HC Deb 10 November 1932 vol 270 cc516-641
Mr. ATTLEE

I beg to move, That, in the opinion of this House, it is an essential preliminary to the success of the forthcoming World Economic Conference that the British Government should give clear and unequivocal support to an immediate, universal, and substantial reduction of armaments on the basis of equality of status for all nations, and should maintain the principles of the covenant of the League of Nations by supporting the findings of the Lytton Commission on the Sino-Japanese dispute. I think the House will agree—[HON. MEMBERS: "Do not read it"]—that I have very fresh in my memory the wishes of the House both as regards the length and time of speeches and the Rule against the reading of speeches. I believe I am not generally very long—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"]—and I never read a speech. To-day I will endeavour to be as short as is compatible with the importance of the subject. I think hon. Members will agree that before this Session comes to an end it is desirable that the House should express its opinion on the conduct of foreign affairs, more particularly in view of the Disarmament Conference, and the Motion on the Paper is one which we think the Government may well support. Everybody in the Houses in agreement that we desire disarmament, desire peace and want no more war, and I believe everybody would wish that our Government should give a clear and decided lead at the Disarmament Conference; but I think, also, that everybody must be conscious that there has been a grave feeling of disappointment throughout the country at the lack of progress made at the Disarmament Conference. There have been numerous letters in the Press and deputations to Ministers from distinguished people of all political opinions and of various occupations and standing. I will refer to one only, the deputation of the Archbishops and the heads of 10 other Churches to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, when they expressed their very grave disappointment with the slow progress made at the Disarmament Conference.

In the Motion we have put on the Paper we have stated that we believe progress at the Disarmament Conference is an essential preliminary to success at the World Economic Conference. We put that down for a very definite reason. In what I may describe as the rather thick and depressing fog of the Prime Minister's speech on unemployment there was one small star of hope, his reference to the World Economic Conference. It was really the only sign of hope throughout the speech. It is perfectly clear that the World Economic Conference cannot succeed without a great measure of success at the Disarmament Conference. Anybody who has any knowledge of public opinion across the Atlantic knows that the United States of America are most unlikely to co-operate in the economic reconstruction of Europe unless they are convinced that the European States are in earnest about disarmament. I am aware that without a settlement of the big disarmament question you cannot get a satisfactory settlement. That is a condition precedent to anything like economic recovery.

In the second place, we link disarmament and the Manchurian question together, for the reason that security and disarmament must go together. I hold that the Manchurian question is the acid test of the League of Nations as a guarantee against attack. Everybody who has followed the discussions of the last 10 years on disarmament and on every international question knows that the problem of security is always uppermost. Those who support the League of Nations claim that it is only through the League that security can be attained. Therefore, when a question arises in which two Member-States of the League are engaged, the question as to whether the League has afforded that security is a vital one. You cannot expect States to rest on the security of the League if, in a leading case, they find that a Member-State has been denied security. I believe that the Manchurian question is a vital one, and that unless it is settled satisfactorily through the League of Nations we shall find that the League will lose its moral authority and that the world will slip back to the old system of individual armaments and sectional alliances. Widespread throughout this country, among lovers of peace, there has been great disappointment. An political parties interested in peace have felt that during the last year we had, to a very large extent, abandoned the moral leadership of the world on this question. I think that we have been weak and timid over the Manchurian question, and in regard to the proposals that have been made by country after country to the League of Nations relating to disarmament, we have been unhelpful, obstructive, evasive and pettifogging, and we have failed to offer constructive proposals ourselves.

I want to say a word, first of all, in regard to Manchuria, because I understand that the Lytton Report is to be discussed very shortly at Geneva. I think that we are all agreed as to the very great service which has been performed to the world by Lord Lytton and his cosignatories. The Foreign Secretary knows something about the difficulties of getting a unanimous report. He knows—although he may be too modest to say so—how much depends upon the chairman of such a commission. I am sure that he will realise the debt we owe to Lord Lytton. We may congratulate ourselves that the chairman who guided the deliberations of that great body was a member of our own country. What are the facts about Manchuria? In 1915 there were the Japanese 21 demands on China, our ally. Perhaps that was not noticed so much at the time, because we were then immersed in the War, but it was a very significant fact. The next fact came in 1922, when the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, of which Japan formed a part, was concluded. Let us remember what was done there. The Powers agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of China. I confess that if such a declaration had been made before the War I should have regarded those words as extremely ominous. In pre-war days, a declaration by certain Powers that they intended to respect the integrity of another Power was always a prelude to partition. We remember the case of Persia. According to the wording of Article 2 of the Kellogg Pact: The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes of whatever nature or of whatever origin should never be sought except by pacific means. In September, 1931, the Japanese occupied Mukden and proceeded to overrun Manchuria. I do not think that that was more than a militarist try-on. We have to remember what the conditions are in other countries. In Japan, the soldiers have considerable influence over policy. As a word of caution I would like to say that, in discussing international affairs, we are apt to think of every country as personified, such as England, France or Japan, and to forget that there are masses of people who do not agree with their rulers. In every country there are different lines of thought, some pacific and some militarist, and we should never try to make an indictment against a whole nation because of the acts of some of their rulers. We showed great weakness at that time. I believe, if our Government had given a bold lead to the League of Nations, that that militarist try-on would have failed, and that the masses of Japan would not have supported it.

4.0 p.m.

I confess that I was puzzled by the attitude of the Foreign Secretary. I am not suggesting that the question was an easy one, but I was rather glad that the Foreign Secretary had chosen the branch of the law that he did. If he had been in the police force, and I blew a whistle for him because someone had suddenly overrun my house, I am afraid he would have stopped first of all to ask for the title deeds of the house, in order to send them round to a friend in Lincoln's Inn for investigation as to whether I had any title and whether there were any rights of way for other people. While my house was being overrun and my family were being ill-treated, an inquiry about title deeds would have been rather cold comfort to me. The Foreign Secretary said that he would not take sides, and I think that that was a definite encouragement to the Japanese militarists—again I do not say to the whole of the people of Japan. There followed the Government of Manchukuo, a Government finally recognised in September of this year by Japan prior to the issue of the report of the Lytton Commission. Well, you have the Lytton Commission's Report, a very detailed, very careful, very balanced report, and we want to know this afternoon what the Government are going to do on that report. They say it is a League of Nations matter, but we want to know what our representative on the League of Nations is going to do on the Lytton Report. I believe that that report gives a great opportunity to vindicate the authority of the League of Nations, perhaps the last chance of the League of Nations.

I suggest that there are very vital issues involved. First of all, the question of China itself and Manchuria itself. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman would be the last man to underestimate the question of whether equal justice is going to be dealt out to a weak oriental country. Secondly, I am sure the right hon. Gentleman perfectly well knows the effect which the action of the Western powers might have on the nations of the East. Thirdly, and most important of all, I say that the handling of this question is vital to disarmament. I do not believe that if we fail over Manchuria we shall get France to go in whole-heartedly for disarmament. I do not believe that you will get Germany to reject all idea of rearmament. I do not believe that you will get Japan to give up what her Imperialists desire. We ask the Government whether they will take the Lytton Report as the basis of their policy on this matter?

Next I want to turn to disarmament. I believe that we have reached a very critical stage in the post-War period. I think I may say that there are three stages in that period. There is, first, the time when everybody is sick of war, but the world is still full of hatred and unrest. There is the second stage when war horror is still strong, but when nationalist illusions and hatreds are weakened. There is a third period when war is beginning to be forgotten, and when militarism, bred too often by despair, is raising its head. I believe that we are, perhaps, at the very end of the second period, and are approaching the danger of entering the third. It seems to me that the Governments with a real desire for peace in the leading countries never seem to synchronise. As soon as you get a Left Government in one country, you get a Right Government in the other. Just at the time when you find one country standing on its feet for its rights, another comes along, perhaps suddenly and unexpectedly, in favour of peace. To-day we have to take advantage of these strong peace tendencies, which, I believe, still exist in this country, and I believe are stronger in France than at any time since the War. But it seems to me that just when France is most ready, our Government—not our country—has become tepid.

Let us look at the records of the Government at Geneva. Whenever proposals for disarmament come up, whether from Italy, Russia, the United States or elsewhere, there is always the tendency to say that they are not bona fide, that there is something -behind them. I think we have treated them, as I say, tepidly. We are proud to think that we have done a great deal for disarmament, but I think that our attitude has sometimes been, or at any rate appears to the outside world to be like the Pharisee who said Lord, I thank thee, that I am not as other men"— French, German or even Russians. I have reduced my armaments more than anyone else. I am ready to give tip submarines, which I do not want, and tanks over 20 tons which I have not got. But when it comes to action, when we pass from general declarations and come down to business, we are like the other Powers, we always Compound for sins we are inclined to By damning those we have no mind to. That is the attitude of every Power. See what has happened. You had the Italian proposal of Signor Grandi for the abolition of ships over 10,000 tons, aircraft carriers, submarines, tanks, heavy guns and fighting aircraft. There was not much response, but we put forward a counter-proposal. The right hon. Gentleman brought forward his famous qualitative disarmament resolution. We were to scrap or internationalise all those "aggressive" weapons which were prohibited to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, but surely this was made farcical by Admiral Pound's declaration that a battleship was not a weapon of aggression. What can you do on that? We then had the Hoover plan agreed to in principle—another of those diplomatic phrases—but the whole plan was whittled away. All tanks under that plan were to be abolished. We said "Oh, no—all tanks over 20 tons;" that is to say, we keep the greater number. All bombing planes—" Oh, no, we have a limitation." Ships—there have been discussions about tonnage. Yet surely the vital thing in disarmament is that the United States and Great Britain should act together. The third point was the abolition of private armament manufacture. The whole thing was rather pooh-poohed—the idea that countries were at all influenced by armament manufacturers. My hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) referred to a document at Question Time, and we have heard of Mr. Shearer and the Comité des Forges. We know the influence of armament firms in this country as well. Now we have a French plan. What will be our response to that? How far are we able to go ahead on that? I hope that it will not break down in the discussions of experts.

I will now say a word with regard to Germany's claim to equality of status. I think that the Foreign Secretary was most unhappy in the response he made to Germany's claim. It was suggested that that claim had been made at the last moment. That claim has been put forward month after month. The Foreign Secretary took a strictly legal line. I think it is generally admitted by everybody that on the broad principle we cannot deny equality of status to Germany, but the vital question comes in: Is that going to be done by disarmament or rearmament? Now we say that if we have equality, it would be absolutely fatal if you coupled that with rearmament. We must voluntarily accept the same limitations as those which we put on Germany. In passing, I would say that these are not easy questions, but I do think that efforts to answer them have been damped by the action of our representatives. What is the cause of the right hon. Gentleman's failure? The right hon. Gentleman has very great qualities. He is a great advocate, but it seems to me that when he gets to a Disarmament Conference he sometimes forgets for whom he is briefed. He seems to think that he is briefed on behalf of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and not the common people of this country.

It is a grave mistake, I think, to go into a Disarmament Conference surrounded by a retinue of military and naval experts. Suppose any of us were to go into a conference the main object of which was to reduce the over-consumption of intoxicating liquor, and we had with us a licensed victualler, a brewer and a distiller, and that after a few moral speeches we committed the practical details to these gentlemen. I do not think that the brewers and distillers want people to drink too much. I know that the Navy, Army and Air Force men do not want war, but the fact is that if you put people whose mind is all the time working on war, you are not going to get good results. I will tell the House what I would do if I were a delegate to a Disarmament Conference. I would take with me as experts, first, a man who had wintered in the Salient., or been through the Somme or Paschendaele. He could give a very good idea as to whether a tank was an aggressive weapon or not.

Major-General Sir ALFRED KNOX

Have not the Army experts been through the Somme?

Mr. ATTLEE

I am not denying that. I am saying I believe that in these things the truth is often hidden from the wise, and revealed to humble men, and that the ordinary, simple soldier who has been through it would give a better view than the man whose ideas are necessarily taken up with higher strategy. Then I would take for Naval Disarmament a man before the mast, an ordinary rating who had been torpedoed; and on the question of gas I would take a man who had actually been gassed. Then, if I wanted to discuss the question of the bombing of civilians by aircraft., perhaps I would take the mother of some child who had been killed by bombing. If other countries were furnished with similar advisers, I think we could speedily reach a very large measure of agreement on disarmament. It is a grave mistake that at these conferences we do not get representatives of all points of view in the country. If the League of Nations had originally been formed by delegations from assemblies such as this House, and people of like views in foreign delegations, we should have avoided this vitiation of so much of our foreign affairs by always lumping people together, and personifying the ordinary common people of this world with entities called nations, and therefore right away from realities.

The policy we ask the Government to carry out is, first of all, full support of the League of Nations. I say that the answer to this question is a vital one. We hope that they are going to support the Lytton Report. Secondly, acceptance of the principle of equality of status, provided there is no rearmament. I believe that there is a very great danger, even with the best intentions in the world, of permitting rearmament, in however small a degree it may be. On the other hand, we must get rid, after all these years, of this division of the nations into the sheep and the goats. That can be done by a qualitative disarmament on the basis of the limitations placed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles—limitations which were laid down and prepared by the greatest military and naval authorities of that time, and were based on the principle that, if you cannot get complete disarmament, you should, as far as possible, restrict aggression and make the defence stronger than the attack; and, further, by acting on the principle of accepting, at least, the measure of disarmament quantitatively proposed in the Hoover Plan. Also, we should stand, I believe, for the abolition of the private manufacture of armaments, and for a rigid inspection by an international body of the armament factories of all nations.

I am not a great believer in mere negations in this matter of war. I believe that what we have to do is to try to build up a constructive internationalism, and I believe that the most fruitful suggestion which has been made in this regard is that relating to the internationalising of civil aviation. If we can begin to build up these economic ties between nations on an international basis, if we can get an international civil aviation force—and I believe that an international civil aviation force would be a very fine force, with all the high traditions of all the air forces—we shall have taken a very great step forward.

I should wish that to be only a prelude to a far greater degree of internationalisation, particularly of transport, for, after all, modern warfare on this huge scale depends on transport, I would like to see an international mercantile marine, and the doing away with all navies save such naval forces as might be necessary to restrain piracy. I would like to see an internationalisation of all the great Continental railway groups, and I believe that the suggestion in this direction which has been made by France should be welcomed and supported by our Government. I know that there are objections to such a course, and I can sympathise with them, on the part of people who have been running these matters from the national point of view and thinking in terms of nationalities, but I have listened to a great many discussions on air warfare, and I do not believe that you have a defence against air warfare at the present time. I do not believe that you can restrain air forces as long as you have nationalised civil aviation, and I believe that, unless air warfare is restrained, civilisation will be wiped out.

The lesson of the difficulties of disarmament; the lesson of the Manchurian trouble, seems to be that the very thing which was maintained in the treaty with regard to China, that is to say, the absolute sovereignty of the individual State, will have to go into the past, and all the States will have to submit to a lessening of their sovereignty in favour of a greater sovereignty. I hope that we are going to have from the Foreign Secretary something that will bring hope to all lovers of peace in this country and in the world. We are discussing this question on the eve of Armistice Day, a day of peculiar solemnity, on which we necessarily recall more fully than at any other time the sacrifices that were made in those four years, and on which we re-dedicate ourselves to the cause of peace. While we are thinking of those friends of ours overseas in those wonderful cemeteries scattered up and down the war area, the Foreign Secretary can give a message that will cheer the hearts of those of us who are left by the feeling that we have been trying to carry out the wishes of those who have gone beyond.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon)

A day was secured for this Debate by the Opposition on the ground that they wished to move a Vote of Censure, and, as they declared that to be their objective, good Parliamentary custom establishes that they are entitled to the day. I think that in any case it is well that we should have a discussion on these gravely important matters, but I confess to a, little surprise on learning from the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down that that which was got for the purpose of moving a Vote of Censure on the Government is to be regarded as nothing more than an opportunity for everybody to accept the Resolution which has been moved. In fact, the Resolution, subject to certain observations which I wish to make, is couched in terms that will appeal to all, and the Vote of Censure has completely disappeared. I will deal first with the Manchurian matter, and here I have a short statement to make as to the present position of the Manchurian question which I think has been overlooked by my hon. Friend in the speech that he has made. The Lytton Report is available to Members in the Library. I think that half a dozen copies have been there provided, and I very much hope that most Members of the House have found time to study it. I regret that it was not possible to make it a Parliamentary Paper, but it has never been the custom, even in extravagant days, to distribute gratis to all Members of Parliament documents which are not produced by the Government or under its authority. There are, however, as I have said, some copies in the Library.

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman that it would be difficult to praise the Lytton Report too highly. It is one of the most readable documents; its moderation is very striking; it is written with a real sense of sympathy and of true statesmanship, and with what is very necessary in this connection, namely, a real sense of perspective. I remember very well an earlier Debate in the House in the course of which I urged that it was necessary to listen to the case for both sides, and I received extremely short shrift from some hon. Gentlemen opposite. No one, however, can read Lord Lytton's Report without seeing that he at least has been anxious to study this question and to present it fairly from both points of view. The Report is remarkable from the fact that, besides being a unanimous report, it is a report to which the chosen representatives of five different nations have lent their signatures. I was very much pleased to hear the hon. Gentleman as my colleague on the Indian Statutory Commission point out that that report also was unanimous. The Lytton Report is specially to be regarded because it was unanimous. I thought then, and I think now, that that is a most excellent maxim, and I hope he will extend it in reference to the Indian report to all his friends on that bench. This Lytton Report represents the view of five nationals, including, as the House will observe, a United States member, Major-General McCoy, and therefore, unquestionably, it is a document of very great importance indeed.

I wish to associate myself with what has been well said by the hon. Gentleman about Lord Lytton himself. The hand of Lord Lytton runs throughout the document, and we ought to remember that the greater part of the report was drafted by him from a hospital bed in Peking in the month of August, that is to say, a time of year when the ordinary resident of Peking, if he can afford to do so, flies off to the hills or the sea. I feel that the whole House would wish to let Lord Lytton realise how gratefully we regard, not only his tact and his leadership, but his courage and his persistence. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]

I come now to the point where I part company from the hon. Gentleman in his speech. He has spoken very slightingly of the action that has been taken in the Manchurian matter, and particularly of the part which the British representative is supposed to have played, but, in fact, the appointments to the Lytton Commission, the methods of the Commission, and the inquiry conducted by the Commission, from first to last represent the policy which was adopted as the outcome of discussions at the League with complete unanimity, and to no small extent at the instigation of the British representatives. The appointment of the Commission was resolved upon in December, 1931. It was important to choose the best possible representatives, and that took, I think, a month. They arrived in the Far East in February of this year. They worked very hard, and visited very widespread areas. Their report was agreed and was signed as an agreed report in September, and it was released to the Japanese and Chinese Governments on the 1st October. Without in the least detracting from the personal work of these devoted men, I am entitled to say that the report is the out-come of League policy about Manchuria.

4.30 p.m.

The hon. Gentleman asks us by this Resolution here and now to declare what action we will take on the findings of the Lytton Commission. If it were not for one circumstance, which I will mention, I should have no hesitation in giving him a very straight answer on that point, but I imagine that the hon. Gentleman is aware of the following facts. At the end of September, just before the Lytton report was about to be released to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, at a meeting of the Council of the League at Geneva a request was made by Japan for a short interval, to enable the Japanese Government to study the report when they received it, to prepare their own observations, and to deliver them to Geneva before the Council undertook the examination of the report. If there had been a rejection of that request, if indeed there had been any member of the Council who voted against it, I could quite understand the suggestion that to-day, on 10th November, before the Japanese observations have been received, this Government should pronounce judgment. The hon. Gentleman is very fond of twitting me with being a lawyer, though I am not conscious of the fact that it is necessarily a disadvantage when you are trying to keep a straight head in difficult affairs. But I have to lay down this legal proposition—and anyone may challenge it who likes—that it is not fair and it is not right, after you have promised to listen to and to read the observations of one of the parties, to pronounce judgment before you have ever seen them. I will leave that entirely to others. As a matter of fact, at the meeting of the Council of the League the Chinese representative was present. He took up a position which I sympathise with entirely and tried to support. He said, "If there is to be any postponement, let us have a definite period fixed; otherwise, we may have unlimited delay."

The President of the League on that occasion was Mr. de Valera. He was not particularly anxious to assist the British Government in the matter, he was acting with complete impartiality to all concerned, and he made a most admirable Chairman. He took the matter in hand and discussed what would be reasonable, and a compromise was reached which was not opposed by anyone and, as a result, it was decided that down to 14th November should be allowed for the Japanese to prepare and to present their document, that it was to be circulated and received on the 18th, and Mr. de Valera himself acting, as he did throughout, with the most admirable impartiality to everyone, has decided that there is to be a meeting of the Council on 21st November after we have studied the Japanese document.

I think I carry the whole House with me when I say it is not reasonable and it is not right to ask the British Government, when that is what we have all pledged ourselves to do, to come here on 10th November and satisfy a demand, however reasonable in itself, when we have never seen the document which the Japanese are now sending to Geneva and when we promised, as every other member of the Council has equally promised, to give no decision until we have seen it. Therefore, I content myself with saying that I associate myself entirely with what has been said as to the striking character of the Lytton Report. No one can fail to be impressed with the fact that such a document should have been reached unanimously, but I am sure the House will agree with me when I say that we are bound in this matter to play fair, having promised to do it. What there may be in the Japanese observations I do not know, but I am perfectly determined for my part not to commit my country to any judgment on the subject until I have heard what they have to say. We shall continue to act, as we have acted throughout, in loyal co-operation with the League of Nations on the whole matter. It is the greatest possible mistake to suppose that good is done by individual preliminary declarations. We shall hope to act, we mean to act, with the League of Nations as a whole, and we have a further ground for satisfaction in knowing that, anxious as this situation is, unsatisfactory as it is in many respects, we have in this matter been able to act not only side by side with other members of the League of Nations but in the closest co-operation and good faith with the United States of America. So much for the part of the Motion which deals with the Lytton Report.

I come to the other and tremendous question of disarmament. The hon. Gentleman has repeated his credo. I think almost every second sentence that he pronounced declared his belief in this, that and the other and, while he speaks always with the greatest courtesy and politeness, his disbelief in me. I must put up with that and endeavour to deal with the matter on broader lines. Let us come straight to the heart of the question. There is a great question raised which is often expressed in the phrase "equality of status." It assumed very great im- portance when Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in July. It is formulated very carefully in the German Note which was addressed to the French Government at the end of August, and it occupied, and rightly occupied, a great place in the very forefront of the attention of all of us who really care for promoting by practical means the cause of reconciliation and peace in Europe. I cannot help thinking that in our intense desire to solve this problem we sometimes simplify a little too much.

Equality of status, as the present German Government understands it and expounds it, involves not one thing but two things, and we must have a clear view about both. It involves, first of all, that to which the hon. Gentleman has referred, the question of the list of permitted weapons, the question of whether the world shall go on on the basis that there are instruments of war forbidden to the defeated Powers and permitted to the rest of the world. That is only one of the two applications of this principle which must he steadily examined. The other claim put forward in the German Note is a claim to reorganise German man-power by, for example, reducing the period of service of their long-service army from 12 to six years, or perhaps less, the establishment of a militia for the training of 40,000 men for three months in each year, together with a number of other things. I am not pronouncing either for or against these things at the moment. What I am saying is that anyone who really wants to inform himself or who is going to take part in meetings and discussions, as many of us will be doing in the next few days, about disarmament, ought to have clearly in mind that those two things are involved and not only one; first, the question of the permitted weapons, and, secondly, the question of the reorganisation of German man-power.

Both those questions were raised in the German Note which was addressed to the French Government. It was, so we understood, the original intention of the German Government to enter into confidential relations with France and to initiate discussions with France alone before opening the question with others. Now that we see how things have been working out, I take the liberty to say I think that method was unfortunate. This is a matter which affects others besides Germany and France. It lies at the root of reconciliation in Europe, and I believe that there are other countries, our own included, which could contribute an influence and a help about this which makes it a very undesirable thing to keep it as a simple Franco-German discussion. Disclosure of the fact that there was to be this special discussion led to what I would call long-range firing, some of it misdirected or misunderstood, whereas what was wanted, and what is wanted now, is a meeting face to face to find a basis on which Germany can return to the Conference with honour to herself and advantage to us all in order that we may between us cleave out a way to peace.

Whatever may be wrong in the conduct of this difficult matter—none of us is always right—there is one thing I am perfectly clear about, and I hope the House will support me in it. I claim that the British Government did perfectly right in making strenuous efforts to bring these parties together. We took some risk. It is not a very pleasant thing for a Foreign Minister or a Prime Minister to make a proposal for a meeting that does not come off. We knew the risk about it, but what we felt was that this thing will go from bad to worse unless we can get Germany to enter into friendly and personal discussions not only with her neighbours in France, but with Italy and ourselves and, we hope, with the United States, and we took the risk of saying that we were ready at any time, as soon as possible, to facilitate that meeting. We did it, not for the purpose of supplanting the Disarmament Conference, not with any desire to put. Geneva in the shade, but because, believe me, if you are going to restore the situation which has been so seriously dislocated, it has to be done by communications between those Powers and those statesmen who are themselves intimately interested in the immediate adjustment of the difficulty. We had the hope, and I am within the letter of the truth when I say we had reason to hope, that Geneva would have been found to be a place where this meeting might have taken place, and it would have had this great advantage, that, obviously, it is much easier for the United States to be avail- able and to take part in such discussions in Geneva than anywhere else, because the United States are already there and are deeply interested in the Disarmament Conference. I can only say we still hope that that may happen.

In the meantime, there are one or two most important events which have occurred on which I should like to say a word. First of all, I should like to present to the House one or two reflections upon what is called the French plan. It has not, in fact, as yet been produced as a plan, but it has been the subject of a speech made by M. Herriot in the French Chamber, where he secured a great majority in its support. It has been the topic of a more detailed explanation given the other day at Geneva by M. Paul-Boncour, the head of the French delegation. Whatever may be said about the details—I will go further and say whatever may be said about some of the structural features of that plan, the first thing I think we all ought to recognise is that it is inspired by a spirit to reach agreement with Germany which we cannot but commend. There are three points about it that I will mention. First of all, it represents a definite effort to meet the German claim for equality of treatment. That is the reason, no doubt, why, as far as one can learn, in some quarters in Germany it has been received with a good deal of approval. The proposal which it contains, drastic as it is, that the home armies of the different nations of the Continent shall all be based upon the same principle of short-term enlistment is, at any rate, an effort at equality. I have noted that one of the observations made about the plan in Germany is this: whether it is a good scheme or a bad scheme, at any rate, it is an admission that the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles are not sacrosanct. That is a feature which is of very great interest in connection with the French plan.

There is a second feature of it which must mention—and which I am certain the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) with his record of service and his great contribution to the cause of peace by the method of developing peaceful pacts, will have closely noted—the proposal of the French plan for pacts of non-aggres- sion to include European Continental nations, which, owing to their proximity to one another, are more particularly exposed to certain common risks. That is a proposal which it seems to me ought to have the heartiest sympathy of Britain. In particular, we note that the French proposals do not, as we understand them, ask from this island anything further than the engagements we have already entered into on the basis of the Covenant and the Locarno Treaty.

Let me take the opportunity of saying—and I think that I speak for all here when I declare this—that we take those engagements—the engagements in the Covenant and the Locarno Treaty—seriously. It is an essential part of British policy, however the Government may be composed, that every such engagement given by us must be entered into, not lightly or inadvisedly, but discreetly and carefully. It is for that very reason that we note with much satisfaction that the French plan is not calling upon us to enter into further engagements of that sort. I think that I am entitled in this connection to remind the House of the declaration made the ether day at Toulouse by M. Herriot. It was quoted with great effect by the Lord President of the Council at the Guildhall last night, because it is a testimony of which any Briton may be proud. M. Herriot said that it had never occurred to him to doubt the signature of Great Britain. Then let us be very sure that we never give our signature unless we really mean it.

In the third place, the French plan contained a reference to the doctrine initiated by Mr. Stimson in the phrase, that the signature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact involves a change in the whole conception of neutrality. That is to say, if war, as an instrument of notional policy, has been outlawed by the signatories, then, in that case, it can no longer he a matter of pure indifference to the nations not involved in a future conflict that an aggressor nation has resort to war. I only wish to make this observation upon that very important declaration of Mr. Stimson. The full implications of that doctrine need most careful thinking out, for what is involved is nothing less than an important branch of international law which deals with the rights and the obligations of neutrals. Things of that im- portance cannot possibly be disposed of in a phrase or in a speech, but in the view of His Majesty's Government this requires to be analysed in all its bearings and consequences, and, important as the conception would be in any case, the House, I am sure, will agree with me that it is more than ever Important because a thoughtful American statesman coming from the United States, which is not a member of the League of Nations, has thrown this idea into the common pool and invited us to reflect upon it.

The comments which I have just made on the French plan lead me to deal directly with the attitude which, as it seems to us, the British Government ought to take up in reference to the German claim for equality. Let me in this connection first say that, in dealing with the German claim to equality of rights in the matter of armaments, as it is presented in the German Note of 29th August, it is very necessary, as it seems to the Government, to insist that the main purpose of disarmament is to ensure a lasting peace. Disarmament has other advantages; it saves money. But, after all, that is the first and primary object which everybody desires. The limitations which were imposed by Part V of the Treaty of Versailles upon Germany, and the corresponding limitations imposed by other treaties on other defeated Powers, were imposed, wisely or unwisely, as a means of securing in the circumstances then existing the peace of Europe.

I have never at any stage hesitated to proclaim that undoubtedly these limitations imposed upon Germany were intended to be and were expressed to be the precursor of the general limitation of armaments. The hon. Gentleman opposite really did me an injustice when he thought that the British Note was full of legal propositions. I aimed at getting rid of a series of merely legal propositions in order to insist that the principal issue is a moral and not a legal issue. I must be allowed at this point to say that our own Government—I mean by that the Government of this country however it may be composed—should not be under any special reproach in this regard, for our country has, in fact, made immense reductions and sacrifices. I cannot put the point better than it was put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) who was with me at Geneva. He made a speech on the very day I think that the Resolution of July was being passed. This is what my right hon. Friend, then my colleague, but alas my colleague no longer, said on behalf of the National Government: On the basis of the figures published in the League Armaments Year Book it will be found that the expenditure of the United Kingdom on armaments has been reduced between the year 1925 and the year 1930 by 15 per cent. Since that date further reductions have been made which give a total reduction of 20 per cent. in seven years. If a simple cut were made in armaments expenditure on the basis of the present year, that would not represent an equal reduction as between countries which in recent years have largely reduced their budgets and countries which have not done so. The former would be required to make their cuts twice over, whereas the latter would only be required to make them once. My right hon. Friend went on: That has a most important bearing upon the whole system of international conferences, the success of which is so momentous to the organisation of mankind. After an interval of years, there will probably be a second Disarmament Conference, and if, at the present time, no account is taken of reductions already effected, when the second conference comes nearer various States which might be in a position to reduce their expenditure would wait until the year of the conference for fear credit should not be given to them for such reductions. From the point of view of precedent, therefore, and taking a wide view of the future, it is essential that the Conference should not ignore the reductions already made. I am the very last to use that quotation or to make this observation with any idea of getting out of the duty of further reduction. But we have come, as the Lord President of the Council said last night, to the end of unilateral reduction. If allowance is made for what has been done by every successive Government during recent years in this country, we are ready along with others, in an international conference, to promote drastic and effective reductions yet further. I do not want to quote figures from other countries, but if those figures were examined it would be found that there are some prominent countries where the claim which we are entitled to make for successive reductions over the last half-a-dozen years certainly could not be made. I say, therefore, that we recognise that the limitations which were imposed upon Germany were intended to be and expressed to be the precursor of the general limitations of armaments.

How are we to deal with the situation presented by the German claim? Here is the position. Now, when an agreement between the nations of the world for the reduction and limitation of armaments is being initiated, Germany claims—I think she very naturally claims—that the methods of limitation which have been applied to her, or which are to be applied to her in the future, should no longer be different in nature from the limitations applied to the other nations. I speak with the authority of the Government when I say that the United Kingdom Government have throughout been ready and anxious to join the other Governments represented at Geneva, including Germany, in framing a Disarmament Convention which would fairly meet that claim. There has been hesitation. But why has there been hesitation? Any hesitation which might arise in any quarter does not proceed from the desire to inflict upon Germany permanent inferiority of status. It is said by ex- tremists here and there, but it is not the general intention. The hesitation has proceeded from anxiety as to the use which might be made of the new situation and from fear of the resulting dangers which might threaten the tranquillity of Europe. That anxiety may be unfounded, but our Governments would most strongly urge that it is, nevertheless, the highest wisdom to endeavour to remove that anxiety.

5.0 p.m.

We would suggest that side by side with the fair meeting of Germany's claim to the principle of equality the European States should join in a solemn affirmation that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between themselves by resorting to force. The world is entitled to this specific assurance. The acknowledgment by others of the moral right of Germany to parity of treatment with other nations, entails upon Germany, along with others, the acceptance of this corresponding obligation. If the hopes which we have and the belief which is so widely held as to the honest and friendly purposes of the great German people are justified, we feel that there is no reason why that assurance should not be given, and I do not associate myself with those who may be tempted to say that an assurance of that sort is not worth having. It is worth having, for the disregard of such an assurance on the part of anybody would mobilise world opinion and domestic opinion to a large extent against the disregard of that assurance.

On the assumption that some such assurance is given, I wish to state, quite definitely, the view which our Government take as to the way in which the German claim for equality of right should be met. I am not describing a programme or giving details, but there are three large heads to be considered. First, there is the question whether the limitation of Germany's armament in the future is to be contained in some special document which is binding upon her, like a peace treaty, or whether the limitation of Germany's armament is to be expressed in the same document and by the same sort of process as the armaments of others. Our view is that the limitation, of Germany's armaments should be contained in the same Disarmament Convention as that which will define the limitations of the armaments of others. That is to say, that the Articles of Part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles, which at present limits Germany's arms and armed forces, would be superseded, and Germany's limitations would be arrived at by the same process and expressed in the same document as those of other countries. That is equality of treatment as regards documents and methods.

Secondly, comes this point, and it is a very grave one. It has to do, not with documents, but with the duration of the Convention. We take the view that the newly expressed limitations in the case of Germany should last for the same period and should be subject to the same methods of revision as those of other countries. It would not appear to be practical politics, and indeed I believe it would produce an exactly opposite result from what some people imagine, if anyone at this time of day tried to prescribe a perpetual proscription for one great people while for themselves and their neighbours they claimed merely a limited period. We come, thirdly, to the most complicated and difficult subject of equality of status from the point of view of the instruments of war that are permitted to the nations of the world. I will do my best, Mr. Speaker, to obey your injunction, but here I would read a passage and would say: Germany has declared that she has no intention of rearming, but that she merely desires that the principle should be acknowledged that the kind of arms permitted to other countries ought not to be prohibited to herself. If equality of status is to be conceded, this principle must be acknowledged, and the United Kingdom Government are prepared to declare their willingness, in co-operation with the other members of the Disarmament Conference, to see that principle embodied in a new Convention. By what means and by what stages this principle can be applied must be a subject of detailed discussion at Geneva.

In that discussion it is absolutely essential that Germany should join. In the meantime may I, on behalf of the Government, make two points? First, what is the object of the Disarmament Conference. Its object is to bring about the maximum of positive disarmament that can be generally agreed upon, and not to authorise, in the name of equality, increases of armed strength. The second observation I would make is this, that the full realisation in practice of the principle of equality cannot as a practical matter be achieved all at once. Nothing but disagreement would arise if that was attempted. Confidence is what it depends upon. Confidence in the further application of the principle will grow as it is seen that the peace of the world has been made more secure by taking the first step. Therefore, the Government conceive that what is needed is a practical programme of stages, each subsequent step being justified and prepared for by the proved consequences of what has gone before. Of course, a similar principle would be applied in the case of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

I have endeavoured, I hope at not too great length, to make clear to the House what is the view which the Government take of the principle involved in this all-important matter. I cannot attempt, and I do not think the House would ask me, to declare in a cut and. dried plan, in this detail and that, how this should be worked out. In the first place, the German Note recognises that the method of application is a matter for discussion and negotiation, and our object is to get Germany back to the Conference to discuss it. In the second place, I am following exactly the method that was followed in France; that is to say, a statement was made in the French Chamber, which I am glad to think received overwhelming support, as I hope our statement will receive to-day. Thereafter a declaration in more detail was made at Geneva, but the full French plan is not yet available. We shall and we must take the same course. I am hoping to go back to Geneva at the end of the week. It is only right that the Disarmament Conference itself should have as early an opportunity as anybody to learn what are the methods and processes by which we suggest this plan might be worked out, but the House of Commons is entitled to have, and the Prime Minister authorises me to say it that it shall have, at the same time and no later, information in exactly the same detail.

Allow me to say, lastly, that what we have attempted to do is in no sort of way to set up a rival to anybody else's plan. I know very well that you can earn an immense amount of popularity at Geneva and elsewhere by announcing that you have a plan. The thing that is really important is to bring the best possible friendly suggestion to a common discussion for the purpose of bringing Germany, France, Italy, America, ourselves and the smaller States round the Table again to apply the principles of disarmament which I have announced. I am very willing to incur the reproach, if reproach it be, that there is nothing spectacular in this mode of procedure. What we are endeavouring to do on behalf of the country, and we ask for the confidence of the House in our efforts to do it, is not to achieve some spectacular success but to transmute into practical and effective form the overwhelming desire and the passionate hope of the British people to see disarmament an accomplished fact.

Mr. MICHAEL BEAUMONT

I think all hon. Members will have derived a great deal of comfort from at least that portion of the speech of the Foreign Secretary to which we have just listened. We must all recognise that the right hon. Gentleman's statement has shown a genuine and constructive effort to achieve what has hitherto defeated the combined brains and the combined attempts of various Powers to achieve, some constructive form of disarmament which would really make for peace. As the right hon. Gentleman has said the object of disarmament that he proposes, is peace. Disarmament in itself and by itself is of singularly little avail if the spirit behind it is not the spirit and the will of peace. You can make and enforce agreements but; unless people want to keep them, and unless they are prepared to do so willingly, any country can drive a coach and four through them, while adhering strictly to the letter of them. Anyone who has been in Germany recently knows perfectly well that, although the disarmament clause of the Treaty of Versailles has reduced Germany's armaments enormously, it is possible to keep up a body of trained and disciplined men, not trained actually in the use of arms but ready at any moment to be so trained and to become an effective military force, and to do that within the limitation and within the letter of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty.

Bearing that in mind, it is useless to imagine that the mere signing of disarmament documents is going in itself to bring peace. Therefore, I welcome the statement by the Foreign Secretary that he realises that it is only by the peace spirit, by stimulating a genuine desire for the settlement of grievances, that this disarmament is going to be of service. That brings me to another point. He said that if the German claim for equal status was to be recognised it must mean that all the Powers in the new Disarmament Pact must guarantee that they would not in their relations with each other in any circumstances resort to force. We shall have to put something effective in the place of force to which they can resort for the settlement of differences. I should like the House to consider what is the trouble that is preventing us at the present time from getting the disarmament that we all say we want and that f think we all genuinely do want. It really amounts to the grievances which arise from the status quo, from the Treaties, on the one hand, and on the other hand from the fear of certain people that what they gain by the Treaties may be lost if they are not considered inviolate. The trouble during the last 14 years has arisen because no proposal for altering the status quo has ever received proper consideration Those who are discontented with the status quo, whenever they have put forward a desire to alter the conditions under which they live, have always had the feeling that the dice were loaded against them.

I spent a good deal of the summed holidays in Germany, and among all classes of the community there the feeling is that life under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles is perfectly intolerable and that an ultimate revision of that Treaty must be conceded if they are to go on. I am not commenting as to whether they are right or wrong, but that is the feeling of the whole German people as expressed to me by Communists and Social Democrats, by the highest and the lowest. I well remember a discussion with a Communist deputy of the Reichstag who talked of internationalism, but made it perfectly plain that he only meant internationalism after the Treaty has been revised. I do not blame him. Like every other country Germany is in an appalling economic situation, and there is no question that there are many provisions of the Treaty which are perfectly indefensible. No one who knows anything about Central Europe would suggest that the Treaties are perfect and cannot bear alteration. The point I want to emphasise is this, that the great block to peaceful settlement and genuine disarmament is the feeling which is steadily increasing, that the League of Nations has not formed an effective safety valve for the ventilation of grievances. Wrapped up in that feeling is 90 per cent. of the trouble with regard to disarmament.

Let me say a word about the Manchurian question, because it is germane to this discussion. A League of Nations in which you can trust and to which you can sacrifice some portion of your national sovereignty must be a League of Nations which is going to face difficulties and not decline to act until someone has taken an illegal action. Without reviewing the Manchurian question, roughly the situation was this; that Japan felt that she was suffering intolerable grievances, that the League of Nations would do nothing to put them right and she took the law into her own hands. That may be wrong, but, nevertheles, it is a spirit which will come up more and more unless we get into the League a determination to face difficulties and see them through, however unpleasant.

There are burning questions all over Europe to-day which have to be settled. If they are going to be shelved and put on one side, or an award given in favour of the stronger Power, then all the disarmament in the world is perfectly useless because you will have a feeling of indignation and intolerable discontent which may sweep away all the effects of your peaceful agreements, your pacts, your legislation and disarmament. I feel sure that the Foreign Secretary will do everything in his power in this respect. I do not often agree with Mr. de Valera but there was a great deal in what he said in his Presidential Address at the League of Nations, and I hope that side by side with the disarmament proposals of the Government, and the actions of the Government, they are going to get the conciliation machinery working properly. If we can get the peoples of the world to substitute some other form than armed forces for settling their differences then they will be only too pleased to disarm quicker than treaties and machinery can be devised. It is the feeling, a growing feeling, that there is no alternative way for getting a difference settled except by taking over that action, and if we can once get rid of that feeling we need have no fear that the cause of disarmament will suffer.

Mr. GRAHAM WHITE

The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, in his opening sentences, commented on the terms of the Motion upon which the discussion is taking place and said that he thought it was desirable that a discussion should take place on these important matters. During the last two or three days we have been discussing unemployment on non-party lines, and I think it is equally desirable that this discussion should proceed on the same lines. Whatever the Motion may be I hope there will be complete agreement that the discussion to-day is well worth while, because we have had a statement from the Foreign Secretary which, I think, is an important addition to the alleviation of the European situation which has taken place during the last few weeks. If I had been asked a few weeks ago what I thought of the European situation I should have had to say that I felt it was more anxious and more alarming than it had been at any time since the War, but I fell to-day that we are entitled to take a more hopeful view of the situation, and the statement of the Foreign Secretary will contribute to that end. I was pleased to hear his observations with regard to the new French plan. It is difficult to discuss or pronounce a final judgment upon it, but the proposal for the reduction of the long service armies a reduction in the period of service for conscript armies; if it is a step to organise them on a militia basis is one which will be heartily welcomed. I do not wish to be critical, we have not yet seen the agreement, but a mere change in the character of the personnel of these armies without any reduction in weapons would not be an acceptable proposition. I was pleased to hear the Foreign Secretary say that these proposals in his opinion were helpful and that they would receive the careful and sympathetic examination of His Majesty's Government.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman was pressed to give certain information with regard to the policy which has been pursued in Manchuria. I think it is clear that it is impossible for the Government to say anything more than they have said to-day. We are fully conscious of the gravity of the situation there, and I should like to associate myself with every word he said as to the statesmanship and personal contribution of Lord Lytton to that very important State document which the Commission has produced. In Manchuria a very vital decision has to be taken in the not very distant future, and in Europe, in relation to the German claim for equality of status, an equally grave decision has to be taken. What is involved in these decisions is really the survival or disappearance of the whole fabric for the maintenance of peace in the world which we have been seeking to build up since the War. In that connecnection may I recall with satisfaction the statement made by the Lord President of the Council last night at the Guildhall, when he said: We are as desirous as any other country in the world to proceed and proceed rapidly, with that substantial disarmament throughout the world which we believe is essential to the cause of peace. If those words have any meaning they mean that the Government policy is based on the maintenance of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in my judgment that is essential in regard to the decision which has to be taken on the Far Eastern question and on the German claim for equality of status. The Foreign Secretary quoted from a speech made by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George).

Sir J. SIMON

It was a quotation from a speech made by the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel).

Mr. WHITE

That was just a slip of mine. I only mention the matter in order to explain that my right hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) is absent to-day at an engagement which he made when it was supposed the House would not be sitting to-day. I do not regret that the German claim for equality of status has been made at this time. Nobdy can say that the world has been over-hasty in the matter of disarmament or in carrying out the pledges involved in the Treaty of Versailles. It may be argued that the time taken is a measure of the difficulties of the situation. I do do not regret that the German claim has been made now because it will put an end to the constant delays and bring the matter more quickly to a satisfactory conclusion. I am in complete agreement with what the Foreign Secretary said as to the spirit and method in which the German claim should be met, and in particular that in any Treaty or Covenant which may be arrived at to deal with the German claim there should be no separate document for Germany, but that every nation included in the Treaty of Versailles should be included and its position defined in the new Treaty. That will go a long way, I hope, towards bringing about an amelioration of the tension, so essential if our civilisation is to be saved. My right hon. and learned Friend referred to the statement of M. Herriot at Toulouse. An equally important factor in the situation is the overture for a new treaty of co-operation between France and Italy; the holding out of the hand of good will between France and Italy is an event which will have a sensible effect on the general European situation.

5.30 p.m.

Let me pass from that to a somewhat different and wider consideration. There is an immense potential capacity for recuperation in the world to day, and we will make a great mistake, I think, if we conclude that most of the causes of our present depression are due to reasons which can be defined as purely economic. A great measure of the depression of today is psychological in its character. One of the reasons why it has been so hard to make any impression upon that atmosphere in the world has been the absence of hope and the prolonged nature of the negotiations which have been dragging on from year to year. In the early part of this summer there was indeed a period when this hope appeared to come to the world, when the undoubted success of the Lausanne Conference brought a new hope to the peoples of the world. The whole of this generation is seeking for a sign, and the sign it is seeking is clear and definite evidence that the countries of the world are not only capable of working together for constructive purposes, but that they intend to pursue that course. As soon as that evidence is clear—we hope that events are making in that direction—there will be immense natural forces released for recovery, and they will do far more than any proposal made in the House during the three days Debate on the relief of unemployment.

That short period in the summer time, when we seemed to have that hope arising from Lausanne, was indeed dissipated by the negative results of the Peace Conference, but the Government may be quite sure that if they are pursuing the policy which they have laid down to-day they will have behind them the steady support of that great body of informed opinion which exists throughout this country. I think that the nature of public opinion in this country on the subject of peace and disarmament has undergone a profound change in the last 10 years as a result of the immense educational efforts that have been made. The science of peace has become a serious study for the first time in the history of the world. As a result of the efforts made it is probable that public opinion on the subject is to-day better informed on that subject than on almost any other aspect of our public affairs, People are following these matters with the greatest possible interest and anxiety. If policy is pursued on the lines which the Govern- ment have indicated to-day the Government may count upon the support of this informed public opinion.

I would mention one other matter on the general subject of the alleviation which is likely to ensue if these matters develop satisfactorily. They will immediately give an impetus to the solution of a very large number of problems which at present are difficult, if not insoluble. In particular they will have a very beneficial influence on the whole question of international indebtedness. I do not intend to say one word of my own on the subject of the European-American debt, because I hold very strongly indeed that the less said on that subject in public the better. But I venture to relate to the House the experience of a friend of mine who was delivering a lecture recently in America. At the end of his lecture, in which he had approached the subject of European indebtedness, there uprose in the body of the hall a questioner who put three questions to my friend. The questioner asked: "How much, Sir, is the European bill for armaments in the current year?" The answer was: "A sum of £500,000,000." The second question was: "Of that sum how much is the British share?" The answer was "£114,000,000 or thereabouts." Thirdly, the questioner asked: "How much is the payment which you have to make annually to the United States in respect of the debt?" The answer was: "About £35,000,000." The questioner then said, "Thank you, Sir" and sat down.

I merely mention that incident as illustrating effectively an attitude of mind which may be very materially altered if it is seen that we in Europe generally are pursuing a policy which will lead to disarmament. I repeat, that if the Government are pursuing their policy on those lines, they may count upon the support of a great body of informed opinion. It would not he ungracious to add that if their policy is not pursued on those lines they will have a body of critical opinion against them, and they will not be supported.

Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN

The House showed at Question Time some little jealousy regarding the amount of time occupied by Ministers and ex-Ministers in the course of Debates. I hope it will not be thought impertinent of me to take a part in the discussion now proceeding. I can plead at any rate that I have not occupied much time in the present Parliament, and I shall not now occupy more time than is necessary to develop certain ideas which I think it my duty to submit to the House. In the first place, I must say a word or two on the subject of the Sino-Japanese difficulty. It is quite true, as the hon. Gentleman who opened this Debate said, that it is impossible to dissociate the consideration and prospects of disarmament at Geneva from the ultimate issue of what has been passing before our eyes in China and Japan. I do not share the criticism which the hon. Gentleman directed against the Secretary of State for not having declared himself more definitely in that conflict at an earlier stage. The power of the League of Nations lies in its capacity to treat the parties to a dispute with perfect impartiality, with great patience, with a sympathy which can understand their hopes and fears and difficulties, which will endeavour to ascertain and place before the world the facts of the dispute, and then to mobilise on behalf of the settlement which it recommends the moral opinion of the world.

All of us are prone to think at different times, and above all when we are discussing disarmament, of the physical risks to which a nation may expose itself if its armaments are insufficient in comparison with those of other nations in the world. But there is a risk which no nation, however strongly armed, can afford to ignore in these days, and it is the risk of entering on a quarrel in which the opinion of the world will declare her in the wrong, with consequent reactions which will inevitably come among her own people as they are called upon to make the sacrifices of blood and treasure which the struggle entails, and which will determine the attitude of every neutral Power—if neutral Powers there still can be—to the combatants engaged. That we should arrive at a peaceful issue of the Sino-Japanese dispute, through the deliberations of the League, is of great consequence because of the effect which it must have upon the mood in which every nation approaches the question of its own disarmament.

I will refrain, as my right hon. Friend rightly refrained at this stage, from com- menting in any detail upon the Lytton Report. I would like to associate myself with all that he said about it, and about Lord Lytton's personal contribution, and, as one who has nothing but friendly feelings for Japan, who treasures the memory of our old alliance, and is indeed one of that dwindling band who at a critical moment in Japan's history, just before the battle of Tsushima, approved in Cabinet our Anglo-Japanese Treaty—as one who was part author of the Alliance and valued it, and who cherishes to-day, when the Alliance has passed away, the same friendly feelings to that country, I would appeal to the statesmen of Japan to give a fair and candid consideration to the facts set forth by the representatives of five nations commissioned by the League, and to the inferences which are to be drawn from their conclusions, and to make it easy, shall I say to make it possible, for their old friends to maintain their old admiration for that island Empire. I will say no more upon that subject.

I turn now to the broader question, not of a particular dispute, but of disarmament. I regret that the Motion which we are discussing was presented to the House in the form of a Vote of Censure. I dissociate myself from what, I think, was the unreasonable and unfounded criticism by the Mover of the Resolution of the past actions of the Government. My right hon. Friend and his colleagues have not sought for themselves praise and I do not attribute to them blame. They have not sought to produce a plan, regardless of its acceptability, regardless of the conditions in which it would be put forward and regardless of the feelings of those with whom they are dealing and whose assent must be obtained. They have not sought to gain credit and kudos for themselves by propounding a scheme and taking the applause which would follow. They have played what I think is the true role of the representatives of a nation so close to the Continent that every shock which passes through the Continental nations reaches it, so near to the points of anxiety and trouble that no disturbance of European peace can be indifferent to it, and yet, sufficiently removed, partly geographically and still more by association and membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations, from the immediate quarrels, rivalries and jealousies of the Continental nations. They have sought, not so much to produce a scheme for themselves as to bring all nations into some scheme—whether our own scheme or the scheme of others is a matter of indifference—which shall give us a wide measure of disarmament and fortify the sense of peace and strengthen the confidence which are needed for the solution, and even for the fruitful approach to any of our political, economic, military or other problems.

Is it too late to make an appeal to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues? They, of course, put this Motion down without any knowledge of the kind of statement which the Foreign Secretary was going to make. I venture to say of that state-merit that it is not merely a speech; it is a new factor in the situation, with immense possibilities for good and that all of us, wherever we sit, weighing our own responsibilities and thinking of the great issues involved, ought, on this occasion, to set aside the quarrels and criticisms of the past and take our departure from this new statement and send our Foreign Secretary to Geneva with the widest national backing, the most universal national mandate that we can give him to strengthen his hands in the policy which he has declared. I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues to reconsider their Motion, and I should like to move, but I will not move unless it has the right hon. Gentleman's assent, a simple statement in which, without criticism and without preamble, we would record that this House unanimously approves of the statement of policy made by the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary.

I am not one who has ever allowed himself to despair of the success of the Disarmament Conference. That is not because I underrated, or even now underrate the difficulties, but because I think the results of failure would be so grave for everybody that no nation can take the responsibility for failure upon itself in the face of the world. In the last few weeks we have had two or three very encouraging signs. We have had the renewed assurance from the head of the Italian Government of the resolution of that Government to pursue a peaceful policy and to co-operate with the League of Nations, and I am glad to think that, throughout these difficulties, as far as one without official information like myself can judge, there has been for the solution of the difficulties a close and cordial co-operation and I think a most satisfactory measure of agreement between the Italian Government and our own.

In the second place, there have been M. Herriot's speeches to which allusion has already been made. No one who knows M. Herriot can doubt his sincerity or his earnest desire to promote friendly relations between France and her neighbours and peace throughout the world. I like to recall that M. Herriot, then, as now, President of the Council and Foreign Minister, was the first Foreign Minister with whom I verbally discussed the proposals which ultimately became the Treaties of Locarno. When I went to him at that time I think—indeed I know—that the message which I carried was in some ways a disappointment to him. Like our present Prime Minister and still more like the late Foreign Secretary, M. Herriot had been one of the prime architects of the Protocol of Geneva, and I had to tell him that the British Government were unable to ratify it. I had to tell him that the time for a Franco-British or Anglo-Belgian alliance with a point against Germany, in substitution for the Anglo-American guarantee, had gone by and that the only basis on which we could act was the basis of the proposals put before us shortly before by the late Dr. Stresemann. He accepted. It is true that he remained only a short time in office and that it fell to M. Briand and myself to work out the ideas which I had adumbrated to M. Herriot, but Locarno was M. Herriot's policy as much as M. Briand's or Dr. Stresemann's or mine, and that man has come back to office today with the same earnest desire for peace that I saw when I first met him in those older days.

In those two speeches, not for the first time, he has held out the hand of friendship and made advances towards reconciliation between the French people and their neighbours across the Rhine and between the French people and the Italian people. These things are hopeful. These things have within the last few weeks greatly improved the prospect, and now comes the statement of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. He called our attention to the fact that he propounded no new plan; that, above all, he propounded no plan in rivalry with the suggestions that came from elsewhere. But he laid down in clear, simple explicit terms the principles upon which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, any settlement ought to be founded. Broadly speaking, excluding all that is immaterial to the point which I am now discussing, what he said was that we were prepared to accept the German claim for equality of treatment, but we attached to it a condition. These two things go together and have rightly been put together by His Majesty's Government because without the condition which he attaches the realisation of our hopes for disarmament is impossible.

6.0 p.m.

The Mover of the Motion I thought permitted himself some rather cheap sneers at my right hon. Friend as a lawyer and he also talked in a way which is common cant of the military, naval and air experts blocking the way to disarmament. If you consult military, naval and air experts as to what conditions are required for your safety, you place upon them a great responsibility. They will answer you according to their knowledge and will, if I know anything about them, not understate the insurance which you ought to make, because if there is any understatement and anything afterwards goes wrong the responsibility will be theirs. But the ultimate decision does not rest with the military, naval and air experts; it rests with the politicians. They have to take their risks also, and they have to take a wider, broader view than it is proper that the experts should take when advising upon their particular problems. We need not trouble too much about committees of experts which seem to raise more difficulties than they solve. It comes back at the end to this one question: Are the political conditions in which we live such as make it possible to contemplate further disarmament? That is the question which has to be answered by the politicians. The answer does not affect and cannot be given by military, naval or air experts. It depends upon political considerations and must be answered by politicians and statesmen. It is because the answer to that question is so doubtful and not because the ex- perts could not agree that disarmament has made so little progress. It is on the answer to that question that the ultimate success or failure of the Conference will depend. I hail, therefore, with great satisfaction, the coupling with that declaration of their readiness to satisfy the German demand, broadly and subject to examination, by stages, and to afford the same treatment to the other countries which are subject to similar treaty provisions in regard to disarmament—I hail with great satisfaction the coupling with that statement of the invitation, and indeed of the condition, that all the nations of Europe shall, at the moment of this disarmament, unite in a solemn affirmation that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future difficulties between them by resort to force. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the world is entitled to that specific assurance, and the known readiness of the Governments to make that assurance as part and parcel of, or at the same time as, the Disarmament Convention which they sign will greatly facilitate agreement upon the terms of the Convention.

It may be said that there is no need, that all the nations with which we are concerned have signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact renouncing war. Germany, has signed the Locarno Treaties, not alone the one which concerns the Western countries, but those Treaties which bind Germany and her Eastern neighbours to settle all future disputes arising between them by peaceful means; and yet do we find that those obligations, voluntarily undertaken—I am not now talking of the Peace Treaties, though I do not wish to make too great a distinction between Treaty obligations of one character or another—inform the policies of the German parties and the speeches of German statesmen? If my voice carries to Germany, I would beg the German Government, the German parties, and, above all, the German people to help those who are trying to help them.

My right hon. Friend's declaration vis à vis them is a generous one. We are taking risks when, so shortly after the War, and with no great assurance that ally large change has taken place in public opinion, we make that declaration. Have they no contribution which they can make? I find that many of those who have worked hardest for disarmament here and in other countries have been surprised, disturbed, and rendered anxious by utterances and actions of people whose position in Germany makes it impossible not to take notice of them. We want to see in their speeches, in their policies, the loyal acceptance of their Treaty obligations. We do not ask that they should abandon hopes which we would not abandon ourselves, which, in reverse circumstances, France would never have abandoned. We do ask of them that they should recognise that the law of Europe must be based upon its treaties, and that treaties must only, can only, be changed by agreement. It is not asking anything much.

When the Locarno proposals were under discussion I made an endeavour to explain them to this House, and perhaps the House will permit me to read a few words. I said, in reference to the German proposals: If I understand them rightly, they amount to this: that Germany is prepared to guarantee voluntarily What hitherto she has accepted under the compulsion of the Treaty, that is, the status quo in the West; that she is prepared to eliminate, not merely from the West but from the East, war as an engine by which any alteration is the Treaty position is to be obtained. Thus not only in the West, but in the East, she is prepared absolutely to abandon any idea of recourse to war for the purpose of changing the Treaty boundaries of Europe. She may be unwilling, or she may be unable, to make the same renunciation of the hopes and aspirations that some day, by friendly arrangement or mutual agreement, a modification may he introduced into the East, which she is prepared to make in regard to any modification in the West."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th March, 1925; col. 318, Vol. 182.] I had only a short time resumed my seat on that bench when I received a message from the German Ambassador urgently desiring to see me. I had to listen to two speeches before I could leave the Debate, but I then went to my room and invited the Ambassador to come and see me. He told me that in what I had said I had gone beyond what was authorized by the German Government. I naturally said that that was a most serious matter, and I tried to ascertain exactly what he meant and in what point he thought I had overstepped what their communications to the British Government had authorised me to say. I put to him specifically this question: "Do you mean that the German Government reserve to themselves the right to use war as a, means of changing the Eastern frontier?" I said, "If that be so, I have indeed misunderstood you, and there is but one thing for me to do. I must go back into the House." I did not disguise from him that it would be a very disagreeable and a humiliating thing to have to do, but I said, "It will be my duty to go back at once into the House and say that I have misunderstood your proposals and that the whole situation must be reconsidered."

I could not get any precise statement from him as to what the claim was. Accordingly, my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council, then Prime Minister, repeated, in other words, the substance of this statement at the conclusion of the Debate, and we telegraphed the passage from my speech and the passage from his to Lord D'Abernon, asking him to explain the circumstances in which we put these passages, and asking that we might be informed whether, in what I had said, and in what the Lord President of the Council, then Prime Minister, had said, we had gone beyond the intentions of the German Government. We got back a confirmation from the German Government of the view which we took of their position. That was, that they voluntarily abandoned any idea of revising the frontiers of Western Europe, and that, while they could not abandon hope of securing revision of the Eastern frontier, they excluded war as an instrument for securing it. May I trouble the House with the words, not of the main Treaty of Locarno, but words which occur in the Preamble of the Treaty between the German Reich and the Polish Republic and the similar Treaty between the German Reich and the Czechoslovakian Republic? They are as follow: The President of the German Empire and the President of the Polish (or Czechoslovak) Republic, Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland (or Czechoslovakia) by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries; Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals; Agreeing to recognise that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent; And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States; Have decided to embody in a Treaty.… and so on.

All that the friends of Germany ask of Germany is that she will, in daily life and in her daily relations with the neighbouring nations, observe, in spirit as well as in letter, the obligation that she has undertaken to respect the Treaty basis of Europe until that Treaty basis is changed by common consent. It is not asking them to abandon all hope. The Treaty basis has changed by common consent, and is changing. The Treaty right to keep foreign troops in occupation of the Rhineland till 1935 has been given up, the Treaty right to reparations has been given up, the Reparations Clauses are gone, and we have come to the Disarmament Clauses.

My right hon. Friend has declared, on behalf of this Government and with, I believe, the assent of all parties in this House, that we are again prepared to revise the Treaties by common consent in Germany's favour. A time may come come when some other and further revisions may be made, but it will not come, and disarmament may become impossible, unless those in whose favour we waived the past Treaty stipulations, in whose favour we now put ourselves on a new equality with them, make clear to us all that in their mind as in ours the purpose for which they seek equality is not that they may make war, but that they may feel as secure as the rest of us. If they preserve peace no one wilt make war. I think that my right hon. Friend's speech and the declarations of M. Herriot are an invitation to the German people and the German Government to respond in the spirit which has been shown, to allay the doubts caused by speeches of people in high places as to whether any treaty, however sound, however voluntary, however recent, is anything more than a scrap of paper.

If they will give us that assurance, no one will more profoundly welcome it, and if they will conform to it their common daily relations with other nations, no one will more heartily rejoice than I, whose pride it will he to my death that I have, at any rate, made two great efforts for peace between antagonistic nations. The fate of those agreements, whether they be with the Free State of Ireland or with Germany, lies in other hands than mine, but I know that if Gustave Stresemann were here to-day, he would hold out his hands to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, he would welcome the declaration that he has made, and he would not hesitate to repeat the declaration which he solemnly signed at Locarno and for which, after a great struggle, he secured the ratification of the German people that henceforth Germany looked for the redress of her grievances to peaceful negotiations with other parties, and not to the sword by which she perished.

Mr. COCKS

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) has addressed to the House a very impressive argument, and I will respond to his appeal to the extent that I will not couch any criticisms or observations I may make to-night in a tone of extreme partisanship. It is a little too much, however, to expect us to say here and now that we fully accept the statement made by the Foreign Secretary for as far as we can understand it without having seen it in print, it does not fully satisfy the rightful aspirations of the people of this country. The right hon. Member for West Birmingham said that he felt uneasy at certain utterances of people in high places in Germany. I am certain that that uneasiness has been shared by a good many other people, but when we consider the attitude of mind of the present rulers in Germany, must we not consider also why the present Government in Germany is there and why that particular school of thought is so prevalent? Are we ourselves altogether free from blame in the matter? Is not the present attitude of German statesmen the reflection of the despair and almost the hopelessness with which Germany has seen her rightful hopes thwarted through many long years? I have an extract from a leader which appeared in the "Times" last September, which appears to me to bear on that point. The "Times" states: The flamboyant missionaries of ultra-nationalism would never have obtained anything like their present hold in Germany if, during the 11 years that have elapsed since the Peace Treaty was signed, the signatory Powers had shown any real determination to carry out the obligations of Article VIII, and to reduce their national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.' The best way to develop a new spirit in Germany and to encourage those elements in Germany which will work, as the late Herr Stresemann did, for peace, would be to fulfil our pledges as given in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and to do our best to secure that the coming Disarmament Conference is a real success.

The Foreign Minister, in the opening of his speech to-night, said that he did not intend to deal with the merits of the Manchurian dispute because he had not yet had the opportunity of seeing the Japanese reply. I do not intend for the same reason to go into the merits of that problem, but I want to say a word or two on the principles upon which those merits should be examined and judged. I appeal to the Foreign Secretary, when he is examining this question and considering the Lytton Report and the Japanese reply, to use his influence in the discussions that preceed judgment to support in every way the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington. I hope also that he will interpret those principles in the plain sense of the words as they are understood by ordinary people. I do not think that I shall be accused of indulging in cheap sneers if I suggest to him that the highest ornaments of his own profession known in history are not those who have merely gained a position by forensic ingenuity and the interpretation of phrases and clauses in certain dialectical ways, but those great judges in whose judgments are enshrined the great principles of English justice which have been handed down as lamps to guide the feet of subsequent generations. I say this because I believe that it is of the highest importance in the Manchurian question that the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as most people understand them, shall be absolutely justified and vindicated.

It can be said of the Foreign Minister that in the whole of this controversy he has not shown any anti-Japanese prejudice. The British Government cannot be accused of being prejudiced against what the right hon. Member for West Birmingham called our ancient ally. For that reason, they will be in a strong position if, when a decision has to be made, they find that they support, generally speaking, the proposals of the Lytton Commission rather than any counter-proposals made by Japan. Without trying to suggest what the judgment will be, I am entitled to say—and it is right that it should he said—that it would be a disaster if that controversy ended in the Covenant of the League of Nations being flouted, and if it were shown that members of the League of Nations could not rely upon the principles of the Covenant and of the Kellogg Pact to protect them against aggression. If it ended like that, the consequence would be disastrous not merely in the Pacific, but throughout the world. In the Pacific it would mean that great navies would have to be built to defend the possessions of those who have interests on that ocean. Australia, New Zealand and British Columbia would have to be defended by a new navy. And as far as the world is concerned, it would mean the end of the League of Nations and the failure of all our hopes of disarmament.

6.30 p.m.

There is a school of thought which looks upon the League of Nations as a small child which suffers from infantile diseases which it can outgrow and which holds that we must not expect too much from the League at this early stage. It may not be able to prevent war—so runs the argument—but we must have patience and, as the years advance, the League will grow stronger and will, in the end, become a shield for peace, which it is not at the present time. That attitude was expressed very well by the right hon. Member for West Birmingham in a statement which he made a few years ago. Speaking at a public dinner, he compared the League of Nations with the growth and slow development of the power of the House of Commons since the days of Henry VII. He said: I want the progress of the League to be as gradual, as ordered, as imperceptible as our own constitutional progress. I venture to suggest that that is a false analogy and a dangerous comparison. The existence of the institution of Parliament or some similar organ of government is inevitable. It does not depend upon its conduct. Any country must have a Parliament or some corresponding organisation through which the voice of the people may be expressed and by which taxes are raised. You may have a, weak or a corrupt Parliament, but the institution of Parliament will go on and will gradually develop. There is, however, no essential necessity in the same way for the League of Nations. It is important that it should exist, but it is not the organ of a world state. Its existence is not inevitable. It has been set up by two forces—the force of hope and the force of fear. It was set up by people who hoped to build up gradually a finer system of organisation through which to remove the causes of war. It was set up also by those who feared the consequences of another war and hoped to erect a shield and a defence against that danger; but if the League of Nations fails when a crisis arises, then hope will fade also, and those who feared a further war will say to themselves, "The League of Nations is not defending us against war, is not defending us against attack; therefore we must go back to the old method of the strong man armed and trust for our defence to our own right arm." The danger is that if the principles of the League of Nations are not carried out, the League itself will vanish. A comparison of the growth of the League of Nations with the growth of Parliament during 400 years might be considered if one could guarantee that peace would be maintained for 400 years, during which the League of Nations could develop, but we cannot guarantee peace for six years, or even six months, and if the League of Nations cannot maintain peace then, if war comes, the League will be swept away with many other institutions.

Having studied this question of disarmament for 14 years, having read piles of documents and miles of speeches delivered at Geneva and elsewhere, I find that one of my chief impressions is that the French policy of saying that security must precede disarmament is the right one. I have always held that to get disarmament we must first have security rather than try to get security by disarming. That is why I always supported very strongly the Protocol of Geneva which I believe the right hon. Gentleman rejected through the influence of the late Lord Balfour. I have always thought its rejection was an international disaster. I believe it marked the greatest advance towards world peace that has ever been attained, and I believe it is absolutely essential and fundamental to get back either to that Protocol or to some organisation based on similar principles before we can get complete and final disarmament—to some system, that is, which defines the aggressor, which sets up a tribunal by which all disputes can be settled definitely, and which guards the attacked State against the aggressor.

Although we have not got that complete and perfect organisation, have we not got certain guarantees which will enable a good deal of disarmament to be brought about? I think we have. First of all, we have the Covenant of the League of Nations, especially if those principles of the Covenant are always supported to the full. Secondly, we have the Kellogg Pact. Regarding the Kellogg Pact, I wish to know why the Foreign Secretary wants a new affirmation to be made by Germany—and by other European States—not to resort to war to settle any dispute, because that has already been agreed to by those who have signed the Kellogg Pact. I do not object to a promise being made over and over again, but I sec no particular benefit in asking them to say again what they have already said by signing the Keilogg-Briand Pact, except that the second promise would be limited to Europe, whereas the Kellogg Pact is worldwide in its application. Thirdly, we have the interpretation of the Eellogg Pact by Mr. Stimson. The Foreign Secretary said something which I thought was rather over-cautious. He said the implications of the Stimson speech required careful thinking out. Why? Mr. Stimson said that consultation between the signatories of the Kellogg Pact when faced with a threat of its violation became inevitable, and went on to imply that if a war took place through a nation violating the Kellogg Pact there would be no neutrals at all, because no nation could take up an attitude of indifference and neutrality in a case of that kind. I should like whoever is to reply for the Government to say whether he does not accept that particular implication. If war takes place through a nation violating the Kellogg Pact, is it possible for any other signatory of the Pact to take an attitude of neutrality; is it not certain that every nation will be dragged in on one side or the other?

Those are some of the securities we have. Then we have the new French principles enunciated by M. Herriot in which he suggests that there should be a sort of chain of pacts, regional pacts, among the various countries in Europe, which would give additional security—a large number of smaller Locarnos. Taken together all these if they have not the completeness and the perfection of the Geneva Protocol have, in my view, certainly given us guarantees sufficient to produce a certain amount pf disarmament. How far can we go in disarmament? The subject is far too serious a one for us to try to impart any humour into this discussion, but I think a great mistake was made in sending the question of what weapons are offensive and what defensive to expert committees. Such meticulous examination of the question is very harmful. I suppose all weapons are both offensive and defensive. Take the case of an ancient warrior armed with a sword and a shield. One might say that the sword was offensive and the shield defensive, but the shield, especially if there were a pointed boss in the middle of it, could also be used as a very offensive weapon, and I have no doubt that in the hand-to-hand combats in the old days such a shield caused many deaths. When you extend that shield and develop it till it covers several people, and then fit it with wheels, it may become a tank: the defensive weapon has become offensive. The spectacle of naval experts arguing that a 35,000 ton battleship was a defensive weapon, whereas the submarine, which smaller nations use to keep the battleship as far away in the offing as they possibly can, was offensive, was really one to make angels weep and gods blaspheme.

Instead of going into that precise and meticulous examination between one weapon and another, why cannot we adopt the broad standard laid down at Versailles, which was decided in a few hours? Why cannot one take as a standard the weapons forbidden to Germany? Why cannot all the nations at the Disarmament Conference agree to abandon every weapon which was forbidden to Germany? That is the first suggestion I would make. Secondly, there is the point which the Foreign Secretary raised about the German army. That is met, it seems to me, by the French proposal to substitute a militia. There are two parts to the French proposals, as far as we know them, because, as has been said, they have only been explained in two speehces, and we have not got the plan worked out in print. First of all, every nation is to have a militia, lightly armed and without the heavier weapons. If for the present German ten-year army there could be substituted a militia of that sort it would place Germany upon an equality of status, especially if we all agreed to abandon the weapons forbidden to her.

As to the second part of the proposal, which was for special national armies, highly professionalised and highly mechanised, to be used only in the service of the League of Nations, and whose weapons would be locked away in a cupboard in some neutral country, I think that is rather a fantastic idea and not one to be recommended. But I think we ought to support the militia proposal because it would help to meet German views on equality of status. If, on top of all this, we could have a Hoover cut of one-third of our armies and our navies, we should have got a long way towards disarmament. The claim of the Foreign Secretary that we cannot start by cutting all round, because we have already disarmed to some extent, is a very dangerous one. Other countries make the same claim. The French say that by abandoning the three years' system for the one-year system they have made a tremendous cut in their military power. But, after all, why should the nations regard 1918 as a sort of basic line, and say they have disarmed from that standard? Because, after all, 1918 was a year in which all countries had heavily swollen armaments though to a different degree in different countries.

I would like to ask whether we are satisfied with our present naval and military position relative to other countries. Do we think we are in a weak position as compared with other nations? If we do, it is the duty of those responsible for our defences to increase our forces at a greater rate than our opponents. If, however, they are satisfied with our present position vis-à-vis other nations, surely there can be no objection to having a still further all-round cut on the present existing lines. I believe it would be possible for us to go to Geneva and ask for disarmament on the lines I have mentioned. The House will agree that it would he absolutely disastrous if the Disarmament Conference failed. If it fails now, the only alternative will be to arm. The nations will arm, and will embark upon another armed race, by land, by sea, and by air. Following upon that, as closely as a man is pursued by his own shadow, will come war, under the waters, in the air and on the land, until civilisation cracks beneath the strain and the Vesuvius of revolution opens out beneath our feet.

Sir ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND

I beg to move, in line 1, to leave out from the word "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words: this House, having heard the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, approves it and assures His Majesty's Government of its support in the vigorous promotion of a policy of limiting and reducing armaments by international agreement through the Disarmament Conference at Geneva; expresses its appreciation of the efforts already made by the Government in that direction; and also its approval of the determination of His Majesty's Government to continue their loyal co-operation with the League of Nations in dealing with the Sino-Japanese dispute. By your leave, Mr. Speaker, I have inserted in the Amendment as it appears upon the Order Paper certain additional words. May I make quite clear why I move this Amendment? When I look at the Motion which was moved by the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee), I find these words: the British Government should give clear and unequivocal support to an immediate, universal and substantial reduction of armaments. I have no objection whatsoever to those words. I take the further words: on the basis of equality of status for all nations. Again I have no objection, provided that in each case we make precisely clear what we mean. As is known to the House, this Motion was asked for as a Vote of Censure upon the Government, and the terms in which it was moved by the hon. Member for Limehouse were those appropriate to a Vote of Censure. That is the reason why I move this Amendment, which I saw described in one of this morning's jou