§ MR. HAYTER
said, that before an answer was given by the Government, he wished to call the attention of the House to the present condition of the Militia, though he could not now, as he had intended to do, move—That the Militia being now reduced in available strength of rank and file by nearly one-half of the entire number borne upon their establishment, it is expedient to adopt the recommendation of the Militia Committee of last year—viz., 'That a Peace Establishment be given to the Militia, reduced, exclusive of staff, to seventy-five men per company.'The hon. Member said that it was an appropriate time for considering that subject, because the system inaugurated by General Peel, and afterwards adopted by Lord Cardwell, of having a large Militia Reserve which might, on an emergency, be summoned to join the active Army, had now been subjected to the crucial test of actual experiment. The Militia and Army Reserve had responded to the call lately made upon them in a manner which reflected the highest credit on the individual men, and also on the excellence of the system adopted under General Peel and Lord Cardwell for the formation of Reserves for our small Army in this country. But, however, excellent that might be as an experiment for the active Army, at the same time it was, under existing arrangements, altogether destructive of the Militia—the backbone of our actual fighting Reserve. Instead of having a Militia Force amounting in round numbers to 120,000, we had, according to the latest Return, not more than half that number of men on whom we could rely. In 1875 the nominal establishment was 123,000; but we had really only 101,000 enrolled. In 1876 the nominal figure was 118,349; but we had only 100,217 enrolled. He was speaking only of the rank and file. Last year we had a nominal Militia establishment of 120,650; but the number really enrolled 1419 was 103,298. From that number he had to deduct upwards of 27,000 who had been called upon as Militia Reserve men to fill up the active Army. That reduced the number to 75,000. The number of men who were absent on the day on which the efficiency of the regiments was tested had increased from 10,000 to 15,000 last year. Those 15,000 must be deducted from the 75,000, and the effective strength of the Militia was thereby reduced to 60,000. There was no jealousy towards the Militia upon the part of the Volunteer Service; but if it was to be the main support of the Reserves, his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War must draw tighter the reins of discipline to make the Militia Force come out as on former occasions, or be effective in times of emergency. Within the last fortnight the Under Secretary of State for War (Viscount Bury) stated in the other House that in the Militia there were 102,877 efficients; but when they deducted the Militia Reserve men who had joined the Army, amounting to 27,343, and the number of men absent without leave on the day of inspection, amounting to 15,007, there remained 60,527, against a nominal establishment of 120,650. There was no difficulty in accounting for the deficiency when the state of the following Militia regiments was taken into consideration:—He had selected these regiments as the weakest from the official list, and it would be found that they came from the manufacturing districts in Lancashire, from the Metropolis, from Scotland, from the mining county of Cornwall, from two Midland counties—Northampton and Rutland—and from the purely agricultural counties of Devon and Wilts. For example—The 2nd Devon, whose establishment in rank and file was 800, had present at inspection only 332; wanting to complete, 468. The 4th Lancashire, establishment, 1,200; present at inspection, 432; wanting to complete, 472. The 5th Lancashire, establishment, 1,200; present at inspection, 573; wanting to complete, 536. The Northampton and Rutland, establishment, 1,400; present at inspection, 742; wanting to complete, 597. The 2nd Surrey, establishment, 1,000; present at inspection, 339; wanting to complete, 531. Wilts, establishment, 800; present at inspection, 480; wanting to complete, 302. Aberdeen, establishment, 800; present at inspection, 1420 289; wanting to complete, 489. Cornwall Rangers, establishment, 800; present at inspection, 371; wanting to complete, 384. The total number of those present at the inspection of these regiments was 3,658; but the total of those who were wanting to complete their establishment was 3,765. On the other hand, he was glad to say that these things might be altered. The Hertford Militia, on the day of inspection, had 598 men out of a total strength of 800; while the regiment had sent 188 men to the Army. Fourteen only of their total establishment were wanting, and only two of their Reserve men failed to join the colours. Militiamen who had joined the Army were liable, under an Act passed by General Peel, to serve the remainder of their five years with the Militia. He (Mr. Hayter) was not alone in thinking that a great many of these men might be disposed to change the terms of their engagement, if admitted to do so by a short Act to be passed for that purpose, and join the Army Reserve. They had possibly contracted a taste for soldiering amongst the comrades with whom they had been thrown; and, at any rate, should be allowed an option as to continuing their service with the colours. If only the half of their number joined the Army Reserve, that Reserve would be risen at once to more than double its present proportions. As for the Militia Establishment, it was really a War Establishment; and he would ask, whether it was advisable to keep up a nominal War Establishment which within the past three years had not been approximated by 17,000, 18,000, and 20,000 men?
§ LORD ELCHO
said, he was glad that the subject had been brought forward, seeing that it affected a Force which had been said to be, and which he believed really was, the backbone of the Army; and he regretted that the Government had not taken steps to prevent things remaining so long in their present invertebrate and unsatisfactory state. The Force had always been short by 20,000 or 30,000. The remedy proposed was reduction; but the Secretary of State and the Government of the day had allowed things to remain in this condition, and had not taken the necessary measures to keep the Militia Forces in a thoroughly healthy state. With regard to the suggestion to reduce the numbers, he was afraid that if such a 1421 proposition was carried into effect, the numbers would get small by degrees and beautifully less. He considered it to be the duty of Government, who were responsible for these matters, to take such steps as the Constitution placed at their disposal to bring into the Force, by inducements or otherwise, a sufficient number of men to keep up the establishment. When General Peel created the Militia Reserve, his intention was that it should be maintained in excess of the established strength of the regiments, and that for every man who volunteered from the Militia to join the Reserve, the colonel of the regiment should be allowed to raise another to fill his place. He ventured to say that such a course would be found beneficial.
§ COLONEL NAGHTEN
said, he knew what trouble and expense asking for Returns caused; but, nevertheless, he would like to know how much Militia Reserve men had cost? They were all astonished and delighted at the way the Reserve men answered to the call; but he could not help thinking the same number of men, or more, might have been obtained by giving £2 or £3 bounty to single men, who had served two or more years in the Militia; and, by that means, many married men would not have had to leave their wives and families on the parish, and a good deal of money might have been saved to the country. He would suggest the reopening of the retirement scheme to the adjutants under the old system; and those adjutants who had joined as young men, and wished to remain on, might be allowed to count their former Army service and Militia service for honorary rank, as given to Militia officers. It would be a great advantage to all ranks to know what description of quarters a regiment would have to occupy beforehand, as almost every year he knew, from experience, that within 24 hours of being called out the officers did not know whether they were to be quartered in billets, forts, or under canvas. If the War Office authorities and the Quartermaster General's Department would think over this matter during the winter, and more consideration was shown to the Militia, it would increase the popularity of the Force.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT
agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend that it 1422 was the duty of the House to support the Comptroller and Auditor General in every way they could. Having served on the Public Accounts Committee, he well knew the value of that gentleman's Report. The Committee looked most carefully into any item brought before them, because they thought it was their duty to prevent any money which had been voted by the House for one particular purpose being appropriated to any other purpose. He, for one, objected most strongly to the way in which the £3,500,000 was voted. When money was voted in a lump sum, the House had no control over the expenditure of it. With regard to the Militia Reserves, he thought that the men who had been called out ought at the end of their temporary service to have the option of joining the Army Reserve if they proved themselves efficient soldiers. This would have the effect of adding nearly 30,000 men to the Army Reserve, though the men elect to go into that Reserve, and would also enable the Militia to be filled up to its proper number. A slight alteration of the existing Act would be necessary in order to make this possible, but he thought there would be no real difficulty in effecting what was necessary.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVRE
said, he thought it would be as well to postpone the further consideration of the question until after the Public Accounts Committee had reported. As he understood the matter, a sum of £300,000 was voted for the purpose of constructing a tactical camp in the North of England; but only a small portion of land had been bought in furtherance of that object. The War Office, however, had appropriated £150,000 of this money to extend the camp at Aldershot, and had purchased two or three commons, which were at present just as much at the disposal of the troops at Aldershot for the purposes of manœuvring as they were at the disposal of the public for recreation. That proceeding appeared to him to be very unwise, and he certainly must protest against money voted by Parliament for a specific purpose being diverted into a different channel. He hoped the question would not be finally settled until after it had been considered by the Public Accounts Committee and reported upon to the House.
§ MR. DILLWYN
said, he was glad that a supporter of the Government had, 1423 brought forward a subject in which the conduct of the Government had been called in question. It was highly necessary that Parliament should look more closely after this matter. The various Departments were too ready to lay hold of unappropriated balances, and transfer them from one purpose to another.
§ COLONEL NORTH
supported the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) that the men in the Militia Reserve should be allowed the option of joining the Army Reserve, if they chose, after completing their term of service with the Force to which they belonged. The Militia Reserve had come forward on this occasion in a manner that was deserving of all praise. It was generally supposed that the Reserves of the Army and the Militia were due to Lord Cardwell; but the credit in connection with, the Militia Reserve was due to General Peel.
§ MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN
said, there could not be a more important point connected with the whole range of the Army Estimates than that to which his hon. and gallant Friend (Mr. Hayter) had drawn attention; and he thought that the hon. and gallant Gentleman had done well to treat it separately before the House went on with the Estimates, lest it might then have been swallowed up in the consideration of other matters. The whole subject of the position of the Militia Reserve and of the establishment of the Militia must, of course, come under fresh consideration now that the Reserve Forces had been actually called out. The noble Lord below the Gangway (Lord Elcho) had spoken of the Militia in terms of high praise, as being the old Constitutional Force and the backbone of the Army; but he had also alluded to it as being invertebrate. It appeared to him that that was an expression which had been somewhat misapplied, because, all that had been proved by his hon. and gallant Friend (Mr. Hayter) was, that the backbone was somewhat shorter than it ought to be. No fault was found with the backbone so far as it went. Had they required any means of testing the efficiency of the Militia, it would have been found in the condition of the Militia Reserve men who had joined the Army within the last few weeks. There was the 1424 extraordinary fact that not only those men had obeyed the call which was made upon them in such large numbers, but also that they had turned out to be men in every respect qualified to take their places with the Regular Army. That was not due to the fact of their being Militia Reserve men, but to the fact of their being Militiamen; and it proved that the training of the Militia was such that under it a man of intelligence was enabled to stand alongside of those who constituted the Regular Army. That was an important fact, and it was one which was encouraging and satisfactory in every aspect of the matter. The question as to what was to be done with the establishment of the Militia, whether that establishment ought to be reduced, and the Militia Reserve men to be treated in future as supernumerary to it, or whether they should in future, after being called out and serving in the Line, have the option of being passed into the Army Reserve, and other questions which had been raised in the course of the discussion, were unquestionably of great importance, and required grave and deliberate consideration; but all that he and others who were interested in them could do at present was to direct attention to them, and especially the attention of the Secretary of State for War, without expecting the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to give any opinion just now as to what he thought ought to be done in connection with them. He believed that the War Secretary must have derived some assistance from what had been said on this occasion. As to the point which had been raised by the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), he certainly thought there was some need for explanation. Power had been taken under the Act to expend a certain sum of money upon "a tactical training station," and, undoubtedly, it was intended that that station should be in the North of England. Insuperable difficulties, however, appeared to have arisen; one site after another had been proposed, only to be rejected; and the question which he thought the Government ought to clear up was this—all that being so, why did they expend the money upon Aldershot, instead of leaving it unexpended, when they found that it could not be applied 1425 to the purpose for which it was originally designed? No doubt, Aldershot was technically and literally a tactical training station; but, apart from the question of the rights of commoners, which was mixed up in the matter, it remained with the Government to show that the expenditure of this particular money in that locality was really within the proper purview of Parliament at the time the Act was passed.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR
said, he felt sure that the country was greatly indebted to the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire for having raised the question which he had that evening brought before the House, of using public funds voted for one purpose to another purpose; and though it was not likely in the present day that any personal abuse would arise, yet this division of funds was nothing less than misappropriation. He (Sir George Balfour) had on various occasions found in that House the misappropriation of money voted by Parliament. He had suggested that the power of making transfers of money from one head of the same Vote to another head of that Vote should be withdrawn from the Departments, and the power lodged with the Treasury when Parliament was not sitting to provide for the then requirements of the Service by an assignment of funds suitable for the Service. The voted sum no longer needed for the purpose sanctioned by Parliament should then absolutely lapse. Until that was done Parliament would not be able to prevent money being transferred from one purpose to another entirely different from that which Parliament intended. The Comptroller and Auditor General had more than once protested ineffectually against such transfers. He hoped in future the express purpose for which the money was required would be inserted in the Estimates. He made this remark because the £3,000,000 Vote for the Localization of the Forces was put before Parliament in a form so condensed and so obscure, that it was difficult for Parliament to compare the application of the funds in detail, with the brief and obscure entries in the original Estimate. Indeed, he had discovered expenditure out of that Vote which was not only not covered by the entries in the Estimate, but was opposed to the financial rules which were 1426 formerly laid down for the management of the financial business of the country With regard to the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member (Mr. Hayter) he would urge that the greatest latitude should be allowed to men to join the Reserves.
§ COLONEL STANLEY
said, he must fully recognize the kindness which the House was in the habit of extending to individuals holding the Office he now held, provided the statements they had to make were satisfactory. Although he might differ in some matters of detail from the views expressed by the hon. and gallant Member behind him, still he concurred in the general opinion that he had advanced, that all possible attention should be paid to the advice of the Auditor General in respect of matters which came under his notice officially. During the tenure of Office by Lord Cranbrook the system of a test audit was for the first time introduced; and he believed the First Lord of the Treasury had been communicated with respecting the application of the same principle to the accounts of his Department. He was, therefore, entitled to say that the Government would by no means be opposed to the system of audit. That system was good up to a certain point. It was the duty of the Auditor General in his Report to state, as an independent officer, his opinion as to the validity of a charge, and as to whether the vouchers and other documents connected with it were satisfactory. It must not be forgotten, however, that behind him there was a body which was regarded with great deference by that House—namely, the Public Accounts Committee. The Report of the Auditor General was laid before that Committee, which carefully investigated all matters that were fairly open to challenge. Not being a Member of that Committee, he was unable to state positively whether the Report had come before it this year, but his impression was that it had, and that it passed either without any remark at all or with a mere casual question. After all, what was the actual state of the case? Certain large sums were reported to the House for the localization scheme of his noble Friend Lord Cardwell. In that amount was included a sum for a Northern tactical station. Reasons had been adduced both by Lord Cardwell and his Successor (Lord Cranbrook), showing why it was impossible 1427 to apply that money to the purpose for which it was originally intended. What with mining rights, the character of the soil, the difference in climate, and other difficulties, it had been found almost impossible to meet with land at a low level in the Northern parts of this country with a sufficient area of open space to afford a tactical ground which would be of practical value. Over and over again it had been thought that such and such a place would answer the purpose. One was found to be cut up with mining and other rights which would interfere with its free use, while another was found to be on too high a level with such inequality of ground as to render it practically useless. These difficulties occurred year after year, and the completion of a Northern tactical station became more and more pressing. Therefore, his noble Friend, looking at the use to which this money was originally destined, and regarding as a secondary consideration the locality in which that use was to be exercised, thought that he should be acting in the spirit in which the money was voted if he applied it in increasing the existing training grounds, and in giving opportunities for regiments in the North to be trained at the great training grounds which they already possessed. The question had been before Parliament on many occasions. In 1876 his noble Friend distinctly stated that the question mentioned by his Predecessor of a tactical station in the North of England still remained in abeyance; but he added that negotiations were going on for the purchase of land suitable for the purpose. Inasmuch as some of the money had been applied with the consent of the Treasury to an extension of land at Aldershot, where Northern regiments could be trained, he thought he might claim that the spirit, if not the letter, of the Vote had been fulfilled. With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), he thought his hon. Friend, when he objected to give to the War Office power over the land at Aldershot, seemed to forget that a much smaller area would be placed under the control of the Department than it was originally intended to obtain in another place. As regarded the transfer from one Vote to another, that was in itself a most important matter; but the power of transfer 1428 with the consent of the Treasury was expressly given to the Naval and Military Departments by Act of Parliament. His hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Mr. Hayter) had called attention to the manifold deficiencies which, unhappily, continued to exist in the establishment of the Militia Force. Now, as far as the scope of his Resolution went, his hon. and gallant Friend was teaching a very willing disciple; for his hon. and gallant Friend cited as his text the Report of a Committee over which he himself presided two or three years years ago. Undoubtedly, the discrepancy existing between the establishment and the enrolled members of the Militia, showed a state of things which was far from satisfactory. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the conditions under which the Militia served rendered it impossible to contrast with fairness and accuracy the number of absentees with the absentees from ordinary regiments. He ventured to say that if the men in a regiment of the Line were allowed to go back to civil life for 11 months in the year, that circumstance would, to a great extent, account for many of these absentees, although he freely admitted that even then there would be a large number of whom it would be impossible to give a satisfactory account. His hon. and gallant Friend had taken three principal classes—from the metropolitan, the mining, and the agricultural districts respectively. Now, it should be remembered that at the present time the Militia was at about its worst. Considerable disturbance was given to that Force by Lord Cardwell's scheme for the localization of regiments, which, for some years, he was sorry to say, produced among the men an indifference to comply with those engagements into which they had formally entered. The men, instead of being in the pleasant places they expected, found themselves suddenly transferred far away to the middle of a large camp or garrison, to perform duties very different, perhaps, from those which they looked for when they joined. But though, on the whole, the localization scheme appeared to be very carefully worked out, he did not feel sure that the original allocation of the Militia regiments was such as, after more experience, could be accepted without some slight modifications. He always entertained 1429 the opinion that those who framed the regulations must have had some vague notion of compulsory service, inasmuch as their calculations were founded, not on the number likely to enlist, but on the number of males in the district. However, the regulations could not be altered without careful consideration. Then, in the metropolitan and other districts in the neighbourhood of large towns, there was another class of absentees. In those districts they must always reckon upon losing a certain percentage. The class of men enlisting were taken from a shifting population, and owing to the fluctuations of labour, the opening of fresh pits, and other causes, the men went to other districts or to sea. Of course, every effort was, and would still be, used to trace accurately where the men went. He had no doubt, however, that some regiments returned as absent from training men who had been up for training and had been afterwards sent down. That he knew to be the case. With regard to the question whether it would not have been better, instead of giving a larger bounty to the Militia, to let the money accumulate in a fund, and then give a larger bounty when men were wanted to volunteer for the Line?—that subject had been considered by the Committee to which reference had been, made, and it had been found to be an unsatisfactory proposal. The fund would accumulate indefinitely, demurs would naturally be made to the money lying idle from year to year, and it would never be known what was the actual number of men on whom they could rely. If a large bounty were given, it would be given with their eyes open to all the evils, which were now condemned, of the former bounty system. Considering the various classes of employment in which the men were ordinarily engaged, the result, on the whole, of the organization of the Militia Reserve was not unsatisfactory. The total strength on the 1st of April, 1878, was 25,111; the number who reported themselves at the Militia head-quarters was 23,372; the number who failed to report themselves was 1,739. Of those who reported themselves, rather a large proportion—2, 026—were found medically unfit, some temporarily, some totally; but the medical examination, being a military one, was rather severe. The number of men, therefore, who joined the Army 1430 was 20,296. Of the 1,739 who failed to attend, 420 were accounted for, and 1,319, or about 5 per cent of the strength of the Force, were unaccounted for. All things considered, and this being the first time they were called out, that percentage was not unsatisfactory. There were taken into custody 161, discharged for fraudulent enlistment 72, dead 61, sick 54. With regard to training, these men of the Militia Reserve were fit to take their places side by side, not only with men of the Line, but with men of the Guards. The illustrious Duke at the head of the Army had informed him that he had seen with great satisfaction that the men who had been sent down to the Guards' depôt were scarcely distinguishable from the trained soldiers among whom they had taken their places. Then, as to the point whether it was advisable to keep up a war establishment, the Committee were of opinion that the Militia establishment should practically be a war establishment, and he thought the result had justified that opinion. When the Militia Reserve men came to be suddenly drafted off, it was desirable that the commanding officers who lost some of their best men should beforehand be able to know what men permanently belonged to them, and it was thought preferable that 25 per cent should be borne as supernumerary. A very important point had been raised—namely, whether Militia Reserve men, having come up to the colours, should be allowed to go into the Army Reserve instead of going down as supernumerary to the Militia? Without any wish to discourage the Militia Reserve, or to prejudge the question, he must ask the House not to be carried away by their natural sympathy for these men, who did their duty so well. It should be borne in mind that the terms of the Army Reserve were made very different from those of the Militia Reserve, avowedly because they had a different class to deal with. In the Army Reserve they had trained soldiers; the Militia Reserve was not composed of the same class of men; and it seemed, therefore, natural that there should be a different rate of pay for the highly trained men. He hoped he had not trespassed unduly on the attention of the House, in endeavouring, as far as he could, to meet the various questions which had been raised. He should be 1431 prepared to answer any other Questions which might be put, and he hoped the House would now consent to go into Committee of Supply.
§ MR. BIGGAR
objected to any Department having the power of devoting any grant of money to a purpose other than that for which it had been voted. He believed that some of the Militia regiments, especially those in the North of Ireland, were thoroughly worthless, and that, in case of emergency, instead of being a source of strength, they would prove the very reverse. He would recommend that the Government should do something to improve the morale of the Force.
§ COLONEL ARBUTHNOT
said, that as he was not in the House when the Army Estimates were last under discussion, he might, perhaps, be allowed to say a few words. He thought the manner in which the Army Reserve had responded to the call which had been made for their services was highly creditable to them and eminently gratifying to all concerned. For this result they were greatly indebted to Lord Cardwell, whose legislation upon this subject was based on sound principles. That noble Lord had made very large changes, but he left Office before he had time to reconstruct or replace what he had demolished. To his Successor belonged the credit of having provided a system of promotion and retirement for officers in place of what had been abolished; and he provided such attractions for the men as not only filled the ranks with the usual number of recruits, but supplied the extra number required by short service. He altered the system of organization in the Royal Artillery; he took steps very materially to improve the condition of the administrative Department of the Army; he altered the system of education at Sandhurst; and, above all, he did away with the ridiculous and mischievous restrictions on exchanges. There were, however, many difficult matters connected with our military system, some of them arising out of the changes recently made, still awaiting settlement. He believed that the Secretary of State would have to reconsider the policy of both his Predecessors with respect to the Medical Department, and that the warrants now in force would have to be repealed. Then he would inevitably have to re-adjust the pay and 1432 allowances of officers. While there were two systems of promotion in force, purchase and non-purchase, each having their own advantages, it was all very well that what were called the scientific branches should be at some disadvantage; but now those branches must be placed at least on an equality with the others. Indeed, special advantages should be given them, if they wished to keep up their standard. At the examination for Woolwich in March, there were 92 candidates for 40 vacancies. Of these 92, only 45 qualified in the preliminary examination; while last November 476 candidates competed for 91 vacancies at Sandhurst, of whom 125 failed to qualify. The remedy must also be found for desertion. The most efficient mode of dealing with it, in his opinion, would be to resort to the old system of marking with letter D. A sentimental objection existed, however, to this, owing to a misconception that men were branded like cattle, as had been said, and that it was a painful process. It had been suggested that all who entered the Service might be marked with a Broad Arrow or Crown, to which officers would, no doubt, gladly submit; but he scarcely thought it logical to make rules under the operation of which good men would come to protect us from the crimes of the bad. Instead of imprisoning deserters, he would like to see them confined to barracks till they could be sent to India or the Colonies, whence they could not desert. If removed from the temptations incidental to English life, most of them would become good soldiers. The next point to be considered was how Indian reliefs were to be kept up under the short-service system. He would suggest that all men should do their first term of six years on the English establishment; that they should then have the option of joining the Reserve, or going for six years to India, in which latter case they must, of course, receive some gratuity or other inducement. He regretted that the Government had not accepted the offer of a portion of those 10,000 troops made by the Dominion of Canada. It would have been a grand spectacle to see the East and the West uniting in defence of the Empire. He should like to see some change introduced whereby the Forces of the Crown, on occasions of emergency, could 1433 be made available without the inconvenience and scandal attending discussions in the House on the question, and suggested whether the case could not be met by an additional clause in the Mutiny Act. He would also suggest the desirability of considering whether the Native Indian troops should not be enabled to extend their travels to this country. ["Oh, oh!"] There were differences of opinion on that subject; but he had consulted soldiers of high rank, Indians both military and civil, and Colonial Governors, and he had found that, with one exception, they were of opinion that the money would be well spent in bringing a portion of the Indian troops now at Malta to this country for a short visit, to participate in the duties of the home troops, and to mount guard at the Queen's Palaces. It would gratify the people of India and promote the unification and consolidation of the Empire, over which they were in the habit of boasting that the sun never set.
§ Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.