HC Deb 19 April 1837 vol 38 cc1-120

The Order of the Day was read for resuming the adjourned debate on the affairs of Spain.

Mr. Otway cave

was understood to express his full concurrence in the speech of the hon. Member for Marylebone (Mr. Henry Bulwer.) Most gratifying indeed would it be to the feelings of the gallant Officer, General Evans, when he should read the speech of the hon. Member, conveying as it did, in the most handsome terms, an approval and defence of the gallant Officer. He did not mean to state that such was the intention, but most assuredly the effect of this motion was, to smooth the way for the party of Don Carlos, and the cheers which had been given by hon. Gentlemen opposite when certain assertions or allusions were made went far to prove that such was the case. Yes, this motion could only have the effect of smoothing the way for the Carlist party; and this object could only be gained by endangering, or rather ruining, the reputation and character of the British soldiers who were employed in the cause of the Queen of Spain. By ruining the fame and military character of General Evans (for whatever might be said by hon. Gentlemen opposite, the course they pursued tended to this object), and by taking from him, moreover, the means of sustaining his reputation, mutiny and ill-feeling must naturally increase in the already disorganised ranks of the British Legion. The true ground from whence much of the evils which had un-happily prevailed, was to be traced to the Horse Guards. The authorities at the Horse Guards had prejudiced the cause of the Queen of Spain by requiring every officer to pledge his word of honour that he would not take service under General Evans. And the injuries had been further increased by the agency of the political writers of the Tory press. He thought that the way in which these charges were brought forward against the Government was extremely inconsistent, inasmuch as that whilst those who were parties to the charges intended to impugn the conduct of the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the real effect produced was to injure the British Legion in Spain. Why make this motion the vehicle for bringing up a case against the British Legion? Why not make a distinct and substantial motion on the subject? In the Speech from the Throne his Majesty gave permission to, and encouraged his subjects to enlist in the service of the Queen of Spain; but the Horse Guards set its veto upon that permission, and declared that no officer should go abroad without promising, on his word of honour, that he would not take service under General Evans. It was discreditable that such a motion should have been made at a time when the Legion was disheartened and disorganized by defeat. He hoped to be able to satisfy the House that the charges brought against General Evans and the Legion had no foundation in fact; and if he proved that, he was satisfied the right hon. Baronet would be quite ready to do an act of not tardy, but immediate, justice to men, some of whom were his own companions in arms. At the time those charges were made, there happened to be in England an officer of high distinction, whose character was above suspicion, who was well known to many hon. Members of that House, and who, although he had had a personal difference with General Evans, was so shocked with the nature of the charges brought against General Evans, that that officer had sent him a letter, although he had scarcely the honour of his acquaintance, merely because that officer knew him to be the personal friend of General Evans,—which would completely bear out everything he had stated, and which, with the permission of the House, he would now read. The letter was from General Shaw, and in reference to the report of the right hon. and gallant Officer's speech, and the statements therein made.

The Speaker

interrupted the hon. Member, and reminded him that he could not, according to the usages of the House, quote from a report in a newspaper; but he was at liberty to read any extracts from the letter, in answer to allegations which had been made by any hon. Member.

Mr. Otway Cave

resumed, by reading the following letter from General Shaw:— Reform Club, April 18. Dear Sir—In The Morning Chronicle of this day I see the report of a speech of Sir Henry Hardinge, with extracts from a book of Major Richardson, and from The Monthly Repository, concerning General Evans and the Legion. The splendid conduct of Sir Henry Hardinge on all occasions made me look on him as one of the greatest ornaments of the British service"—[an opinion, said the hon. Member, in which I beg to say I entirely concur]—"whose example I not only wished to follow, but whose good opinion I frankly confess I was most anxious to attain: therefore you may have some idea how deeply I feel hurt at seeing this gallant Officer being led to read statements which I am sure he will regret after the explanation I now make. I do not pretend to be a friend of General Evans, because I do not think he behaved to me as he ought to have done; but that is matter of opinion, and I shall now go to matter of fact, not only to do justice to that very brave man, but to ward off the obloquy which is attempted to be thrown by these publications on the brave and gallant body of men under his command, many of whom mainly contributed to the establishment of constitutional freedom in Portugal. Sir Henry looks upon us as mercenaries. If Sir Henry means we all fought for money, I deny it. We commenced fighting for those principles of constitutional liberty which before long must rule the world; and I venture to say, that in one campaign in the Peninsula, Sir Henry received more money than I have during the last six years, although I was always in command of a regiment or brigade. But now to facts. Major Richardson, in The Chronicle, says, that when the Legion arrived in Vittoria there were no blankets nor beds for the Legion. The 8th and 4th regiments were in my brigade. The 8th regiment were about 650 strong, and in their convent there were upwards of 700 beds and blankets; but as the Quarter-Master-General's department (to which Major Richardson belonged) had left the 4th without any blankets or beds, I made an equal division between the two regiments. It is stated the Algerine Legion were billeted in the houses in town. This is true; but at this time the greater part of the Legion were quartered in the houses of the neighboring village. I do not pretend to defend the conduct of the Spanish government (as their behaviour to the Legion in many cases was most shameful, and the sufferings of the men dreadful), but was Major Richardson's department quite free from blame? Did the health and morals of the Legion not assume quite a different aspect as soon as General M'Dougal was appointed Quartermaster-General? Sir Henry, by the report, in speaking of the sufferings of the Legion at Trevino, says, that while he commanded a brigade there he did not lose a man. Was not the Peninsular army at Vittoria the élite of all those who had ever landed in the Peninsula? the weakly soldiers either being dead or employed in garrisons. I commanded the Irish brigade when they marched from Vittoria, in April, 1836, 1,875 strong, and they landed in St. Sebastian, from Santander, 1,872, losing three men, not having one complaint against them from the inhabitants during that long march; and at Velorado the junta of the town thanked the officers and men of the 4th and 8th regiments for their good conduct. It is not true, that the 10th Irish regiment offered to fire on a Scotch regiment. It is not true that the 8th Scotch regiment were put on board boats (to go in pursuit of Gomez) by the bayonets of the 9th Irish. I was present with Lord John Hay and Colonel Wylde, and, if my memory does not fail me, Major Richardson was in St. Sebastian that day. The fact is, the Scotch would not embark without their pay, but said they were ready to go any where if paid. The Irish said they were ready to go whether they were paid or not. Both regiments embarked; but it is not true they were marched through a line of Spanish troops. The Spanish Guards at the gates turned out as a compliment, and this compliment, Sir, is thus shamefully taken notice of to make it appear a disgrace. The Scotch, who said their year of service was finished, were not marched as prisoners to the castle of St. Sebastian. As to the 10th Irish regiment threatening to go over to Don Carlos, it is so absolutely ridiculous, that the writer must have been listening to the conversation of some drunken fellows while spending their four dollars each. Now, as to our characters, as officers and men, being unhumanised by this horrible war, I shall refer solely to the points mentioned in the report of The Morning Chronicle. In The Monthly Repository the 'eye-witness' says, that on the night before the action of the 5th of May, the commanding officer of the rifles ordered his men to 'give no quarter, and to kill the wounded.' I know Major Fortescue, and I do not believe him capable of making use of the latter words of the order; and I am cer- tain of one thing—and I state it after years of experience—that, be the officer who he may who gave such an order, he must be aware that neither English, Irish, nor Scotch soldiers would obey such a 'barbarous Don Carlos order.' But if this 'eye-witness' heard such a speech, did he not, on the afternoon of the 1st of August, see the soldiers of this very regiment of rifles carrying a wounded Carlist soldier on their shoulders, defending him against the attacks of the Christino Spaniards, until they had placed him in a hospital? This gallant officer—no friend of Colonel Evans, but an officer with a British heart, cannot help saying what I say—it really is too bad. The Report in The Morning Chronicle says, that the gallant Colonel of the 4th regiment said, 'Now, we will have no nonsense, no firing behind walls, fix bayonets, walk into them and skewer the scoundels,' and that these orders were given in cold blood the day before the action. Now, as to the facts. The commanding officers of the 4th and 8th regiments had served under my command in Portugal. They landed from the steamer during the action. While I was explaining to both (within 200 yards of the enemy, exposed at the moment to a heavy fire, and while men of both regiments were knocked down) that our great loss had been owing to our men halting to fire, I said I hoped they would run at the enemy with the bayonet. They did run at the enemy with the bayonet, and the enemy fled. Surely if the commanding officer of the 4th gave such an order, it cannot be said it was given the day before the action, as he was then actually in Santander. It is stated, that the Irish, like the first brigade, bayoneted all those that came near them. Now, what is the actual fact? Don Carlos had sent to St. Sebastian to inform General Evans that the Durango decree would be put in full force against all ranks of the Legion. This caused a great sensation, and I believe some officers made use of hasty expressions like that said to be used by Major Fortescue. When the Irish brigade was formed before daybreak, for the attack on the 6th of May, I called the officers together, and begged them not to give way to their naturally outraged feelings, to which they at once agreed. I went from the head of the brigade to the rear, begged the men to be silent, not to fire, and hoped they would not hurt a prisoner, as 'it would tell well for the Irish in. England.' They most gladly assented, only some asking if there would be much harm in shooting Don Carlos? Before the last assault of the lines, the enemy had time to carry away their wounded; and, from five hours fighting on clayey, heavy ground, the men could not follow rapidly enough to take prisoners. The Irish entered the battery nearly with the 4th and 8th, and only one prisoner was taken, and he was—[what Sir?—murdered?' 'No,' says the gallant Officer]—not murdered by the Irish. Therefore the Irish kept their promise to me, and they did not bayonet the wounded. I know for a fact, that such was the desire of General Evans to humanise this war, that an officer in command thought it his duty, after guns were mounted in the Puyu battery, to inform the officer in command of the Carlist picket, that he had better withdraw his picket until the proper range of his picket-house was found. The Carlists' picket was withdrawn, both Legion and Carlist soldiers looking on; and after two shells had struck the house, the Carlist officer was informed he might return to his picket house. He came forward and thanked the Legion officer. I could mention many particulars. On the 16th of March, the Scotch, whose comrades had been barbarously murdered, returned, 'good for evil,' giving ten wounded Carlists bread and water, instead of hurting them. I hope I have now proved to you that we are not such barbarians as the report of the Debate may lead the world to believe. I have expressed no opinion as to whether matters were conducted properly or not in the Legion— that is another question; but as a soldier I consider it my duty to come forward to defend the characters and honours of men with whom I have fought. Major Richardson may or may not be a very good officer; but I fear there may be an animus in his publication, as in my official duty I received a letter from the officers of his regiment declining to serve with him. Adjutant-General Le Marchant is in town, and knows particulars, as the correspondence was sent to me through his office. I shall only say, that after some years of experience of 'irregular service,' difficulties arose for which great allowances ought to be made, both for officers and men. The facts are here before you; and if you show this letter to Sir Henry Hardinge, I feel certain his high, honourable mind will at least doubt the correctness of the extracts which he quoted in his speech. This has been written in a great hurry, and I do not think there are any inaccuracies. I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully, CHARLES SHAW. R Otway Cave, Esq., M. P. P. S. Some excuse may, perhaps, be allowed for the inaccuracies mentioned by Major Richardson, as to the conduct of the men on the 5th of May, as in the early part of the day having received a contusion in the arm he left the field and remained in St. Sebastian till the fight was over. My authority for stating this, were different officers who saw him in town, but I myself did not see him, not returning till the evening of the 6th to St. Sebastian. I omitted to give you an idea of the style of men of which the Legion was composed. The bounty given to them was 2l. each. Very few of them kept more than 10s. to themselves, leaving the greater proportion to their wives, mothers, and sisters; and there were instances of brothers enlisting to employ the bounty in paying their parents' house-rent until their return. These men embarked in the Clyde, in steamers, and on an average, each ship left about 400l. The present Lieutenant-Colonel, Boyd, of the Legion, (Rifles), when my Sergeant-major in Oporto, after an action, wished to bury three Miguelite officers, killed close in upon our position. The enemy fired on anybody approaching these bodies. After three days, Boyd came to me with two sergeants to ask permission to bury them. At first I refused, when he said to me, 'The soldiers who die in front are always brave soldiers, whether friend or foe; do let us give them a soldier's grave.' I did so; but a heavy fire was kept on them while so employed. Such were the officers, such the men, whom they were called upon by a vote of that House, for the sake of casting a slur upon the policy of the Foreign Secretary, and of embarrassing the Government, deliberately to stigmatise and ungenerously deprive of an opportunity of retrieving their late reverse. He called upon the House by the feelings of Gentlemen not to inflict this disgrace upon the Legion. Not to be guilty of an act of such monstrous injustice as to censure men who were not present to defend themselves. Let time be given them. It was unjust and ungenerous to judge them now. But for the facts he had stated to the House, and which had been in his possession only for a few minutes, a verdict would have been pronounced against the Legion; they would have been stigmatized in the face of Europe, and, as a natural consequence, mutiny and disaffection would spread through their ranks. Having said so much with respect to the officers and men of the Legion, he might now, perhaps, be allowed to offer a few words with respect to General Evans. He knew that gallant Officer to be actuated upon the occasion, as upon all others, by the highest, purest, and noblest motives. The gallant Officer opposite (Sir H. Hardinge) in the warmth of debate had called General Evans a mercenary. He was sure the gallant Officer did not mean deliberately to apply that term. However, that it might not go forth to the world on such high authority that General Evans was a mercenary, and that the men who served under him were a brutal and demoralized rabble, he would state one fact that he knew of his own knowledge. When General Evans was about to leave this country it was thought by many of his friends, by a general officer in the service, and by many others, that as he was giving up great advantages at home, exposing himself to great personal danger, and leaving his reputation (dearer to him than life) exposed in his absence to every species of slander, be ought to make some stipulation for himself; and a stipulation was made with the Spanish minister that he should receive 10,000l. Now General Evans was not a rich man, and might very well have accepted the 10,000l. which were offered him. What was the conduct of General Evans on the occasion? Wishing that there should be no possibility nor shadow of suspicion with regard to his motives, after the stipulation had been agreed to and signed by the Spanish minister, General Evans went to him immediately and annulled and annihilated the whole of it, and insisted that he should not receive one farthing for his service in the cause of the Queen. He hoped, then, that the House would not consent to trample upon the reputation of that gallant soldier for the sake of casting a slur upon the policy of the foreign minister. Without wishing to impute motives to the gallant Officer opposite, he did not hesitate deliberately to say, that the charges brought against General Evans and the Legion, of brutality and inhumanity, and which in reality were the groundwork and sole pretext for this motion, were frivolous, unfair, and ungenerous. He lamented that the Legion had lately suffered a severe reverse; but against that reverse he thought in fairness its many victories should be placed. In seven out of the eight actions in which the Legion had been employed they had covered themselves with honour; and although in the eighth they had suffered a defeat, he thought he was justified in saying that they had not lost their honour. If he wanted an authority upon this point he might quote that of the French General Harispe, who, in speaking of General Evans, said his honour as a soldier remained untarnished; and then, as if anticipating this motion of the gallant Officer opposite, General Harispe went on to say: "I regret that the hateful spirit of party is likely to exaggerate this reverse, and to distort the facts relating to it. In my opinion, the honour of the British troops remains untarnished, and the noble conduct of the marines in covering the retreat proves that time and discipline only are wanting." He lamented that a time should have come when a British soldier, having his conduct assailed in the House of Commons, should be obliged to look to a soldier of France for an advocate. He regretted as much as any man the dreadful privations and sufferings that the Legion had undergone. Let not the House aggravate those sufferings by its vote that night. Let them not cast an unmerited stigma on unfortunate but gallant and absent men. Let them not cut off from the Legion all hope and every chance of recovering their character and credit. After the statement that he had made he hoped and believed that the gallant Officer (Sir H. Hardinge) would be ready amongst the first to do justice to the men whom he had unintentionally injured, and against whom he had allowed himself to bring allegations which were in themselves unfounded. But even supposing them to be true, the gallant Officer's was not the hand from which such a blow should be levelled against the Legion. In the beginning of the contest the cry of Don Carlos was, "Save me from Rodil!" He was saved from Rodil by British interference, and the return he made for it was the issuing of the sanguinary and butchering Durango decree. A newspaper which was generally the advocate of Toryism, had put the question of the right of Don Carlos to issue that decree in so just and proper a light, that he thought he could not do better than read the whole passage to the House. In The Standard of Thursday, March 28th, the following observations were made upon the subject:— And now we must say a word to two highly respected contemporaries, which have, this morning, rather severely reproved our opinions with respect to Don Carlos and his brutal Durango decree. We call the decree brutal, and its author a monster, unfit to live; because, though we see no use in exaggerated language, when the matter in hand is to deal with murder and a murderer, we will never mince our phraseology. Both the respected contemporaries whose displeasure we have incurred seem to go a great deal too fast in assuming that Don Carlos is entitled to exercise royal rights. Of what country is he king? Spain does not acknowledge him. No nation of Europe acknowledges him king of Spain. The Basque provinces, of part of which he holds military occupation—we are not concerned to deny, that he holds it with the consent of the people—the Basque provinces have never yet been recognised to constitute a separate state. Don Carlos and his followers are, therefore, whatever may be his title, in the condition of de facto rebels against a de facto government. If this prince considers himself as the sovereign and representa- tive of a nation, why has he not declared war against England since the affair of Bilboa? The hostilities committed by the Government of this country against him, upon that occasion, were as unequivocal as we admit they were iniquitous and impolitic. Why not resent them by a declaration of war—by at least a royal remonstrance, and an appeal to the governments of Europe? But it is idle to pursue this inquiry further. Every one knows that Don Carlos is not a de facto king; but if not de facto king of Spain, he has no more right to enforce the laws of the Basque provinces—the pretext for the Durango decree, and for the murders committed in pursuance of it—than has the correspondent of The Morning Post or Morning Herald. He is, as Charles Edward said of himself, as yet a self-commissioned adventurer, supporting his own title, just as General Evans is an adventurer commissioned by the Queen, supporting the title of her Majesty. Now, there are evils enough necessarily attendant upon this war of adventurers without allowing it to familiarise the soldiers of modern Europe with the bloody sacrifices of barbarous times; and it is the business of all Europe to see that he who first attempts to introduce usages repugnant to the authorised laws of war be visited with an European chastisement. The justification attempted to be set up by one of our contemporaries—namely, the assertion that Carlos is menaced with a felon's death—is no justification at all. Every claimant of a throne already occupied de facto, if he press his claims by force, is, by the universal practice of mankind, regarded as a traitor, and exposed to the penalty of death, if defeated and captured. But are we to be told, therefore, that the supporters of a de facto prince, whether native or foreigner, justly forfeit their lives? The law of England, which merely echoes the rule of common sense, and the law of nations, has for 350 years, distinctly declared that the defence or service of a de facto government can never constitute a crime. But away with all this quibbling apology for a brutal decree which none but an inbred savage could fulminate, which none but a worse than butcher, an amateur hangman, could enforce in a single instance. Thanks to heaven, the whole tendency of modern war has for centuries run to the mitigation of the horrors inseparable from any form of military contest. Our generals—and we include Frenchmen, Germans, and even Russians, in speaking of the generals of our time—our generals have frequently had to apologise for advantages sacrificed, and triumphs forgone, through considerations of humanity. This Carlos, this pretender to a throne, but without commission or acknowledgement from any authorised sovereign, would replunge us in the carnage puddle of unpitying and unspairing slaughter. But, Gore-moistened trees shall perish in the bud, And, by abloody death, shall die the man of blood. In that sentiment he concurred and he hoped Don Carlos might die the felon's death; and if it should happen—as probably it might happen—that he should fall at last into the hands of the constitutional government of Spain, let them recollect the way in which their clemency had been recompensed on former occasions. Let them have for ever in recollection the fate of those patriot martyrs who, when plunged into the dungeons of the inquisition, refused to betray the secrets of their associates, and allowed not a sigh of weakness to escape from them while their limbs were dislocated by the executioner. Let them recollect the fate of Riego, whose character, both in public and private life, was almost without reproach; yet this could not secure him from the death of a felon and a malefactor, nor from indignities and tortures which it would be too revolting to describe. He would further say, if the constitutional party in Spain should ever have power, let them place their institutions out of the reach of danger. When the sword of justice should be committed to their charge, let them not idly trifle with the awful responsibility which would devolve upon them. When the up as tree was within their reach, let us not see the hatchet tremble in their hands; let not the people of Spain, in the first dawn of liberty, be still frightened and subdued by the spectre of departed despotism.

Sir Henry Hardinye

wished to say a few words in explanation. What the hon. Gentleman had stated to the House could call forth nothing but sympathy on the part of all, and he should be most happy if anything he could say would give the hon. Gentleman satisfaction. The House must be aware that when he (Sir Henry Hardinge) made his statement he cautiously abstained pledging himself to the accuracy of that statement. He mentioned as his authority the name of Major Richardson. He had made inquiry as to the character of that officer, and the result was of such a nature as to justify him primâ facie in giving credit to that gentleman's statement. It appeared that Major Richardson, in consequence of certain allegations contained in his production, gave offence to certain officers of his regiment, who called him to account, and a court of inquiry as held upon him. The result of that inquiry was a distinct admission on the part of Lieutenant-general Evans, in his own hand-writing, and which was in Major Richardson's possession, that there was not the slightest imputation in any respect against Major Richardson, who subsequently to the offence given by him to his regiment, obtained his majority. He (Sir Henry Hardinge) had therefore given credit to an officer holding his Majesty's commission, and who after his offence, had been promoted, [cries of Explain, explain!"] He was sure the House would allow him to—

Mr. Barron

rose to order. The hon. and gallant Officer was not confining himself merely to explanation, but was making a speech; and this was at least the tenth speech he had made on the present question.

The Speaker

observed, that anything which the right hon. and gallant Officer had himself said he was justified in explaining; but with respect to the conduct and character of Major Richardson, he apprehended that other persons were just as competent to speak to that as the right hon. and gallant Officer.

Sir Henry Hardinge

was sure that the House must be perfectly aware that as he had made his Motion by way of Amendment, he had no right to a reply. If he had had that right he should not have risen at the present moment, In answer, then, to the hon. Member opposite—

Mr. Barron

said, it was quite obvious, from what the right hon. and gallant Officer had himself stated, that he was taking an opportunity to make a reply which the rules of the House did not justify. [Order, chair.] He rose to order, and would appeal to the Chair whether the right hon. and gallant Officer was in order.

The Speaker

repeated, that the rule of the House was, that if anything which the right hon. and gallant Officer had himself stated was misrepresented by any hon. Member, then he would be entitled to give an explanation as to that point; but the rule would not permit him to make any additional remarks to his own former statement.

Sir Henry Hardinge

said, it was not usual for any hon. Member to read a letter in reply to any speech which had been made by another hon. Member: but he had made no objection to that course being taken by the hon. Member for Tipperary; on the contrary, he thought it was only an act of justice to General Evans that it should be done, and instead of objecting to its being done, he was rather pleased, because it afforded him (Sir Henry Hardinge) an opportunity to explain; and he certainly was surprised that any hon. Member should be so presumptuous as to— [Order, order],

Mr. Barron

I presume to do my duty in this House, and I conceive it is excessive impertinence on the part of the gallant Officer, [Order.]—I appeal to the House whether [Order, chair.]

The Speaker

was sure that the hon. Member must feel that he had used an expression which, on reflection, he would, not have used towards any hon. Member.

Mr. Barron

If the gallant Officer stands up and says that he does not mean that it was presumptuous in me to speak to order, I shall be satisfied; otherwise I shall be bound to take notice of it. It is not the first time I have seen this kind of conduct in this House, on the part of the same hon. and gallant Officer.

Sir Henry Hardinge

; I admit it is possible to take offence at a person's manner as well as words; but I appeal to the House whether my manner was calculated to give offence. I assure the House that it is the farthest from my intention to offer anything in the shape of insult to any individual. At the same time if I pass by what was said, as to the expressions which have been used by the hon. Member, at the present moment I entirely pass them by. The right hon. and gallant Officer then proceeded with his explanation of the observations he had made on General Evans's conduct.

Captain Curteis

rose to order. He really thought that the gallant Officer ought to give some explanation as to the word "presumptuous," which he had applied to an hon. Member of that House.

Sir Charles Burrell

was sure, after what the right hon. and gallant Officer had said as to his not intending to give any hon. Member offence, that must be perfectly satisfactory to the hon. Member (Mr. Barron) and to the House also.

Major Beauclerk

quite agreed with the hon. Baronet, and was sure that the hon. Member for Rye must feel satisfied with, the explanation which the fight hon. and gallant Officer had made.

Viscount Palmerston

would not have risen but for some words which fell from the right hon. and gallant Officer, when he declared that he should pass by the expressions of the hon. Member for Waterford. The right hon. and gallant Officer, in making that statement, used the words "at present." He would appeal to the right hon. and gallant Officer, and to his hon. Friend whether, in the warmth of assertion which arose incidentally, both of them had not used one towards the other words which they would not probably, on cooler reflection, have used. The expression of the right hon. and gallant Officer was certainly offensive in its nature, though he had no doubt that the right hon. and gallant Officer did not mean it to be so. The words retorted by his hon. Friend were also offensive, though he was equally sure that his hon. Friend would not knowingly use towards any hon. Member terms of provocation, or words that were offensive. He would, therefore, submit to the consideration of the House whether both the hon. Members should not feel, upon consideration, that those words ought not to have been used.

The Speaker

said, that after what had occurred, he should have been quite satisfied if the matter had been suffered to drop, had it not been for the expression used by the gallant Officer alluded to by the noble Lord.

Sir Henry Hardinge

knew from experience how futile it was to waste the time of the House upon this kind of what he supposed he must call a point of honour. He hoped it was not necessary at his time of life to say much upon this subject. But he could not help observing that before he made use of the expression presumptuous—a word which was not, he admitted, strictly Parliamentary—the hon. Member's manner towards him was not that which one Member ought to use towards another. It was, however, useless to pursue the matter further, and as far as he was concerned, having used the word "presumptuous," he should not found any proceedings on the expressions of the hon. Member.

Mr. Barron

said, that as he understood the gallant Officer had withdrawn the expression, which was the sole cause of the observations he (Mr. Barron) had made, he felt of course bound to withdraw the words which had been used by him in reply.

Sir H. Hardinge

would merely say, that he did in his opening speech state that the British Legion had on several occasions signalised themselves by acts of bravery; and that it was only when they had degenerated into a system of insubordination and mutiny that their services were rendered nugatory. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would recollect that he did make use of those expressions; con- sequently he would hold him free from any desire to throw unnecessary obloquy upon the troops.

Captain Boldero

said, it was his intention last night to have stated that Major Richardson had been most wantonly, outrageously, and wickedly calumniated by the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny.

Mr. Morgan O'Connell

rose to order. He wished to know whether it was orderly for any hon. Member to say, that any person had been wickedly calumniated by another hon. Member.

The Speaker

said, that the hon. Member had unquestionably used an expression which he ought not to have used.

Captain Boldero

said, if he had used any expression that was offensive, and contrary to the rule of debate, he most cheerfully retracted it. The hon. and learned Member declared that Major Richardson was dismissed the service of the Queen of Spain, and that his character was such that the officers of the Legion refused to associate with him. It was very true that the officers of the 6th regiment wrote a letter conveying the sentiments of those officers to Major Richardson. The facts were these:—Major, then Captain, Richardson, was wounded on the 5th of May in Spain, and be returned to England on sick leave. When in England he published a narrative of the proceedings which had taken place in Spain. On his return to Spain, the officers of the 6th regiment considered that he had reflected on their character in his narrative, and they wrote a letter desiring him to retract the accusations he had made. Captain Richardson immediately wrote to General Evans, demanding a court-martial, either upon himself or upon the officers who wrote the letter. Some time elapsed, but at last a court of inquiry was held upon Captain Richardson's conduct. Captain Richardson, after the action of the 5th of May, felt aggrieved because he was passed over in the promotions, while a junior captain received the rank of major. The court of inquiry assembled on the 30th of June, 1836, upon charges against the captain, one of which he had never heard of until he returned from England. One was the having written the pamphlet in England speaking in terms not very flattering towards the Legion; and the other was, that on the 5th of May, he received a wound in the field, which was very trifling, but that, notwithstanding, he went to the rear. The hon. Member, to prove that the wound was not trifling, read the evidence of the two medical men, given before the court-martial, who attended Captain Richardson when he left the field, having received a contusion, and one of them added that he had recommended that officer to retire. He then read the opinion of the court-martial, which was to the following effect; namely, "that the court having maturely weighed and considered the papers which were laid before them, both printed and written, was of opinion, that although they exhibited considerable disappointment and irritation on the part of Captain Richardson, still, under the circumstances of the case, they considered there was nothing in them calculated to cast any discredit on the Legion." With respect to that officer having retired from the field on the 5th of May on the plea of being wounded, the court was of opinion that it appeared, that he did not until he had been desired by the surgeon to withdraw to the town: they therefore considered that not the slightest imputation rested on him for having retired. The minutes of the court-martial were signed by General Chichester, who presided at it, and it was composed of some of the most distinguished officers of the service. In addition to this, General Evans made some observations on the proceedings. He said, that not the slightest imputation rested on the character of Captain Richardson; and, on the other hand, he stated that the officers of the 6th regiment, not knowing all the circumstances of the case, only evinced a becoming spirit in endeavouring to vindicate themselves from what they conceived to be unjust charges on them. He also added, that if Captain Richardson had not tendered his resignation, an opportunity would have been taken of doing justice to him by promoting him. After this, he had no hesitation in saying that his friend, Captain Richardson, ought to be considered as honourable a man as any one who heard him. Captain Richardson afterwards consented to remain with the Legion, when General Evans promoted him to a majority in the 4th regiment, and that officer continued for a long time to do duty with that regiment, and at the time wore on his breast a badge of honour that had been conferred on him by General Evans. With respect to the general question, he wished to make a few observations. He knew that the chapelgorries went into the action on the 16th ultimo with the determination of neither giving nor taking quarter, and in consequence of this, the Carlist soldiers came to the same resolution. The men of the Legion being mixed up with the others, were driven by self-defence to act upon the same cruel and revolting principle. It was very natural that it should be so. He would do the same himself, for if he saw a man who he knew would, if he had the opportunity, stick him through, by George, he would, if he had the opportunity, serve him the same. Again, with reference to the raising the siege of Bilboa, he knew that had been done almost entirely through the exertions of Colonel Wylde, than whom there was not a better officer in the British service; he planned this enterprise, and it was almost entirely executed by the British naval force and the artillery. The Carlists might have taken the place by assault some time before, but Don Carlos abstained from doing so from feelings of humanity. Such was the small quantity of provisions in the place, that the soldiers and inhabitants were almost dying from want. Don Carlos, therefore, considered that within a very few days the town must capitulate, when he could march his troops into the place with some degree of discipline, and thus the inhabitants would not be exposed to the horrid scenes and privations that almost always accompanied an assault on a town. In the meantime, however, Colonel Wylde found means to raise the siege. Again, it had been said, that but for the British Legion being retained at San Sebastian, that place would have fallen into the possession of the Carlists; but such was the strength of that fortress, that if the Spaniards were true to themselves, Don Carlos never could gain possession of it. He was satisfied that the late defeat of the Legion was solely attributable to the infamous conduct of the Spanish government towards that force. This disastrous result did not arise from any want of animal courage on their parts, but from the want of fair treatment, the men could not be relied upon. Their proceedings cast no stain on the reputation of the British arms, for the conduct of the troops in the north of Spain, on many occasions, added a luster to their character.

Mr. Roebuck

said, he was quite surprised at the appeal which had been made to him by the hon. and gallant General opposite. If the hon. and gallant General thought thereby to catch a vote, he would find himself exceedingly disappointed. As to this question of intervention, as it was called, the hon. and gallant General must by this time be well aware that his (Mr. Roebuck's) opinion was decidedly against any interference on our part in the affairs of foreign countries. [Hear] The hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite said, "Hear, hear," with great complacency. Did the hon. and gallant Gentleman mean to imply that his party had never interfered in the affairs of foreign countries? Could the hon. and gallant Gentleman deny, that the oppressive burthen under which this country now laboured, arose out of our systematic meddling with foreign affairs of other nations, to our having been, as a witty writer had expressed it—the bull-dogs of Europe? Had not a former British Government—a Tory Government—interfered in Spanish affairs in just the same way, with only a difference in the manner of doing it, that the present Government now interfered in Spanish affairs? When Napoleon tried to introduce civilization into Spain, did not the British Government come forward and say to the Spaniards, "We will assist you in your glorious struggle—we will fight for your threatened liberties, and so forth;" and did they not act upon this promise? And what was this but interference? Oh, but it was now said, "We must not support the Spaniards, for they are so cruel in their warfare;" just as if the Spaniards had not been cruel, most cruel, in their treatment of the soldiers of Napoleon! Oh, it was said, "But we insist upon giving Spain a constitutional monarch." How had we taken advantage of our former opportunity of establishing a constitutional government over the Spaniards? Why, we gave them the beloved Ferdinand. It was most surprising, therefore, looking at this and similar circumstances, that hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, should attempt to persuade Members of the House to vote against Ministers because they had interfered in the present struggle in Spain. It was not surprising either, for it was clear enough that the hon. Members opposite made the thing a party question, in order to see whether they could not weaken the hold of their opponents in office, and so get into office themselves. On the field of Spain the Tory quarrel against the present holders of office was fought, and the hon. and gallant General appeared desirous of seizing the occasion to enlist the Radicals under his banner. Speaking as one of these Radicals, he begged to state that his quarrel with Ministers on this subject was not on the grounds enlarged upon by the hon. and gallant General and other Members on the opposite side of the House. The quarrel with them was quite of a different nature. Addressing Ministers on the behalf of the people of great Britain, he would tell them that his quarrel against them on this subject was, that they had interfered in a matter with which they had no possible concern. That the interference was one that had been an exceedingly expensive affair, that it might involve us in a war with more than one powerful nation, and that it was an interference which could do no one any good. It was perfectly absurd to suppose, that a constitutional government could be established in Spain or any other country by foreign interference. A nation must establish a constitutional Government for itself, or go without it. If constitutional Governments were things so much to our liking, he should like to know why we confined our efforts for their establishment to Spain? He should like to know whether Ministers considered there was a constitutional Government in France at this moment, and if such was not their opinion, as it could hardly be, why they had not long since set about affording assistance to the liberals in that country? He should like to know whether ministers considered that the acts of Don Carlos in Spain could by possibility have a worse effect on constitutional principles than the mad doings of Louis Philippe in France? It appeared to him that if government persisted in their interference in Spanish affairs, they must, on the same principle, enter upon a general crusade against all the despotic governments of Europe. Before, however, we proceed to the quixotic task of forcing constitutional governments upon all the nations of Europe, whether they would or no, it would be as well for us to ascertain whether the nations subject to the British Crown were all secured in constitutional governments? How long ago was it, he would ask, that the British House of Commons had voted away the constitutional rights of the Canadians? Was the voice of the hon. and learned Member for Tipperary heard in defence of the outraged Canadians—he who so loudly claimed for the Spaniards the support of the British Legislature? The fact was, that all these questions were for the most part treated by the respective leading par ties in that House as mere implements for effecting their own particular objects—the Tories struggling to get into office, the Whigs to keep in office; while the hon. and learned Member appeared to work everything for Irish purposes. Ministers were ready enough to throw away 600,000l. in this way, but for the great purposes of education they grudged a paltry 20,000l. It had been laid down in a publication which might to a certain extent be supposed to proceed from some hon. Members of that House, though he was not himself one of them, that the course for the Radicals was to vote on all questions without reference to any idea of keeping in or throwing out the present Ministry. Now it had throughout been the broad principle of the Radicals that interference with Spain was improper and uncalled-for, on the ground that with foreign nations we ought to have no relations other than commercial ones. This was the principle laid down by the new President of the United States. Sounder policy it was impossible to proceed upon; and he would call upon the Radicals in that House to act upon this principle which they had repeatedly declared to be, in their opinion, essential to the maintenance of cheap and good government all over the world. He would put it to the Radical Members whether consistently with this policy they could support the Ministerial counsels on this occasion. The assertion of this great principle was of far higher importance than the maintenance of any Ministry whatever. Supposing now that hon. Gentlemen opposite should get into office, and should take it into their heads—and nothing was impossible—to call upon Russia, Austria, or Prussia, or any other despotic power, to send them assistance to enable them to maintain their constitutional Government here, how would the country like this? There was no proof that the Spaniards liked what we wished to impose on them as a constitutional government. If they wanted it let them fight for it; it was no possible affair of ours, and they did not thank us for our interference in the matter. All we had to do was to look to ourselves. And then as to this "intervention" of ours, what a farce it was; never was there a more monstrous and unmeaning piece of patch-work. It was neither interference, not co-operation, nor intervention, nor anything else: it was mere peddling. Surely if anything was to be done it should be done properly, and in an efficient manner: if we really thought that a constitutional government should be established by our assistance, and if we thought proper to give that assistance, let the House vote supplies to his Majesty for the purpose, let us fit out a British navy, let us send out by it a British army, and let that army land in Spain and fight under the British flag. But what where we doing now? Neither one thing nor the other. If this country was not interfering in Spanish affairs, what business had our troops in Spain? It was mere special pleading to talk about our marines there being only a naval force. The common sense of this country at once saw through the attempted delusion. There had been three more nights wasted on this subject. How was it that the noble Minister for Foreign Affairs had not got up in a manly and honest way, to say what he had got to say immediately after the hon. and gallant General opposite had made his statement? Why was it that he had allowed so much of the public time to be wasted? The noble Lord seemed to think that there was a sort of bush-fighting going on, and to be afraid lest he should be hit down the moment he ventured to show himself. It was most outrageous that when an important question of foreign policy was before the House the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should so long decline to come forward and let the House understand what it was he proposed to do. Not, for that matter, that he (Mr. Roebuck), even when the noble Lord did enter into his explanations, could very well make out what the explanation was, for the noble Lord had a peculiar faculty for making a long speech without letting the House know, in the slightest degree, what he was talking about. The noble Lord had almost invariably contrived to wrap up his replies in so peculiar a phraseology as to put in despair all those who sought an elucidation of the mysteries of his foreign policy. There were three nights of the public time wasted in hopeless discussion, solely because the noble Lord had not the courage and the manliness to come forward at once and explain in clear terms what his policy really was. Certainly if anything ever required a clear explanation it was the policy of ministers; theirs was the true see-saw principle —now to this side, now to that side leaning.

Mr. Cutlar Fergusson

* Sir, the hon. and learned Member for Bath has, with his usual impartiality, and the usual courtesy towards both sides of the House, intimated that he considered this to be a battle, not for or against the cause of Queen Isabella and of free institutions in Spain, but a battle on the one side to get into place, and on the other to retain it. Whatever may be the motive of those who have brought forward the motion,—and I should be the last to impute any thing like unworthy motives to the right hon. and gallant Officer who introduced it to the House,—I utterly deny, that the motives of those who oppose the motion can fairly be stated to be such as the hon. and learned Member for Bath has chosen to impute to them. It is not the first time that the hon. and learned Gentleman has stigmatised the Members of his Majesty's Government, as men whose only object was the retention of office. Is there nothing involved in this motion but a question of office? What is the charge that has been made against Ministers? They are charged with having, by their system of foreign policy, and the measures which they have pursued in the course of it, disgraced and dishonoured the British name in the eyes of Europe and the world. The question put to those who think well of the present Government, and who place confidence in them, as well as to those who, without being attached to the Government, are unwilling to do them injustice, is not whether Ministers shall, by the result of this motion, retain or Jose their places, but whether their character and their honour, in the transactions respecting Spain, shall be vindicated, or shall be declared to be forfeited by a vote of the House of Commons? It is a question, Sir, of greater importance than a question of office. It. is whether our system of foreign policy shall be maintained or given up; and whether an ally who, upon the faith of treaties, claims our assistance, shall be supported or abandoned. The hon. and learned Member for Bath seems to be alarmed, lest the Members of what is called the Radical party in this House should not see the conduct of Ministers in the same light with himself. I trust and believe that he will have, on this occasion, to pass condemnation on his From a corrected Report. own Friends, and to class them with those whom he chooses to consider as his enemies, or, as he would put it, no doubt, as the enemies of the people. It is evident, from the tone assumed by the hon. and learned Gentleman, on this as well as upon other occasions, that he wishes to establish for himself the reputation of being the only honest man in this House and in the country. Those whom the hon. and learned Gentleman has addressed as his Friends, upon this occasion, are not to be led away by mere vituperation—they will exercise their own judgment—and if they are of opinion that the conduct of Ministers has not reflected that disgrace and dishonour on the country which the supporters of the motion endeavour to establish, they are bound in honesty to vote against the motion, which seeks to affix that stigma upon his Majesty's Ministers. Let it be observed, that it is sufficient, on this side of the House, that the attack on the Ministers be repelled. No vote is called for in favour of Ministers; although I am of opinion that the whole of their policy in respect of Spain, and of the measures which have been adopted by them in pursuance of that policy, may be fully justified on the soundest views that can be taken of the interests of the country, and the best precedents that our history affords. The hon. and learned Member for Bath has said that this country ought not, on any occasion whatever, to interfere in the affairs of other countries—that she ought to enter into no treaties—to form no alliances with other States;—and it is upon such principles that he calls upon the persons whom he styles Radicals, in this House, not to give their support to the foreign policy of Ministers, or, in other words, to vote against them on this motion. That the general principle of the foreign policy of this country ought to be non-intervention in the affairs of other countries, cannot be denied; but that there are occasions which form exceptions to this principle, cannot, I think, be disputed. Take the case of the Peninsula: —the affairs of that country never have been and never can be indifferent to this country or to France,—and I contend that there may be occasions in which France and England would be justified in interfering in those affairs—France more particularly in respect of Spain, and England in respect of Portugal. The hon. and learned Gentleman, in denouncing all treaties between this country and foreign powers, has forgotten that we are already bound to Portugal by solemn treaty, and that we may be called upon again, as we have been called upon already, to put forth our strength, and to employ our forces, naval and military, in support of this ally. No person that is, in my opinion, worthy of the name of statesman, has ever laid it down that England—a great and powerful state like England—could detach and isolate itself from the affairs of the continent of Europe; and if there be One connexion or alliance more than another, to which England ought to adhere, not only in a commercial, but in a political point of view, it is Portugal. The right hon. and gallant Member for Launceston, can tell of what importance our alliance and near connexion with that state was, during the great war in which he bore so distinguished a part. If France should ever resume her power over Spain, and if the good understanding which subsists between this country and France should ever be unhappily interrupted, which God forbid, for I think it would be a great calamity to both countries, and to Europe; but, should this ever occur, (and treaties are made as much; or more, with a view to a possible state of war than of peace,) the importance of our connexion with Portugal would again be sufficiently appreciated. In the mean time, all must be agreed, that France and England are deeply interested in the peace and tranquillity of the Peninsula—and, if not exclusively, certainly more deeply interested in it than any other of the nations of Europe. This was the feeling and the principle on which the Quadruple Treaty was founded, and in the spirit of which those measures have been adopted which have called forth the unmeasured censure of the opposite side of the House. The right hon. and gallant Member who moved this question, said, that he would not observe on the Quadruple Treaty; that his concern was with the Order in Council; and that there was no connexion between the Quadruple Treaty and the Order in Council. I cannot concur in this opinion. By the Quadruple Treaty, the Queens of Spain and Portugal became the allies and confederates, for a particular object, of the King of Great Britain and the King of the French. Certain measures were taken by both these sovereigns in pursuance of that treaty, and with a view to carry into effect the objects which that treaty bad in view. France not only permitted, but authorised and sanctioned, the levying of soldiers and corps in France, to act as auxiliaries to the Queen of Spain. The King of England relieved his subjects from a restriction which had been imposed upon them by the Foreign Enlistment Bill, as far as respected the service of our ally the Queen of Spain. This, if not required by the precise terms of the Quadruple Treaty, was a very natural consequence of it, and was in the spirit of its provisions, and in fulfilment of the object it had in view. The policy of the Quadruple Treaty itself was, in my opinion, fully justified. Without the Quadruple Treaty, Don Carlos became King of Spain, and Don Miguel King of Portugal, under the protection of the northern powers of Europe. Let us see what led to the Quadruple Treaty. On the death of Ferdinand of Spain, which happened in September, 1833, the Sovereigns of England and of France saw the necessity, for the peace and tranquillity of Spain and of Europe, of maintaining the title of Isabella to the throne of Spain. France and England seemed to run a race to try which should be the first to congratulate the Queen of Spain, and to offer her their aid and assistance in maintaining her on the throne to which she had succeeded. I will not here enter into a discussion of the right of the Queen of Spain to the throne. The right hon. seconder of the motion has said, that, upon inquiry, his impressions were in favour of her rights. On a former occasion, I have stated my opinion, that she had in her favour every sanction that law and right could give to any sovereign. No one, at least, will deny, that at the death of Ferdinand, she became possessed of the throne of Spain. As Queen of Spain, she became our ally; and became bound to us, as we became bound to her, together with other powers, by solemn treaty. But it is said, that it is not denied that the treaty is binding upon us, and that it ought to be carried into effect; but then, it is contended, that we have gone beyond the treaty, and even have contravened the terms of it, as some have contended. Let us consider, then, what we were bound to do by the treaty, and what we have done under its provisions. The treaty, dated the 22nd of April, 1834, although intended to have a more immediate and direct operation at the time on the affairs of Portugal, did by no means lose sight of the interests of Spain; They are prominently put forward in the preamble, which, after stating that the Regents of Spain and Portugal, having come to the determination of uniting their forces in order to compel Don Carlos and Don Miguel to withdraw from the. Portuguese territories, "had addressed themselves to the King of Great Britain and the King of the French,—who, considering the interest they must always take in the security of the Spanish monarchy," [mark the words well,—the security of the Spanish monarchy] "and being further animated by the most anxious desire to assist in the establishment of peace in the Peninsula, as well as every other part of Europe, and his Britannic Majesty considering, moreover, the special obligations arising out of his ancient alliance with Portugal, have consented to become parties to the present engagement." Then follow the articles of the treaty, the object of which is the establishment of peace both in Portugal and Spain, by the expulsion of the Infantes from Portugal, where Don Carlos and his adherents were not only supporting the cause of Don Miguel in Portugal, but were conspiring against Donna Isabella, and the security of the Spanish monarchy. By the second article of the treaty, it is accordingly stated, that the Queen Regent of Spain, having just cause of complaint against the Infante Don Miguel, by the countenance and support given by him to the Pretender to the Spanish crown, engages to cause such a body of Spanish troops as may be agreed upon to enter the Portuguese territory, to co-operate with the troops of the Queen of Portugal, for the purpose of compelling Don Carlos and Don Miguel to withdraw from the Portuguese dominions. Here, then, are military operations contemplated and agreed upon by the contracting parties, to be carried on by Spain and Portugal acting in co-operation within the Portuguese territory. Now, what does Great Britain, another of the parties, engage to do for the common object? By article the third, the King of Great Britain engages to cooperate, by the employment of a naval force, in aid (observe well the words which follow) of the operations to be undertaken in conformity with the engagements of the treaty, by the troops of Spain and Portugal. Here, then, is a naval force contemplated to be employed, not in aid of another naval force of an ally, nor against a naval force of an enemy at sea, but in aid of, and in co-operation with, the military force of an ally carrying on its operations on land. In whatever manner, and to whatever extent Great Britain has been accustomed with her naval force to aid and co-operate with her own military force in similar cases, I contend that, in the same manner and to the same extent, she was bound to aid and co-operate, in this case, with the troops of her allies. But, it is contended, that the same reasoning, if it were good in respect of the treaty, dated the 22nd of April, would not hold good in respect to the additional articles, dated the 18th of August, 1834, in which it is said, that there is no mention made of military operations, or of the co-operation of a naval force with such military operations.

Sir, I am persuaded that this House will not listen to such quibbling on the construction of a treaty with an ally. I contend that, if the words of the treaty of the 22nd of April would justify the co-operation of a naval force in the way I have mentioned, we are bound to give the same construction to the additional articles when the words "naval force," are again employed. The immediate effect of the Quadruple Treaty of the 22nd of April was the expulsion of Don Carlos and Don Miguel from the territories of Portugal. Don Carlos, having taken refuge on board the Donegal, a British ship of war, and having placed himself under the protection of the British Government, arrived in England on the 1st of June, 1834; but soon quitted that protection, and repaid it in the manner that is so well known. He left England about the 1st of July; and, having passed clandestinely into France, and through France into Spain, arrived in Navarre about the 10th of the same month. The events which followed his arrival in Spain, made it necessary for the parties to the Quadruple Treaty to take fresh measures for the carrying its objects into effect. The more particular and direct object of the additional articles was to uphold the throne of Isabella, by putting down Don Carlos, and the insurrection in Spain, at the head of which he had placed himself; and thereby to give peace and tranquillity to the Peninsula. For this purpose the additional articles, dated the 18th of August, were entered into by the same parties; who, as the preamble states, had taken into consideration the recent events which had occurred in the Peninsula, and were deeply impressed with the conviction that, in the new state of things, new measures had become necessary for the complete attainment of the objects which it was the purpose of the treaty to accomplish. The object of the additional articles, Sir, was not for the expulsion of Don Carlos and Don Miguel from Portugal, for that had been already accomplished; but the object of the additional articles, like the object of the original treaty, was the establishing of peace in the Peninsula, and giving security to the Spanish monarchy, in which the Kings of the French and of Great Britain had declared, by the treaty, that they must always take an interest. By the first additional article, the King of the French engaged to take the measures best calculated "to prevent any succours of men, arms, or warlike stores, from being sent from the French territory to the insurgents in Spain." By the second article, the King of Great Britain engaged "to furnish to her Catholic majesty such supplies of arms and warlike stores as her Catholic majesty might require; and further to assist her majesty, if necessary, with a naval force." Now, it is contended, that, if the words of the treaty of the 22nd of April could have justified the cooperation of a naval force with military operations in Portugal, the same mode of co-operation in Spain could not be justified under the additional articles, in which there is no mention whatever made of military operations in Spain, Those who reason in this manner, consider the treaty and the additional articles as separate and distinct treaties, having no sort of connection with, or bearing on, each other; whereas I contend that there is but one treaty, and that the whole of the articles, original and additional, must be taken together, and must be construed so as to support and give effect to the common purpose for which they were entered into. Nobody knows better than my hon. and learned Friend opposite (Sir William Follett), that, in Acts of Parliament relating to the same subject matter, although there may be no direct reference in one Act to the other, they are, every day, taken to explain each other; and that they must be construed so as to give effect to the common purpose they appear to have in view. But will the House permit me to refer them to the fourth additional article, which will, I think, remove all doubt, if any could have been entertained on the point? The article is to this effect:—"The foregoing articles shall have the same force and effect as if they were inserted in the treaty of the 22nd of April, and shall be considered as forming a part of the same." Will it be contended, after this, that the words "naval force," must be construed differently, and less largely, when used in the additional than in the original articles of the treaty? Sir, it is clear that, in both cases, the naval force was to co-operate with military operations; and when the seat of war was transferred from Portugal to Spain, the obligation of Great Britain towards Spain, as to the co-operation of its naval force, became identically the same as it was towards Portugal by the treaty of the 22nd of April. Then, Sir, as to the employment of marines in this co-operation, which has been so violently attacked on the other side of the House, I think my hon. Friend, the Secretary of the Admiralty, has disposed of that point. It has been said, indeed, that the cases cited by my hon. Friend do not apply, because they occurred when we were at war; and that they were cases of aid and support given by our marines to our own troops. This, Sir, I confidently maintain makes not the least difference. Whatever was fit for us to do, and was usual for us to do, for ourselves, we were bound to do for our ally under similar circumstances. If the service which we had engaged to perform for the Queen of Spain, with a naval force, required the aid of marines, we were bound to furnish them in such number as the service required, and in the same manner as we should have done had the operations on land been those of our own military force, in place of those of our ally. I will not, Sir, further labour this point, but will content myself by saying, that if there was a doubt respecting the construction of the treaty in this particular, which I contend there is not, it would become this nation to give the benefit of that doubt to her ally. I lament, Sir, that the evils of war have fallen upon the people of the Basque provinces. Their population seems much to resemble that of a part of my own country, which was formerly as attached as the Basques to their own customs and usages; who were devoted to their chiefs, and to that prince of the house of Stuart whose cause they espoused and supported by arms. It was impossible for those who met them in arms not to respect the motives that led their opponents into the field. My ancestors fought against the house of Stuart; one of them laid down his life in the field in defence of the revolution settlement. I am, and ever shall be, attached, as my fathers have been, to the principle on which that settlement was founded; but I respect that brave portion of my countrymen who fought in the cause of the prince whose right to the throne they considered to be just. I repeat, Sir, that I lament that the Basque provinces have been the seat of war; but the seat of war was not of our choosing, nor of the choosing of the Queen of Spain. Don Carlos was the enemy on whom war was made; it was necessarily made in the country where he was to be found, and where he was found in arms and in rebellion against the Queen of Spain. If the privileges of the Basque provinces be valuable to them, I shall rejoice if Great Britain be the means, at one time or another, of retaining them. But I say, Sir, that the miseries of the Basque provinces have been brought upon them, not by this country, or by the Queen of Spain, but by Don Carlos, who has fomented the rebellion, and headed the insurrection in those provinces against the lawful government of the Queen. I will now, Sir, proceed to consider the other point (a point of great importance) embraced by the motion of the right hon. and gallant Member for Launceston. He proposes, that we should address the Crown not to renew the Order in Council which permits his Majesty's subjects to engage in the service of the Queen of Spain, and which will expire on the 10th of June next. The noble Lord the Member for South Lancashire, has quoted a speech of Lord Melbourne, when a Member of this House, in the debate on the motion of Lord Althorp, to repeal the Foreign Enlistment Bill in 1823; and he has charged that noble Lord with inconsistency, in having agreed to the Order in Council, dispensing with the provisions of that Act in the case of British subjects engaging in the service of the Queen of Spain. The noble Lord, the Member for South Lancashire, produced, as is usual in such cases, a scrap of a speech, to fix a charge of inconsistency on the speaker of it. If he had continued his quotation he would have shown that what has been done by Lord Melbourne, on the present occasion, is not inconsistent with the principles laid down by him in the debate in question. The motion, on that occasion was for the total repeal of the Foreign Enlistment Act; Lord Melbourne, then Mr. Lamb, opposed it on the same ground on which I oppose the motion of the right hon. and gallant Officer,—as an attack on the prerogative of the Crown. Immediately after the words quoted by the noble Lord, the Member for South Lancashire, are to be found the following:—"He (Mr. W. Lamb) objected to the principle of the proposed measure, because, in his opinion, the prerogative of deciding for war or peace was vested in the Crown by the constitution of the country, and he wished to see that prerogative exclusively exercised by the Crown. He deprecated any attempt to take the exercise of that prerogative out of the hands of the Crown, or of his Majesty's Ministers, through whom the Crown acted, and to whom, from their superior knowledge it was most safely intrusted."* The object of the motion of Lord Althorp, on the merits of which I will give no opinion, was to take away from the Crown the prerogative of refusing leave to the subject to engage in the service of a foreign state. The object of the motion of the right hon. and gallant Member for Launceston is to interfere with the prerogative of the Crown, in preventing his Majesty from granting leave to his subjects to engage in the service of a foreign state, our ally, for purposes common to both, and sanctioned by solemn treaty between them. The right hon. and gallant mover of the question has deprecated the employment of British subjects in the service of foreign States, and the shedding of their blood in a cause not their own. Sir, I am not one of those who can regard with approbation the conduct of any man who sells his person and his sword to whomsoever will pay him, without regard to the cause in which he agrees to engage himself. But the British soldier, whose heart is in the cause in which he engages, in place of disgracing himself, is raised, in my estimation, by partaking in the dangers of such a cause, when his own country is at peace, and does not require his services. I believe that the officers of the Legion, and not only the officers, but the men when they engaged in the service of the Queen of Spain, considered, as I consider, that they engaged in a service in which the cause of freedom was involved. Will it be said that no cause would justify an Englishman in engaging in the service of a foreign State? There is a cause, Sir, on the subject of which I am known to feel strongly,—Gentlemen are aware that I have frequently addressed the House upon it,— I mean the cause of Poland. Who is there, who would pass censure on a countryman * Hansard (New Series) vol. viii, p, l028 who had engaged in that noble cause? If I had known, Sir, a young English officer, who at the time the Poles were carrying on their glorious struggle for independence, had, impelled by a generous enthusiasm, devoted his life to assist them, so far from blaming, I would have taken him to my bosom. To encourage a spirit of generous adventure in a just cause, has been the policy of this country in the best of times. That great princess, Queen Elizabeth, gave assistance to the suffering Protestants of France and of the Low Countries. She supplied the Huguenots with money; she encouraged the levying of troops in her dominions to assist them; and, among other instances, the historian adduces that of her having permitted Henry Champeron to levy and transport into France a regiment of a hundred gentlemen volunteers, among whom Walter Raleigh, then a young man, began to distinguish himself in that great school of military valour. Elizabeth entered into a treaty and alliance with the States of the Low Countries, who were called the revolted subjects of Philip; and she stipulated to assist them with a body of 5,000 foot, and 1,000 horse, at the charge (let it be observed) of the Flemings. Elizabeth was not afraid of being reproached with permitting her subjects to serve as mercenaries in a foreign country, and in a cause not their own. But was the cause not their own? Was the cause of the oppressed Protestants of Europe at that time not the cause of the people of England, and of every other Protestant State in Europe? Is the cause of the Queen of Spain, and of free institutions in that country, in opposition to the cause of despotism and bigotry, wholly indifferent to the people of England? Will it not justify, at least in their eyes, the conduct of those brave men who have fought and suffered in the cause? I speak of the British Legion and its officers, who embarked in a cause which they approved, and whom no consideration would, I believe, have induced to embark in the cause which they opposed. I have cited, Sir, the example of Elizabeth. In the same way Charles 1st. endeavoured to succour the Palatinate. Gustavus Adolphus, says the historian, made a priva agreement with the King of England, whereby Charles engaged to furnish him with 6,000 men, in the Marquess of Hamilton's name, as if that lord had raised the men at his own charge. The force was raised, and sent to the Palatinate; and the historian adds that the King of Sweden, being in a condition in his turn to assist the King of Bohemia, and not having done so, Charles withdrew his forces, which had done good service during the war. Thus, indirect aid was given by Charles 1st. to the King of Sweden, for the relief of the Palatinate, by means of an auxiliary force raised in the name of one of his subjects. Gustavus Adolphus was the defender of the liberties of Germany, and of the Protestant religion in Europe; and in his service, and in that cause, the gallant youth of Scotland, in particular, embarked and were trained to arms. Almost all the Scotch officers of merit, who afterwards distinguished themselves in the civil war, had served under Gustavus Adolphus; Dundee, when Graham of Claverhouse, had served under the Prince of Orange; and the great Marlborough sought for instruction in his profession under Marshal Turenne. The honour of such persons was never, I believe, impeached on the ground of their having risked their lives, or shed their blood, in a cause not their own. General Evans and his brave companions have served in a cause which they believed, and which I believe, to be a just cause. They have served under the most trying circumstances with a gallantry, constancy, and courage, not to be surpassed; and if, upon one occasion, they have met with a disaster, to whatever cause it may be attributed, is that a reason why the British Legion should be abandoned, and marked with that stigma of disgrace which the motion of the right hon. and gallant Officer, if carried, would inevitably affix upon it? Give the British Legion and its brave commander the opportunity of retrieving what they may have suffered in military reputation by the late disaster. I venture to predict, that this opportunity, if given to them, will not be thrown away. In justice, then, to that body of our brave countrymen—in justice to our ally, the Queen of Spain, in whose service they are engaged, reject the motion of the right hon. and gallant Member, which, if adopted, would place one foot of Don Carlos on the throne of Spain. To the cause of the Queen of Spain the injury would be irretrievable. It would be received throughout Europe as a decisive proof that that Princess and her cause were abandoned by England. What might be the effect of it in France? Might it not be a signal to that government to withdraw, if they should be so in- clined, whatever support is still given by them, to the cause of the Queen of Spain? I will not enter, Sir, into a consideration of the conduct of the French government towards Spain. They have put their own sense and given their own construction to the Quadruple Treaty, and the spirit of the obligations which it imposed upon them; and, however much it is to be lamented that their views have fallen short of what might have been wished and expected of them, I will not, on that account, join in the bitter censure which has been passed, much less in the vituperative language which has been heaped upon a sovereign,—our ally,—a prince placed under circumstances of difficulty such as no one before him ever had to encounter, and whose personal character, and whose courage in the face of danger, to which no prince of modern times has ever been exposed, ought to have saved him from that contumely with which he has been assailed, I regret to say, by some Members of this House. I trust, Sir, that France and England may still be made to co-operate cordially and effectually in the cause of. Spain. The government of France say, that they have not abandoned Spain. In the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on the address to the King, the ministers of that day were attacked for having abandoned the Queen of Spain. In answer to this charge, M. Guizot, on the part of the ministers, said, that although they had disapproved of the proposed measure of the cabinet of the 22nd of February, for a larger and more extended armed co-operation with Spain,—and although they had not adopted the policy of that cabinet, they had done every thing for Spain that the cabinet of the 11th of October had done. He then quoted a despatch of the Duke de Broglie, President of the cabinet, of the 11th of October, addressed to the Duke de Fria, dated the 26th June, 1835, in which he says, "Every facility that can be desired will be given as well to augment, by way of recruiting, the foreign Legion, as to raise other corps composed of Frenchmen. As to the arming of these corps, the French government understand that it can only take place on the Spanish territory." The minister of public instruction then quoted another despatch of the Duke de Broglie, addressed to M. de Rayneval, French minister at Madrid, dated the 8th of July, 1835, in which he says, "The foreign Legion having, by a conven- tion, been transferred to the service of Spain, the recuiting cannot be continued but for the account of Spain and by Spanish agents." M. Guizot adds, "Whatever has been done by the cabinet of the 11th of October is maintained and continued by the present cabinet." The House will be pleased to observed, that the foreign Legion referred to is now in the service of Spain. It consists of several thousand men, under the command of a brave and distinguished French officer, Colonel Conrad. If I understand aright what I have quoted from the speech of M. Guizot, delivered a few months ago, the foreign Legion may now be recruited in France provided it be done by Spanish agents, and without the aid or intervention of the French authorities. I apprehend, further, that French subjects may now fully engage in the service of the Queen of Spain,—a liberty which this motion seeks to take away from the subjects of the King of England. Let it not be said, that England will do less than France in the cause of our ally,—let it not be said, in the face of Europe and the world, that the Queen of Spain is abandoned by England, and by England alone. You have to decide, this night, upon a question which is one of life or death to our ally, and one in which the honour and character of this country are deeply involved. I trust that the House will reject the present motion, the adoption of which would affix upon England the disgrace of having abandoned, in her utmost need, an ally to whom she was bound by common interest as well as by the faith of the most solemn obligations.

Mr. Bingham W. Baring

said, the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had very dexterously evaded the attack which had been made upon the foreign policy of the present Ministry to which he belonged. The real question now before the House was, whether this country had a right to interfere in the domestic affairs of foreign countries. The treaty of Quadruple Alliance had engaged us to afford certain assistance to the Government of Spain. The question now was, whether we were to stand by the letter of that treaty, or go beyond it, and afford other assistance than was therein provided for. The hon. and learned Member for Bath said, that it was the Tories who first set up the principle of the right of England to interfere in the domestic policy of neighbouring states. He entertained an opinion the reverse of that. Mr. Pitt never agreed to foreign war, except when it became necessary for the sake of British interests; and to fight for them alone. The Duke of Wellington, on the restoration of the King of France, in the glorious days of Paris, as they were called—did he then meddle with the supposed future policy of that monarch? No; he was content in seeing him acknowledged king de facto, and so expressed himself in his first note to this country on the subject. Fox, also, had always contended against interfering in foreign civil disputes, as tending only to exasperate the feelings of the conflicting parties. The same sentiment was, he believed, entertained at the present day by a great majority of the people of this country, and the hon. Member for Bath had truly represented their sentiments when he declared, that they were averse from interference. As it appeared to him, the great argument opposed to all these considerations was, that the motion was made by "a set of Tories." Now, as to the injustice and impolicy of the line of conduct pursued by his Majesty's Ministers, he thought they had an acknowledgment of it in the very speech of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down; for it was admitted by him that if they were to stop where they were, the result would be to put Don Carlos on the Throne. Much had been said about the Foreign Enlistment Bill, but that was not the real question; the real question was, whether the British Legion ought to be recalled, and whether his Majesty had the power to control a portion of his own subjects. He supposed the Government sent out these subjects to support British interests. If that was the case, the Government ought to have had them under their control; but instead of that the Government had been pleased to transfer the management of the business to a joint-stock company, which had been deluded under various pretences to furnish small pittances to carry out an enterprise which they supposed was taken up by France and England; and as to supporting British interests, they had a specimen in Portugal of the manner in which British interests were protected by our interference with the internal affairs of that country. Instead of making any return for services rendered, the Portuguese Government was throwing every impediment in the way of British interests. It was said, also, that we interfered because we wished to consolidate a union with France; but the policy of France was peaceful, and if we wished to act in concert with that country we ought to follow the same policy, and refrain from interfering in the affairs of other countries. Considering all the circumstances of the case, he should feel it his duty to rote for the motion.

Mr. Villiers

said, that when he rose before, it was for the purpose of making some observations upon the speech of the hon. Member for Bath, and he had to regret that the hon. Member had thought it right to take the opportunity of attacking the party with whom he generally acted, in the absence of every one of them except himself; and that as soon as he had made the bitter attack he did upon his friends, he should have left the House. He could not help regretting this the more as, if he had stopped, he would have heard who was the first person that had complimented and expressed his satisfaction at what had fallen from him, after he had thought proper, with so much asperity, to attack, as well as to leave, the party with whom he had formerly acted, for he would have learned that the first person who hailed him as a friend was the Member for Winchester—a Gentleman who once sat on the liberal side of the House, and who now sat on the opposite side. Agreeing generally, however, with many of the views of the hon. Member for Bath, he was glad to hear the Member for Winchester quote him as an authority for the opinion of the people of England. The hon. Member said, that the people were against rendering any assistance to the Queen of Spain because the Member for Bath had said so. Now, if the hon. Member for Bath should continue to express liberal opinions in. this House, and of the same character as he had done before, he should remind the Member for Winchester that if he differed from him he was differing from the people of England. He did not think that the hon. Member for Bath did altogether represent either in manner or matter the feelings and opinions of the people of England; but as he purported to do so, and his views were somewhat peculiar, he was sorry that he had not, on the many occasions which had been afforded him on the discussion of this question, stated them at any time but when it was most prejudicial to his party, and most favourable to his opponents; and, beyond the praise which he received from the opposite side, he could not conceive who would profit by this tardy announcement of his views on the Spanish question. The moment for discussing again this question had been selected simply for party purposes, and there was no fresh ground stated that at all justified the postponement of the public business for this debate; if there had been such ground it ought to have been stated, as it was only this time last week that he had heard the speech of the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Tamworth, which he concluded with a bitter sarcasm upon the present Government, that none of their measures had yet passed this House, and that whatever they originated they failed to complete; and he accompanied this reproof with an intimation that if they found that they were unable to carry through any measure, and were thereby induced to resign, the country would find energy sufficient to compensate the loss, and that another Ministry could be found. Now, when he considered with whom this measure originated, and by whose lengthy speeches the debate had been protracted, he could not but think that there was some object in thus wasting the public time, in order that they might, after another period, come down to this House and say that nothing was done, and thus provoke that energy that they talked of, which was to substitute themselves for the present Ministry. There was nothing but a party excuse for bringing forward this question now, and he admitted that the occasion was more favourable with that view than it had been in former times, because, when the same question had been submitted to this House before, either success had attended our countrymen in their gallant enterprise, or they had yet fortitude for their duty in spite of the ill treatment and disappointment which they had met with in Spain, and in spite of that unworthy, unceasing, and disheartening abuse which had been heaped upon them in this House and out of this House from the moment that they had left those shores till the present time. Victims to this ill-usage, they were now declining; and yielding to the impression of past circumstances and looking forward with no hope for the future, they had lost all heart for service. This, then, was the moment for a favourable attack, because no time was so good to strike your enemy as when he was down: it was then that a weak antagonist strikes his foe with most effect. It was a good party topic he did not deny, because it was easy to induce vulgar minds to conclude against a general policy from the peculiar event. It was a mode of gratifying national pride if it was wounded to sacrifice some party or other as the cause; and such motions as these afforded a pretext for the malcontents of any party to desert their friends without danger to their interests: and if any there were who took views larger than those which belonged to party, and hoped by the result of the division to favour Carlist policy throughout the world, why, the opportunity was a happy one; for by nothing could that party be more favoured than by such a motion. If the minority was even large in its favour, there would be indeed joy at Durango; the rack and wheel would be put in repair, and the grand inquests of Don Carlos, or Charles the Fifth, as the Member for Dover delighted to call him, would, doubtless, commence its work. But divested of these circumstances what was there to distinguish this motion from the many on this subject that they had heard, except that it is the gallant General, and not the Member for Oxford, or in his temporary absence the Member for Hertford, who brings it forward? There was no doubt that the question before them concerned the policy of the Quadruple Treaty, and the mode in which it had been executed. He thought, that the policy of the treaty was the great matter in question, which it might be difficult to defend; but if justified, all other questions connected with this motion were trifling. The charge of deviating from the principle of non-intervention all turned upon this. This charge came from two quarters. It came from the opposite benches, and it also came from a quarter which entitled it to great respect, namely, from many thinking men, who thought that it was unwise to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; that the treaty was a deviation from that principle, and that they, therefore, were induced to look with suspicion upon anything which exceeded the precise terms of the engagement of that treaty. Now, he distinguished the quarters from which this attack came, because he could not suppose that Gentlemen on the opposite side were converts to the principle of non-intervention, seeing that they were the party who for twenty years and upwards were interfering with the internal affairs of France—who made this country pay for subsidizing one-half of Europe also to interfere—and who were parties to an alliance which was based upon the principle of interfering with the affairs of every country in Europe. But with respect to this principle of non-intervention, which had been laid down so exclusively by the hon. Member for Bath, to the intent that we were under no circumstances to deviate from it—that we were, according to him, to shut ourselves up in our shell and care nothing for the rest of mankind—for his part, he recognised no principle of this exclusive character, nor any principle which precluded the consideration of circumstances which might justify a deviation from it. The great object of the principle was our own interest, and he contended that might upon particular occasions be better promoted by departing from the principle than by observing it. Our tenacity of the principle was chiefly founded upon our desire to avoid the expense and disaster of war. To justify a departure from the principle, it was necessary to show, that the chances of preserving peace and promoting our real interest or some other advantages were to be expected. He contended that this rule of policy was recognised in many cases, and many might be mentioned in which it would be so. For instance, he might refer to our interference to prevent the traffic of slaves by other countries. This was an intervention in the internal affairs of another country, but which we had combined with other countries to prevent. He might refer to the complaint, he believed made the other night, that there had not been interference enough against the treaty of Adrianople when it was made, and, again, against the Foreign Secretary that he had not prevented the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; and, again, he believed by the hon. Member for Bath himself, that we did not go to war with Russia on account of the question in dispute between that country and a trader of our own; and why? Not because of the general or existing evils arising out of these circumstances, but because of the evils apprehended, in order, as the hon. Member for Bath stated, by showing ourselves ready to fight, to prevent war. But that recognised the principle that he was contending for—that it was sometimes wise to risk something to avert a greater evil. He could also consider cases that might arise in which it was politic, upon a principle of self-defence, to interfere in the affairs of other countries. For instance, suppose that Russia was more powerful than at present, and that she could do by force what she attempts to do by duplicity and intrigue, and that she could overthrow, as she tries to undermine, every liberal government in the world—suppose it was the misfortune of the world that there should be confusion in the United States of America—supposing that the southern states were at war with the northern, and that to preserve slavery the assistance of Russia, or any despotic power, had been invoked to her aid—and supposing that there was danger apprehended by the northern states for their freedom, and they sought our alliance to assist and defend them from this evil, he asked, if they might not upon a selfish principle think it wise to co-operate with a constitutional friend in defence of institutions in the existence of which the happiness of mankind was implicated? He only mentioned these cases to reconcile the minds of hon. Members to the possibility of circumstances arising under which it might be wise and right to interfere in the affairs of another country; and he did this with the view of bringing them to the case before the House, as to whether any circumstances had arisen when the Quadruple Treaty was entered into, that justified it. Now, if men intended to judge this treaty justly, they must examine those circumstances—they must take themselves back to that period, and, in the first place, consider the very critical state in which every nation in Europe had been placed since the last revolution in France; how much more decidedly had that struggle of opinion been manifested as to forms of government which now agitate the world; and this question was raised in the Peninsula upon the death of the late King of Spain. The people of Spain, then under the influence of the example of France, elected for constitutional Government; they acknowledged the Sovereign who accepted the Throne on those terms. She became the Sovereign de facto; and by all the constituted authorities of the country she was considered so de jure. The absolutist party in that country, necessarily large, attempted insurrection—a pretender to the Throne became their rallying point—it was important to Spain that the constitutional Monarch should be recognised by foreign powers There was no reason for those powers not conforming to the usage of nations in recognising the Sovereign then on the Throne. It was impossible to withhold their recognition without interfering in the civil dispute that might then be said to exist. What was then the conduct of the northern powers? Did they conform, to the recognised principles of amicable relation between Sovereigns, or did they interfere in the dispute of the country? Most decidedly the latter; for they refused to recognize the Queen of Spain, and to this hour they had never sent any ambassadors to her court. Here, then, was a decided step taken by the northern powers, favouring as they did the views and party attached to the pretender. They thus gave great encouragement to the insurrection, and great hope to the Carlists. England and France were now called upon to act. Were they to ally themselves with constitutional power or with Carlism? How much more abuse would have been heaped upon the Government than has been now if they had decided otherwise than they have! But what was the state of the Peninsula at that time? There were two pretenders to the Thrones of Spain and Portugal, and two constitutional Sovereigns recognised by the people. We were bound already in alliance, offensive and defensive, with Portugal. The pretenders relied upon each other. If Don Carlos succeeded in Spain, and then assisted Don Miguel in Portugal against the Queen, we might have been called upon by our treaty to go to war. We had also to apprehend that France might interfere singly in the affairs of Spain. It was also an object to us to preserve our friendly connexion with France. France, as well as Belgium, were then threatened by the nor then powers, who were regarding with doubt and with threatening aspect the progress of constitutional Government in the west of Europe. Under all these circumstances, then, it was with the view to prevent war—with the view to have amicable instead of hostile neighbours, and from sympathy with constitutional Government—that it was considered expedient at the time to form the Quadruple Alliance, hoping thereby, without even being called upon to force Our intentions by war, to secure peace and good Government in the Peninsula. Was there anything irrational in the expectation? What was the first effect? That which was intended. The insurrection was almost at an end, and the pretenders in both countries were subdued. Why, then, was Spain in confusion now? Why simply, because Don Carlos was alive and free, and he was so because we chose to stand between justice and regard for a bad man's life. We saved his life when it was at the mercy of the Queen's troops—we brought him to this country—we suffered him to escape from this country—France suffered him to pass through her country, and he thus finds himself again in the revolted provinces a rallying point for all the disaffected peasantry. He (Mr. Villiers) would ask, how it would have been consistent with honour, honesty, or any feeling worthy of our country, if we had refused, when called upon at that time, to take effective steps to enforce our engagement? We had agreed by the treaty to secure the Queen of Spain upon her Throne, but had been the means of adding to its danger. How could we refuse to fulfil our obligation to render it secure? This was the time when the additional articles were signed, and at that time, bound as we were to take means of securing her Throne, we had only to consider the mode that would be most effective for the purpose. The means that were then agreed upon might either have been a military or a naval force. It was only the policy of the one or the other that he conceived was in question at that time. It was thought most politic to confine the assistance to a naval co-operation, and upon that ground it was granted, and this was an important element in the consideration, whether we were justified in sending out a few more or a few less of marines attached to our ships, and whether they did act a few yards more or less from the shore; for if the treaty was justified, and if the object of the treaty had not any reference to the means of enforcing it, the questions that Gentlemen opposite raised were useless, and not worth discussing. And with respect to the object of the gallant Gentleman's motion, that the Order in Council for allowing British subjects to engage in the service of the Queen of Spain should be rescinded, could he suppose, in the first place, that he could influence Members who were opposed upon principle to the Act itself? And if we were bound to the Queen of Spain by treaty to secure her on her Throne, and that her Government considered that we could render her more effectual assistance by allowing her to raise a corps in this country, and thereby avoid offending the pride of the Spanish people by introducing a foreign army, what pretext was there on principle as regarded the Ministerial side of the House, or in honour, if they were bound by the treaty, for refusing to the Queen of Spain the advantage of the assistance of British subjects in her service? Let hon. Members remember, on the other side that the Foreign Enlistment Act was passed because it was alleged, that we were bound in good faith to our ally, the King of Spain, to prevent our countrymen entering the service of his revolted provinces, and that the law did not allow him to enlist our subjects in his service. Now, then, we were bound by good faith to our ally, the Queen of Spain, to allow British subjects to enlist in her Service. The ground of fidelity in alliance was the same in both eases, and yet, because it served the present purpose, the party opposite reject this ground, and argue in favour of restricting our Countrymen from engaging in foreign service at all, as being derogatory to the honour of the country. He observed the impatience of the hon. Member for Yorkshire, who doubtless was going to answer him. He would not trespass further upon the attention of the House. His object had been to show, that there were grounds on which a justification of the Quadruple Treaty might be rested; that that treaty having a definite object, the means by which it was to be executed need not have been limited to a naval force; and that under those circumstances it Was idle to quibble about whether it had been exceeded or not in some trifling degree, and it was unjust to judge either of the policy of the treaty or the mode of its execution by the present result. Failure as well as success must always be contemplated in every engagement, but the policy of the engagement would not be fairly or fully judged of by either. If the treaty had failed, and the failure had been owing either to the bad faith of France, to the incapacity of the Spanish Government, or the ill Usage of the Legion in Spain, he should say that there was ground for the Government of this country to review the relations in which we at present stand towards the different parties to the treaty, for the purpose, if possible, of accomplishing the original object with more effect; but this, he considered, was widely different from supporting the present motion, Which he regarded as originating in party views, with the hope of injuring the cause of reform in this country, of disheartening the constitutional party in Spain, and spreading dismay among Liberals wherever they might be found.

Sir William Follelt

said: Sir, it was not my intention to have at all troubled the House upon this occasion, and I and induced to do so more from what has fallen from my right hon. and learned Friend opposite (Mr. C. Fergusson) in the course of this debate, than from any desire to take a part in the discussion; but, however, Sir, I Will venture shortly to trouble the House with the reasons which induce me to give my vote for the motion of my right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir H. Hardinge.) The hon. and learned Member who has just sat down, has repeated the assertion which has been made by every hon. Member who has Spoken On the other side of the House, that this question has been made a mere party question. I know how easy it is to make that assertion, and I was quite satisfied that it would be cheered by the hon. Members opposite. It may be very politic to make that assertion with a view to influence the fate of a division; but I am perfectly satisfied, that if the hon. and learned Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. Villiers) had taken the trouble to converse with persons out of this House, he would have discovered that, however we may be split into parties, and however we may differ on questions of domestic policy, and of changes in the institutions of the country, it is the strong and general opinion of the people of this country, that our late policy has wasted the blood and treasure of England—that the quarrel is one in which the people of England have no concern, and relates to objects with Which the national interests and honour are in no way connected, I have listened most attentively to the Course of this debate. I felt a strong interest it the question, long before my right hon. and gallant Friend brought it forward. I have been most anxious to hear-the opinions of some Members of his Majesty's Government on this subject. Some Mem- bers connected with his Majesty's Government have undoubtedly spoken, but we have now arrived at a late hour in this the third evening which this debate has lasted, and no Member of his Majesty's Cabinet has yet thought it right to favour the House with any observations. But, Sir, upon what grounds has this question been put by those hon. Members connected with his Majesty's Government who have addressed the House? I will not say that I have heard no argument to prove that the interests and the honour of England are connected with the present contest in Spain, but I will say, that I have heard no statement, no assertion, that either the interests or honour of England demand the presence of the Legion, and of the marines in that country. No one has said, that any insult has been offered to the honour of our flag: which should make us forget the sacrifices, the miseries, and the misfortunes of war, and induce us to embark in a struggle, in the result of which our interests are not involved. I have heard no such statement; and yet what do I find to be the fact? A large body of our fellow-subjects has been sent out to Spain; no less than 10,000 of our fellow-countrymen have left England in arms to support the cause of the Queen, of whom a large proportion has already perished—some in battle with persons who were not the enemies of this country; others, in consequence of the hardships and diseases which have been brought about by the position in which they have been placed. And shall I be told, Sir, by the hon. Members opposite, that when we find this to be the state of things, that when we find 10,000 of our fellow-subjects have been exposed to those miseries and sufferings—shall I be told, Sir, that to call the attention of Parliament to these circumstances is a mere party proceeding, and that the Representatives of this country are not bound to raise their voices against the continuance of such a state of things? Ought we not to ask ourselves whether this state of things is wise, or politic, or just, in order that we may know whether we should sanction its continuance or not; and if we find that it is neither wise, nor politic, nor just, ought we not to raise our voices to prevent his Majesty's Ministers from persevering in their present course? I cannot conceive that this can be treated as a party question. I do not think that the people of England look at it as a party question. I think the matter is one which touches the interests and the honour of the country too nearly; and, with the permission of the House, I will attempt to show how untenable are the grounds of defence relied on by his Majesty's Government. Now, what is the nature of that defence? The Ministers do not tell us, that the interests and the honour of the country are concerned in the struggle now going on in Spain, but the argument put forward is this—I do not know whether any other will be relied on, but hitherto this is the only argument on which the Government has rested its defence—"It is too late to be discussing now the policy or impolicy of the quadruple treaty, or the policy or impolicy of the additional articles of the treaty; the Government entered into that treaty, the House of Commons has not departed from it, and we are bound by all the obligations of national faith and honour, to carry its stipulations strictly into execution." That is the argument put forward on the opposite side of the House. It is impossible not to admit the strength of such an argument, provided it be valid. I will say more, that I should be the last man in the House to assert, that we ought not to abide strictly, and with good faith, by the terms of any treaty into which this country has entered; but I do not think that hon. Members opposite have acted fairly in taxing Gentlemen on this side of the House with a design to evade the stipulations of that treaty. If the Government can prove, that in allowing our countrymen to be employed in the service of the Queen of Spain, it has acted in accordance with the stipulations of the quadruple treaty, or the additional articles, I will admit, that the Ministers have made out their case. But till they prove that, they have no right to reproach Members on this side of the House with a disregard of the spirit of the treaty. The stipulations of that treaty were strictly performed by my right hon. Friend, the Member for Tamworth, when he was at the head of the Government, and I was surprised that the hon. and learned Member for Tipperary should have used by way of taunt the fact, that when the Duke of Wellington was in the Foreign-office, he sent 50,000 muskets and bayonets to be used against the Basques, because one of the articles in terms expressly declared, that the King of England is bound to send the Queen arms and munitions of war. That is the express language of one of the articles, and the Duke of Wellington, in the performance of its stipulations, sent arms and munitions of war to the Queen of Spain. But it is a very different question, whether the terms of the treaty bound us. to furnish the Queen of Spain with these supplies, and whether we are also bound by its provisions to send a levy of 10,000 British subjects, and to send into Spain also a battalion of marines, and a party of the Royal Artillery. This is a very different proposition, and the question is, whether that interpretation is in accordance with the meaning of the treaty, or not? Last night a discussion took place between my noble Friend, the Member for Hertford, and my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for the Tower Hamlets, respecting the construction of the treaty. I am not now prepared to say, whether the construction put upon it by my noble Friend was correct or not; that, however, will not decide the question, and. I am even willing to admit, that my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for the Tower Hamlets, may, to a considerable extent, be right in his construction of it. The true construction of the additional articles may be gathered from the facts. It is evident, after Don Carlos had left Portugal, and arrived in Spain, the Queen's government were anxious to prevent his receiving from abroad any supplies to enable him to carry on the war in the northern provinces, and especially to prevent the introduction of arms and ammunition from France. For this purpose, in the first article, the King of the French engages to employ an army to prevent the introduction of these supplies. But the sea would still be left open, and arms and ammunition might be landed on the northern coast of Spain. What, then, is the object of the second additional article? Not to furnish a fleet to attack a navy of Don Carlos, but to use a naval force so as to prevent supplies reaching him by sea. The noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, will hardly contend that this is not one of the main objects of the treaty. I know the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets says, this cannot be the right construction of the treaty, and he asks if there is no such word in the English vocabulary as blockade. It is true, that there is no direct stipulation that we should blockade the ports of Spain. And how could there be? The ports and the coast of Spain were in the possession of the Queen our ally, and a stipulation to establish a blockade of such a coast would have been idle. I think, indeed, as we were not at war that no such blockade could have legally been established. Even if the coast had been in the possession of the insurgents, but I am on that account convinced, and I call on the noble Lord to contradict me if I am wrong, that one, at least, of the main objects of the second additional article originally contemplated was, that the ships of England should be employed to prevent the landing on the northern coast of Spain of arms and supplies for the use of Don Carlos. I will now revert to the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Kirkcudbright, with respect to the Quadruple Treaty itself. The hon. and learned Gentleman contended, that the effect of the treaty, without the additional articles, was, to bind this country to co-operate with the Queen of Spain in actual warfare, and to afford assistance. [Mr. C. Fergusson No; what I said was, that that was the effect of the two.] Well, the hon. and learned Gentleman had said, that the effect of the two was to bind the King of England to interfere, to take part, in fact, in the war in Spain, and that therefore, the Government had done no more than it was bound to do. The right hon. and learned Gentleman, however, did not advert to the time at which the treaty was made. It was agreed to when Don Miguel had been driven from Lisbon to Santarem, where Don Carlos had joined him. At that time the discontented Spaniards were flocking to Don Carlos, and whilst these two princes were there, a Spanish army under Rodil, crossed the Spanish frontier for the avowed purpose of putting down any attempt upon public tranquillity in Spain. Those were the existing circumstances at the time, when this treaty was entered into. Now, what was its object? The first and foremost object of the treaty, was, to secure and maintain the independence of Portugal, and our great aim was to prevent a Spanish army remaining in that country any longer than was necessary for the accomplishment of Spanish purposes. With this view the treaty was made, and the very first articles of the treaty declared that it was made for the purpose of compelling the Infante Don Carlos, and the Infante Don Miguel, to withdraw from the Portuguese territories, and the second] article went on to say—" Her Majesty, the Queen Regent, engages that her troops shall withdraw from the Portuguese territory as soon as the above-mentioned object of the expulsion of the Infants shall have been accomplished, and when the presence of those troops in Portugal shall no longer be required by his Imperial Majesty, the Duke Regent," Then the third article ran as follows:—" His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, engages to co-operate by the employment of a naval force," ? and by the 4th article, the King of the French undertook to do nothing without the concurrence of the other three Powers. These objects are clear and defined. There is no uncertainty of expression in this part of the treaty; we are not at liberty to put a construction on the treaty to suit ourselves. The object was declared to be the expulsion of Don Carlos and Don Miguel from the Portuguese dominions. Now let us look at the additional articles. There are only two in effect. The first runs thus:—" His Majesty, the King of the French, engages to take such measures in those parts of his dominions which adjoin to Spain, as shall be best calculated to prevent any succours of men, arms, or warlike stores, from being sent from the French territory to the insurgents in Spain." By the second article, "His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, engages to furnish her Catholic Majesty, such supplies of arms and warlike stores as her Majesty may require, and further to assist her Majesty, if necessary, with a naval force." I ask the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, what is the construction which he puts upon the latter article itself? The treaty was made for the expulsion of Don Miguel and Don Carlos from Portugal, and that object was accomplished; and will the noble Lord go so far as to say, that by the second of the additional articles, the King of England is to continue to assist the Queen of Spain as long as the Queen may be pleased to require his assistance? Does the noble Lord mean to say, that we are to embark in a war of succession? Does the noble Lord mean to contend that this treaty will continue to be binding so long as Don Carlos shall have supporters, or shall be found in Spain? If that be the meaning which the noble Lord assigns to the treaty, if that be its true interpretation, does the noble Lord believe that the House of Commons, knowing such to be its meaning, would have sanctioned the treaty? Does the noble Lord affirm that the people of this country are aware that they have been bound to give such a support to the Queen of Spain, and that they will be obliged to continue that assistance until they have put down Don Carlos and all his partisans? Would it not, I ask, have led to an European war, if it had been known that we had entered into such stipulations? Suppose you fail in the attempt—suppose, after wasting the blood and treasure of England in a prolonged and tedious contest, that Don Carlos gets seated on the throne at Madrid, is it politic to make, after all, a bitter enemy of the sovereign of a country like Spain? And suppose you succeed, let me ask what sort of a throne the Queen of Spain is likely to have, if she owes that throne to the bayonets of foreigners? We know the jealousy with which foreigners are regarded by the Spanish people; the effects of your success will be almost as bad as if you had failed. I am quite satisfied, if it had never been asserted that the treaty bore this construction, that the House would not have consented to it. Is that, I ask you, the construction which you put upon the treaty? The object of the Quadruple Treaty itself, were it politic or not, was at least a clear and a defined object, the expulsion of the Infante from Portugal; and after the expulsion, we were not bound by the terms of the treaty, but the additional articles are for objects undefined and uncertain, and I want to know what interpretation you give to them, and for how long and to what extent England is to be bound by them. But now, with respect to the execution of the treaty, what is it you have done? The object of the motion which my right hon. and gallant Friend has brought forward, is to prevent the continuance in Spain of the British Auxiliary Legion, of the marine force, and of the corps of artillery, and sappers and miners. Is their continuance in that country in accordance with the treaty? Until I heard my right hon. and learned Friend, I was never aware that the employment of 10,000 Englishmen in Spain, was in compliance with the terms of the treaty. [Mr. C. Fergusson had not so contended.] I understood him to have so contended, but I beg his pardon if I misunderstood him. It is probable that what he meant to say was, that this proceeding is so intimately connected with the success of the Queen's cause, that its necessity may be collected from the articles of the quadruple treaty, and therefore that that circumstance will afford a justification for that proceeding. In the first place, let me beg the attention of the House for a moment to the question of the employment of the marines, because that is contended to be in strict accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Both my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for the Tower Hamlets, and the hon. Secretary to the Admiralty, asserted such to be the fact; they said, that the Government of this country had done nothing more than assist the Queen of Spain by a naval co-operation. Now let us see whether this is a fair construction of the treaty or not. You do not send out ships with their fair complement of marines, but you send out a battalion of marines under the command of a field officer of marines, and you attach that battalion to a Spanish army, although you say, that that battalion does not receive orders from the general in command of the Spanish military force. Is that naval co-operation? Now let us see for a moment how the hon. Secretary to the Admiralty proves his case. He says, that, this was a naval operation for this reason, that in the last war there were instances without end of sailors inarching across deserts and taking forts and cities, and of marines being landed from the fleet, and taking a part in land operations. Why, nobody doubted the fact, and I think I could have added other instances. I think I could have shown him more than one example in which the land artillery was worked by the sailors of the fleet, and if I am not much mistaken there was a battalion of marines attached to the army which the Duke of Wellington commanded in the Peninsula. Surely the hon. Gentleman does not mean to say, that what was done when we were waging a war of life and death against the power of France can be quoted as a precedent in this case—that when these officers and sailors were thus employed they were acting as a naval force. They did what became them as British officers and subjects; they were seeking the enemies of their country wherever they were to be found; but they did not fight in their character as naval officers, nor as a part of a naval force. And if sailors and marines have taken part in land battles, and in the operations of armies during the late war, the hon. Secretary of the Admiralty might also have recollected that soldiers have fought at sea. I think I have heard that the first man that boarded the Spanish Admiral's ship in the action off Cape St. Vincent, was a private soldier of a regiment of the line then on board the English fleet. But is it because English seamen or soldiers, have been ready to fight whenever they had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, that it is a fair construction, when you are entering into a treaty with regard to the insurgent subjects of the Queen of Spain, to apply the same rules to this treaty, and insist that naval co-operation means that the sailors and marines are to be landed and fight on shore? Is it a fair construction of that treaty to say, that because a battalion of marines served under the command of the Duke of Wellington within the lines of Torres Vedras, a battalion of marines is to be sent to serve in Spain? It is not a naval co-operation but of a different character, and they act as part of a land force. Nothing can make the case plainer than this fact. There are, I believe, but two brigs of war on the coast, whose complement of marines does not amount altogether to more than forty or fifty men, and yet there were 500 British marines engaged in the late affair at Hernani. The instances therefore quoted by the Secretary of the Admiralty were in no respect applicable;—the marines that marched from Acre were merely, the complement of the ships of war on the coast, and so also were those that took part in the other affairs alluded to by him—but the force employed in Spain is altogether different, and where would the distinction have been if instead of marines you had sent a regiment of foot or a battalion of guards? Where, I ask, was the distinction, for the marines were not attached to the vessels, but went for the purpose of acting against the forces of Don Carlos on land? Whatever construction may be put upon the meaning of naval cooperation, the employment of this battalion of marines and of the corps of royal artillery and sappers and miners in conjunction with the army of the Queen of Spain, cannot be brought within it. This cannot be defended on the ground that we are bound to assist Spain with a naval force; the Government must defend it on some other ground, such as the hon. and learned Member for Wolver-hampton had put forward—namely that we are bound to interfere in this civil contest, but if we do interfere at all let us do it in a manly, open manner becoming the dignity of a great nation. And let me ask here what was the meaning of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets, when he said last night, that if his Majesty's Ministers had made the proper arrangements with the Spanish government for the due supply of the-British Legion with provisions and necessaries, he should have been sorry to have had to defend their proceedings. Did he mean that they might encourage and sanction the employment of that force in Spain—but that they were not openly to take upon themselves the responsibility of this interference in the civil warfare of that country. My right hon. and gallant Friend, when he introduced the subject, pointed out the miserable state of destitution in which the Legion was left; they had no hospitals, no medicines, no clothes, no provisions. Exposed to these various privations, they died away by hundreds and hundreds at Vittoria, to the amount of twice the number which perished in the splendid victory gained on the same spot. If the Government had acted as became them they would not have sent an army of Englishmen abroad, without taking care that they were properly fed and clothed. Why had they not done so, because they had not ventured to act fairly and openly. They had sent troops to Spain, and they had not taken upon themselves the responsibility of that proceeding. If the Government have done right in sending the Legion to Spain, my hon. and learned Friend could have no difficulty in defending proceedings which would have secured the proper clothing, feeding, and maintenance of that force. I will next advert to the argument which was raised upon the Foreign Enlistment Bill. My right hon. and learned Friend (Mr. C. Fergusson), in speaking of that Bill stated, that previous to its introduction by the old law of the country, any subject would have had a full and complete right to enter into the service of any foreign state. Now, if that was the statement of my right, hon. and learned Friend, I differ from him. By the constitutional law of this country, as my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for the Tower Hamlets, correctly stated it, the King of England could at any time prevent his subjects from entering into the service of any foreign power. Indeed, hon. Members opposite must see that it would be quite impossible to maintain any international system of policy, unless his Majesty had the power to prevent foreign states from levying armies within his dominions, and therefore the Foreign Enlistment Bill had not extended the King's prerogative in this respect. It enabled it in some respects to be more effectually put in force—but there were, as is well known, statutes previous to the Foreign Enlistment Bill directed to the same object and more penal in some of their provisions. Whatever, therefore, was the immediate cause of the introduction of that Bill. I cannot see that it can in any way affect the question now before us, except, thus far, that the suspension of its provisions is the act of the King's Government, and that it is under their express sanction and by their express authority that a British force is sent to take a part in this contest, The Government has issued an order in council which sent out 10,000 men to Spain. What provision in the treaty was there that authorised the Government to send these men to Spain? The right hon. Member for Kirkcudbright said, that he did not believe that there was any. Does the noble Lord (Palmerston) think he can point out any? I have no doubt, that the soldiers of the Auxiliary Legion, are as brave as men coming from the three countries to which they belong ought to be; and I believe, that they would have formed good soldiers, if they had been properly treated by the Government to whose assistance they went. But I want to know, what was the policy of sending 10,000 English soldiers to Spain to be engaged in a contest the most brutal and demoralising that has ever disgraced the civilised world? I want to know, and the country wants to know, what was the policy of sending out such a force of Englishmen to Spain without making provision for their support and maintenance —I want to know what was the policy of sending them out covertly, when, if the British Government was justified, in, inter- fering at all, it ought to have interfered openly in the affairs of Spain? I wish the noble Lord would recollect what has been stated by a French general, who had great experience in affairs of this kind. "If you interfere at all," said he, "interfere openly; if you interfere openly, you must send out an army to act under its national colours; and, even then, you must not send out an army, unless every supply and every comfort which it may require is stipulated for beforehand." That language was used by a distinguished French general; but the noble Lord had forgotten, or if he had not forgotten had neglected, to take every one of the precautions which the French officer had recommended. With respect to the policy of this interference, I must remind the noble Lord of what was stated by an individual whom I do not expect to hear accused of being too friendly to despotism. I wish that the policy which has been proclaimed by the Government of the United States as the rule of its political action had been followed by the Government of this country. The President said, in his last message to the Congress of the United States?—"We endeavour to conduct our intercourse with openness and sincerity; promptly avowing our objects, and seeking to establish that mutual frankness which is as beneficial in the dealings of nations as of men. We have no disposition, and disclaim all right, to meddle in disputes, whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries; regarding them in their actual state as social communities, and preserving a strict neutrality in all their controversies. Well knowing the tried valour of our people, and our exhaustless resources, we neither anticipate nor fear any designed aggression; and, in the consciousness of our own just conduct, we feel a security that we shall never be called upon to exert our determination, never to permit an invasion of our rights, without punishment or redress." Upon this authority, I say, we ought not to interfere at all in the disputes, internal or foreign, of other countries; but, if we do interfere, we ought to interfere openly and frankly. There is one topic more to which I must allude before I sit down. We, on our side of the House, have been met again and again with this taunt—" Don Carlos is the author of the Durango decree. He is an assassin; and will you vote in favour of a motion which will place the crown of Spain upon the head of an assassin?" I am surprised to hear an argument of that kind come from the Ministerial side of the House, because, if the present government of Spain—which is not the government that existed when the Quadruple Treaty was entered into, but a government of recent origin, taking its rise from a military insurrection; if the present Government, be so popular as hon. Gentlemen represented it to be, how can the carrying of this motion, or the withdrawing of the supplies sent from this country, produce the effect of placing Don Carlos on the throne of Spain? If the government of the Queen of Spain be so popular as we are told it is by hon. Gentlemen opposite, there is surely still enough of courage and honour among her partisans to prevent its overthrow; and when we are told to recollect that William 3rd came into this country with a foreign army, surely it was not meant to intimate that 5,000 or 6,000 Dutchmen had had any effect in overthrowing the tyranny of the Stuarts. The Revolution of 1688 was brought about by the people of England; and, if the people of Spain be either desirous or worthy of constitutional liberty, it is the people of Spain who must earn it for themselves. But when we, on this side, are taunted with this conduct of Don Carlos, I must say that no man feels greater abhorrence than I do at the cruelties which have been authorised by that Prince. I do not stand here either as the apologist or the vindicator of Don Carlos, but though I take no interest and feel no sympathy in his success, I take as little interest and feel as little sympathy in the success of his antagonists, I can take no interest, I can feel no sympathy, in a Government which could continue Mina in his command, after he had been guilty of conduct far more atrocious even than the promulgation of the Durango decree. I take no interest, I feel no sympathy, in the party which instigated, or, at any rate, was the apologist of the massacres at Barcelona. I can take no interest, I can feel no sympathy, in a contest between such parties, but I have an interest, and so too have the people of England, in preventing the further effusion of the blood of our countrymen. I have an interest in withdrawing a large body of Englishmen from the brutal and demoralising contest in which they are at present engaged; and every man who hears me, has an interest in providing that the land which was historically connected with us by the most proud and glorious recollections shall no longer be the scene of a national misfortune, and the disgrace and dishonour of the English name.

Viscount Palmerston

spoke as follows: * The House will suppose that I was only performing what I conceived to be my duty, and showing that respect which is becoming from me to this House, if I have delayed to rise till this period of the debate; because, having the honour to hold the office peculiarly connected with the subject of the present discussion, I felt it right to wait to hear the arguments by which the motion would be supported, before I presented myself to the attention of the House. But even now—even after the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Exeter (Sir W. Follett), who, having been moved by a sudden thought in the course of the evening, has most opportunely, and not without necessity, rushed to the rescue—even after the speech, able and learned as it was, I should be perfectly ready to go to the vote upon the statements and arguments of those who have preceded me on this side. I should, indeed, be content to let the judgment of this House, of this country, and of Europe, rest upon the powerful arguments of my hon. and right hon. Friends, as compared with what I must be allowed to call, without intending any offence, the lamentable failure of the hon. Gentlemen who sit opposite. And since the ability of the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just addressed the House, has been insufficient to make an impression upon the powerful speech of my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Dr. Lushington), I cannot anticipate that any aid that may yet be afforded by his unlearned Friends near him will be more successful. I think, then, that I owe no apology to any one, for not having at an earlier moment addressed myself to the subject of debate.

I must first of all beg to say, I regret the line of argument which the hon. and gallant Officer (Sir H. Hardinge) who brought this motion forward, was induced to adopt; and which led him to go into so many details with respect to the Legion. I know that the gallant Officer, * From a corrected report, published by Ridgway. whatever the strength of his political opinions may be, is an honourable and generous man. I regret, therefore, that the line of argument to which, for want of any better, he was driven to have recourse, made it necessary for him to string together a number of details which must have the effect of producing painful impressions on the minds of the persons concerned. The chief grounds upon which the right hon. and gallant Officer rested his motion, were the sufferings of the Legion in Spain, in consequence of the default of the Spanish government to provide them with those resources which were necessary for their comfort and well-being. But I must do the gallant Officer the justice to say, that there was nothing in his speech that reflected in the slightest degree upon the character of General Evans. The right hon. and gallant Officer pointedly and distinctly did justice to the bravery of General Evans in the field, and to his anxiety for the welfare of his men. The generous and disinterested nature of the motives which impelled General Evans to embark in the enterprise he has undertaken, has been fully explained by my hon. Friend, the Member for Tipperary (Mr. Otway Cave), who spoke with so much ability in the early part of this evening; and I can myself corroborate his statements, because I have had communications with General Evans, both before he accepted the command, and since he has held it, which enable me to speak to this point, and to bear witness to the nobleness of mind that prompted him to undertake a task, in which he has done himself so much credit. It was no mercenary motive that impelled him—it was no mean desire of obtaining any personal advantage, beyond that which arises from the performance of an honourable duty; General Evans thought, that by taking the command of the Legion in Spain, he should be promoting the interests of his country, the policy of its government, and those great principles which he himself had always advocated. I say, therefore, that the conduct of General Evans has done him honour, and has protected him from imputation from any person whatever, whose good opinion a high-minded man could value.

It is not fitting for me to discuss with the hon. and gallant Officer, questions of a military kind; but I must submit to his higher judgment in these matters, whether the position in which General Evans was placed, has not been one of peculiar difficulty; and whether even he must not acknowledge, that it has seldom happened that an officer has acquitted himself so well under such trying circumstances? For what has been General Evans's situation? He was landed in command of 8,000 or 9,000 men, upon a foreign coast, and within musket-shot of the enemy. Few of his men had ever seen each other before; they were not organized, they had to go through the whole process of being converted into regular and disciplined troops, and that, too, upon the very spot where their active and immediate services were required. Therefore, when Gentlemen compare the Legion in its earlier career, with the regular army in the King's service, I must call upon them to recollect the difference between the two. The one consisted of troops half-organized and half-disciplined, while the other takes into the field all the qualities that result from a long course of military discipline and control. With respect to the sufferings of the Legion, and the sickness at Vittoria, I must be allowed to ask the right hon. and gallant Officer;(Sir H. Hardinge), whether, in the course of his military experience, he has not seen those sufferings and that sickness equalled? I would ask him particularly, whether in the Peninsular war, and especially in the neighbourhood of Badajos, after the battle of Talavera, the sickness which took place in the British army, an army far better equipped and provided than the Legion, but, like the Legion, consisting in a great degree of men recently arrived in the country, was not even greater than that which happened in the Legion at the period to which he has alluded. So far, then, from its being just, to make these circumstances, which are the ordinary evils and inconveniences of war, the ground for a specific charge against the measures of the Government, I believe that if the facts were well looked into, it would appear that the inconveniences which the Legion has sustained, have not been so great as those endured, at times, by the regular troops of England employed in the Peninsular campaigns.

But, then, the hon. and gallant Officer dwelt much upon the demoralizing effect that must be produced upon the Legion by serving in conjunction with men guilty of the cruelties practised by the Christinos. In the first place, I believe that if cruelties have been practised in Spain, they have been committed far less by the troops with whom the Legion has been serving, than by those whom the Legion has been fighting against. But it is too much for the gallant Officer, who served during the Peninsular war in co-operation with the troops of Spain—who saw the arms of England aided by the guerillas, and who must recollect the cruelties then committed upon the French, upon all stragglers, upon prisoners, and upon the wounded—enormities which I will not now repeat to the House, but which every one who hears me, and recollects that period of war, must have present to his mind—it is too much, I say for the hon. and gallant Officer, or for the right hon. Baronet (Sir R, Peel), who, I suppose, will follow me— it is too much for them, who did not think that the army of the Duke of Wellington ought to be recalled from the Peninsula, lest the morals of the men should be contaminated by the co-operation of General Mina—that same Mina, by the by, whose continuance in command, we are told to-night by the hon. and learned Member for Exeter (Sir William Follett) ought to have been a sufficient reason to induce us to break faith with the Spanish government—I say it is too much for these Gentlemen now to tell us that the Legion ought to be recalled, lest the morals of the men should be contaminated by the example of their Spanish allies. I regret these atrocities, whatever they may be, or by whomsoever committed, as much as any man in this House can do. But unfortunately, Sir, history tells us, that it is in the character of the Spanish people, and has been so in all times, whether in war or in peace, to be more reckless of the shedding of blood than any other nation in Europe. Look at their conquest of America. Look at all the wars that have taken place in Spain, from the war of the Succession down to the war which ended in 1815; and then look at their civil commotions; and you will see upon all those occasions a greater disregard of those principles of humanity, which we are so justly proud of, than is to be found in the annals of any other nation in Europe. But I trust and hope that one of the results of the regeneration of Spain, through the means of a free constitution, will be the creation of a public opinion, by which these defects and blemishes in the national character will for the future be corrected.

There is one topic from which I wish in the first place to disencumber this question. We have been told, that it is a crime in us to have allied ourselves with parties who are endeavouring to rob the Basques of their privileges. We have been accused of assisting to oppress, to subjugate, to reduce to degrading servitude, a free and independent people, who are fighting for their liberties and privileges; and to hear hon. Gentlemen opposite, one should suppose, that the question was, not whether despotism is to be imposed upon the people of Spain, but whether the inhabitants of the Basque provinces are to be deprived of free institutions, and to be reduced to arbitrary sway. Now, I say, that this is not the question;—the reverse of this is the question. The war in the Basque provinces, the insurrection, as the hon. and and learned Gentleman calls it —I thank him for the word: he talks of the insurgents; the hon. Member for Sandwich calls them, I believe, the royal forces—but that war, what was its origin? Why did the insurgents, as the hon. and learned Gentleman terms them, take up arms? Was it because their privileges were invaded? No such thing. They took up arms for Carlos and despotism, against Isabella and constitutional government. And what is the present state of the war in those provinces? Why, if I am not much misinformed, the Basques are as tired of the war, as any people can be of a great infliction from which they are unable to escape. The army of Carlos, I believe, is mainly composed of persons not belonging to those provinces. The councillors of Carlos, Moreno, and many of his other generals, are not Basques; and although a portion of his army is composed of Basques, even that portion consists in a great degree of persons who cannot quit his service, because their property, their houses, and their families are in the country occupied by the troops of that ferocious man. They know—they are more than told, for the threat has been executed—that if they desert his service their families will pay the forfeiture of their offence; these men are therefore compelled, whether willing or not, to continue in the service of Don Carlos. One hon. Gentleman, I think it was the noble Lord, the Member for South Lan- cashire (Lord Francis Egerton), said that he believed it would be a greater advantage to the Basques to get rid of their privileges than to retain them. I concur with that noble Lord in this opinion. Those privileges were great and valuable so long as the rest of Spain was subject to arbitrary government and a despotic King. So long as neither justice nor law were to be had in Spain, then the exemptions of the Basques were an approach to constitutional freedom. But when the whole of Spain is governed, as I trust it will be, by a free constitution, with independent and impartial tribunals, by equal laws properly administered, and by a responsible executive; then, the Basques will find it far more to their advantage to be incorporated with the rest of the Spanish nation, than to be shut out in a corner of the land, from those benefits which their countrymen enjoy.

But what were these privileges of the Basques? No man will pretend that exemption from custom-houses on the coast, was a real advantage to them; because they themselves have frequently petitioned to be relieved from that privilege, and to be allowed to be placed, in that respect, on the same footing with the rest of their countrymen. The great privilege which they enjoyed, was the possession of local self-government, through those municipalities by which they managed their own affairs. And what are we to think of the consistency of those Gentlemen, who, while on the one hand they are endeavouring to deprive their own countrymen of those corporations to which they are so firmly attached, on the other hand stand up and entreat us not to interfere with the municipal corporations of the poor Basques—that invaluable legacy bequeathed to them from their remotest ancestry! I beg, Sir, that we may hear no more of this, affected compassion for the Basques fighting for their privileges. The poor Basques are made the victims of persons who have other ends in view than the welfare of Biscay; and whose real object is to establish arbitrary power in Spain. The war which is carried on in the Basque provinces is not a war between the modern institutions of Spain, and the ancient institutions of Biscay. It is there, and upon that contracted scene, that is to be decided by issue of battle that great contest between the opposing and conflicting principles of government— arbitrary government on the one hand, and constitutional government on the other—which is going on all over Europe; but which, fortunately for mankind, is waged in other countries with argument instead of arms, so that the peaceful occupations of the people are not disturbed thereby. I trust, that in all other countries that contest will still continue to be thus peacefully carried on; and that no violence of party, on the one side or the other, may disturb the tranquillity of Europe. But that is the real question at issue, and those who endeavour to limit us to the privileges of the Basques, give an imperfect and unjust representation of the true nature of the struggle.

I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has at last brought this question to an issue, to be decided by a vote of this House. This mode of dealing with it is fairer to the question, and, I must say, more worthy of the party, than that which they have hitherto pursued. For, whatever may be the strength of their opinions, their course has not been calculated to impress other people with a notion that their convictions were very strong upon this subject. Their courage seems to have ebbed and flowed according to the fluctuations of the tide of war in the provinces of Biscay. When things went a little well for Don Carlos, there was a movement to their front; but when his affairs went ill there was stillness in their ranks. Last autumn it was thought that Bilboa would be taken and great was their song of triumph. Parliament not being then sitting we could not have those rejoicings here; but loud was the exultation that resounded from all their acknowledged organs of opinion. Bilboa was relieved, and relieved by that naval co-operation which, according to the hon. Gentlemen opposite, has done no good to the interests of England, though it rescued a town in which there were many English merchants, and much English capital, from a most disastrous fate. For, though it has been said tonight, that Don Carlos abstained from taking Bilboa by storm out of tenderness to the inhabitants, I firmly believe, that, if Bilboa had fallen, a scene of massacre and devastation would have ensued, exceeding any of those horrors which the hon. Gentlemen on the other side have referred to. Well, Bilboa was relieved; Parliament met; did we shrink from discussion? No; we put foreign affairs into the very first paragraph of the King's Speech. Yes, foreign affairs were put foremost in the speech. The hon. Gentlemen opposite contented themselves with some slight allusions to the subject; but the objections which are now made, it did not suit them (I believe that is their own expression) at that moment to bring forward. Then came the unfortunate event of Hernani; and then the courage of the Carlists in Spain, and the courage of the Carlists here, was once more aroused. Before that, and when the success of Bilboa had not been followed up with the activity which had been expected, the noble Lord, the Member for Hertford, went so far as to call the attention of the House to this subject, after the House had gone into a Committee of Supply. The noble Lord on that occasion candidly stated, that he waited till the Speaker had left the Chair, because, if he had made his speech at an earlier moment, some other hon. Member might have moved a resolution against it, and have carried that resolution by a large majority. Well, before this last encounter —this last misfortune—they had got so far as a speech in a Committee of Supply. But when the defeat of Hernani took place, and they were induced to think that things were going much worse for the Queen, their courage rose, and hence the present motion. They now came forward with a formal motion, to persuade this House to pass a vote which is intended to be, and which, if adopted, would be, a censure upon the Government, and a call upon that Government by this House to break faith with the Queen of Spain—to abandon our engagements—to tear our treaty in pieces, and to desert our ally, because some temporary disaster has befallen our arms.

For what is the motion before the House? It is true, that the motion of the right hon. Gentleman does not in words go to the extent I have just described. Quite the contrary. Oh dear, no; he knows too well—he and his Friends all know too well, that there is a feeling of honour in this House—that there is a regard for national faith—that there is a spirit, too, of good-will towards a nation struggling for its freedom; and if they had acted in a manly way, and had come boldly forward and put in words that which was to be the effect of their motion, they know that they would have a most inconsiderable minority, and that there would be no chance for them whatever of success. But that which I have stated is the meaning—at all events must be the effect—of the motion of the right hon. Gentleman, if that motion should be adopted by the House. Because, will any man tell me, that if this House were to say, that the order in council was improper, and were to affirm by implication that the naval co-operation which has been afforded, is not justifiable, will any man tell me that the effect, both in this country and in Spain, would not be equivalent to a declaration that England is to abandon the cause of the Queen of Spain, and that our engagements and our mode of executing them have been specifically condemned by the House of Commons?

Now, what is the fault which the Gentlemen opposite find with the Quadruple Treaty? They say, that it has been detrimental to the interests of England, and injurious to her honour. Is that really the case? If it be, why have not these Gentlemen come forward sooner? Why have they not stretched forth their saving hand to rescue this country from injury, and to save it from dishonour? Have they, during the three years that the treaty has been before this House, proposed a resolution of censure on the Government for concluding that treaty? Censure! Why, they have acted upon it themselves—they have executed it themselves—they have made it their boast to have done so. Is it then the treaty which they call upon us to disavow? Is it the treaty which they would have us abstain from executing? No, they will say, it is the order in council. The order in council indeed! Why, it is two years since the order in council was issued. Their objection to the order in council, excepting the objection of the right hon. and gallant Officer who has made the present motion, and who has rested his case chiefly upon the particular events that have passed in Spain, is an objection upon principle, and not an objection founded upon the operation of that order. But if they thought, that it was against the laws which ought to regulate society, for men to engage in another country in a war not their own; if their objections on this score were just and valid, why not come manfully forward when the order in council was first land upon the table of this House? Why did they not then call upon the House to address the Crown to revoke that order, and prevent those countrymen of theirs, for whom so much compassion has been now expressed, from exposing themselves to all those calamities, and entailing upon their country all that dishonour, which these Gentlemen now so pathetically deplore?

Then the naval co-operation, also, has been equally denounced. Why, that cooperation has been going on for a twelvemonth. It has been known during that period to all the world, and has been avowed in this House from its very commencement. What then, I ask, is the reason for this tardy interposition—what is the reason they did not rescue the country from the injuries to be inflicted on it, when they had it in their power to state their views, and when there was time, if those views were correct, for some good to have arisen from stating them? Has the secret been let out by accident, by anything which has been said in this House in the course of the last week? Is it that there is anywhere any prophetic vision of things which may occur? Do "coming events cast their shadows before." Is it thought by any body, that it might for certain persons, in certain contingencies, be convenient to have a Parliamentary sanction for abandoning a treaty, which, in certain quarters, is not much approved of; and for receding from engagements which it was felt so grievous to execute? I have upon other occasions complimented the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Tamworth, for his faithful and honourable execution of the treaty when he was in office: I should be sorry if there were reason for any man to think, that the right hon. Gentleman was not prepared, under any circumstances, and let what may befal him, to continue to act in the same honourable manner as before: or that it would be agreeable to him to have any pretence for breaking the engagements and altering the policy of this country—a policy, which has for its object the freedom of Spain.

There are three subjects involved, then, in this discussion. The Quadruple Treaty, —the order in council,—and the naval co-operation. The right hon. and gallant Officer did not, in his speech, allude to the treaty, but other Gentlemen have done so. I will take leave to" treat of these three subjects separately and distinctly.

There are those on the other side of the House, who know as well as I do, under what circumstances, and for what objects, the treaty was concluded. Every man, even the most superficial observer, must have perceived that the change which was made by Ferdinand in the succession to the Spanish crown, though effected by the will of the reigning sovereign, carrying into execution the recorded intentions of a predecessor; though sanctioned by the constitutional authorities of the country; though adopted by the people at large; and though accompanied by every circum-stance of legality and regularity, yet laid the foundation for a great revolution in Spain. It was not merely the substitution of an infant female for a grown man; it was evident that out of that change must spring a great alteration in the internal institutions of Spain; and that with such an alteration in its internal institutions, there would also arise a change in the tendencies of its external policy. I say, that the change which soon after took place in the external policy of the government of Spain, was the natural consequence of the change in the order of succession. Up to the death of Ferdinand, Spain had invariably exhibited the greatest hostility to the government of Donna Maria in Portugal; and had supported Don Miguel in every possible indirect manner; and had even gone to the extent of offering him the assistance of troops. From the time that Ferdinand died, a change took place in the feelings and conduct of the Spanish government towards Portugal. England had at first remained neutral in the contest that was going on in Portugal; what was then our language to Spain? We said to the Spanish government, "If you send armed men across the frontier of Portugal to assist Don Miguel, the British fleet in the Tagus will instantly co-operate with the forces of Donna Maria; if you do not send troops, and do not otherwise interfere, we will not take part in the contest." What was the result? Spain remained passive, and England continued neutral. What happened on the death of Ferdinand? A change of policy almost immediately occurred. A Spanish minister came to London, actually to request the English Government to send a force to assist in expelling Don Miguel from Portugal, and to establish Donna Maria on the throne. Nothing was more natural than this, because Don Carlos. was at that time, in Portugal, organising an army for the in- vasion of Spain. What was the answer of the English Government? "We will not comply with your request; we will not give the military assistance you desire to the cause of Donna Maria; we have taken our line of policy, and from that line we do not intend to depart. We will, however, give you something which will be of advantage to you — we will not give you an army, but we will give you a treaty." This offer was acepted; and now let us see what this treaty was. One of the objects of the Spanish government was, that a Spanish force should be allowed to enter Portugal, to put down the army of Don Carlos; and for the attainment of this object it was necessary that a convention should be entered into between the governments of Spain and Portugal. This afforded an opportunity for the attainment of a greater object. The English government said, "We will embrace the occasion which this convention affords us, to join the four great powers of the west of Europe, namely France, England, Spain, and Portugal, in one alliance—we will unite them for the attainment of one common and general object." England and France had for ages been enemies; Spain and Portugal had long been accustomed to regard each other with jealousy. To convert these former enemies and rivals into friends and allies, was surely a good deed; and without entering now into all the distant bearings of the Quadruple Treaty, or pointing out the contingent possibilities which may arise from it, I may be permitted to say, that thus to unite four great powers, between whom there are so many points of contact, and so many great interests in common, must materially tend to preserve the peace of Europe. We proposed this alliance to the French government, who joyfully acceded to it; I need not say, that the offer was thankfully received by the Spanish government; and the government of Portugal accepted it with eagerness. The right hon. Gentlemen opposite smiled when I mentioned that we had offered a treaty; I am not surprised at this; they know so much about treaties and protocols; and have bestowed so much study on the subject. They no doubt suppose, that this treaty was of no importance; they think it was a mere mockery to Spain and Portugal to offer it—well, what happened? The treaty was concluded in London, in April 1834, and was then sent to Portugal to be rati- fied, and the ratifications were sent back to England to be exchanged. This was in conformity with the practice of diplomacy, for the Gentlemen opposite are, of course, aware that a treaty is not in force until the ratifications are exchanged. The ratifications were exchanged in London on the 31st of May. But such was the effect of the treaty, that even before the ratifications were exchanged, Don Miguel surrendered; his army of 12,000 men laid down their arms; and the two pretenders abandoned Portugal. If, instead of a treaty, the English Government had offered an army of 20,000 men, the same result would not have been accomplished in the same time.

But this treaty consisted of two parts. In the first place, the general principle and objects were stated in the preamble; and next there were the articles of execution. Now, the preamble to which I wish to call the attention of the House states the views of the contracting parties, and the objects of the treaty. Hon. Gentlemen opposite said, that the treaty merely applies to the entrance of the army of General Rodil into Portugal, and to the object then immediately in view, namely, the expulsion of the two pretenders from Portugal. The preamble, however, says no such thing; but it states, in the following terms, the objects for which the parties entered into the treaty. It says, that "her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, and his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, regent of the kingdom of Portugal, being impressed with a deep conviction that the interests of the two crowns"▀×not the interest of the crown of Portugal only, but that of the crowns of both kingdoms—"being impressed with a deep conviction that the interests of the two crowns and the security of their respective dominions," not the security of Portugal only, but, the security of both dominions "require the immediate and vigorous exertion of their joint efforts to put an end to hostilities, which, though directed in the first instance against the throne of her Most Faithful Majesty, now afford shelter and support to disaffected and rebellious subjects of the crown of Spain." It is here obvious, that the intention of the treaty had reference to Spain as well as to Portugal. "And their majesties being desirous, at the same time, to provide the necessary means for restoring to the subjects of each,"—to Portugal only? No; "to the subjects of each, the blessings of internal peace, and to confirm by mutual good offices." Mutual good offices? Where would be the mutuality, if the treaty contemplated assistance from Spain to Portugal, but no assistance from Portugal to Spain? "The friendship which they are desirous of establishing and cementing between their respective states; they have come to the determination of uniting their forces, in order to compel the infant Don Carlos of Spain, and the infant Don Miguel of Portugal, to withdraw"—from whence? Why, from the place where they were; that is from Portugal. Would you have had the treaty stipulate that Don Carlos should be compelled to withdraw from a place where he was not? Such a treaty would, indeed, have been well worthy of the merriment of hon. Gentlemen opposite.

In consequence of this agreement between Spain and Portugal, to provide for the security of the two countries, and to restore internal peace to the two kingdoms, these two powers addressed themselves to the King of England and to the King of the French. What were the answers of the King of England and of the King of the French? Did the King of England say, "I am bound by treaty to Portugal to afford her aid and assistance under certain circumstances, but I have no interest in Spain; I will therefore abstain from being a party to the treaty? "No, the King of England and the King of the French say, that for certain reasons they consent to become parties to the proposed engagement. They state those reasons, and what are they? The first is, the interest which they must always take in the security of the Spanish monarchy; this is set forth as their first object in joining in this treaty. They were further" animated by the most anxious desire to assist in the establishment of peace"— where? In Portugal? "No; in the Peninsula:" Was this all? No; "as well as in every other part of Europe." Do the hon. Gentlemen opposite think that the peace of the Peninsula has no connexion with the peace of the rest of Europe! I will tell them, that if Don Carlos could succeed in establishing his power in Spain, peace might indeed exist there, for the iron tyranny that would ensue might secure a species of tranquillity; but even if this tranquillity of death were to prevail in Spain, peace would be destroyed in the rest of Europe. Look to the condition of France if Don Carlos should succeed: if instead of having on the other side of the Pyrennees a friendly power, with whom she has common interests, she should see established in Spain a government similar to that which existed when Ferdinand ruled. I believe, though I cannot state it officially, that when the revolution of France in 1830 took place, and when it was doubtful whether the military powers of Europe would not unite, and endeavour to put down the new French Government by force, a message was sent from one of those powers to Ferdinand, that as soon as hostilities should begin on the Rhine, he must send an army of 40,000 men to the foot of the Pyrennees to control and embarrass the operations of France. The Spanish Government was not then independent, but was swayed by foreign powers, and by influences coming from afar. I say, then, that the establishment of Don Carlos on the throne of Spain would be incompatible with the independence, the security, and tranquillity of France. I am sure, if the French nation thought, that the cause of Carlos was likely to be successful, and that Isabella and the constitution were in danger of being overthrown, they would compel the French government to interfere, and to secure the throne of Isabella by the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain.

I have before said, that the change of succession in Spain was in fact a revolution, a legal and peaceful one, but not on that account the less real. For what is the great and fundamental difference between the champions of divine right, and the advocates of the popular principle? Nothing more decidedly than this; that the first party consider nations to be like a private estate, the beneficial property of their rulers, and that hereditary rights must, in all cases, be held sacred; while the other party are of opinion that governments are established for the benefit of nations, and that there must reside in every community the right as well as the power to change, not only the form of government, but the order of succession. This was the principle on which our own Government was founded in 1688. This was the principle on which the present Government of France was founded by the revolution of 1830. The Government of Isabella rests on the same principle; and arose as much out of a revolution, although a peaceful one, as the Government of July in France; and I will not deny, that one of the effects which we looked to, as a possible consequence of the treaty was, that under its moral influence, this revolution might be worked out, without bringing upon Spain those calamities of civil war, with which she has since unfortunately been afflicted.

Now, as I have before said, this treaty is founded on the bounden obligations under which we are with respect to Portugal; upon our view of the interest of this country, as connected with Spain; and upon a desire to preserve the peace of Europe. I think that it was a wise and honourable measure.

Well, now, as to the articles of execution. When a prudent Government enters into an engagement, it is apt to limit its obligations to the circumstances of the case as they then stand— therefore the obligation on our part was, in the first place, confined to Portugal, because in Portugal at that time the parties were, against whom the treaty was directed. But will any man contend, that the spirit of the treaty was, that we should compel Don Carlos to retire from Portugal, in order that he might go and land in Spain? Would this have been honourable, or consistent with good faith? When Rodil was within two hours' march of Don Carlos, and would have known how to deal with him, we rescued Don Carlos from capture, and gave him a safe passage to England, from whence he soon after went to Spain. But will any man say, that this was the intention of the Treaty, and that when we engaged to compel Don Carlos to quit Portugal, it was for the purpose of enabling him to invade Spain more easily from another quarter? Having interfered to protect Don Carlos, and having thus been unintentionally the means of enabling him to put himself at the head of the insurrection in Spain, could we have turned round on the Spanish Government, and have said, Don Carlos has been compelled to retire from Portugal, and the Treaty has been fully accomplished? Would this not have been insulting mockery? I say, that after what had happened, and happened by our means, if we had then shrunk from the honest and complete fulfilment of our engagements, we should justly have exposed ourselves to the charge of the grossest treachery towards Spain. That power might well have said, you pretend to be anxious for the tranquillity of the Spanish monarchy, but you have snatched from our grasp the pretender to our crown; you protected him by British agents; you sheltered him under the British flag; you conveyed him away in a British man-of-war, you received him hospitably in the territory of Great Britain; you then allowed him to depart through France to invade the northern provinces of Spain; and now, when we call upon you to fulfil your promises to us, you quibble with us as to the meaning of words, you shrink from your engagements, you shuffle as to the interpretation of the treaty; you draw a difference between men firing off guns from a ship, and men firing off guns on shore; you set up a distinction between naval co-operation with your own army, and naval co-operation with the army of an ally. Sir, I say, that Spain would have had an unanswerable case for proving England guilty of the grossest bad faith, and I should have been ashamed to have stood up in my place to have defended the Administration of which I am a member, had we so behaved to Spain.

The first articles of the treaty are important, as showing what was the naval co-operation which all those who were parties to it, understood we were then prepared to afford. It was a co-operation with the troops of Spain and Portugal, engaged in military operations in pursuance of the treaty. Now let it never be forgotten that there is but one treaty in the case; the additional articles are no new treaty, but are as much articles of the original treaty as if they had been inserted in it word for word; and I am justified in stating, and my right hon. Friend, the Member for Kirkcudbright, who has spoken with so much ability on the subject, has well argued, that we must take the treaty and the additional articles together and in connexion, and that we must construe the one by reference to the text of the other.

Well, Sir, then, as I have said, came the escape of Don Carlos, and his placing himself at the head of the insurgents in the Basque provinces. Did the four contracting parties then consider, that the treaty was no longer applicable to that state of things? that the treaty had ended by its complete execution in Portugal, and that a new engagement was necessary for anything else they might have to do? Quite the contrary: the four powers considered the treaty to be fully in force, and that it was only necessary to prepare new articles in order to provide for the altered circumstances and localities of the case; and therefore, instead of entering into a new treaty respecting Spain, they deemed it sufficient to draw up these additional articles, which enabled them to adopt all such measures as might become requisite for the full attainment of the object which it was the purpose of the treaty to accomplish. These additional articles, may be said to be complementary of the treaty.

Among these articles was the one by which this Government engages to give, if necessary, the aid of a naval force. Sir, some hon. Gentlemen have been good enough to expound for us the meaning of this article; and they state, that the only manner in which this naval force was intended to act, was by a strict blockade of the northern coast of Spain; now I take leave to say, that so far from this being the only manner in which the article was intended to be executed, it is precisely the only manner in which it is utterly impossible that the article could be carried into effect. I have not to tell hon. and learned Gentlemen that the right of blockade is altogether a belligerent right —a right which can only be exercised by principals in a war, and not by those who act merely as assistants; and I have already stated over and over again, until I thought I had fairly tired the House by repeating it, that in this war we are auxiliaries, and not principals. Under such circumstances, the law of nations prevents us from instituting a blockade; and the law of England forbids it. Were we to stop a neutral vessel, we should have to answer for it to the country to which the vessel belonged. Were we to seize a British merchant vessel, its owner would have a clear ground of action at law against the captain of the seizing vessel. It is, indeed, somewhat curious, that that, which some hon. Members say, is the only true and real way in which we could carry this article into effect, does, in fact, happen to be precisely the only thing which, in virtue of this article, it was absolutely impossible for us to do. Well, then, what was it that we were bound to do? I repeat that which has been already stated by my hon. and right hon. Friends, that we were bound in good faith to give to the army of the Queen of Spain that same co-operation of our naval force, which, if we were principals in war, would be given by our naval force to our own army, or to the troops of any ally acting in conjunction with us. To have taken in this respect, a different course from that which we have adopted, would have been disgraceful to the Government of England. The only question to be considered on this point is, what has been the manner in which our seamen, and our marines have co-operated with our own army, or with that of an ally, when employed in conjoint operations. Now, my hon. Friend, the Secretary to the Admiralty, has shown, in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, what has been the kind of co-operation which, in such circumstances, our navy has been in the habit of affording. Hon. Members, how-ever, appear to think they destroy the force of the instances quoted by my hon. Friend, by saying, "Oh, but these are cases which occurred when we were at war;" but this only confirms my hon. Friend's argument. His argument indeed rests on this very foundation. Do these hon. Gentlemen cull on us to show them instances of naval co-operation in time of peace? Do they require us to show them instances of our naval force acting on shore when there was no enemy to meet, no place to take, no hostile operations to carry on? Sir, this sort of thing is on a par with their expecting us to have signed articles to expel Don Carlos from Spain, at a time when Don Carlos happened to be in Portugal.

My hon. Friend has quoted cases enough, but he had more ready, had he not thought that to detail them would weary the patience of the House. He has quoted cases enough to prove, that it has been the invariable practice of our navy at all times, and in all quarters of the globe, when in co-operation with our own, or with an allied army, not to limit their operations simply to acting on ship-board. He has marched our sailors and marines across deserts, has shown them raising batteries, storming works, besieging fortresses, and taking towns. My hon. Friend has quoted sufficient instances fully to make out the position he laid down. There are, however, two cases which I shall beg leave to mention, in addition to those already adduced, and I quote them the rather, because they refer to the country now the subject of discussion; and because the question is, what our naval force ought to do in connexion with an army acting in Spain. The cases I shall mention are certainly not of recent occurrence, but they are not on that account the less well known, nor the less important in the annals of this country. The instances I shall mention are both connected with transactions occurring in what were Spanish territories—the first relating to the capture of Gibraltar; the second to the taking of Minorca; in both which events our naval force acted on shore.

What is the account of the taking of Gibraltar, as related in an excellent work from which I am quoting? It is this:— Sir G. Rooke, the English Admiral, and the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt, the Spanish General, with five or six thousand land troops, returning from an unsuccessful attempt on Barcelona, in 1704, determined to attack Gibraltar. They summoned the place; but the Governor, Diego de Salines, refused to surrender. On receiving this answer, the Prince of Darmstadt immediately landed [what? his own troops? No; he landed] 1,800 marines on the isthmus, while Sir G. Rooke opened his batteries by sea. The bombardment began on the 2nd of August, and continued till the 3rd, when part of the garrison went to prayers, it being a saint's day. While they were thus employed, the eastern quarter of the rock was left unguarded, and a party—[of whom? we have already landed our marines, and here come the sailors,]—and a party of English sailors seized this opportunity to scale the almost inaccessible precipice, thus threatening the fortress from the heights which overhang it. Captain Whittaker manned his boats, stormed the mole-head, and carried the town; and the garrison having capitulated, Sir G. Rooke took possession of the place in the name of the Queen of England, and it has continued in our possession ever since. What, Sir, is the account in the same work of the taking of Minorca? It is this:— In 1708, General Stanhope and part of the fleet of Admiral Leake reached Minorca on the 14th of September. The whole force, including the marines who served on shore, did not exceed 2,600 men, about one-half of them being English. Now I beg the House to attend to what follows, because we have been told that to land guns from ships is an unheard-of thing:— And the Artillery from the ships consisted of forty-two great guns, and fifteen mortars. On the 30th of September the place surrendered. Among the killed was General Stanhope's brother, the captain of the Milford, who had determined to head his own marines on shore. We have been found fault with for employing marine artillery on shore. Why, are Gentlemen aware that there is attached to the corps of marines a train of field artillery, as part of the regular equipment of the force. And I should like to know where the marines are to use field artillery, except on shore? The very motto of the marine force, per mare, per terrain, shows that their operation are not intended to be limited to the sea. The hon. Gentlemen opposite are desirous of making it appear, that it is not according to the practice of war to land artillery from ships, but it seems to me, that the contrary has been clearly proved. The book I have quoted from is the work of an author who writes in a spirit well worthy of the nation to which he belongs; and the House will fully bear me out in saying so, when I have read another short extract from the work; an extract also somewhat applicable to the present discussion. In speaking of the abolition of the Fueros, in 1707, by a decree of Philip 5th, he says:— And thus, disputed succession and contending parties, which to most nations have given a dawn of liberty, in this ill-fated country only added to the darkness; and instead of augmenting and confirming the popular power, overthrew the frail remnants of its past authority. Sir, if the motion of hon. Members opposite be carried—if their object be effected—and if this country shall declare to Europe that it withdraws itself from the alliance with Spain—that it abandons its solemn engagements—it is very possible that the present disputed succession and contest of parties in Spain, may lead to the result which the author of this book so eloquently deprecates. The book from which I have quoted, a book which does honour to the author's character and talents, is the "History of the War of the Succession, by Lord Mahon."

I repeat, then, that it is a mockery to try to draw a distinction between men waging war on ship-board, and the same men waging war on shore. We are told that we had no right to send marines to shoot the Basques two miles in shore; but there is no harm, it seems, in the marines shooting them from the ships. It is said, "If you let the marines kill men on shore you commit an outrage, you violate the law of nations; but if your marines kill men from the ships, it is all very proper; you are fulfilling your engagements, and we hold you perfectly harmless." Now, Sir, I will put this question:—In the attack on the Carlist lines before San Sebastian, the Phoenix fired her guns with such admirable precision and effect, that though she was at the distance of two or three miles from the works, her shot made a breach in the walls, through which the troops entered. Now, can it be asserted that this was allowable, but that it would have been unjustifiable to have landed the same men, and the same guns to have done precisely the same thing on shore? Is an assembly of intelligent and practical men to be gravely told that the distinction between right and wrong depends on whether troops act a mile one way or a mile the other? This seems to me a mode of reasoning altogether unworthy to be addressed to a legislative assembly like this.

But supposing for the sake of argument it were admitted, that the employment of the marines on shore was somewhat beyond that, which the treaty compelled us to do, (which however I entirely and totally deny,) I beg to ask who in that case is the injured party? who states himself aggrieved? Don Carlos? No. The whole treaty was against him, and he was no party to it. There are only two parties who could have any possible ground of complaint. The Spanish Government might complain, that we were exercising an interference in the affairs of Spain a mile or so more inland than we were called upon to go; but has such a complaint been made by them? I will undertake to answer for them. I will undertake to assure hon. Gentlemen opposite that no complaint has been made, or will be made by the Spanish Government, of our having gone beyond their wishes in the assistance we have afforded. If any complaint were made by them, it would be of a very different character; it would be a complaint that we had not yielded to their repeated request to give more active and extensive aid. The other party who might complain are the marines; but I am well convinced that we have no forgiveness to ask at their hands. The marines and sailors of England have never complained of any Government for sending them upon arduous services—for putting them in the path of honour. But the marines have here not only been sent on arduous service, and put in the path of honour, but they have also been placed under the command of a distinguished officer—distinguished not more by his high professional talents and gallantry in the field, than by his prudence and judgment. Lord John Hay's conduct has been such as to earn for him the applause of his country, and the warm approbation of his Sovereign, and to render him an object of admiration to all Europe. Now, what says Lord John Hay in the dispatch which has been laid before the House, as to the manner in which the marines acted, and how far as a naval force?—I am ready to concede, that if the battalion had been marched into the interior of the country, and placed under the command of Spanish or other military officers, this would have exceeded the meaning of the term "naval co-operation;" but I contend that so long as they are under the orders of a naval officer only, they are, in the strict sense of the word, a naval force. Lord John Hay, in giving an account of the action of Hernani, at which he was present with his marines, states, "As I considered the force belonging to his Majesty's squadron employed on this occasion had rendered all the assistance they were calculated to afford, I directed the different detachments to return to their ships, and the marine battalion and artillery to the positions they occupy for the protection of his Majesty's ships in the ports of San Sebastian and Passages." Thus we have it under the hand of the Commander himself, that though these men were employed three miles from the sea, yet they were never out of the command of their naval superior and were strictly and literally a naval force. An attempt has been made to contend that Major Owen, who commanded the marine battalion, was under the orders of General Evans, because he complied with his request on the field of battle. But the distinction is clear between the case of an independent and responsible officer acceding to a request, which implies that in assenting, he exercises his wn discretion; and that of an officer acting under the orders of a superior whom he cannot disobey.

Sir, I say, that, looking at the manner in which this treaty has been executed on our parts, we have not done more for Spain, than Spain was entitled to demand at our hands; and I say further, that if we had done less, we should have been guilty of a breach of faith.

I am glad of the nature of the charge that is now brought against us. I rejoice that I do not stand here to defend the Government of which I am a Member from an accusation so overwhelming as the violation of our plighted faith to a deceived and deluded ally; that I am not standing here to vindicate us for having meanly evaded an engagement—for having basely abandoned a friend in a moment of difficulty. The charge that I am repelling is, that we have acted with too much good faith—that we have executed our engagements too completely—that we have, in the opinion of persons, not indeed our friends, and therefore not altogether inclined to see our merits, but more likely to distort them into faults—gone a little—and how little it is that even they can allege—beyond the point to which we were strictly, and, by their own acknowledgement, bound to go.

Really, I scarce like to notice the objection, it is so extraordinary a one, taken by an hon. Gentleman opposite, that all this might have been very well, if there had not been some supernumerary marines employed—and if the ships had only had their regular complement. What did my right hon. Friend, the Member for Cumberland, with whom I had the happiness of acting, when he was First Lord of the Admiralty—what did he think of such an argument as that? Did it not occur to those who used this argument, that it would have been exceedingly easy to have legalised the affair according to their views, by sending an additional ship or two of the line, with the necessary number of additional marines in their holds. If that had been the only difficulty, we might have got rid of it after the manner of the judge, of whom we are told, that when a document was held up to him, and was objected to by counsel as not being a complete indenture, because the top of it was not cut, he asked to look at it, and having received it, took out his scissars, and cut its edge with the proper waving outline. So, Sir, I say, that to have got rid of the objection to which I have referred, it was only necessary for us to send out a few more ships, and in their holds, a few more marines, and thus we should have had as many marines as we wanted, without having any supernumeraries. But is the practice of employing supernumerary marines a novelty? And if it be not a novelty, is it unsuited to this occasion? I am sure that the naval officers in this House will bear me out in saying, that it is a constant practice to send on particular services, supernumerary marines. I don't know whether it was when my right hon. Friend opposite had the management of the Admiralty, that the arrangement took place, I rather think it was; but the Mediterranean fleet has long had—what? Why, supernumerary marines, and a train of field artillery—yes, a field train of the marine artillery! Sir, having come across this argument, I could not help noticing it; but in doing so, I must declare I think it an argument which the hon. Gentlemen opposite will not be much disposed to insist upon.

I say, then, that what we are charged with, is that to which we plead guilty— namely, an honest, honourable, and straight-forward fulfilment of our engagements—a resolute determination not to quibble with an ally, and not to shuffle out of the fulfilment of a treaty, into which we had advisedly and freely entered. And holding, as I do, a responsible situation under the Crown, a position in which men must lay their account with being attacked by the party opposed to them, I only pray to Heaven, that I may never be exposed to any more serious charge than this—that, in the execution of a treaty, we have not only gone to the full extent of our promises, have not only fulfilled our engagement to the letter, but out of a sense of delicacy towards our ally, we have, if any thing, even gone beyond it. I trust that such a charge will be the heaviest that it will ever be my lot to meet.

I will now proceed to the next point, the order in council; and here I must repeat that it is somewhat singular, if hon. Gentlemen entertain such objections to this order in council, that they did not venture to come to Parliament, and ask its opinion on the subject, at a time, when, to have done so, might have led to a more practical result. The first objection taken is, that the order in council giving British subjects permission to enlist into the service of Spain, is disgraceful and dishonourable to the country. No Gentleman has said that it was illegal; but why is it not illegal? What makes it strictly legal? Why, the circumstance that it is specifically provided for by Act of Parliament. The very issuing of such an order in council, is provided for in the Foreign Enlistment Act: a power is reserved, by that Act, to the Crown, to give permission, either by order in council, or by licence, to British subjects to engage in a foreign service. Now, if for British subjects to engage in a foreign service is a disgraceful thing—if it is dishonourable to the country, as has been alleged, how came Parliament to give the Crown the power to disgrace itself, and to permit its subjects to dishonour their country? Why, what a reproach this is, on the memories of Lord Liverpool and Lord Londonderry, who proposed this measure to Parliament. Is it to be imagined, that they would have deliberately inserted in the Act a provision, which, from its very nature, it would be impossible, because disgraceful, to execute? I say, Sir, that the hon. Gentlemen who utter that opinion, are pronouncing a most serious and unfounded censure on the memory of their departed friends. But let us see what was the argument used by those who brought in the Foreign Enlistment Bill. Did they think, that the permissive power was in no case to be exercised? They said, "We object to allow British subjects to enlist at their will, when and where, and for what purpose they please, because their doing so might bring the country into quarrels which the Government did not mean to engage in. We contend, therefore, that British subjects ought never to be allowed to enlist into a foreign service, except in accordance with the avowed policy of their own Government." I say, that the enlistment in the case which is now the subject of debate, was in accordance with the avowed policy of the Government. And, inasmuch as it cannot be supposed that Parliament would make an enactment which it intended should never come into operation, the issuing of the order was also in accordance with the intentions of Parliament, when it passed the Act. Could it be intended, that this power should be exercised in a case in which the country meant to remain neutral? That the King should formally give permission to his subjects to enlist into a foreign service when he had declared himself neutral? Obviously not. But, on the other hand, to grant this permission in cases in which the country is at war, would be evidently unnecessary; I contend, then, that the case contemplated for the exercise of this permissive power, is one in which the country neither acts on the system of neutrality, nor takes a part as a principal in war; but in which it may bind itself by treaty, or without a treaty may think it politic, to favour one side. Under such circumstances it was thought right that the King should be empowered to give permission to his sub- jects to engage in a foreign service, and such is precisely the present case.

Now, really, when I am told that it is a thing in itself disgraceful, that the subjects of one country should enlist into the service of another, to take part in a war in which their own country is not engaged, I stand amazed; for I am asked to imagine, that the whole history of the world is nothing but a fanciful dream; that the practice of some of the most distinguished men of all ages and of all countries, has not been a reality; and that the records of their actions which history has handed down to us, are mere creations of imagination, and never had existence in the actual transactions of mankind. There is no country in Europe whose subjects have not, at some time or other, engaged in the service of a foreign power. Many of those men who have taken a part in the wars of foreign nations, have excited the admiration of all ages. Many of those Englishmen whose names are dearest to our recollections, and whose characters we most admire, have had recorded in the annals of other countries, achievements which secure for their memories immortal fame. The hon. and gallant Officer who began this debate, mentioned a conversation which took place between him and his friend (and my friend, too, I am happy to say), General Alava, with regard to the exploits of the Black Prince. Does not the hon. and gallant Officer know, that the Black Prince was guilty of this disgraceful and dishonourable practice? and in Spain, too? And, by-the-bye, as the hon. and gallant Officer has mentioned the name of General Alava, I beg to ask him to recollect who it was who applied to the Government of England for this disgraceful and dishonourable permission? Who was the Spanish minister in London, who, of his own authority, on his own responsibility, without waiting the instructions of his government, but knowing well their sentiments and intentions, made the demand for the order in council? It was General Alava himself. Who was it, who, when the Legion was raised, accompanied it to Spain? Who was it, who, thinking that in his double capacity of a gallant and patriotic Spaniard, and of an adopted Englishman, for he had served with our armies till he taught them to admire his valour and look on him as a brother; who was it, I say, who, thinking that in his double capacity he might faci- litate the first operations of the British corps, by establishing friendly relations between them and the people of his own country, embarked with them himself for St. Sebastian? Why, it was the friend of the hon. and gallant Officer opposite. General Alava. And who was it who accompanied General Evans on that Sunday réconnoissance, of which we have heard? General Alava.

Sir, we are told that it was a work of supererogation on our part, thus to put ourselves forward in defence of the Queen, by allowing British subjects to enlist. But did the English Government act singly in this matter? No. When application was made to the Government of England for this kind of assistance, a similar and simultaneous application was made to the government of France. France acceded to it as readily as England had done; with only one difference—our consent was given, that men should be raised by the Spanish agents, but we were to have nothing to do with the recruiting; and it was stipulated that the force should not be organised or disciplined in this country. But the men enlisted in France, were men who had been raised, organised, and disciplined at the expense of the French government; and they were commanded by officers holding rank in the French army; in fact, a complete French corps was transferred to the Spanish service, under the condition that, when it had finished its engagement, it should return into the service of France, and resume its place on the military establishment of that country. And is that corps no longer in the service of Spain? Have the Carlists in the French chambers urged their government to re-call this corps? No, it is still in the ranks of the Queen of Spain, doing good service, and greatly distinguishing itself whenever it is called into action. Nay, more; the French government contemplated a large increase of that force before the events of La Granja happened; at that period, the Legion was to be increased to 10,000. Why was not that proposition carried into execution? The French government took a view somewhat different from our's of the events of La Granja. They thought those events a reason for not giving that additional succour. We, on the contrary, were not of opinion that those events afforded any just motive for withholding aid from Spain. We did not think, that because the Queen was involved in unexpected difficulties, we ought therefore to withdraw our assistance from her.

I have mentioned the Black Prince, and some other hon. Gentlemen have adverted to the reign of Elizabeth. I do not propose to mention all the instances bearing on this subject in that reign, because it is full of them; but there are one or two which are so peculiarly applicable, that I must be permitted to allude to them. One of the first acts of Elizabeth was to do precisely the thing which we are found so much fault with, for having done. It is well known, that peace having been concluded at the commencement of her reign between England on the one hand, and France and Scotland on the other, disturbances broke out in Scotland, and the Scotch congregation applied to Elizabeth for succour, in consequence of the arrival of troops, to be employed against them, from France. Elizabeth, after much consideration, determined to afford the assistance required. She supplied not only troops, but a naval cooperation, arms and ammunition; and the assistance thus given, was attended with success. The hon. Gentlemen opposite may say, put that case aside, for we do not approve of it, and do not think it deserving of imitation. But what was the opinion given of that case, not by a contemporary nor by any mean authority, but by a man who will, for different reasons, find favour on both sides of the House; whose political opinions will not be thought too liberal by Conservatives, whose philosophical views will not be deemed too confined by Liberals? What says Hume on this subject? We read as follows:—"Thus Europe saw, in the first transaction of this reign, the"—what? the imbecility and short sightedness? no, the "genius and capacity of the Queen and her Ministers. She discovered, at a distance, the danger which threatened her, and instantly took measures to prevent it. Making all possible advantage of her situation, she proceeded with celerity to a decision, and was not diverted by any offers, negociations, or remonstrances of the French Court. She stopped not, till she had brought the matter to a final issue, and converted that very power to which her enemies trusted for her destruction, into her firmest support and security." I beg to call to the following passage the particular attention of those who reproach us with not having made sufficient use of the assistance we have given to Spain, in order to extort from the Spanish Government commercial and other advantages for the promotion of our own particular interests:—"By exacting no improper conditions from the Scottish malcontents, even during their greatest distresses, she established an entire confidence with them; the regard which she acquired" by this disgraceful and dishonourable proceeding? No; "by this dexterous and spirited conduct, gave her every where, abroad as well as at home, more authority than had attended her sister, though supported by all the powers of the Spanish monarchy." Now that is one very remarkable instance. There is another which I beg to quote. In 1562, the French Huguenots applied to Elizabeth for assistance, and she gave them troops and money. But most remarkable are the reasons which are stated for her conduct on this occasion by Camden, the historian of her life. He says, "She sent an army into Normandy, not to recover that country, though it were the ancient inheritance of the Kings of England, and forcibly taken from them against all right and reason, but to preserve it for the French King, being not yet of age, and to deliver it from the tyranny of the Guises, who had begun to practise barbarous cruelty against the professors of the purer religion." For the "French King not of age," read the infant Queen of Spain." In place of the words to "deliver it from the tyranny of the Guises," read "to deliver it from the tyranny of Don Carlos;" and for the conclusion of the sentence, "who had begun to practise barbarous cruelty against the professors of the purer religion," read "who had begun to practise barbarous cruelty against the professors of constitutional principles," and the passage will be no less applicable than the example, to the transactions we are now discussing. There are various other cases in the same reign. But one in 1589 is worthy of being mentioned. The circumstance took place on the assassination of Henry 3rd by James Clement, the monk, and the account is to be found in Camden's life of Elizabeth. He observes as follows:—"The King of Navarre, whom the King at his death had declared his successor"—read the Queen of Spain, whom the King at his death had declared his successor—"according to law and right; they (the league)"—read the Carlists, "excluded from the Crown, by proclamation, as an apparent heretic, and one that had brought in foreign enemies armed into the country." The very pretence upon which the decree of Durango was issued "The Cardinal of Bourbon was proclaimed king by the title of Charles 10th. The Duke of Maine advanced against the King of Navarre, also proclaimed King of France, and then at Dieppe. The King of Navarre sent to Elizabeth for aid: The Queen, not to fail a king of the same profession, and in his so dangerous a condition, supplied him with 22,000l. English money, in gold, sent him arms, and 4,000 men, under Peregrine, Lord Willoughby, who had commanded in the Low Countries, after Leicester's departure. She appointed for colonels, Sir Thomas Wilford, who was made marshal, Sir John Boroughs, Sir William Dury, &c, and readily offered them a month's pay beforehand." Elizabeth, on that occasion, sent money and men, and the circumstances under which this assistance was given, were strikingly similar to those of the present case.

To mention all the cases in which British subjects have joined foreign armies, would be to remind Gentlemen of the pages of history with which they are familiar. I will simply mention the 4,000 volunteers sent by James 1st, under Lords Essex and Oxford, to assist the Elector Palatine; the assistance given to Gustavus Adolphus, by the force raised by the Marquess of Hamilton, under Charles 1st; the Scotch Brigade, so long in the service of Holland; the Irish Brigade in Spain; the Irish Brigade in France; the glorious instance of Marlborough, who obtained his first experience in the art of war at the sieges of Nimeguen and Maestricht. In addition to these cases, what do hon. Gentlemen think of the many British officers who have held, and still hold commissions in the Austrian service, not to mention the thousands of persons who have gone into the service of Portugal, and of the South American States. There are instances, without number, of a similar kind; and if the name of Marlborough be held in respect—if that of Sydney be entitled to our enthusiastic admiration, then may we venture to doubt that the reflections cast upon the honour of our country in the present case, are well founded.

But has there been no reciprocity in this matter? Has this country always given, and has she never received in return? On the contrary, our history is full of cases, in which foreign troops, I will not call them mercenaries, because that name has, by a perversion of meaning, been construed into a term of opprobrium, but in which foreign troops have been engaged in the service of England? Look at our navy—during the last war it was full of Danes, and Swedes, and Americans, at times too when neither Denmark, nor Sweden, nor the United States, were themselves at war with our enemies'; but when, nevertheless, those hardy seamen did service honourable to themselves, and useful to this country. Then look at our army: does not the hon. and gallant Officer know, that, during the late war, we had constantly foreign corps in our army? That Swiss, Germans, Italians, Corsicans, Illyrians, Greeks, were perpetually fighting in the same ranks with our own men? And I beg to ask, whether the right hon. and gallant Officer ever knew, that on the morning of battle, the General bid these men retire from the field, and not disgrace our troops by their contaminating presence; or did he ever know that in the evening of victory, they were branded with the stamp of infamy, as murderers, instead of sharing in the laurels with which their companions in arms were crowned? Did the hon. and gallant Officer himself, when fighting side by side with these very men, ever say to them, that in so going to war, they were doing an act disgraceful in the eye of man, and sinful before heaven. But if this be really so, and if a man who fights in a cause not nationally his own deserves such censure, what must be the offence of those who bribe him to commit the crime; and what must be the guilt of the government which shall enlist into its ranks whole regiments, and shall subsidise whole armies for its service; and shall urge and pay great empires to continue the prosecution of a war, when, if they consulted but their own interests and their own policy, they would conclude peace. And yet, in former periods how long have some of our allies been induced by these means to continue in arms when but for the subsidies received from us, they would have been at peace? But, between these two cases, there is this material distinction, that whilst in the one case, we have officers and men engaging in war at the risk of their own lives; in the other, we have a government, who, with a view, perhaps, to its own permanence or advantage, engages, not a regiment, not a legion, but whole nations in the continuance of war, in which they have no necessary and natural interest. Let us hear then no more of arguments, which I cannot speak of as they merit, without departing from that courtesy of language which, on all occasions, I wish to observe.

However skilfully the question we are now debating may be disguised, it is nothing more nor less than this: in the first place, whether England shall continue to fulfil her engagements with the Queen of Spain, or whether she shall disgracefully recede from the position she has taken up, and abandon an ally whom she has pledged herself to succour." This is the immediate question actually before the House to-night! but even this is far short of the real and ultimate tendency of the motion. The question is not simply what has happened, or may happen, in the Basque provinces; it is of wider range and more extensive bearing. The contest now waging in Spain, is but a portion of that great contest which is going on elsewhere throughout the world. The House has to decide to-night between two opposite systems of foreign policy. But these opposite systems of foreign policy are not isolated principles, which may be taken or rejected by themselves; they are intimately connected with, and deeply affect, also, our domestic interests. Hon. Gentlemen opposite say, that they are most anxious to reform all proved abuses at home, and that they hate tyrants and despots abroad. But we have never yet had the good fortune to point out an abuse at home which they were ready to acknowledge as a fit subject for reform; and if we are to judge by the way they have clung to Don Miguel and Don Carlos, it is clear that, in their opinion, despots and tyrants abroad are extinguished races of animals. They say, indeed, they do not support Don Carlos; but still they do support the principles of which he is the champion; and the result of their motion, if carried to-night, will be to give great assistance to his cause. Such must be the consequence of proclaiming to the world, that England has no interest in the success of the existing government in Spain. Don Miguel was, in like manner, supported by hon. Gentlemen opposite. When in office, they truckled to him, and submitted to indignities from him, which nothing would have induced them to bear, but their attachment to the principles of which he was the type; for I will not believe, that they could have endured the affronts which they received from Don Miguel, except from the fear that, by resenting those insults, they would have shaken that system of government in Europe to which he belonged. Out of office there was no sort of assistance they could give him, and by which his Majesty's Government could be embarrassed, that was not afforded with alacrity by hon. Gentlemen opposite. They, in fact, have throughout, done all they could to support Don Miguel and Don Carlos; and as it could not be from any regard for the individuals themselves, I can only attribute it to their approval of the principles of government with which those individuals were connected. Such, then is the question before us. It is a choice, in the first instance, between certain opposite principles of administration at home, and, secondly, between the success or defeat of certain general principles of policy as applied to the whole of Europe.

The right hon. Baronet, Member for Tamworth, was pleased the other night to taunt us with the state of our Government at home, and of our relations abroad. The right hon. Baronet was pleased to say, that within and without we were at such desperate straits, that, for our own sakes, we were desirous of being released from the arduous responsibility of our functions. And, then, with a courtesy and considerate kindness which was hardly to be expected from a political opponent, he added that he was ready to relieve us from all our embarrassments. Bad as is our position, desperate as is our case, the right hon. Baronet is ready to take up our tables, and win the game by his own superior skill, with our pieces as they stand. The right hon. Baronet deplores, that in consequence of our unfortunate foreign policy, and our total want of influence amongst our neighbours, we have not been able to do—what? —why, forsooth, to make a ministry for France! Where, too, is our influence in Spain? exclaimed the right hon. Baronet; have not the Spaniards repeatedly changed their constitution, have not they had first the Estatuto Real, and then the Constitu- tion of 1812, and is not that also now about to be altered; have not they had Martinez de la Rosa, followed by Torreno, and then Mendizabal, and now Calatrava; and where was our influence that we could allow of such proceedings, at a time, too, when we had a frigate and three brigs in a creek at Passages, and 400 marines in a barrack at St. Sebastian. Is it not truly disgraceful that we should permit such things to go on? And these taunts proceed from the non-intervention Gentlemen; from those who are daily reproaching us with meddling too much with the affairs of other countries! But, as the right hon. Baronet has been pleased to taunt us with the extremities to which we have reduced ourselves, and brought our foreign relations, I should wish very much to compare the position of affairs now, with their state when he was himself in power. I wish for no other ground on which to call for a vote to-night, or upon which to go to my constituents at the hustings, than a comparison between the state of our foreign relations at the present moment, and what they were in 1830. In 1830, when, I will not say that the Ministers of the day fled from the helm and left the ship to the mercy of the winds and the waves, but when most assuredly they were not sorry to see the vessel boarded and themselves compelled to surrender their charge. I do sot wish to dwell upon the internal state of the country at that time. I will not compare the discontent and irritation which prevailed throughout the United Kingdom at that period, with the tranquillity and satisfaction which are now everywhere seen. I will not contrast the lawless and unruly conduct of the agricultural population at that time, when flames were blazing in the farm-yard and in the corn field, with the industrious toil which distinguishes the present period, and the peaceful fires which warm the hearth of the peasant on his return at night to the bosom of his family. I will not go into all these topics; but I will ask the right hon. Baronet what was the general opinion of the state of our foreign relations at that period, and what those relations are now? In 1830, was there one man belonging to the present Opposition who believed that peace could be maintained for six months? Was there one man amongst them who, when expressing his opinion in public, did not state that war within six months was unavoidable? Not only was that declaration made in debate in this House, but when sitting by an hon. Member on a side bench, I was warned in these prophetic words: "If an angel were to come down from heaven to write your despatches, even that would not prevent a war within the next six months." Now, no angel descended from heaven to write our despatches, and yet we have succeeded in maintaining peace, not for six months, but for six years. Do I mean to infer that these hon. Gentlemen were not sincere when they announced those direful forebodings? On the contrary, I believe that they were perfectly sincere; and with their views of things, with their political opinions, with their tendencies and principles of action, there was good reason why they should have thought as they did; and knowing the opinion of Europe at large in regard to their policy, they saw no' possible escape from that war which they predicted. I do not mean to say, that if they had remained in office, war would inevitably have occurred: I am sure they would have done their best to avoid it, but we may be allowed to doubt whether they could have succeeded. But did we, even at that period, ever express the same apprehension? Did we ever proclaim that war was inevitable? We said the exact reverse, and pledged ourselves to maintain peace. That pledge we have redeemed; and I do say, that when we consider the calamities which war brings in its train, destroying the results of human industry, retarding the improvement of mankind, and rolling back the tide of civilisation, those who have materially contributed to avert for six years the calamities of war from the community of European nations, may indulge in the satisfactory reflection that their pains have, not been fruitless, nor their labour vain.

So much for a general view of the state of Europe now and in 1830. I will not go into a detailed comparison of the state of the different countries of Europe in the two periods, but there are one or two which I feel it necessary to particularize. What was the state of Belgium in 1830? As complete anarchy and confusion as ever existed in any country in this world. What is her condition now? She is one of the most tranquil, prosperous, and happy countries in Europe. Yet if there is any one topic upon which I have been made the object of pointless attack, it is the affairs of Belgium. When a cheer was wanted to be raised, some hon. Member on an opposite bench would utter the word "protocol," and would be responded to by those who perhaps never happened in their lives to know what a protocol is. Why, Sir, if our seventy protocols, (aye, or had they been seventy times seventy,) have succeeded in tranquillizing Belgium and preventing the revolution in that country from producing a general war throughout Europe, I really think that protocols after all, have done no inconsiderable service. Then, as to Portugal. I will not expatiate upon the indignities which England had experienced in 1830 from the government of that country; but I will simply state my conviction, that Don Miguel, whom the Government of that day had denounced as an usurper, would, nevertheless, in six months, if that Government had continued, in power, have been acknowledged King of Portugal, just as in six years afterwards Don Carlos would by them have been recognised as King of Spain. And this brings me to Spain, and how do we stand there? Our relations with Spain are greatly improved: I am asked whether we have gained any influence there, I answer yes; and, as a proof of it, I point to the treaty which we have concluded with that power for the suppression of the slave trade; an act of humanity and justice which ought to have been accomplished long since, but which no power of diplomacy on the part of England had before been able to extract from the former governments of Spain. And whereas, in the time of Ferdinand, the influence of Russia was paramount at Madrid, Great. Britain is now regarded in Spain with those sentiments of friendship and esteem which are due to our good faith, and to our strict adherence to treaties and engagements. I am bound to say, that the respect which Spain has for this country, is very much owing to the able and judicious conduct of the representative of the British Government at Madrid. The high character which that minister has personally established, and the good faith which the British Government has observed in its dealings, have indeed rendered the character of an Englishman a passport throughout Spain.

I say, then, that whether we look at the general question or at its details, the object of one party is to support Carlos and despotism, the object of the other to uphold Isabella and the constitution. But what an Unnatural and un national alliance, is that which combines Orangeism at home, with bigoted Catholicism abroad; the only link of connexion being, aversion to reform here, and detestation of constitutions there. In the days of the Reformation, when religion divided the different powers of Europe, we saw despotic sovereigns and free states united in league to defend the principles of religious liberty. In these days, we see men of the most opposite religious opinions confederated together to retard the progress of political improvement. The real question then which the House is about to decide, is one of great importance, not to England only, but to all Europe; and the House may rest assured that their vote this night will determine, not merely whether General Evans shall or shall not return, or whether Lord John Hay shall permit his marines to go a mile more or less from the coast, but what shall be the issue of questions which affect the interests of the world. The opinion which this House will to-night pronounce, will decide not simply between conflicting parties in England, but between antagonist principles struggling for ascendancy in the other countries of Europe; and on that decision may depend the peace, the welfare, and the happiness of nations.

Sir R. Peel

Before I proceed to state what is in my opinion the real question at issue, I must be permitted to refer to that part of the noble Lord's speech which was meant as a reply to a speech which I delivered about ten days since. All the noble Lord's ponderous levities might have been discharged then. The noble Lord was in the House when I spoke. He was in his place when I arraigned his foreign policy. It was not half-past one o'clock.— [It was half-past one when Lord Palmerston finished his speech.]—He had no excuse for his silence in the lateness of the hour, for I concluded my speech at twelve o'clock on that night, and yet the noble Lord has found it necessary, after ten days' deliberation, to reply to my speech at about an hour and a quarter after the hour at which I finished. The noble Lord has referred to a declaration which I then made, and which I will repeat in his presence. Why did I make that declaration? Because the town was full of reports, "on the highest authority," that Ministers were going to resign. We were told the very day on which the fatal event was to take place, and I did mean to say, what I now believe, that the Government, seeing the embarrassments in which they were involved in their domestic and foreign policy, would be but too glad to find a pretext on which they might retire; and I did, with a friendly warning, supposing that the threat of resignation might for once not be a sham or fallacious one, say, that if Ministers did upon a pretext release themselves from their difficulties, I thought it possible, that the energy and spirit of Englishmen might enable the country to bear up under the misfortune. The noble Lord says, that I made him responsible for the want of a government in France. I did nothing of the kind. I stated the simple facts, with respect to which I apprehend there can be no question, that at the time I was speaking, it was uncertain whether, in the three great countries of the west of Europe—namely, in England, according to your own declarations, and in France and Spain, according to public and unquestioned report, any government existed; but I did not suppose the noble Lord had influence enough to relieve the King of France from his difficulties. I did not taunt him with the failure of his influence on account of there being no government in France. What I did say was this, that one of the professed objects of the Quadruple Treaty being to cement the relations between England and France, I thought the circumstances which I adverted to afforded tolerably pregnant indications that, as far as that object was concerned, the Quadruple Alliance had not been eminently successful. I did also refer to the relations of this country with the northern powers. We have heard nothing about the case of the Vixen. The noble Lord said, that this case was of vast importance about a month since—that it was under the consideration of the law-officers of the Crown—that no one could foretel what might be the issue of it, and he has not yet told us. If, however, I may infer from the noble Lord's solemn tone, when touching on the subject, I would suppose that our relations with Russia are not of the most satisfactory nature. I did likewise refer to the position in which we stand with respect to the three great northern powers, because I bear in mind that the noble Lord, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, did, in the course of last Session, declare to us, that three months should not pass without a British representative being at Cracow. When the noble Lord was questioned upon that point a short time since, he did not deny the statement which he made in the face of Parliament and Europe; but he said that difficulties which he had not contemplated had occurred, which difficulties I presume to be the objections made by the three powers, which are so formidable, notwithstanding the solemn engagement which the noble Lord had made in the face of Parliament, that he has been compelled or induced to recede. I also referred to the internal embarrassments of this country, to the unfortunate position of commercial affairs. I referred to the state of business in this House. I stated that, day after day, new measures were proposed, but no progress was made with them. I said, that Ministers touched every thing with a palsied hand, but settled nothing. The noble Lord congratulates himself on a comparison of the present state of affairs with their state in 1830. The noble Lord rests half the defence of his conduct on an unfortunate speech of a noble Friend of mine, Lord Ashburton, who stated his apprehension, in which I never participated, that it would require an angel, like the noble Lord, to keep Europe out of a war six months. On every occasion in which our foreign policy has been mentioned, the noble Lord has referred to the non-fulfilment of Lord Ashburton's prophecy, as if it were his sole title to diplomatic distinction. The noble Lord has, indeed, another. Compare, says the noble Lord, the state of Belgium in 1830, when the Duke of Wellington left office, with its state at the present moment. To be sure, this would be a very convenient thing for the noble Lord to do. A revolution had broken out in Belgium, the consequence of the revolution of July, in France, about three weeks or a month, I believe, before we abandoned office in consequence of an adverse vote of the House of Commons. If the noble Lord is compelled to make it a matter of triumph that, at the expiration of six years, Belgium is more settled and quiet than it was at the end of three weeks from the breaking out of the revolution, his topics of self-gratulation must indeed be very limited. Then, says the noble Lord, look to Portugal; you absolutely contemplated the recognition of Don Miguel. Why this enormity of contemplating the recognition of Don Miguel was actually shared by Lord Althorp, the leader of the House of Commons, with whom the noble Lord held office and acted. I heard Lord Althorp declare, with more wisdom than the noble Lord exhibits, that the personal character of Sovereigns, either claiming the Throne by legitimate suc- cession, or establishing their right to it by the popular choice, was not a point which should he taken into consideration; hut that wherever we found a king de facto, we ought to recognize him; and Lord Althorp went further, and distinctly declared that, in his opinion, the time was come when Don Miguel ought to he recognised. The noble Lord has found it convenient, by answering a speech delivered ten days since, to divert the attention of the House from the question before it. I will address myself solely to those considerations which properly belong to the subject under discussion, and which have made a deep impression on the mind of every man of common sense whether in or out of this House. The question, I beg leave to say, is not whether we shall maintain existing engagements with the Queen of Spain, but whether we shall give to those engagements a construction perfectly indefinite, which will impose upon us the onerous duty of forcing upon the people of Spain, by an armed intervention, a Government which for anything we know, may be against their inclination. The noble Lord expressed his surprise that the Motion should have been brought forward at the present time. Considering that the order in Council will expire on the 10th of June next, this does not appear to me a very extraordinary time for calling the attention of the House to the policy of continuing that order. The noble Lord says, that we have, never questioned the policy of his measures before. The noble Lord forgets I have on various occasions remonstrated against the policy of the Quadruple Treaty and of the order in council; but I say that if the House of Commons is prepared to sanction the policy of an indirect but armed intervention in the affairs of Spain, this is the proper time for taking the subject into consideration. The noble Lord said, he suspects that we wish to evade the obligations of the Treaty. The noble Lord has had experience of my acts and those of my friends when in office with respect to the Quadruple Treaty. What right has the noble Lord to assume that there exists any wish on our part to evade the true obligations of that treaty? I call the noble Lord himself as a witness, and ask the House to decide whether it may not be perfectly consistent to doubt the policy of employing the marines on a strictly military expedition—to doubt the policy of revoking an Act of Parliament by an Order in Council in order to permit British subjects to volunteer in the service of the Queen of Spain—whether it is not consistent to entertain these doubts, and yet determine rigidly to adhere, not merely to the letter, but the spirit of the treaty? On the 24th of June, 1835, the noble Lord, speaking of the manner in which the Duke of Wellington had acted upon the treaty, said, "All that I have seen in the records of the office over which I preside, as to the manner in which the noble Duke acted in execution of the Quadruple Treaty, has only tended to convince me more that the noble Duke has the interests of Spain at heart; because those documents show me that the noble Duke has acted with the strictest good faith, sincerity, and honour, in the execution of the treaty, whatever may be his opinion of the policy in which it originated."'* The Duke of Wellington did not advise the issuing of an Order in Council to permit a direct military intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. The noble Lord admitted, that the noble Duke acted with the strictest good faith, sincerity and honour in the execution of the treaty; it is rather too much, then, to assume that he who disapprove of the Order in Council must therefore be inclined to evade the stipulations of the treaty. If the maintenance of the Order in Council is an essential obligation of the treaty, how comes it that General Evans has publicly declared that he shall be in London on the 10th of June next at farthest; because the existing engagement with Spain of the British legion will have expired before that time I always doubted the original policy of the treaty, I believe that the safe principle for this country to adhere to is that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, unless some great and overwhelming necessity should establish and justify an exception; but the treaty having been signed, there cannot be a question, whoever may constitute the Government, that it must be adhered to I, however, trust that this House will pause before it sanctions an indefinite extension of that treaty. I hope that we shall pause before we allow ourselves to be betrayed, stop by step, info becoming principals in a contest in which we are now auxiliaries, and being left with no resource but that of sending an overwhelming military force in the pay, and under the colours of England, * Hansard (third series) vol. xxviii. p. 1145. for the purpose of bringing to some settlement a contest which, I believe, we have fomented by our improper interference. The noble Lord now claims the right of employing the marines in a military interference, though he originally boasted that the treaty pledged us only to furnish military stores to the Queen of Spain, and to afford her, if necessary, the aid of naval co-operation. I perfectly admit, that these are acts of a belligerent character—as much so as it would be to send 10,000 soldiers in the pay of England to Spain. The result of the two acts, however, though of an equally hostile character, would be perfectly different. The furnishing of military stores does not, in the slightest degree mix us up in the civil war. Naval co-operation also, though it has a greater tendency to involve us in the contest, is free from the objections to which direct military intervention is liable. Formerly the noble Lord boasted, that in consequence of our assistance being cautiously limited to naval co-operation, there was no chance of our being involved in the civil contest; but now what says the noble Lord? Why, that we have engaged to give naval co-operation, and it is necessary in fulfilment of that promise to employ a marine force on shore. He says we must look through all the records describing the manner in which our marines have cooperated with our own land forces—we must see how far they have marched into the interior of countries, and give the Queen of Spain the benefit of the precedents. This is involving us to a serious extent. The hon. Secretary for the Admiralty travelled back to the attack on Washington, and the noble Lord referred to the case of Gibraltar in which 1,800 marines were employed, for the purpose of justifying the manner in which the marines have been engaged in Spain. If it be true that Spain has a right to require from us, for the purchase of naval cooperation, the assistance of a military force, we have contracted an engagement which is indefinite. What limits has it? The noble Lord has begun with a marine force which is not required for the service of the fleet—he has taken a battalion of marines from their own service at Woolwich, and supplied their place with a battalion of the Foot Guards —that is what the noble Lord calls naval co-operation!—removing the marines from their usual occupation in their own country, and supplying their place by troops of the line. The noble Lord said, on a former occasion, that there was a vast difference between allowing British subjects to enlist in the service of the Queen of Spain, and placing at her disposal a military force in the pay of Great Britain. It is necessary to refer to the past declarations of the noble Lord, for the purpose of establishing, to the conviction of the House, that we are gradually becoming principals in the contest. In June, 1835, the noble Lord, speaking in reply to my noble Friend (Lord Mahon), who had condemned the policy of his measures towards Spain, said, "He confounds the measure now under consideration,—namely, the permission accorded to English subjects to enter into the service of the Queen of Spain, with a measure perfectly distinct in its nature—the sending into Spain of armies under generals obeying foreign sovereigns and receiving foreign pay, and therefore not under the orders, and not at the disposal, of the government of Spain. No English army has been sent as an English army; permission has been simply given to British subjects to enrol themselves in the service of the Queen of Spain; and the dignity of the crown of Spain is in no wise wounded by such a measure. A force such as this, and a foreign army, are so palpably distinct, that I wonder how any man can confound them."* I should wish to be apprised of the exact distinction between a battalion of marines and a battalion of infantry; and its bearings on this part of the noble Lord's argument. If we employ a battalion of 400 marines, not merely to defend the coast batteries of Spain, but to facilitate the operations of a force about to defend the wing of an army of 13,000 men,—if you may do this, and that act is vindicated by the presence of a British naval officer, who has left his ship for the express purpose,—tell me, in the first place, is not the Queen of Spain's dignity as much offended as it could be by the employment of a whole battalion of regular infantry? She will not be offended by your permitting British subjects to enlist, because they are her soldiers. But suppose the Spanish troops should say they will not be led by foreign soldiers, why, what an answer were it to say, "it is true these operations are not led by any part of the infantry of Great Britain, but they are conducted by the royal marines!" * Hansard (third series) vol. xxviii.p. 1147. Besides, if it be politic so to employ the royal marines in any greater number than would be actually required for the naval purposes of the service, why not employ a larger force at once? Why limit it to 400? Why not increase it to 1,200, for example? When you have once violated your own favourite principle of nonintervention, why do you hesitate to employ that description of force which may best answer those purposes on the strength of which you have violated that principle. So much for the marines. I come now to the Legion. As for the Legion, no one, I apprehend, will now contend that its employment was provided for by the stipulations of the treaty. I think I have shown by the compliment the noble Lord has paid to my noble Friend, and by the declaration of General Evans, that whatever may be the case of the Marines, we may discuss that of the Legion unembarrassed by the same considerations in connexion with the treaty. The question now comes to this;—whether, after an experiment of two years of the British Legion in Spain, it would be wise in us to sanction its continuance; or whether the time has arrived at which the interests of this country and of Spain require its withdrawal? In the course of his speech, the noble Lord made some important remarks, which seemed to me to lead to the inference, that he thought it would be politic and wise to withdraw it. He said—(or this, at least, was the effect of his words)—"You blame General Evans, but you do not sufficiently estimate the difficulties with which he has had to contend." Neither on this, nor on any former occasion, have I said a word against General Evans. I appreciate the difficulties of his position; I admit his bravery; and if he have failed, I greatly doubt whether his failure has not arisen from difficulties which were inherent in the service in which he was engaged. If this be the case, it is no reflection upon General Evans to have advised the withdrawal of the Legion. "You underrate his extreme difficulties," says the noble Lord. "Why, Sir, the greater the difficulties he had to contend against, the more cogent the argument in favour of departing from the policy of the noble Lord, and of withdrawing the Legion." The noble Lord talked of the embarrassment which must attend the command of 9,000 or 10,000 disorganised men, strangers to one another, and imperfectly disciplined. "You expect him," said the noble Lord, "to do with them just as much as he would do with a very different description of force." Sir, I have expected no such thing. Certainly, nothing could be expected from such troops but that which has occurred. But I should have thought that those who suspended the order in council would have found out, or anticipated, the extreme difficulty of controlling such a body of men, so constituted, and under such circumstances. The noble Lord then says, "You complain of the military cruelties practised in the Legion;" and he shows how much more cruel are the Spaniards: he quite exults in this charge against them. "Of all the people on earth," said the noble Lord, "there are none so cruel and bloodthirsty as the Spaniards. They are remarkable for their appetite for blood." If this be so—if the Spaniards be really the bloodthirsty people described by the noble Lord, that may be a very good reason, in the policy which he appears to be bent on pursuing, for establishing a British force among them to learn the dreadful lesson of cruelty, and to justify the spirit of sanguinary retaliation. But if the Spaniards, be a people of this character—if for ages past, their internal strafes have deluged the soil with their blood;—if these dreadful imputations be true, that supplies a good reason for withdrawing the subjects of the King from this revolting warfare, seeing that the consequence of sending them to engage in a cause supported by such soldiers must be to habituate them to the sanguinary atrocities which disgrace this contest, and to which they may plead that they are compelled to resort in self-defence. We are told that there must be something of retaliation in these cases: and the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite says—"Don't you see that you cannot compel your men to bear with these cruelties which are practised by their antagonists; and does there not arise a grave doubt whether or not, after all, the best way to deal with the latter is to retaliate? You cannot permit our men to be murdered in cold blood without retaliation." All these dreadful things are, no doubt, true; but all of them, assuredly, suggest a powerful argument against the continuance of a contest which renders it necessary to justify and palliate such crimes in a service which has enlisted British soldiers in its ranks. The hon. and learned Gentleman, admitting that the Spanish government had shown the utmost neglect of the British troops—that they had provided for them no hospital, and no convenience or comfort —went on to say, "that, from the very nature of this service, it was impossible that any stipulation for such a provision could be made." So that there was no difficulty as to permitting the enlistment of the Legion; you were bound to send these 10,000 men to Spain, but the dicta of Puffendorf did not justify any attempt, on your part, to insist on their being provided for there. That claim you could not have supported. So delicate is the hon. and learned Gentleman about the exact limits of intervention with a foreign power. Now, to be sure, for the same Gentleman who offered no objection to the species of intervention which was exercised by 400 of our marines, occupying a position in which they were to cover one of the wings of a military force, in movement; to find all this difficulty as to stipulating, beforehand, to have these poor men fed regularly, and to be allowed stables, at least, to lodge in,—does imply a degree of fastidious delicacy which I should think can exist no where but in the profession of the civil law. One most important topic the noble Lord opposite, in his anxiety to approach the speech which I delivered ten days ago, has omitted, altogether, to touch upon: and that topic involves no less important matter than the result of his own policy with respect to the contest in Spain. I doubted the policy of the original treaty; but the noble Lord has, himself, admitted that, when in office, I faithfully executed it; and I am still prepared to support the noble Lord in the same faithful execution of it. Whatever comes within the fair definition of naval co-operation—whatever can come fairly under the description of "naval assistance"—ought I conceive, to be afforded to Spain. From that engagement, I distinctly repeat, I am not at all disposed to recede; but the distinction I draw is this:—that there still is a very material difference between the stipulated supply of military stores, and the grant of naval aid,—and the commencement of that system of direct military interference, which, beginning at the coast with battalions of marines, proceeds seven miles into the country, and might, with equal consistency, and in order to be effectual, be kept extending from the confines until it should reach the very centre of Spain, where it might terminate in the substitution of one dynasty for another. I deprecate the extension of the principle of intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries; and I contend that you,—the Government,— have, by pursuing this course of policy, already abandoned the principles on which the great authorities of your own party profess to act—principles which I repeat were thrown aside the moment you undertook, not the expulsion of a hostile prince from a particular kingdom (for that would have been a definite and legitimate object), but the moment you undertook the establishment of a government in that country, and its defence by foreign force. This was the commencement of a system, the limits or termination of which it is difficult to conceive, and which violates principles that, in international law, have hitherto been held and acknowledged to be supreme. What was the principle laid down by Mr. Fox, at the commencement of the French war, although there then existed separate and distinct grounds of intervention, as on the part of this country with France? Mr. Fox did not deny, that there existed grounds for war after previous protest; but suspecting that one of the main causes for the war was the dissatisfaction which prevailed here with respect to the internal state of Finance, and a desire to dictate what would be a proper form of future government to the people of that country, he moved the following resolution:— That it is not for the honour or interest of Great Britain to make war with France on account of the internal circumstances of that country, for the purpose of punishing individuals there professing principles, however pernicious their tendency, or for the establishment among the French people of any particular form of government. It may be said, that Mr. Fox was jealous of interference with a government which was founded on principles of liberty, but that it is possible he might have connived at an interference intended to destroy a despotic form of government. No such thing. Mr. Fox's principle was universal; it was by him extended equally to popular and to despotic forms of government:—he remonstrated against any interference for extending, by the sword, the principles of liberty; and, in the debate which preceded the resolution to which I have called the attention of the House, Mr. Fox expressly stated that— He trusted he should soon see this war as generally execrated as it was now thought to be popular. He knew he should be represented as holding up the internal government of France as an object of imitation. He thought it anything but an object of initiation; but he maintained, as a principle inviolable, that the government of every independent state was to be settled by those who were to live under it, and not by foreign force. Now, Sir, observe how Mr. Fox applied his principle to the case to which I have just adverted. He said — The conduct of the French in the Netherlands was the same. It was a war of pikes and bayonets against opinions;—it was the tyranny of giving liberty by compulsion;—it was an attempt to introduce a system among a people by force, which the more it was forced upon them the more they abhorred. The same principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries— unless you have for such interference, some manifest justification on the ground of necessity, or otherwise—was broadly laid down by my lamented Friend, the late Marquess of Londonderry. When the allied powers met at Verona, an intervention with the affairs of Spain was proposed; and here I would entreat the attention of the House to the language of the late Lord Londonderry, as to the policy of such intervention on the part of England. My late noble Friend remonstrated against it, and said— Fearful as is the example which is furnished by Spain of an army in revolt, and a monarch swearing to a constitution which contains in its frame hardly the semblance of a monarchy, there is no ground for apprehension that Europe is likely to be speedily endangered by Spanish arms. It never was, however, intended as an union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states. … We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe; but this country cannot and will not, act upon abstract and speculation principles of precaution. Now, the whole justification of the course of policy pursued by the noble Lord consists in this, that certain despotic principles are identified with Don Carlos. He maintains that England has an interest in opposing those despotic principles, and, therefore that our present interference with Spain is justified. That is his plea. But that is the plea by which intervention in all cases, and at all times, past and present, has been, and will continue to be justified —a plea which has been in all times repudiated, rejected by all the leading men in the councils of this country, whatever shade of politics they professed. All these authorities have concurred in saying, that unless some circumstances of vicinage—of danger to the neighbouring country, and of paramount necessity — exist to justify interference, the general rule ought to be adhered to. The instructions of my noble Friend the late Marquess of Londonderry to the Duke of Wellington with reference to Spain were these:— With respect to Spain there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued; solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the basis of his Majesty's policy. I want to show you, by quoting from this paper, that the general rule, the opinions and practice, of my noble Friend, were in exact conformity with those of Mr. Fox. In 1823, when France determined to interfere with Spain, she made use of the same arguments now advanced by his Majesty's Ministers. The noble Lord now stands in the same position that France did at that period: the noble Lord, it would seem, has searched through the despatches of Chateaubriand for grounds to justify his policy, and for a case now to force France to interfere; and thus it is urged, on the present occasion, that as a despotic principle is mixed up in the affair, it is proper to supplant it by force. But what said Mr. Canning on the subject of the course pursued by France in 1823? Mr. Canning, having remonstrated and done all he could against that unprincipled intervention as to Spain, said— No proof was produced to his Majesty's plenipotentiary of the existence of any design on the part of the Spanish government to invade the territory of France—of any attempt to introduce disaffection among her soldiery, or of any project to undermine her political institutions; and so long as the struggles and disturbances of Spain should be confined within the circle of her own territory, they could not be admitted by the British Government to afford any plea for foreign interference. If the end of the last, and beginning of the present, century saw all Europe combined against France, it was not on account of the internal changes which France thought necessary for her own political and civil reformation, but because she attempted to propagate, first, her principles, and afterwards her dominion, by the sword. At the present moment, the struggles and disturbances of Spain are confined within her own territory. France says, "True it is, that this is a civil contest among the Spanish people; but still these prin- ciples are so disgraceful, that we must march armies to suppress them." What argument in this circumstance do you not supply us with? True it is, it seems, that these hostilities are confined within the Spanish territory. But, first of all, we must employ a military force—then our marines. And thus, by slow but inevitable degrees, you creep on till you produce a combustion that will extend throughout Europe, which no man can foresee the end of, or devise the means of extinguishing. Sir, I think Mr. Fox was clearly right in holding that it is equally unjust to impose upon a people a popular form of government, as it is to inflict upon them a despotism, by the bayonet. What, I beg to ask, is to be the limitation attached to this principle? Our excuse and our consolation may be, that we have so contrived matters as to make intervention ridiculous. But what I fear is, that other governments may follow the example—I mean, in the violation of the principle which has thus been laid down,—and may act a more open, direct, and intelligible part, in bringing that violation in and of the execution of their own designs. They, probably, are not now meditating such a part; but does that consideration diminish the danger of such a contingency? Yet, granting even that the apprehensions of the noble Lord were well founded, and that some necessity did exist for marching troops into Spain to suppress a principle which, for the sake of the argument, I will suppose to be dangerous to this country; I would ask the abettors of our policy, whether it has been successful in suppressing those principles? As hon. Members opposite are fond of comparing positions, perhaps they will allow me to ask them what they conceive the position of Don Carlos to be now, compared with what it was when this policy of intervention was first brought into action? I now take up a separate branch of the subject. Let us even admit, in the way of argument, that, on account of vicinage, or some other danger, interference, on the part of Great Britain, by force, was justifiable; still, I contend, that it has been inefficient, that it has done no good, but, on the contrary, that, it has encumbered those whom the noble Lord intended to assist, and it has aided the party which it was designed and intended to demolish and destroy. If I can prove this, I shall have offered a conclusive reason in favour of the adoption of another course. His Majesty's Government profess to be the sworn enemies of Don Carlos, but I doubt much whether the greatest friend of Don Carlos could have done so much For him as the Foreign Secretary of England has accomplished. The noble Lord Does good by stealth, and blush to find it fame. What was the position of Don Carlos in 1834, when you succeeded in effecting his expulsion from Portugal? You thought so little of the danger, that you brought him to this country, without any stipulation being required from him for his future conduct. Thus he was permitted to leave, and the Government could hardly believe their senses, when they found that Don Carlos had passed through France, and was again in Spain; and then, but but till then, were articles prepared to carry out the original intention, — namely, his expulsion from Spain. Winn Don Carlos had been expelled from Portugal, the boast of General Rodil was, that (Don Carlos) and his family had not been able to escape with even a change of linen. Don Carlos, however, after coming to this country, contrived to get again to Spain. What did the noble Lord opposite tell us? He laughed at those who entertained the notion that it might be necessary for the British Legion to remain, at least, two years in that country. It is said that, supported only by 10,000 or 12,000 men, in a state of no discipline at all, in three or four provinces, it would be ridiculous to suppose it possible fur Don Carlos to keep his ground against the forces raised against him. The House has been told, that the struggle is a mere mountain insurrection, and that the first appearance of the Legion would be decisive. Time after time the noble Lord opposite (Lord Palmerston) has treated the House and the country to prophecies that the contest would speedily be at an end. Now, however, the army of Don Curios has increased from 10,000 to about 31,000 disciplined troops, as they have been designated; and yet the noble Lord informs the House that Don Carlos was never in so hopeless a state as al the present moment. If so, then, why continue the British Legion? The noble Lord also stated, formerly, that though it was quite true, that Don Carlos had had some favour shown him in the Basque provinces, all the other provinces and great towns in Spain were against him. But now the noble Lord tells you that even these Basque provinces are all against him, and that hitherto they have been the victims of other designing persons. I took the words down; I was my own reporter. It was also stated by the noble Lord, that Moreno was not a Carlist; and is it not extraordinary that, under all these circumstances, it should be thought necessary by the noble Lord on account of a person in Don Carlos's position,— opposed by all Spaniards but the Basques, and not universally supported even by them,—to continue the British Legion, and the system of intervention? How happens this? Is our intervention so wholly fruitless that Don Carlos has actually gained weight and strength, just in proportion as that interference has been extended? If so, surely the Government, as enemies of Don Carlos, had better try another and a different system of policy. Or is the intervention by foreign arms to be continued merely for the purpose of exciting jealousy in the breasts of the Spanish people? Will the House permit me to read a high authority as to the probability of such a result? This authority consists in the advice given by my noble Friend, the Duke of Wellington, to France. When that country was about to endeavour to force a similar state of things to the present, the advice of my noble Friend was as follows:— His Grace does not hesitate, upon his intimate experience of Spanish affairs, to pronounce that the Spanish nation is, of all the European people, that which will least brook any interference from abroad; he states the many instances in which, during the last war, this distinguished trait of national character rendered them obstinately blind to the most pressing considerations of public safety; he states the imminent danger in which the suspicion of foreign interference, and more especially of interference on the part of France, is likely to involve the King; and he further describes the difficulties which would oppose themselves to any military operation in Spain, undertaken for the purpose of reducing, by force, the nation to submit themselves to an order of things to be either suggested or prescribed to them from without. The noble Lord said, that if the Spanish government had shown half the energy and activity which have been exhibited by General Evans, the war would long since have been brought to an end. But what is the cause of the inactivity of the Spanish generals? It may have arisen either from the reliance placed by a nation like Spain on the aid of an ally, when that ally began to interfere; or from a jealousy of that interference, founded on the fear that a powerful nation like ours might reap the fruits of victories gained in their cause, and that to us, not to them, would be the triumph of establishing among them a free constitution. If either of these be the causes of inactivity and apathy on the part of the Spanish generals, it is clear that you, by your intervention, have obstructed the successful termination of this contest, and have prevented the satisfactory establishment of constitutional liberty in Spain when this contest shall have come to a close. I firmly believe, therefore, whilst I would adhere with the most perfect good faith to every obligation of the treaty, whilst I would give to Spain the assistance of a more effective naval force, if it could be supplied, I should yet shrink from the extension of the treaty beyond its legitimate object—I should rigorously resist the commencement of a system which would bring his Majesty's troops, marine or infantry, into direct collision with the inhabitants of Spain. I repeat, that I should draw the broadest practical distinction between the supply of warlike stores, and actual military cooperation: It is on these grounds that I shall support the resolution proposed by my right hon. and gallant Friend; and I do hope that those hon. Gentlemen who are averse to the extension of the ravages of war, will well consider what the effect must be, if they lend the sanction of their high authority to the extension of such evils. Men of different political opinions, in respect of the main question only, will, on this occasion, combine in support of the resolution of my right hon. and gallant Friend. Those who think that where a great country like England intervenes, she ought to employ a military force immediately under her own orders and control, in her own pay, and responsible to her own Government, may protest against the continuance of the British Legion;—those who think, with the highest military authority in England, that the cause of liberty in Spain will never be promoted by foreign military interference—may agree to the resolution of my right hon. and gallant Friend. Those who concur with the highest military authority in France, Marshal Soult, in deprecating the employment of an ill-disciplined army, not subject to the military rules of their own country, may equally concur in this resolution. Those who take higher views, and who think with me that the subjects of one nation are not justified in wantonly destroying the lives of another people; who think— That reason frowus on war's unequal gain, Where thousands bleed to raise a single name; and who hold that warfare should be limited to, as it can only be justified by, cases of extreme peril, or the necessity for vindicating the national honour—may unite in support of the resolution of my right hon. and gallant Friend. Those, also, who hesitate as to the justice of this country interfering to correct political errors, and to punish the unfortunate inhabitants of the Basque provinces for their fidelity, which all of us must admire—all these may combine in deprecating the continuance of this species of armed interference with the affairs of Spain, and the extension of the treaty beyond its legitimate objects. There are other powerful reasons for discouraging and terminating this warfare. There is the evils of the violation of a principle hitherto held sacred, which forbids one nation dictating to other countries what shall be the legitimate form of their Government, or the form of constitution under which they shall live. Again, the signal failure of the experiment as to the promotion of the object for which it was intended, and the probable excitation of the jealousies of the Spanish nation, and their fears lest the constitution should be unstable because it will not have been created by native hands —all these are so many considerations in favour of the resolution now before the House. Depend upon it, the public gorge is rising against the continuance of this system. The people of England see men returning without pay, in distress and destitution; visible appeals to the sympathies of their countrymen—appeals much more powerful than any argument that could be offered, and calculated by such exhibitions to raise a prejudice against the cause by which they have been left in that helpless condition. It is truly painful to see the British uniform under such melancholy circumstances as we have lately witnessed. Against these and other powerful arguments, the only appeal is to our false pride—a pride allied to shame, the supposed shame of withdrawing from or discontinuing, a system which can bring only discredit on this nation, and can terminate with no benefit to Spain. You have been told that there will be bonfires at St. Petersburg, and rejoicings in the camp of Don Carlos. Be not scared by such idle apprehensions. Better you should see the light of those bonfires, and hear the clamour of these rejoicings, than that hon. Members should be appalled by the upbraiding of their own consciences for having promoted a warfare, the justice of which is subject to much doubt, and of which the ultimate success has been already proved by experiment to be in the last degree problematical.

Lord John Russell

Sir, at this late hour of the morning I shall not detain the House for more than a very few minutes; but I cannot omit adverting to a question which has been several times asked in the course of this debate, but which does not appear to me to hare been answered in any explanation which the right hon. Gentleman has attempted to give upon one part of the question under discussion. I mean, Sir, the question why it is that this particular time should have been selected? Yes, Sir, I repeat, why is it that this particular time should have been selected for this discussion? Why was it not brought forward at an earlier period of the Session? It was known that the night before Christmas-day an action had been fought at Bilboa; and that action furnished hon. Members opposite with precisely the same arguments, because it was attended with the same circumstances as the cases which they have relied upon in this debate. The English marines took a part in that action, and the part they took was against the Basques—fighting, as the right hon. Baronet contends, for their liberties. Be that as it may, certain it is, that our seamen were engaged, assisting with our boats, manning batteries, working guns, and performing all the necessary operations of a war. The Parliament assembled on the 31st of January, and the Speech from the Throne, with which it was opened, after expressing his Majesty's regret at the continuance of the civil war in Spain, spoke of the events which were going on at Bilboa. The passage was this;—"His Majesty has continued to afford to the Queen of Spain that aid, which, by the treaty of Quadruple Alliance of 1834, his Majesty engaged to give if it should become necessary; and his Majesty rejoices that his co-operating force has rendered useful assistance to the troops of her Catholic Majesty." Sir, there was scarcely a debate upon these words, although we conceived very naturally that they were the very strongest words we could have introduced into the speech; and we introduced them for the purpose of eliciting a discussion upon this very subject. Yet no discussion took place. There was scarcely any dissent expressed. The House adjourned before eight o'clock, and we did not then hear anything of these tremendous evils; and it was not, I am sorry to say, until this failure—until this reverse in the arms of the Legion—afforded the proper opportunity, that the right hon. Gentleman thought fit to bring forward the question, in a manner and, with reference to the circumstances under which he moved his amendment on the original motion, in a spirit, never known before. I do confess, Sir, that I very much lament the course that the right hon. Gentleman has deemed it proper to pursue. I think the right hon. Gentleman would have acted with more fairness, not to say with his wonted generosity, had he brought forward his question at a moment, as he might have done, when these troops had won honour, and not suffered a disaster. Sir, we shall decide this question upon its general policy; and I am sure that, even from the details that have been offered to the House, they will not be disposed to think that English pride has been in any degree hurt, or that a brand has been put on the forehead of our national character. But the question is now brought forward because, as the right hon. Baronet may tell me, very likely, there may be a new combination of all parties to support it; that some may support it through dislike of Don Carlos, some through a hatred of despotism, some through a love of the Basque privileges, some from their political delicacy, some from a fear of wounding the Castilian pride, and others because this cause may not be successful. I deeply lament, for my part, that a question of this sort should be thus brought forward, seriously affecting, as it does, the honour of individuals who are not present to vindicate themselves; and still more sorry that, for the purpose of taking advantage of this imaginary combination, the disaster of the British Legion should be laid as the foundation of a party triumph. The right hon. and gallant Officer who brought forward this motion laid down certain grounds, upon which he chiefly dwelt, as facts discreditable to the character of the Legion. But I think that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman felt afterwards, when the question was argued by those who followed him, that there was some want of generosity in the severe reflections which in this instance he indulged in. I must be allowed to observe, that he has subsequently entered into five or six different explanations; but each time, as it seems to me, he successively took away a brick from his original edifice. At one time he did not mean to impeach the character of General Evans; he said he respected the character of General Evans—he bore testimony to his merits— to him he did not attribute any blame: at another time he did not assail the bravery of the men; in fact, Sir, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, at last, altogether deprived himself of those grounds upon which he originally rested respecting the misconduct of the Legion—a misconduct which, at first, he had represented as so flagrant, that it was necessary for this House to interpose, in order that an eternal stigma might not be fixed on the character of British soldiers. I think, after all, that the right hon. and gallant Member has been exceedingly unfortunate; for he was finally driven to rest upon the sole testimony of Major Richardson, whose authority an hon. and gallant Member opposite was last night cruel enough utterly to demolish. Allow me, Sir, to say one word with respect to what has been dwelt upon at so much length—the impolicy and the injustice of imposing a constitution, or a particular form of government, upon any foreign nation. I entirely agree, Sir, with the maxim that has been laid down. But I think, after all that has been said of he efficiency of the Legion and of our naval co-operation, it is rather too much to talk of forcing a constitution upon such a country as Spain, by the aid of a holy of raw recruits, and this handful of marines who marched, at any time, scarcely three miles from the shore. The present case is one by no means very unusual in the history of Europe, In the first "Quadruple Treaty," there was introduced a stipulation that aid and assistance should be rendered by us to a friendly government, then engaged in a civil contest, wherein it was thought that the interests of this nation were ultimately concerned. Amongst the cases adverted to by my noble Friend, in his very powerful and promising speech, to justify the giving this sort of aid and assistance as proffered under the Quadruple Treaty now in question, let me refer to the conduct of our Whig ancestors in 1688. An hon. and learned Gentleman opposite says, that though the Revolution was effected by the people of England, it is unjust to impose, by force, a new government upon a country contrary to the wishes and inclinations of its people. No doubt of it. In that general proposition I fully agree; but I ask that hon. and and learned Member—I ask any Member of this House—to read the invitation which was sent to the Prince of Orange, signed by Shrewsbury, Lord Danby, Lord Dorset, Admiral Russell, and Mr. Sydney, and which stated the grounds on which they asked him to come. After setting forth the grievances and disaffection of the country, they go on to say, that if they should move, and there be no force to support them, they shall be oppressed and overwhelmed; and they ask the Prince of Orange to come with a considerable force, to give them assistance. Yes, they wrote to the Stadtholder of Holland to come over and to bring arms and engineers. "We need not," they write, "say any thing about ammunition, military stores, &c— but bring some good engineers with you." Were these English engineers? No, they were Dutch engineers, and Dutch artillery, to effect the Revolution of 1688. And had they any scruple—those great authors of that Parliamentary revolution, under the establishment confirmed by which we are, at this moment, acting—had they any scruple to employ foreign arms in their just cause? Not at all. But there was a curious circumstance, which I may well mention here, as connected with the establishment of the House of Hanover, namely':—that in the rebellion in Scotland a body of Dutch troops was sent over to England, under the Barrier Treaty, and marched to Edinburgh to oppose the Scotch rebels. Now, I ask, Sir, is it so clear that the principles of our ancestors have been, that no foreign assistance should be allowed in the internal disputes of a country? But there is a great difference between imposing a government on a country, by sending an army there for that purpose, which is to occupy the capital and the country, or the capital at all events—and giving assistance to a government, or the great majority of a nation who wish to establish a particular form of government, but require, in order to effect that object, the aid and co-operation of another state, having itself an interest in seeing the establishment of that particular form of government. So far, therefore, I say, we have been justified in giving assistance to Spain. I will not go at large into this question, the details of which have been so very ably discussed by my noble Friend, the Foreign Secretary. But I must take some notice of the speech delivered by the right hon. Baronet the other night. That right hon. Gentleman (Sir Robert Peel) was pleased to speak of the difficulties of our foreign policy; and he stated those, among the other reasons, on account of which he conceived that the Ministry must be so embarrassed as to make it impossible they should face them, and, that they would be forced, in despair, to abandon the helm of the vessel of the State. Whatever may be the course of the present Government, whether they shall remain in office, or quit office, in either case they would have the satisfaction of thinking that the present state of affairs is greatly more advantageous to the country than it was when the right hon. Gentleman left office. To advert to merely one point of our foreign affairs: the right hon. Baronet says, that it was only three weeks before his resignation of the Government, that the Belgian revolution broke out; but does the right hon. Baronet forget that during those three weeks his Government advised his Majesty to put into the Speech a sentiment approving of the conduct of the King of Holland, whom it styled "the enlightened King of the Netherlands," thus pointing him out as one who ought to be supported, and indicating that, if not the physical, at least all the moral, support of our Government was given to that Sovereign? I do not mean to adopt the observation of Lord Ashburton, though I have considerable respect for the sagacity of that noble Lord, and cannot think it is so easily to be put aside, or treated so lightly, as the right hon. Baronet seems to suppose; but I do think, Sir, that if that course had been adopted, it would have had the most unwise and unfortunate result of eventually leading to a general war. We had before our eyes the recent revolution of France. We knew that there existed in that country old associations of conquest connected with Belgium—old prejudices for the talked-of extension of the Belgian boundary to the Rhine—and had you succeeded in establishing the King of Holland, you would have seen a war in Europe, and probably you would not have seen an independent kingdom, after all, established in Belgium. I need not, Sir, go into our domestic affairs, though there is one which I may mention, as I have no doubt it will be considered by the right hon. Baronet himself an important one, as he has reminded me of it. He mentioned that a battalion of foot guards went down to Woolwich—that they were obliged to be sent down—in order to replace the marines. Now, allow me, Sir, to explain. My noble Friend having mentioned to me that there might be a deficiency of soldiers in England, I wrote to the Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, desiring that he would consult with the Commander of the Forces in that country, to know whether any soldiers could be spared from our force in that country. I received a reply, to the effect that the Lord-lieutenant had consulted the Commander of the Forces, who informed him that two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry might very well be spared. That, I believe, was not exactly the case in 1830. I leave it to the future Ministers, of whom the right hon. Baronet seems to be the representative, to try whether they can remove troops from Ireland; relying, as I doubt not they will, upon the increased confidence and attachment of the people, and the tranquillity of that country, after their refusal to them of municipal institutions. With respect to other matters of difficulty adverted to by the right hon. Baronet, the Government has about as much to do with them as they have to do with the nonformation of the French ministry, of which they are also accused. There is some commercial embarrassment; one of those revolutions in trade which a Government can neither produce nor alter. But there is not, thank God! now prevailing that species of discontent, during the prevalence of which every mail brought accounts of fresh fires, fresh burnings, and fresh excesses. There is not now prevailing that discontent in the metropolis which would prevent his Majesty, if it pleased him to go to Guildhall, to do so with the most perfect safety!

Sir Stratford Canning

rose amidst loud cries of "Divide," and "Spoke." He said, that if it had been his own character only that had been attacked, he should not obstruct the division, but wait a more convenient opportunity. In the remarks, however, which the noble Lord had addressed to him, a public principle of government of some importance was involved [Cries of "Spoke," and "Chair."] He was aware that it was the duty of persons who filled the confidential situation of ambassador, not to divulge the instructions they had received; but the noble Lord had raised a feeling of momentary impatience, if not something stronger; and he had alluded to his instructions, but he denied that he had proclaimed their meaning or general bearings.

The House divided on the original motion for going into committee of supply: Ayes 278; Noes 242: —Majority 36.

List of the AYES.
Acheson, Viscount Chichester, J. P. B.
Adam, Sir C. Clay, William
Aglionby, H. A. Clayton, Sir W.
Ainsworth, P. Clements, Viscount
Alston, Rowland Codrington, Sir E.
Angerstein, John Colborne, N. W. R.
Anson, Colonel Collier, John
Anson, Sir George Collins, W.
Astley, Sir Jacob, bt. Cowper, hon. W. F.
Attwood, T. Crawford, W. S.
Bagshaw, John Crawford, W.
Baines, E. Crawley, S.
Ball, N. Curteis, H. B.
Bannerman, Alex. Curteis, Edward B.
Barclay, David Dalmeny, Lord
Baring, F. T. Dennistoun, Alex.
Barnard, E. G. D'Eyncourt, C. T.
Barron, H. Dillwyn, L. W.
Barry, G. S. Divett, E.
Beauclerk, Major Donkin, Sir R.
Belfast, Earl of Duncombe, T.
Bellew, Rich. M. Dundas, hon. J. C.
Bellew, Sir P. Dundas, hon. T.
Bennett, J. Dundas, J. D.
Bentinck, Lord W. Dunlop, J.
Berkeley, hon. F. Ebrington, Viscount
Berkeley, hon. C. C. Edwards, Colonel
Bernal, R. Ellice, E.
Bewes, T. Elphinstone, H.
Biddulph, Robert Etwall, R.
Blake, M. J. Evans, G.
Blunt, Sir C. Ewart, W.
Bodkin, J. Fazakerley, J. N.
Bowes, John Fergus, John
Brady, Denis C. Ferguson, Sir R
Bridgeman, Hewitt Ferguson, Sir R A.
Brocklehurst, J. Fergusson, Robert
Brodie, William B. Fergusson, R. C.
Brotherton, J. Fitzgibbon, hon. R.
Browne, R. D. Fitzroy, Lord C.
Buller, Charles Fitzsimon, C.
Buller, E. Fleetwod, P. H.
Bulwer, H. L. Folkes, Sir W.
Bulwer, Edw. L. Fort, J.
Burdon, W. French, F.
Buxton, T. F. Gillon, W. D.
Byng, George Gordon, R.
Byng, G. S. Goring, H. D.
Callaghan, D. Grattan, J.
Campbell, W. F. Grattan, Henry
Carter, B. Grey, Sir Geo. bt.
Cave, R. O. Grote, G.
Cavendish, hon. C. Guest, J.
Cavendish, hon. G. H. Hall, B.
Cayley, E. S. Handley, H.
Chalmers, P. Harland, Wm, Chas.
Chetwynd, Captain Hastie, A.
Hawes, B. Parnell, Sir H.
Hawkins, J. H. Parrott, J.
Hay, Sir A. L. bart. Parry, Sir L. P.
Heathcoat, J. Pattison, James
Hector, C. J. Pechell, Captain R.
Heneage, E. Pendarves, E. W.
Hindley, C. Philips, Mark
Hobhouse, Sir J. C. Philips, G. R.
Hodges, T. L. Pinney, William
Hodges, T. T. Ponsonby, W.
Holland, Edward Ponsonby, J.
Hoskins, K. Potter, R.
Howard, P. H. Poulter, John Sayer
Howick, Viscount Power, James
Hume, J. Power, John
Humphery, John Poyhtz, W. Stephen
Hurst, R. H. Pryme, George
Hutt, Wm. Pryse, Pryse
James, W. Ramsbottom, John
Jervis, John Rice, rt. hon. T. S.
Johnston, Andrew Rippon, Cuthbert
King, Edward B. Robarts, A. W.
Labouchere, H. Roche, William
Lambton, Hedworth Roche, D.
Leader, J. T. Rolfe, Sir R. M.
Lee, John Lee Rooper, J. Bonfoy
Lefevre, Charles S. Rundle, John
Lemon, Sir C. Russell, Lord John
Lennard, T. B. Russell, Lord W.
Lennox, Lord G. Russell, Lord Charles
Lennox, Lord Arthur Ruthven, E.
Leveson, Lord Sanford, E. A.
Lister, E.C. Scott, J. W.
Loch, J. Scrope, G. P.
Long, W. Seale, Colonel
Lushington, Dr. Seymour, Lord
Lushington, C. Sharpe, General
Lynch, A. H. Sheil, Richard L.
Macnamara, Major Smith, J. A.
M'Taggart, J. Smith, Robert
Maher, J. Smith, R. V.
Mangles, J. Smith, B.
Marjoribanks, S. Speirs, A.
Marshall, William Stanley, W. O.
Marsland, Henry Steuart, R.
Martin, T. Stewart, P. M.
Maule, hon. F. Stuart, Lord D.
Methuen, P. Stuart, Lord J.
Milton, Viscount Stuart, V.
Molesworth, Sir W. Strangways, hon. J.
Moreton, A. Strickland, Sir G.
Morpeth, Viscount Strutt, E.
Morrison, J. Surrey, Earl of
Mostyn, E. Talbot, C. R. M.
Murray, rt. hon. J. Talbot, J. Hyacinth
Musgrave, Sir R. bt. Talfourd, Serjeant
Nagle, Sir R. Thomson, C. P.
O'Brien, Cornelius Thompson, Paul B.
O'Connell, D. Thompson, Colonel
O'Connell, J. Thornley, T.
O'Connell, M. J. Townley, R. G.
O'Connell, Morgan Tracy, Charles H.
O'Conor Don Trelawney, Sir W.
O'Ferrall, R. M. Troubridge, Sir T.
Palmer, Gen. Tulk, C. A.
Palmerston, Viscount Turner, Wm.
Parker, John Tynte, C. J. Kemeys
Villiers, C. P. Wilks, John
Vivian, J. H. Williams, W.
Wakley, T. Williams, W. A.
Walker, C. A. Williams, Sir J.
Walker, Richard Williamson, Sir H.
Wallace, Robert Wilson, H.
Warburton, H. Winnington, Sir T.
Ward, Henry George Winnington, H. J.
Wason, R. Wood, Alderman
Westenra, hon. H. R. Worsley, Lord
Whalley, Sir S. Woulfe, Sergeant
White, Samuel Wrightson, W.
Wigney, I. N. Wyse, T.
Wilbraham, G. TELLERS.
Wilde, Sergeant Wood, Charles
Wilkins, W. Stanley, Edward J.
List of the NOES.
Agnew, Sir A. bart. Compton, H. C.
Alford, Viscount Conolly, E. M.
Alsager, Captain Cooper, E.
Arbuthnot, hon. H. Coote, Sir C. C.
Archdall, M. Copeland, W. T.
Ashley, Viscount Corry, hon. H. T. L.
Ashley, hon. H. Dalbiac, Sir C.
Bagot, hon. W. Damer, D.
Bailey, J. Darlington, Earl of
Baillie, H. D. Davenport, John
Bainbridge, E. T. Dick, Q.
Balfour, T. Dottin, Abel Rous
Baring, Francis Dowdeswell, Wm.
Baring, H. Bingham Duffield, Thomas
Baring, W. B. Dunbar, George
Baring, T. Duncombe, W.
Barneby, John East, J. B.
Bateson, Sir R. Eastnor, Viscount
Beckett, Sir J. Eaton, Richard J.
Bell, M. Egerton, Sir P.
Bentinck, Lord G. Egerton, Lord Fran.
Bethell, Richard Elley, Sir J.
Blackburne, John I. Elwes, J.
Blackstone, W. S. Estcourt, T. G.
Bolling, W m. Estcourt, T. H.
Bonham, R. Francis Farrand, R.
Bowles, G. R. Fector, J. M.
Bradshaw, James Feilden, William
Bramston, T. W. Fielden, J.
Brownrigg, S. Ferguson, G.
Bruce, C. L. C. Finch, George
Bruen, Colonel Fleming, John
Bruen, F. Foley, Edw. Thomas
Buller, Sir J. B. Y. Follett, Sir W.
Burrell, Sir C. M. Forbes, W m.
Calcraft, J. H. Forester, hon. G.
Campbell, Sir H. Forster, C. S.
Canning, rt. hon. Sir S. Freshfield, James W.
Castlereagh, Viscount Gaskell, J. Milnes
Chandos, Marquess Geary, Sir Wm.
Chaplin, Colonel Gladstone, T.
Chapman, A. Gladstone, Wm. E.
Charlton, E. L. Glynne, Sir S. R.
Chichester, A. Goodricke, Sir F.
Clive, Viscount Gordon, hon. W.
Clive, hon. R. H. Goulburn, H.
Codrington, C. W. Goulburn, Sergeant
Cole, A. H. Graham, Sir J.
Cole, Viscount Grant, hon. Colonel
Greene, Thomas Neeld, John
Greisley, Sir R. Nicholl, Dr.
Grimston, Viscount O'Neill, General
Grimston, hon. E. H. Ossulston, Lord
Hale, Robert B. Owen, Sir John. bart.
Halford, H. Owen, Hugh
Hamilton, Geo. Alex, Packe, C W.
Hamilton, Lord C. Palmer, Robert
Hammer, Henry Palmer, George
Hanmer, Sir J. Parker, M.
Harcourt, G. Patten, John Wilson
Harcourt, G. S. Peel, Sir R. bart.
Hardinge, Sir H. Pelham, hon. C.
Hardy, J. Pemberton, Thomas
Hawkes, T. Penruddock, J. H.
Hayes, Sir Edm. S. Perceval, Colonel
Henniker, Lord Pigot, Robert
Herbert, hon. Sidney Plumptre, John P.
Herries, rt. hon. J. C. Polhill, Frederick
Hillsborough, Earl of Pollen, Sir J., bart.
Hinde, J. H. Pollington, Viscount
Hogg, J. W. Powell, Colonel
Hope, hon. James Praed, W. M.
Hope, Henry T. Price, S. G.
Hotham, Lord Pringle, A.
Houldsworth, T. Rae, Sir Wm., Bart.
Houstoun, G. Reid, Sir John Rae
Hoy, J. B. Richards, John
Hughes, Hughes Richards, R.
Inglis, Sir R. H. Rickford, Wm.
Irton, Samuel Robinson, G. R.
Jermyn, Earl Ross, Charles
Jones, Wilson Rushbrooke, Colonel
Jones, Theobald Russell, C.
Kearsley, J. H. Sanderson, R.
Kerrison, Sir Edward Sandon, Viscount
Kirk, Peter Scarlett, hon. R.
Knatchbull, Sir E. Scourfield, W. H.
Knightley, Sir C. Sheppard, T.
Law, hon. Chas. E. Shirley, E. J.
Lawson, Andrew Sibthorp, Col.
Lees, J. F. Sinclair, Sir G.
Lefroy, A. Smith, A.
Lefroy, right hon. T. Somerset, Lord G.
Lewis, David Stanley, E.
Lewis, Wyndham Stanley, Lord
Lopes, Sir Ralph Stewart, John
Lowther, Col. H. C. Sturt, Henry Chas.
Lowther, Viscount Tennent, J. E.
Lowther, J. H. Thomas, Colonel
Lucas, Edward Thompson, Ald.
Lushington, S. Trench, Sir Fred.
Lygon, hon. Gen. Trevor, hon. A.
Mackinnon, W. A. Trevor, hon. G.
Maclean, Donald Twiss, H.
Mahon, Viscount Tyrrell, Sir J.
Manners, Lord C. Vere, Sir C. D.
Marsland, T. Verner, Colonel
Mathew, Captain Vesey, hon. Thomas
Maunsell, T. P. Vivian, J. E.
Maxwell, H. Wall, C B.
Meynell, Captain Walpole, Lord
Miles, W. Walter, John
Miles, P. J. Welby, G. E.
Miller, Wm. Henry West, J. B.
Mordaunt, Sir J. bt. Weyland, Major
Neeld, Joseph Whitmore, Thomas
Wilbraham, hn. B. C. Wynn, rt. hon. C. W.
Williams, Robert Yorke, E. T.
Williams, T. P. Young, J.
Wodehouse, E. Young, Sir W.
Wood, Colonel TELLERS.
Wortley, J. S. Fremantle, Sir T.
Wyndham, Wadham Clerk, Sir G.
Paired Off.
FOR. AGAINST.
Andover, Viscount Peel, right hon. W. Y.
Baldwin, Dr. Longfield, Richard
Berkeley, hon. G. Peel, Colonel
Bish, Thomas Somerset, Lord E.
Blackburne, I. Smith, T. A.
Brabazon, Sir W. Shaw, right hon. F.
Childers, J. W. Dugdale, W. S.
Clive, E. B. Price, Richard
Campbell, Sir J. Pollock, Sir F.
Conyngham, Lord A. Chisholm, A.
Crompton, S. Barclay, Charles
Denison, J. E. Harcourt, Granville
Fellowes, N. Halse, James
Finn, W. F. Stormont, Viscount
Fitzsimon, N. Mandeville, Viscount
Gaskell, D. Wynn, Sir W.
Gisborne, T. Peel, Edmund
Grosvenor, Lord R. Egerton, Wm. Tatton
Gully, John Smyth, Sir H.
Hallyburton, D. G. Scott, Lord J.
Jephson, C. D. O. Jackson, Sergeant
Maxwell, J. Bruce, Lord E.
Oswald, J. Norreys, Lord
Oliphant, L. Hope, Johnston
Paget, F. Fancourt, Major
Phillips, C. M. Borthwick, Peter
Price, Sir R. Gore, Ormsby
Scott, Sir E. D. Cartwright, Wm. R.
Tancred, H. W. Sinclair, Sir G.
Tooke, Wm. Martin, John
Vivian, Major Hay, Sir J.
Westenra, hon. J.C. Beresford, Sir J.
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