HC Deb 05 July 1860 vol 159 cc1383-507
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

rose to move the first of three Resolutions of which he had given notice, and which are as follows:—

  1. "1. That the right of granting Aids and Supplies to the Crown is in the Commons alone, as an essential part of their Constitution; and the limitation of all such Grants, as to the matter, manner, measure, and time, is only in them."
  2. "2. That, although the Lords have exercised the power of rejecting Bills of several descriptions relating to Taxation by negativing the whole, yet the exercise of that power by them has not been frequent, and is justly regarded by this House with peculiar jealousy, as affecting the right of the Commons to grant the Supplies and to provide the Ways and Means for the Service of the year."
  3. "3. That, to guard for the future against an undue exercise of that power by the Lords, and to secure to the Commons their rightful control over Taxation and Supply, this House has in its own hands the power so to impose and remit Taxes, and to frame Bills of Supply, that the right of the Commons as to the matter, manner, measure and time, may be maintained inviolate."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTONE

said: Sir, I rise upon an occasion which undoubtedly will rank as one of the first importance among those which have arisen in regard to our form of Parliamentary proceedings, because there can, in my opinion, be nothing more important to this House; there can be nothing, I think, of greater importance to the country than those questions which relate to the respective rights, privileges, and practices of the Houses of Parliament. But, Sir, before I address myself to this subject, I wish to perform what I consider to be a duty—to call the attention of the House to that Report which has been presented to them by the Committee whom they appointed to investigate and examine the Journals and authorities bearing upon the question—a document, I think, containing a summary of Parliamentary lore that will prove a lasting source of advantage to the House in regard to the history of its proceedings. And, Sir, I should fail to express what I am sure is the opinion of the Committee, of which I was a Member, if I did not state to the House how thankful they felt; how very greatly they were indebted to the right hon. Member for Cambridge University, who was the Chairman of that Committee, and to those officers of this House who gave us their willing and assiduous assistance in the performance of our labours; and I am satisfied that the House will respond to the Committee in returning their sincere thanks and acknowledging their obligations both to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge, and to those officers of the House by whom we have boon so ably aided.

Now, Sir, the question at issue involves considerations of the utmost constitutional importance. Our constitution consists of authorities separate from, and independent of, one another; each possessing rights and powers which it may exercise upon its own authority. In the earlier periods of our history that was not the case. If, indeed, we go back to very remote periods, we shall find that the Lords—that is the Barons—were powerful enough to overrule the Crown, and by their exertions, by their courage, by their perseverance, by their spirit, and by their patriotism, they obtained for us the great and fundamental charter of our liberties. Then came a conflict between the Crown and the Barons, which lasted for a great length of time; but the Crown in the end prevailed, and established an arbitrary power, which ground down and controlled the liberties of the nation until at last it became an intolerable burden to the people. The extreme exercise of an excessive power created resistance. The nation rose against the Crown, and in withstanding its arbitrary authority, it not only overthrew the Crown itself, but involved the other estates of the realm in its ruin. Well, Sir, the humour of the country did not long adapt itself to that state of things. The power of the Crown was restored, but it was restored only to be again abused. That abuse of authority again produced its natural result. The Crown was once more overthrown—that is to say, those who exercised the authority of the Crown were overthrown by the very excess of their power, and their unchecked and uncontrolled exercise of it. Then came about that state of things under which we have since so happily lived and flourished—under which, I may say, this nation has enjoyed a greater amount of civil, political, social, and religious liberty than, perhaps, ever fell to the lot of any other people in the world. But how has that result been accomplished? Not by vesting in either of the three estates—the Crown, the Lords, or the Commons—exclusive or overruling power over the others. It has been brought about by maintaining for each its own separate and independent authority; and also by those three powers combining together to bear and forbear, endeavouring by harmonious concert with each other to avoid those conflicts and clashings which must have arisen if independent authority, and independent action had been exerted by each or by all. The consequence of this has been that which we now so fortunately see around us.

Well, Sir, I say that each estate of the realm retains its power. Each of the three retains the power of originating laws, and each possesses the power, in common with the other two, of rejecting laws when proposed for their acceptance. It is generally supposed that the power of the Crown to reject laws has ceased to exist; but that is a fundamental error. That power survives as before, but it is exercised in a different manner. Instead of being exercised upon the laws proposed for the Royal Assent, it is exercised by anticipation in the debates and proceedings of the two Houses of Parliament. It is delegated to those who are the responsible advisers of the Crown; and it is therefore not possible that a law passed by the two Houses should be presented to the Crown, and should then by the Crown be refused. And why is this? Because it cannot be imagined that a law should have received the consent of both Houses of Parliament, in which the responsible Ministers of the Crown are sitting debating, acting, and voting, unless those who advise the Crown have agreed to that law, and are, therefore, prepared to counsel the Sovereign to assent to it. What would he the consequence if that course were not pursued? Why, Sir, if a law were passed by the two Houses against the will and opinion of the Ministers of the day, those Ministers must naturally resign their offices and be replaced by men in whose wisdom Parliament reposed more confidence and who agreed with the majorities in the two Houses. If that were not the case the two Houses would very soon intimate to the Crown their opinion in regard to those advisers, and would not leave any choice as to the hands in which the confidence of the Crown should be placed.

I say, then, Sir, that each branch of the Legislature retains its respective power of rejection. But the Commons House of Parliament have claimed from time immemorial particular privileges in regard to particular measures. They have claimed—and I think justly claimed, as is stated in these Resolutions—the exclusive right of determining matters connected with the taxation of the people. We (the Commons) have claimed to ourselves the right of originating such measures. We have denied to the Lords the right of originating such measures: we have, moreover, denied to them the right of altering or amending such measures. And both these assertions of right we have the power to enforce; because, in either case, Bills ori- ginating or amended in the Lords must come down to this House, and this House then has the opportunity either to confer with the Lords, thereby endeavouring to persuade them to give up their alterations, or to reject the Bill. In either alternative we have in our hands a clear, plain, straightforward, and direct method of giving effect to the claim or right which properly and legitimately belongs to us.

But, Sir, in those memorable Conferences which took place between both Houses of Parliament in the year 1671, it was admitted by the Attorney General, on behalf of the Commons—and for his conduct on the occasion of those Conferences he was thanked by this House on the ground that he had satisfactorily maintained its rights and privileges—it was admitted by the Attorney General that the Lords, although they could not originate and could not amend, had nevertheless the power to reject, money Bills. That admission, however, was no great concession, because, as I have stated, a Bill rejected in the other House at once disappears. It does not come back to this House again; and therefore no direct or immediate action is possible on the part of the Commons in regard to a measure so rejected in the Lords. Consequently, in admitting, as the House of Commons did at that time, and afterwards in the year 1678, that the House of Lords have the power of rejecting "in the whole" as was the expression used, this House only admitted that which it would be difficult to deny, and that with regard to which, if denied, there would be no direct manner of giving effect to the denial.

Thus, then, matters have stood since that period. A great number of cases, indeed, have arisen in which Bills connected with taxation and impositions upon the people, having been amended by the Lords and returned to us, have here been immediately rejected in some instances, as is recorded, with marks of contumely, or Conferences have taken place upon them, by means of which the Lords have been induced to depart from their decision. In other instances, again, where the Amendments of the Lords have been merely verbal and unimportant, or only such as were calculated to further the intentions of this House, those Amendments have been adopted in other Bills sent up to the House of Lords which have accordingly been passed by that Assembly.

But, Sir, the cases to which I am now adverting relate to Bills which have for their object the imposing of taxes. The present case is of a different nature. It is the case of a Bill repealing a tax; now, when you admitted the right of the Lords to reject Bills, if that concession were not accompanied—as it was not—by any limitation as to the kind of Bills to which the admission applies, you can only by argumentative and abstract reasoning establish a distinction between one set of Bills, and Bills of a different description. But in fact, although we contend—and I think, justly contend—for a right which is closely interwoven with the constitutional history of the country—although we contend for the right of originating measures for the grants of supply, or of shaping them according to our belief of what is for the public interest, yet, nevertheless it is well known that the Bill so prepared and framed by us cannot pass into law without the assent of the Lords; and it is clear that an authority whose assent is necessary to give a proposal the force of law must, by the very nature of things, be at liberty to dissent and refuse its sanction. To take from the Lords the power of dissenting to a Bill to which their assent is now required, you would need an Act of Parliament to which they must themselves be parties, or you must by a revolutionary proceeding subvert our existing Constitution.

But, Sir, if we look to that large number of precedents in which the Lords have returned to us with Amendments Money Bills which have been sent to them from this House, and in regard to which conferences took place by means of which the alterations thus made were either rejected or agreed to, we shall find, as I have said, that that long string of precedents relates almost entirely to Bills imposing taxes; and even in the great precedent of 1671, upon which the conference was held, and by which a mutual right of rejection was conceded, that conference originated in the Lords trying to diminish a tax which which was proposed to them. It did not arise in a case similar to that which has recently occurred, in which the Lords refused their consent to the repeal of a tax. Then, Sir, I say that the great bulk of this series of precedents is somewhat besides the question which has given rise to the search of the Committee. There are, however, precedents which boar directly upon the point at issue; because we find that between the year 1714 and the present time there have been about thirty-six cases of Bills for repealing duties or imposts of some kind or other, which have been sent up to the Lords, and have been rejected by them, or at least have not come down to this House again. So far, therefore, as these precedents go, it may be contended that they are authorities upon which the House of Lords may ground itself to justify its recent proceeding. Nevertheless, Sir, if you look at them you will find that the Bills which were so rejected were Bills involving taxes either of small amount, or connected with questions of commercial protection, or of public policy of some kind; so that in fact it may be said that in these cases the rejection of the Bill arose not so much from the determination of the Lords to continue the imposts upon the country as imposts, but rather from their differing in opinion with the Commons as to some question of national policy with reference to which these taxes or imposts were to be continued or repealed. This also may be said with regard to those taxes, that none of them were at all to be compared in amount to the revenue which was involved in the Bill for the repeal of the duties on paper.

Well, then, Sir, admitting as I think we must do, that technically, in point of fact, we have never questioned the right of the Lords to reject Bills of that nature, yet the present case assumes a character somewhat different from that of any of the precedents, because we have maintained in word, and we have also maintained by action, that it rests with this House to frame the Supplies of the year, and to consider and determine with regard to the aids and Supplies of the year what taxes shall be imposed, and what shall be remitted, and also what shall be the proportion between imposition and remission, and what shall be the nature of the arrangements. It is our privilege to combine the whole into one scheme, and when that scheme is so framed, it certainly is not consistent with the exclusive functions of this House that any material portion of it should be rejected by the other House, so as to alter and entirely vary the bearing of all the financial arrangements.

The question is, was that done by the House of Lords upon the late occasion. One must admit, I think, that in principle it was so. It cannot be denied that the repeal of the paper duty did form one important element in the plan of finances which was sent up by this House to the Lords, and if everything had remained as it was when that plan was framed, the refusal of the Lords to pass that remission of duty, they having agreed to pass a Bill adding to another tax, would have deranged the combination of finance which, upon a balance of remission and imposition, had been thought by this House to be good for the interests of the country, and sufficient for the Supplies of the present year. At the same time, Sir, as we have admitted, that in those thirty-six cases of rejection to which I have alluded, a question of policy was allowed to enter as an element into the decision of the House of Lords in those cases, now it is not easy to affirm with certainty what were the grounds upon which the House of Lords may have acted in any one of those cases; but looking at the manner in which in those instances questions of taxation were combined with other questions of policy, it is fair to assume that in those cases the rejection of the Bill did not arise simply from the refusal of the Lords to relieve the people from a certain amount of burden, but was partly dictated by the belief that the arrangements with which the abolition of that burden was coupled was not for the public advantage, and therefore they rejected the Bill with which it was connected.

Well, Sir, can the same be alleged in the present instance? I wish to put that as fairly and as impartially as I can. This is a question in considering which I think that party feelings ought to be cast aside. It is one in which higher and larger interests than those of party are concerned, and in which the course that the House may now take will be a precedent to guide future Parliaments; and, therefore. Sir, I think that in considering this matter one ought, as far as possible, to place oneself in the position of an impartial spectator, and to state fairly and honestly that which may be said upon each side of the question.

I cannot here allude to anything that may have passed in debate in the House of Lords. That is not consistent with our Orders; that is not our function; but looking broadly at the matter I do not believe that if, under ordinary circumstances, this House had determined that a certain tax ought to be repealed, and had sent a Bill to the House of Lords for that purpose, that House would have rejected such a measure. If it had been shown that there was an excess of taxation which pressed heavily upon certain interests of the country, that the revenue raised by it was unnecessary, or that a better arrangement might be made by transferring the burden to some other interest that could bear it better, I do not believe, judging from what has happened on many former occasions, that the Lords would have taken the step which they recently took. We know, Sir, what an immense amount of taxation has been repealed by the two Houses of Parliament since the end of the war in 1815, and in no one instance, that I am aware of, did the Lords dissent from the decision of the Commons as to the relief of the country from burdens which were thought to be no longer necessary. Therefore I cannot bring myself to believe that the Lords, in the step which they have now taken, intended to enter on a course, their progress in which, if they did enter upon it, it would be the duty of this House to resist by every constitutional and legal means which are at our command. I mean that I do not believe the House of Lords intended to take the first step towards a partnership with this House in arranging the Budget of the year, in fixing the measure, the manner, the time, or the amount of aids and Supplies, which it belongs solely and exclusively to this House to determine. If we believed that such was their intention, and that this is only the first step in such a course, then, Sir, I say that it would become us to resolve in our own minds to take those measures which are in our power to defeat and frustrate it; but until we have some more decided proof that such an intention was entertained, I would adjure the House to content itself with the record of that declaration which is contained in the Resolutions, which I have had the honour to lay upon the table, and not, without being driven to it as a matter of necessity, to enter upon a formal conflict with the other House of Parliament.

But, Sir, I ask have the Lords received no encouragement from this House to take this particular step? The Bill for repealing the Excise Duties on Paper was brought into this House under circumtances which were materially and notoriously altered when its rejection in the House of Lords took place, and although its second reading was carried by a majority of 53, its third reading was passed by a majority of only 9.

Well, Sir, if it had gone to the Lords with an equally large majority upon the third reading as upon the second, I do not believe that they would have done otherwise than pass it; but they saw—although they may not have known it officially, it was a matter of public notoriety when our proceedings were laid upon their table—they saw that during the interval between the second and third reading the opinion of this House appeared to have undergone considerable alteration. The majority of 53 upon the second reading of the Bill was reduced to 9 upon the third reading. Were not the Lords, therefore, entitled to think that the opinion of this House upon this question was not so strong as it had been? Then, as far as they could judge by public opinion, they might legitimately infer that which the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury has since confirmed by the Estimates laid on the table of the House, that that which we had a right to expect would not take place with regard to the balance of income and expenditure had taken place; and might they not think that it would be wise to give this House time for reconsideration, with a view to see whether that amount of revenue, which was justly thought to he unnecessary when the financial arrangements for the year were made might not, by altered circumstances, the occurrence of which it was beyond our power to control, become a source of income which it was desirable to keep up for the year, rather than to make up for it by transferring to other interests the burden which had been long borne by that industry and that interest of paper manufacture which was affected by the duty.

Well, Sir, stating, as I trust, the case impartially upon both sides, while on the one hand I think the House would have been right to have resisted any attempt on the part of the Lords to enter into a partnership with us with a view to determine the financial arrangements of the year—while I think that by so doing they would be stepping out of their province and departing from the line of constitutional right which the history of the country has assigned them—yet on the other hand, if it can be believed, and I am led myself to think so, that they were not actuated on this occasion by any such intention, but by motives of policy dependent upon the circumstances of the moment, I think it would not be wise for this House to enter into a conflict with the House of Lords upon a ground which may not really exist, but to satisfy themselves with a declaration of what are their own constitutional powers and privileges, reserving to themselves the exercise of that power, which they have within their own means if any case should arise, if that opinion which I have expressed should not be confirmed; and if a deliberate course should be pursued of changing the whole system of constitutional proceedings in regard to taxation—I say, Sir, that if that should arise we will determine to use those means which I am convinced we possess and which are quite sufficient to restrain or to prevent any such inroads on the constitutional privileges of this House. Many may think that the last Resolution is too vague, and that it does not distinctly point out the method by which we might enforce our constitutional rights and privileges in the event of an attempt being made to invade them. But there are many ways in which, upon such a case arising, we should be able, first by argument, ultimately by the exercise of our own authority, to prevent such an encroachment upon the constitutional functions of this House. If, Sir, such a mad course were to be adopted by the Lords, it would not be by a Resolution entered upon our Journals; it would not be by commencing a scolding match with the other House; it would not be by impotent words laid on our table that our constitutional rights could be vindicated. No, Sir, it would be by action, which we should not be slow to discover the mode of taking; and I have not so mean an opinion of the powers of this House and of the weight of public sentiment—which would be declared emphatically in such a case—as to believe that we should be reduced to that condition in which the Commons of 1671 represented themselves to be when they said, that their right to originate and grant aid to the Crown was the only poor thing they had to proffer for the acceptance of their Sovereign. The House of Commons stands now in a very different position from that in which it has been at other periods of our history. The course of events, the extension of representation, the diffusion of knowledge, the power of the press, and the effect of public opinion have been such that this House is daily increasing in its power instead of diminishing in that respect; and therefore, Sir, so far from feeling any apprehension that the Lords may be able to usurp our legitimate functions, I am convinced that if we pursue a steady, dignified, and consistent course—if we abstain from anything that may savour of passion or aggression—if we stand upon and maintain our own rights, using, when necessary, the means belonging to us of making those rights respected, we shall be able, whenever our real functions are deliberately invaded, to protect them in the face of day, and with the full approval and sanction of the country.

I say, then, Sir, that these Resolutions are adequate to the present occasion. They declare in plain language what our constitutional functions are—rights and functions which I may say are interwoven with the whole course and history of this country, which no man can deny, which will not be denied, I venture to say by any single individual in the other House or in any part of the country. The Resolutions moreover point out that if our rights should be invaded we have within our own hands the means of resisting such invasion. I think, Sir, it would not have been becoming or even decent upon an occasion on which there was an appearance at all events of an intention to invade our functions—it would not have been right or decent for this House to have remained absolutely silent. Such a silence might have been construed into a yielding of rights and functions which we mean steadily to maintain in our own hands. On the other hand, Sir, I think we should not have raised ourselves in public estimation: I do not think we should have done anything towards maintaining effectively those rights and functions which belong to us if we had thrown into these Resolutions anything likely to prove the commencement of hostilities with the other branch of the Legislature. It is of the utmost importance in a Constitution like ours, where there are different branches independent of each other, each with powers of its own, and where cordial and harmonious action is necessary, that care should be taken to avoid the commencement of an unnecessary quarrel. The party which acted otherwise would, I consider, incur a very grave responsibility. I will not believe that it was the intention of the House of Lords to do so. Some may think that I entertain too favourable a view of the conduct of that House, but I say that if we have not proof sufficient to satisfy us that the rejection of the Paper Duty Bill was the first step in a new system of constitutional conduct, we had bettor, instead of involving ourselves in an unnecessary quarrel, pursue the policy which we now recommend for the adoption of the House. I think that course is a dignified one. I think, too, it will be efficacious. I am convinced in my own mind that these Resolutions, going forth from this House will be a sufficient warning to guard against any occurrence in future to which we might fairly take exception. We are not prepared to undo that which has been done. Perhaps in ordinary times, under ordinary circumstances, we might have advised this House to pass again the Bill which was rejected by the Lords, to return it toties quoties, if you will; to suspend all other business till it was passed, and by the exercise of those means which we have in our own hands, to render it necessary for the Lords to give way. But, Sir, the circumstances of the moment do not render that course of action desirable; and that being so, I say that unless we felt at liberty to return the Bill in some shape or other, and to insist in the present Session upon the repeal of the paper duty, we ought to take the course which it is my duty to recommend for adoption.

And, Sir, in conclusion, I would only urge upon the two houses the advice which a great authority in Parliamentary matters—Mr. Hatsell—has embodied in two passages of his well-known work. I would say to the Lords, The conclusion to be drawn from all these transactions is that it should be the endeavour of each House of Parliament to take care in their proceedings not to transgress those boundaries which the Constitution has wisely allotted to them, nor to interfere in those matters which by the rules and practice of Parliament in former ages are not within their jurisdiction, for the rights and privileges of Parliament are interwoven with the earliest establishment of government in this country. Sir, I would recommend that passage to the consideration of the House of Lords. To the House of Commons I would venture to suggest another passage from the same author. I would say to them, The sole and exclusive right of beginning all aids and charges upon the public, and not suffering any alteration to be made by the Lords, is sufficiently guarded by the claims as here expressed, and it does not seem to be either for their honour or advantage to push the matter further, and, by asserting privileges which may be subjects of doubt and discussion, thereby to weaken their claim to those clear and indubitable rights which are vested in them by the Constitution, and have been confirmed to them by the constant and uniform practice of Parliament. I think, Sir, that to refuse the Lords the right of rejecting Bills which go up to them for their assent, would bring us under the meaning of the passage I have just read. But I do not believe that the House would be disposed to follow that course. I am inclined to think that this House values highly the existence of that harmony which it is essential should prevail between the two branches of the Legislature: and if at all times that ought to be the ruling feeling of the House, I am sure there is nothing in the present aspect of affairs out of the kingdom—there is nothing, I repeat, Sir, in the general aspect of affairs in Europe and in the world which should lead this House to think less highly of the importance of a harmonious union, or to dispose them to exhibit to foreign nations the lamentable and humiliating spectacle of a disunited Legislature, of a divided people, and of internal conflicts at a time when it is desirable for the dignity, honour, and interests of this country that we should manifest to all nations a harmonious unity of action among all the estates of the realm for the common welfare of the country. I now beg, Sir, to move the first Resolution:—

Motion made and Question proposed, That the right of granting Aids and Supplies to the Crown is in the Commons alone, as an essential part of their Constitution: and the limitation of all such Grants, as to the matter, manner, measure, and time, is only in them.

MR. COLLIER

Mr. Speaker, it appears to me that the first Resolution which has been proposed for our adoption by the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government is sufficiently explicit. It declares that which the House of Commons has many times declared before, and it appears to me that the declaration is on a fitting occasion. But I cannot compliment the noble Lord on the perspicuity of the two following Resolutions. I am not sure whether, from these two Resolutions, it is to be collected that the House of Commons has or has not a right to complain of the proceedings of the House of Lords in respect to the rejection of the Bill for the repeal of the paper duty.

Sir, I rather collect from the last of these Resolutions that we have cause to complain, because if we have not a right to complain of the proceedings of the House of Lords, I hardly know upon what principle it is declared that we are to take proceedings to prevent the recurrence of a similar proceeding on the part of the House of Lords.

Now, Sir, I have given notice of an Amendment which would have remedied any ambiguity in these Resolutions. My Amendment was to this effect:—that the House of Lords, by rejecting the Paper Duty Repeal Bill, had committed a violation of constitutional usage. I used no hard words; I implied no strong expressions; but it appeared to me that they had done one of two things—either that the House of Lords had committed a breach of constitutional usage or that they had not. If they had not, I do not know what reason we have for a Resolution at all. If they had, I do not see why the House of Commons should shrink from expressing our views and declaring so.

Sir, it was my determination to have proposed a Resolution then containing a definite expression of the opinion of this House. As, however, I find that the opinions of many hon. Members around me are in favour of a unanimous vote, and that I should be running counter to the feelings of the House if I were to propose that Resolution, I feel that it would not be desirable that I should take any course which might prevent that unanimous decision to which the House wishes to come.

But, Sir, perhaps the House will permit me, having been a Member of the Select Committee, and having considered the subject and given it some attention, to state very briefly the views which I entertain upon the subject now under discussion. Not one word will I utter in this discussion, I promise the House, in the slightest degree disrespectful to the House of Lords upon this occasion.

Now, Sir, all who are moderately well acquainted with the history of this country are aware that we owe to the House of Lords no small portion of our freedom. They have privileges as valuable and as dear to them as our own; their privileges are as dear to them as are the privileges of the House of Commons to the House of Commons. But while we respect their privileges we are bound to assert our own, for we hold them, not only for ourselves, but we hold them in trust for the people of England.

Now, Sir, I will state at once to the House what it is I am prepared to maintain with respect to the recent vote of the House of Lords.

Sir, I do not mean to assert that the vote of the House of Lords was illegal, but I do assert that it was opposed to constitutional usage. I assert that it is a breach of that tacit understanding which regulates the functions of the two Houses of Parliament, without the maintenance of which the constitution cannot work. And, Sir, I may in one moment illustrate the difference between that which is legal and that which is constitutional.

Now, Sir, no man will dispute the legal right of the Crown to veto any Bill or any number of Bills; but will any man tell me that if the Crown vetoed every Bill which is passed by the two Houses during the Session, let me ask whether any man would say that such a course would be constitutional?

Sir, upon the subject of the difference between what is legal and what is constitutional, I will at once quote an authority which I am sure will be respected by hon. Gentlemen opposite if they will do me the favour to listen to me. It is the authority of Lord Lyndhurst on the occasion of the discussion in the House of Lords on the Life Peerages Bill. Lord Lyndhurst upon that occasion insisted as against the Crown that although there may have been a strict legal right, still the exercise of that right was unconstitutional; and I pray the House to hear what was said by Lord Lyndhurst upon that occasion, which explains more clearly to my view the difference between what is legal and what is constitutional. Lord Lyndhurst says,— I hear it repeated that this is part of the prerogative of the Crown, and that the Crown may legally appoint a Peer for life. Assuming that to be the case, it does not follow that every exercise of such a prerogative is consistent with the principles of the Constitution. The Sovereign may, if he thinks proper, by his prerogative create a hundred Peers with descendible qualities in the course of a day. That would be consistent with the prerogative, and strictly legal; but everybody must feel, and everybody must know, that such an exercise of the undoubted prerogative of the Crown would be a flagrant violation of the principles of the Constitution. In the same manner, the Sovereign might place the Great Seal in the hands of a layman wholly unacquainted with the laws of the country. Other cases might be adduced, but these already cited are sufficient to establish the principle which I maintain. And, Sir, Lord Lyndhurst concludes with these words, to which I pray the particular attention of the House. Every person who has studied the Constitution of this country, and who is at all conversant with the principles on which it is founded, must be aware that one of its principles is long continued usage. Sir, the same argument was used by another noble and learned Lord, who, as against the Crown, quoted this maxim, Leges per consuetudinem abrogantur. Sir, I will now call the attention of the House to a Resolution of the House of Lords with respect to the conduct of this House, which directly illustrates the position which I now put before the House.

Sir, in 1702, in a Bill called the Land Tax and Irish Forfeiture Bill, we had inserted a provision creating an incapacity in the managers of the Excise from sitting in Parliament. Now we had a right to do that; there can be no doubt whatever that we possessed a legal right to do that, but the House of Lords passed this Resolution— That the annexing any clause or clauses to a Bill of Aid or Supply, the matter of which is foreign to and different from the said Bill of Aid or Supply is Unparliamentary, and tends to the destruction of the Constitution of the Government. Now, Sir, I say that if the House of Lords could assert as against the Crown the distinction between that which is legal and that which is constitutional, they cannot complain that the same distinction is asserted against them. The House of Lords were perfectly right—there was such a distinction. Our Constitution is not founded in any code, nor written in any book; happily, I say you do not describe the Constitution by defining the precise legal and technical rights of any one branch of the Legislature—for any one branch of the Legislature, by insisting on no more than its legal and technical rights, without transgressing any positive law of Parliament, may upset the whole balance of the Constitution. The three bodies politic, if I may use the expression, are not retained in their orbit by any force which it is possible with mathematical precision to define. Their harmonious action was secured by a tacit understanding which regulates the motion of each, which, though the least palpable, was one of the most essential elements of the Constitution, and when any one of them deviates from the course prescribed by that tacit understanding, the whole Parliamentary equilibrium was disturbed.

Now, Sir, having established the difference between that which is legal and that which is constitutional, forgive me for a moment reminding the House of the precise effect of that which the House of Lords have done.

Sir, the House of Commons have passed a Budget, one main feature of which was the repeal of the Paper Duty, and another main feature was the increase of the Income Tax. There were several divisions in this House upon the question as to whether the Paper Duty should be repealed and the Income Tax increased, and many hon. Members voted for the increase of the Income Tax, upon the express understanding, if I mistake not, that the Paper Duty would be repealed.

Now, Sir, the House of Lords have accepted so much of the Budget as increased the income tax, but they have refused so much of the Budget as repeals the paper duty; and I do assert that this is a course which they have never taken before. I say that there is no precedent for it; I say that it is an interference with the right of the Commons to regulate taxation which the House of Lords until the year 1860 never has attempted.

Now, Sir, let us see what the effect of this would be if the Paper Duty Repeal Bill had been intended to take effect at once. The duty would have been actually taken off, and the effect of the vote of the House of Lords would have been that a tax being taken off, it would have been re-imposed, and that for the first time in the history of our Constitution.

Sir, the vote in the House of Lords has been defended, not upon the ground suggested by the noble Lord (alluding to the Earl of Derby who was sitting in the Peers' gallery,) but it has been defended upon the ground that the House of Commons did not take sufficient care to provide proper supplies for the exigencies of the State. It has been said that the House of Lords took a more comprehensive view than the House of Commons. [Cheers from the Opposition.] I quite understand hon. Gentlemen opposite maintaining that view of the question—that the House of Lords looking to a possible deficit this year, and a possible deficit in the next year, and the year to come—[Cheers from the Opposition.] I am glad that I am right in the view I take—that the House of Lords differing from the Crown and differing from the Commons, undertook to supply a million and a quarter more than the House of Commons thought necessary to supply.

Sir, I cannot accede to the doctrine broached by the noble Lord that the constitutional right of the House of Lords to deal with the Bill depends upon the amount of majority. I know of no constitutional maxim that if a Money Bill has been carried by a majority of 50, the House of Lords has no right to deal with it, but that if passed by a majority of ten they have a right to deal with it. That is entirely new to me.

Now, Sir, that then is the effect of the argument of the noble Lord. The course pursued by the House of Lords has unquestionably taken everybody by surprise.

Sir, I will now proceed to inquire whether this proceeding of the House of Lords is or is not consistent with constitutional usage, and before I come to the precedents to which I will invite the attention of the House very shortly, I wish to remind them of what is familiar to them, but which from its very familiarity may not present itself to their minds. It is hardly necessary to remind them that this House alone is addressed by the Crown on the question of Supplies. Whether or not at the conclusion of the present Session, Her Majesty will thank the House of Lords for not consenting to the remission of taxation, I do not know, but it seems to me to be a matter of courtesy that Her Majesty should do so.

Sir, Money Bills are sent back to this House instead of being presented by the House of Lords to the Crown, and above all (and to this I beg to draw the particular attention of the House), the Votes of the House of Commons with respect to Supplies have been treated for a great length of time as practically final and conclusive.

Now, Sir, if the House will allow me I will read a short extract from Blackstone (and there was no greater lawyer than Blackstone), written more than a hundred years ago, in which it appears that the confidence of the public in the Votes of this House was then old. Blackstone writes this:— The Resolutions of this Committee (Ways and Means) when approved of by a Vote of the House are generally esteemed to be as it were 'final' and 'conclusive.' For though the supply cannot be actually raised upon the subject till directed by an act of the whole Parliament yet no moneyed man will scruple to advance to the Government any quantity of ready cash on the credit of a bare Vote of the House of Commons, though no law be yet passed to establish it. Now, Sir, I ask would Blackstone, the most accurate of writers, append this passage if the House of Lords had ever dealt with this? I quote the passage as a commentary upon the precedents, and I say that Blackstone would never have appended this passage if there had been a precedent at all in point on the recent proceedings of the House of Lords.

Now, Sir, having called the attention of the House to a passage from a great lawyer, perhaps I may be permitted to call the attention of the House to the opinion of the greatest of statesmen, Lord Chatham. It is an extract from his speech on the subject of the taxation of America. Lord Chatham says: Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. And I pray the attention of the House to this distinction. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the Peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone. In ancient days the Crown, the barons, and the clergy possessed the lands. In those days the barons and the clergy gave and granted to the Crown. The property of the Lords, compared with that of the Commons, is as a drop of water in the ocean; and this House represents these Commons, the proprietors of the lands. And those proprietors virtually represent the rest of the inhabitants. When, therefore, in this House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. The distinction between legislation and taxation is essentially necessary to liberty. The Crown and the Peers are equally legislative powers with the Commons. If taxation be a part of simple legislation, the Crown and the Peers have rights in taxation as well as yourselves. And I pray the attention of the House to the prophetic passage in conclusion. He says: Rights which they will claim, which they will exercise, whenever the principle can be supported by power. Sir, to the last Lord Chatham maintained that, although we had a right to legislate for America with respect to all other questions, even with regard to the regulation of trade, although it might incidentally involve taxation, we had no right to deal with questions of pure taxation, on the principle that taxation and representation went together.

Now, Sir, this is the creed in which we have all been brought up. Sir, it is the faith in which the country have acted; and the House of Commons, acting on this faith, have in the present century voted a large quantity of revenue, which was formerly annual, but which they made perpetual, on the understanding and belief that the House of Lords would never interfere to prevent the grant. Sir, I am satisfied that we never should have voted the Sugar Duties and Malt Duties as permanent duties, if we had believed that we, the grantors, giving a voluntary grant, should not be permitted at any time to change our minds; and the House of Lords, who have repeatedly said that we, the House of Commons, were the sole judges of the matter, the manner, and the time, would in- terpose, and say you, are not the judges of these things, and we will interpose to prevent you exercising your own judgment as to the time for which these taxes will be taken.

Sir, I think I may instance the very appointment of this Committee, as a proof that every one was taken by surprise at this vote of the House of Lords. I hear it said occasionally, "Oh, the House of Lords have done no more than they have been accustomed to do; they have just as much right to reject this Bill as the Bill for the Abolition of Church Rates, or any other Bill." But if this proceeding was altogether analogous, why was not the Motion of the noble Lord for a Committee to search for precedents opposed; a precedent, be it remembered, which the House of Commons has never taken, except upon very grave occasions, when its liberties have been seriously endangered, either by the Lords or by the Crown?

Now, Sir, having made these observations, if the House will permit me, I will now refer to the precedents; and I promise them that if they will give me their patience a very short time, I will not abuse that patience; I will go through the precedents as briefly as possible; and I shall be able to classify them, and very shortly to deal with them; but it is absolutely necessary to do that. These precedents must be explained; these precedents, as they stand alone, would entirely mislead the House.

Now, the Committee, of which I was a Member, have not thought it necessary to go back before the year 1628. And probably the House will think that a wise step, for the greater number of the most important precedents have occurred since that time; and unquestionably it is most important to ascertain what has been the practice since the Revolution, when the Constitution may be said to have been finally settled. Let it always be borne in mind, that if the Revolution settled the Constitution, it settled it upon the old foundations. The Revolution introduced nothing new; it merely restored what was old. It is true that the foundations of our liberty had been undermined; but still the old and solid masonry remained, and is distinctly visible; and it is because the fabric of our Constitution has been erected upon these foundations that it now stands.

Sir, one of those main foundations was the exclusive right of the Commons to tax the commonalty of England; and it may be well to establish, if, indeed, there be a question of it, that this is not a comparatively new right set up by the House of Commons; it is not the consequence of usurpation, but it is as old as the existence of the very Commons themselves.

Now, Sir, without discussing the obscure points in the early history of this country, I will make this remark—that the Commons appear to have broken the egg fully fledged with all the powers of taxation. Their powers of taxation were coeval with their existence, and they were called into existence as instruments of taxation. I find in the 9th of Edward II., this extract in the Rolls of Parliament. I will not fatigue the House by reading any lengthened passages; but I think it necessary to read some passages. As early as the reign of the 9th of Edward II., I find this entry in the Rolls of Parliament:— Cives, burgenses et milites de comitatibus qui venerunt ad Parliamentum concesserunt domino Regi in auxilium expeditionis quere sui Scot quintain decimam, bonorum mobilium civium burgensium, et hominum de civitatibus, burgis et dominiis Domini Regis in regno suo. Now, Sir, it is important that the very next entry to this is that of an Act in which both Houses concur, enabling the King to raise troops; but the grant of money was from the Commons alone. In this reign, in the next of Edward III., in the next of Richard II., and in the next of Henry IV., the Commons have asserted again and again their right to the exclusive taxation of the Commonalty. I know that in ancient times the House of Lords taxed themselves, and the clergy taxed themselves up to the reign of Charles I., in Convocation; but the exclusive right of the Commons to tax the people of England was coeval with their very existence. They soon became assured of those rights, and they insisted on conditions in the reign of Richard II., which is stated by Hallam in his Middle Ages:— The Commons refused to grant a Supply except upon the condition that the King would pardon the insurgents; and thereupon a controversy arose between the King and the Commons, and the King eventually gave way. There a controversy had arisen between the King and the Commons, and the King eventually gave way. That was a case in which the House of Lords was in no way concerned.

Now, without going at length through the earlier reigns, it may be enough to say that through the reigns of the Princes of the House of Tudor, the rights of both Houses of Parliament were, to a great degree, in abeyance, both Houses being overawed by the Crown. But neither in the reign of Henry VIII., nor in that of Elizabeth, did the Crown ever venture to dispute the right of the House of Commons to tax the people to the extent to which it was disputed by James, and subsequently by Charles I. But the right to tax had always been valued by the Commons more than all their other rights put together, and they have always regarded the struggle for the right of taxation as a struggle for their own existence.

Now, Sir, having thus rapidly given a sketch of the previous periods of history before the Report (I am very unwilling to occupy the time of the House; I assure them that I will not do so longer than is absolutely necessary), I now come to the year 1640, when Pym asserted the rights of the House of Commons, and I venture very shortly to say that Pym insisted upon no new right; but he insisted upon a right which had existed for centuries before. I beg to call the attention of the House to what took place upon that memorable occasion. The Lords sent a message to the Commons to this effect. They intimated very politely at first that it would be desirable to begin with Supply before anything else; but they accompanied that message with these memorable words, to which I beg to call the attention of the House. They say:— Upon all these considerations, although my Lords would not meddle with matters of subsidy which belong properly and naturally to you; no, not to give you advice therein, but have utterly declined it, yet being members of one body, &c., they have declared by vote that they hold it most neceesary and fit that the matter of Supply should have precedence over any other matter or consideration whatsoever. Sir, the House of Lords, in 1640, declared that they would not meddle with subsidy; not so much as even to give advice. But the House of Lords, in 1860, have done a good deal more than give us advice. They have not only taken on themselves to advise, but they have also taken on themselves to correct. Upon that occasion to which I refer, Pym vindicated the rights of the House of Commons. He said:— Your Lordships have been pleased to affirm that the matter of subsidy and Supply naturally belonging to the House of Commons, your Lordships would not meddle with it; no, not so much as to give advice. But," he continued, "if you have voted this (referring to their vote), you have not only meddled with matter of Supply; but as far as in you lies, have concluded both the matter and order of proceeding which the House of Commons takes to be a breach of their privilege. If the House will now kindly give me their attention for a few minutes, I think I shall be able to show that there are none of the precedents quoted in the Report of the Committee to which I am about to address myself at all applicable to the recent proceedings of the House of Lords. Those precedents are divided into two classes—where the Lords have amended the Bill, and where they have rejected the Bill. And this I must say, that if the question had been whether the Lords had a right to amend instead of rejecting, I should have had more difficulty in dealing with the precedents, because there are far more precedents for amending than for rejecting Bills. It ought to be borne in mind that the House of Lords never relinquished the right to amend. They asserted it as strongly as they did the right to reject; more so, in fact.

Now, Sir, if the House will permit me, I will proceed to deal with the thirty-four precedents relating to the rejection of Bills repealing or altering a tax. I have classified them, and I think I shall be able to state the effect of them very shortly. Let it always be borne in mind with respect to those precedents that the House of Commons does not dispute, and never has disputed, the right of the House of Lords to deal with all questions independent of taxation. All that the House of Commons maintain is that taxation is our province. We have never said that if a Bill concerning the Church, for example, or concerning highways, incidentally imposed a tax or contained taxing provisions, that, therefore, the House of Lords have no right to deal with it. If we did so, we should arrogate to ourselves a most unconstitutional power, and should be encroaching on the proper functions of the House of Lords. But I shall be able to show the House that these precedents do not contain a single case in which the Lords have rejected a Bill repealing or altering a tax upon purely financial grounds. Five of the precedents (I will go through them very shortly) relate to religion—the Gaol Chaplains Bill, the Roman Catholic Land Tax Bill, the Tithes (Ireland) Bill, the Personal Tithes Abolition Bill, and the Church Rates Abolition Bill. These all relate to religion, and I may state that several of these are what are called "tacks," that is, provisions were added to them which the House of Commons had, strictly speaking, perhaps, no right to add, and relating to matters other than taxation. I find, for example, that the Gaol Chaplains Bill was an Act relating to the salaries of clergymen, and giving justices of the peace the power of dismissing officiating chaplains in Houses of Correction. There can be no doubt that the House of Lords had a perfect right to deal with that Bill.

Now, Sir, I come to six other Bills. I have disposed of five. Six other Bills are the Highways Bill, the Highway Penalties Bill, the Sale of Game Bill, the Court of Session (Scotland) Bill, the Tolls on Steam Carriages Bill, and the Rating Stock-in-Trade Bill. All these Bills involve questions of policy of various descriptions relative to the regulation of highways, the sale of game, the relief of the poor, &c.—questions with which this House never asserted an exclusive right to deal. Eighteen other Bills relate to the regulation of trade, and I say that the House of Commons have never arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to regulate any branch of trade. The House of Lords might have thrown out a Bill concerning the corn laws when that Bill was sent up to them, that being a question with which they had a perfect right to deal. It was a question of free trade and of protection. The distinction suggested by Lord Chatham should be clearly borne in mind with reference to this point. "You may tax the Americans," Lord Chatham says, "for the regulation of trade, but you must not tax them for fiscal purposes." The House of Lords have a perfect right to interfere with Bills for the regulation of trade, but they have no right to interfere with money Bills. Now, the Woollen Manufactures Bill was a question of protection to trade; the Irish Cattle Importation Bill and the Irish Tallow Bill were questions of justice to Ireland. The Anglesea Copper Mines Bill was a question of protection. The Thread Lace Bill involved the protection of the lace manufacture of the country. The Foul Salt Bill—salt used for manure—the Brass Exportation Bill, the Corn Regulation Bill, the Coasting Trade Bill, which has been quoted, and which is what is called a "tack"—all these Bills contained regulations on a variety of subjects with which the House of Lords had a perfect right to deal. The Duties on Coals in Wales Bill was a Bill regulating the coasting trade. Then there is the Worts Bill, and I dwell upon this for a moment, because it has been quoted, I am informed, in "another place" as a precedent. In 1841 the price of corn was very high, and the question was whether facilities should be given for distilling from molasses—a question between the West Indian interest on the one side, and the farmers on the other, and it was so argued in the House of Lords. That, therefore, was a question of free trade or protection. We then come to the Manure Carriage Bill and the African Goods Bill, after which comes the celebrated Stone Bottles Bill, which, I believe, is the main foundation of the recent proceeding of the House of Lords. I happen to have the preamble of the Stone Bottles Bill, or rather of the Bill subsequently passed, which will show the meaning of it. The preamble expressly recites. Whereas, for the protection of the glass manufacturers of the United Kingdom, it is expedient to repeal the said duties and drawbacks, and to impose other duties, &c. And I may make this observation with respect to this Bill and a great many others, that there were always fifty other provisions besides those. This is a Bill which contains a great variety of provisions of all sorts, and finally there is the preamble to which I have just called the attention of the House. That, therefore, was a Bill for the protection of a trade with which no one disputed the right of the House of Lords to deal. Then we have the Inland Coals Bill, the Inland Navigation Bill, the Tobacco Growth (Ireland) Bill—all Bills relating to the regulation of trade.

Sir, I have thus disposed of three groups containing respectively five, six, and eighteen of those Bills. I now come to five which cannot be disposed of upon similar grounds. Two of them are Customs Officers Fees Abolition Bill—one for England, the other for Ireland. These have been quoted as precedents directly to the point, and which justify the course adopted by the House of Lords. I maintain that they have nothing whatever to do with the question. They were Bills for the purpose of preventing Custom House officers from levying gratuities on persons who had to deal with them. They involved no tax whatever on the public, nothing relating to a tax upon the public, either the levying it or the taking it off. They were simply Bills containing certain criminal provisions preventing Custom House Officers from exceeding their duty. There is another Bill—the Tobacco Duties Bill —which I may confess, when I first looked at it, rather staggered me. Here, I said, is a Revenue Act—an Act for repealing duties on tobacco and snuff, and granting new duties in lieu thereof. This clearly is a fiscal Act. But I looked at the second Bill which passed, and the former Bill which it was to explain and to amend, and I find that the Bill which it explained and amended contained no less than 177 clauses regulating the whole of the tobacco and snuff trade between America, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, prescribing the tonnage of vessels, the size of casks, the forfeiture of vessels, respecting warehouses, the right of entry of Custom House officers into the premises of private persons, the jurisdiction of justices, &c. This, then, constitutes no precedent at all. This was one of those Bills which nobody in his senses ever denied the right of the House of Lords to deal with, and which I am astonished to find quoted as a precedent.

Now, Sir, I have, I am happy to say, only two left. I now come to the Wine Merchants Bonds Bill, and the Tobacco and Wine Merchants Bill; and here we are getting "small by degrees and beautifully less." These precedents are so small that Mr. Hatsell does not think it worth while noticing them, and they are hardly worth quoting. A few wine merchants petitioned to be relieved from the interest on bonds which they had given for duties. They had paid the principal, and they wished to be relieved from the interest, and the question was whether a clause in an Act of Parliament then existing was sufficient to enable the officers of Customs to remit the interest. That was the question. The House of Lords differed from the House of Commons upon that subject. Thus I have disposed of these two Bills which are perfectly frivolous questions, and have nothing whatever to do with this subject. They were so small that we need not be surprised even if the Commons did not watch them very closely. They could not always be awake to their rights in regard to such questions. Perhaps the principle de minimis non curat occasionally prevailed.

Now, Sir, I have gone through the whole of the precedents which have been quoted of Bills altering or repealing taxation which had been rejected or postponed by the House of Lords. And allow me to observe with respect to them that several of them were dropped by the Government, one or two in consequence of the lateness of the Session, one or two in consequence of Amendments in Committee. But if the House will favour me with their indulgence for a very few minutes longer, I will proceed to deal with another class of Bills, namely, Bills imposing a tax; and I shall show that here all precedents are equally irrelevant. I shall be able to go through these in a very few minutes if the House will be good enough to follow me, and they are far less in number than the others, The Worsted Yarn Duties Bill was a question of protection to the worsted trade of this country. The Tobacco Trade Bill—(and if the House will allow me I will refer to the preamble of the Bill) if any one does not know what a "tack" is, he may learn from this—contained provisions for encouraging the tobacco trade, for disposing of goods in Her Majesty's warehouses, for the making of linen in Scotland, provisions with regard to Customs officers, to enable the Bank of England to lend on South Sea Stock, for the relief of Sir J. Lambert and others, and a variety of other heterogeneous provisions.

Now, that is gravely quoted as a precedent. If the House of Commons chose to send up such a hotch-potch as this, the House of Lords had no other course but to reject it. Again, the Pawnbrokers Regulation Bill prescribed a great number of regulations with respect to pawnbrokers' tickets, and the lodging of them, and a great number of things of that kind, but before a certain date we can find no Bills. I cannot tell you precisely what the Bill was, but it appears to have related to the regulation of the trade. There are a hundred clauses prescribing all sorts of regulations with which the House of Lords had a perfect right to deal.

It has, moreover, been just suggested to me with perfect truth, that before a certain date we cannot find the Bills, and we cannot therefore tell precisely what some of them were. The Raw Silks and Velvets Bill was a most clear "tack," for besides imposing additional duties on the importation of raw silks and velvets, it had clauses to prevent the unlawful combination of workmen employed in the silk manufacture. That is a totally different question.

It was never alleged that the House of Lords had not the right to deal with a Bill relating to the unlawful combination of workmen. I need hardly mention the case of the reward to Dr. Smith. Then there is the Bill with regard to Phillips's powder for the destruction of insects. I can only say that if the House of Commons were inclined to fight with the Lords they would hardly have done battle with Phillips's powder. Then there is the Lotteries Bill, involving penalties under the criminal law, and even inflicting in some cases the penalty of death. The Cocoa-nut Duties Bills were precedents which were strongly relied upon, I understand, by a great authority in "another place." I maintain them to be as irrelevant to the question as any paper which may happen to he on that table. The question involved was the charging of duty on foreign cocoa-nuts imported into the British plantations, but the Bills also contained provisions regarding the removal of sheep from Southampton and Portsmouth to Cowes; the removal of sheep and lambs and other goods under certain regulations between those ports free of cocket or bond, empowering licences to be granted to open boats of certain descriptions and subjecting boats and vessels of certain build to forfeiture. Here was a case in which, by the Standing Orders of the House of Lords, they were bound to reject the Bill. I say that these Bills have nothing to do with the question. With regard to the Lotteries Bill proposed by Mr. Pitt in 1790, I have taken some pains to inquire into this subject, and I must express my sincere thanks to the Chairman of the Committee who gave me some information upon the subject of this Lotteries Bill; that Bill contained clauses inflicting a penalty for advertising illegal lotteries, and among other things contained the punishment of death for certain forgeries. The obnoxious clause relating to the penalty for advertising having been 6truck out the Bill passed, containing precisely the same amount of supply as before. It was not thrown out on any question of tax or expenditure. It was not rejected as part of the Budget, or upon the ground that the House of Lords differed with the House of Commons upon the subject of the amount of Supply, but it was rejected on account of one of the criminal provisions which it contained. The Malt Duties Bill has also been quoted which was rejected on account of its being a "tack," according to the Standing Order of the House of Lords. Then there was the Extra Post Bill for regulating the postage of Great Britain, the Corn Bill, involving the question of Protection, and then comes the Corn Bill of 1827, introduced by Mr. Canning, and altered in the House of Lords by an Amendment proposed by the Duke of Wellington, and subsequently dropped. Another Bill containing the same provisions for a limited period was sent up again and again to the House of Lords. And if the House will permit me, I will read what Mr. Canning said upon that occasion. Mr. Canning said, I presume the House of Commons is not so reduced as to abjure what its Members have declared to be necessary principles, rescind its deliberate Resolutions, and throw away as waste paper that Bill which they have so long and so carefully considered, merely because in a certain assembly, which for many reasons is entitled to respect, it did not happen to be received with that courtesy which might have been expected. And then Mr. Canning continued, If there be a single spark of pride or of shame in the House you will not submit to it. Now, Sir, I will only refer to one more question on which the House of Lords have exercised, or rather have attempted to exercise, such a power. It was in the case of the soap duties in 1853. The House will perceive a very remarkable difference between the tone of the House of Lords in 1853, and in 1860. The Soap Duties Repeal Bill went up to the other House. Lord Ellenborough proposed a Motion to the effect that it be put off for one week; no more than that was at that time contemplated. Lord Aberdeen on that occasion asserted the constitutional doctrine, and I beg to call the attention of the House to his words. The postponement had been proposed on the ground that the money might be wanted for the Russian war, which was then impending. Lord Aberdeen on that occasion said— If the greatest calamity that could befall this country should be imminent, why, even then, he did not think it was the duty of the House of Lords to interfere and prevent the relief afforded to the people by the repeal of those duties. He went on to say:— If it should so happen that the House of Commons should determine that this country should be placed in a state of war, the House of Commons would undoubtedly find the means of carrying it out. Lord Derby upon that occasion used very different language from that which he so recently employed. Lord Derby said:— The Opposition were not disposed to bring this House into collision with the House of Commons. So that his Lordship clearly thought at that time, that taking a certain course would bring the Houses into collision. That statement, therefore, shows where, in the present instance, the collision began. His Lordship goes on to say:— His noble Friend did not ask them to refuse their assent to the measure, but to be quite satisfied before they passed it that the circumstances were the same in which the House of Commons were placed when they thought it expedient to take off this amount of taxation. Would it not be prudent to keep the amount in hand in order that the House of Commons might have an opportunity of judging whether, under the new circumstances, they could afford to dispense with this tax? It appeared to him that a short delay was the course dictated by prudence and sound sense. Acting upon the suggestion of the noble Lord, it was moved that the Bill be put off for one week, but that was negatived without a division. The House of Commons at that time understood that it was not prudent to put off the Bill.

Now, Sir, I am sure I have to thank the House for the great patience with which they have listened to my somewhat dry speech. I have now gone through all these precedents, not perhaps at so great a length as I might have done, or ought to have done, but as fully as I thought proper or decent. The conclusion seems to me to be this—that it does not appear, at all events affirmatively, that the House of Lords have on any occasion, either rejected a Bill imposing a tax, or repealing a tax, upon purely financial grounds. I know that it was admitted in one of the conferences by the then Attorney General, Sir Henry Finch, that the House of Lords has the abstract right to reject a Bill. The question was not then one of rejection, it was one of alteration; but the Attorney General merely discussed that question in argument, which he might safely do, that they had the power which in his time they had never exercised, as far as I know, for these precedents, which begin in 1773, do not show a single instance in which that power has been exercised.

Now, Sir, it behoves us to consider the consequences that will arise from the adoption of this course by the House of Lords, from the assumption of these new functions by them. The immediate result must be that on no future occasion can a tax be remitted, or a tax be levied upon the vote of this House. It will be necessary for merchants before making their arrangements to ascertain, if possible, what may be the views of their Lordships upon the subject of taxation as compared with ex- penditure, and whether or not the Bill is likely to pass that House. And, Sir, great inconvenience must arise to the public from such a state of things. Those only who are acquainted with the mercantile world can know the vast amount of inconvenience that would arise from the postponement of the settlement of the Budget. If the Budget is not to be considered as settled when it passes the House of Commons, and has to go through a new ordeal in the House of Lords, many grave and most important results must ensue. It will create a disturbance in our commercial relations of which we cannot foresee the consequences. If the House of Lords are to assume this power, it would seem to me that they should be furnished with the Estimates for the purpose of giving consideration to the question—Estimates, be it remembered, which they have many times applied for, but which have always been withheld from them. Indeed, upon one occasion, on the House of Lords asking for the Estimates, Mr. Pitt, with great complaisance, but with great firmness, withheld them. If the House of Lords are to assume this new function, it would seem desirable for the future that the Estimates should be laid before them. It might be advisable for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to sit in the House of Lords, and it might be enough for this House if the Budget were explained to us by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Sir, it does seem to me that this vote of the House of Lords—although I take it, as I have assumed it from the beginning, to be legally and technically right—is productive of more disturbance to the constitutional functions of both Houses than any proceeding which has taken place in our times. I trust that the noble Lord at the head of the Government is right in supposing that the House of Lords do not intend to proceed in this course, but it will be necessary for this House to take care that they shall not be able to do so. If necessary we must alter the course of our proceeding, and the very necessity of considering whether or not we ought to alter it is a conclusive argument that something new has been done. I believe that a great responsibility lies on us. It is all very well to say that the country is apathetic. The country can distinguish between the paper duty and the constitutional question. The country is not so stupid as is sometimes represented. No questions can he more distinct than whether the House Lords is financially right, and whether they are constitutionally right. If they happen to be financially right the more the danger—the danger that those who do not distinguish clearly in questions which are essentially different may accept a present benefit at the expense of a permanent evil. But, Sir, I am satisfied that the eyes of this country are upon this House. We must look well what we do. Remember we have rejected the Reform Bill. [Cries of "No, no!"]—we have virtually rejected it, and we have thereby refused the extension of popular rights. It remains to be seen how far those to whom popular rights have been promised by statesmen on both sides of the House will rest satisfied, if, in addition to withholding popular rights, we show ourselves inclined to abandon those which we already possess. If we show ourselves careless guardians of those rights, depend upon it that we shall entirely and irrevocably forfeit the confidence of the country, and the forfeiture of that confidence will, I believe, more than anything else, give an impetus to that democratic and dangerous reform which is dreaded by all who value the institutions of the country.

Sir, in conclusion, (and tendering to the House my sincere thanks for the indulgence which they have shown me) I am satisfied that we shall not part with our right of taxation. The exclusive right of taxation is the life blood of the House of Commons. The principle of taxation being co-ordinate with the representation is the most vital element of the Constitution. But should the time ever arrive, and I trust that time may be far distant, when the House of Commons shall bate one jot or tittle of its privileges in respect to the sole and exclusive control of the finances, I say from that day we date the decadence of the Constitution of this country.

MR. CONINGHAM

Mr. Speaker, I have listened with great attention to the speech of the noble Lord, the First Lord of the Treasury in bringing forward these Resolutions on the part of the Government, and I very much doubt whether that speech will be received throughout the country with the same degree of favour which it seems to have met from the Opposition benches. For my part, I cannot help thinking, nay, I am firmly convinced that the determination of Her Majesty's Government to do nothing but place a mere dry and idle record upon the Journals of this House as an answer to the vote of the House of Lords, is calculated to prove fatal to the Administration. I am satisfied that no Government can last under the contempt to which it must inevitably give rise on the part of the country at large, while the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton stands forward in this House as the defender of the rights and privileges of the House of Peers instead of being the defender of the rights and privileges of the House of Commons. The noble Lord seems to forget that every word that he has uttered in palliation of the conduct of the other House of Parliament, was in reality casting a censure upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the body who sit beside him.

Sir, it is not a financial question, as has has been said before, which we have to consider. It is a great constitutional question whether the people of this country by their representatives are to maintain their ancient rights and privileges, which is to tax themselves by their representatives, whom they have sent into the House of Commons.

Sir, I can state to the House that I have recently met my constituents upon this very question, and I venture to tell hon. Members who would be inclined to jeer at my statements, that the constituency which I have the honour to represent is fully as enlightened and as intelligent a constituency as that of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, and I believe that their opinions are but a type of the opinions of the majority of the people of this country. You talk of the apathy of the people of this country! For my part I am prepared to deny that that apathy exists, and I will venture to tell the hon. Members of the Government as well as the hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Opposition side of the House, that they are tampering with very dangerous elements when they venture to bring the rights and privileges of an irresponsible House into direct collision with the rights and privileges of the representatives of the people. You think that by passing this Resolution you have disposed of the question. I can tell you that the debate which is taking place this evening, will create an agitation such as you have not seen for many years. ["Oh, oh!"] I imagined that the proceedings of this House were regulated by order and the rules of courtesy. It is not by rude interruptions that I am to be put down, and I intend to be heard and to state what I have to say. I am an independent Member of this House, and a real and genuine representative of my constituents. I am not the representative of a rotten borough, but I am the representative of a large and enlightened constituency. [Interruptions.] It is not, I say, by idle clamour and interruptions of that kind that I am to be put down and silenced. I am acting upon my right and privilege in now addressing this House, and this is not the first time that I have received those rude and idle interruptions, which I will venture to say are most unwarrantable and most unjustifiable. I have never trespassed unfairly or unduly upon the time or patience of the House whenever I have spoken. I have, on the contrary, endeavoured always to adhere closely and rigidly to the question at issue, and I do certainly appeal to the hon. Gentlemen who sit on both sides of the House, to at all events give me a fair hearing when I come upon an important occasion of this kind to express my sentiments in a manner, I trust, like a Gentleman and a Member of Parliament.

Now, I can assure the House, Sir, that I do not wish to trespass at any length upon its patience. I think that fully enough has been already said upon this question. I think that an immense amount of time has been lost in the idle search that has taken place for precedents. I know well how that search will end; but before I sit down I cannot but enter my deliberate protest against the decision which has been come to by Her Majesty's Government, who have contented themselves by simply placing this unmeaning (for it is unmeaning) platitude upon the Records of this House. If there should be a division upon the present occasion, I should certainly vote against placing any such idle record upon our Journals which is calculated to bring the House of Commons into contempt—it is barking when we do not intend to bite. I am of opinion that the Petition which was presented to this House this evening by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) should be again presented to this House; and if it should be so presented, and if the Paper Duties Repeal Bill should be again brought forward, I am sure it will be passed by such a commanding majority in the House of Commons as shall compel the House of Lords to pass it likewise. I moreover warn the House of Commons that if they turn a deaf ear to the voice of the people, that voice will be raised in no unhesitating accents, and that when the hon. Members of this House go back to their constituents, those who have failed in this great crisis of our constitutional history to do justice to those constituents who have sent them here to represent their rights and to defend their just and ancient privileges—I say, Sir, that I feel that confidence in the honesty and clear-sightedness of the constituencies of this country that they will not send those, who fail in a moment like this to do their duty, back to the House of Commons again to betray the rights and privileges of their constituents.

MR. VINCENT SCULLY

Sir, I have listened with great attention and great admiration to the speech which has been addressed to the House by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier), but although I agree with the entire of what my hon. and learned Friend has stated, I apprehend at the same time that he did not arrive at a right conclusion. If you read over these Resolutions which are now before the House carefully, as I myself read them over most carefully before I came here, I think you will arrive at the conclusion at which I have arrived. I may also add, that I have carefully gone through all the precedents which have been laid before us, and the conclusion I have come to is, that these Resolutions are in substance all that the House of Commons can do at the present stage of the proceedings. I, for one, do not consider these Resolutions as at all final and conclusive; I consider, on the other hand, that they may be regarded as only the first step in the initiation of a much bolder course. I apprehend that it will be quite open to the hon. Member for Brighton, who has just sat down, to take a much bolder course when these Resolutions have been put to the vote and passed.

Now, Sir, to refer at once to the Resolutions, because it is those that we have here to deal with. The first Resolution is a mere transcript, as I read it, of the Resolution that was passed by this House in the year 1692. The words appear to me to be identical; they are given in this printed Report of the Select Committee on Tax Bills, and hon. Members therefore may readily refer to them. As I said just now, the first Resolution proposed to the House by the noble Lord at the head of the Government is an exact copy and transcript of a Resolution which was come to in 1692 by the House of Commons, and which was then handed to the House of Lords. In the year 1692 the House of Lords did not sit down tamely under that Resolution, but they then thought it necessary to come to an equally strong Resolution; in fact, they thought it necessary to give the House of Commons of that day a Roland for their Oliver—at all events they did not think proper to sit quietly down under that Resolution. I find this passage:— After several conferences, Mr. Attorney General reported that their Lordships did not insist upon their proviso. Reasons assigned by the Lords: 'That they can by no means agree to what was offered by the House of Commons at the last Conference because, besides many precedents in former times in taxing themselves for their personal estates, they have had a very late one in the Act intituled, An Act for raising Money by a Poll and otherwise towards the reducing of Ireland and prosecuting the war against France, wherein they did nominate Commissioners of their own for taxing their personal estates. And because they conceive that the making of amendments and abatements of rates in Bills of Supply sent up from the House of Commons is a fundamental inherent and undoubted right of the House of Peers from which their Lordships can never depart; they have therefore thought themselves obliged to assert it upon this occasion. But considering that a difference between the two Houses upon this Bill may create such delays in the passing of it as would be of the most fatal consequence in the present conjuncture, the Lords have not thought it convenient at this time to insist upon their provisos. A Committee on that occasion had been appointed by the House of Commons to draw up reasons, and the reasons to be assigned were,— That the right of granting Supplies to the Crown is in the Commons alone, as an essential part of their constitution; and the limitation of all such grants as to the manner, matter, measure, and time is only in them, which is so well known to be fundamentally settled in them, that to give reasons for it has been esteemed by our ancestors to be a weakening of that right. And the clause sent down by your Lordships to be added to this Bill is a manifest violation thereof. And then the reasons of the Lords follow, which I have already read to the House.

Now, Sir, that occurred in the year 1692. We had thus, to a certain extent, been allowed to establish a precedent in our own favour, but there is the assumption of authority on the part of the House of Lords which, as far as I can make out from reading these Resolutions (and I have, I assure hon. Members, read them very carefully), is a direct assumption; it is an assumption of authority to that extent, that is, as regards the right to interfere in an important matter of taxation upon purely and exclusively financial grounds. I cannot find that the question is carried to a further extent, and I certainly do not find that the House of Lords ever imagined in that day that they had a right to amend or to reject any Money Bill from the House of Commons. That question had never arisen, but the debate has now arisen, and the question before the House is whether they have a right to reject the Repeal of the Paper Duties Bill; a Committee has been appointed for the purpose of searching for precedents, and the Report of that Committee is before the House.

Well, now, Sir, I look upon that first Resolution as a very valuable one. It raises the question of the right of the House of Lords to interfere. The House of Lords must either have taken some active steps against this Resolution, or they must have fought the battle. If, however, they have taken no steps in the matter and have done nothing, it is perfectly clear that we have got a step in advance. If they do take a step in advance, we may possibly come in collision. But then there are two other Resolutions, which are very vague.

Now, this being the state of affairs, I do not see what more we can do. These Resolutions are merely the assertion of our rights. The oldest precedent to be found in this very valuable Report contains the same sentiment. It is, that these proceedings of the House of Lords are not to be brought into action, are not to be brought into precedent, against the House of Commons. I see that quoted here in page 8 of this most valuable Report, and I will give to the House the exact sentence from the Report, in order that there may be no mistake upon the subject. It says that these proceedings of the House of Lords at that time Are not to be drawn into a precedent by which the House of Commons would be bound." [It is a precedent in the year 1407]—"neither in this present Parliament nor at any time hereafter. Now, Sir, I do not for a moment say that these Resolutions of the Government might not have been framed in terms more clear and precise. I do not say that they might not have been framed in more terse, clear, and cogent phraseology by many hon. Members who are now sitting around me. I flatter myself that I could have put them into more clear and bright language than that in which they are framed. However, Sir, there the Resolutions stand, and they must be judged of and decided upon as they stand, and I leave that matter by stating that I think I could have thrown them into more severe and striking language. If the Government does think fit to assert the right of the House of Commons, and the House of Commons supports the Government, I apprehend that that will be sufficient. The House of Lords have found means to enforce their rights in cases where the House of Commons were utterly at variance with them in the House of Lords. I have found a precedent which does not appear in this printed Report of the Select Committee which has been presented to the House, but it is connected with one of the matters which is referred to in the Report of the Select Committee. I have no doubt whatever that if the Government think fit to assert the right of the House of Commons to pass the Repeal of the Paper Duty Bill and the House would support it, the Bill would be carried. The House has the means of enforcing such a course, even if they were in the wrong. There is a precedent with regard to this point which, as I have already said, is not quoted in the Report. It relates to the Irish Cattle Importation Bill in 1758. That Bill was sent up from the House of Commons to the House of Lords, who ordered it to be postponed, which in point of fact amounted to its rejection, and it was afterwards rejected. But I find in the year 1766 a very distinct precedent, which is not given in this collection of precedents. But it appears that a direct and distinct contest arose upon this very question in the House of Lords, and after several pitched battles on the subject the House of Lords were obliged to give way, although they had declared the importation of Irish cattle a public and common nuisance. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Plymouth quoted the precedent to which I refer from Cartes Ormond, as extracted from The Irish Land Question, by Mr. Vincent Scully. The battle between the two Houses of Parliament upon the Cattle Importation Bill ended by the House of Commons forcing the House of Lords to accept the measure in its integrity, however unjust, and also to swallow the obnoxious word "nuisance." If, therefore, the House of Commons were to be again driven into a contest with the House of Lords, I have no doubt as to which of the combatants would come out successful. The House of Commons came to a certain Resolution, and the House of Lords came to a counter-resolution; but I take these two Resolutions to amount to this, that they would not draw this misbehaviour into a precedent. They said, you shall not make a practice of it. That is what we say to the House of Lords now:—Although you do this now, we will not allow you to make a practice of it; we will assume your right. Like the lady who allowed her admirer to take a liberty with her on condition that he would not make a practice of it, so the House of Commons should give the House of Lords to understand that what they have done in this instance must not be converted into a practice.

Now, Sir, all I can say with respect to asserting the privileges of the House of Commons, although I gave no vote on the question before and deliberately left the House—indeed, I was not able to make up my mind upon it—all I can say is, that if it is necessary to assert the privileges of this House upon the question of taxation and finance, so much do I think that it is their interest—the existence of this House depends upon the question of taxation—that I shall unquestionably, without the least hesitation, vote for the repeal of the Paper Duty Bill, and that it should be sent back to their Lordships in order that we may assert our rights. It is to be recollected that our very existence depends upon that—our very existence depends upon the power of taxation which is vested in this House, and in this House alone. That power rests with us, and with us it ought to rest if we are to have any weight or importance with the country. When these Resolutions which have now been proposed by the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government were first talked of, I imagined that on this occasion we were to have only a consistent finale to all the other shams, the very numerous shams, which we have had from the beginning of this Session, and of which this Session has been fruitful; but having now carefully examined the whole of the circumstances of the case, I do not see how Her Majesty's Government can well do more than propose the Resolutions which have been submitted for our consideration, thus leaving it open to the House of Commons to take such further and stronger action as it deems necessary under all the circumstances which have taken place. Under all the circumstances of the case, I think it better that the House should adopt these Resolutions, and I hope that they will carry them.

MR. LEATHAM

Mr. Speaker, that one branch of the Legislature should in- vade the privileges of this House, may or may not excite our surprise, but that hon. Gentlemen opposite—although those hon. Gentlemen opposite have not expressed up to this time an opinion upon this subject—and whose cheering and significant cheering, and counter-cheering to-night it is altogether impossible to misconstrue, should volunteer to abet and encourage this invasion, either in this House or out of doors, I must say surpasses all previous experience of their occult policy.

Now, Sir, I ask this House, what is the aim of hon. Gentlemen? I ask this House is the aim of those hon. Gentlemen further to humiliate and degrade this House in the eyes of the country at large? Surely, we have had enough of that in one Session of Parliament. If hon. Gentlemen suppose that the debate upon the Reform Bill has tended to raise this House in public estimation, or that the means to which they had recourse in order to defeat that Bill have inspired their constituents with any deeply-rooted idea either of the dignity of this House or of the feelings of hon. Gentlemen, I ask, have these things inspired the constituents of hon. Gentlemen with any high idea of their sincerity? I ask, do hon. Gentlemen ever read the public press? I ask do hon. Gentlemen now wish still further to lower their position in the eyes of their constituents and of the country at large? I think that there is a growing suspicion which pervades all ranks of society. I think there is a feeling which pervades every class of opinion in this country that this House is becoming contemptible. Hon. Gentlemen sneer, but I do assure you that it is my firm conviction that it is a feeling which is very prevalent throughout all classes of the State.

Now, Sir, the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government has spoken about inaction and forbearance on the present occasion. For my part, I am quite sure that I should be the last man to criticise anything that the noble Viscount has said; but let me ask the House, whom do we sit here to represent? I ask the House do we sit here to represent people intolerant of aggression and insult, or a people who lick the hand that smites them? That is the aspect which the present state of things presents to our view.

Now, Sir, when this question first came before the public, it may he said that the public did not at first perceive how grave was the issue that had been raised between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Great efforts were made to jumble together two questions totally distinct—namely, the merits of the Paper Duty Repeal Bill, and the infringement of the privileges of this House. Great endeavours were used to lead on the public mind from the question really at issue to questions affecting the expediency of proceeding. But, Sir, I believe that when the people shall have had time thoroughly to appreciate the wrong which has been done them, I may almost say the danger which has beset our whole representative system. I believe that there is no event which shall occur for many years which shall tend more to disperse that political indolence and apathy which has been the stronghold of hon. Gentlemen opposite. The compromising aspect of affairs both at home and abroad alone serves to show on how slender a thread hangs that political apathy among the people in which hon. Gentlemen exult; and, Sir, I do think that the aspect of things generally is not very encouraging to those who build so much upon what they call the public indifference and apathy. Abroad, we have the perpetual menace of European war—at home we have the very prosperity, upon which some of us perhaps depend, threatened; a gloomy responsibility is beginning to exhibit itself, and trade itself begins to languish. Under these circumstances I say again how slender is the thread of that political apathy among the people in which hon. Gentlemen so much exult!

But, Sir, those efforts were at first successful, and we were reluctant to believe at this time of day that this House would have been subjected to so incredible an usurpation as this.

Well, Sir, to revert to the question which is more particularly before the House, you appointed a Committee for the purpose of searching into precedents. That Committee has reported. Has that Committee, I ask, found a single precedent? In point of fact, is not the result of the labours of that Committee this, that this act of the House of Lords amounts to an act of attempted taxation without representation?

Now Sir, this taxation without representation is a thing which is not altogether new in our constitutional history. It is only new when it is attempted by the House of Lords. Upon three occasions within the last two centuries and a half there have been attempts to tax the people without their consent, and all these at- tempts have been unfortunate. The first resulted in the decapitation of one King; the deposition of another, and the loss of our American colonies were the results of three former encroachments of this kind—and the third marks what Mr. Burke has called the era of calamity, disgrace, and downfalls which no feeling mind can contemplate without being struck with—it was our attempt to tax the American colonies.

Sir, upon that occasion it was contended that the great bulk of the people not being represented in Parliament had always been taxed without their own consent. It was alleged that the East India Company had been taxed—it was alleged that the Bishop of Chester and the Bishop of Durham had been taxed. How was it that Lord Chatham, who at that time occupied a seat in this House, disposed of these flimsy artifices to lead the public mind away from the real question at issue? Sir, Lord Chatham upon that occasion said that he came not armed at all points with law cases and Acts of Parliament, but he took his stand on the well-established constitutional principle that British subjects could not be justly taxed without their consent, and I would venture to submit to the House that this is a ground on which, upon this occasion, we might dare to meet any man.

But, Sir, since I have quoted Lord Chatham I shall proceed, with the leave of the House, to refer to another speech of that celebrated statesman upon the American question, and there Lord Chatham says, that to tax America is contrary to every principle of the British Constitution, and I will venture to submit that these words of Lord Chatham apply with peculiar force to that which is the very essence of the subject at present under discussion.

Now, it has been said that these rights are imperilled by precedents? What are those precedents? Upon what occasion have the circumstances of the cases been identical? In the case of any of the precedents to which reference has been made, upon what occasion has a large and important remission of taxation, forming a portion of the financial scheme of the year, (and it is not contended for a moment, that the instance before us has injured in any way any branch of industry)—upon what occasion has such a remission of taxation been rejected by the House of Lords?

But, Sir, a precedent to be a true prece- dent not only requires that the circumstances should be identical but it also requires that the question of right shall have been raised and discussed. But is it pretended that in any of these cases of precedents referred to that the question of right was ever raised at all? They maintained that the right to tax themselves was a right which was imperilled by no precedent. On the contrary, the perusal of the Report of the Select Committee proves this. The Report of the Select Committee proves that the House of Commons was at all times and in all vicissitudes most vigorous in defending this one great and cardinal privilege. On that ground, therefore, which has been adopted by the House of Commons under all circumstances and in all ages, I do earnestly hope and trust that this House is now about to take its stand. But we are told by hon. Gentlemen, perhaps not within these walls but outside the House, that if a precedent do not exist, now is the time to make one. So it was said in the reign of Charles the First, and so thought Charles the First, and he made a precedent which will endure as long as history is read; and so again thought King James the Second who contributed his precedent. So again thought the political ancestors of the hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Opposition side of the House, when, against the solemn prayers and entreaties of the political progenitors of liberal Members, they proceeded to tax America, and lost her.

Now, Sir, these are the great precedents of taxation which have been attempted without the consent of the people, and they are precedents which overwhelmed with execration those who made them. In supporting the House of Lords I maintain that they would be following in the same footsteps, but I do earnestly hope and trust that the House of Commons will not relinquish their right unless it should please them that the symbol of their high privilege should once more become a bauble.

MR. BERNAL OSBORNE

Sir, with all dues ubmission to you, and to the House in general, I cannot help thinking that on the present occasion the House cuts but a very humiliating figure.

Sir, the noble Lord who moved these Resolutions, and certainly they are not Resolutions which are— . . Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. The noble Lord has made a speech which if it means anything at all is, in the shape of a defence of the House of Lords, nothing more than an attack upon his own Ministry. The noble Lord was followed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth, and I must say that to my mind, and I think to the mind of the House generally, the speech of that hon. and learned Member did credit to him as a lawyer and honour to him as a statesman.

Sir, I did expect after that speech that some hon. Member on the other side of the House, well fitted for the task, would at least have paid the House, if not my hon. and learned Friend, the compliment of answering that lucid speech, which I think has exhausted every argument upon the question. I lamented to find that after all that research which my lion, and learned Friend exhibited, and all the pains-taking labour which he had evidently given to the subject, that speech was not followed by any conclusion. It appears that my hon. Friend's Motion has been withdrawn totally unknown to me—but I am told at a meeting of the great Liberal party—[Interruption]—the hon. Gentleman said so—I am in the recollection of the House—the hon. Gentleman certainly said so. Of whom that great Liberal party consists I am at a total loss to conjecture, but I think that, however distasteful it might be to be beaten upon a division, that the hon. Gentleman was