalities independence of the Governments which had hitherto ruled over them, or to unite the scattered fragments of a race into a single nation. Was the cause for which Byron died at Missolonghi one concerned with the competition of armaments? Was it to the cause of competition in armaments that Garibaldi, or Kossuth, or Pashitch or Venizelos gave their lives? Of course not. It was for an ideal, and, as long as men are prepared to fight for an ideal, so long is the status quo bound from time to time to be upset by force. I remember very well, over 20 years ago, listening to Mr. Tim Healy speaking from the opposite benches in this House and referring to Ireland as a nation. Someone on our side asked, "What is a nation?" And like a flash he replied, "What a man is prepared to die for." And, if you would die for a cause, you are not afraid of making others die for it too.

Take the other side of the argument. Has the absence of armaments prevented war? The longest, costliest and bloodiest war in the whole century between the Napoleonic wars and the Great War was the American Civil War, which arose between two groups of communities that were practically unarmed. It may be said that the competition in armaments just before the Great War 115 was getting so burdensome that it may have played some part in precipitating the hasty decision of the Central Powers. That may be so; but it is equally true to say that the causes in Central Europe which brought about the Great War would have brought it about a generation earlier if it had not been for the predominant strength of the status quo Powers. Indeed, it was the weakness of Turkey, inviting attack by Italy and the Balkan States, that may be regarded as the real beginning of the Great War.

I have laid stress on this matter, not because J am opposed to disarmament—on the contrary, I would welcome any reasonable and practical plan for saving the burden and the possible suspicion connected with excessive armaments—but because I am convinced that disarmament, unless it is coupled closely with, and, indeed, made consequential upon, a settlement of political issues, may not only do nothing to secure peace, but may indeed do much to injure the cause of peace. I submit that the political issues must be dealt with first. These issues, I would add, are not susceptible of any cut-and-dried mathematical or arithmetical solution. These problems cannot be solved by 33 per cent, reductions all round. They are individual; they are local; they affect particular frontiers and particular groups of nations. The political and economic problem of Europe is one, and can only be settled if it is dealt with as one. The political and economic problem of the Far East is another, and can only be settled by itself, and I trust that we shall not listen to the mad militarists of Geneva who invite us to go and settle it for them. The problem of our own Empire is another, which will require more and more of our care and watchfulness. I believe that it prejudices any solution of these individual political issues to muddle them all up together and treat them as one problem under the label of disarmament.

The problem of Europe, as has already been pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping, is essentially just this: Whether the Versailles Settlement was a fair and possible one or not. If it was fair and possible, by far the best way of maintaining it till another generation became accustomed to it, is to do what my right hon. Friend suggested 116 and see to it that the status quo Powers have a sufficient margin of strength to prevent any attempt to reverse that settlement. If it is not in every particular a fair and reasonable settlement, in Heaven's name let us devote ourselves, with all the patience and all the ability that we can, to finding a political solution which will automatically get rid of suspicion, fear and hatred. The trouble is that the Governments of the world have consistently shirked the real issues and have played about with the sham, issue of disarmament. It was so much easier with disarmament to say, "This is a matter for a Preparatory Commission, and then for another Preparatory Commission," in the hope that the thing might be postponed indefinitely. Unfortunately, these things cannot be postponed, and meanwhile the Governments of Europe—they are responsible, and our successive Governments have been equally responsible—have built up a Frankenstein's monster in the shape of a sincere, well-meaning, unintelligent public opinion, hypnotised by the continued identification of disarmament with peace and believing, in its genuine and admirable love of peace, that peace must somehow be secured by any measure of disarmament, the more sweeping the better, the more impracticable and the more foolish the better. The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means; and my people love to have it so; and what will ye do in the end thereof? When I look at the various Conference proposals that have been brought forward and think of the gap, to which my right hon. Friend referred, between the realities of the situation, between what the Governments know to be their duty towards their own peoples, and the public professions of those Governments, I feel that the hopes that are founded on this Conference are destined to bitter disappointment, and the sooner the people of the country are warned of the true situation the better. All these things have naturally and inevitably their element of more or less unconscious hypocrisy. They all aim at a world disarmament consistent with maintaining the position of: each country. France is willing to adopt any scheme, however far-reaching, which puts irresistible power behind the status quo. I endorse, earnestly, my right hon. Friend's appeal 117 that our Government, at any rate, should not commit itself to any engagement which means that we are in honour bound to intervene in every future European war. Italy wants a measure of disarmament that makes her equal to France. Germany wants equality, but only in the sense of being allowed to rearm. The United States is only too delighted to suggest big cuts which cause her no loss in prestige and power, but there again no cuts which interfere with the type or size of the battleships or cruisers that she likes to have. What of ourselves? I think we have been more sincere, but can we claim to be wholly free from the faults of others? I would ask anyone to talk about the abolition of submarines to a Frenchman and see the smile on that Frenchman's face. After all, here are we, the fifth air Power, suggesting that everyone else should come down to our level before we all diminish by 33 per cent. Italy, with an immense coast line, is the fifth naval Power. What should we say if Italy made the proposition that all navies were to be scaled down to the Italian level and then reduced by 33 per cent.?

These things do not arise from deliberate hypocrisy and dishonesty. The Governments have been forced, by the inexorable logic of the nonsense which they have talked and which they have asked and encouraged the people to believe, into a position from which they cannot honourably extricate themselves. I think the crowning instance of what is either dishonesty or dangerous absurdity is the proposition that this Government has made that, if an effective international control of civil aviation can be devised, all military and naval air forces should be abolished. I can only imagine one conceivable reason why most members of the present Cabinet have agreed to that proposal, and that is their profound conviction that no workable scheme for the control of civil aviation can be devised and that, therefore, the whole thing will only end in a gesture. I know very well that that proposal was commended to the House the other night in a remarkable speech by the Lord President of the Council. It was a very impressive speech, though to me a very disquieting one. It was a speech which dealt not so much with the problem of preserving peace as with the problem of mitigating the horrors of war. It was a 118 speech which seemed to me to be obsessed with an altogether excessive fear of what the developments of science mean to the world. I think any reflection on the past shows that, with every advance of science, its dangers have always found their antidote. I entirely refuse to believe that the whole of civilisation is going to be wrecked merely because mankind has learned to fly. That sort of thing was said when gunpowder was invented. Speeches of the same sort might have been delivered 100 years ago about the danger of allowing steamships to come into existence which could go anywhere, in spite of wind and tide, and bombard an undefended country.

It is not necessary to go into technical matters but I believe that the problem of aerial defence can be solved. It may have to be met by differentiation on a larger scale than we have hitherto conceived of between combatant and non-combatant zones. It may become possible by infra-red rays to discover an aeroplane, in the distance, just as we learned during the Great War to discover a submarine beneath the waters. War is terrible, always, but the war of to-day is infinitely more merciful than the war of 100 or 1,000 years ago. More than that, I believe it is a profound delusion to think that the offensive character of war is going to make it more disastrous to civilisation. It is the long-drawn-out wars that ruin civilisa